

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AEMR
AMGT
AE
AU
AID
AORC
APER
AS
AM
AFIN
AMED
AJ
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
ABLD
AL
AA
APECO
AGAO
AY
AGMT
APEC
AINF
AG
ACS
AECL
AFFAIRS
ABUD
ASUP
ADANA
AADP
AMCHAMS
ARF
ASEAN
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
APCS
ADCO
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ADM
AN
AIT
BU
BR
BL
BO
BA
BB
BG
BM
BBSR
BH
BEXP
BK
BD
BTIO
BT
BE
BY
BF
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BILAT
BIDEN
BC
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CH
CG
CF
CU
CE
CVIS
CASC
CO
CS
CA
CIDA
CBW
CW
CMGT
CI
CODEL
CY
CPAS
CJAN
CD
CWC
CDG
CIA
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CT
CR
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CFED
CV
CACS
CARSON
CLINTON
CN
CONS
CM
CAC
CIC
COPUOS
CDC
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EG
EZ
EUN
ECON
ETRD
ECPS
EFIN
ENRG
ETTC
EPET
EINV
EAID
EAIR
EWWT
EU
EAGR
EC
ELAB
EIND
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
EFIS
ELTN
ET
ECIN
EFTA
ES
EINT
EI
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
ELN
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
EXIM
ETRO
ENIV
ESA
ER
EK
EUR
EFINECONCS
EUMEM
EUREM
EPA
ERNG
ENERG
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
IS
IZ
IR
IC
IO
IN
ID
IGAD
IT
ILC
IAEA
ITU
ICAO
IMO
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
IAHRC
ITF
INRA
INRO
IWC
IQ
IV
ICRC
ICTY
INRB
IEFIN
ILO
ITRA
ITALY
IBET
ISRAELI
IL
INTELSAT
IRC
IDP
ICTR
IRAQI
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
INDO
IDA
ISLAMISTS
KSPR
KNNP
KWBG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KN
KS
KIPR
KCRM
KDEM
KIRF
KJUS
KHLS
KSCA
KOMC
KAWC
KV
KFRD
KWMN
KTIP
KPWR
KSUM
KGHG
KTIA
KTFN
KIRC
KCOR
KACT
KMDR
KGIC
KOLY
KUNR
KIDE
KMPI
KPKO
KCFE
KVPR
KRAD
KPAL
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTEX
KTDB
KFSC
KZ
KSEP
KFLU
KE
KU
KPLS
KRVC
KRIM
KSTH
KG
KFLO
KPOA
KICC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KBCT
KSAF
KMOC
KDRG
KBIO
KREC
KSTC
KVRP
KBTR
KMIG
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KWAC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KWMM
KPRP
KNEI
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KX
KMCA
KCRS
KMFO
KID
KCIP
KNAR
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KHDP
KFIN
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KTER
KRCM
KCFC
KSAC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KCOM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KAID
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KHSA
MPOS
MOPS
MARR
MTCR
MNUC
MASS
MX
MCAP
MAR
MTRE
MASC
MK
MG
MTCRE
MI
MD
MA
MO
MY
MU
ML
MRCRE
MAS
MEDIA
MC
MR
MIL
MW
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
NATO
NG
NL
NZ
NT
NW
NO
NU
NS
NPT
NASA
NI
NK
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NP
NATIONAL
NSSP
NSF
NA
NGO
NV
NR
NDP
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NEW
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NPG
NSC
NPA
NSFO
OPDC
OPRC
OEXC
OTRA
ODIP
OIIP
OVIP
OPIC
OPCW
OAS
OREP
OSCE
OSCI
OES
OFDP
OECD
OCS
OIC
OPAD
OVP
OHUM
OFFICIALS
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PTER
PHUM
PK
PREF
PM
PHSA
PA
PINS
PE
PBTS
PCI
PO
PL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PGIV
PROP
PP
PBIO
POL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PBT
PMIL
POV
PTBS
PG
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PROV
PNAT
PINF
PRL
PAS
PDOV
PRAM
PREO
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PAO
PREFA
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PGOC
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RW
REACTION
RCMP
RSO
RO
RP
ROOD
RM
ROBERT
RICE
REGION
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
RFE
REPORT
SY
SP
SOCI
SMIG
SNAR
SCUL
SC
SU
SO
SI
SENV
SZ
SW
SA
SR
SF
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SEN
SG
SYR
SWE
SK
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SCRS
SYRIA
SL
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SHI
SHUM
SIPRS
TSPA
TSPL
TU
TBIO
TRGY
TPHY
TS
TP
TW
TBID
TI
TF
TZ
TD
TT
TN
TNGD
TC
TX
TH
TL
TIP
THPY
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
US
UNSC
UNGA
UK
UP
UNCHC
UN
UNMIK
UNCSD
UY
USTR
USOAS
UNHRC
UNFCYP
UG
UNAUS
UNESCO
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
USUN
UZ
USNC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNEP
USEU
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO428, ALCKMIN THE BETTER MANAGER, SAO PAULO BUSINESS TELLS A/S WAYNE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO428.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO428 | 2006-04-24 17:54 | 2011-03-05 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO3003
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0428/01 1141754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241754Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4898
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6043
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2858
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7015
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2516
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2171
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1923
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2727
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1665
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0250
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2378
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000428
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND EB/IFD/OMA K.MOSS
STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/LEZNY
STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC
NSC FOR CRONIN
TREASURY FOR OASIA - DAS LEE AND FPARODI
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/ITAUSCS/OIO/WH/RD/DDEVITO/SHUPKA SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ETRD BR
SUBJECT: ALCKMIN THE BETTER MANAGER, SAO PAULO BUSINESS TELLS A/S WAYNE
REFS: (A) Sao Paulo 415;
(B) Brasilia 608
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
------- SUMMARY -------
¶1. (SBU) E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary of State (A/S) for Economic and Business Affairs, visited Sao Paulo April 5-6 to participate in the World Economic Forum on Latin America. While here, A/S Wayne also had several meetings with Sao Paulo business leaders. They indicated a general disappointment in the Lula Administration's lost opportunities for improving the economy over the last four years, particularly the failure to make headway on the microeconomic reform agenda, and conveyed a preference for leading opposition presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin. Despite trailing substantially in the opinion polls, political and financial analysts claimed Alckmin has a fighting chance to win the presidency in October. Alckmin, who recently resigned his post as governor of Sao Paulo state to run for president, is seen in the business community as a better manager and more likely to favor trade agreements with the United States. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ----- IF YOU CAN'T CHANGE GOV'T POLICY, CHANGE THE GOV'T --------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (SBU) In general, the business leaders with whom A/S Wayne met in Sao Paulo expressed dissatisfaction with the state of the Brazilian economy and the way it has been managed by the Lula Administration (Ref A). On April 5, A/S Wayne met with the president and several directors of the Industry Center of Sao Paulo State (CIESP), a non-profit trade organization providing technical, legal and other support services to 9,700 member companies. A/S Wayne was told that the GoB has wasted many opportunities to spur greater economic growth and has fostered policies, including high interest rates and an appreciated currency, that have had the effect of favoring commodity exports at the expense of the manufacturing sector. While several CIESP directors remained circumspect regarding the upcoming presidential election and which candidate the business community likely would support, President Claudio Vaz pointedly said he had no qualms stating that most industrialists he knows want to see a change in Brazil's leadership. "Knowing we cannot expect change from the Lula government," said Vaz, "we would prefer a change in government."
¶3. (SBU) When asked at lunch about former Sao Paulo state governor Geraldo Alckmin's (Brazilian Social Democracy Party - PSDB) chances for success in the presidential race, former journalist and current political consultant Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva said Alckmin is a viable candidate and has a solid chance of beating Lula. While a string of corruption scandals have toppled major players in the governing Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) and the Lula Administration, all agreed that Lula himself is still a strong political figure, especially among the poor. Even with lackluster economic performance (see Ref A), Lula will be hard to beat, said Silva. He elaborated that, unlike in years past, Brazil is in a new era where political scandals do not rattle the economy; without severe economic shocks, the government remains stable and the Brazilian people appear satisfied with the status quo. Political consultant Joseph Tutundjian added that while many Brazilians were expecting much more from Lula in terms of poverty elimination and promotion of socio-economic equity, there has been a net gain of "formal" jobs in Brazil over the last three years. (NOTE: Some analysts believe Brazil's informal sector, in which many people hold jobs of limited duration, benefits and pay, comprises more than 40% of the economy as a whole. END NOTE.)
SAO PAULO 00000428 002 OF 003
--------------------------------------------- ------- NEW STYLE BUT NO POLICY SHIFTS EXPECTED FROM ALCKMIN --------------------------------------------- -------
¶4. (SBU) The business leaders with whom A/S Wayne met over two days almost unanimously agreed that if Alckmin were elected, they would see immediate and important changes in how the GOB operates, and consequently, in Brazil's business environment. At CIESP, Boris Tabacof, an entrepreneur originally from the Northeast of Brazil with experience in electronics, chemicals and banking, said, "We expect that with a new president, we will see change on the first day." Yet, all the business leaders and analysts cautioned that they would not expect to see major economic policy shifts with Alckmin as president, especially regarding macro-economic management. Rather, the business leaders suggested, based on Alckmin's solid state-level record, that the government under Alckmin would simply be more effective in carrying out policy.
-------------------------------- ALCKMIN, THE DISCIPLINED MANAGER --------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) The consensus among business leaders and analysts was that, with 12 years aggregate experience as vice-governor and governor of Sao Paulo state, Alckmin, who is also a medical doctor, has simply proven to be a better manager than Lula. CIESP president Vaz noted that Alckmin better understands how to make public-private partnerships work, and that as an experienced state executive, he could harmonize policies and priorities between states more effectively than Lula. Likewise, almost all the business leaders consulted said they expected Alckmin to improve trade relations between Brazil and the United States, especially in regard to bilateral and sectoral agreements. Former journalist Silva tried to bolster this assertion by pointing out that as governor, Alckmin regularly convened a well-received council on trade to boost export opportunities for companies in Sao Paulo state.
¶6. (SBU) During the lunch session, consultant Tutundjian further described Alckmin as "incredibly objective and effective," and as "a man of action." Tutundjian said Alckmin has been able to reduce taxes in Sao Paulo state and still grow the economy by effectively raising residents' incomes. Tutundjian added that Alckmin has been the only Brazilian governor to do so, and wondered aloud why other politicians in Brazil have not tried to replicate this model. He noted that Alckmin would be likely to cut government spending as a means to refocus government priorities and spur investment. According to Tutundjian, "all he has to do is spend less, and that alone will help the economy tremendously." Even a one percent reduction in Brazil's deficit would have a huge impact on Brazil's government and economy, because it would force agencies to make better choices, and it would free up bank money now used to finance the government for private loans.
------------------- IMAGE VS. SUBSTANCE -------------------
¶7. (SBU) To illustrate the difference between Lula and Alckmin, Tutundjian recounted a comment he had heard from someone who has met both men. According to this source, "When you meet Lula, he will entice you in two minutes; but when you meet Alckmin, he will change your mind in 30." Thus, the problem for Alckmin will be that Lula has the warmer, more gregarious image, and generally speaking, Brazilians are more taken with image than with substance.
----------------- PARTY ALIGNMENTS SAO PAULO
00000428 003 OF 003
-----------------
¶8. (SBU) Tutundjian raised a concern that Alckmin might be swayed by advice from party associates who are less inclined to support market driven economic policies. He explained there are two main schools of economic thought in Brazil based in two major universities: the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro school advocates reduced tariffs and market driven economics, while the University of Campinas (Sao Paulo State) school remains more interventionist and protectionist. Many of Alckmin's PSDB predecessors and close advisors have aligned in the past with the Campinas school, as has the PT. But Tutundjian said Alckmin has not fostered Campinas-like policies as governor. Franklin Feder, President of Alcoa Aluminum of Brazil, added that he had been told by Pedro Malan, Finance Minister under Lula's predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso and long-time PSDB member and advisor, that Alckmin has no interest in resurrecting interventionist government policies, and would follow market-driven policies.
¶9. (SBU) The CIESP leaders also predicted that if elected, Alckmin would be able to attain a power base rather quickly because of new rules regarding electoral counts. A political party now needs to achieve a threshold level of five percent of the votes in elections for the Chamber of Deputies in order to retain its privileges, such as holding leadership positions in Congress. Many smaller parties are expected to fall short. Thus, surmised CIESP leaders, we should see a consolidation of parties down to as few as five, and any alliance between Alckmin's PSDB and another leading party will be all the more powerful.
----------------------------- COMMENT: HOPE SPRINGS ETERNAL -----------------------------
¶10. (SBU) The business leaders A/S Wayne met with in Sao Paulo were mostly open about their preference for Alckmin over Lula for president, but they also could not help but acknowledge that, to their general dismay, Lula remains strong in the polls despite what one consultant called the "worst corruption scandal in Brazil's history." These business leaders based in Sao Paulo, some Brazilian and some expatriate, have grown familiar with Alckmin's style of executive leadership and his support of business interests. (NOTE: One Brazilian noted almost mockingly that Alckmin has a very "American" style of starting meetings on time, dispensing with opening remarks, sticking to an agenda, and closing with specific action items on which he will follow up. END NOTE). We will need to watch closely who Alckmin chooses as his key economic advisors, and determine how open he will be to discussions. But given the charismatic Lula's continued strength in the polls, Alckmin will need to add some warmth and folksiness to his "ethical manager" persona if he wants to gain ground on Lula, especially in the Northeast. END COMMENT.
¶11. (U) This cable was coordinated/cleared with Embassy Brasilia and with EB A/S Wayne.
MCMCULLEN