United Nations ✸ Nations Unies

Internal Audit Division I
Office of Internal Oversight Services

TO: Mr. Jacques Paul Klein,
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
and Head of Mission
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

DATE: 20 September 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:M(23/04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

P. Azarias

SUBJECT:
OBJET: **OIOS Audit No. AP2004/626/09: Audit of Security Procedures in Liberia
(UNMIL)**

1.   I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the subject audit, which was conducted by the Office of the Chief Resident Auditor in the United Nations Million in Liberia (UNMIL). The audit was conducted in accordance with the general and specific standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such tests as the auditors considered necessary.

2.   Based on comments received, recommendations remain open in OIOS' recommendations database pending further actions. Recommendations 2, 4, 5, and 8 through 11 require further action by UNMIL, and recommendations 1, 3, 6, 7 require action by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Also, please note that OIOS considers recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, and 10 as being of critical importance and requests that particular attention is paid to these recommendations.

3.   I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the cooperation and assistance extended to us on this assignment.

Cc: Ms. Hazel Scott, Director, ASD/DPKO
Mr. Tun Myat, Director, Deputy UN Security Coordinator.
Ms. Savitry Butchey, Director of Administration, UNMIL
Major-General Ishmael Opande, Force Commander, UNMIL
UN Board of Auditors
Ms. Juanita Villarosa, Resident Auditor, UNMIL

Office of Internal Oversight Services

Internal Audit Division I

Audit of Field Security Procedures in Liberia

Audit no:	AP2004/626/09
Report date:	20 September 2004
Audit team:	S. Goolsarran, Chief Resident Auditor
	Auditors V. Bendapudi, S. Ferrell

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Audit of Field Security Procedures in Liberia (AP2004/626/09)

OIOS conducted an audit of field security procedures at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The audit was conducted during the period 13 June to 17 July 2004.

UNMIL was established with effect from 1 October 2003. Although there is evidence that concerted efforts are being made to ensure adequate procedures are put in place for the security of UN personnel and the safeguarding of UN assets, the process needs to be accelerated. In particular, the staffing of the Security Section is not up to the required level and there is urgent need to procure the necessary security equipment and to have an improvement in the warden system. There is no formalized security education program in the mission and emergency evacuation procedures are not rehearsed.

OIOS made a number of recommendations to improve the operational effectiveness of the Security Plan and to strengthen the overall security of UNMIL's personnel and facilities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

1.   OIOS conducted an audit of UNMIL field security procedures in Monrovia, Liberia carried out in July 2004 as part of a global review of the security procedures in place for political and peacekeeping missions throughout the world.   The audit was conducted in accordance with the general and specific standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such tests as the auditors considered necessary under the circumstances.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

2.   The objectives of the audit were to assess:

(a)   Whether the Mission's overall security procedures are being efficiently and effectively carried out;

(b)   If the Mission's security staff and resources are adequate and are being effectively managed; and

(c)   Whether there are any organizational or other problems that affect the Mission's effective implementation of the security and emergency-planning requirements.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

3.   The audit scope covered the Security Plan for UN offices/agencies operation in Liberia, the security staffing and operations for UNMIL and the level of coordination with the various parties and officials involved in execution of the security mandate in the Mission area.   The auditor undertook such audit procedures as a walkthrough and physical inspection of UNMIL facilities, an analysis of data and structured interviews with key personnel of UNMIL and other entities involved in UN Security.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4.   UNMIL was established in October 2003.   While there is evidence that efforts are being made to ensure adequate procedures are put in place for the security of UN personnel and the safeguarding of UN assets, the process needs to be accelerated.   In particular, the staffing of the Security Section stands at 60 per cent of the required level and there is urgent need to acquire necessary security equipment and to have an improvement in the warden system. There is no formalized security education program in the mission, emergency evacuation procedures were not rehearsed and security personnel required a formalized security education programme.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Inadequacy of Staffing at the Security Section

5.   The Security Section has an authorized staffing of 159 for the period to 30 June 2004, as indicated in figure 1. The revised actual staffing as at 31 May 2004 was, however, 97, giving a vacancy rate of 39 per cent of the authorized staffing, as shown below:

Figure 1: Security Section Staffing Levels as at 30 June 2004

Category	Authorized	Actual	Vacant
P-5	1	0	1
P-3	2	0	2
P-2 *	11	3	8
Field Service	49	33	16
General Service (OL)	1	0	1
Special Security	18	15	3
National Staff	77	46	31
TOTAL	159	97	62
PERCENTAGE	100%	61.0%	39.0%

6.   This state of affairs can have an adverse effect of the operations of the Security Section with consequent implications for the security and safety of staff members as well as the safeguarding of the Mission's equipment. This is particularly so since five out of the fifteen counties are still in Security Phase 5 – Evacuation, while the remainder are in Phase 4 – Program Suspension. In fact, only five out of the eight security offices were established outside Monrovia with two to three staff members each, as opposed to the required eight. The Chief Security Officer explained that the present staffing situation is due to the pace of recruitment at PMSS in New York. However, as can be noted from the above table, approximately 50% of the vacant positions relates to national staff.

> **Recommendation 1**
>
> UNMIL SRSG should take urgent measures to fill all vacancies in the Security Section to enable it to become fully operational and to properly discharge its responsibilities (AP 2004/626/09/01).

7.   *The UNMIL Administration agreed with this recommendation and stated that measures have been taken and still underway to accelerate the recruitment of Security Officers and that in spite of the lengthy administrative process in fielding staff, the mission has proceeded with planned activities. The mission also agreed that it is imperative that the full complement of security personnel should be in place at the very beginning and closing of a mission as these are the most volatile times in terms of staff security and safety, protection of UNOE and security assessments for new installations. It may be worth mentioning that in view of more competitive conditions of service offered by other international organizations and private security companies, it is difficult to attract*

qualified security personnel such as close protection officers. However, since the time of the audit, there have been some improvements in the staffing table of the Security Section by 11.9 per cent since 31 May 2004, bringing the vacancy rate to 27 per cent. OIOS will close this recommendation upon notification from the mission that all Security Section posts have been filled.

8.   With regards to Figure 1 above, the actual number of P-2 posts on board has been revised to reflect 3 Security Officers (P-2) that arrived in the mission area in May 2004.   As a result, the "actual" number of P-2 level posts should be 3 instead of 11 as previously reported. This resulted in a decreased vacancy rate of 39 per cent for the Security Section as at 30 June 2004.

9.   The auditors were unable to obtain information from the Security Section on any budget assumptions and justifications covering the accounting period to 30 June 2004.   The Chief of Security explained that, given the need for an urgent start up of the Mission's operations, the conventional methods for budget preparation were not followed. In addition, the Security Section is not a "self-accounting" one since it operates under the Office of the Director of Administration. The Chief Budget Officer, however, provided a schedule of budgeted acquisition of security and safety equipment valued at US$2.8M, inclusive of freight. There are no other identified costs associated with the operations of the Security Section.

10.   For the Mission's proposed budget 2004-2005, the Security Section also has no documentation of any proposals along with the relevant assumptions and justifications. The Chief Budget Officer, however, provided the auditors with a schedule of proposed expenditure totaling $13.859M, of which $9.537M relates to the emoluments of international staff while $2.130M relates to general supplies and equipment.

> **Recommendation 2**
>
> The Security Section of UNMIL should prepare on an annual basis budgetary proposals, incorporating work plans, assumptions and justifications for the amounts requested as well as performance or key output indicators against which actual performance can be measured (AP 2004/626/09/02).

11.   UNMIL *concurred with this recommendation and indicated that the Security Section is now fully involved in budget proposals in consultation with the UNMIL Budget Section. Formal work plans are being prepared within the Security Section for early implementation. It should be noted that the Security Section is not a Self Accounting, Requisitioning nor an Asset Holding Section and as such is reliant upon other Sections for those tasks* OIOS will close this recommendation upon receipt of documentation on formal work plans.

Need to Accelerate the Procurement of Safety and Security Equipment

12.   In terms of the equipment requirement for the Security Section, up to the time of reporting no such equipment had been acquired. Evidence was seen that as early as October 2003, the Security Section made representation for the acquisition of the equipment. However, it was not until 22 May 2004 that Requisition No. 4SUP-157 and valued at $2.385M was approved for the purchase of equipment for the Logistic, Training & Development Unit.

13.   Given that the Mission is in the last month of the budget period, it seems unlikely that the equipment would be bought before the close of the accounting period. In fact, a check with the Procurement Section indicated that no action was taken in relation to this requisition, and the entire list of equipment was re-budgeted for in the new accounting period.

Recommendation 3

UNMIL's SRSG should take urgent measures to procure the required equipment for the Security Section to enable it to properly discharge its responsibilities (AP 2004/626/09/03).

14.   *The UNMIL Administration agreed to this recommendation and indicated that the necessary security equipment is being procured and is gradually arriving to the Mission. Further, the mission has experienced problems in procuring arms and ammunition, x-ray line scanners, metal- and explosives detectors due to the security status of the country and laws and regulations in supplying countries that prohibit the selling of such items to countries like Liberia, despite the fact that they are intended for the use of the United Nations. This is yet another issue that needs urgent attention and rectification by UN HQ and proper procedures must be put in place in order to speed up procurement and delivery of security related equipment for start-up phases of missions. It is also imperative that all security related equipment, like security personnel should be fully deployed at the very beginning of a new mission.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database until this issue has been addressed by UNHQ.

Absence of E-PAS

15.   The Mission has not yet commenced the use of E-PAS for evaluating the performance of its staff members. Instead, it uses the Field Operation Performance Appraisal System (FOPA). See attached sample document at Appendix 1. Part 1 requires the staff member to describe briefly his/her major assignments during the period under review and whether they were clearly defined and explained while Part 2 provides for comments by the staff member's supervisor in relation to Part 1. Part 2 also provides for ratings from 1 to 5 on a number of factors such as quality of work, quantity of work, working under pressure/hazard, dependability and adaptability and supervisory skills. There is no provision for the definition of goals and achievement.

16.   The Chief Security Officer explained that there is a special appraisal system for staff members who are on short-term contract i.e. less than a year. The appraisal is done against the staff member's job description and list of duties. He nevertheless acknowledged the need for

performance appraisals to include a definition of goals and achievements specifically relating to security and evacuation planning.

Recommendation 4

> UNMIL's SRSG should introduce the Electronic Performance Appraisal System (E-PAS) so that, among other things, goals as well as their related actions and success criteria can be incorporated in a staff member's performance appraisal. In relation to officials involved in security aspects of the mission, goals and achievements should relate to security and evacuation planning (AP 2004/626/09/04).

17.   *The UNMIL Administration took note of this recommendation and indicated that the ePAS, as a UN Headquarters-administered project, could only be implemented after the necessary training has been provided to all staff mission wide and the necessary installations have been done electronically. It is their understanding that this system might be in place by beginning of 2005. It may be necessary to carry out a careful review by DPKO and OHRM at UN HQ whether the ePAS system can be adopted as is or whether there would be a need to make some adjustment to reflect the needs of Special Peacekeeping Operations.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database until the implementation of the ePAS in 2005 is undertaken.

Requirements of MOSS not Fully Implemented

18.   On 27 February 2004, the FSCO presented to the SMT a draft of a revised country MOSS for Liberia. The revision includes the recommendation to have shatter/blast resistant film to be fitted in all exterior and interior windows of UN buildings in Liberia. The SMT unanimously approved of the revised MOSS at its meeting of 12 March 2004. The joint purchase of the blast film for all UN agencies was also discussed. At the time of the audit, 50 rolls of film arrived from Brindisi and work had already started to place the material on one of the three buildings occupied by UNMIL.

19.   A proposed MORSS was submitted to the SMT on 27 May 2004. Given the costs involved, the SMT unanimously approved of the document being sent to HQ for approval accompanied by letter from DO pointing out the cost implications.

20.   The auditors reviewed the revised MOSS for Liberia for compliance and held discussions with both the Chief Security Officer and the Field Security Coordinator. There are 77 categories of items in the revised MOSS. However, the Mission is yet to comply fully with 21 items.

Recommendation 5

> The Security Management Team of Liberia set an appropriate deadline for the Mission to fully implement the revised country MOSS, especially with regard to the installation of shatter/blast resistant film and the procurement of all outstanding materials (AP 2004/626/09/05).

21.   *The UNMIL Administration concurred with this recommendation and indicated that presently, Shatter Resistant Film (SRF) was being installed in UNMIL and UN Agency buildings in Monrovia. Also, a priority list was established by the UNMIL Security Section and communicated to the UNMIL Engineering Section which is responsible for the installation of the SRF. The work is slowly progressing by the already overloaded UNMIL Engineering Section and installation is now completed in the UNMIL HQ main building, the "Green Building" and the UNOL building that was recently taken over again by UNMIL to house the OCHA department of UNMIL. The installation of SRF was a subject of discussion in the Liberia SMT on 12 August 2004 and a deadline for installation will be set by the SMT once relevant information is obtained on the status of film in Liberia and estimated timeframe it takes to complete the installation in those buildings that are not yet completed.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending receipt of documentation evidencing the implementation of the recommendation.*

Reporting Relationship of the Chief Security Officer

22.   The auditors noted that the Security Section does not have any direct reporting relationship to the Head of Mission who is also the Designated Official. Instead, such reporting relationship is the Chief Administrative Officer. This practice is also not in keeping with the requirements of the DPKO Field Security Policy issued on 19 December 2003. Paragraph 9 reads as follows:

> "In each DPKO-led mission, the Chief Security Officer (CSO) reports directly to the Head of Mission, who will direct the CSO to develop and implement the Mission Security Programme. The CSO directly advises the Head of Mission on the coordination and integration of all security-related plans and assets, and the full implementation of the Head of Mission's directives/plans for the security and safety of the personnel and assets of his/her mission. The CSO will maintain a technical staff information link with DPKO SFP for the purpose of staying informed and coordinating routine security matters."

23.   The Mission is therefore yet to comply with this requirement of the DPKO Field Security Policy.

Recommendation 6

UNMIL's SRSG should ensure urgent compliance with DPKO Field Security Policy as it relates to the Chief Security Officer having direct reporting relationship with the SRSG (AP 2004/626/09/06).

24.   *UNMIL Administration took note of this recommendation and indicated that the UNMIL Chief Security Officer reports daily to the SRSG and meets with the Mission's senior staff every morning at 0900 hrs. Additionally, regular consultation meetings on security matters related to UNMIL operations are held. The Security Section is, however, administered by the Director of Administration (DOA) of UNMIL, who deals with contractual and other staff matters.* However OIOS considers that the purpose of paragraph 9 of DPKO Field Security Policy is to bring Chief Security Officer under direct administrative control of the SRSG but not mere reporting in the

morning meetings. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database until this issue has been addressed by DPKO.

<u>Absence of Mechanisms to Identify Lessons Learnt</u>

25.   The Mission has not yet put in place mechanisms for the identification of security-related 'lessons identified and best practices". The Chief of Security explained that this was due to the stage in the life of the Mission and the staffing situation of the Security Section. He pointed out that the Section does have access to various reports and is in constant contact with DPKO and UNSECOORD. He nevertheless acknowledged the need to develop certain procedures in order to improve the Section's day-to-day operations.

> **Recommendation 7**
>
> UNMIL Security Section, in collaboration with DPKO and UNSECOORD should develop procedures to identify security-related "lessons identified and best practices" and to incorporate such lessons and practices in its day-to-day activities (AP 2004/626/09/07).

26.   The *UNMIL Administration agreed with this recommendation and indicated that DPKO will shortly establish procedures to identify security related lessons learned in cooperation with DPKO Field Missions through yearly consultation meetings with e.g. UNSECOORD where all CSOs meet to share lessons identified. This whole problem is however further exacerbated by the fact that there is not one (1), but rather four (4), security systems within the United Nations. It is anticipated that there will be changes in the security management within the UN this fall, hopefully, to include the amalgamation of the already classified, "dysfunctional", four (4) security systems into one (1) that would include elements such as UN Security Training Academy.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database until this issue has been addressed by DPKO.

<u>Need for Improvement in the Warden System</u>

27.   Appointment of wardens is to be based on the zonal system according to Para 28 of United Nations Field Security Handbook. The zone covered by a warden should preferably not be larger than that which enables him to reach staff members on foot in case of emergency. Security Plan for UNMIL also endorses the same.

28.   However as per the Warden System formalized on 07 June 04, Section Chiefs were appointed as wardens irrespective of zones or place of residence. DOA serves as the Chief Warden for the UNMIL Administration side and Chief of Staff O/SRSG serves as a Chief Warden for the Substantive side of UNMIL.

29.   OIOS noted that appointment of administrative heads as wardens poses a problem in the event of an emergency since the staff under particular warden may reside in a different zone. Chief Security Officer explained that present system of administrative heads as wardens would be more practicable because it would be easier for Section Chiefs to pass on the information to the his staff

under his/her command. Moreover, the same system was implemented in UN missions in Kosovo and Bosnia. Nevertheless, we are of the view that apart from communicating with the staff warden is responsible to be physically present during the emergency at assembly points/concentration area to coordinate security arrangements.

Recommendation 8

The Security Section of UNMIL should review the present arrangement of appointing the administrative heads of section as wardens and consider having a zonal warden system in order to facilitate better coordination of security arrangements, information and instructions (AP 2004/626/09/08).

30.   *The mission took note of this recommendation and indicated that the current warden system was based on the system the UN Agencies used at the commencement of UNMIL operations in Liberia. Extensive meetings were held between the UNSECOORD FSCO and UNMIL CSO on the best way to perform this important function noting that the UN operations in Liberia are fully integrated and that the SRSG for Liberia is also the coordinator of UN operations in the country. With a full integrated mission approach, the Warden System is already in place for the UN Agencies – built on the same principle as the current UNMIL Warden System i.e. that of a Department / Section / Unit approach – would have to be dismantled and UN Agency Staff, CIVPOL, MILOBS and more would have to fall under the responsibilities of a particular Zone Warden. However, this approach would have been practically impossible to implement. Therefore, it was decided by the UNSECOORD FSCO and the UNMIL CSO to use the Department / Section / Unit approach and build on existing means of communications and transport now in place in each Department / Section / Unit in order not to complicate things when in a crisis situation of having Staff Members revert to a "new" system of getting from A to B. This system approach is used in other missions, such as UNMIK and before that in UNMIBH and is acceptable. The system has been exercised within the Mission and found to be very functional, by those who administered the exercise, so the current evidence points to the fact that the Department / Section / Unit Warden System is more practical for the current UN Operations in Liberia than the Zonal System. Further exercises of the system are planned.* While OIOS noted the comments of UNMIL, it will keep this recommendation open in its database and will continue to monitor the effectiveness of the warden system.

31.   We interviewed ten wardens. All of them confirmed having received the letter of appointment as warden from SRSG, the designated official, setting out their duties and responsibilities. However they informed that they were not given any formal training in the warden system by the Security Section. None of them met with staff under their responsibility.

32.   We sent a questionnaire to 25 staff members in connection with the warden system. We received responses from 11 staff members and analysis of these responses indicated that a) Five did not know who their wardens were b) Ten did not receive any briefing from their wardens c) all of them were unsure of the effectiveness of the warden system because it was introduced recently d) Four of them were not familiar with the mission evacuation plan. It is evident that Warden System is not as effective as it should be.

Recommendation 9

The Security Section of UNMIL should conduct periodic briefings of wardens to sensitize them as to their duties and responsibilities. Wardens in turn should have regular meetings with staff under their responsibility so as to keep the latter informed of the latest security assessment and the actions they need to take in event of an emergency (AP 2004/626/09/09).

33.   The *UNMIL Administration agreed with this recommendation and stated that all Wardens have been provided with a comprehensive list of their duties along with their Appointment letters. A five (5) page extract (see attached) of the UN Liberia Security Plan has been sent to all Staff Members of this Mission. Wardens have also been briefed in the UNMIL Section Chiefs meetings on their responsibilities, and the necessity to hold regular meetings with their staff. Briefing packages for the Wardens are being prepared and periodic briefings will continue as necessary.* OIOS has reviewed the briefing package for wardens and will keep this recommendation open pending documentation that all wardens are briefed and that regular meetings are held with staff under their responsibility.

Emergency Evacuation procedures not rehearsed

34.   Emergency evacuation procedures in the mission are required to disseminate to the staff in order to make them aware of necessary steps to be taken in case of emergency. This aspect is particularly relevant in the context of uncertain mission environment. At the same time it is absolutely essential to rehearse the procedures to equip the staff to face the emergency situation.

35.   OIOS have sent questionnaires to twenty five staff members to understand the level of awareness on security related matters. We received eleven responses out of which four were not aware of the emergency evacuation procedures and all of them indicated that these procedures were not rehearsed.

36.   Failure to rehearse the emergency evacuation procedures can pose a serious security risk and expose the staff members to the dangers.

37.   Chief of Security explained that since the security section is engaged in establishing systems in the mission, time could not be devoted to rehearse the emergency procedures.

Recommendation 10

The UNMIL Security Section should ensure emergency evacuation procedures are rehearsed in the mission so that staff members would be well equipped to face situations during emergency (AP 2004/626/09/10).

38.   *The Mission concurred with this recommendation.* According to UNMIL, *a partial rehearsal was conducted, as mentioned under point h., on the effectiveness of the Warden*

System/Evacuation Plan. This confirmed that our present system works better, although it does not follow UNSECOORD's Field Security handbook outline. It is probably more effective than the recommended Zonal based Warden System. The current system builds on existing lines of communication and transportation as they now exist. More exercises are planned for the future. OIOS will keep this recommendation open until evidence has been provided on rehearsal of the evacuation plan.

Absence of formalized security education program

39.   Security education is fundamental for all staff members to develop adequate knowledge to guarantee individual competence and accountability commensurate with security responsibilities. It seeks to develop and maintain personal knowledge and understanding of the Mission Security Plan and to implement the said plan in order to ensure security of the mission personnel and assets. However we noted that no such education program is in place in the mission. Chief Security Officer acknowledged the need for such education and informed that mission is in the process of starting a Security Program Education along the lines of model program developed by MONUC.

Recommendation 11

The Security Section should accelerate the efforts to have a formalized security education program in place in order to develop and maintain personal knowledge and understanding of staff members relating to Mission Security matters (AP 2004/626/09/11).

40.   *The Mission agreed with this recommendation and indicated that all available efforts are being made to accelerate the compilation of a Mission Security Training Module and, as already stated to the auditors, the MONUC model will be used as a baseline document for this purpose.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open pending implementation of the mission security education program by the mission.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

41.   OIOS wish to express its gratitude for the cooperation extended to the audit team.

Patricia Azarias, Director
Internal Audit Division I

United Nations   Nations Unies

OIOS/IAD Client Satisfaction Survey

The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. A key element of this assessment involves determining how our clients rate the quality and value added by the audits. As such, I am requesting that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, and complete the survey below. I assure you that the information you provide will remain strictly confidential.

Audit Title & Assignment No.: Audit of UNMIL Field Security Procedures AP2004/626/09

By checking the appropriate circle please rate:

	1 (poor)	2	3	4 (excellent)
1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.	◯	◯	◯	◯
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.	◯	◯	◯	◯
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)	◯	◯	◯	◯
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:				
-- accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions	◯	◯	◯	◯
-- clarity and conciseness	◯	◯	◯	◯
-- balance and objectivity	◯	◯	◯	◯
-- timeliness	◯	◯	◯	◯
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.	◯	◯	◯	◯
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors	◯	◯	◯	◯
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.	◯	◯	◯	◯

Please comment on any areas in which you have rated the audit team's performance as below your expectations. Also, please feel free to provide any further comments you may have on the audit process to let us know what we are doing well and what can be improved.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Name:_____   **Date:**_____

Title:_____

Organization:_____

Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please send the completed survey form as soon as possible in the enclosed envelope addressed to: Ms. Patricia Azarias, Director, Internal Audit Division, OIOS, Room DC2-518 United Nations Headquarters New York, NY 10017 U.S.A. or by fax to: 212-963-3388.