

United Nations  Nations Unies  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

Internal Audit Division I  
Office of Internal Oversight Services

TO: Maj. Gen. Alain Pellegrini  
A: Force Commander, UNIFIL

DATE: 14 October 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:3 (2837 /04)

THROUGH:

S/C DE:

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division-1  
Office of Internal Oversight Services



SUBJECT:

OBJET: **OIOS Audit No. AP2004/672/01: Audit of UNIFIL Security Procedures**

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the subject audit, which was conducted in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in June 2004.

2. Based on comments received on a draft of this report, we have closed recommendation 4. All of the other recommendations remain open in OIOS' recommendations database pending further actions specified in the last sentence of the paragraph following a recommendation. Recommendation 1 requires further action by DPKO and/or UNSECOORD and recommendations 2, 5, 6 and 7 by UNIFIL. In order for us to close out recommendation 3, we request that you provide us with supporting documentation as indicated in the text of the report. Also, please note that OIOS considers recommendations 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 as being of critical importance and requests that particular attention be paid to these recommendations.

3. OIOS is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

## I. INTRODUCTION

4. In view of the changing security environment and threats worldwide, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), identified the audit of global field security procedures as a matter of priority. The audit was conducted in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD).

5. The Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary-General have issued several policy documents recognizing the paramount importance of security and safety of UN personnel in the field. In one of these documents (A/57/365 of 28 August 2002), the Secretary-General set out an inter-organizational security framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system. The document states unambiguously the responsibilities of every entity, individual and group of individuals within the United Nations system of organizations involved in the management of security. DPKO has initiated reforms to its security operations in peacekeeping missions with the issuance of the new DPKO Policy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for a trial period of one year effective October 2003.

6. The following paragraphs from documents authored by ESCWA Security and Safety Unit give an overview of the United Nations security structure in Lebanon.

7. "The Designated Official (DO) for Security in Lebanon, North of the Litani River and the Pocket of Tyre is Ms. Mervat Tallawy, Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). All the Heads of United Nations Agencies are members of the Security Management Team and each agency has an appointed security focal point. The Security Warden network, for international and national staff, covers the whole of Lebanon, excluding the Bekaa Valley."

8. "Security Phase I (Precautionary) is currently in effect in Lebanon. The area south of the Litani River, excluding the Pocket of Tyre (UNIFIL Area of Operation) is currently in Security Phase III (Relocation). The Designated Official is the UNIFIL Force Commander. Any travel to UNIFIL Area of Operations (AO) requires prior authorization from the Designated Official."

9. This report assesses the capability and readiness of UNIFIL in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area. The report discusses policy and procedural issues associated with the security of UN personnel and provides practical recommendations for improving security management. The report incorporates UNIFIL's comments, which are shown in italics.

## **II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES**

10. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the capability and readiness of UNIFIL in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area.

## **III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY**

11. The audit included interviews with concerned personnel and tests, which the auditors considered necessary under the circumstances. The audit was conducted in accordance with the general and specific standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such tests as the auditors considered necessary.

#### IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

12. Based on the audit work performed, the planning, coordination and control of Security function in the Mission needs improvement to ensure the capability and readiness of the Mission's security components to perform its mandate. The following major issues were noted during the review:

- The absence of a civilian mission security officer position jeopardizes the implementation of an effective DPKO Security Management Programme.
- The designation of the Mission's area of operations as security Phase III has not been revised since February 1993. Moreover, the continued deployment of international civilian staff to work in a Phase III, described as relocation, environment needs to be reviewed.
- Perimeter security in and physical access control to both the Naqoura Camp and UNIFIL House in Beirut is recognized by the audit team and mission management as in need of substantial improvement..
- The Mission Security Plan has neither been updated since February 2003 nor has it been rehearsed.
- The Mission Security Management Team needs to be convened and meet on a regular basis, in accordance with the mandated frequency for a Phase III security environment.

#### V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### A. Security Management and Coordination

###### Review Security Phase and Corresponding Need to Maintain Civilian Staff in Naqoura Camp

13. UNIFIL has been operating in the area south of the Litani River, except for the pocket Tyre, under Security Phase III (Relocation) since its inception. The United Nations Field Security Handbook and Annex L to the Mission Security SOPs of 26 September 2003 describe Phase III as follows:

“Phase Three indicates a substantial deterioration in the security situation, which may result in the relocation of staff members or their eligible dependents. When recommending Phase III to UNSECOORD, the Designated Official and Security Management Team may recommend any of the following **mandatory** (emphasis OIOS) actions:

- (i) Temporary concentration of all internationally-recruited staff members and/or their eligible family members in one or more sites within a particular area;
- (ii) Relocation of all internationally-recruited staff members and/or their eligible family members to alternative locations within the country; and/or

- (iii) Relocation outside the country of all eligible family members of internationally-recruited staff members and/or non-essential internationally-recruited staff members...”

14. The Naqoura Camp, located south of the Litani River, houses the military and during the workweek all international civilian components of the Mission. UNIFIL also has a 5-storey office building in Beirut together with other UN agencies.

15. The UNIFIL security phase and deployment of international staff to the camp is anomalous in the following respects:

- From February 1993, the security situation has changed and yet the Security Phase has not reflected such change.
- If the DO and/or UNSECOORD believe that security situation still remains at Phase III in the Mission's area of operations (AO), the continued deployment of all the 115 international civilian staff in the Naqoura Camp needs to be reviewed.

16. The co-location of civilian administrative staff to a Phase III operations HQ has some merit on cost and operational effectiveness, but the decision to co-locate undermines the Mission claim that it operates in a Phase III status. It is equally inconsistent that within the AO, the city of Tyre is designated Phase I, and therefore this allows staff and dependents family to reside there. Daily movement of staff in and out of a Phase III AO is, in itself, a serious security risk, which has not been considered.

### **Recommendation 1**

The Head of Mission should seek guidance from DPKO and/or UNSECOORD on the security phase in the Mission's area of operations. Accordingly, mandatory actions should be made on the deployment and relocation of international civilian staff in accordance with the UN regulations and rules. (AP2004/672/01/01)

17. UNIFIL stated that *“it is not pragmatic to have international support staff isolated from the military personnel they support. Moreover, it is useful to reflect that the City of Tyre, which is designated Phase I, is not inside the UNIFIL Area of Operations.”*

18. OIOS reiterates the recommendation. It should be noted that the City of Tyre is located south of the Litani River and this area, excluding the City of Tyre, is under Phase III. OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until a review is made by DPKO and/or UNSECOORD on the security phase of the Mission.

### **Implement DPKO Mission Security Management Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)**

19. Neither the Head of Mission nor the Senior Administrative Officer has seen the DPKO instructions that were sent to all missions, on the adoption of the 23 September 2003 DPKO SOPs. Hence, implementation of the SOPs has not been planned and started. In the interim, military security SOPs are being followed.

## **Recommendation 2**

The Head of Mission should immediately implement the DPKO Mission Security Standard Operating Procedures. (AP2004/672/01/02)

20. UNIFIL stated that *“at the time of the audit, neither the Head of Mission nor the Senior Administrative Officer had received the DPKO Mission Security Management Standard Operating procedures. However, following the audit, copies of the document have been obtained and are currently in the process of being reviewed prior to implementation, which should be within the next four (4) weeks”* from the date of the Mission’s reply, 20 September 2004. OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

### Convene Regularly the Mission Security Management Team

21. Although senior Mission officials have been meeting regularly to discuss significant issues, including security concerns, they have not been convened regularly as the Mission Security Management Team (SMT). Furthermore, the Mission SMT does not have a medical officer as a member (United Nations Field Security Handbook, Paragraph 24).

## **Recommendation 3**

The Head of Mission should regularly formally constitute a Security Management Team, inclusive of the Civilian Medical Officer and convene required meetings. (AP2004/672/01/03)

22. UNIFIL stated that *“UNIFIL Security Management Team convenes on the last Thursday of each month, under the chairmanship of the Head of the Mission to review the security requirements of the Mission. The meetings have been formalized since April 2004 and the minutes of the meeting are forwarded to UNHQ, New York, in reporting format issued by UNSECOORD vide its memorandum of 4 January 2004.”* OIOS will leave this recommendation open until it receives evidence, in the form of minutes of meeting and in the format mandated by UNSECOORD, that the Mission SMT has been regularly meeting.

## **B. Organization**

### Appoint a Full-time Security Officer

23. UNIFIL security operations are embedded within multiple functions of the Mission’s military structure. The Force Provost Marshall, the French Guard Component Commanding Officer, and the Senior Planning Officer all have specific roles with respect to security activities. The Camp Commandant is responsible for overall security coordination. The Deputy Force Commander is the *de facto* Mission Chief Security Officer.

24. The mission does not have a designated civilian security officer but security issues predominantly administrative in nature have been subsumed as the responsibilities of the Senior Administrative Officer (SAO) who reports to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The SAO carries out what could be referred to as “liaison and nominal oversight” functions of Mission

security activities.

25. While the composition of the military units dedicated to security planning, facilities security and investigations parallel those set out in the DPKO generic structure for a small mission, there is a need to have a full-time security officer to be held accountable for the implementation of the DPKO Mission Security SOPs and coordination of all security functions.

#### **Recommendation 4**

The Head of Mission should request a civilian security officer position and in the interim appoint a staff member as focal point for security, reporting directly to the Head of Mission, to handle all security functions in the Mission. (AP2004/672/01/04)

26. UNIFIL accepted the recommendation and stated that *“The Mission had requested a Chief Security Officer post in its 2004-2005 Budget Proposal, which was rejected by the Controller. The Controller finally agreed to have the post created after the ACABQ meeting. This has resulted in UNIFIL having to finance the post from within its own resources. The position of Chief Security Officer was advertised with a closing date of 1 September 2004. Applications are currently awaited from UNHQ, New York in order to carry out a formal review and selection process. In the interim, the Deputy Force Commander has been designated, effective April 2004, as Acting Chief Security Officer with the Senior Administrative Officer being responsible for security matters pertaining to civilian staff members.”* OIOS acknowledges Management’s efforts and hereby closes this recommendation.

### **C. The Security Plan**

#### Update and Rehearse the Security Plan

27. The Mission has a comprehensive Security Plan detailing all the essential elements that should be contained in such a plan. However, we noted the following deficiencies that will hinder the plan’s effectiveness, if not rectified immediately:

- The plan has not been tested. Testing the plan is necessary to identify weaknesses in the plan and the capacity and readiness of medical services to respond to contingencies. The DPKO SOPs dictates, “It is essential that the Security Plan be subjected to rigorous rehearsal, evaluation and appropriate modifications, in consultation with the United Nations Security Coordinator.” In Baghdad, the lack of contingency planning and drills in relation to evacuation manifested itself in the rescue mission, “There was no systematic or organized response from staff members in relation to command posts, points of assembly or the tracking of casualties...” [20 October 2003 Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN personnel in Iraq].
- The plan has not been updated since February 2003. As such, staff lists are also not up-to-date. We noted a number of international civilian staff members who are already out of the Mission but are still included in international staff list. In August 2003 when the UN Headquarters in Baghdad was attacked, “no one could give accurate

numbers of the staff in the Canal Hotel or account for other staff in the country who could be in danger and might need to be evacuated.”

- Fifty percent of international staff members OIOS randomly surveyed did not know the concentration point for evacuation, 43 percent do not have a packed emergency bag for quick evacuation. Also, the survey indicated that all but one (who happens to be a radio operator) of the 14 staff members surveyed did not have portable radio device where they could be contacted in case of an emergency.
- Two of the three zone wardens available for the survey indicated that they had not seen a copy of the Mission’s evacuation plan or had participated in any training on conducting their duties as zone wardens. Moreover, there is no constituted Crisis Management Team (CMT).

### **Recommendation 5**

The Head of Mission and Mission Security Management Team should update and rehearse the Mission Security Plan.  
(AP2004/672/01/05)

28. UNIFIL stated that the security plan *“is a document that is under constant review...”* However, it did not comment on the importance and availability of current/up-to-date staff list and the rehearsal of the plan. Also, its comment that *“The UNIFIL Evacuation Plan is ‘UN Secret’”* and *“...because of the sensitivity of the document, Zone Wardens have never been given a copy”* is unacceptable. As such, OIOS reiterates the recommendation and requests the Mission to consider seriously the recommendation to ensure staff safety and security during any contingency.

### **D. Physical Security**

#### Perimeter Security in Naqoura Camp (HQ)

29. The UNIFIL base of operations in Naqoura houses facilities for civilian administration functions and military operations. The base is home to approximately 115 international staff and 1,200 soldiers. Local staff and contractors account for approximately another 125 persons.

30. Progressive military and civilian staffing reductions over the past several years have not seen a consolidation of UNIFIL facilities and therefore the size of the base and the resources required to protect it effectively and efficiently is problematic. Base protection is consigned to a French gendarme security component of approximately two hundred soldiers. Perimeter security and access control to facilities are their prime responsibilities.

31. UNIFIL facilities in Naqoura are not contiguous, with the main base facility separated from the fuel depot, parking facilities and French Guard force by the principal North-South highway from Tyre to the town of Naqoura. The West side of the base borders the Mediterranean, while to the East are low ranges of hills.

32. The outer wall of the main base is adjacent to the Naqoura road and it also acts in several areas as the façade to a number of civilian and military offices. Parts of the perimeter wall have deteriorated and are in need of repair or reinforcement. The Mission is in the process of relocating principal operation (administration and military) to locations within the base, leaving vacant the structures adjacent to the Naqoura road.

33. The Mission realizes that there is an urgent need to reassess its current physical security arrangements and therefore it has hired an external security consultant company to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its security arrangements: physical, technical and resource requirements. It is expected that the consultants' report will be available by the end of July 2004 and that a comprehensive assessment of the Naqoura Camp and UNIFIL House in Beirut will emerge from the exercise. The audit team met with the consultants to discuss their review strategy and methodology and expected results.

#### Strengthen Physical Access Control to UN Premises

##### (i) Naqoura Camp

34. Access controls to the main UNIFIL base are through three entrances that are manned by the French gendarmes. The access points do not have the required equipment to detect the importation of bomb or other explosive devices, either by vehicles or persons entering the base. UN vehicles and vendors' commercial vehicles have access to the premises with little more than a visual examination of vehicle contents.

35. UN personnel are provided with UN ID cards, which are color-coded according to their respective function. Our review of the ID card issuance procedures indicated that internal controls were inadequate. The blank ID cards are kept in a safe under the control of a local staff member, with no evidence of periodic oversight by the Chief Civilian Personnel Officer. The number of ID cards issued to the clerk for printing is not reconciled to cards issued and/or destroyed. Similarly, blocks of blank ID cards issued to the Military for new rotations were not supported by a list of personnel.

36. Within the Naqoura base, there is a local cemetery, which has traditionally been accessible to local residents one day a week and as warranted by funerals. Access is through the pedestrian entrance gate, but there is no physical inspection of visitors who pass through it on their way to the cemetery. ID cards are not required for visitors to the cemetery.

37. The French Guard Force provides a cordon security route from the access gate to the cemetery as and when required. However, OIOS audit team noted during an inspection visit that no such visible security cordon was present as the French Guard Force was conducting security drill on that day. The presence of local residents, with unknown factional political loyalties, who are not physically checked and/or subject to technical inspection (scanner/x-ray) before they enter the mission grounds, is a serious security risk to UN facilities and staff.

38. The Mission carries out humanitarian work by providing medical services to those in the local community who seek it. The medical services are provided within base facilities and therefore accessed by the local population through the two principal access gates. The absence of security



procedures governing persons seeking medical services poses a serious security threat to the mission.

(ii) UNIFIL house in Beirut

The UNIFIL House, a five-storey apartment building, is located in a residential and diplomatic mission area. It is essentially a liaison office, staffed by eight local staff that carry out general administration tasks with local vendors and government officials. The facility is also a transit place for military personnel, United Nations Liaison Office Beirut (UNLOB), and UNDP UN Volunteer programme. Subject to a more in-depth review of the necessity of maintaining civilian administrative operations at Naqoura, the utility of UNIFIL house of such size should be reassessed.

32. The UNIFIL House security was reviewed by UNIFIL military personnel in April 2004, and identified a number of physical and technical security enhancements needed for it to be Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) compliant. The report concluded that current arrangements are "deemed adequate for first line guarding and reporting purposes, the House is nevertheless vulnerable against potential terrorist attacks." The Mission has requested funds to acquire equipment to address security deficiencies identified, which includes CCTV cameras, scanners, x-ray machines and vehicle inspection mirrors. We also note the concerns of Administration about constructions that have commenced opposite UNIFIL House on an embassy. Proposed access to the construction site will significantly infringe onto an otherwise reasonable security perimeter.

33. A private commercial security complemented with an armed Lebanese Police presence provides full time security coverage. As is the case at Naqoura, security personnel do not have minimum required equipment to carry out their gate access control duties.

**Recommendation 6**

The Head of Mission should strengthen the perimeter security of and access control to the UNIFIL offices in Naqoura and Beirut and rectify the deficiencies noted above. It is expected that the external consultants report will provide a comprehensive list of physical, technical and human resource countermeasure options (AP2004/672/01/06).

39. UNIFIL accepted the recommendation. OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented. OIOS requests that a copy of the consultants report and the status of implementation of recommendations contained therein be made available to OIOS auditors for review.

**E. Other Issue**

Enforce completion of the Basic Security in the Field-Staff Safety, Health and Welfare Course

34. The completion of the Basic Security in the Field-Staff Safety, Health and Welfare course is mandatory for all UN staff in peacekeeping missions. Opportunities for staff to complete the mandatory online course, by 31 March 2004, were made available for all UNIFIL staff.

35. A random sample of international civilian staff members indicated that four of 14 surveyed had not completed the course.

36. The Personnel Section and SAO have not coordinated their joint responsibilities to ensure that staff completes the course and completion certificates are received and appropriately filed.

#### **Recommendation 7**

The Chief Civilian Personnel Officer and SAO should obtain from the IT section the list of personnel who have not completed the course and enforce completion of the security-training requirement.  
(AP2004/672/01/7)

40. UNIFIL accepted the recommendation and stated that it will "*ensure that all personnel have completed the security-training requirement by 31 October 2004.*" OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

### **VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

37. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations  
Ms. Hazel Scott, Director, ASD/DPKO  
Mr. Patrick Devaney, CAO, UNIFIL  
UN Board of Auditors  
Programme Officer, OIOS  
Mr. Terrance Norris, Chief Resident Auditor, UNOCI  
Mr. Arnold Valdez, Auditor, IAD I

## ACRONYMS

CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CMT	Crisis Management Team
CSO	Chief Security Officer
DCSO	Deputy Chief Security Officer
DO	Designated Official
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FC	Force Commander
HOM	Head of Mission (and the FC are one)
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
SG	UN Secretary-General
SMT	Security Management Team
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNLOB	United Nations Liaison Office Beirut
USG	Under-Secretary-General



OIOS/IAD Client Satisfaction Survey

The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. A key element of this assessment involves determining how our clients rate the quality and value added by the audits. As such, I am requesting that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, and complete the survey below. I assure you that the information you provide will remain strictly confidential.

**Audit Title & Assignment No.: OIOS Audit No. AP2004/672/01: Audit of UNIFIL Field Security Procedures**

**By checking the appropriate circle please rate:**

1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:
  - accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions
  - clarity and conciseness
  - balance and objectivity
  - timeliness
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.

	1 (poor)	2	3	4(excellent)
1.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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-- accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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