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Viewing cable 09PESHAWAR41, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)-PESHAWAR
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PESHAWAR41 | 2009-02-28 11:25 | 2010-11-30 21:30 | SECRET | Consulate Peshawar |
R 281125Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7857
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
SS E C R E T PESHAWAR 000041
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/SCA; DS/TIA/ITA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/28/2019
TAGS: ASEC PK PTER
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)-PESHAWAR
REF: STATE 33533
CLASSIFIED BY: David J. Hazarian, Regional Security Officer,
RSO, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
The following responses are provided for the Security
Environment Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) Responses are keyed to
questions in Reftel.
(U) Demonstrations
¶A. Yes. There are numerous religious communities and
organizations within the NWFP and FATA, including a high volume
of violent Islamist islamaci radical groups that are fully
capable of carrying out anti-American demonstrations. In
addition, political parties, at times, include anti-American
sentiments in their demonstrations on domestic political issues.
i. In Peshawar, YES. There were eleven medium to large
demonstrations following Friday prayers relating to counter
terrorism efforts in the Tribal areas. There was also one large
demonstration where locals were protesting against the NATO
supply shipments transiting Peshawar onward to Afghanistan.
ii. No, Consulate Peshawar is located within the confines of a
Military cantonment and is marginally insulated from
demonstrations.
iii. The one demonstration stated in (Ai), consisted of
approximately 3,500 individuals.
iv. All three are possible. Pakistani military operations in the
FATA are perceived as initiated by the U.S. or policies viewed
by some as anti-Islamic are often blamed on U.S. influence.
¶B. Demonstrations are generally peaceful but have the
potential to become violent.
i. No
ii. No
¶C. Peshawar has not witnessed a large volume of Anti-Government
demonstrations over the past year.
i. No
ii. 250-700
iii. Demonstrations are generally peaceful but have the
potential to become violent.
iv. No
II. (S) Macro Conflict Conditions
¶A. Yes. Elements of the Taliban and Al-Qaida fighting in
Afghanistan use sites in the NWFP and the FATA for training,
rest, and recuperation. The Taliban have used the NWFP and the
FATA to stage attacks into Afghanistan and have also initiated
attacks on the Pakistan Military and Government in both the
Settled areas and the Tribal areas. Elements sympathetic to the
Taliban have attacked GOP buildings, officials, citizens and
Western-associated enterprises and personnel inside Peshawar,
often as retaliation for GOP efforts to stop Taliban and Al
Qaeda activities. The Pakistani Military has engaged in clashes
with Taliban elements inside the FATA and NWFP and local Police
have engaged with militants within the confines of downtown
Peshawar. The NWFP and the FATA have seen frequent instances of
sectarian violence between Shi'a and Sunni elements, most
notably in Peshawar (two bombings of Shi'a mosques in the Old
City during the Muharram Holiday); Sectarian violence has taken
place in Swat, Bannu, Kurram Tribal area and the NWFP's D.I.
Khan area.
¶B. The conflicts mentioned above have taken place mostly in the
FATA and NWFP to include the "settled areas", which are adjacent
to the FATA. Almost every FATA Agency has been effected by the
above mentioned conflicts. Heavily effected areas include Tank,
D.I. Khan, Bannu, Swat, Mohmand, Hangu and North and South
Waziristan. However, recently a significant number of attacks
have occurred in the settled areas.
¶C. U.S. Consulate Peshawar
¶D. Yes, the Taliban, Al Qaeda and extremist militants are
Anti-U.S. in nature and express this in their actions and
demonstrated capabilities.
III. (S) Host Country Capabilities
¶A. The Peshawar police are poor at deterring crime, and
responses to emergency calls by local citizens often go
unattended. The police have generally responded effectively to
Consulate Peshawar's requests when assistance has been needed.
The Police have limited resources, such as a shortage of
vehicles, and criminal lab facilities. Their police force is
geared toward security force work, i.e. protecting a street
corner, than investigative work or proactive procedures. As a
result of crime concerns a number of wealthier citizens in
Peshawar have hired contract security companies to provide armed
personnel at their residences.
¶B. The police forces in the NWFP have received significant
training and support from the U.S. State Department, Diplomatic
Security Anti-terrorism Training Assistance (ATA) Program and
the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The training is first rate
but it has not had a major effect on police capabilities in the
province. Their ability to conduct effective investigations,
whether it be post-blast, homicide or kidnappings is extremely
limited.
¶C. Yes. Corruption tends to be wide spread and pervasive at all
ranks of law enforcement. There are also reports of high-level
corruption in the province.
¶D. Yes, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is
professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions.
However, they do face resource challenges which sometimes
affects their ability to effectively conduct counterterrorism
operations.
¶E. Yes, ISI for the most part, is cooperative with U.S.
Consulate requests for information and support. They are an
important U.S. ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
However, there is a divided loyalty within ISI ranks which may
cause inaction, or assistance to Taliban and anti U.S. groups.
¶F. Yes. A number of Al-Qaeda and Taliban members have been
killed or apprehended.
¶G. Yes. Pakistani officials have been very responsive. At the
Consulate in Peshawar, we have a platoon of Capital City Police
and a platoon of Frontier Constabulary augmenting security at
the consulate.
¶H. The airport security is below-average.
¶I. The customs and immigration control at airports is adequate
but at border crossings along the border with Afghanistan and
Iran it is ineffective.
¶J. Ineffective, the borders are porous. Taliban and militant
extremists are constantly crossing the border with Afghanistan
and engaging in terrorist and smuggling activity. The rugged
terrain makes it difficult to patrol and control the border.
(6) (S) Indigenous Terrorism
¶I. (S) Anti-American Terrorist Groups
¶A. Yes-Pakistan has a significant number of Islamic extremist
militants. Jaish-i-Muhammad (banned by the GOP) aka
Khudam-ul-Islam, Lashkar-I-Tayyiba (banned by the GOP),
Jamaat-ul-Furqaan, Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami, Harakat
ul-Mujahideen aka Jamiat ul-Ansar, harakat ul-Mujahideen
al-Alami, Al-Badr Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harakat ul
Ansar, Lashkar I-Jhangvi (banned by the GOP), Sipah I-Sahaba
Pakistan (banned by the GOP), Hizb-e-Islami Khalis, Tehrik Nefaz
I-Shariat Muhammadi (banned by the GOP), Taliban and Al Qaeda.
¶B. In Peshawar, Yes, the killing of an Amcit USAID Contractor.
¶C. Yes, the attack of the Principal Officer.
¶D. Yes, see C.
¶E. See C-and there continues to be credible on-going reporting
by these groups to target U.S. interests and personnel.
¶F. They operate across the FATA and NWFP and inner city of
Peshawar.
¶G. U.S. Consulate Peshawar which is located in Peshawar.
II. Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups
¶A. In Peshawar, yes
¶B. Yes, there have been three diplomats kidnapped within 2-5
kilometers of Consulate residences; thirteen individual rocket
attacks which have impacted within 1-7 kilometers from the
Consulate and Consulate residential housing area; three large
IED attacks within 800 meters to 3 kilometers of the Consulate;
four shooting incidents between host nation police and militants
within 200 meters to 1.5 kilometers from the Consulate
residential housing area; seven infantry-style assaults
conducted by militants on NATO shipping terminals located 5-7
kilometers from the Consulate residential housing area ranging
from 50-275 militants used in these attacks and two
assassination attempts of Amcit personnel, resulting in the
death of a USAID Contractor and the unsuccessful
assisination/kidnapping attempt of the Principal Officer within
125-meters to 3 feet from the Consulate residential housing
area. Additionally, there have been 138 incidents of violent
crimes and kidnappings targeting locals which have occurred
within 2-3 kilometers of the Consulate and Consulate residential
housing area.
¶C. In Peshawar, yes. Indiscriminate attacks have occurred
directly in front of Consulate facilities/residences and as
close as 400 meters from the Consulate. On two separate
occasions USG personnel were specifically targeted, resulting in
the death of one USAID Contractor (see B). There have also been
sectarian violence aimed at specific groups i.e. Sunni, Shi'a
and there have also been numerous random attacks
indiscriminately targeting innocent civilians.
¶D. Yes, see-(B and C)
(7). (S) Transnational Terrorism
¶I. (S) Transnational Terrorist Indicators
¶A. Yes, Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic
Jihad Union, Peshawar is the birthplace of Al-Qaida and
continues to provide a safe haven for it's activities.
¶B. All
¶C. Officially no, however, sympathizers are suspected
throughout the GOP ranks.
¶D. Yes, some Islamic charities include al-Rashid Trust,
Al-Akhtar Trust, Idara, Khidmat-e-Khalq. Also, madrassas support
some of these groups.
¶E. Both Sunni and Shi'a with extremist views support these
groups.
¶F. The hostile third country intelligence services in Pakistan
include Russia, Iran, Cuba and China. There is no corroborated
information at this time to suggest that these intelligence
services are directly targeting U.S. interests in Pakistan or
are engaged in anti-American terrorist acts.
¶G. The availability of weapons and explosives is high in the
NWFP and FATA as well in neighboring Afghanistan with the border
area being so porous. On a routine basis, Pakistani security
forces and police are uncovering sizeable numbers of weapons and
explosives from suspected terrorist locations throught downtown
Peshawar, FATA and the NWFP.
¶8. (U) Point of contact of contact for this information RSO
Peshawar, David J. Hazarian