

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AEMR
AMGT
AE
AU
AID
AORC
APER
AS
AM
AFIN
AMED
AJ
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
ABLD
AL
AA
APECO
AGAO
AY
AGMT
APEC
AINF
AG
ACS
AECL
AFFAIRS
ABUD
ASUP
ADANA
AADP
AMCHAMS
ARF
ASEAN
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
APCS
ADCO
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ADM
AN
AIT
BU
BR
BL
BO
BA
BB
BG
BM
BBSR
BH
BEXP
BK
BD
BTIO
BT
BE
BY
BF
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BILAT
BIDEN
BC
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CH
CG
CF
CU
CE
CVIS
CASC
CO
CS
CA
CIDA
CBW
CW
CMGT
CI
CODEL
CY
CPAS
CJAN
CD
CWC
CDG
CIA
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CT
CR
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CFED
CV
CACS
CARSON
CLINTON
CN
CONS
CM
CAC
CIC
COPUOS
CDC
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EG
EZ
EUN
ECON
ETRD
ECPS
EFIN
ENRG
ETTC
EPET
EINV
EAID
EAIR
EWWT
EU
EAGR
EC
ELAB
EIND
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
EFIS
ELTN
ET
ECIN
EFTA
ES
EINT
EI
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
ELN
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
EXIM
ETRO
ENIV
ESA
ER
EK
EUR
EFINECONCS
EUMEM
EUREM
EPA
ERNG
ENERG
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
IS
IZ
IR
IC
IO
IN
ID
IGAD
IT
ILC
IAEA
ITU
ICAO
IMO
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
IAHRC
ITF
INRA
INRO
IWC
IQ
IV
ICRC
ICTY
INRB
IEFIN
ILO
ITRA
ITALY
IBET
ISRAELI
IL
INTELSAT
IRC
IDP
ICTR
IRAQI
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
INDO
IDA
ISLAMISTS
KSPR
KNNP
KWBG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KN
KS
KIPR
KCRM
KDEM
KIRF
KJUS
KHLS
KSCA
KOMC
KAWC
KV
KFRD
KWMN
KTIP
KPWR
KSUM
KGHG
KTIA
KTFN
KIRC
KCOR
KACT
KMDR
KGIC
KOLY
KUNR
KIDE
KMPI
KPKO
KCFE
KVPR
KRAD
KPAL
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTEX
KTDB
KFSC
KZ
KSEP
KFLU
KE
KU
KPLS
KRVC
KRIM
KSTH
KG
KFLO
KPOA
KICC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KBCT
KSAF
KMOC
KDRG
KBIO
KREC
KSTC
KVRP
KBTR
KMIG
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KWAC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KWMM
KPRP
KNEI
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KX
KMCA
KCRS
KMFO
KID
KCIP
KNAR
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KHDP
KFIN
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KTER
KRCM
KCFC
KSAC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KCOM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KAID
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KHSA
MPOS
MOPS
MARR
MTCR
MNUC
MASS
MX
MCAP
MAR
MTRE
MASC
MK
MG
MTCRE
MI
MD
MA
MO
MY
MU
ML
MRCRE
MAS
MEDIA
MC
MR
MIL
MW
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
NATO
NG
NL
NZ
NT
NW
NO
NU
NS
NPT
NASA
NI
NK
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NP
NATIONAL
NSSP
NSF
NA
NGO
NV
NR
NDP
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NEW
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NPG
NSC
NPA
NSFO
OPDC
OPRC
OEXC
OTRA
ODIP
OIIP
OVIP
OPIC
OPCW
OAS
OREP
OSCE
OSCI
OES
OFDP
OECD
OCS
OIC
OPAD
OVP
OHUM
OFFICIALS
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PTER
PHUM
PK
PREF
PM
PHSA
PA
PINS
PE
PBTS
PCI
PO
PL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PGIV
PROP
PP
PBIO
POL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PBT
PMIL
POV
PTBS
PG
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PROV
PNAT
PINF
PRL
PAS
PDOV
PRAM
PREO
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PAO
PREFA
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PGOC
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RW
REACTION
RCMP
RSO
RO
RP
ROOD
RM
ROBERT
RICE
REGION
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
RFE
REPORT
SY
SP
SOCI
SMIG
SNAR
SCUL
SC
SU
SO
SI
SENV
SZ
SW
SA
SR
SF
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SEN
SG
SYR
SWE
SK
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SCRS
SYRIA
SL
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SHI
SHUM
SIPRS
TSPA
TSPL
TU
TBIO
TRGY
TPHY
TS
TP
TW
TBID
TI
TF
TZ
TD
TT
TN
TNGD
TC
TX
TH
TL
TIP
THPY
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
US
UNSC
UNGA
UK
UP
UNCHC
UN
UNMIK
UNCSD
UY
USTR
USOAS
UNHRC
UNFCYP
UG
UNAUS
UNESCO
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
USUN
UZ
USNC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNEP
USEU
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PANAMA347, PANAMA: POLITICAL COMMENTATOR PROVIDES INSIGHT ON
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PANAMA347.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA347 | 2009-04-29 21:51 | 2011-04-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Panama |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0347/01 1192151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 292151Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3333
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000347
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV PM PREL
SUBJECT: PANAMA: POLITICAL COMMENTATOR PROVIDES INSIGHT ON
POST-ELECTION LANDSCAPE
Classified By: Classified by: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reas
ons 1.4(b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Ricardo Martinelli's Alliance for Change movement
will perform well in next weekend's elections, and the PRD
will be weakened but will regain strength and prepare for
2014, political commentator Alfredo Castillero told POLOFFS
during lunch on April 23. Castillero noted that a Martinelli
Administration, nonetheless, will have some surprises,
probably referring to unexpected Cabinet appointments from
various political parties. He also provided commentary on
the individuals surrounding Martinelli's campaign and noted
that Martinelli will have to realize that he cannot run the
presidency like a business "because the public sector simply
does not work that way." Castillero's assessment reiterates
themes that Post has heard from other contacts in the run-up
to the May 3 elections. His comments regarding a rocky
transition period track with Post's impressions. The
transition will be chaotic, and the Martinelli team is solely
focused on winning the election on May 3, and has not begun
thinking seriously about governing the country.
----------------------------------------
PRD: Weakened, But Still Important Force
----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) "The ruling PRD will be weakened in the elections
next weekend, but the party's strong history and large base
of support will allow it to regain strength," political
analyst Alfredo Castillero told political officers during
lunch on April 23. The party's core values such as
discipline, loyalty, and organization have helped its
cohesiveness and allowed it to retain its large membership.
(Note: The Electoral Tribunal statistics from December 2008
show PRD membership at over 660,000, making it by far
Panama's largest party.) He explained that the dynamics of
the PRD's presidential bid changed considerably after
President Martin Torrijos decreed the security reforms in
August 2008 and Balbina Herrera defeated Juan Carlos Navarro
to win the party's presidential primary in September 2008.
"Balbina's checkered past has hurt her campaign because
Panamanians associate her with former Panamanian dictator
Manuel Noriega," Castillero commented. Infighting within the
PRD has weakened the normally disciplined party, and centrist
members of the party -- such as Juan Carlos Navarro -- had
difficulty in accepting her as the party's candidate. "Juan
Carlos Navarro may emerge even stronger within the party as a
result of an opposition presidential win," he explained.
(Note: La Estrella daily published an article on April 23
which outlined four supposed factions in the PRD, which the
daily claimed were led by Ernesto "El Toro" Perez Balladarez,
Martin Torrijos, Balbina Herrera, and Juan Carlos Navarro.)
¶3. (C) Castillero predicted that the PRD would win
approximately 30 National Assembly seats, which he
characterized as a large opposition bloc, though short of a
majority. (Note: The total number of National Assembly
Deputies will decrease from 78 to 71 with this election, and
36 Deputies will constitute a majority). Although he would
not predict the number of National Assembly Deputies that the
Panamenista Party would win, he noted that the Panamenista
Party will be essential to a probable opposition majority in
the National Assembly. Castillero noted that it has been
difficult for the Panamenista Party to assume second billing
to a Democratic Change candidate for the national ticket, but
the party is looking forward. "Mireya Moscoso has already
touted herself as the candidate to assume the party
presidency in 2011," Castillero said.
-------------------------------------------
Martinelli's Decisionmaking Style, Advisors
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) "Although Martinelli has a reputation of not listening
to anyone before he makes decisions, he actually does listen
to those around him, but then retreats to make his own
decisions. A Martinelli Administration, nonetheless, will
have some surprises," Castillero commented, probably
referring to unexpected Cabinet appointments from various
political parties. Key individuals who have surrounded
Martinelli include lead advisor Jimmy Papadimitriu, Frank de
Lima, Roxana Mendez, and Alma Cortez, according to
Castillero. Castillero insinuated that Frank de Lima was a
bit too rigid and young to be Minister of Economy and
Finance, a post for which de Lima had been rumored to be a
candidate. Roxana Mendez was a respected proponent of social
welfare, according to Castillero. (Note: Roxana Mendez is
the running mate of Alliance for Change mayoral candidate for
Panama City, Bosco Vallarino.) Castillero speculated that if
Vallarino wins the mayoral race and Mendez were offered a
Cabinet position -- most likely the Ministry of Social
Development -- she would resign from her mayoral duties to
serve in the Cabinet. Castillero described Alma Cortez as
one of Martinelli's main lawyers and the legal face of his
campaign. He said that in a Martinelli administration,
Cortez would probably be offered a legal appointment but
expressed misgivings about that prospect. "Cortez has made a
lot of enemies over the years because she has relentlessly
pushed legal cases to lengthy appeals processes in order to
reach settlements," Castillero said.
¶5. (C) "Martinelli and his running mate Juan Carlos Varela
have a good personal relationship, and they had been talking
to each other long before they made official their opposition
alliance," Castillero commented. He said that they had
agreed in January 2008 that the opposition candidate who was
leading in the polls by early 2009 would run as the
opposition presidential candidate while the other would
assume the VP role. (Note: This agreement is often referred
to as the Pese Pact (Pacto Pese).) Nonetheless, Castillero
acknowledged that Martinelli did not help the personal
relationship between the two when he publicly declared that
Varela would head the public transportation reform effort
because it sets Varela up to fail on a complicated project
and probably will prevent him from assuming a key Cabinet
position, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
¶6. (C) "Martinelli will need to realize that he cannot run
the presidency like a business. The public sector simply
does not work that way," Castillero noted. He commented that
he has heard from friends who are part of Martinelli's team
that Martinelli has run his campaign in a rigid manner. For
example, Castillero said his friend was afraid to arrive late
for work or make any personal calls during business hours.
--------------------------------------------- --
Political Background of Democratic Change Party
--------------------------------------------- --
¶7. (C) "Not all Panamanians who support Martinelli are in
favor of his liberal economic policies, but his promise of
repairing the country's problems through change drives his
popularity," Castillero said. He explained that the
Democratic Change (CD) party was not yet institutionalized
but rather was centered around Martinelli's personality, his
social promises, and dissatisfaction with the ruling PRD.
Politics in Panama are based on patronage rather than a
particular ideology, and Martinelli seems to be winning that
race, according to Castillero.
--------------------------------------------- -------
Panama City's Mayoral Race: "A Sad State of Affairs"
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶8. (C) Castillero lamented the "sad state of affairs" in the
contest for Panama City's mayoral seat; he had no doubt
(though no absolute proof) that PRD candidate Roberto "Bobby"
Velasquez received money from alleged Colombian
money-launderer David Murcia but noted that this would not be
a shock to most Panamanians and it would probably not greatly
affect the outcome of the race. He conceded that the
Alliance for Change candidate Bosco Vallarino was a terrible
candidate and noted that Vallarino's vigil pleading for
permission to run for mayor despite questions about his
U.S.-Panamanian dual citizenship was "shameless." (Note:
After controversy surrounding the possible disqualification
of Vallarino's candidacy due to his dual citizenship, the
Electoral Tribunal in mid-April declared Vallarino's mayoral
eligibility.) Castillero said that because of Panama's
centralized government system, it would strengthen the
opposition if the Alliance for Change won both the presidency
and the Panama City mayoral race. Nonetheless, the mayor of
Panama City does not have much power "other than collecting
the garbage," Castillero noted.
-------
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Alfredo Castillero, whose last GOP position was
serving as MFA Director General for External Political
Affairs in the Moscoso Administration, professes not to be
registered with any political party, but his sympathies are
generally understood to lie with the opposition in general
and the Panamenista Party in particular. Castillero's
assessment reiterates themes that Post has heard from other
contacts -- such as the impending difficult transition period
and the trouble that the Panamenista Party has had in
assuming second billing to the CD on the election ballot.
Nonetheless, Castillero stopped short of calling this
election "revolutionary" and assessed that the PRD will
weather the current political storm, regroup, and prepare for
¶2014. His comments regarding a rocky transition period track
with Post's impressions and do not assuage our fears that the
transition will be chaotic. It is abundantly clear that the
Martinelli team is solely focused on the May 3 election date
and has not prepared to begin governing the country.
STEPHENSON