

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AEMR
AMGT
AE
AU
AID
AORC
APER
AS
AM
AFIN
AMED
AJ
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
ABLD
AL
AA
APECO
AGAO
AY
AGMT
APEC
AINF
AG
ACS
AECL
AFFAIRS
ABUD
ASUP
ADANA
AADP
AMCHAMS
ARF
ASEAN
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
APCS
ADCO
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ADM
AN
AIT
BU
BR
BL
BO
BA
BB
BG
BM
BBSR
BH
BEXP
BK
BD
BTIO
BT
BE
BY
BF
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BILAT
BIDEN
BC
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CH
CG
CF
CU
CE
CVIS
CASC
CO
CS
CA
CIDA
CBW
CW
CMGT
CI
CODEL
CY
CPAS
CJAN
CD
CWC
CDG
CIA
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CT
CR
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CFED
CV
CACS
CARSON
CLINTON
CN
CONS
CM
CAC
CIC
COPUOS
CDC
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EG
EZ
EUN
ECON
ETRD
ECPS
EFIN
ENRG
ETTC
EPET
EINV
EAID
EAIR
EWWT
EU
EAGR
EC
ELAB
EIND
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
EFIS
ELTN
ET
ECIN
EFTA
ES
EINT
EI
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
ELN
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
EXIM
ETRO
ENIV
ESA
ER
EK
EUR
EFINECONCS
EUMEM
EUREM
EPA
ERNG
ENERG
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
IS
IZ
IR
IC
IO
IN
ID
IGAD
IT
ILC
IAEA
ITU
ICAO
IMO
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
IAHRC
ITF
INRA
INRO
IWC
IQ
IV
ICRC
ICTY
INRB
IEFIN
ILO
ITRA
ITALY
IBET
ISRAELI
IL
INTELSAT
IRC
IDP
ICTR
IRAQI
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
INDO
IDA
ISLAMISTS
KSPR
KNNP
KWBG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KN
KS
KIPR
KCRM
KDEM
KIRF
KJUS
KHLS
KSCA
KOMC
KAWC
KV
KFRD
KWMN
KTIP
KPWR
KSUM
KGHG
KTIA
KTFN
KIRC
KCOR
KACT
KMDR
KGIC
KOLY
KUNR
KIDE
KMPI
KPKO
KCFE
KVPR
KRAD
KPAL
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTEX
KTDB
KFSC
KZ
KSEP
KFLU
KE
KU
KPLS
KRVC
KRIM
KSTH
KG
KFLO
KPOA
KICC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KBCT
KSAF
KMOC
KDRG
KBIO
KREC
KSTC
KVRP
KBTR
KMIG
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KWAC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KWMM
KPRP
KNEI
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KX
KMCA
KCRS
KMFO
KID
KCIP
KNAR
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KHDP
KFIN
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KTER
KRCM
KCFC
KSAC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KCOM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KAID
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KHSA
MPOS
MOPS
MARR
MTCR
MNUC
MASS
MX
MCAP
MAR
MTRE
MASC
MK
MG
MTCRE
MI
MD
MA
MO
MY
MU
ML
MRCRE
MAS
MEDIA
MC
MR
MIL
MW
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
NATO
NG
NL
NZ
NT
NW
NO
NU
NS
NPT
NASA
NI
NK
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NP
NATIONAL
NSSP
NSF
NA
NGO
NV
NR
NDP
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NEW
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NPG
NSC
NPA
NSFO
OPDC
OPRC
OEXC
OTRA
ODIP
OIIP
OVIP
OPIC
OPCW
OAS
OREP
OSCE
OSCI
OES
OFDP
OECD
OCS
OIC
OPAD
OVP
OHUM
OFFICIALS
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PTER
PHUM
PK
PREF
PM
PHSA
PA
PINS
PE
PBTS
PCI
PO
PL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PGIV
PROP
PP
PBIO
POL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PBT
PMIL
POV
PTBS
PG
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PROV
PNAT
PINF
PRL
PAS
PDOV
PRAM
PREO
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PAO
PREFA
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PGOC
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RW
REACTION
RCMP
RSO
RO
RP
ROOD
RM
ROBERT
RICE
REGION
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
RFE
REPORT
SY
SP
SOCI
SMIG
SNAR
SCUL
SC
SU
SO
SI
SENV
SZ
SW
SA
SR
SF
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SEN
SG
SYR
SWE
SK
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SCRS
SYRIA
SL
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SHI
SHUM
SIPRS
TSPA
TSPL
TU
TBIO
TRGY
TPHY
TS
TP
TW
TBID
TI
TF
TZ
TD
TT
TN
TNGD
TC
TX
TH
TL
TIP
THPY
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
US
UNSC
UNGA
UK
UP
UNCHC
UN
UNMIK
UNCSD
UY
USTR
USOAS
UNHRC
UNFCYP
UG
UNAUS
UNESCO
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
USUN
UZ
USNC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNEP
USEU
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08STATE1265, REQUEST TO ALLIES FOR NEW DEMARCHE TO CHINA REGARDING CHINA'S JANUARY 2007 ANTI-SATELLITE TEST
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08STATE1265.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08STATE1265 | 2008-01-06 19:49 | 2011-02-02 21:00 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #1265 0062000
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061949Z JAN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0000
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0000
S E C R E T STATE 001265
SIPDIS SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MARR CH
SUBJECT: REQUEST TO ALLIES FOR NEW DEMARCHE TO CHINA REGARDING CHINA'S JANUARY 2007 ANTI-SATELLITE TEST
REF: (A)07 STATE 4837 (NOTAL), (B)07 BEIJING 331, (C)07 BEIJING 473, (D)07 STATE 4836, (E)07 BEIJING 4185
CLASSIFIED BY ACTING U/S FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (T) JOHN C. ROOD, REASONS, 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1.(SBU) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 3 below.
2.(S) BACKGROUND: On January 11, 2007 (UTC), China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test by launching a ground-based weapon against one of its own satellites. On January 15, 2007, Ambassador Randt delivered a demarche to Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister He Yefei. (REFTELs A and B) On January 21, 2007, AFM He delivered the Chinese Government's formal response, telling Assistant Secretary Hill that the test posed no threat to any SIPDIS other nation, targeted no third country, and that "for the time being, China has no plans for further tests." (REFTEL C) In reply, A/S Hill emphasized that the explanation did not square with China's stated position of not wishing to embark on any kind of arms race in outer space. A/S Hill cautioned AFM He that the U.S. remained concerned that China had not explained adequately the purpose of the test. In nearly 12 months since the Chinese test, Beijing has provided no further explanation in diplomatic or military-to-military channels regarding the questions first raised on January 15, 2007. To increase diplomatic pressure on China, the U.S. requested last January that the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea demarche China. (REFTEL D) On their own initiative, French and German Chiefs of Mission in Beijing also approached the Chinese MFA immediately after the test and received "no sensible answer" to questions concerning the apparent contradiction between the test and the PRC's stated policy against militarizing space. (REFTEL E) On or about January 7, 2008, Embassy Beijing will deliver a second demarche to the Chinese MFA.
3.(S) GUIDANCE REQUEST: For Berlin, Canberra, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Seoul, Tel Aviv, and Tokyo: Ambassador or other senior Embassy official in each host country is instructed to deliver Washington's request for assistance in demarching China. Embassies may draw upon the capital-specific talking points in paragraph 4 and key points in the new U.S. demarche to China in paragraph
5.The U.S. demarche to China in paragraph 5 should be left as a non-paper for host Nation's information. Embassies are requested to provide confirmation of delivery and any reactions provided at the time of delivery. Embassies may refer to "if raised" talking points in paragraph 6, as appropriate.
4.(SBU) BEGIN CAPITAL-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS: a. (S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) FOR ALL:
-- The United States delivered a demarche to the People's Republic of China on or about January 7, 2008, concerning China's continued refusal to adequately explain its anti-satellite flight-test on January 11, 2007. China's direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon was used to intentionally destroy a satellite. As a consequence of this event, China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low earth orbit than any other spacefaring nation.
-- Despite expressions of concern by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, South Korea, France and several other nations, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not provided adequate explanations to our questions and concerns.
-- Over the nearly 12 months since these demarches, the U.S. has made numerous follow-up requests for answers in both diplomatic and military-to-military channels. To date, Washington has not received satisfactory answers to many of the questions posed in our January 15, 2007, demarche.
-- The United States requests your government's assistance in applying diplomatic pressure to the Chinese government to respond to several important unanswered questions regarding its January 11, 2007, flight-test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon.
-- We have provided China with a non-paper detailing our specific concerns. We are sharing this non-paper with you and other key allies.
-- We look forward to continuing our discussions with your government on this topic. b. (S//REL AS, CA, JP, ROK, and UK) For Canberra, London, Ottawa, Seoul, and Tokyo: We are grateful for your government's assistance last year in joining us in demarching China. We will continue to consult with you regarding the implications of China's direct-ascent ASAT and other counter-space activities both for the space environment and for our shared security interests. c. (C//REL FR and UK) For London and Paris: We look forward to continuing our bilateral strategic space dialogues with you in 2008. Our discussions during the past year have identified many opportunities for increased cooperation and diplomatic coordination. d. (S//REL AS, CA, GM, IS, IT, and JP) For Berlin, Canberra, Ottawa, Rome, Tel Aviv, and Tokyo: We wish to initiate a bilateral strategic space dialogue with you in 2008 to address common concerns regarding protection of our shared national security space interests and new opportunities for cooperation and diplomatic coordination. (SBU)
END CAPITAL-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS.
5.(S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) BEGIN U.S. DEMARCHE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
-- As Ambassador Randt explained in a demarche to Assistant Foreign Minister He on January 15, 2007, and in follow-up discussions throughout 2007 between senior U.S. and Chinese political and military officials in diplomatic and military- to-military channels, the United States remains concerned about the possibility of increased risk to human spaceflight, including the International Space Station and the U.S. Space Shuttle, resulting from China's flight-test of a direct- ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.
--- Debris from China's ASAT test has increased hazards to other peaceful uses of space in low earth orbit by the United States and other space-faring nations.
--- This is a very serious matter for the entire international community.
-- Unfettered access to space and the capabilities provided by satellites in orbit are vital to United States national and economic security.
--- The United States considers space systems to have the rights of unhindered passage through, and operations in, space without interference.
--- Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or conflict.
--- The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, to defend and protect its space systems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to military.
--- Purposeful interference with the space systems of other nations which are used by the United States for peaceful purposes in pursuit of U.S. national interests also will be considered as contrary to the interest of maintaining international peace and security.
-- It has been nearly a year since China intentionally destroyed an aging weather satellite using a ground-based direct-ascent ASAT weapon.
--- Since this flight-test occurred on January 11, 2007, the United States has detected and tracked over 2,500 pieces of orbital debris directly attributable to this ground-based direct-ascent ASAT flight-test.
--- Our experts estimate that many of these pieces, and as many as 100,000 smaller debris objects, some of which will remain in orbit for the next 100 years.
-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45 percent was generated by China.
--- China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low earth orbit than any other state.
-- We have already been compelled to take precautionary measures to maneuver U.S. satellites to reduce the probability of collision with the debris. Our experts predict that to avoid collisions with the debris from China's test, the International Space Station may need to make maneuvers that otherwise would not have been required.
--- China's intentional destruction of a satellite, and the resultant creation of long-lived debris, is contrary to international Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. These guidelines were endorsed over four years before the ASAT test by Chinese government scientists.
--- Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, China may be liable for damage caused by debris from China's January 11, 2007, ASAT flight-test.
-- The contradiction between China's statements and actions in this area raise questions about the credibility of China's declaratory policies and commitments in other areas of national security affairs.
-- The United States believes China's development and testing of such capabilities is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our Presidents have outlined, including in the area of civil space cooperation.
--- The inadequate nature of China's response to our January 15, 2007, demarche and your government's continued unwillingness to provide a full explanation for its actions call into question China's intentions in space and undermines trust.
-- As Secretary of Defense Gates noted in his meeting with President Hu on November 6, 2007, the United States remains interested in talking to China about China's anti-satellite weapons development.
--- Such a dialogue could help reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation.
-- As we look to the future, we expect China to bear in mind the requirement under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, to which China is party, for a State Party to "undertake appropriate international consultations" before proceeding with any activity that it "has reason to believe would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space."
-- The U.S. is refraining from any expansion of space-related cooperation with China. One of the primary reasons for this position is the continued lack of transparency from China regarding the full range of China's space activities. One sign of increased transparency would be forthright responses to the following questions:
--- What analysis did China perform to estimate the debris that would be caused by the intentional destruction of your satellite in the January 11, 2007, test?
--- What steps did China take to mitigate damage to the satellites of other countries?
--- What are China's future intentions for its direct-ascent ASAT development and testing program?
--- Will there be further tests of a direct-ascent anti- satellite weapon or other anti-satellite weapons, capabilities, or technologies? If so:
---- How will your government ensure that further testing does not create new hazards for human spaceflight and other space activities?
---- What notification will China provide for any future ASAT tests?
--- Are you planning to deploy your ground-based direct- ascent ASAT, or other, similar weapons, capabilities, or technologies?
END U.S. DEMARCHE TO CHINA.
6.(S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) BEGIN "IF RAISED" TALKING POINTS: a. If host government notes that the U.S. has opposed China's calls to begin negotiation of a treaty on the "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), U.S. response should be:
-- We understand that China may join Russia in introducing in this CD session a draft treaty banning deployment of weapons in space and the threat or use of force against space objects. If so, we urge your government not to support it.
-- We carefully studied the draft treaty circulated by Russia last summer, which we understand was developed in collaboration with China. It provides no grounds for the United States to change its long-standing opposition to negotiations on new, legally-binding space arms control agreements.
-- Notably, the draft treaty would not prohibit the development and deployment of a ground-based direct- ascent interceptor of the type of ASAT China tested last year.
-- We remain convinced that there is no arms race in space but rather unprecedented cooperation. The CD needs to move beyond unnecessary, counter-productive and ill-defined discussions of "weaponization" of outer space.
-- The United States will support efforts to explore new voluntary "Best Practices Guidelines" in the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and other appropriate fora to preserve the space environment and to ensure safe operations.
-- Our National Space Policy makes clear, however, that we will oppose new, legally-binding regimes that seek to limit our access to, and use of, space, or which impair our rights to conduct research, development, testing and operations in space.
-- It is not in the interest of any U.S. ally or friend that the CD be diverted toward work on treaty regimes that could be used to limit legitimate national security uses of space, such as for communications, navigation, missile warning and intelligence. b. If host government notes that the U.S. has also tested a direct ascent ASAT, the U.S. response should be:
-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45 percent was generated by China.
--- China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low earth orbit than anyone else.
-- All breakup debris attributed to the U.S. that is now in low earth orbit was caused by accidents (e.g., fuel tank explosions) and other unintentional events. ---The vast majority of breakup debris created by China is the result of an intentional act.
-- The United States has not conducted an anti-satellite test since 1985. The Cold War is over and the world economy is now significantly more dependent on Low Earth Orbit satellites than it was in 1985. That is why so many countries have expressed concern about the Chinese test.
--- The majority of the debris created by the 1985 U.S. test reentered the atmosphere within less than three years, and none remains in orbit today.
--- The majority of trackable debris objects (e.g., those with areas larger than 10 square centimeters) created by China's ASAT test will remain in orbit until the late 2030s.
-- Less than three years after conducting this test, the United States adopted the first of a series of national policies directing all U.S. space activities to minimize the creation of debris.
--- In fact, the longevity of the debris resulting from the 1985 ASAT test led directly to U.S. Department of Defense and then national-level policies to minimize debris from space tests.
-- The U.S. has actively worked with other nations to protect the space environment for future generations.
--- These efforts include development of voluntary guidelines in the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination (IADC) committee and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
--- The U.S. also supports consideration at COPUOS of new voluntary "Best Practice Guidelines" to ensure safe space operations by all spacefaring nations.
-- China's civil national space agency participated in developing the IADC and COPUOS debris mitigation guidelines, which specifically call for nations to refrain from any intentional destruction of satellites that might create long- lived debris. c. If host government counters with an assertion such as: "We believe the United States is pursuing space weapons," the U.S. response should be:
-- The United States does not have any "weapons" in space, nor do we have any plans to field such weapons. d. If host government raises points related to U.S. missile defense, the U.S. response should be:
-- The U.S. missile defense system is strictly a defensive system. Missile defense protects people from attack, potentially saving many lives. A Chinese attack on a satellite using a weapon launched by a ballistic missile threatens to destroy space systems that the United States and other nations use for commerce and national security. Destroying satellites endangers people. d. If host government raises questions relating to U.S cooperation on China's future Shenzhou or other crewed spaceflight missions, the U.S. response should be:
-- The United States will continue to offer basic warning advisories which China could use to protecting Chinese spacecraft carrying astronauts from collision with other space objects.
-- These advisories are offered in the spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance to minimize dangers to Chinese astronauts in their role as envoys of humanity in outer space. END "IF RAISED" TALKING POINTS.
RICE