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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA178, LACAYO: FSLN INTEREST GROUPS COMPETE FOR DOMINANCE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MANAGUA178 | 2007-01-23 15:43 | 2011-04-25 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2743916.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743919.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743922.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2752792.aspx |
VZCZCXRO5825
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0178/01 0231543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231543Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8722
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0899
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000178
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL ENRG EPET
SUBJECT: LACAYO: FSLN INTEREST GROUPS COMPETE FOR DOMINANCE
REF: MANAGUA 0155
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Antonio Lacayo, secretary minister of the
presidency during Violeta Chamorro's presidency and her
son-in-law, believes that the power struggle among competing
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) interest groups
will "test" the new Ortega government and could be exploited
to the opposition's advantage. He recently warned the
Ambassador that Ortega is intent on mounting a "parallel
government" operating outside of public scrutiny, but
believes the opposition holds the key to counter this trend.
End Summary.
Ortega Set on Mounting Parallel Government
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) In a January 18 meeting with Ambassador, DCM, and
PolCouns, Antonio Lacayo warned us that President Ortega is
determined to mount a parallel government that will operate
outside of public scrutiny. Lacayo, who served as Violeta
Chamorro's secretary minister of the presidency and is her
son-in-law, described Ortega's new cabinet as "a group of
largely unqualified, incapable novices". Their loyalty to
Ortega is unequivocal, but they will exercise no significant
influence. Citing Education Minister de Castilla as a case
in point, Lacayo observed that the minister's double
discourse has the population reeling, and even pro-Sandinista
education union ANDEN has criticized de Castilla. Lacayo
recounted how in the course of a week de Castilla had
proposed eliminating school cafeterias, and then reinstated
them. Similarly, the minister declared educational autonomy
"dead" and ordered parents to refuse to pay any
administrative school fees; days later, however, de Castilla
announced that parents will be responsible for holding fund
raising events to contribute to their children's schools.
¶3. (C) As for Health Minister Maritza Cuant, Lacayo
highlighted the fact that she was quick to correct the FSLN's
pre-election opposition to abortion of any kind and is now
openly opposing the penalization of abortion. As for
National Energy Institute (INE) director David Castillo, "he
is totally crazy," declared Lacayo, while new Energy Minister
Emilio Rapacciolli is one of the capable few in the new
cabinet. (Comment: The FSLN has traditionally openly
supported therapeutic abortion; its change of heart in the
lead up to the November 2006 national election was clearly a
political ploy to gain more votes and ingratiate the party
with the Catholic Church. (Note: The January 22 editions of
Nicaragua's dailies La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario both
featured Managua Archbishop Leopoldo Brenes' comments that
the FSLN should remember its campaign position against
abortion.)
¶4. (C) According to Lacayo, another reason for Ortega's
delay in standing up his cabinet and the lack of transparency
surrounding the process is his inability to deliver on his
campaign promise to appoint women to 50% of the government
positions. Lacayo reported that GON "Zero Hunger" director
Orlando Nunez had apprised him of the dilemma -- many capable
women work for NGOs and are unwilling to sacrifice their
generous salaries to take a much lower paying government job,
especially if Ortega delivers on his promise to halve the
salaries of senior government officials.
So, Who is in Charge?
- - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Depicting President Ortega as a "disorganized sort
with absolutely no sense of time," Lacayo believes that
Ortega will not be engaged in the daily goings on of his
government. He ventured that the increasingly evident
rivalries and divisions among Sandinista leaders close to
Ortega will further complicate the Ortega government. Lacayo
listed four main currents: Ortega's wife Rosario; his new
senior economic advisor Bayardo Arce; Managua Mayor Dionisio
"Nicho" Marenco; and, the ever-present Lenin Cerna, still a
power to reckon with, even though he is not to Rosario's
liking. Lacayo opined that in the scheme of things,
Rosario's influence is on rise, recounting that while a year
ago Tomas Borge had ordered Rosario to "shut up," today he
would not dare to confront her.
MANAGUA 00000178 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) Comment: The other shadow power figures in Ortega's
government will be Miguel D'Escoto, Alvaro Baltodano, Manuel
Coronel Krautz and Mohammed Lashtar. Marenco's presidential
ambitions could eventually trump his loyalty to Ortega.
While National Assembly Deputy Edwin Castro and Foreign
Minister Samuel Santos (and probably Nicaraguan
Ambassador-designate to the United States Arturo Cruz) lie
within Rosario's camp (considered the more "moderate" and
"intellectual" wing), National Assembly President Rene Nunez
appears closer to Bayardo Arce. Lacayo predicted that the
power struggles among these camps will test the new Ortega
government and suggested that these tensions could be
exploited to the opposition's advantage. End Comment.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised concerns regarding Ortega's
choice of former Libyan/naturalized Nicaraguan Muhamad
Muhktar Lashtar as his personal secretary, noting that
Lashtar was a commercial attache at the Libyan embassy in
Managua in the 1980s and reportedly associated with Libyan
intelligence. Lacayo, who shared the Ambassador's concern,
remarked that Pepe Mathus, a former Contra (associated with
the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance, ALN) who has been involved
in some business dealings with Lashtar, told Lacayo recently
that the Libyan Embassy had informed him that Lashtar no
longer maintains any relation with the embassy. PolCouns
shared that Lashtar is reportedly Moammar al-Ghadafi's
nephew.
Disgruntled Convergencia
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) Lacayo related how Edwin Castro had sent a letter to
President Ortega recommending he appoint Convergencia leader
Santiago Rivas as Defense Minister, but Cerna knocked the
idea down and lobbied for wife Marisol Castillo to take the
job. Only vigorous foreign and domestic objections derailed
Castillo's appointment, opined Lacayo. Similarly, Luis
Guzman, another Convergencia member, was not taken into
account, said Lacayo, who added that at one point he was also
affiliated with Convergencia.
Transformation in the Fast Lane
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¶9. (C) The Ambassador observed that President Ortega appears
intent on a transformation of state along the lines of the
Chavez model and is quickly trying to pass legislation that
would reduce the role of traditional governmental
institutions. The Ambassador added that Ortega's aggressive
efforts to consolidate power and his association with the
Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Iranian presidents is causing him
to quickly waste the political capital he had gained during
the campaign and following his election.
Stepping Back on Law 290
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¶10. (C) Lacayo, who agreed with the Ambassador's assessment,
attributed Ortega's recent decision to retreat a few steps on
some of his party's most egregious proposed changes to Law
290 (including revisions that would have accorded Ortega
direct control over the police and the military) to his
realization that he can only go so far, so fast before the
opposition will dig in its heels. However, Ortega is certain
to try to "score other goals," warned Lacayo.
Ortega's Double Discourse -- A Matter of Money
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¶11. (C) The Ambassador solicited Lacayo's views on whether
Ortega is serious in his "double discourse" that he seeks
positive relations with the United States while allowing the
Venezuelan and Iranian presidents to lambaste the United
States as they signed a number of cooperation agreements.
Lacayo's response was immediate: "It's all about the money"
-- Ortega wants to remain within the graces of the IMF, and
with the U.S., EU, Japan, and other donors. Thus, Ortega's
rhetoric during his inaugural ceremonies was relatively
benign. However, because Ortega needs more funds than these
traditional sources can provide to deliver on all of his
campaign promises, he must court Chavez. Ortega knows that
President Chavez saved Cuba, explained Lacayo, adding that
"Chavez is not a revolutionary, he's a gorilla." Fidel
Castro does not even respect Chavez and Daniel possibly might
MANAGUA 00000178 003 OF 003
not even consider Chavez a "true ideological" colleague, but
they both need him, he concluded.
¶12. (C) The Ambassador commented that some of Chavez'
offers are to problems that the Nicaraguans do not have, for
example, the construction of a refinery that will process
much more crude than Nicaragua's domestic consumption
requires. Lacayo replied that the refinery and pipeline are
directed at meeting China's growing energy needs.
Taking Advantage of the New Political Chapter
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¶13. (C) Lacayo mused that Ortega's return to power and his
fast-track efforts to transform Nicaragua's political model
has panicked the opposition and opened a new political
"chapter" that offers the divided liberals and other
opposition parties a chance to rally around a common purpose.
He listed lawmakers Wilfredo Navarro, Francisco Aguirre
Sacasa and Jose Pallais as some of the PLC deputies who might
be willing to participate in such an effort with their ALN
and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) counterparts. Both
Navarro and Aguirre Sacasa hold strong ambitions to run for
president, so their loyalty to Aleman could be compromised,
he explained. Referring to DCM/POL's recent meeting with PLC
caucus chief Maximino Rodriguez, he agreed that Rodriguez
would be another good candidate.
A Bit of Pact History
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¶14. (C) Commenting that Aguirre Sacasa claims he is
"different" from his father Francisco Aguirre Baca, Lacayo
related how Aguirre Baca, who resides in the United States,
and Humberto Ortega were the initial intermediaries who set
up the "pact" between Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega.
Later on, current VP Jaime Morales and Managua Mayor Nicho
Marenco replaced Aguirre Baca and Humberto Ortega as the pact
intermediaries, he explained.
Comment
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¶15. (C) Lacayo's insights track closely with many of our
other contacts, although he seems out of touch regarding PLC
deputy Wilfredo Navarro; thus far, Navarro has shunned ALN
efforts to seek common ground against Ortega. The fissures
within Ortega's inner circle can be exploited to the
opposition's and our advantage, particularly if the
opposition starts rallying around a common goal to prevent
Ortega from transforming Nicaragua's political model and
remaining indefinitely in power. The media can also help by
informing the public that Chavez' use of Nicaragua as his
bully pulpit against the United States demonstrates his
aggressive, neo-imperialistic intentions for the region.
TRIVELLI