



IED Task Force Field Team Volume 1, Issue 13
 Building 100, Camp Victory
 Baghdad, Iraq 16 August 2004
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SHARING SOLDIER KNOWLEDGE

IED TICKER

N 26/18 NC 67/59 W 51/34 BAGHDAD 49/94 CS 2/5 SE 1/3

* Number of IED Events for Week Ending 7 Aug 04 / Week Ending 14 Aug 04.

VOIED EMPLACED ON ROAD LEADING TO POINT OF ORIGIN

Don't be predictable

Avoid the obvious routes

Vary your routes

EOD recently responded to a report of two mutilated cows with possible wires leading from the carcasses to a drainage gate placed in the middle of a road. On arrival at the scene, EOD cleared the area around the carcasses and identified the point of detonation and recovered components of an improvised pressure switch. Fragmentation recovered from the scene was consistent with a thin cased munition such as a 80-120mm rocket warhead. The point of detonation was located on the edge of the road near the pressure plate that was initiated by one of the cows. The incident is believed to be linked



Pressure Switch

to a rocket attack where the point of origin (POO) was located approximately 300m away. The road where the Victim Operated IED (VOIED) was emplaced is the only route leading to the POO which makes it highly probable that the VOIED was emplaced to ambush coalition forces during their immediate response to the rocket attack. Coalition Forces must use extreme caution when investigating the POO of a rocket or mortar attack. To prevent from becoming predictable, it is recommended to avoid the obvious routes, and to vary the routes if the enemy continues to conduct attacks from the same location.

IMPROVISED ROCKET LAUNCHER AS A SECONDARY DEVICE

A patrol recently investigated a tire they spotted on their route that they considered to be suspicious and found two 100mm projectiles with a garage door opener initiator. As they cordoned the area, they discovered an improvised rocket launcher (IRL) attached to a tree pointed towards the location of the primary device. The IRL was 100m north in a



Scan for secondary devices

Sweep the area 360 degrees



of sweeping 360 degrees around suspected IEDs when cordoning the area. If the security element had not searched the area to the north of the road, the IRL would not have been found and may have killed the EOD soldiers responding to clear the primary IED.

palm grove along a trail that ran perpendicular to the patrolled route. The device consisted of a 57mm High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) round in a steel pipe that was affixed approximately 4 ft high to a palm tree with a nylon strap, and a pager initiator. This incident highlights the importance



Search high and low

BAIT AND TRAP TTPS

The Bait and Trap TTP has been used by Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) for quite some time but has been a noticeable increase in the last few weeks. The use of this TTP is a clear indicator that AIF are observing and studying the TTPs being used by our patrols, QRF, and EOD to include routes being used, security and cordon procedures, and IED disarming techniques.

The Bait and Trap is an attempt by AIF to inflict casualties by drawing Coalition Forces into a desired kill zone, while maintaining maximum survivability with planned escape routes. In past issues, IED TF Newsletters have highlighted other Bait and Trap scenarios that were recently seen but beware that AIF will continue to refine this TTP.