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Viewing cable 06BOGOTA4750, ESTIMATES ON REGROUPING OF DEMOBILIZED
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA4750 | 2006-05-30 19:02 | 2011-03-04 16:00 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks |
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #4750/01 1501902
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301902Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5368
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6838
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7765
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY LIMA 3820
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9179
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4463
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3568
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T BOGOTA 004750
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2025
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: ESTIMATES ON REGROUPING OF DEMOBILIZED
PARAMILITARIES, GOC STRATEGY
REF: BOGOTA 4645
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) Estimates of the collectively demobilized
paramilitaries (30,902 to date) that have regrouped into
criminal organizations range from 2 to 4 percent. According
to Colombian National Police Intelligence (DIPOL) analysts
and the Military's Joint Intelligence Center, 21 new criminal
groups have formed. Sergio Caramagna, Director of the
Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS),
warned that the numbers could increase significantly if
national and local governments fail to offer adequate
security, reinsertion programs, and basic services. In an
effort to improve security, 5,000 police officers are being
trained to be sent to 53 of the 120 administrative regions
the GOC and the MAPP/OAS have identified as critical.
Caramagna would like the Mission to increase its verification
efforts and assist high-risk communities with tailored
reinsertion programs, and requested USG support for these
efforts. Caramagna and DIPOL analysts agreed that the
Constitutional Court's May 18 decision to uphold most of the
provisions of the controversial Justice and Peace Law were
positive in the short-term, but not necessarily good for
future peace processes with the remaining illegal actors.
End summary.
-----------------------------------------
RELATIVELY FEW DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES
REGROUP AS CRIMINAL GANGS
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Caramagna told poloff on May 19 that press reports
estimating over 4,000 demobilized paramilitaries returning to
criminal activity were inflated. In his view, less than 2
percent of the 30,140 collectively demobilized combatants
have returned to crime. Caramagna warned, however, this
number could increase if the national and local governments
fail to offer adequate security, reinsertion programs, and
basic services, such as education and health to these
individuals. (The majority of demobilized combatants are men
under 30 years of age with limited education.)
¶3. (S) DIPOL analysts believe 4 percent have regrouped.
According to DIPOL analysts and the Military's Joint
Intelligence Center, 21 new criminal groups have formed. Of
these, DIPOL identified 10 structures through intelligence
means, such as signal intercepts, and the remaining 11
through other evidence. On average, each group is composed
of 50 members and not all the members are demobilized
paramilitaries. Each group has a mix of former combatants,
paramilitaries who never demobilized, narcotraffickers, and
other criminals.
¶4. (C) DIPOL analysts said these new groups cannot be
categorized as re-emerging paramilitary groups, but rather
are criminal organizations primarily interested in
narcotrafficking and other illegal activities. DIPOL
analysts disagreed with some aspects of the MAPP/OAS Sixth
Quarterly Report, such as the sources and methods the OAS
used to gather its information. They did not say that the
information was inaccurate, but rather that it was mainly
obtained through individual testimonies rather than "hard
evidence."
¶5. (C) In DIPOL's field experience, information obtained
primarily by individual testimonies can be tainted because it
is associated with "paramilitary phantoms and legends" in the
regions. This does not mean that remnants of paramilitary
structures do not exist or that new groups use their
"paramilitary masks" to create fear, among the people, but
all intelligence indicates the main paramilitary groups and
leaders are tired of living in hiding and many have seen the
peace process as an opportunity to legalize their situation.
The individuals that DIPOL analysts have found leading these
new groups are mainly "third-tier" or "third-generation"
paramilitaries, with the exception of two groups that are led
by former mid-level paramilitary leaders. The "third-tier"
were never interested in the peace process and were fully
engaged in narcotrafficking, according to DIPOL.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
GOC'S STRATEGY AGAINST THE EMERGING GROUPS, REINSERTION
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶6. (C) According to DIPOL analysts, the GOC created in March
an interagency group called "Intelligence for Peace,"
composed of representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the
Peace Commissioner's Office, Administrative Security
Department (DAS, FBI equivalent), Army, Navy, and Police
intelligence, to coordinate GOC efforts on the reemergence of
new groups and encourage further desertions from illegal
armed groups. Since its initiation, three operations have
taken place against newly identified groups. The most recent
operation was held in Narino Department and police detained
three key individuals.
¶7. (C) With the help of MAPP/OAS, the Intelligence for Peace
Group has identified 120 administrative regions or
"corregimientos" of high risk that need immediate attention.
DIPOL analysts explained that these "corregimientos" are
located in zones "intersected by the conflict" or areas where
the different illegal armed groups are present and where key
routes or economic interests are found. Not surprisingly,
these "corregimientos" are located primarily in the
Departments where the majority of demobilized paramilitaries
are located. According to a study done by the Organization
for International Migration Mission in Colombia, 70 percent
of these former combatants live in five Departments:
Antioquia (32 percent), Cordoba (14 percent), Cesar (10.5
percent), Magdalena (8.6 percent), and Santander (4.8
percent). Other Departments that require attention are Choco,
Narino, North Santander, Sucre, Valle and North Valle.
¶8. (C) Caramagna noted that the National Police has been
more engaged compared to the military in trying to promote
security. For example, 5,000 police officers are being
trained to be sent to 53 of the 120 "corregimientos"
identified (DIPOL analysts noted that in 24 of the 53
"corregimientos" police presence has recently been
increased). Moreover, the police plan to offer jobs and
training to 3,700 demobilized paramilitaries as unarmed
traffic auxiliaries. In contrast, Caramagna saw the military
divided between those who support the efforts to provide
security and those less willing, as they see the
demobilization of the paramilitaries as favoring the FARC.
There is a consensus between MAPP/OAS and the Intelligence
for Peace Group that in addition to creating new police
posts, there needs to be an integral effort from various
government entities to increase their presence and assistance
to these communities. Tierradentro, Cordoba Department will
be used as a model for this new interagency effort.
¶9. (C) Though the Medellin Reinsertion Program is always
cited as an example, Caramagna argued that it is not great,
but it is "the least the government should do" around the
country. He thought that the government should develop a
clear strategy to conduct a "territorial follow up" on
demobilized paramilitaries. Moreover, to increase the
relevance and importance on reinsertion, the GOC should name
a High Commissioner for Reinsertion. Caramagna said the
government is considering naming a High Commissioner or
creating a Ministry to deal with this effort. The name of
Gustavo Villegas, formerly in charge of the reinsertion
program in Medellin, is floating around (although Villegas
told the DCM he plans to accept another job within the
administration of Sergio Fajardo, Medellin Mayor, and is not
prepared to work as the High Commissioner for Reinsertion.)
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EVALUATING MAPP/OAS MISSION CAPACITY
------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Caramagna highlighted the increased support to the
Mission from member states and observer countries, which has
permitted the hiring of personnel in recent months.
Twenty-two officers have been designated by members states as
their contribution, all of whom are international experts
with experience in reinsertion and conflict resolution. Even
though the OAS said in its Sixth Quarterly Report that the
Mission would achieve its goal of having 10 regional offices
and more than 100 officers by mid-year, Caramagna has decided
to increase OAS personnel in the already established offices
instead, until he is able to hire more people (MAPP/OAS
currently has a total of 80 people, 56 in the field and a
total of six regional offices.) With Spain's recent offer of
USD 1 million and the USG contribution of USD 1.5 million
just recently approved, this could enable the OAS to open
other offices later in the year.
¶11. (C) In addition to its verification role in the peace
process, Caramagna requested USG support for the Mission to
further assist high risk communities with reinsertion
programs. He argued that the Mission,s access to these
communities and the confidence that the people have in its
representatives, puts it in a unique position to help.
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READ-OUT ON IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶12. (C) Caramagna and DIPOL analysts agreed that the
Constitutional Court's May 18 decision to uphold most of the
provisions of the Justice and Peace Law (septel) was positive
in the short-term, but not necessarily good for future peace
processes with the remaining illegal actors. Problems could
arise with the remaining three paramilitary groups that are
scheduled to demobilize after the presidential election on
May 28--Elmer Cardenas Bloc, Cacique Pipinta, and Martin
Llanos Bloc--and future peace processes with the ELN and the
FARC.
¶13. (C) Now that the Constitutional Court has upheld the
Justice and Peace Law, DIPOL analysts plan to continue to
assist the Prosecutor's Office Justice and Peace Unit. Since
the creation of the Intelligence for Peace Group, in the last
three months, DIPOL analysts knowledgeable about the various
demobilized paramilitary groups and leaders have been
training prosecutors and investigators on the history and
activities of each group.
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FOLLOW UP ON CURUMANI, CESAR MASSACRE
-------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Caramagna noted that the Mission continues to follow
closely a massacre that occurred in Curumani, Cesar
Department, perpetrated by the AUC's North Bloc in December
¶2005. (This massacre was referenced in the OAS Mission's
Sixth Quarterly Report.) One minor who remained missing
(16-year-old Jesus Emiro Manzano) was found recently and he
and his family are in the GOC's protection program. Mission
staff talked to him; he vividly recalled the paramilitary
incursion and the killing of his father and cousin, among
others. Manzano reported that the AUC first tortured and
then shot people. He explained that several town members
were accused by the paramilitaries of being ELN sympathizers,
which he said was untrue and was used as an excuse. The true
motivation, according to Manzano, was competition between an
AUC informant and Manzano's cousin for the affection of one
of the town's girls. He explained, however, that the ELN has
always had some type of presence in the area, but in the
recent years has been weakening. Caramagna said that the
Mission has found these collusions/massacres to be generally
motivated by personal vengeance or disputes over economic
interests.
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COMMENT
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¶15. (C) Because of the illegal nature of the activity, the
actual number of demobilized, who are now entering "new"
illegal gangs or remobilizing in their old blocs, is
difficult to ascertain. The OAS Mission is one of the few
neutral observers in a position to assess the dimensions of
the problem, but their estimates may also be optimistic.
Given the general coincidence of the OAS and DIPOL, however,
it is probably fair to say the problem so far is less than
feared. But it is early in a complex and novel process for
anyone to say with authority how much "remobilization" will
take place. End comment.
WOOD