

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AEMR
AMGT
AE
AU
AID
AORC
APER
AS
AM
AFIN
AMED
AJ
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
ABLD
AL
AA
APECO
AGAO
AY
AGMT
APEC
AINF
AG
ACS
AECL
AFFAIRS
ABUD
ASUP
ADANA
AADP
AMCHAMS
ARF
ASEAN
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
APCS
ADCO
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ADM
AN
AIT
BU
BR
BL
BO
BA
BB
BG
BM
BBSR
BH
BEXP
BK
BD
BTIO
BT
BE
BY
BF
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BILAT
BIDEN
BC
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CH
CG
CF
CU
CE
CVIS
CASC
CO
CS
CA
CIDA
CBW
CW
CMGT
CI
CODEL
CY
CPAS
CJAN
CD
CWC
CDG
CIA
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CT
CR
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CFED
CV
CACS
CARSON
CLINTON
CN
CONS
CM
CAC
CIC
COPUOS
CDC
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EG
EZ
EUN
ECON
ETRD
ECPS
EFIN
ENRG
ETTC
EPET
EINV
EAID
EAIR
EWWT
EU
EAGR
EC
ELAB
EIND
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
EFIS
ELTN
ET
ECIN
EFTA
ES
EINT
EI
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
ELN
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
EXIM
ETRO
ENIV
ESA
ER
EK
EUR
EFINECONCS
EUMEM
EUREM
EPA
ERNG
ENERG
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
IS
IZ
IR
IC
IO
IN
ID
IGAD
IT
ILC
IAEA
ITU
ICAO
IMO
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
IAHRC
ITF
INRA
INRO
IWC
IQ
IV
ICRC
ICTY
INRB
IEFIN
ILO
ITRA
ITALY
IBET
ISRAELI
IL
INTELSAT
IRC
IDP
ICTR
IRAQI
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
INDO
IDA
ISLAMISTS
KSPR
KNNP
KWBG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KN
KS
KIPR
KCRM
KDEM
KIRF
KJUS
KHLS
KSCA
KOMC
KAWC
KV
KFRD
KWMN
KTIP
KPWR
KSUM
KGHG
KTIA
KTFN
KIRC
KCOR
KACT
KMDR
KGIC
KOLY
KUNR
KIDE
KMPI
KPKO
KCFE
KVPR
KRAD
KPAL
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTEX
KTDB
KFSC
KZ
KSEP
KFLU
KE
KU
KPLS
KRVC
KRIM
KSTH
KG
KFLO
KPOA
KICC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KBCT
KSAF
KMOC
KDRG
KBIO
KREC
KSTC
KVRP
KBTR
KMIG
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KWAC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KWMM
KPRP
KNEI
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KX
KMCA
KCRS
KMFO
KID
KCIP
KNAR
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KHDP
KFIN
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KTER
KRCM
KCFC
KSAC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KCOM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KAID
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KHSA
MPOS
MOPS
MARR
MTCR
MNUC
MASS
MX
MCAP
MAR
MTRE
MASC
MK
MG
MTCRE
MI
MD
MA
MO
MY
MU
ML
MRCRE
MAS
MEDIA
MC
MR
MIL
MW
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
NATO
NG
NL
NZ
NT
NW
NO
NU
NS
NPT
NASA
NI
NK
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NP
NATIONAL
NSSP
NSF
NA
NGO
NV
NR
NDP
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NEW
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NPG
NSC
NPA
NSFO
OPDC
OPRC
OEXC
OTRA
ODIP
OIIP
OVIP
OPIC
OPCW
OAS
OREP
OSCE
OSCI
OES
OFDP
OECD
OCS
OIC
OPAD
OVP
OHUM
OFFICIALS
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PTER
PHUM
PK
PREF
PM
PHSA
PA
PINS
PE
PBTS
PCI
PO
PL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PGIV
PROP
PP
PBIO
POL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PBT
PMIL
POV
PTBS
PG
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PROV
PNAT
PINF
PRL
PAS
PDOV
PRAM
PREO
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PAO
PREFA
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PGOC
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RW
REACTION
RCMP
RSO
RO
RP
ROOD
RM
ROBERT
RICE
REGION
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
RFE
REPORT
SY
SP
SOCI
SMIG
SNAR
SCUL
SC
SU
SO
SI
SENV
SZ
SW
SA
SR
SF
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SEN
SG
SYR
SWE
SK
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SCRS
SYRIA
SL
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SHI
SHUM
SIPRS
TSPA
TSPL
TU
TBIO
TRGY
TPHY
TS
TP
TW
TBID
TI
TF
TZ
TD
TT
TN
TNGD
TC
TX
TH
TL
TIP
THPY
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
US
UNSC
UNGA
UK
UP
UNCHC
UN
UNMIK
UNCSD
UY
USTR
USOAS
UNHRC
UNFCYP
UG
UNAUS
UNESCO
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
USUN
UZ
USNC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNEP
USEU
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MEXICO456, MADRAZO AIMS FOR THE SENSIBLE CENTER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MEXICO456.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06MEXICO456 | 2006-01-27 20:41 | 2011-04-05 01:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico |
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/eu-dudaba-de-la-viabilidad-del-pri/ |
VZCZCXRO4837
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0456/01 0272041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272041Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8549
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
50972
2006-01-27 20:41:00
06MEXICO456
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
05MEXICO7426|05MEXICO7612|06MEXICO251
VZCZCXRO4837
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0456/01 0272041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272041Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8549
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000456
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
SUBJECT: MADRAZO AIMS FOR THE SENSIBLE CENTER
REF: A. A) 05 MEXICO 7612
¶B. B) MEXICO 251
¶C. C) 05 MEXICO 7426
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS:
1.4(B/D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Roberto Madrazo, candidate of the PRI-led
Alliance for Mexico, has kicked off his campaign by trying to
position himself as the candidate of the political center.
Madrazo used the month long holiday break to smooth over the
divisions in his fractious party, restructuring his campaign
so as to put the full weight of the party machinery behind
it. He has succeeded in integrating into his campaign
structure -- at least for the moment -- key rivals from
within the PRI's ranks. He also released his long promised
personal financial statements, eliciting little negative
publicity for their delayed release, or for the remarkably
high reported net worth of this lifelong public servant. Yet
despite his efforts, Madrazo remains third in all recent
opinion polls, lagging by a considerable margin in at least
one. And his success in forging party unity will be sorely
tested in the months ahead, when the PRI finalizes its
legislative lists: in order to win the support of his critics
within the party and maintain the loyalty of his allies, he
has made far more promises of political rewards than he will
be able to keep. The publication of the PRI's legislative
lists in March may end up disappointing some key supporters
and fomenting party disunity just as the campaign enters its
most intensive phase. End summary.
Staking Out the Middle Ground
-----------------------------
¶2. (SBU) On January 15, Roberto Madrazo Pintado officially
registered with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) as the
presidential candidate of the Alliance for Mexico, consisting
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Green
Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM). Madrazo used the
opportunity of his post-registration rally -- his first
public appearance as the Alliance's candidate -- to stake out
the center of the Mexican political spectrum. Before a
partisan crowd, he spoke about the importance of ending
poverty and reducing inequality, while eschewing the cadences
of class conflict preferred by his left-wing rival, Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). He addressed the issue of
migration in relatively moderate terms, noting that while the
proposed border fence (ref A) offended Mexicans, the
migration problem had to be resolved first and foremost in
Mexico, through economic growth and job creation. He said
the next administration would need to devote its efforts to
restoring Mexico's economic competitivity, strengthening the
rule of law, and reducing poverty and inequality. In
subsequent campaign appearances, Madrazo has continued to
tack to the center, dismissing Felippe Calderon as a
"neoliberal," and AMLO as a "populist" and a "demagogue."
Papering Over Differences in the PRI
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) During the campaign "cease fire" declared by the IFE,
Madrazo worked intensively behind the scenes both to
restructure his campaign and to achieve unity -- or at least
the appearance of unity -- within the PRI. Contacts in the
party largely concur that he has been fairly successful in
winning at least the token support of his erstwhile critics.
Francisco Guerrero, Chief of Staff to Senate President
Enrique Jackson, told poloff that several key leaders of the
Everyone United Against Madrazo (TUCOM, for its Spanish
acronym) faction have closed ranks with the candidate, an
assertion supported by other contacts. Many of the
supporters of former rival Arturo Montiel have been
integrated into the Madrazo team, most notably Montiel's
former campaign manager and PRI heavyweight Manuel Cadena.
Senate President Enrique Jackson, another leading member of
TUCOM, has signed on to a senior advisory role in the
campaign, and Nuevo Leon Governor Natavidad Gonzalez has
publicly backed Madrazo as well.
¶4. (C) At this point, it appears the only two major PRI
figures who remain fully outside the fold are Sonora Governor
Eduardo Bours and teacher's union leader Elba Esther
Gordillo. Jose Alcalde, a political analyst with ties to the
PRI, told poloff that Bours reportedly was contemplating a
PRD offer to defect; whether or not true, the influential
governor has not concealed his desire to undermine Madrazo's
campaign. As for Gordillo, she and Madrazo appear to have
settled into a temporary stalemate in their long-simmering
feud. The PRI suspended its effort to formally evict her
from the party, fearing that, according to PRI Deputy Jose
Alberto Aguilar, doing so would cause it unnecessary
political damage. For her part, Gordillo appears content to
MEXICO 00000456 002 OF 003
remain a titular member of the PRI, while openly supporting
the candidate of the New Alliance party, her protege and
former PRI deputy Roberto Campa. We suspect Gordillo is more
likely to break this uneasy stalemate than is Madrazo, and if
she does, Aguilar believes it would cost the PRI most, but
not all, of the 16-20 deputies who are loyal to Gordillo.
The High Price of Unity
-----------------------
¶5. (C) While Madrazo has managed to paper over differences
with most of his critics in the PRI, this semblance of unity
came at a high price, a price that will come due in March,
when the party finalizes its national lists for the
legislative elections. Francisco Guerrero told poloff that
in order to secure the support of those senior PRI leaders
who initially opposed his candidacy, Madrazo presumably
promised many of them high-ranking spots on the party's
electoral lists. He undoubtedly has made similar promises
not only to his numerous long-term supporters, but also to
other assorted party luminaries.
¶6. (C) Moreover, according to the terms of the PRI's
alliance with the Green Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM),
four of the Senate list's top eight spots have been set aside
for PVEM candidates. In fact, the Senate list affords
relatively few opportunities to reward political allies.
While the party can list 32 candidates, only the most
optimistic of Madrazo supporters would be satisfied with a
position outside of the top 12; in the last legislative
elections, the PRI succeeded in electing only 12 senatorial
candidates from its national list, and this year's race
promises to be more competitive. Guerrero suspects -- and
other contacts tend to agree -- that the electoral lists will
leave some Madrazo supporters very dissatisfied, creating the
possibility of major dissension in the party just as the
campaign enters its most intensive phase.
Counting on the Machine
-----------------------
¶7. (SBU) Unlike the campaigns of his two principal rivals,
which are managed separately from their party apparatus, in
December, the Madrazo campaign integrated its operation with
that of the PRI party apparatus, even physically moving the
campaign's offices to the PRI headquarters. PRI president
Mariano Palacio Alcocer has agreed to serve concurrently as
Madrazo's campaign manager, to ensure that the full weight of
the PRI political machine is employed on behalf of his
campaign. According to campaign media advisor Ady Garcia,
the campaign has set up a number of regional and thematic
directorates, to ensure that the regional PRI operations are
well-coordinated.
¶8. (C) The party appears to be counting on its
well-organized nationwide political machine to give it the
margin of victory in this election. The PRI boasts of having
between 9 and 10 million hard core loyalists, of whose
unconditional support the party is confident. Assuming this
large base holds, our contacts observe that Madrazo would
need to win over far fewer uncommitted voters than his rivals
in order to win the election. They believe that their
party's superior political machine will pick off enough
uncommitted voters to swing the election to Madrazo.
Transparency Starts at Home
---------------------------
¶9. (SBU) To the surprise of many, on January 18, Madrazo
actually complied with a longstanding promise to release
information concerning his personal finances. His financial
statement revealed that this lifelong public servant has a
net worth of approximately USD 3 million, including four
luxury condominiums in Mexico City, all purchased in 2004,
other properties in the capital and in his home state of
Tabasco, and a Porsche automobile (among others) worth
approximately $100,000. He further revealed that his wife --
the widow of the scion of one of Mexico's wealthiest families
-- owns a luxury condominium in Williams Island, Florida.
One issue that remains murky, at least in press accounts
surrounding the release of Madrazo's financial statement, is
his ownership of a second Williams Island luxury condo. This
property sparked controversy last fall (ref A), when Reforma
reported that Madrazo had purchased the property through a
British Virgin Islands company. Recent press reporting has
stated that Madrazo rents this condominium and has an option
to purchase it; the reporting does not confirm whether
Madrazo controls the offshore company that owns the condo, as
earlier reporting strongly suggested.
Comment: Where are the Loyal PRI Voters?
----------------------------------------
MEXICO 00000456 003 OF 003
¶10. (C) A consummate political operator, Madrazo appears to
have been fairly successful in uniting his party -- at least
to the public eye -- and surviving to wage the general
election campaign. However, by making profligate promises of
political rewards, he has set himself up for a possible
crisis in March, when the party's electoral lists will be
published, and he will have to make good on those promises.
Indeed, many in the party are questioning the wisdom of
promising four of the party's top eight Senate spots to the
PVEM, a party that historically has drawn only approximately
5 percent of the national vote. Madrazo may need to draw on
all of his formidable political skills to navigate the
intra-party crisis that the publication of the legislative
lists could provoke. On the other hand, the candidate has
built a long political career on the practice of making
promises he knows he may be unable to keep, and he may be
counting on his ability to pull this off one more time.
¶11. (C) With nearly six months to go until Election Day,
this is very much a three-way race and it is entirely
possible that it will remain that way until the finish line.
Although Madrazo is lagging for the moment, the PRI's
organizational advantages are considerable and many in the
party are so hungry to return to power, they will use every
tactic at their disposal -- no matter how ignoble -- to win.
In a closely fought, three-way race, the final advantage
might go to the candidate who makes the fewest mistakes, a
dynamic that could tend to favor the highly experienced
Madrazo. Nevertheless, we have trouble reconciling PRI claims
of a 10 million vote rock solid base with Madrazo's polling
in the low to mid 20 percent range. We cannot help but
wonder whether even for many formerly loyal PRIistas, a vote
for Madrazo is a bridge too far, or if the candidate simply
has no traction whatsoever beyond his base. End comment.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
GARZA