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Viewing cable 05HELSINKI242, ACEH TALKS: CONVERSATION WITH AHTISAARI'S OFFICE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05HELSINKI242 | 2005-02-25 13:22 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000242
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/IET, EUR/NB, AND INR/EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM MOPS MARR EAID ASEC ID FI
SUBJECT: ACEH TALKS: CONVERSATION WITH AHTISAARI'S OFFICE
REF: A. HELSINKI 228
¶B. JAKARTA 2068 (NOTAL)
Classified By: POL Chief John Hall for reasons 1.4(B) and (D)
Summary and Action Request
--------------------------
¶1. (C) On February 24, POL Chief and UK DCM met with
Meeri-Maria Jaarva of former Finnish President Ahtisaari's
staff for a more detailed read-out of the second round of the
GoI-GAM talks held February 21-23 (Ref A). Jaarva described
discussions in each of the agenda items, and said both sides
have been charged with bringing written, concrete proposals
to the next round, scheduled for April 12-17, and to be
prepared to negotiate in detail. Ahtisaari and the GoI had
wanted to hold the next meeting in March, but the GAM needs
more time to prepare -- particularly because they are short
of legal expertise. Jaarva was told by the GoI delegation
that they are hoping for "something tangible" by July or
August; she herself is uncertain whether that goal can be
achieved, but is gratified that at least a process is under
way.
¶2. (C) Jaarva said that one area of special GAM concern is
whether the TNI will go along with a GoI/GAM agreement; in
this regard the GAM had said it is hoping that contacts
between the TNI and the U.S. military can be used to help
bind the armed forces to an agreement. Jaarva also mentioned
that Ahtisaari's office needs financial support for the
process: Ahtisaari's Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
currently pays for the transportation and hotel costs of the
GAM delegation. We would appreciate the Department's advice
as to whether the CMI might usefully approach a corporation
with strong ties to Aceh, to ask for financial sponsorship.
End Summary and Action Request.
Moving Forward on the Agenda
----------------------------
¶3. (C) As reported Ref A, Jaarva said the GAM spent the first
day stonewalling -- insisting on full independence for Aceh
as the only possible outcome, and unwilling to tackle the
point-by-point agenda of Ref B. By mid-afternoon of February
21, Ahtisaari realized that the talks were "going nowhere",
so he adjourned for the day to give the GAM side a chance to
consult internally. He also met separately with them Monday
evening to urge a more constructive stance. On February 22,
the GAM attitude was altogether different, and Ahtisaari was
able to take both sides through the agenda. Jaarva gave us
the following additional detail on the key items, which
should be read in conjunction with Ref A:
-- Political parties: Jaarva said there was quite a long
discussion on political participation, which collided with
the fact that Indonesian law rules out formation of a
political party that essentially has its strength in one
province and which at most would represent two per cent of
Indonesia's people. Ahtisaari has specifically charged the
GoI with preparing a proposal during the inter-round break on
how the GAM can play a political role within the framework of
the Indonesian constitution. Jaarva said the CMI had earlier
asked some Finnish legal experts to review the Special
Autonomy law. Their analysis was sharply critical, said
Jaarva, and Ahtisaari gave the GoI delegation a non-paper
with their comments.
-- Human rights: The GAM is eager to see past injustices
investigated, but Ahtisaari feels this is not the time to
launch a truth and reconciliation process. He is counseling
the GAM to hold back on that demand until a settlement has
had a chance to take hold.
-- Amnesty/Reintegration of fighters: The GoI says it has
prepared a draft amnesty law, which it will table in Round
Three. There is also a GoI plan for providing some land to
disarmed GAM fighters, but Ahtisaari has not seen the details.
-- Security: The GoI remains unwilling to discuss a ceasefire
except as part of an overall settlement, and in any case
Ahtisaari feels a ceasefire would be impossible to monitor at
present. Decommissioning of GAM weapons remains to be sorted
out -- as does disarming of government-supported militias.
The GoI apparently provided some figures on the extent to
which TNI forces and paramilitaries would remain in the
province.
-- Monitoring: Both sides agreed that both military and
civilian monitors will be needed. The GoI suggested that
ASEAN as an organization perform this task. Ahtisaari felt
ASEAN "would not be credible enough" for the GAM, but
suggested that ASEAN and the EU together might suffice. He
left this thought (which he has already mentioned to Solana)
for both sides to consider.
-- Timetable: The GoI apparently did not provide Ahtisaari
with the level of detail discussed by VP Kalla in Ref B, but
did say that they would like to see "something tangible" by
July or August. They originally proposed that Round Three
begin in March. The GAM argued that they needed more time to
prepare, so the dates for the third round will be April
12-17. In particular, the GAM is short of legal expertise.
Apparently their primary legal expert was in jail in Banda
Aceh at the time of the tsunami, and was killed with all
other inmates. A second legal advisor is still incarcerated.
We commented to Jaarva that it might be a useful
confidence-building measure for the GoI to release this
person; she said the GAM had in fact asked for this but the
GoI only reiterated that any amnesty provision must await the
final settlement.
¶4. (C) Ahtisaari adjourned the round at midday on February
23, and charged both sides with preparing written proposals
on each of the agenda items to bring to the table April 12,
and to be ready for several days of detailed negotiation.
Jaarva said that the Finns too wish the next round could take
place in March, since something could happen in the meantime,
but concede that the GAM needs a longer preparation time than
does the GoI. Ahtisaari appealed to both sides to show
restraint on the ground during the break.
¶5. (C) Summing up, Jaarva said, "I wouldn't bet much money
yet -- especially my own -- that there will be an agreement
by July or August. But at least there's a process going on
now." Asked whether Ahtisaari feels both sides are
negotiating in good faith, Jaarva answered with a cautious
yes. A question more difficult to answer is whether the GAM
negotiators represent only their own people, or wider Aceh
society. There was some discussion at the table of engaging
the Acehnese as a whole in the process, she said, but the GoI
shied away from anything that might resemble a referendum.
¶6. (C) Jaarva said one troubling question from Ahtisaari's
point of view is whether the TNI can be counted on to go
along with a settlement. MGEN Tippe was a member of the GoI
delegation and participated in the government side's internal
deliberations, but not in the talks at the table. She said
the GAM fears that the TNI will become a third party to the
negotiations. Ahtisaari hopes that U.S.-Indonesian military
cooperation will help "bind" the TNI to an
internationally-accepted agreement. A second, more prosaic
problem is the cost of these talks. The CMI is only a small
office with a limited budget, and currently is funding the
transportation and hotel costs for the GAM side. (The
Government of Finland provides the manor house in which the
talks are held, and meals served there.) Ahtisaari's staff
will spend part of the break hunting for financial assistance.
¶7. (C) We asked whether the presence of Kingsbury and other
foreign activists had hindered the negotiations. As reported
Ref A, Jaarva said that Ahtisaari had allowed these visitors
onto the grounds of the estate, but had denied them
permission to join the talks. At first the GoI side was
unhappy about the activists, but Ahtisaari made the point to
the government delegation that these people were not
participating in the talks -- and besides, the GoI had jailed
some Acehnese whom the GAM might have wanted to bring
instead. For his part, Ahtisaari was concerned that
Kingsbury was "quite talkative to the press," but on balance
the presence of the activists may have been positive: Jaarva
said that Ahtisaari now suspects they did play a role in
bringing about the GAM delegation's change of attitude on the
night of February 21.
Delegations
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¶8. (SBU) Jaarva provided this list of the two delegations.
All spellings and titles are as received from her.
-- Government --
Supervisor of the delegation:
Mr. Adi Sudjipto Widodo, Coordinating Minister for Political,
Legal and Security Affairs
Delegation:
- Mr. Hamid Awaluddin, Minister for Justice and Human Rights,
Chairman of delegation
- Mr. Sofyan Djalil, Minister for Communications and
Information
- Mr. Farid Husain, Deputy Minister for Social Welfare
- Mr. I. Gusti Agung Wesaka Pudja, Director for Human Rights
and Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Usman Basyah, Deputy III Coordinating Minister for
Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Department of National
Security
In addition to the official delegation:
- Major-General Syarifuddin Tippe, TNI
-- GAM --
- Mr. Malik Mahmud
- Dr. Zaini Abdullah
- Mr. Bakhtiar Abdullah
- Mr. M. Nur Djuli
- Mr. Nurdin Abdul Rahman
In addition to the delegation:
- Mr. Teuku Hadi
- Dr. Damien Kingsbury
- Dr. Vacy Vlazna
- Mr. Muzakkir Abdul Hamid
WEISBERG