



INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

AUDIT REPORT

Audit of Management of United Nations Laissez Passers

25 July 2007

Assignment No. AH2006/513/10

United Nations  Nations Unies
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION · DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE
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TO: Ms. Alicia Bárcena Ibarra, Under-Secretary-General
A: Department of Management

DATE: 25 July 2007

REFERENCE: AUD-File no. (07- 00366)

Mr. David Veness, Under-Secretary-General
Department of Safety and Security

FROM: Dagfinn Knutsen, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS



SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AH2006/513/10: Audit of Management of United Nations**
OBJET: **Laissez Passers**

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit, which was conducted from September to December 2006.

2. Based on your comments, we are pleased to inform you that we will close recommendation 5 in the OIOS recommendations database as indicated in Annex 1. In order for us to close the remaining recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.

3. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as critical 1, 3, 4, 6 to 10, 12 to 14, 16, 17, 19, 23, 29, and 31, and 32 in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.

4. IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

cc: Ms. Joan McDonald, Director, Facilities and Commercial Services Division
Mr. Anton Bonner, Chief, Travel and Transportation Service
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors
Mr. Jonathan Childerley, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Programme Officer, OIOS

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

FUNCTION

“The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

CONTACT INFORMATION

DIRECTOR:

Dagfinn Knutsen, Tel: +1.212.963.5650, Fax: +1.212.963.2185,
e-mail: knutsen2@un.org

DEPUTY DIRECTOR:

Fatoumata Ndiaye: Tel: +1.212.963.5648, Fax: +1.212.963.3388,
e-mail: ndiaye@un.org

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Audit of Management of United Nations Laissez Passers

OIOS conducted an audit of the Management of United Nations Laissez Passers (UNLPs) from September to December 2006. The main objectives of the audit were to review the effectiveness and efficiency of managing and administering United Nations travel documents. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

UNLPs have generally been effective in facilitating the travel of UN officials. For the most part, the Office of Central Support Services (OCSS) has been following the best practices required by the International Civil Aviation Organization standards (ICAO) for travel documents. However, there is an overall need to improve the risk awareness of UNLP management. The Department of Management and the Department of Safety and Security should analyze and track all the security risks involved in the issuance, renewal, and retrieval of UNLPs in order to reduce opportunities for illegal use and possible serious reputational damage to the UN. Moreover, there is need to strengthen the policies and procedures over UNLP renewals and cancellations. Significant improvements in the IT system supporting the UNLP operations are necessary to ensure the reliability, integrity, and availability of UNLP data. Specifically:

- The “Guide to the Issuance of United Nations Travel Documents” should be enhanced to provide adequate guidance to UNLP administrators;
- Standard Operating Procedures should be implemented to guide UNLP management and increase operational effectiveness and efficiency;
- Memoranda of Understanding on the responsibilities over UNLPs should be established between the UN and the Specialized Agencies;
- A policy on the official use of UNLPs as staff identification to enter UN premises should be established;
- Policies for guiding renewal reporting and processes should be enforced;
- Monitoring of compliance with internal controls over UNLPs, especially by renewal offices away from headquarters, should be strengthened;
- Roles and responsibilities for UNLP risk management should be clarified and assigned;
- UNLP information technology (IT) systems should be improved to ensure reliable and timely information to decision-makers;
- Reporting requirements to adequately manage and monitor UNLPs in circulation should be established; relevant information should be generated, reviewed, and approved by senior officials;
- Modifications to UNLP IT systems should be reviewed and approved;
- An IT manual should be developed and distributed to users; and
- A business continuity plan should be established to mitigate disruption during the conversion to the UNLP centralized information system.

OIOS has issued 33 recommendations to improve the management of United Nations Laissez Passers.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted the audit of the management of United Nations Laissez Passers (UNLPs) from September to December 2006. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

2. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946)¹ grants the UN authority to issue UNLPs to its representatives who travel on official business for the Organization. The specialized agencies of the UN Common System are also granted UNLPs in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (1947). Except for the International Labor Organization (ILO), which has the authority to issue its own UNLPs, the UN issues UNLPs to officials of the UN and the Specialized Agencies for the purpose of facilitating official travel. UNLPs are recognized and accepted as valid travel documents by fifty (50) Member States. UNLPs also serve as an official identification document for UN staff members accessing UN buildings and premises around the world.

3. The Department of Management (DM) has overall responsibility for UNLP administration. UNLPs are issued at the main duty stations in New York, Geneva, and Vienna. At headquarters, these functions are performed by the Travel and Transportation Services Unit within the Office of Central Support Services. Offices away from headquarters have delegated authority to renew blue UNLPs within established guidelines².

4. In 2006, a UNLP Task Force (Task Force) was established to assess the internal control system over UNLP issuance, renewal, and cancellation and come up with recommendations on how to improve its effective and efficient management. The Task Force comprises senior officials from DM and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). The appointment of the Task Force was a step to address serious issues raised previously by OIOS and, more recently, by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU). The latter looked at the systemic issues of UNLP management in its review in 2005. The Task Force will report its recommendations to the policymakers with a view to improving the authenticity of the UNLP as an official travel document.

5. One professional, four full-time support staff, and one part-time support staff are allocated to service all areas of UNLP administration at TTS. TTS also supports the consolidated activities of UNLP administration for all duty stations and offices away from headquarters with UNLP responsibilities. In 2006, approximately 12,000 UNLPs were issued, 14,000 renewed, and 9,000 cancelled, a total of 35,000 UNLP transactions processed at all locations.

¹ Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations, 1946, Article VII, Sections 24 – 28. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, 1947, permit the issuance of UNLPs to the officials of the UN specialized agencies.

² “Guide to the Issuance of United Nations Travel Documents”, 13 January 2006

6. Comments made by the DM are shown in *italics*. OIOS is not in a position to assess the validity of all estimates and explanations presented by DM or to evaluate the full range of options available to DM in implementing the audit recommendations. However, given the significant reliance and reference to the new UNLP IT system, currently in testing phase, to strengthen internal controls in UNLP processes, OIOS will readdress the solutions proposed by DM in a future audit. A follow-up audit will be scheduled in the near future to review the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in this report.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

7. The major objectives of the audit were to assess the:
- (a) effectiveness and efficiency of controls for the safe custody of UNLPs and the issuance, renewal, and retrieval of UNLPs; and
 - (b) adequacy of oversight of UNLP management.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

8. The review covered the period from 1 January 2003 to 31 October 2006. The audit also incorporated a follow-up of the recommendations of the previous audits conducted by IAD³ at Headquarters, Geneva, and Vienna in 2002 and addressed the security management aspect of the UNLP. The audit was carried out using a risk-based approach through the conduct of interviews, review of policies and procedures in place, review of records, and analytical procedures.

IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Policies and Procedures

The “Guide to the Issuance of UN Travel Documents” needs to be clarified and enhanced to provide adequate instructions

9. In January 2006, OCSS issued “The Guide to Issuance of United Nations Travel Documents” (the Guide) to heads of offices and departments, field missions, and the specialized agencies. Generally, the Guide provides directives on eligibility for UNLPs, procedures to follow for their issuance and renewal, and the responsibilities of the certifying officers who approve UNLP applications. The issuance of the Guide follows OIOS’ previous recommendation to update the PAH/INF.78/2 (issued in 1977). While OIOS commends DM on its implementation of this recommendation, the auditors found several inconsistencies in the Guide. For example, field offices are instructed to retain the original UNLP renewal applications and forward copies on a regular basis to the appropriate issuing office in New York, Geneva, or Vienna.

³ Audit reference: AH2002/31/3 and AE2002/105/1

However, Appendix B of the Guide states that the field office should retain the “duplicate” form and forward the original to the issuing office.

10. The Guide does not adequately instruct offices away from headquarters that they should first have the approval of their head offices to receive a delegation of authority to renew UNLPs. On the other hand, the “Delegation of Authority” form states that head office approval should be obtained before submitting the application to TTS. In practice, only some offices obtain head office approval before applying for this delegation of authority. The basis for granting delegation of authority to renew UNLPs in the field, therefore, is inconsistent.

11. In another instance, the Guide states that officials holding a ranking of D-2 and above may be issued red UNLPs. However, certain officials below the D-2 grade who are approved by the Secretary-General may also be granted red UNLPs in connection with their specific “field” duties. The criteria for when UN officials should surrender these specially issued red UNLPs and the temporary diplomatic status associated with the red UNLPs should be revoked are not clear. All contradictions and inconsistencies in the Guide should be corrected in accordance with the policy to ensure consistent practices.

Recommendation 1

(1) The Department of Management should clarify contradictory and vague statements in the “Guide to Issuing UN Travel Documents”.

12. *DM accepted recommendation 1, stating that it plans to update the Guide periodically and will continue to do so as necessary.* Recommendation 1 remains open pending submission of the updated Guide.

Standard operating procedures need to be developed for consistency of UNLP management in all duty stations

13. OCSS does not have Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to guide all duty stations and offices away from headquarters that administer UNLPs. The audit found that while the three UNLP issuing offices (United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ), United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG), and United Nations (UNOV) generally followed the guidelines issued by TTS, there was a lack of consistency in the day-to-day administration and management of UNLPs. For example, UNOG monitors UNLPs in circulation through a number of management reports. These reports are reviewed by UNLP administrators on a regular basis to identify and resolve discrepancies. The same procedures are not followed by UNHQ and UNOV as regularly. A previous audit conducted by OIOS (AE2002/105/02) in 2002 recommended that OCSS prepare SOPs to facilitate uniform implementation of UNLP policies and procedures. The recommendation was accepted by OCSS; however, it has not yet been implemented.

Recommendation 2

(2) The Department of Management should formulate and issue Standard Operating Procedures to assure the highest level of consistency in UNLP management throughout the Organization.

14. *DM accepted this recommendation, stating in addition to the Guide, it will issue a user manual with the launch of the new UNLP system. Recommendation 2 remains open pending the submission of the new user manual for OIOS review.*

Lack of Memoranda of Understanding between the UN and the Specialized Agencies

15. The Convention on the Privileges of the Specialized Agencies (the Convention) states that their officials shall be granted UNLPs to facilitate travel for official purposes. Presently, TTS is unable to adequately monitor and control the risks to UNLPs issued to Specialized Agencies because they fall outside the scope of the UN Regulations and Rules. Therefore, the heads of those organizations need to be held accountable for managing UNLP risks. The lack of a legal agreement between the UN and the Specialized Agencies may weaken the enforceability of the Guide and other UN instructions on UNLP management.

16. To address the previous audit recommendation, TTS issued the Guide to UN departments and client organs for the purpose of obtaining their endorsement and acceptance to follow standard instructions when issuing UN travel documents. However, the Guide by itself is not a legally binding agreement and does not mandate that the highest authority of all client organs account for compliance to the established rules. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the accountability of the heads of Specialized Agencies for the effective management of UNLPs issued to their officials is needed. This was previously recommended by OIOS in 2002 Audit of UNLP management (AE 2002/105/01), which stated that DM, in collaboration with the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), should draft the language for such an MOU. DM previously accepted this recommendation, but it has not yet been implemented.

Recommendation 3

(3) OIOS reiterates its recommendation to establish Memoranda of Understanding with the Specialized Agencies that includes appropriate language on the responsibility of each agency for UNLP management.

17. *DM disagreed with the recommendation to formalize a separate Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretariat and all Specialized Agencies. DM stated that the Convention of Privileges and Immunities for the Specialized Agencies granted their staff members entitlement to the use of Laissez-Passers to facilitate their official travel. Therefore, the issuance of a Memorandum of Understanding is not needed. Furthermore, a*

draft of the Guide to the Issuance of United Nations Travel Documents was provided to all Specialized Agencies for comment prior to promulgation. By receipt acceptance of the Guide, the Specialized Agencies agreed specifically in writing to comply with the standards and guidelines governing the administration of UN Laissez Passer documents.

18. In OIOS' view, DM's comments are not supported by facts. OIOS found that only 39 endorsements out of 91 expected from UN departments and client organizations were on file. Of the 39 respondents, only three Heads of Offices signed their acknowledgement to follow the rules. The remaining signatories were line managers with appointments at an administrative level or lower. It was not clear if these line managers had the authority to bind their organizations to the standards outlined in The Guide. Furthermore, at least four programmes and funds listed as UN-related entities according to data published by the Department of Public Information (2006) were not included in the client organization listing per the appendix⁴ to the Guide. It could not be determined if these four organs had been informed of the established rules on the issuance of UN travel documents and their need to comply, as prescribed by the Guide.

19. Given the relevance of establishing a contractually binding agreement for all organizations to conform to the general principles for issuing UN travel documents, OIOS reiterates its recommendation to establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the UN and the client organizations. The MOU should specify each organization's role and responsibilities in relation to the UNLP document. The MOU, which is a bi-lateral contractual arrangement, would have enhanced legal reference compared to the signed "acceptances" of The Guide on record. Moreover, the MOU, duly signed by the Chief Executive Officer of each organization, would show the necessary commitment of the client organizations to conform to all the requirements outlined in The Guide. The recommendation remains open pending submission of the signed MOUs by client organizations.

A policy on the official use of the UNLP as an entry identification document to UN premises should be established

20. UNLPs are used as official staff identification (ID) documents permitting staff to enter UN premises all over the world. However the rules of using the UNLP as staff identification differ amongst the various duty stations and field offices. In some offices, for example, UNLPs are used as a basis to issue temporary local staff IDs to visiting officials. At headquarters, UNLPs may actually be used by the visiting official to gain access at the staff entry points. Due to the limitations of the UNLP database, UN Security does not have real-time information on issued and renewed UNLPs, therefore, UNLPs are visually checked by security officers. There is no instruction or SOP for using UNLPs for access to UN premises. A policy to guide the consistent treatment of UNLPs as staff IDs needs to be established and followed by all duty stations and field offices.

⁴ For reference, client organizations comprising the UN Family entities are listed as an Appendix to the Guide.

Recommendation 4

(4) The Department of Safety and Security should identify the risks involved in using UNLPs to access UN premises and introduce policies and procedures to mitigate these risks.

21. *DM accepted this recommendation, stating that a pilot was initiated at UNHQ and the lessons learned will be incorporated in the DSS risk analysis. Recommendation 4 remains open pending submission of the documentary evidence of DSS' risk assessment.*

Lack of a standard retention policy on UNLP documents

22. The retention policy for establishing how long UNLP documentation should be kept on file by the issuing offices and offices away from headquarters is set individually by each office. However, there is a need to establish a uniform retention policy for all offices, identifying a specific period of time that documents will be retained and in what format – electronically or hard copy. There is also need to establish a central repository and assign a custodian that will have the overall responsibility for managing UNLP documents. In its 2002 audit on UNLP management, OIOS recommended that DM set a retention policy for UNLP documentation. DM accepted the recommendation; however, it has not yet been implemented.

Recommendation 5

(5) OIOS reiterates its recommendation that the Department of Management should establish a retention policy for originating UNLP documents and data.

23. *DM stated that recommendation 5 is implemented as of July 2007 and provided a copy of the policy. Based on the action taken by DM, recommendation 5 has been closed.*

B. Current UNLP Management Practices

Controls over issuance of UNLPs need improving

24. UNLPs are processed in a semi-public area that can be accessed by unauthorized persons. Staff members who process UNLPs sit in open cubicles and their computers are not restricted from physical access and are vulnerable to unauthorized tampering. Blank UNLPs booklets are kept in an open area for processing. Processed UNLPs are kept on a desk near an open doorway and there is no requirement for staff members collecting UNLPs on behalf of other staff members to have authorized instructions to do so. While staff members are required to sign the UNLP log book when picking up UNLPs, there is no control in place to ensure that this procedure is followed. The UNLP log is maintained in an open area next to the processed UNLPs and a custodian is not assigned to

collect signatures. These lapses in controls can lead to unauthorized persons getting hold of UNLPs and misusing them.

Recommendation 6

(6) The Department of Management should establish internal control practices, including (i) processing UNLPs in a restricted area which is not accessible to the public; (ii) requiring blank UNLP booklets to be kept in a locked drawer at all times; (iii) keeping processed UNLPs in a locked drawer until they are signed for upon collection; and (iv) assigning the maintenance of the log book to a custodian who would only release processed UNLPs to officials who have been properly identified or have written permission to collect UNLPs.

25. *DM accepted recommendation 6(i), 6(ii), and 6(iii). DM did not accept recommendation 6(iv), stating that it does not agree to dedicate a single resource to the custodial function since all Passport and Visa Unit staff have been cross-trained and must remain flexible in service support assignments. DM views the single log as a sufficient internal control.*

26. OIOS wishes to clarify its point with reference to role of the custodian. Assigning the responsibility for the log to a custodian establishes better control over the release of UNLPs and accountability. For example, the role of the custodian would be to (i) ensure the safe custody of all UNLP documents that have been processed for collection; (ii) provide assurance that all processed UNLP documents have been accounted for; and (iii) ensure that all UNLPs are collected and signed for by an authorized person before being released from the Travel Unit. As an option, the role of the custodian may be rotated amongst the Travel Unit staff in conjunction with other cross-training duties. OIOS reiterates the need, therefore, to assign the custodial role to a staff member, which may be on a rotational basis, to ensure that only authorized persons collect UNLPs.

27. Recommendation 6 will remain open in the database pending submission of documentation establishing stronger physical controls over blank and processed UNLP documents. Submission of written documentation of the role and responsibility of the custodian is also required.

Controls over the renewal process needs strengthening

28. There are serious weaknesses in the administration of field renewals of UNLPs which can have significant security implications. While the issuance of UNLPs can be processed only through the three issuing offices (UNHQ, UNOG and UNOV), renewals can be processed directly in the field without being recorded in the UNLP centralized database until months later. The renewing of UNLPs by field offices, which do not have adequate systems in place to validate UNLP data, is vulnerable to unauthorized renewals. The renewal process itself is vulnerable to replication, since UNLPs are renewed manually with only a stamp and signature. Renewal safety features, similar to those embedded in the new

issues, have not been adequately addressed in pioneering an enhanced, secure UNLP document. Additionally, TTS is unable to adequately monitor renewals due to the fact that the field offices do not submit renewal information to the issuing offices in a timely manner. The risk of unauthorized renewals going undetected for long periods of time, therefore, is heightened.

29. While DM has placed strong emphasis on controls over new UNLP issues, the controls over UNLP renewals are deficient. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) field offices frequently fail to inform the issuing offices of UNLP renewal transactions processed by them. In such instances, it is difficult for the issuing offices to ensure that the latest UNLP information is entered into the database. Issuing offices have to rely solely on the field offices to submit renewal information and ensure that UNLP renewals are authorized and within the policy guidelines. On the other hand, field offices have limited capacity to verify UNLP data, such as whether staff members have duplicate UNLPs, etc., since they do not have access to the automated UNLP database.

30. An assessment of the trends in UNLP renewals from 1992 to 2006 noted that renewal activities are on the increase. In each of the years between 1992 and 2006, renewal activities represented approximately 93% (36% of total processing workload) of all UNLP requests (i.e., issues and renewals). More significantly, in each of the years between 2000 and 2006, with the exception of 2003 and 2004, UNLP renewal processing exceeded that of new issues by as much as 17%. In 2005 and 2006, renewal processing represented approximately 40% (up from the average of 35% experienced earlier in the decade) of the total UNLP processing workload.

31. Increasing workload for UNLP renewals means that stronger controls need to put in place for effective management and monitoring in future. It is important, therefore, that DM strengthen controls in the area of the UNLP renewal process. The use of enhanced security features in renewed UNLPs and improved information management, including current and complete data to monitor renewal activities, should be required. Without stronger controls, TTS will not be able to determine whether field offices are properly renewing UNLPs.

Recommendations 7 to 9

(7) The Department of Management should implement stronger controls over the renewal process, including enhanced security features and improved information management of renewal transactions to minimize the likelihood of improper renewal of UNLPs and to detect unauthorized renewals in a timely manner.

(8) The Department of Management should require field offices to secure renewal stamps and restrict access to authorized officials only.

(9) The Department of Management should enforce the policy for timely reporting of renewal transactions by all field offices.

32. *DM did not accept recommendation 7, stating that it has had extensive discussions with UNLP manufacturers, JIU, and auditors to devise a system for the renewal of UNLP documents. However, a business solution addressing these constraints needs to be clearly identified before considering possible IT solutions. DM will continue to explore possibilities but notes that any resolution of this issue will come at great expense and the outcome for funding support at this point is uncertain.*

33. OIOS acknowledges the constraints highlighted by DM, but believes that efforts should be pursued to strengthen the controls over the renewal process. OIOS, therefore, reiterates recommendation 7 which will remain open pending submission of documentation of new procedures for strengthening controls over the renewal process.

34. *DM accepted recommendations 8 and 9.* Recommendations 8 and 9 will remain open pending submission of the revised Guide to the Issuance of United Nations Travel Documents, incorporating instructions to the field offices on the safety requirements for renewal stamps and the requirement of all field offices to provide ongoing status information on all UNLPs to the respective duty stations.

Controls over the timely retrieval of UNLPs from separating staff members need improving

35. Another vulnerable area is UNLPs' management is retrieval from separating staff members. In accordance with UNLP policy, staff members who are separating from the Organization are required to return their UNLPs to OCSS for cancellation prior to leaving the Organization. The only exception to this policy is when the separating staff member requests to use the UNLP for his or her official repatriation to their home country. In the latter case, the separating staff member is required to return the UNLP to OCSS for cancellation within 30 days of separation. At UNHQ, non-compliance with this requirement would result in the separating staff member not receiving his or her final paycheck until the UNLP is returned. At UNOG and UNOV a lighter penalty is applied and a smaller amount of the paycheck may be withheld for non-compliance. For example, only \$500 is withheld from the separating staff member's paycheck. The policy is inconsistent and needs to be formalized.

Recommendation 10

(10) The Department of Management should establish a consistent policy on the return of UNLPs by separating staff members and ensure its implementation by all duty stations, field offices, and specialized agencies.

36. *DM accepted recommendation 10, stating that it will strengthen language toward uniform procedures for all UNLP client organizations in the*

revised Guide. Recommendation 10 remains open pending submission of the revised Guide, incorporating stronger language on the UNLP return policies and procedures to be carried out by all offices, departments, and client organizations in collecting UNLPs from separating staff members for cancellation.

Monitoring controls over lost and stolen UNLPs need strengthening

37. Staff members are required to report lost or stolen UNLPs immediately to DSS. Lost or stolen reports are also required to be accompanied by a police report where feasible and appropriate. Such losses are investigated by DSS and reported to the issuing duty station. There is no further requirement for DSS to report lost and stolen UNLP cases to Member States that accept UNLPs for border crossings. Additionally, DSS does not share information with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the international agency that deals with public safety. Therefore, the lost UNLPs may be used by unauthorized persons to enter such countries. It is important that DSS inform Member States and INTERPOL on missing UNLPs in a manner similar to Member States who report the loss of their national passports.

38. OCSS produces a periodic lost and stolen UNLP report based on information obtained from DSS. OCSS does not use the information to analyze unusual patterns of lost or stolen UNLPs and therefore does not identify staff members who report repeated cases of missing UNLPs. DSS also does not perform any review of this information in their investigation. For example, a review of UNLP data from 1992 to 2006 disclosed 85 cases of UNLPs lost more than once by the same staff members.

Recommendations 11 and 12

(11) The Department of Safety and Security should establish close communication with Member States and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) regarding the possible misuse of UNLPs by unauthorized persons crossing international borders. All cases of lost or stolen UNLPs should be reported to INTERPOL, accordingly.

(12) The Department of Management and the Department of Safety and Security should analyze patterns of lost and stolen UNLPs to determine if there are repeated cases of negligence by the same staff members and to suggest an appropriate action to curtail such patterns.

39. *DSS accepted recommendations 11 and 12.* Recommendation 11 will remain open pending submission of the communication framework and the MOU between INTERPOL and DSS. Submission of a written policy requiring the regular monitoring of lost/stolen UNLP activity and the procedures DM and DSS should take to identify, investigate, and resolve any such activity is required for closure of recommendation 12.

C. Management, Monitoring, and Oversight of UNLPs

Roles and responsibilities to manage the risks associated with UNLP management are unclear

40. The overall risks associated with UNLP management are not owned and managed by any department in the Organization. Control over UNLPs is assigned to DM only when they are issued. DM has very little control over UNLPs that are renewed in the field and rely on the field offices to report on their renewal activities for updating the UNLP centralized database. DSS is responsible for the safety and security of the UN complex and are involved in screening UNLPs only to the extent that they are used as staff IDs at UN entrance points to enter the premises. Organizationally, there is a gap in responsibility for (i) the safeguarding of UNLPs, (ii) ensuring that the most updated UNLP information is recorded in the UNLP database, (iii) and reconciling UNLP data with the UNLP inventory in circulation. The security aspects of UNLPs need to be given closer attention to prevent unauthorized persons from having access to them. The safety of the UNLP is better left to the security specialists, who have the expertise, awareness, resources, and infrastructure to monitor new opportunities and threats to the UNLP, detect fraud and abuse, and take corrective action against violators. In view of this, there is a critical need to streamline the responsibility for the safety and security of the UNLPs under a single department.

Recommendations 13 and 14

(13) The Department of Management and the Department of Safety and Security should assign clear roles and responsibilities pertaining to UNLP risk management to address the vulnerabilities of the UNLP to fraud and misuse

(14) The Department of Management and the Department of Safety and Security should develop a risk management policy and periodically conduct risk assessments to identify, monitor, and reduce risks to the UNLP through stronger controls.

41. *DM accepted recommendations 13 and 14.* Recommendations 13 and 14 remain open pending submission of the revised Guide and written risk management policy.

There is a need to increase the use of discrepancy reports generated from the UNLP system

42. Discrepancy reports should be regularly produced and reviewed by management on a consistent basis. These reports could be used to identify errors and reportable issues, including (i) persons who have reported lost UNLPs more than once in a short timeframe, been separated from the organization, but still have active UNLPs in their possession, and been issued more than two active UNLPs; (ii) lost data in the event of corrupted records; and (iii) incorrect entries

and updates in the system. Also, client monitoring reports can be used to monitor field offices for the issuance, renewal and retrieval of UNLPs. At UNOG, management produces monthly statistics reports which are used to identify discrepancies. UNOG also generate “Client Monitoring” reports to monitor the monthly UNLP transactions initiated by certifying officers during a given month. A daily “Work Trace” report is also produced and periodic data integrity checks are performed by UNOG personnel. The only discrepancy report produced at UNHQ is the irregular billing report for the purpose of tracking billings to specialized agencies for issued and cancelled UNLPs during a particular quarter. UNOV does not issue any discrepancy reports, except for standard monthly UNLP reports which do not capture discrepancies.

Recommendation 15

(15) The Department of Management should regularly produce and review exception reports that disclose data discrepancies.

43. *DM accepted recommendation 15, stating that the reports will be incorporated into the reporting module of the new system and will be shared amongst all issuing duty stations. Recommendation 16 remains open pending completion of the new UNLP system and submission of evidence of sample reports included in the reporting module.*

D. Information Technology (IT)

There is a need to develop a single repository for all UNLP information

44. UNLP data is stored, processed, and managed in three separate, but identical databases at the issuing offices. OCSS uploads the information of all issuing offices once monthly through a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) exchange. However, this “information exchange” is limited to UNLP renewal and cancellation data only. The lack of a single platform on which the UNLP data of the individual offices are consolidated into a single database limits management’s ability to generate consolidated reports for all issuing offices. TTS is working towards implementing a centralized UNLP system with real-time interactivity to all the issuing and field offices. However, until the new system is implemented, there is a need to consolidate all UNLP transactions to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and availability of UNLP data. A complete UNLP database is needed to enhance the monitoring of the UNLP operations.

Recommendations 16 and 17

(16) The Department of Management should consolidate all three UNLP databases on a regular basis to ensure that UNLP data is complete, accurate, and available to all the three issuing offices.

(17) The Department of Management should require the Information Technology Service Division to assist the Travel

and Transportation Section of OCSS in consolidating UNLP data as a matter of priority.

45. *DM accepted recommendations 16 and 17.* Recommendations 16 and 17 will remain open pending completion of the consolidation of the three individual databases in the body of the new UNLP system and submission of the ITSD high-level business case study, which incorporates all IT user needs of TTS, the issuing duty stations away from headquarters, and the renewal field offices.

Adequate checks and controls are needed to minimize duplication in the UNLP system

46. In certain circumstances, OCSS issues duplicate UNLPs to staff members for a limited duration of six months. Such duplicates should be given a unique UNLP number that is denoted with a “D” for duplicate in the UNLP system. However, the system allows the processor to enter “false” duplicate entries, such as incorrect staff index numbers, names, dates of birth, etc, when processing regular UNLPs. Staff members, therefore, may incorrectly be issued more than one UNLP that is not a “duplicate”. This is principally due to a lack of adequate IT controls and management review of UNLP data for “false” duplicate entries.

47. For example, although the system authenticates the index number and name of staff input by the data entry clerk and gives a warning if a duplicate entry is being made, the system does not prevent the clerk from incorrectly proceeding with a duplicate entry. For authorized duplicate UNLPs, the system does not require the data entry person to manually enter this information. Additionally, the system does not automatically flag duplicate entries. Currently this is done manually by the data entry clerk who demarcates the “duplicate” box; however, this is not adequate since the data entry person may overlook this step and can proceed with the UNLP transaction unhindered. Due to the lack of controls, tracking unauthorized duplicate entries is difficult and differentiating between valid and invalid duplicate entries is cumbersome. The system also allows the data entry clerk to input “false” personnel information for staff members. Therefore, this also makes it difficult to detect “false” duplicate entries.

48. The UNLP database does not contain accurate and updated information; therefore, it may not be reliable. For example, OIOS found a total of 21,592 UNLP entries in the UNLP database from the period of 1991 - 2001, which had expired but were not cancelled. It was not clear how many of these entries were valid and how many pertained to staff members that had actually separated from the Organization.

Recommendations 18 and 19

(18) The Department of Management should review the UNLP database for “false” duplicate entries and delete all invalid entries.

(19) The Department of Management should implement adequate IT controls over duplicate entries in the new system by forcing the data entry clerk to (i) enter a reason for the duplication and (ii) demarcate the “duplicate box” when processing valid duplicate entry.

49. *DM did not accept recommendation 18, stating that it disagreed with OIOS’ definition of “duplicate”. Under certain conditions, staff members are permitted the issuance of additional UNLPs. For example, a staff member stationed at a hardship duty station, for example, a duty station bordering Israel, may be granted a duplicate UNLP to facilitate travel for official purposes. A unique record associated with the staff member is created, therefore, there are no false duplicates.*

50. OIOS acknowledges DM’s explanation of the need to issue duplicate UNLP documents to staff members serving in hardship places and in other cases. Notwithstanding, there is need to validate all entries marked as duplicate or “D” in the database to ensure that all information entered is accurate. OIOS’ review of the system showed that some entries tagged as duplicate UNLPs had data glitches and inconsistent information. For example, some records contained fictitious staff index numbers, incorrect names, birthdates, etc., of staff members who had been issued duplicates. There was no explanation entered for these inconsistent data. To detect these errors, exception reports should be produced on a regular basis to identify missing data and correct invalid information to ensure data integrity. OIOS therefore reiterates recommendation 18, which will remain open pending submission of exception report highlighting incorrect entries and evidence of database cleanup of such records (correction of invalid data).

51. *DM accepted recommendation 19, stating that IT controls have been incorporated in the new UNLP system to enforce rules over the duplicate entry, which was not possible in the old system. Recommendation 19 remains open pending submission of the test of embedded IT controls over duplicate entries in the new system.*

There is a need to validate data maintained in the UNLP system

52. The UNLP system is not linked to the UN’s Integrated Management Information System (IMIS). Therefore automatic validation of personnel data on UNLP applicants is not performed. OCSS relies on certifying officers to verify this information before certifying and approving UNLP applications. The personnel information of UNLP applicants is then manually input in the UNLP database on this basis. In the New York UNLP database, 159 staff index numbers out of a sample of 104,020 were found for which there were no matching entries in IMIS. Overreliance on certifying officers to verify personnel data could lead to the incorrect issuance or renewal of UNLPs to officials who have already separated from the organization or “ghost” employees. Independent verification of personnel data of all UNLP holders should be periodically done with all Executive Offices and offices away from headquarters? for accuracy.

DM should also consider interfacing the new UNLP database system to the new integrated information system that will be launched in 2009.

Recommendations 20 to 22

(20) The Department of Management should formulate a policy requiring all issuing offices to submit periodic verification of the names and personnel data of all staff holding active UNLPs.

(21) The Department of Management should implement a direct interface between the new centralized UNLP system and the UN's new integrated information management replacing IMIS to validate staff information directly.

(22) The Department of Management should periodically issue reports to the Executive Offices of funds, programmes and specialized agencies that do not use the UN integrated information systems to verify their staff information

53. *DM accepted recommendation 20, stating that it will send a report to each UNLP client organization with a request that they reconcile their data against the active UNLP database. Recommendation 20 remains open pending submission of DM's request to client organizations to reconcile their data against the UNLP database.*

54. *DM disagreed with recommendation 21, stating that it should be noted that UNLP client organizations of the UN system do not provide derivative data to validate their member activities, therefore, Secretariat data would only be a component phase to source HR data. Any linkage or interface with a participating agency enterprise resource planning (ERP) system would be extremely expensive, technically challenging, and would require some measure of security and IT protocol that cannot be addressed in the scope of this audit response. TTS will also bring the issue of a UNLP interface to the new ERP system developers once consultations begin.*

55. *OIOS issued recommendation 21 to address weaknesses in UNLP data management specific to the Secretariat. DM did not address the recommendation, which is reiterated. Recommendation 21 will remain open pending submission of feasibility assessment to interface the new UNLP system with the planned ERP system.*

56. *DM accepted recommendation 22, stating that it will send a report to each UNLP client organization to reconcile their data against the active UNLP database. Recommendation 22 remains open in OIOS' database pending submission of DM's report sent to each UNLP client organization to facilitate their reconciliation of data to that of the active UNLP database. Submission of a written policy requiring this reconciliation procedure to be done periodically is also required.*

There is need to ensure that the UNLP system enforces UNLP issuance and renewal rules

57. The UNLP system does not support certain rules required for the issuance UNLPs to staff. For example, the system does not automatically detect and flag data entries where the contract expiration date is less than the UNLP expiration date. Additionally, the audit found that there were 14,686 entries out of a sample of 104,020 in the New York UNLP database that did not have any appointment expiry date at all. Additionally, there were also 2,205 entries where the renewal expiration date was later than the appointment expiry date. In the case of the latter, the system permits the data entry clerk to leave the field for the appointment expiry date blank.

58. DM stated that these entries related to staff holding permanent contracts and therefore no expiration dates were entered into the database. DM also explained that, in those cases where UNLP entries show expiration dates later than contractual dates, this is allowed under the rules. Pursuant to UNLP rules, staff members are permitted to use their UNLPs up to 30 days after separating from their organizations. Notwithstanding, it should be required that each UNLP entry bears an expiry date, including UNLPs belonging to permanent staff members. All expiration dates should be no later than the allowable 30 days subsequent to the staff member's end of duration of service in accordance with the rules.

59. Given the security concerns surrounding the issuance and renewal of UNLPs, stronger controls should be established to ensure data integrity, reliability, and security. Some other examples are the need to prevent the input of invalid data of UNLP expiry dates longer than ten (10) years and renewal dates longer than five (5) years. Furthermore, there are no automatic checks in the UNLP system which would prevent the issuance of UNLPs to UN consultants holding SSA contracts. The auditors did not verify the data in this regard. However, there is a risk that such discrepancies may occur if proper controls are not put in place.

60. The system should force the user to make selections from pre-established dropdown lists containing duty stations, certifying officers, etc. For example, 8,147 entries out of the 13,026 entries in the UNOV UNLP database have the entry "Unknown" in the duty station field. The system permits the data entry person to manually input the renewal officer's name. There is no control in place to prevent the entry person from inputting an unauthorized name in this field and the likelihood of the issuing office detecting an incorrect entry on a timely basis is low. Another example showed that UNLPs dating back as far as 12 years indicate the status "active" in the UNLP database even though the longest expiry date of a UNLP is five years. The audit found a total of 21,592 such UNLP entries (17,153 from New York database, 3,274 from Geneva database and 1,165 from Vienna database) in the UNLP database from the period 1991 – 2001 in active status.

Recommendations 23 and 24

(23) The Department of Management should strengthen controls in the UNLP information system to ensure that all relevant information is entered accurately and only once in order to maintain the quality of the data. Inaccurate data should be flagged and removed. A written policy establishing validation rules and the correction of inaccurate or obsolete data entered as a result of human error should be developed. Adequate controls should be put in place to ensure that errors are captured in a timely manner. Exception reports highlighting erroneous data should also be generated on a regular basis for review. Errors should be timely identified, investigated, and resolved.

(24) The Department of Management should clean up the UNLP database to resolve and clear existing discrepancies and errors.

61. *DM accepted recommendation 23. Recommendation 23 remains open in the database pending completion of the new UNLP system and OIOS' assessment of the controls. A written policy requiring system administrators to conduct regular monitoring of the system to ensure that all relevant information is entered accurately and only once is also required for closure of recommendation 24.*

62. *DM did not accept recommendation 24, stating that in the new design of the UNLP database, prescribed dropdown menus and other features are incorporated into the system. This includes information regarding certifying officers and simultaneously displays the specimen signature of the approved Certifying Officer. DM also believes that it is unethical practice to delete records from the database which are tied to UNLPs that have been issued. DM does not change a record except through the proper channel of amendments.*

63. OIOS notes DM's response concerning the elimination of records, "except through the proper channel of amendments". However, given the context of the recommendation, OIOS re-emphasizes the importance that DM should ensure all data entered is accurate and complete and entered only once in order to maintain the quality of the data. Inaccurate data should be flagged and removed. A written policy establishing validation rules and the correction of inaccurate or obsolete data entered as a result of human error should be developed. Adequate controls should be put in place to ensure that errors are captured in a timely manner. Exception reports highlighting erroneous data should also be generated on a regular basis for review. Errors should be timely identified, investigated, and resolved.

64. Recommendation 24 is reiterated and remains open pending submission of documentation showing the steps taken to validate data and correct errors and obsolete data in the UNLP database.

There is need to establish change management procedures

65. Technical changes to the UNLP system are made on an “as needed” basis. The changes made to the system are not documented and maintained by the system administrator. In addition, there is no documentary evidence to ensure that all changes made are approved by management and tested thoroughly before being implemented. Lack of IT change management procedures can result in system errors and lead to the incorrect processing of information.

Recommendation 25

(25) The Department of Management should ensure that all changes to the UNLP system are made in accordance with proper IT change management procedures which require the changes to be approved, tested, and documented prior to their implementation.

66. *DM accepted this recommendation.* Recommendation 25 remains open pending submission of documentation of change management procedures for revisions, upgrades, etc. of the new UNLP system.

The approval process for access to the UNLP system needs strengthening

67. In all UNLP issuing offices, the approval process for acquiring access to the UNLP system is done on an informal basis (usually verbally) and is not adequately documented. Prudent security administration requires that written approval of users is first granted. Lack of a written approval policy for granting user access to the system may lead to unauthorized access, which in turn could lead to unauthorized changes to the data.

Recommendation 26

(26) The Department of Management should restrict access to the UNLP system to only authorized users relative to their official roles due to the sensitivity of UNLP data and security concerns associated with UNLPs. It should be ensured that access to the system is given only on written approval from the Chief of the Travel Unit.

68. *DM accepted the recommendation.* Recommendation 26 remains open in the database pending submission of the user access authorization form, which should be duly approved by the Chief of the Travel Unit. Submission of a written policy on the level of access assigned to each user in conjunction with their roles is also required.

There is a need to develop user activity reports to improve monitoring controls

69. User activity reports are not generated for management review. Such reports will provide an audit trail to track UNLP activity, monitor productivity levels, monitor records for compliance, and ensure adherence to applicable data

security policies and procedures. Given the security concerns associated with the issuance of UNLPs, it is important to periodically review the audit trail of staff accessing the system to see if any unauthorized changes have been made. Lack of a proper audit trail could weaken management's ability to detect inappropriate changes made in the system.

Recommendation 27

(27) The Department of Management should produce user activity reports and review them to identify any unauthorized data changes.

70. *DM accepted this recommendation, stating that the new system has the ability to produce user activity reports and will contain a detailed audit trail, as well as reports that will be periodically reviewed.* Recommendation 27 remains open in the database pending completion of the new UNLP system and submission of the written guidelines for producing activity reports.

There is a need to develop an IT User Manual for the UNLP system

71. TTS has produced and disseminated general desk procedures that guide the issuance and renewal of blue and red UN Laissez Passers. But there is no user manual in place, which can guide the user, step by step, on how to use the UNLP system. The lack of user manuals could lead to the incorrect application of the UNLP system, thus leading to data inaccuracies and errors and inefficiency. System documentation describing the parameters of the UNLP system, such as the structure of fields, connectivity between the various tables templates and scripts have not been in place. Lack of system documentation can result in incorrect system modifications, in turn compromising data integrity.

Recommendations 28 and 29

(28) The Department of Management should develop a comprehensive IT User Manual, incorporating screenshots of all UNLP modules, for the effective usage of the UNLP system. The User Manual should be distributed to all the UNLP issuing offices.

(29) The Department of Management should establish detailed system documentation of the UNLP system, which describes the parameters of the system such as the field structure, connectivity between various tables, and a description of all scripts used.

72. *DM accepted recommendations 28 and 29.* Recommendations 28 and 29 remain open pending submission of the new IT manual and a written policy requiring the update of system documentation of the UNLP system with each new release.

There is a need to ensure that a complete business analysis is done for the new centralized UNLP system to correct the gaps in the current system

73. ITSD is currently performing a business analysis for the new centralized UNLP system. The business analysis will assess the feasibility of delivering real-time connectivity to field offices and other enhanced capabilities. However, the business analysis is focused on the immediate need of consolidation of the current three databases with insufficient emphasis being placed on correcting the existing gaps in the current version. There is a need to identify and resolve these gaps in the business analysis phase to ensure that adequate controls are put into the new system.

Recommendation 30

(30) The Department of Management should conduct a full gap analysis of the current system to identify all control deficiencies before embarking on the new system.

74. *DM accepted recommendation 30.* Recommendation 30 remains open in the database pending submission of ITSD's gap analysis of the existing system and control configuration for the new system to ensure that gaps are mitigated.

There is a need to consider interfacing the UNLP system with DSS' access control system

75. In late 2006, DSS installed a new access control system (ACS) at UNHQ. The new system introduced new technology that reads the IDs of staff members accessing the UN complex. However, no provision has been made for UNLPs that are used for entering the UN. If the policy to use UNLPs as staff IDs continues to be supported by the UN Administration, the need to enable the ACS to read the machine-readable zone of UNLPs to effectuate an equal level of security for staff members using them as access documents should be addressed. The installation of compatible optical readers that feeds into the ACS can strengthen the screening of UNLPs at UN entry points, allowing only valid UNLP holders access to the premises. In those offices away from headquarters that do not yet have ACS technology, access to the online, real-time UNLP database should be provided to enable DSS security officers in the field for verification purposes. Until such interfaces are developed, however, DM should provide all DSS offices with real-time, read only access to the UNLP system.

Recommendations 31 and 32

(31) The Department of Management should consider interfacing the new UNLP centralized database with Department of Safety and Security's access control system to ensure that only authorized officials are granted access to UN premises.

(32) The Department of Management should provide the Department of Safety and Security with real-time, read-only

access to the UNLP system until an interface to the access control system is developed.

76. *DM accepted recommendations 31 and 32.* Recommendations 31 and 32 remain open in the database pending submission of the feasibility study, including technical capability, cost, and timing, for interfacing the UNLP centralized database with the access control system. Submission of evidence granting DSS “read-only” access to the active consolidated UNLP database is also required.

There is a need to ensure that business continuity is achieved in the new centralized UNLP system during each planned phase

77. The development of the new UNLP system will take place in three phases. Phase I, which is currently being implemented, entails the establishment of daily synchronization of the databases amongst the issuing offices of New York, Geneva and Vienna. Phase II will entail the centralization of the real-time UNLP system, which will reside in the UNHQ server and be accessible to UNOG and UNOV. In Phase III, a fully functional system that can be accessed by all issuing duty stations and field offices through web interface will be incorporated. Phases I and II are being developed and implemented by a lone technical staff member at the G-6 level assigned by TTS in New York.

78. ITSD’s role in the first two phases is limited to providing the technical infrastructure and to resolve technical problems involving File Transfer Protocol (FTP), a system used to connect two or more computers over the Internet, network performance and server issues as needed. ITSD will be fully responsible for Phase III and initial planning for this phase is currently being done. However, ITSD is not sufficiently involved in the initial phases of the new UNLP system. As a result, there may be some gap exposures that have not been addressed by the TTS technical staff. Furthermore, the limited involvement of ITSD in Phases I and II may lead to a duplication of efforts in designing the system, wasted resources due to an incompatible design, and unidentified gaps in all phases that could potentially hinder ITSD’s ability to deliver a complete end-to-end system on schedule in Phase III. In the event that ITSD decides to build on the platform developed in Phase II, there is a risk that unidentified defects can be carried over to the final phase of the system development.

Recommendation 33

(33) The Department of Management, in order to avoid gaps and ensure business continuity, should assign Information Technology Support Division to play a leading role in the design and implementation of all phases of the new UNLP system.

79. *DM did not accept with recommendation 33, stating that ITSD is aware of the planned implementation of the upgrade of the UNLP database. The ITSD business analysis has considered the aspects of the first two phases of this plan.*

ITSD will also include the UNLP project in its work plan provided funds are made available to support the initiative.

80. OIOS concurs that ITSD consulted with TTS in the design of Phases I and II on a limited basis, but does not agree that ITSD's involvement had been significant in contributing to the final product (Phase III) at the time of the audit. ITSD had informed OIOS that it would consider the TTS interim IT solutions (Phase I and Phase II), but it was not certain that these prototypes would be useful in designing the final ITSD-designed centralized UNLP system.

81. Given the importance of developing an IT support system that will enable TTS to effectively and efficiently manage UNLP information and reduce opportunities for misuse or abuse of UNLP documents, it is essential that DM gives the new UNLP system high priority. Adequate resources should be designated to building out the new system to ensure its successful and timely completion. OIOS reiterates recommendation 33 and will keep it open in its database pending submission of ITSD's business analysis identifying detailed, defined requirements and complete detailed specifications for the new UNLP system.

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

82. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of the Department of Management for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	C/O ¹	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ²
1	O	Submission of the updated Guide.	October 2007
2	O	Submission of the new user manual for OIOS review.	End 2007
3	O	Submission of signed MOUs by client organizations.	Not Provided
4	O	Submission of the documentation of DSS' risk assessment	Mid-2007
5	C	Action Completed	Implemented, July 2007
6	O	Submission of documentation establishing stronger physical controls over blank and processed UNLP documents. Submission of written documentation of the role and responsibility of the custodian is also required.	(i) End 2007 (ii) Implemented, May 2007 (iii) Implemented, May 2007 (iv) Not Provided
7	O	Submission of documentation of new procedures for strengthening controls over the renewal process.	Not Provided
8	O	Submission of the revised Guide to the Issuance of United Nations Travel Documents, incorporating instructions to the field offices on the safety requirements for renewal stamps.	End 2007
9	O	Submission of the revised Guide to the Issuance of United Nations Travel Documents, incorporating the requirement of all field offices to provide ongoing status information on all UNLPs to the respective duty stations.	End 2007
10	O	Submission of the revised Guide, incorporating stronger language on the UNLP return policy and procedures to be carried out by all offices, departments, and client organizations in collecting UNLPs from separating staff members for cancellation.	End 2007
11	O	Submission of the communication framework and the MOU.	End 2007
12	O	Submission of a written policy requiring the regular monitoring of lost/stolen UNLP activity and the procedures DM and DSS should take to identify, investigate, and resolve any such activity	End 2007
13	O	Submission of the revised Guide.	End 2007
14	O	Submission of the written risk management policy.	End 2007
15	O	Completion of the new UNLP system and submission of evidence of sample reports included in the reporting module.	End 2007
16	O	Completion of the consolidation of the three individual databases in the body of the new UNLP system.	End 2007
17	O	Submission of the ITSD high-level business case study, which incorporates all IT user needs of TTS, the issuing duty stations away from headquarters, and the renewal field offices.	End 2007
18	O	Submission of exception report highlighting incorrect entries and evidence of database cleanup of such records (correction of invalid data).	Not Provided
19	O	Submission of the test of embedded IT controls over duplicate entries in the new system.	End 2007
20	O	Submission of DM's request to client organizations to reconcile their data against the UNLP database.	End 2007
21	O	Submission of feasibility assessment to interface the new UNLP system with the planned ERP system.	Not Provided
22	O	Submission of DM's report sent to each UNLP client organization to facilitate their reconciliation of data to that of the active UNLP database.	End 2007

Recom. no.	C/O ¹	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ²
		Submission of a written policy requiring this reconciliation procedure to be done periodically is also required.	
23	O	Completion of the new SQL system and OIOS' assessment of the controls. A written policy requiring system administrators to conduct regular monitoring of the system to ensure that all relevant information is entered accurately and only once is also required for closure of the recommendation.	End 2007
24	O	Submission of documentation showing the steps taken to validate data and correct errors and obsolete data in the UNLP database.	Not Provided
25	O	Submission of documentation of change management procedures for revisions, upgrades, etc. of the new UNLP system.	End 2007
26	O	Submission of the user access authorization form, which should be duly approved by the Chief of the Travel Unit. Submission of a written policy on the level of access assigned to each user in conjunction with their roles is also required.	End 2007
27	O	Completion of the new UNLP system and submission of the written guidelines for producing activity reports.	End 2007
28	O	Submission of the new IT manual.	End 2007
29	O	Submission of a written policy requiring the update of system documentation of the UNLP system with each new release.	End 2007
30	O	Submission of ITSD's gap analysis of the existing system and control configuration for the new system to ensure that gaps are mitigated.	Implemented, May 2007
31	O	Submission of the feasibility study, including technical capability, cost, and timing, for interfacing the UNLP centralized database with the access control system.	End 2007
32	O	Submission of evidence granting DSS "read-only" access to the active consolidated UNLP database is also required. Written guidelines on usage of the UNLP database by DSS personnel in connection with the authentication UNLPs at UN entry ports is also required.	Q1 2008
33	O	Submission of ITSD's business analysis identifying detailed, defined requirements and complete detailed specifications for the new UNLP system.	Not Provided

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by client in response to recommendations. "Implemented" where recommendation is closed; date given by the client

UNITED NATIONS



OIOS Client Satisfaction Survey

Audit of: Management of United Nations Liassez Passers

(AH2006/513/10)

	1	2	3	4	5
By checking the appropriate box, please rate:	Very Poor	Poor	Satisfactory	Good	Excellent
1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a manager.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Professionalism of the audit staff (demeanour, communication and responsiveness).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. The quality of the Audit Report in terms of:					
• Accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Clarity and conciseness;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Balance and objectivity;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Timeliness.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. The extent to which the auditors considered your comments.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please add any further comments you may have on the audit process to let us know what we are doing well and what can be improved.

Name: _____ Title: _____ Date: _____

*Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please send the completed survey as soon as possible to:
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