



AUD-II /01060/06

30 January 2006

TO: Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna

FROM: Egbert C. Kaltenbach, Director
Internal Audit Division II
Office of Internal Oversight Services

SUBJECT: **Audit of UNOV Security and Safety Management (AE2005/321/02)**

1. I am pleased to submit the final report on the audit of UNOV Security and Safety Management, which was conducted in September 2005 in Vienna, Austria by Ms. June Tan and Mr. Chunlin Tang.

2. A draft of the report was shared with Mr. Franz Baumann, the Deputy Director-General of UNOV and Ms. Diana Russler, the Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) on 12 December 2005, whose comments, which were received in January 2006, are reflected in italics in this final report.

3. I am pleased to note that most of the audit recommendations contained in the final Audit Report have been accepted and that UNOV has initiated their implementation. The table in paragraph 61 of the report identifies those recommendations, which require further action to be closed. I wish to draw your attention to recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 which OIOS considers to be of critical importance.

4. I would appreciate if you could provide me with an update on the status of implementation of the audit recommendations not later than 31 May 2006. This will facilitate the preparation of the twice yearly report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of recommendations, required by General Assembly resolution 48/218B.

5. Please note that OIOS is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. I therefore kindly request that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, complete the attached client satisfaction survey form and return it to me under confidential cover.

6. Thank you for your cooperation.

Attachment: Client Satisfaction Survey Form

cc: Mr. D. Veness, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security (by e-mail)
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United Nations
Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division II

Audit Report

Audit of UNOV Security and Safety Management
(AE2005/321/02)
Report No: E05/R17

- **Report date: 30 January 2006**
- **Auditors: Huiming June Tan, Chunlin Tang**



**Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division II**

AUDIT OF UNOV SECURITY AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT
(AE2005/321/02)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of the United Nations Office at Vienna Security and Safety Management. The audit covered activities with expenditure of approximately \$32 million for the biennium 2004-2005, out of which the cost attributable to United Nations was approximately \$8 million. Overall, UNOV Security and Safety Section (UNOV SSS) had adequate arrangements in place to provide security services in compliance with its mission. The representatives from IAEA, UNIDO and CTBTO expressed their satisfaction with the security services provided by UNOV SSS. However, OIOS noted a number of areas in which arrangements could be improved to provide more efficient and effective security services.

Security management system

- The Designated Official (DO) has not established a country level security management team (SMT) for Austria and the crisis management for UNOV and all other organizations in Vienna International Centre (VIC) was incomplete. Whilst the Security Advisory Group appeared to be similar to the SMT, there were distinct differences in these two bodies particularly in the roles and decision-making powers of the DO.

Initiatives to strengthen and unify the security management system

- There had been little change in the security management at UNOV after the establishment of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). DSS had not established common security policies and the reporting lines for the DO and the Chief of Security required further clarification.
- Under H-MOSS requirements, UNOV proposed to relocate the commissary from the VIC. UNOV is unable to implement this proposal without the agreement of other international organizations in VIC. Furthermore, UNOV has been unsuccessful so far, in implementing some mitigating measures identified to reduce the risks associated with the commissary in VIC. This issue had remained unresolved at the time of the audit.
- The expected completion date for the H-MOSS projects had been continuously revised from the initial date of December 2004 to June 2006 and the implementation rate for H-MOSS projects was only 28 percent in August 2005. The main reasons for this were the somewhat slow reaction of the Austrian authorities; the lack of continuity in the leadership at UNOV SSS during the past two years; the co-ordination challenges among the many parties involved in the implementation of the projects; and the overestimation of costs in the approved budget.

Organizational structure

- UNOV SSS planned to change its organizational structure following the significant increase in the number of staffing from 90 to 155. The new structure, however, was based on existing operational requirements and consideration was not given to the new security posting requirements as stated in the H-MOSS, such as the establishment of layered security perimeters within the VIC.

Human resource management

- Security Officers that worked on official United Nations holidays were not paid overtime. They were merely given credits for time-off at single rate.
- UNOV SSS did not establish training directives and policies. There was no assurance that training opportunities for Security Officers were adequate. No physical assessment trainings were conducted and therefore, no assurance could be taken that all Security Officers were physically fit to perform their duties. Moreover, the Security Officers at UNOV did not undergo periodical testing for use of illegal drugs and/or controlled substances.

Provision of security and safety services

- There was no consolidated policy that governed the condition of access to VIC. Data input controls to ensure information integrity in the Pass system were inadequate. Out of a total of 16,500 ground passes in circulation, 4,909 ground passes had no expiry dates and 539 ground passes had an expiration period beyond the recommended period of five years.
- UNOV had no approved procedures to govern the conduct of security investigations. Whilst three of the six Security Officers responsible for security investigations have some prior experience as Police Officers, none of them received any formal investigation training after they joined the United Nations.
- The 610 Fire Wardens in VIC did not receive any practical training in first aid skills or basic fire fighting knowledge due to a lack of equipment.

Asset management and weapons control

- UNOV SSS needed to improve its weapons control. During a surprise count, OIOS found four cases of firearms being issued without the required weapons permit. In addition, UNOV had not taken any steps to ensure that the 23 firearms issued to Security Officers on missions during the last five years are still in UN custody.
- UNOV SSS did not maintain records to monitor the quantity of ammunitions on hand.
- No logs were maintained to account for the use of the sensitive surveillance equipment and there was a lack a segregation of duties between the user and the custodian of the equipment.

January 2006

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report discusses the results of an OIOS audit of the United Nations Security and Safety Management. The audit was conducted in September 2005, in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
2. UNOV Security and Safety Section (UNOV SSS), a section under the Division for Management of UNOV, operates as part of common services and is responsible for security and safety services for UNOV as well as other Vienna International Centre (VIC) based international organizations (VBOs) comprising of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
3. Total resource requirements for UNOV SSS for the biennium ended 2003 and 2005 are as per the table below.

Table 1

All figures in \$'000


Description	Total Expenditure 2002-2003 (note 1)	Budget for 2004 –2005 (note 2)
Regular UNSSS operations requirements	12,021.6	16,525.7
Supplementary budget approved for security enhancement to be in compliance with Headquarters Minimum Operating Security Standards (H-MOSS)	-	16,018.0
Total resource requirements for UNSSS	12,021.6	32,543.7

Note 1: IMIS expenditure report for the biennium ended 31 December 2003.

Note 2: Summary of appropriation for 2004-2005 prepared by UNOV Budget Section based budget approved by General Assembly after recosting.

4. The financing of these total requirements are shared among UNOV and the other three VBOs based on agreed cost sharing ratios as shown in the chart below. The net costs attributable to the United Nations amount to \$7.7 million or 23 percent of the total cost.

Chart 1: Agreed cost sharing ratios for security expenditure for 2004 and 2005.



5. As of September 2005, the approved staffing table for UNOV SSS included a P-5 supported by two Professional staff and 152 General Service (GS) staff.

6. The findings and recommendations contained in this report have been discussed during the exit conferences held between 28 September 2005 and 30 September 2005 with the Deputy Director-General (DDG) of UNOV and Chief of Security.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

7. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy of UNOV's arrangements for security and safety management of its staff, assets and premises. This included assessing:

- a) the efficiency and effectiveness of UNOV's arrangements for security and safety of its staff, assets and premises, which includes its relations with Department of Safety and Security (DSS); and
- b) whether the security and safety services are being carried out in compliance with UN regulations and rules and relevant standards.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

8. The audit focused on the adequacy of UNOV's arrangements for managing security and safety during the biennium 2004-2005, including the implementation of Headquarters Minimum Operating Security Standards (H-MOSS).

9. The audit activities included a review and assessment of existing operating procedures and the compliance thereof, interviews with staff, analysis of applicable data and a review of the available documents and other relevant records.

IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Security management system

(a) Designated Official

10. According to the United Nations Security Operations Manual, the Designated Official (DO) is the key person responsible for the United Nations security management system in a country. The DO is directly accountable to the Secretary-General (SG) through the United Nations Security Co-ordinator (now the Under Secretary-General for the Department of Safety and Security), for ensuring the security and safety of United Nations personnel. The DO for Austria is the DDG of UNOV. Following the statement by the SG in his report of October 2004¹ that “*the Directors-General or Executive Secretaries will serve as designated officials, working in close co-operation with their Chiefs of Administration*”, DSS proposed the Director-General (DG) of UNOV to be appointed as the DO for Austria. As there are three DGs and one Executive Secretary (ES) heading the organizations at the VIC, the DG of UNOV agreed to be the DO and requested that his appointment be made in consultation with other DGs and ES of the VBOs and that DSS provide him with the necessary training. At the time of the audit, DSS had not yet acted on the DG's requests and therefore, the DDG remained the DO for Austria.

¹ Paragraph 59 pf the Report of the Secretary General (A/59/365)

11. The DO stated that he did not receive any training, either from UNSECOORD or DSS. OIOS noted the same condition occurring in Geneva and The Hague duty stations where the DOs were not provided with any form of training. The DO for Austria did not appoint an alternate DO in his/her absence and had not formed a Country Security Management Team (SMT) as required under the UN Security Operations Manual. However, he initiated the crisis management plan and participated in the formation of a Security Advisory Group. *DSS stated that, with the assistance from the Chiefs of Security, DSS is in the process of identifying training dates for the DOs, envisioned to be in early 2006.*

(b) Security management team

12. The Consultative Committee on Common Services in Vienna (CCCS)², of which the DO is also a member, established the Security Advisory Group (SAG), a subsidiary body focusing on security issues in VIC, in January 2004. Whilst the SAG may appear to be similar to a SMT, there are distinct differences between these two bodies as summarized below.

Table 2: Differences between SMT and SAG

SMT	SAG
SMT members consist of the DO, the Deputy or Alternate DO, heads of agencies (as determined by the DO), a security advisor, a medical officer, and an internationally recruited staff member familiar with local conditions and/or the local language and a staff member with a legal background. ³	SAG members consist of the DO and representative of each VBOs (nominated by each Organization) and the Chief of Security as an ex-officio member.
To advise and assist the DO in country wide security management	To advise and give recommendation to CCCS on security management issues within VIC.
Chaired by the Designated Official	Chairmanship on an annual rotating basis. The representative from CTBTO was the chairman in 2005.
Decision making powers lies with DO	Decision making powers lies with CCCS

13. In the absence of a SMT, the SAG provides a forum to discuss security issues with the stakeholders and plays an important role in monitoring the implementation of H-MOSS security enhancements projects. *The DO agreed with OIOS that the SAG is not a substitute for a SMT and therefore undertook to establish it. DSS agreed to this in December 2005.*

(c) Co-operation with Host Country Government

14. UNOV maintained a good relationship with its host country, Austria and reported that the Austrian authorities were co-operative and responded swiftly to UN requests for the reinforcement of policing outside VIC as well as at the residences of the four Vienna based USGs as and when required, the sharing of intelligence and joint trainings. However, the Austrian authorities had been less forthcoming in implementing VBO's requests in conjunction with security strengthening projects under H-MOSS. These included requests for traffic diversion, closing of public roads and a public car park adjacent to the VIC, and moving further away the bus terminal, which is near the VIC.

² CCCS is a joint consultative machinery that oversees the management and administration of common services in VIC.

³ Ideal composition of SMT as stated in the United Nations Security Operations Manual.

(d) Crisis management plan

15. UNOV SSS had prepared a crisis management plan which, as of the date of audit, only for UNOV with no involvement of other VBOs. OIOS found the plan incomplete. Alternate members were not included for the Vienna Crisis Operations Group (VCOG) and the location where VCOG would direct crisis management operations had not been identified in the event that the VIC cannot be used.

Recommendation:

➤ UNOV 's Designated Official should, with the assistance of the Chief of Security and the Security Advisory Group, appoint representatives from the various agencies in VIC to be members of Vienna Crisis Operations Group; and with the co-operation of the Host Country, identify the location to direct crisis management operations in the event that the VIC cannot be used. (Rec. 01)

16. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and will implement it by July 2006.* OIOS will consider the recommendation implemented when it receives a copy of the complete and updated crisis management plan.

B. Mandate

17. The ST/SGB/2000/5 on the organization of the United Nations Office at Vienna stated that the Division for Management, UNOV is responsible to provide security and safety services to users, property and buildings in VIC. This statement remains valid even after the establishment of DSS in January 2005 as the SG stated in his report⁴ that “*DSS is to provide common security policies and standards*” and “*day to day decision making on matters of security will remain decentralised. Security decisions regarding Secretariat personnel in Geneva and Vienna will be made by the Directors-General, with the advice of the Chief of Security and Safety at the duty station.*”

C. Initiatives to strengthen and unify the security management system**(a) Establishment of DSS**

18. General Assembly resolution 59/276 requested the creation of DSS in January 2005 to strengthen and unify the United Nations' security management system (SMS). The SG's report of 11 October 2004 outlined the role of DSS and reporting lines of the UN's SMS. In July 2005, DSS issued guidelines on the reporting and accountability structure for Offices Away from Headquarters (OAHs) as well as for the Regional Commissions. The status at UNOV as of September 2005, following these changes, is summarized in the table below.

4 Paragraph 37 of SG report dated 11 October 2004 (A/59/365)

Table 3

SG report of October 2004⁵	DSS guidelines issued in July 2005	Status at UNOV as of September 2005
The SG report did not state the reporting lines for the Chief of Security and Safety Section.	The Chief of Security and Safety is responsible for the day to day operations and reports to the DG or the Executive Secretary, unless otherwise specified;	The first reporting officer for the Chief of Security was the DDG of UNOV.
DSS is to provide common security policies and standards to enable the United Nations to make a quantum leap in the quality and scope of its arrangement [paragraph 45 of SG's report];	The Director, Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services in DSS provides overall policy direction and technical support to Chiefs of Security and Safety at OAHs. S/he monitors implementation and acts as alternate first reporting officer for Chief of Security;	DSS had not established common security policies and standards. The Chief of Security did not have an alternate first reporting officer.
The DO will report to the Directorate of Security on security related matters regarding all UN civilian personnel in the country and any disagreement would be brought to the attention of the SG, who would make the final decision; and [paragraph 39 of SG's report]	The DG at UN offices at Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna and the Executive Secretaries of the four Regional Commissions and the USG/DSS are directly and jointly accountable to the SG for security arrangements. In cases where the Executive Head of the headquarters is concurrently appointed as the DO, the above reporting line and specific responsibility for the headquarters staff and officers remain unaffected.	DSS had not implemented its proposal for the DG of UNOV to be DO for Austria. The reporting lines for the DO and DG of UNOV on security related matters remain unchanged.
The Directorate of Security will designate a senior security officer as Country Security Adviser. The Country Security Adviser will report directly to the DO and through the DO to the Directorate of Security. This will unify all country security programmes under a single individual, providing unity of command and clarity of accountability. [Paragraph 40 of SG's report]	The Chief of Security and Safety may also serve as the Chief Security Advisor to the DO. In this dual function, the Chief of Security and Safety/Chief Security Adviser will report to the Director of Headquarters Security and Safety Services and to the Director of Regional Operations in the DSS, as appropriate. In cases, where the Chief of Security is not the Chief Security Advisor for the country, specific guidance will be provided to clarify reporting lines at the duty station.	The DO has recommended to DSS to appoint the Chief, UNOV SSS as the Chief Security Adviser for Austria. However, DSS has neither confirmed nor rejected this proposal. Thus, there was no UN Chief Security Advisor for Austria at the time of audit.

19. As indicated above, the DSS guidelines suggested that the Chief of Security had to report to a number of persons. They included the DG of UNOV, the DO (since the DO for Austria is not the DG of UNOV), the Director, Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services in DSS and possibly the Director of Regional Operations in DSS, if the Chief of Security is appointed as the Chief Security Adviser for Austria. There were too many persons that the Chief of Security had to report and could limit his ability to respond as needed, resulting in a lack of unity of command and clarity in respect of accountability. UNOV stated that DSS did not respond in a timely and authoritative manner on their requests for guidance.

⁵ Report of Secretary General – Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/59365)

Recommendation:

- Department of Safety and Security should to:
 - (a) provide timely, comprehensive and authoritative guidance to UNOV Security and Safety Section;
 - (b) settle the determination as to who is the Designated Official and Chief Security Adviser for Austria; and
 - (c) limit the number of persons to whom the Chief of Security reports to. (Rec. 02)

20. *DSS sought clarification on instances where requests for guidance were not met in a timely fashion and stated that the designation of the DO and the Chief Security Advisor are forthcoming. With regards to Recommendation 2(c), this matter will be made clearer in the finalized reporting guidelines.* OIOS will record the recommendation as implemented when we receive confirmation from UNOV that DSS had responded timely to requests for guidance, notification of the designation of the DO and Chief Security Adviser as well as a copy of reporting guidelines from DSS limiting the number of persons to whom Chief of Security reports to.

21. Overall, OIOS was of the opinion that there had been little change in security management at UNOV after the establishment of DSS. The major changes at UNOV were mainly derived from the implementation of security strengthening projects in conjunction with H-MOSS.

(b) Enhanced H-MOSS

22. UNOV SSS received a supplementary budget of \$16 million to strengthen security arrangements in VIC, following the upgrade of H-MOSS in 2004. These amounts were funded by the four VBOs according to the agreed cost-sharing ratios as shown in Chart 1 above.

23. In 2004, SAG contracted, through UNIDO, an external security-consulting firm to assess as to whether there were any omissions in UNOV's proposal in their response to H-MOSS as well as the relevance of UNOV's planned projects. Members of SAG and the Chief of Security reviewed the report and concluded that it largely validated their own analysis and subsequently made little changes to the H-MOSS plan. SAG maintained that the report was very useful as it provided a sound basis for discussions with the Austrian Authorities. In particular, urging them to take quick action to co-operate with UNOV in implementing H-MOSS projects. The suggestions and comments in the report that were not included in the H-MOSS proposals are summarized in Annex 1 of this report. The reasons for not implementing these aspects of the H-MOSS were not documented.

24. The most controversial issue among the VBOs in implementing H-MOSS appears to be UNOV's proposal to relocate the commissary, that is considered not essential to UN business, from the VIC. UNOV SSS was concerned that the heavy traffic, customers' and delivery vehicles, and the large number of non-VBO staff members that received access rights to VIC, including OPEC and OSCE personnel, present security risks. The other VBOs, including the IAEA, who is managing the commissary, disagreed with the proposal. The IAEA Commissary Advisory Committee expressed its concern that the relocation of the commissary may create a second "soft target", unless it was protected in the same degree as the VIC. The SAG explored

measures to mitigate the threats including recommendations made by the external security-consulting firm to have a loading/unloading site for commercial deliveries outside VIC. However, the negotiations with the Austrian authorities to provide a site near VIC were unsuccessful. No agreement had been reached as yet among the VBOs on the relocation of the commissary and UNOV faced difficulties in implementing the identified mitigating measures.

Recommendation:

- The Designated Official for Austria needs to assess the residual risks resulting from the on-site commissary and report to the Secretary-General through the Department of Safety and Security, if the residual risks would significantly jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel at Vienna International Centre. The justifications for any other non-compliance of H-MOSS should also be clearly documented. (Rec. 03)

25. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and will implement it by July 2006.* OIOS will record the recommendation as implemented when the Designated Official completed the risk assessment and residual risks are communicated and accepted by all stakeholders.

(c) Security strengthening projects

26. The expected completion date for the H-MOSS projects had been continuously revised from the initial date of December 2004 to June 2006 and the implementation rate for H-MOSS projects was only 28 percent⁶ as of August 2005. .

27. Whilst the implementation of H-MOSS projects totaling \$3.6 million or 23 percent of the approved supplementary budget (only 1 percent implementation rate as of 31 August 2005) might have been dependent on co-operation with the Austrian Authorities, the implementation of the remaining 77 percent of projects was within the control of UNOV SSS, other sections in UNOV and the three VBOs.

28. Other reasons that may have contributed to the low implementation rate are:
- a) the lack of continuity in leadership at UNOV SSS with three Chief of Security in the last two years;
 - b) Co-ordination challenges among the parties involved i.e. UNOV SSS, General Support Section, Information and Technology Service, Human Resource Management Service and UNIDO's Building Management Services; and
 - c) Overestimation of costs in the approved budget.

29. UNOV had taken some measures to address the above factors. Since January 2005, the leadership of UNOV SSS appeared to be stabilized with the appointment of a new Chief of Security. In August 2005, the Chief of Security appointed a consultant for a period of six months to assist him in the co-ordination and project management of H-MOSS related projects at VIC. However, the progress report, used for monitoring purposes, did not accurately state the parties involved and did not clearly indicate the party responsible to take action as the projects progressed. OIOS is not making any recommendation because UNOV subsequently took the

⁶ As per H-MOSS progress report of 31 August 2005 prepared jointly by UNOV SSS, SAG and UNOV Budget Section.

necessary action to update the H-MOSS progress report on a monthly basis and reports now indicate the party responsible to take action as well as the date from which the task had been outstanding.

D. Organizational structure and shift management

(a) UNOV SSS organizational structure

30. UNOV SSS planned staffing was increased from 90 to 155 as per the approved supplementary budget to ensure compliance with H-MOSS. Subsequently, the Chief of Security, in his review of the section's structure endeavoured to streamline the reporting lines after referring to the organizational structure of other OAHs and regional commissions. The Chief also solicited views and comments from Security Supervisors and Security Officers. The new organizational structure proposed

- (a) an increase in the number by two G-7 security inspectors , four G-6 security lieutenants and ten G-5 security sergeants;
- (b) a dedicated unit for provision of security services for conferences known as the conference squad with 10 security officers; and
- (c) a counter surveillance emergency response team with 14 security officers.

31. Whilst OIOS concurs with the Chief of Security, that the existing organizational structure had to be reviewed, the proposed structure did not take the new H-MOSS requirements, changes in VIC infrastructure and recommendations in the external security consultant report into account.

32. UNOV SSS should re-assess its operational requirements taking into consideration, the location of security posts, duration of security coverage and number of Security Officers required in these locations, as well as re-consider the rationale of maintaining some of the existing operational requirements that are detailed in Annex 2 of this report. OIOS estimated that UNOV could achieve savings as much as \$250,000 per biennium⁷ from such an exercise.

(b) Shift management

33. The new organizational structure maintains the existing pattern of shift management i.e. a combination of eight-hour shifts and twelve-hours shift. The duty-shifts system for Security Officers varied for duty stations. There was, however, a trend with duty stations in Europe, such as ICTY and UNOG, having eight-hour shifts whilst duty stations in Africa, such as UNON and ICTR, are on twelve hours shifts. OIOS was of the opinion that a re-structuring of the section presented a good opportunity to re-evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the shift system, taking into account its impact from a health perspective, alertness of the staff to perform security functions, staff welfare, as well as financial implications to the organization, such as overtime and night differentials.

⁷ Please refer to Annex 2 for computational details.

Recommendation:

➤ UNOV Security and Safety Section should re-assess its operational requirements, taking into account the Headquarters Minimum Security Standards and its shift system, and adjust its structure and deployment of Security Officers accordingly and consistent with its requirements and environment. (Rec. 04)

34. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and will implement the recommendation by July 2006. UNOV is in the process of re-assessing the operational requirements and restructuring the Section accordingly, which include introducing steady eight-hour shifts.* OIOS will consider the recommendation implemented upon receiving the results of UNOV SSS re-organization exercise that adequately considered the operational requirements in accordance with H-MOSS.

E. Human resource management**(a) Job descriptions**

35. Job descriptions of Security Officers were incomplete and mostly outdated. OIOS made no recommendation because UNOV took action and was in the process of updating it at the time of the audit.

(b) Medical testing for security officers

36. Security Officers had undergone psychological testing prior to the release of firearms to them. However, there was no periodical testing on the use of illegal drugs and controlled substances as practiced at UN Headquarters as required by ST/AI/2003/2.

Recommendation:

➤ UNOV Security and Safety Section should clarify with Department of Safety and Security the requirements to conduct periodical testing for the use of illegal drugs and controlled substances for its security officers. (Rec. 05)

37. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and will implement it by July 2006.* OIOS will consider the recommendation implemented upon receiving confirmation from UNOV SSS that the periodical testing for use of illegal drugs and controlled substance is conducted for its security officers.

(c) Overtime

38. The conditions governing the compensation for overtime work, as per Appendix B of the Staff Rules for Vienna, was not updated and only were applicable for General Service staff of UNIDO. UNOV, however, applied the provisions for its staff. Paragraph 1(b) of the Appendix B stated that “*Work in excess of the basic work week performed after 2000 hours or before 0600 hours on a scheduled work day, on the sixth or seventh day of the work week, or an official holiday, is special overtime (double rate).*” OIOS noted that Security Officers working on official UN holidays, as part of their normal twelve-hour shift duty, were not paid overtime.

They were merely given credits for time off at single rate. This is a deviation from the practice in other UN duty stations where staff members working on official UN holidays are compensated with overtime at double rate.

Recommendation:

- UNOV should update Appendix B to the Staff Rules and provide appropriate compensation for overtime work performed by Security Officers on United Nations official holidays. (Rec. 06)

39. *UNOV disagreed with the recommendation. It recognized that there are differences between UNOV and other duty stations. This does, however, not mean that UNOV General Service staff are not appropriately compensated for overtime work and argued that Appendix B had been agreed upon by all VBOs and respective Staff Councils. Its provisions are linked to a number of other matters such as salary surveys and overall conditions of service applicable to the duty station and for all staff in the General Service category and not only for those serving in UNOV SSS. Given that changing Appendix B is not within the purview of UNOV, UNOV requested that the recommendation be withdrawn.*

40. OIOS recognise that the revision of Appendix B will require agreement from other VBOs. However, the existing Appendix B had not been updated since February 1977 with its contents only applicable for UNIDO's staff. If the existing Appendix B is applicable to UNOV, then the non-payment of overtime to Security Officers working on official UN holidays is in contravention to paragraph 1(b) of Appendix B. Therefore, UNOV should give consideration to the applicability of conditions in Appendix B to UNOV staff. If applicable, it should be practiced and if not, then a revision is required. OIOS will also contact OHRM for clarification.

(d) Training

41. OIOS is pleased to note that UNOV SSS had arranged for security awareness training for all its security officers to refocus the attention of these officers to the presence of threats and their roles as security officers. However, OIOS found that UNOV SSS has not established training directives and policies to ensure security officers receive relevant and adequate training to execute their functions.

42. In the first nine months of 2005 and out of the 9,826 training hours, 766 hours were devoted to non-security related courses though some basic security training had not been conducted. Except for Security Officers in the Fire and Safety Platoon, there had been no physical trainings and fitness assessments for Security Officers.

43. There were also no controls to ensure adequate training opportunities among Security Officers. Some received training hours that exceeded 160 hours, while others received as little as 2.5 hours or none at all. UNOV SSS informed OIOS that DSS is developing a standard training programme for UN Security Offices. However, until such programme is finalized, UNOV SSS needs to identify and prioritize the type of training, as well as determine the number of training days required for its Security Officers to ensure security officers receive relevant training within operational constraints.

Recommendation:

- UNOV Security and Safety Section should develop a training policy, indicating the type of training required and minimum required training days for its Security Officers. (Rec. 07)

44. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and will implement it by July 2006. According to DSS, a standard training programme is scheduled for July 2006 for a system-wide implementation. Once completed, UNOV SSS' training programme will be derived from it. OIOS will record the recommendation as implemented when UNOV SSS' training policy and programme had been established.*

F. Provision of security and safety services**(a) Access control**

45. There was no single access policy for VIC. The UNOV Security Pass Office issued ground passes to staff, affiliates and interns based on emails, internal memorandums from VBOs and non-VBOs (e.g. OSCE, OPEC). Although, the Pass Office has a list of personnel who can request ground passes for staff, but was not updated regularly and therefore is outdated. Also, the Pass Office did not maintain copies of requests and other supporting documents.

46. Data input controls were inadequate to ensure data integrity in the UNOV badge system and conference system. Although there was a user access table, the Pass Office assigned a common user name to a pool of short-term camera operators whom were recruited during peak conference periods. As a result, camera operators, whom issued ground passes to conference participants, could not be identified.

47. OIOS reviewed the list of 16,541 valid ground passes in circulation and noted that 4,909 were issued without expiry dates. The Pass Office did not use the facility available to verify the accuracy of information in the Pass system. OIOS identified 539 cases in which ground passes had expiry dates beyond the staff members' contract expiry dates and 56 ground passes had a validity period beyond the recommended period of 5 years.

48. OIOS noted that the security officers did not always comply with the established procedures for checking visitors. On one occasion, OIOS noted that two visitors were allowed to enter VIC premises without presentation of identification documents.

Recommendation:

- UNOV Security and Safety Section, in consultation with the other VIC based UN organizations should establish a consolidated policy that governs conditions of access to Vienna International Centre; and
 - (a) improve data input controls and ensure that each user to the pass system have a unique login name for audit trail purposes; and
 - (b) perform a 100 percent verification of the accuracy of the information in the system by using the facility to compare records in the Pass system with IMIS or other comparable reports and make necessary corrections. (Rec. 08)

49. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and undertook to implement it by July or December 2006. Although the implementation of the RFID system is pending until approved by the GA and VBOs, UNOV is in the process of developing a policy and manual for the Pass Office, updating the list of staff authorized to signed requests for passes on quarterly basis, keeping supporting documentation for ground passes and requested UNOV IT to create a query that could identify discrepancies between IMIS, other comparable VBOs reports and the badge system. Discrepancies identified will be corrected. The services of short term camera operators ended by 31 December 2005 and the use of general log-in names have been eliminated. Of the 4,909 passes without expiry dates, 3,204 are passes for retirees and the majority of the remaining 1,305 ground passes are held by IAEA and UNIDO staff members and their dependents. Approximately 500 of these passes have been changed and the rest is due to change as soon as IAEA approves the RFID system.*

50. OIOS will record the recommendation as implemented when UNOV SSS's consolidated policy, governing access to VIC, is completed, the standard operating procedures had been updated and confirmation is received that a complete verification of information in the Pass system has been completed.

(b) Security investigations

51. There were no Security Officers dedicated to conduct investigations. The Special Services Platoon (SSP), which is responsible for security investigations is also responsible for providing close protection services, performing random spot checks within the buildings, conducting tests on alarm systems, responding to medical emergencies, administering the registers of lost and found property and for conducting money escorts for in-house banks. Three of the six Security Officers in SSP have some prior working experience as police officers, but none of them received any formal investigation training after they joined the UN.

52. Although SSP followed standard practices when receiving complaints and/or inquiries, its standard operating procedures (SOP) had not been approved by the Chief of Security and therefore, could be inadequate and/or incomplete. In August 2005, UNOV SSS reviewed and updated its SOPs, but no SOP had been approved for investigations. When updating its SOP on investigations and reporting, General Assembly resolution 59/287 of 13 April 2005, on the mandatory reporting by Programme Managers of allegations of misconduct to OIOS Investigation Division, should be considered. All cases of serious misconduct and/or criminal behaviour should be conducted by OIOS.

53. OIOS noted that there was inadequate mechanism to prevent unauthorized deleting of the electronic copies of these cases in the incident database. Since UNOV SSS has already taken corrective action, OIOS is making no further recommendation.

Recommendation:

- UNOV Security and Safety Section should refer to the General Assembly report A/58/708 and in consultation with OIOS Investigation Division, develop guidelines indicating the protocols for receiving complaints, conducting investigations, issuing reports and following up on reported complaints as well as recruitment and training of Security Investigative Officers. (Rec. 09)

54. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and mentioned that within the new organizational structure of UNOV SSS, the Special Services Platoon will be divided into two separate units, one of which will consist of one Sergeant and two Security Officers working solely on investigations. UNOV SSS has also requested OIOS Investigation Division (ID) in Vienna in July 2005 to provide an investigation course, and with the OIOS ID's assistance develop guidelines for investigations. OIOS had not been able to do so in 2005 due to the non-availability of trainers, but planned to do so in 2006. Furthermore, DSS stated that an ST/AI would be promulgated with regards to SSS investigations for DSS. SSS in NY developed and implemented investigation policies, which will be provided to UNOV SSS. According to DSS, the delineation of investigative responsibilities between OIOS and SSS, however, requires clarification. Progress had been made and OIOS will record the recommendation as implemented when UNOV SSS' complete its guidelines for investigation.*

(c) Fire and safety

55. The Fire and Safety Platoon of UNOV SSS is responsible for the training of 610 Fire Wardens in the VIC. The training provided was limited to a general introduction to evacuation procedures without any practical training on first aid skills and/or basic fire fighting knowledge due to a lack of training equipment.

Recommendation:

- To ensure that fire wardens can effectively discharge their roles in cases of emergencies, UNOV Security and Safety Section should provide fire wardens with basic fire fighting knowledge. (Rec. 10)

56. *UNOV accepted the recommendation and will implement it by July 2006. Whilst UNOV SSS had conducted theoretical training exercise with majority of staff, UNOV SSS is now in possession of special environmental (non pollutant) and user friendly (non-carcinogenic) fire-fighting training device. This equipment stimulates various types of fires such as computer monitor fires, wastebasket fires. Practical training for fire wardens has been included in the training plan for 2006 and all Evacuation Team members (fire wardens) will be trained by end of July 2006. OIOS will consider this recommendation implemented upon UNOV's confirmation that all fire wardens have attended the practical training on basic fire-fighting skills.*

G. Provision of services to Vienna based international organizations (VBOs)

57. IAEA, UNIDO and CTBTO were satisfied with the security services that UNSSS provided. Although there were instances in which VBOs disagreed or questioned the effectiveness of some proposed security measures undertaken by UNOV SSS, they felt that their concerns and reservations had been properly dealt with in the SAG. Also, all VBO representatives interviewed expressed their agreement to the principle of not interfering with the day-to-day operations of security management in VIC since it is the mandate of UNOV.

H. Asset management and weapons controls

(a) Firearms and ammunitions

58. UNOV SSS managed 1,400 non-expendable assets valued at \$1.2 million. Included were 188 firearms. OIOS' surprise count of weapons revealed the following:

- (a) The list of firearms managed by UNOV SSS showed an additional 20 firearms belonging to Field Administration Logistics Division (FALD).
- (b) Three security officers were issued with firearms although their weapons permit have expired.
- (c) One security officer signed out a weapon without leaving his weapon permit in the duty firearms safe, as required.
- (d) In April 2000, two weapons belonging to FALD were issued to security officers who went to peacekeeping missions without proper sign-out for these weapons.
- (e) Twenty-three weapons remained issued to security officers on missions for a period between one to five years. UNOV SSS has not taken any action to communicate with these missions to confirm that the weapons are still in UN custody.
- (f) UNOV SSS did not maintain records on the total quantity of ammunitions on hand.

(b) Sensitive surveillance equipment

59. The Head of the Special Services Platoon is the custodian as well as the user of the sensitive surveillance equipment such as secret listening devices. Logs were not maintained to account and monitor the use of the devices and there was a lack of segregation of duties between user and custodian.

Recommendation:

- UNOV Security and Safety Section should strengthen its weapons and ammunitions controls; conduct surprise checks to improve enforcement of established procedures; introduce segregation of duties between the user and custodian of sensitive surveillance equipment and maintain logs to account and monitor the use of equipment. (Rec. 11)

60. *UNOV accepted the recommendation, but mentioned that the Lieutenant of the Special Services Platoon will remain the custodian of the sensitive surveillance equipment as is the case in NY and other OAHs. However, following the recommendation, UNOV will maintain a logbook to account and monitor the use of the devices.* OIOS would like to clarify that maintaining a logbook without any segregation of duties between the user and the custodian is ineffective from an internal control viewpoint. Although some OAHs have the same control weakness in this area, OIOS has made similar recommendations to recently audited OAHs. OIOS will record the recommendation as implemented when the SOP/guidelines are updated to incorporate the improved weapon and ammunition controls.

V. FURTHER ACTIONS REQUIRED ON RECOMMENDATIONS

61. OIOS monitors the implementation of its audit recommendations for reporting to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly. The responses received on the audit recommendations contained in the draft report have been recorded in our recommendations database. In order to record full implementation, the actions described in the following table are required:

Rec. no.	Action/document required to close the recommendation
1*	A copy of complete and updated crisis management plan.
2*	Confirmation from UNOV that DSS had responded timely to requests for guidance, notification of the designation of the new DO and Chief Security Adviser as well as a copy of reporting guidelines from DSS limiting the number of persons to whom Chief of Security reports to ensure unity of command and clear accountability lines.
3*	Confirmation that the security risk assessment had been concluded on the on-site commissary and residual risks are communicated and accepted by all stakeholders.
4*	Confirmation that UNOV SSS' re-organization exercise adequately considered the operational requirements in accordance with H-MOSS
5	Confirmation from UNOV SSS that the periodical testing for use of illegal drugs and controlled substance are being conducted for its security officers.
6	A copy of an updated Appendix B to the Staff Rules or clarification from OHRM that the existing Appendix B is applicable to UNOV staff and that the non-payment of overtime on UN official holidays is in accordance with the provisions of the existing Appendix B.
7*	A copy of the UNOV SSS's training policy and programme.
8*	Confirmation that a policy governing access to VIC had been established, updated standard operating procedures, that included steps to improve data input controls, had been developed and confirmation that a 100% verification of the accuracy of information in the Pass system has been completed.
9	Confirmation that the guidelines for investigations had been completed.
10*	Confirmation that all fire wardens has attended practical training on basic fire-fighting skills.
11*	Confirmation that UNOV SSS updated the SOP/guidelines that incorporate the improved weapons and ammunition controls and a segregation of duties between the user and custodian of sensitive surveillance equipment.

* Critical recommendations.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

62. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the audit team by the staff and management of UNOV, UNOV SSS, other VBOs, members of the SAG and CCCS.

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External security consulting's firm comments on UNSSS response to H-MOSS requirements that were not included in the August 2005 H-MOSS plan.

No.	H-MOSS requirements	External security consulting firm's comments
1	The optimum security strategy shall be implemented through standard physical security measures that focus on rigorous layered perimeter security, coupled with a tight access control system.	The lack of security entrances to individual buildings and links between buildings places a greater emphasis on the effectiveness of the site perimeter security. Any failure in or breach of the perimeter security would allow an attacker free run in the VIC. <i>UNOV's comments: This danger is recognized. Strengthening of perimeter security, especially vehicle screening and establishment of CSERT(Quick Response) team and a mobile patrol plan along the security perimeter are the priorities.</i>
2	Security services shall have exclusive control over all issuance of passes and shall ensure that conference participants, contractors, affiliates, members of non-governmental organizations, media and other groups of people are screened in an appropriate manner.	A commercial organization would not allow conference participants the uncontrolled access currently provided. <i>UNOV's comments: Conference members represent member states and are screened like staff members and delegates.</i>
3	While still subject to security controls, such facilities as reception, pass and ID offices, commissaries and mail operations shall be located away from principal buildings and ideally outside the main security perimeter.	The mail (including all hand screening) should be moved to the perimeter of the site from F-365. As an alternative, the mailrooms should be hardened against blast and chemical and biological contamination. <i>UNOV's comments: This is recognized and remedial action will be taken.</i>
4	Specific assessments of the security of executive floors shall be undertaken, as well as of other higher risk occupational groups, with a view to implementation of targeted protective measures.	This should also apply to other areas where the same executives could be known to be – restaurant, car parking etc. <i>UNOV's comments: This is recognized and remedial action will be taken.</i>
5	Commercial deliveries shall take place off-site or by vehicles pre-cleared for access to loading docks.	If the Commissary is not relocated, the following measures should be considered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Off site deliveries and screening with deliveries to site by UN vehicles; • Comprehensive screening of all deliveries at the site perimeter; and • Strict scheduling of all deliveries coupled with security vetting of the supply chain. <i>UNOV's comments: This is recognized and remedial action will be taken.</i>

Examples of security postings that needs to be reconsidered include but not limited to the following

Assignment of one security officer at the entrance of the commissary during its opening hours.

1. Both IAEA and UNOV management representatives had explained that the need for security officer is primarily to ensure that only authorized personnel entitled to purchase tax free goods are allowed to enter the commissary. OIOS is of the opinion that this is not a Security Section responsibility and can be performed by a non-security personnel. Furthermore, the access to commissary is controlled by type of ground pass issued and the security officers on patrol can respond quickly to any security needs at the commissary.

Total cost of this post is estimated to be

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \text{No of working days in a year} \times 8.5 \text{ hours per day} \times \text{estimated salaries of a G-4 step 3 p.a.} \\
 &\text{including other staff common costs} / \text{number working hours per staff per annum}^8 \\
 &= (365 \text{ days} - \text{weekends} - \text{UN holidays}) \times 8.5 \text{ hours} \times \$ 48,000^9 / 1,326 \text{ hours} \\
 &= (365 \text{ days} - 104 \text{ days} - 10 \text{ days}) \times 8.5 \text{ hours} \times \$48,000 / 1326 \\
 &= \$77,200
 \end{aligned}$$

Assignment of one security officer at WIG (Wien International Garden) gate during lunch hours for 7 months in year.

2. It appears to OIOS that the opening of WIG gate is mainly for the convenience of staff rather than an operational requirement. Furthermore, UNOV SSS had not obtained the consent from the Austrian authorities to the UN armed post location at this gate, which is outside the VIC perimeter.

Total cost of this post is estimated to be

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \text{No of working days in a year} \times 7 \text{ mths} / 12 \text{ mths} \times 2.5 \text{ hours per day} \times \text{estimated salaries of a G-4} \\
 &\text{step 3 p.a. including other staff common costs} / \text{number working hours per staff per annum} \\
 &= (251 \text{ days} \times 7 \text{ mths} / 12 \text{ mths}) \times 2.5 \text{ hours} \times \$48,000 / 1,326 \\
 &= \$13,250
 \end{aligned}$$

Assignment of one security officer at asbestos storage area (post location known as D-3) from 14.00 to 18.00 during weekdays

3. Unless it is a regulatory requirement, the assignment of a security officer at this post location seem questionable since there are regular patrols by security officers to this area.

Total cost of this post is estimated to be

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \text{No of working days in a year} \times 4 \text{ hours per day} \times \text{estimated salaries of a G-4 step 3 p.a.} \\
 &\text{including other staff common costs} / \text{number working hours per staff per annum} \\
 &= 251 \text{ days} \times 4 \text{ hours} \times \$48,000 / 1,326 \\
 &= \$36,300
 \end{aligned}$$

⁸ Staff availability days per annum as per the operational analysis report prepared by UNOV SSS dated June 2004.

⁹ Based on net salaries including allowances of G-4 step 3 of approximately US\$4,000 per month as per IMIS report for September 2004.

Total estimated savings for abolishing these three security postings are approximately \$126,750 per year (\$77,200 + \$13,250 + \$36,300) or some \$253,000 per biennium.

Examples of security requirements stated in H-MOSS and the external security consulting firm's report (see no. 1 and no.4 of Annex 1) yet to be implemented are:

4. Security post requirements to establish a layered security perimeter within VIC; and
5. Protection services within VIC premises for United Nations officials faced with credible threats.