



HB 9 Paramilitary Terrorist Insurgent Groups

Afghanistan 1 Mar 09



HIG



Taliban AF



Al-Qaeda

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To inform deploying units, trainers and scenario writers of the current insurgent syndicate laydown in Afghanistan, including paramilitary, terrorist and insurgent groups operating in the vicinity of Afghanistan and Pakistan that pose a direct threat to US/NATO Forces.

This presentation has been developed from multiple sources and is intended for use as a training assistance product for Department of the Army organizations preparing to deploy. This briefing **should not be considered a finished intelligence product, nor used in such a manner.**

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TRISA <http://tradoc-dcsint.leavenworth.army.smil.mil>

TRISA <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx>

TRISA <https://www.intelink.gov/inteldocs/browse.php?fFolderId=21435>

TRISA <https://www.intelink.gov/sites/TRISA/default.aspx>

TRISA Handbooks

<http://www.csis.org> (Anthony Cordesman's reporting)

<http://www.npgs.mil>

<http://www.start.umd.edu/start/>

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/terror_report_orgs.html

<http://www.osac.gov/Groups>

<http://internet-haganah.com/>

<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/>

<http://www.milnet.com>

This handbook is designed to specifically provide trainers, leaders and soldiers a “hip pocket” reference resource. It is intended for informal instruction for forces deploying to Afghanistan.

Not all militant groups are discussed in this briefing; only those groups whose attacks regularly appear in the open press are included.

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Insurgent Syndicate Characteristics

The nature of the enemy in AF HAS NOT CHANGED:

- This enemy is primarily Pashtun in nature and Sunni Muslim (Wahhabi and Deobandi).
- This enemy is funded by drug economy and Gulf Arab money (for religious reasons).
- This enemy is trained and assisted by ISID or ISID affiliated elements (Kashmiris/HuJI/LeT/HuM, with some Uzbeks).
- They are assisted by AQ in terms of funding, **foreign fighters** and other assistance.
- Logistics is the Achilles heel of ISAF operations in AF. Pak control of FATA and the Torkhum Gate.

Insurgent Syndicate

Taliban Alliance



Taliban AF



HIG




TTP

Uzbek Jihadis



IJU



IPT

Al-Qaeda



Osama Bin Laden Zawahiri

Other
Uyghurs
Chechens
Europeans
Algerians
Somalis
Sudanese
Libyans

Pakistani & Kashmiri Jihadis



LeT



HuM



JeM



LeJ -Sipah

Threat Lay down

Strength (Est.)	Initials	Group
30,000	TB	Taliban Afghanistan
15,000	TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
5,000	TNSM	Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Cleric Maulana Fazullah)
3,000	LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
2,000	LeJ	Lashkar-e-Janghvi (mil wing Sipah-e-Sahaba)
2,000	AQ	Al-Qaeda, aka. Qaeda al-Jihad Black Guard 055 Brigade (Arab Legion of AQ) Libyan Islamic Jihad (The late al-Libi's group)
1,000	HIG	Hizb-i-Gullbudin
200	HIK	Hizb-i-Khalis
200	IPT	Islamic Party of Uzbekistan; formerly Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
200	IJU	Islamic Jihad Union (Faction IPT)
200	JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
200	HUM	Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (Faction Harakat ul- Jihad-I-Islami-HUJI)
30	JAM	Jaish al Mahdi

Note: Strength estimates are based on those forces fighting with the TB and AQ against US/NATO and Pakistan.
Sources: Think tank estimates, new reports and counterterrorism database centers.

Insurgency Objectives in 2008

RC-North: Destabilize - Increased asymmetric attacks aimed at destabilizing the region

RC-West: Expand - Aggressive insurgent expansion designed to further develop support areas

RC-East: Sustain - Enemy sustains current level of operations in the east through increased use of asymmetric tactics

RC-South: Control - Enemy attempts to consolidate gains IOT control the south by isolating Kandahar

Factors for a decrease in Significant Acts for 2008 compared to the same time-period in 2007:

- Waziristan fighting and POLMIL instability in Pakistan
- Successes against key HVTs and networks
- Winter weather
- Sustained ISAF operations due to no winter RIP/TOA
- Increased use of OPSEC by insurgents
- Insurgent training

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Paramilitary Groups Operating in Afghanistan

[Definition: Armed groups not under control of the Afghan National Government]

Warlord Militias



Aliases: Former Northern Alliance

Leaders:

Abdul Rashid Dostum (Uzbek, RC North; photo top right)

Mohammed Qasim Fahim Khan (Tajik, RC East)

Ismail Khan (Tajik/Pashtun, RC West)

Ustad Atta (Tajik, RC North and East)

Burhanuddin Rabbani (Tajik, RC East)

Hazrat Ali (Hazara, Central Afghanistan and RC East)

Mohammed Mohaqiq (Hazara, Central Afghanistan and RC East)

Ramazan Bashardost (Hazara, Central Afghanistan and RC East)

Description: Leaders of large, heavily armed paramilitary militias that are staunchly anti-Taliban; have suffered crimes against humanity conducted by past Taliban regime.

Strength: Combined; tens of thousands.

Activities: Protect their warlord's area of operations.

Financing: Crime, narco-trafficking, smuggling, illegal taxation , including illegal road checkpoints for taxation.

Lashkar-i-Islami



Aliases: LI.

Leaders: Mangal Bagh.

Description: Tribal warlord over a large militia that controls key areas in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass (Both sides of the border).

Loose ties, but not allied with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Not allied with AQ, but would consider it.

Bagh wants Pakistani forces out of his area, yet claims that he supports US/NATO convoys and forces in his area to counter criminal Taliban elements.

Strength: Unknown, claims 12,000.

Activities: Attempting to control his area; opposes criminal Taliban elements.

Financing: Locally raised financial support; independent fund raising operations at the commander level.



Iranian & Pakistani Intelligence Forces

Al-Quds Forces - Afghanistan



Aliases: IRGC forces and Quds brigades.

Leaders: Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi.

Description: Shia; conducts operations abroad that are much like the US' CIA and US Army's Special Forces.

Note: Quds Forces view the enemy of my enemy is my friend, which is why they will support Sunni groups in their fight against the US/NATO forces.

Strength: Unknown, likely less than 500 in Afghanistan.

Activities: Smuggling weapons (IEDs, AT weapons, SAMs and other weapons) to the Taliban (Sunni)

Financing: Iran.

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate



Aliases: Military Intelligence.

Leaders: Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

Description: Pakistan's powerful and secret military intelligence agency is headquartered in Islamabad (see HQ Photo top right). Many of its officers support the Taliban and insurgent syndicate.

It is often referred to as Pakistan's shadow government; ISI Generals may actually dictate key policies. Likely sponsors the 'freedom movement' in Kashmir against Indian 'occupation forces.'

Strength: Six to eight division, totaling 10,000 personnel in Pakistan.

Activities: Internal security and counterintelligence operations in the military; operates much like the CIA does abroad. Supports, trains, equips and gives sanctuary to the Taliban and its allied groups.

Financing: Pakistan government and jihadist governments abroad.



Terrorist Groups

Al-Qaeda



Aliases: Qaeda al-Jihad.

Leaders: Osama bin-Ladin and Ayman Zawahiri.

Description: International terrorist group that directs its operations to eventually force the establishment of the new Caliphate in the Middle East; intends to destroy Israel and seize Jerusalem; intends to destroy Western Civilization and its Christian Religion.


Well established on the internet; AQ's internet operations, some may argue, are AQ's most dangerous operations due to its global audience.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 2,000.


Activities: IEDs and suicide IEDs; kidnappings, executions on video, RPGs, mortars, rockets, ambushes, raids and direct assaults; supports insurgencies against US allied governments; conducts spectacular attacks against key targets, especially key western targets; have killed the most Americans over any other terrorist group.

Financing: Internet donations, jihadists worldwide and jihadist governments.

Al-Qaeda's AOR 2008



Islamic Jihad Union



IJU

Aliases: IMU faction, Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan and Islamic Jihad Group.

Leaders: Tohir Yuldashev.

Description: Split from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); trains in Taliban and AQ camps in western Pakistan. Jihadists who intend to support the overthrow of the Afghanistan and Uzbekistan elected governments.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 200.

Activities: IEDs, mortars, rockets, ambushes and raids.

Financing: Crime, jihadists worldwide and jihadists governments.



Islamic Party of Turkestan



IPT

Aliases: Turkistan al-Islamiyya .

Leaders: Abd al-Haqq Turkistani.

Description: Uighur jihadist group training and fighting alongside AQ and the Taliban in Western Pakistan; separatist-jihadist group from the Uighur Province in China.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 200.

Activities: Joint training and fighting alongside AQ, Haqqani Network and Taliban.

Financing: Jihadists world wide; www.tipawazionline.net.

Harakat-ul-Mujahideen



HuM

Aliases: Al-Faran, Al-Hadid, Al-Hadith, Harakat ul-Ansar, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, HUA, Jamiat ul-Ansar and the HuM.

Leaders: Dr. Badr Munir .

Description: Kashmiri group that supports the Pakistan claim to the territory; maintains training camps in western Pakistan; allied with the Taliban and AQ; signed bin-Laden's Fatwah against the West; linked to Daniel Pearl murder; is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam's Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F).

Strength: Unknown, approximately 200; Jane's now reports possibly thousands (2009).

Activities: IEDs, raids, ambushes, kidnappings and assaults; based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan, HUM conducts insurgent and terrorist operations primarily in Kashmir, but members have also been found operating in Afghanistan. HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Financing: Pakistan and jihadists worldwide.

Jaish-e-Mujahideen



JeM

Aliases: Army of Mohammed, Jaish-i-Mohammed, Khudamul Islam, Khuddam-ul-Islam, Kuddam e Islami, Mohammed's Army, Tehrik ul-Furqaan and JeM.

Leaders: Masood Azhar.

Description: Jihadist group based in Pakistan that is intent on reuniting Kashmiri with Pakistan; has openly declared war against the United States; is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam's Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F).

Pakistan outlawed JEM in 2002. By 2003, JeM had splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), headed by Azhar, and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar, who was released from Pakistani custody in August 2004. The group was well-funded, and was said to have tens of thousands of followers who supported attacks against Indian targets, the Pakistani government, and sectarian minorities.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 200.

Activities: Hijacking, suicide bombings, IEDs, rockets, mortars, raids and assaults.

Financing: Locally financed through its supporters and jihadists worldwide; JeM collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets, and allegedly from AQ.

Lashkar-e-Janghvi



LeJ -Sipah

Aliases: LeJ.

Leaders: Unknown.

Description: Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani President Musharraf in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then sought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom they had existing ties. Linked to the murder of Daniel Pearl.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 2,000.

Activities: IEDs, assassinations, suicide attacks, mortars, grenades, rockets and raids.

Financing: Local financing from supporters and jihadists worldwide.



Taliban - Afghanistan



اللّٰهُمَّ صَلِّ وَسَلِّمْ عَلَىٰ مُحَمَّدٍ وَآلِهِ
وَعَلَىٰ مَنْ تَبِعَهُمْ يَوْمَئِذٍ أُولَئِكَ فِي عِلِّيِّينَ

Taliban AF

Aliases: Pashtun Taliban Militia.

Leaders: Mullah Omar.


Description: Insurgent force consisting of mainly Pashtuns from Afghanistan and Pakistan; Sunni-Deobandi Islamists allied with AQ and other related groups; intends to overthrow the Karzai government and re-establish the Taliban regime and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; anti-US/NATO; training and logistical bases in Western Pakistan; supported by many high ranking officers in the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 30,000.

Activities: Insurgency and terrorist attacks including IEDs, suicide attacks, mass casualty bombings, mortars, rockets, assassinations, kidnappings, executions, raids, assaults and extensive internet operations.

Financing: Pakistan entities and jihadists worldwide.

Threat Lay down = Afghanistan



Source: Taliban Organizational Diagram, Military Review, May-June 2008.

Taliban Indicators



Indicators that a strong TB presence has moving into an area:

- Local music shops and barber shops are closed.
- Television and stereos sets found burnt in street.
- Girl's schools threatened or bombed.
- TB taxes levied.
- District government officials have resigned or were found executed.
- TB Flags seen flying over buildings.
- TB CDs, DVDs and cassettes were prolific throughout the area where they were not before.
- Taxi Cabbies play TB music in their taxis.
- Armed TB fighters reportedly walking freely in the towns and villages.
- IEDs and ambushes reported on roads leading into that district or area.
- Armed men on motorcycles.
- Armed men not in official uniform driving/riding in police vehicles.

Taliban Increase Presence in Afghanistan

- **December 2008, Taliban maintain a permanent presence in 72% of the state compared to 54% in 2007 (ICOS; formerly Senlis Council).**
- **ICOS presence definition: A “permanent presence” is defined by provinces averaging one (or more) insurgent attacks/week (lethal and non-lethal). Areas with “substantial presence” average one/more insurgent attacks/month and include local resident reports of frequent Taliban sightings.**
- **Areas with “light presence” have fewer than one insurgent attack per month and local residents don’t frequently observe Taliban in the area.**
- **To calculate percentages, the total area of Afghanistan was divided by the total area hosting a permanent/substantial/light Taliban presence.**
- **The 18% increase includes heavy presence in southern provinces, western and north-western provinces and steadily creeping towards Kabul.**
- **According to ICOS-3:4 main highways into Kabul compromised by Taliban; Taliban infiltrate Kabul at will.**

Source: http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/struggle_for_kabul/press_release , 08.

Taliban TTPs



- **Direct Fire Attacks:**

- **Anti-armor and vehicle attacks**
 - ✓ RPG
 - ✓ IED/VBIED
- **Anti-personnel attacks using IEDs**
- **Small arms fire (SAF) attacks**
 - ✓ Rifle
 - ✓ Machinegun
 - ✓ Grenade
- **Surface-to-air-fire (SAFIRE) attacks**
 - ✓ Anti-F/W or R/W targets of opportunity
 - ✓ Anti-air ambush
 - ✓ RPG
 - ✓ Heavy Machinegun
 - ✓ Anti-Aircraft Weapons
- **Suicide attacks against vehicles/personnel/building: Bomber(s) on foot or in vehicle(s) (Increasing annually).**
- **Ambushes (Large and small)**
 - ✓ Large (Company size(+), fighters with IEDs RPGs; intent to destroy)
 - ✓ Small (Platoon size(-), fighters intend to cease fire and withdraw quickly)
- **Raids (Most often used to free prisoners or seize weapons, vehicles, equipment or food)**
- **Sniper Operations (Limited in OEF, likely to increase)**


Taliban TTPs

- **Indirect Fire** (Harassment or combat fires)
 - Mortars
 - Rockets
 - Note: Taliban view both harassment and combat fires as being effective types of attacks.

- **Assassinations** as an integral part of information warfare (IW) operations
 - When/where
 - ✓ At worksite
 - ✓ Enroute to/from work (Known route)
 - ✓ At home
 - How
 - ✓ Knife = Up close and personal and in public
 - ✓ SAF = Drive by or Raid on home
 - ✓ IED/VBIED = Enroute to/from work

- **Kidnappings**
 - Ransom to raise funds
 - Execution in public, often on video (IW Operations)

- **Crime:** to raise funds and to seize equipment and food or to 'cover' an assassination
 - Burglary
 - Robbery
 - Extortion
 - Smuggling
 - Opium, heroin and hashish cultivation and trafficking**



Taliban TTPs

- **Non-Kinetic IW Operations -- influence the minds of US, NATO and local population**

- **Internet Operations (Websites, forums and allied websites/forums)**

- ✓ **Internet Media:**

- ❖ Online magazines
 - ❖ Photos
 - ❖ Typed media
 - ❖ Videos (Operational, production, training, etc.)

- ✓ **Internet Communications:**

- ❖ Messaging
 - ❖ Sharing TTPs
 - ❖ Training
 - ❖ Building ideological support
 - ❖ Spreading ideology

- ✓ **Internet Fundraising:**


- ❖ Fraudulent Islamic charities
 - ❖ Hawala
 - ❖ Direct website donations
 - ❖ 'Support mujahideen orphans and widows'

- **Printed media:**

- ✓ Taliban magazines
 - ✓ Taliban newspapers
 - ✓ Pro-Taliban Islamic magazines/newspapers
 - ✓ Night-letters

- **Radio: Taliban Radio has been infrequently broadcasting when possible.**

- **Islamic Media: Taliban co-opt Islamic Media to conduct regional and even international IW Operations**



Taliban TTPs

- **Kinetic IW Operations – to disrupt and to deny**
 - **Assassinations of key leaders and pro-US/NATO leaders**
 - ✓ Targeted sniper operations (Limited in OEF, likely to increase)
 - ✓ Suicide attacks (e.g. Bhutto)
 - **Major assaults against small, isolated FOBs (Will increase; e.g. COP Wanat); especially those located along key infiltration/smuggling routes**
 - **Multiple ambushes along US/NATO lines of communication (Khyber Pass Route; e.g. costly complex ambush against French in 2008)**
 - **Harassing indirect fire attacks against US/NATO bases, camps and outposts**
 - **Assaults against border checkpoints to clear infiltration routes**
 - **Attacks against observation posts (OPs) along the border to deny ‘eyes-on’ capabilities and to clear infiltration routes**
 - **Computer attack: Pro-Taliban hackers= Arabian Hackers Team (Saudi), Qaedahacker, Adil Watanmal a Taliban webmaster?, Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan (arrested, created websites, false email accounts, crypto/steno and participated in the London bombings), Terrorist 007, UBL Hackers, Melhacker (created al-Qaeda worm), al3iznet crew, Gforce Pakistan and Al-Qaeda Alliance Online.**

Tehrik-e-Taliban - Pakistan



Baitullah

Aliases: Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Leaders: Baitullah Masoud (Right photo).

Description: Insurgent force consisting of mainly Pashtuns from Pakistan; Sunni-Deobandi Islamists allied with AQ and other related groups; intends to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a Taliban regime and the Islamic Emirate of Pakistan; anti-US/NATO; training and logistical bases in Western Pakistan; supported by many high ranking officers in the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 15,000.

Activities: Insurgency and terrorist attacks including IEDs, suicide attacks, mass casualty bombings, mortars, rockets, assassinations, kidnappings, executions, raids, assaults and extensive internet operations.

Financing: Pakistan entities and jihadists worldwide.

Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis Faction)

Aliases: HIG.

Leaders: Mulavi Younas Khalis .

Description: A heavily armed militia (See bottom right photo) under the command of Khalis. Operates in the RC East area; fights alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 200.

Activities: IEDs, raids, ambushes, rockets and mortars.

Financing: Opium trafficking, Taliban and jihadists worldwide.



Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin



HIG

Aliases: HIG

Leaders: Hekmatyar Gulbuddin

Description: A heavily armed militia under the command of Gulbuddin. Operates in the RC East area; fights alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Strength: Unknown, approximately 1000.

Activities: IEDs, raids, ambushes, rockets and mortars.

Financing: Opium trafficking, Taliban, AQ and jihadists worldwide.

Haqqani Network



Aliases: Haqqani Militia.

Leaders: Jalaluddin Haqqani (Former member of the Khalis faction) and sons (e.g. Sirajuddin Haqqani).

Description: Tribal warlord militia; pro-Taliban and AQ; seeks to expell all US/NATO forces from the Haqqani area of operation; maintains training camps, sanctuary locations, a madrassa and a mosque in Western Pakistan (Dandi Darpa Khail in North Waziristan).


“Jalaluddin Haqqani is one of the most important Taliban military commanders fighting against the Afghan government, and US forces in Afghanistan. He is seen by some analysts as the main engine in the Taliban movement. He is aligned with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri as well as secretly with Pakistan's spy agency, the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). The Pakistani government denies the relationship their spy agency has with Haqqani, however, the evidence clearly shows that the ISI is secretly working with various Taliban leaders to weaken and eventually destroy the US backed government in Kabul.” (<http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/haqqani.html>)

Strength: Unknown; numbers are included in Taliban of Pakistan’s total strength.

Activities: Insurgency and terrorist attacks including IEDs, suicide attacks, mass casualty bombings, mortars, rockets, assassinations, kidnappings, executions, raids, assaults and limited internet operations.

Financing: Opium trafficking, Taliban, AQ and jihadists worldwide.


Insurgent Syndicate's AOR 2009




Known Infiltration Routes into AF – March 08



- 1 Pachir Wa Agam
- 2 Goshta
- 3 Lal Por
- 4 Torkum Gate
- 5 Tsatsobi Pass
- 6 Ghaki Pass
- 7 Kaga Pass
- 8 Nawa Pass
- 9 Ursan Pass
- 10 Bari Kowt Pass
- 11 Shaundrai Pass
- 12 Zinor Pass



Taliban & AQ's AOR 2009 (Est.)




Western Pakistan



Western Pakistan

TB	Taliban Afghanistan
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
TNSM	Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Janghvi
AQ	Al-Qaeda, aka. Qaeda al-Jihad
HIG	Hizb-i-Gullbudin



Training Camps & Safe Houses Western Pakistan Jan 2009

1. Reuse of camps operational during Soviet-Afghan War.
2. Many camps are now utilized simultaneously by a wide variety of jihadist groups (IMU, IJU, JaM).
3. More Kashmiri Groups (LeT, HuM, HQJI, JeM) are now fighting alongside the TB, AQ and HIG.
4. Many madrassas and some mosques are also conveniently collocated with training camps.
5. HIG camps tend to be located between the Central FATA and the NWFP.
6. AQ camps are more spread out between N Waziristan and the NWFP.
7. Haqqani Network camps are located in the Central FATA up to the NWFP.
8. Taliban camps tend to be located generally in the Central-South FATA.
9. Up to 157 training camps are reportedly operational in Western-Northwestern Pakistan.
10. Approximately 25 camps are permanent; remainder are more mobile.
11. Approximately 400 logistics sites support these camps.

Training Camps & Safe Houses

Western Pakistan Jan 2009

Western Pakistan

[Peshawar](#)

[Village of Hutier, Hangu Province](#)

North West Frontier Province (NWFP)

[Malakand](#)

[Manshera](#)

[Balakot \(JeM\)](#)

[Musaffarabad \(LeT, multiple camps\)](#)

[Moaskar Ummul Qura](#)

[Moaskar Aqsa](#)

[Moaskar Abdullah bin Masood](#)

[Haieera](#)

[Miramshah \(Haqqani Network\)](#)

[Danda Saidgai \(AQ-Black Guard\)](#)

[Mohmand](#)

Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)

Khyber

N Waziristan (FATA)

[Village of Daygan](#)

[Damadola](#)

[Danda Saidgai](#)

[Chingai,](#)

[Zamazola](#)

[Danda Saidgai](#)

[Mami Rogha](#)

[Village of Lwara Mundi](#)

[Mir Ali \(IJU, multiple camps\)](#)

[Village of Daygan](#)

S Waziristan (FATA)

[Azam Warsak \(IMU, IJU\)](#)

[Wana \(IMU, IJU\)](#)

[Angordada](#)

[Bajaur \(AQ, IJU\)](#)

[Dhook Pir Bagh](#)


Select Insurgent Camps in Pakistan

(Not to Scale)

FBI 2007

TRISA OEA TM Jan 2009





Legend

- Area with heavy Taliban/insurgent activity
- Area with a substantial Taliban/insurgent activity
- Area with a light Taliban/insurgent activity
- Main road
- Secondary road
- Major supply route in and out of Afghanistan

Areas of Taliban presence in Afghanistan during 2007 - November 2008


A re-made map indicating where the Taliban used to have a 54% permanent presence in 2007. On request, this map is available in high resolution: film@icosgroup.net.

AFGHANISTAN MAP

November 2008

Areas of Taliban presence in Afghanistan plus fatal violent incidents in 2008 - November 2008

Map detailing provinces with permanent, substantial and light Taliban presence along with acts of violence that have resulted in a known civilian, military or insurgent fatality. Permanent Taliban presence now amounts to 72% of the total landmass. On request, this map is available in high resolution: film@icosgroup.net.



Legend

- Area with heavy Taliban/insurgent activity
- Area with a substantial Taliban/insurgent activity
- Area with a light Taliban/insurgent activity
- Main road
- Secondary road
- Violence resulting in:
 - Civilian fatality
 - Military fatality
 - Insurgent fatality
- Tanji Valley, Taliban Base
- Major supply route in and out of Afghanistan


Major Insurgent Attacks

- **Company plus size attacks and assaults against US/NATO Camps & outposts in Kandahar and Helmand.**
- **Attacked in force, US camps, outposts and firebases along the Pakistani Border; some firefights have lasted up to 8+ hours, requiring air and ground QRF responses.**
- **Overrun squad and platoon size ASF outposts and checkpoints along the Pakistani border with company size plus forces.**
- **Defended strongholds in Pakistan, repelling superior size Pakistani Army Forces, causing many Pakistani casualties. TB patrols have crossed paths with Pakistani Patrols, resulting in long and intensive firefights.**
- **Have used battalion sized forces to seize and hold entire towns, cities and districts in the RC South and East. TB currently control most of the rural areas in the RC South and East and western Pakistan.**

Suicide Trends

- **2005, majority of suicide bombers were mostly Arab**
- **2007, bomber profile is more typically a Pashtun from a Pakistani madrassa**
- **Majority of suicide attacks occur in provinces that border Pakistan**
- **Public recruitment occurs in the streets of Quetta and Peshawar**
- **Many bombers have detonated their explosives prematurely**
- **2008, total military/civilian casualties from all types of attacks increased 43% compared to 2007, with more than 50% of these were caused by suicide bombers**
- **SVIEDs onboard buses tend to be the most costly**

SVBIED **ATTACKS** BY PROVINCE 2008*




IED Attacks Rise Winter 2008-09

- **IEDs attacks rose late summer 2008 and continued to rise in 2009.**
- **Historically, IED attacks decrease as winter weather impedes movement of nationals/insurgents, traveling by foot.**
- **Winter violence are at highest levels since 2001 invasion.**
- **Influx of new US and NATO forces into eastern provinces have likely affected the increase in IED attacks-more targets; insurgents have promised not to let up in the winter due to this new troop increase.**
- **Insurgents favor IED attacks over other types of attacks.**
- **Attacks (see map next slide) tend to disperse across the state but increase in intensity along the eastern and southeastern provinces; safe havens for insurgents.**


Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/Improvised_Roadside_Attacks_In_Afghanistan_Rise_Sharp/1359015.html, DEC08 and <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE4BB09J20081212>, DEC008.

IED Attacks Winter 2008-09



Source: <http://blog.fortiusone.com/2008/10/28/violence-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-pre-and-post-%E2%80%9Csurge%E2%80%9D-part-iv, 08>.

KIAs by Year



Total Deaths (US Forces)

07 OCT 01 – 03 JAN 09		KIA
1. EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (INCLUDES MOST EXPLOSIVES EXCEPT THOSE LISTED BELOW)		181
2. SMALL ARMS/HOSTILE FIRE		122
3. AIRCRAFT DOWNED		26
4. ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE		10
5. INDIRECT FIRE (INCLUDES ARTILLERY, ROCKET AND MORTAR)		8
6. COMBAT RELATED VEHICULAR ACCIDENTS		2
7. OTHER (INCLUDES 57 NOT REPORTED/UNKNOWN)		61
TOTAL HOSTILE DEATHS		410
1. AIRCRAFT CRASH		89
2. VEHICLE CRASH		35
3. SMALL ARMS/HOSTILE FIRE		17
4. EXPLOSIVE DEVICE		12
5. MEDICAL		10
6. DROWNING		5
7. OTHER (INCLUDES 42 NOT REPORTED/UNKNOWN CASES)		48
TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS		216

- RED REPRESENTS
HOSTILE ACTION /
BLUE REPRESENTS
NON-HOSTILE

- CF KIAs CONTINUE TO
RISE

-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
CAUSE NEARLY 45% OF
ALL FATALITIES

Hostile Death Causes (Coalition Forces)

07 OCT 01 – 03 JAN 09	KIA
IED (INCLUDES 25 DEATHS FROM LANDMINES)	343
SMALL ARMS/HOSTILE FIRE	213
ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADES (DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE USED AGAINST AIRCRAFT)	55
SUICIDE ATTACKS	43
SURFACE-T0-AIR FIRE	35
INDIRECT FIRE	24
FRATRICIDE	16
EXPLOSION (INCLUDES GRENADES, BOMBS AND UNKNOWN EXPLOSIVES)	16
VEHICLE (DESTROYED BY HOSTILE FIRE/UNK)	1
TOTAL HOSTILE DEATHS	746

- 746 KIAs by hostile action to-date

- IEDs continue to be the top casualty producer (since late 2007)

- IED casualties increased 36% in the last 18 months

- Suicide attack casualties increased 30% in the last 18 months

- SAF casualties increased 20% in the last 18 months



"To understand Afghanistan you have to go to the places the majority of the poor go to," Haji Sher said. "The bazaar is Afghanistan." In one of the shops, only miles from the ISAF headquarters of Gen. David McKiernan, a middle-aged man was selling hundreds of AK-47s. "You can buy almost anything on the street," Haji Sher said laughing, as the proprietor pulled an old Kalashnikov off the shelf and handed it to him.

See our links on NIPRNET Intelink at

<https://www.intelink.gov/sites/TRISA/default.aspx>
(Homepage)

<https://www.intelink.gov/inteldocs/browse.php?fFolderId=21435>
(Document storage)

Our BCKS Homepage Online

<https://bcks.army.mil/secure/default.aspx> BCKS home, <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx> direct link

Army Knowledge Online - Microsoft Internet Explorer provided by Fort Leavenworth, KS

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Address <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/136429?c=dmluy2VudC5tY2x1YW4=> Go

BCKS Welcome, Vincent Mclean

Open web site in a separate browser window.

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START Army Operational Knowledge Management

What is AOKM?
(click on tab to stop rotation or pause and resume below)

What's New (NEW) KM In the News (NEW) Press Releases STRATCOM Products

Magazines	Online	Newspapers/Newsletters
CAC-K Director, COL Galvin, and KMA Dustin Cloos contributed articles to the Jan-Mar 2008 Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin	Junior officers share battlefield experiences in "Army Lessons Learned" in the July 2006 issue of FCW.com .	Workshop encourages KM - Ft. Leavenworth Lamp (Feb 09)
COIN Net/Tomoye Specialist Jeff Oxendine provides "Get Smart on COIN" to the Mar-Apr 2008 Military Review	COL Galvin discusses KM with bloggers in their Feb 2008 interview on the Defense Bloggers Roundtable .	Web sites earn KM awards - Ft. Leavenworth Lamp (Aug 07)
Contracting community shares knowledge on LOGNET in this article from the Mar-Apr 2008 Army Logistician .		BCKS wins KM awards - Ft. Leavenworth Lamp (Apr 06)
LTC(P) Degan discusses "Knowledge Management by the Generating Force" in the Jul-Aug 2008 Military Review .		L21 IOWA KNOWLEDGE NET NEWS , July 2008.

Pause Resume

BCKS Director
Welcome to the Army's Operational Knowledge Management Page, operated by the Battle Command Knowledge System.

NEW! Warrior Knowledge Base Search
Open web site in a separate browser window.
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BCKS Special Hot Topics
Take a look at the [Army Warfighters' Forum network](#) being developed in conjunction with US Army Forces Command and US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Contact and Directions to BCKS
 Contact BCKS
Driving Directions to BCKS at Ft. Leavenworth

Links for our Customers

- English-Arabic Translated FMS
- 2006 Armor Warfighting Symposium Videos
- 2007 Armor Warfighting Conference Videos (FOUO)
- 2007 Army Operational Knowledge Management Conference
- Army Knowledge Strong Home Page
- Best Practices building an AKO site.
- CAC Drivers and Active Card Gold Download
- CAC on a MAC
- Collaboration Environment Handbook (39MB)
- Long Hard Road. Stories for HCOs by HCOs (OEF-OIF)
- [StrikerNet Home Page](#)
- [TRISA-Threats Web Site](#)
- [Ultimate Warrior Website](#)

Our BCKS Homepage Online


<https://bcks.army.mil/secure/default.aspx> BCKS home, <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx> direct link

DCSINT Threats - Home - Microsoft Internet Explorer provided by Fort Leavenworth, KS

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TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) - Threats

Home Handbooks Video Exploitation (VEX) OIF Attack Database Terrorism Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Enduring Freedom OEAs COE TSP TRADOC Schools & Centers Sites

Fort Leavenworth Home

SharePoint Portal Server

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- OIF Attack Database
- Terrorism
- Operation Iraqi Freedom
- Operation Enduring Freedom
- OEAs
- COE
- TSP
- TRADOC Schools & Centers
- Sites
- Wargaming Directorate

Product Evaluation

Survey Name: Product Evaluation
 Survey Description:
 Time Created: 6/20/2008 10:32 AM
 Number of Responses: 1

Purpose

This is the TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats, US Army TRADOC G-2 web site.
 (Formerly TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats)

Welcome to the TRISA -Threats home page. We are proud to offer relevant and quality training support products in the following areas: (when trying to view a document, the quickest way is to is to right select and "save target as" that works best for the word and PowerPoint documents. The PDF extension files open easily with just by selecting.

- OIF
 - OIF OE Assessment
 - OIF Insurgent Products
 - OIF Maps & Other Resources
- OEF
 - OEF OE Assessment
 - OEF Insurgent Products OEF Maps and Other Resource Video Exploitation (VEX)
- OIF VEX Collection
 - OEF VEX Collection
 - Other Regions -Sudan, Somalia, Lebanese Hezbollah

1. Insurgent Group Target Folders (Group Profile, Statements, Videos)
 2. Training Support Folders (Key Example Videos by Attack Type)

- OIF Attack Database
- Terrorism
- Handbooks
- Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)
- North Korea OE Assessment

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Williams	Walter	913-684-7923	Walter.Williams@us.army.mil

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<http://tradoc-dcsint.leavenworth.army.smil.mil>

POCs: Mr. Vincent Mclean vincent.mclean@us.army.mil or Ms. Penny Mellies penny.mellies@us.army.mil at 913-684-7920/22; DSN: 552-7920, 700 Scott Ave, Bldg 53, ADCSINT, TRADOC, Ft Leavenworth, Ks 66027.



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