

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AEMR
AMGT
AE
AU
AID
AORC
APER
AS
AM
AFIN
AMED
AJ
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
ABLD
AL
AA
APECO
AGAO
AY
AGMT
APEC
AINF
AG
ACS
AECL
AFFAIRS
ABUD
ASUP
ADANA
AADP
AMCHAMS
ARF
ASEAN
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
APCS
ADCO
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ADM
AN
AIT
BU
BR
BL
BO
BA
BB
BG
BM
BBSR
BH
BEXP
BK
BD
BTIO
BT
BE
BY
BF
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BILAT
BIDEN
BC
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CH
CG
CF
CU
CE
CVIS
CASC
CO
CS
CA
CIDA
CBW
CW
CMGT
CI
CODEL
CY
CPAS
CJAN
CD
CWC
CDG
CIA
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CT
CR
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CFED
CV
CACS
CARSON
CLINTON
CN
CONS
CM
CAC
CIC
COPUOS
CDC
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EG
EZ
EUN
ECON
ETRD
ECPS
EFIN
ENRG
ETTC
EPET
EINV
EAID
EAIR
EWWT
EU
EAGR
EC
ELAB
EIND
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
EFIS
ELTN
ET
ECIN
EFTA
ES
EINT
EI
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
ELN
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
EXIM
ETRO
ENIV
ESA
ER
EK
EUR
EFINECONCS
EUMEM
EUREM
EPA
ERNG
ENERG
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
IS
IZ
IR
IC
IO
IN
ID
IGAD
IT
ILC
IAEA
ITU
ICAO
IMO
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
IAHRC
ITF
INRA
INRO
IWC
IQ
IV
ICRC
ICTY
INRB
IEFIN
ILO
ITRA
ITALY
IBET
ISRAELI
IL
INTELSAT
IRC
IDP
ICTR
IRAQI
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
INDO
IDA
ISLAMISTS
KSPR
KNNP
KWBG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KN
KS
KIPR
KCRM
KDEM
KIRF
KJUS
KHLS
KSCA
KOMC
KAWC
KV
KFRD
KWMN
KTIP
KPWR
KSUM
KGHG
KTIA
KTFN
KIRC
KCOR
KACT
KMDR
KGIC
KOLY
KUNR
KIDE
KMPI
KPKO
KCFE
KVPR
KRAD
KPAL
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTEX
KTDB
KFSC
KZ
KSEP
KFLU
KE
KU
KPLS
KRVC
KRIM
KSTH
KG
KFLO
KPOA
KICC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KBCT
KSAF
KMOC
KDRG
KBIO
KREC
KSTC
KVRP
KBTR
KMIG
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KWAC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KWMM
KPRP
KNEI
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KX
KMCA
KCRS
KMFO
KID
KCIP
KNAR
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KHDP
KFIN
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KTER
KRCM
KCFC
KSAC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KCOM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KAID
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KHSA
MPOS
MOPS
MARR
MTCR
MNUC
MASS
MX
MCAP
MAR
MTRE
MASC
MK
MG
MTCRE
MI
MD
MA
MO
MY
MU
ML
MRCRE
MAS
MEDIA
MC
MR
MIL
MW
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
NATO
NG
NL
NZ
NT
NW
NO
NU
NS
NPT
NASA
NI
NK
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NP
NATIONAL
NSSP
NSF
NA
NGO
NV
NR
NDP
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NEW
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NPG
NSC
NPA
NSFO
OPDC
OPRC
OEXC
OTRA
ODIP
OIIP
OVIP
OPIC
OPCW
OAS
OREP
OSCE
OSCI
OES
OFDP
OECD
OCS
OIC
OPAD
OVP
OHUM
OFFICIALS
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PTER
PHUM
PK
PREF
PM
PHSA
PA
PINS
PE
PBTS
PCI
PO
PL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PGIV
PROP
PP
PBIO
POL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PBT
PMIL
POV
PTBS
PG
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PROV
PNAT
PINF
PRL
PAS
PDOV
PRAM
PREO
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PAO
PREFA
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PGOC
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RW
REACTION
RCMP
RSO
RO
RP
ROOD
RM
ROBERT
RICE
REGION
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
RFE
REPORT
SY
SP
SOCI
SMIG
SNAR
SCUL
SC
SU
SO
SI
SENV
SZ
SW
SA
SR
SF
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SEN
SG
SYR
SWE
SK
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SCRS
SYRIA
SL
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SHI
SHUM
SIPRS
TSPA
TSPL
TU
TBIO
TRGY
TPHY
TS
TP
TW
TBID
TI
TF
TZ
TD
TT
TN
TNGD
TC
TX
TH
TL
TIP
THPY
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
US
UNSC
UNGA
UK
UP
UNCHC
UN
UNMIK
UNCSD
UY
USTR
USOAS
UNHRC
UNFCYP
UG
UNAUS
UNESCO
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
USUN
UZ
USNC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNEP
USEU
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07TELAVIV1732, ISA CHIEF DISKIN ON SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07TELAVIV1732.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07TELAVIV1732 | 2007-06-13 16:03 | 2010-12-19 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv |
VZCZCXRO4174
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #1732/01 1641603
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131603Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1626
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001732
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MARR MASS KPAL KWBG EG IS
SUBJECT: ISA CHIEF DISKIN ON SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP
AND WEST BANK
REF: TEL AVIV 1705
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In a June 11 meeting that entailed
discussion of the benchmarks (reftel), Israeli Security
Agency (ISA) Head Yuval Diskin shared his assessment of the
current situation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, painting a
picture of a desperate, disorganized, and demoralized Fatah
in the Gaza Strip, versus a well-organized and ascendant
Hamas. Speaking before the dramatic events of June 12-13 in
Gaza, Diskin qualified that Hamas is currently not in a
position to completely destroy Fatah. Diskin said that he
opposes USSC LTG Dayton's proposal to equip security forces
loyal to Palestinian Authority President Abbas and Fatah, as
he is concerned that the provisions will end up in the hands
of Hamas. He claimed that the security forces loyal to Abbas
and Fatah have been penetrated by Hamas, and pointed to a
recent incident in which Hamas reportedly seized heavy
machine guns from Abbas' Presidential Guard. Diskin noted
that the failed hostage-taking attempt two days earlier at
the Kissufim crossing had been carried out by Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades militants,
and led by PIJ. He said that ISA had no prior information
about the attack, and described it as "operationally
creative." Diskin said that overall counter-tunnel
cooperation with Egyptian security forces has improved over
the last two months, but claimed that that the Egyptians
still only react to intelligence supplied by ISA, and are
otherwise not proactive.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY, CONT.: Diskin described the overall security
situation in the West Bank as comparatively better, and
praised the level of cooperation ISA receives from the
Palestinian security services operating in the West Bank.
That said, he lamented what he characterized as a crisis of
leadership in Fatah, with PA President Abbas already focusing
on his retirement, and his possible successors incapable of
leading the Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Diskin especially criticized PA National Security
Advisor Muhammad Dahlan as attempting to lead his loyalists
in the Gaza Strip by "remote control" from abroad. Diskin
said that Fatah is on its "last legs," and that the situation
bodes ill for Israel. He noted his intention to discuss some
ideas on how to deal with the situation with PM Olmert in the
near future, and said he would share his thoughts afterwards
with the Ambassador. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
DISKIN DESCRIBES SITUATION FOR FATAH IN GAZA AS DESPERATE
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶3. (S) Speaking before the dramatic events of June 12-13,
Diskin said that Hamas is dominant in the Gaza Strip, but is
not yet strong enough there to completely destroy Fatah. The
difference, he explained, is between the "quality" of Hamas,
and the "quantity" of Fatah's security apparatus that is
loyal to Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas. Hamas
is dominant in most areas. In the Gaza Strip, it can win
every fight with Fatah, but Fatah can do it harm in its
"chaotic" way of fighting. Diskin said that some Fatah
members are being paid by National Security Advisor Muhammad
Dahlan, while others are being paid by Abbas -- especially
the Presidential Guard. He noted that the Presidential Guard
had been involved in the June 10 clashes at the Rafah
crossing.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
BUT NOTES HE OPPOSES PLAN TO SUPPORT FATAH SECURITY FORCES
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶4. (S) Diskin noted that he had heard earlier on June 11 from
Palestinian sources that Hamas had succeeded in stealing some
"Doshka" heavy machine guns from the Presidential Guard. He
said that this is an example of why he does not support "at
this time" USSC LTG Dayton's proposal to supply ammunition
and weapons to Fatah: "I support the idea of militarily
strengthening Fatah, but I am afraid that they are not
organized to ensure that the equipment that is transferred to
them will reach the intended recipients." Diskin claimed
that most of the Fatah-aligned security forces have been
penetrated by Hamas. He reiterated that he does not want to
see any equipment transferred to them before he is convinced
that the equipment will arrive at its intended destination.
¶5. (S) Diskin raised as another matter the question of
whether Fatah will be able to hold on to any equipment
provided to it. He expressed concern about Fatah's
organizational capabilities, and what he characterized as a
TEL AVIV 00001732 002 OF 003
glaring lack of leadership: "Dahlan is trying to manage
Fatah's security forces by remote control. We are not even
sure where he is." (NOTE: Diskin's aide said he believed
Dahlan is in Cairo. But on June 13, Diskin told the
Ambassador that Dahlan had surfaced in Amman the day before.
END NOTE.) Diskin continued: "Fatah is in very bad shape in
the Gaza Strip. We have received requests to train their
forces in Egypt and Yemen. We would like them to get the
training they need, and to be more powerful, but they do not
have anyone to lead them." Diskin also made clear his
reservations on training Palestinians in a country like Yemen
with a strong Al-Qaida presence.
¶6. (S) Diskin's aide said that the security forces at the
Rafah crossing are strong, but are demoralized with the
overall situation in the Gaza Strip. Diskin added that their
communications with the ISA had become "desperate," and
indicated no hope for the future. He observed that there is
a young generation of leaders among Fatah who are being
"pushed" by Dahlan and who have a sense of the urgency of the
situation and what needs to be done. At the same time,
however, they are not behaving in a way that is to be
expected by people in their urgent situation. Diskin
observed, "They are approaching a zero-sum situation, and yet
they ask us to attack Hamas. This is a new development. We
have never seen this before. They are desperate."
--------------------------------------------- -----
DISKIN: SITUATION IN WEST BANK BETTER THAN IN GAZA
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶7. (S) In the West Bank, Diskin said that ISA has established
a very good working relationship with the Preventive Security
Organization (PSO) and the General Intelligence Organization
(GIO). Diskin said that the PSO shares with ISA almost all
the intelligence that it collects. They understand that
Israel's security is central to their survival in the
struggle with Hamas in the West Bank.
¶8. (S) While he described this overall relationship with the
Palestinian security services in the West Bank as healthy,
Diskin noted that Fatah did not react to the last set of
Hamas attacks in the West Bank due to the current "mood" of
GIO leader Tawfik Tirawi. Diskin explained that Tirawi (whom
he described as psychopathic, cruel, dangerous and prone to
extreme mood swings) is disaffected and feels that his status
has declined, and that he is no longer respected by Abbas.
Diskin claimed that Tirawi also feels that his relationship
with Dahlan has deteriorated. Diskin said that he hopes to
meet with Tirawi the week of June 17 to dissuade him from
"doing stupid things, as he is trying to develop ties with
the Dughmush family in the Gaza Strip."
--------------------------------------------- -------------
DISKIN ON ABBAS: HE HAS FAILED. NOBODY CAN LEAD FATAH NOW
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶9. (S) Diskin said that Abbas views Fatah as weak and "on its
last legs," and incapable of being rehabilitated within six
months. Stressing that it was his own opinion (and not
necessarily shared by the GOI), Diskin said that Abbas is
starting to become a problem for Israel: "He's a paradox.
He cannot function and do anything. Why is Fatah failing?
Because Abbas has become the 'good guy' whom everyone is
trying to do everything for in order to keep him alive.
Everyone is afraid of the alternative, and yet Abbas is
already talking about how he plans to retire from the
political scene after his term ends in 2008. He knows he is
weak and that he has failed. He has failed to rehabilitate
Fatah. He did not start to take any action when he had the
chance in 2004. Instead of choosing to be the leader for
Fatah, he chose to be a national leader for all
Palestinians." Diskin lamented that the current situation
suggests that nobody can now assume leadership of Fatah.
Dahlan, he said, can only lead in the Gaza Strip -- if that
-- and Marwan Barghouti can lead in the West Bank, but not
the Gaza Strip. "It is something in their blood," he said,
"the leaders of the West Bank cannot rule the Palestinians in
the Gaza Strip and vice versa." Diskin warned that
Palestinian society is disintegrating, and that this bodes
ill for Israel. He said that he has some ideas about how to
address this that he wishes to discuss with PM Olmert, and
would share with the Ambassador afterwards: "We have to give
Fatah the conditions to succeed, but we cannot do this
through your benchmarks (reftel)."
--------------------------------------------- ----------
DISKIN ON ISA COUNTER-TUNNEL COOPERATION WITH EGYPTIANS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
TEL AVIV 00001732 003 OF 003
¶10. (S) Responding to a question from the Ambassador, Diskin
said that cooperation between Egyptian and Palestinian
security forces recently led to the discovery of some tunnels
in the Gaza Strip. He said the ISA occasionally hears that
tunnels are found in the Gaza Strip, and while he is inclined
to believe the information, he admitted that ISA cannot
always verify it. Diskin said that ISA's cooperation with
Egyptian security services has improved over the last two
months after their respective delegations had met. That
said, he claimed that fundamental challenges remain
unresolved: "They react on the intelligence that we provide
to them, but they are not proactive." He lamented that there
has been no dramatic change in the tunnel situation, adding
that there are still many tunnels running under the
Philadelphi corridor.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
DISKIN ON THE FAILED ATTACK AT KISSUFIM; THREATS ON FAYYAD
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶11. (S) Referring to the failed June 9 attempt by Palestinian
militants to kidnap Israeli soldiers stationed at the
Kissufim crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip, Diskin
said that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Al-Aksa Martyrs
Brigades carried out the attempt under PIJ leadership. He
said that the militant who guided the attack was one of PIJ's
main operatives in the northern Gaza Strip. Diskin said that
the attack was staged against an empty post, but designed to
appear dramatic. He admitted the attackers were
operationally very creative, and that ISA had no indication
that the attack was going to take place: "This was another
ISA failure. We had no intelligence on the attack in
advance."
¶12. (S) Responding to the Ambassador's question, Diskin said
that he had not seen any specific evidence about threats to
PA Finance Minister Salam Fayyad. He observed, however, that
as a former Fatah activist, Fayyad ought to be concerned
about his own security. Diskin noted that the man thrown by
Hamas militants from the roof of a 15-story building in the
Gaza Strip the day before was a member of Force 17.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES
...