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Viewing cable 09PANAMA15, PANAMA: NEW MOGJ MINSTER LAYS OUT PLANS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA15 | 2009-01-07 20:22 | 2011-04-11 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama |
Appears in these articles: http://www.padigital.com.pa/periodico/edicion-actual/wikileaks-panama-interna.php?story_id=1036419&codeth=1593 |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0015/01 0072022
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 072022Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2817
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2737
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1963
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T PANAMA 000015
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: NEW MOGJ MINSTER LAYS OUT PLANS
REF: PANAMA 00008
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Security has become the government's weak spot, newly
appointed Minister of Government of Justice Dilio Arcia told
the Ambassador December 19. He described plans to address
gang violence, including tougher sentences and implementation
of community policing initiatives. In discussing the FARC
presence in the Darien, Arcia said that increased mobility
for GOP police forces was key, as Panamanian forces could not
arrive quickly enough to confront FARC incursions. He also
spoke about the need to improve governance in the Darien. He
reaffirmed GOP policy that the U.S. should not have a
permanent physical presence in the Darien, and forcefully
asserted his and the President's authority to decide on any
increase in temporary presence or qualitative change in the
nature of USG presence. He and his Vice Ministers described
recent outreach to the Embera Indians, following a FARC
incursion into their autonomous comarca. They also discussed
forthcoming equipment upgrades, including the arrival of
helicopters in February and March. End Summary.
----------------------
It's the Crime, Stupid!
----------------------
¶2. (C) Dilio Arcia, who was appointed Minister of Government
and Justice on November 18 replacing Daniel Delgado, met with
the Ambassador and EMBOFFs on December 19, together with Vice
Minster of Public Security Rodrigo Cigarruista and Vice
Minster of Government Severino Mejia. Arcia said that his top
priority was to develop and implement policies to confront
the crime wave affecting the country. He complained that the
political opposition was using the security issue to
politically weaken Martin Torrijos' government and Balbina
Herrera's presidential campaign. He said security had become
the "weak spot" of the government. Arcia complained that
Panama was being overwhelmed by the effects of "Plan Mexico."
(Comment: Arcia was referring to the Merida Initiative. End
Comment) He said foreign drug traffickers were hiring local
gangs to kill people as a result of lost drug shipments
seized by the authorities in Panama. He said the MOGJ, the
Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office were working
together on an anti-gang strategy, that would focus on
combating illegal weapon possession. The MOGJ proposed an
increase in the penalty for weapon possession to four-six
years, so that preventive detention could be used against
offenders. (Note: Under the current Penal Process Bridge Law,
which is in effect until the judicial system switches over to
the new adversarial law system, preventive detention can only
be requested for crimes that carry a prospective sentence of
four years or more. The current sentence is two-four years.
End Note) Arcia said this will allow gang members caught with
guns to be investigated for other crimes while in detention.
He said the police needed to focus on the retail sale of
drugs, the main source of funds for the gangs.
------------------
Community Policing
------------------
¶3. (C) Arcia also asserted that the MOGJ was interested in
implementing community policing programs. He emphasized
getting NGOs and business groups to work with the police,
citing a pilot program in the province of Veraguas he said
had been successful and an existing program called "Vigilant
Neighbors." He also praised the Integral Security Program
(PROSI), which is an IDB-funded crime prevention program that
focused on building up recreational infrastructure in poor,
gang prone neighborhoods. He also stressed the need to bring
in other elements of the GOP, like the Ministry of Education
and the Ministry of Social Development to help develop a
coordinated GOP strategy to prevent kids from finding their
way into gangs. Arcia complained that prisoners were
continuing to run their criminal operations from prison, and
said he would like to see a program to build new prisons that
were smaller and easier to control and improve the old ones.
--------------------------------------------
To Forward Deploy, or Not to Forward Deploy?
--------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the Darien,
Cigarruista said Panama was primarily a transit and R&R zone
for the FARC, though he also noted the 57th Front charged
tolls for cargo being smuggled into the Darien. Arcia said
Panamanian police forces needed greater mobility to be able
to deal with the FARC effectively. He said even if the
security forces heard about incursions, they could not get to
the scene quickly enough to do anything about it. He asserted
that with the National Frontier Service (SENAFRONT) police's
separation from the Panamanian National Police (PNP), Panama
would now have a permanent presence along its borders, noting
that 350 new police graduates would make it possible to keep
SENAFRONT police deployed on the borders, and not bring them
into Panama City to reinforce the PNP, as had often happened
in the past. Arcia said the plan was to concentrate large
groups of SENAFRONT police in a few places, and then respond
quickly by helicopter to any reports of incursions. Mejia
said the Darien was a big, tough area to patrol and that it
could only be patrolled by helicopters and boats. He said
that to be effective, SENAFRONT needed to deploy closer to
the border and that to do so they needed helicopter lift
capability. Asked by the Ambassador if SENAFRONT would then
be moved closer to the border, Cigarruista said they would
not/not be deployed on the border, but would observe and
react from bases further back. Mejia stressed that the GOP
had great cooperation with Colombia, and that the GOC would
help them. Arcia interjected that the situation was far from
imminent hostilities, noting that the main threat from the
FARC was their use of Panamanian territory for R&R, drug
trafficking and kidnappings. Mejia agreed, noting the FARC
was not looking to start a two-front conflict, while
Cigarruista noted that Panama also did not want a regional
conflict. He said the GOC would support them, but that the
answer would be the extension of Panama's effective control
over its own territory. Arcia said the extension of effective
governance was the key, and that the GOP was going as far as
to consider the development of new towns in the Darien as a
solution to the difficult challenge of providing essential
services in such a thinly populated area.
--------------
Need any Help?
--------------
¶5. (C) EMBOFF asked about the deployment of SOUTHCOM Joint
Planning Assistance Team (JPAT) and Counter Narco-Terrorist
(CNT) training teams currently in-country to the Darien to
support the development of SENAFRONT. (Note: These teams are
currently forbidden by the GOP to train SENAFRONT police in
the Darien, thought they are permitted limited "technical
assessment" visits. All USG training for GOP police deployed
to the Darien takes place in training areas closer to Panama
City. End Note) Arcia said the GOP did not want a permanent
U.S. physical presence in the area that might create
misunderstandings. Mejia said an increased U.S. presence
depended on SENAFRONT Director Commissioner Frank Abrego.
Arcia immediately and forcefully cut Mejia off, and said
Abrego could recommend such a change to him, the Minister, or
directly to President Torrijos, but could not/not decide this
on his own. Arcia justified this assertion of authority by
saying that he was a lawyer, and wanted to make sure
everything was "legal".
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Taking Care of the Little People
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¶6. (C) Arcia said they had met with indigenous leaders in
the Darien (Embera) to assure them they would not be
abandoned by the GOP, following a recent FARC incursion in
their territory (see reftel). He said the President himself
had gone to Puerto Indio to meet with the Gran Cacique of the
Embera and had promised that the GOP would have a presence in
their areas. Mejia said the MOGJ would train the Embera
"police" - traditional Embera figures who help maintain
internal order in the Embera semi-autonomous comarcas - to
get intelligence for them, and would set up meetings for them
with SENAFRONT police to increase cooperation. Arcia said
they had explained to the Embera that despite their
semi-autonomy in their comarcas, they were Panamanians under
the security responsibility of the President. He said a GOP
official in the past had decided to withdraw the police from
the comarcas, but that following the recent incursion, the
Embera were ready to cooperate with the GOP.
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New Equipment on the Way
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¶7. (C) Cigarruista said that the MOGJ was refurbishing 5
Bell-212 helicopters, and the first one would be delivered on
March 1, after which two more would be delivered each month
and a half. He also said that another new helicopter the MOGJ
had bought would be delivered on February 15. He said two new
boats would also arrive in February for the National
Aero-Naval Service (SENAN). Mejia noted that SENAN assets,
especially the helicopters would be used for multiple
missions, including search and rescue, moving teachers into
remote areas, disaster relief, and flying foreign
dignitaries, in addition to law enforcement. Cigarruista
said Panama had an immediate need for helicopters, especially
for maritime patrol and border support. He added that Panama
was buying six small target acquisition radars that had sea
and air capability for $4.5 million. He said they also
planned to use radars of the Panama Canal Authority (ACP)
that could see 180 n.m. into the sea and air. He said the ACP
was only using 30% of its radar capacity, so the SENAN would
be able to use them as well. Mejia said the MOGJ was
interested in acquiring mobile computers for the police to
give them the information to "enact a plan," and not just
react to crime. Cigarruista noted that the MOGJ was working
on a computer system to amass crime data that could then be
used to target areas of high crime in real time, similar to
the COMPSTAT program used by U.S. law enforcement agencies.
He said the MOGJ needed assistance to bring in experts to
train their personnel in how to interpret the data so they
could use it effectively.
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Comment
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¶8. (C) Arcia's embrace of community policing is a welcome
change from Delgado. Arcia is in many ways the anti-Delgado,
focusing on urban crime and community outreach, while Delgado
framed the issue as a choice between democracy and law and
order, and did not really care what civil society thought.
Arcia has been quoted in the papers calling for NGOs and
community involvement in the fight against crime. This brings
the MOGJ in line with Post, as we are both now focused on
urban police reform and anti-gang programs. While the reason
for Arcia's embrace of community policing might be to help
undo some of the political damage Delgado and Torrijos
himself did, it is a further step towards institutionalizing
the idea of community policing as the best way to respond to
Panama's crime/gang problem.
¶9. (S//NF) This meeting also reinforced the fact that MOGJ
does not have operational control of the security forces in
Panama. While Arcia was quick to point out that Abrego could
not decide on increased cooperation with the U.S. on his own,
he added a telling line that he had to check with him - or
the President. In reality, it is Torrijos and the National
Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS), under Erik
Espinosa and his deputy Javier Fletcher, who really control
the operations of the security services. The confusion shown
here among Mejia and Cigarruista about how far forward the
SENAFRONT would deploy indicates they might not be the ones
who would decide. The heads of the PNP, SENAFRONT and the
SENAN all report directly to Torrijos, who then delegates
operational control and oversight for major operations to
Fletcher. Under Delgado MOGJ had the political weight to
challenge Espinosa/Fletcher, but under Arcia this influence
is likely to wane. The real mission of the MOGJ is to
administer these services and buy supplies, a limited mission
in which the MOGJ's effectiveness is highly questionable.
Post will continue to coordinate training issues with the
MOGJ and the service chiefs in parallel, but high-level
planning for law-enforcement operations will continue to be
done through Fletcher or the service chiefs.
STEPHENSON