

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AEMR
AMGT
AE
AU
AID
AORC
APER
AS
AM
AFIN
AMED
AJ
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
ABLD
AL
AA
APECO
AGAO
AY
AGMT
APEC
AINF
AG
ACS
AECL
AFFAIRS
ABUD
ASUP
ADANA
AADP
AMCHAMS
ARF
ASEAN
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
APCS
ADCO
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ADM
AN
AIT
BU
BR
BL
BO
BA
BB
BG
BM
BBSR
BH
BEXP
BK
BD
BTIO
BT
BE
BY
BF
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BILAT
BIDEN
BC
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CH
CG
CF
CU
CE
CVIS
CASC
CO
CS
CA
CIDA
CBW
CW
CMGT
CI
CODEL
CY
CPAS
CJAN
CD
CWC
CDG
CIA
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CT
CR
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CFED
CV
CACS
CARSON
CLINTON
CN
CONS
CM
CAC
CIC
COPUOS
CDC
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EG
EZ
EUN
ECON
ETRD
ECPS
EFIN
ENRG
ETTC
EPET
EINV
EAID
EAIR
EWWT
EU
EAGR
EC
ELAB
EIND
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
EFIS
ELTN
ET
ECIN
EFTA
ES
EINT
EI
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
ELN
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
EXIM
ETRO
ENIV
ESA
ER
EK
EUR
EFINECONCS
EUMEM
EUREM
EPA
ERNG
ENERG
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
IS
IZ
IR
IC
IO
IN
ID
IGAD
IT
ILC
IAEA
ITU
ICAO
IMO
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
IAHRC
ITF
INRA
INRO
IWC
IQ
IV
ICRC
ICTY
INRB
IEFIN
ILO
ITRA
ITALY
IBET
ISRAELI
IL
INTELSAT
IRC
IDP
ICTR
IRAQI
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
INDO
IDA
ISLAMISTS
KSPR
KNNP
KWBG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KN
KS
KIPR
KCRM
KDEM
KIRF
KJUS
KHLS
KSCA
KOMC
KAWC
KV
KFRD
KWMN
KTIP
KPWR
KSUM
KGHG
KTIA
KTFN
KIRC
KCOR
KACT
KMDR
KGIC
KOLY
KUNR
KIDE
KMPI
KPKO
KCFE
KVPR
KRAD
KPAL
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTEX
KTDB
KFSC
KZ
KSEP
KFLU
KE
KU
KPLS
KRVC
KRIM
KSTH
KG
KFLO
KPOA
KICC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KBCT
KSAF
KMOC
KDRG
KBIO
KREC
KSTC
KVRP
KBTR
KMIG
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KWAC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KWMM
KPRP
KNEI
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KX
KMCA
KCRS
KMFO
KID
KCIP
KNAR
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KHDP
KFIN
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KTER
KRCM
KCFC
KSAC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KCOM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KAID
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KHSA
MPOS
MOPS
MARR
MTCR
MNUC
MASS
MX
MCAP
MAR
MTRE
MASC
MK
MG
MTCRE
MI
MD
MA
MO
MY
MU
ML
MRCRE
MAS
MEDIA
MC
MR
MIL
MW
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
NATO
NG
NL
NZ
NT
NW
NO
NU
NS
NPT
NASA
NI
NK
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NP
NATIONAL
NSSP
NSF
NA
NGO
NV
NR
NDP
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NEW
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NPG
NSC
NPA
NSFO
OPDC
OPRC
OEXC
OTRA
ODIP
OIIP
OVIP
OPIC
OPCW
OAS
OREP
OSCE
OSCI
OES
OFDP
OECD
OCS
OIC
OPAD
OVP
OHUM
OFFICIALS
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PTER
PHUM
PK
PREF
PM
PHSA
PA
PINS
PE
PBTS
PCI
PO
PL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PGIV
PROP
PP
PBIO
POL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PBT
PMIL
POV
PTBS
PG
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PROV
PNAT
PINF
PRL
PAS
PDOV
PRAM
PREO
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PAO
PREFA
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PGOC
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RW
REACTION
RCMP
RSO
RO
RP
ROOD
RM
ROBERT
RICE
REGION
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
RFE
REPORT
SY
SP
SOCI
SMIG
SNAR
SCUL
SC
SU
SO
SI
SENV
SZ
SW
SA
SR
SF
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SEN
SG
SYR
SWE
SK
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SCRS
SYRIA
SL
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SHI
SHUM
SIPRS
TSPA
TSPL
TU
TBIO
TRGY
TPHY
TS
TP
TW
TBID
TI
TF
TZ
TD
TT
TN
TNGD
TC
TX
TH
TL
TIP
THPY
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
US
UNSC
UNGA
UK
UP
UNCHC
UN
UNMIK
UNCSD
UY
USTR
USOAS
UNHRC
UNFCYP
UG
UNAUS
UNESCO
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
USUN
UZ
USNC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNEP
USEU
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08USEUBRUSSELS1716, EU INFORMAL DEFMIN MEETING, DEAUVILLE, AND EU
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08USEUBRUSSELS1716.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08USEUBRUSSELS1716 | 2008-11-10 06:15 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | USEU Brussels |
VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBS #1716/01 3150615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 100615Z NOV 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/SACEUR SD SHAPE BE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFITT/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001716
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2018
TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP EUN FI
SUBJECT: EU INFORMAL DEFMIN MEETING, DEAUVILLE, AND EU
STRATEGIC PLANNING CAPABILITY: A FINNISH VIEW
Classified By: USEU/POL M-C Chris Davis, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Finnish Defense Counselor (protect)
discussed with USEU Defense Advisor the October 1 EU's
Informal Defense Ministers' Meeting at Deauville, and a
UK-France-Germany proposal for an EU crisis management and
planning capability. On capabilities, the French presidency
views its capability goals as paramount. They are: European
Air Transport Fleet, helicopters, maritime counter-mine
warfare, maritime aviation, military space activities, and
the relationship between the EDA and OCCAR. Ministers
discussed, with the participation of the NATO Secretary
General, the challenges of creating and maintaining
multinational high-readiness forces and of generating the
political will to use them. The necessity of U.S. support
for operations was also discussed. Ministers reviewed
current EU operations in Bosnia, Chad and off the coast of
Somalia. Finland supports a minimalist approach in Bosnia
and will send troops to a UN operation in Chad. Ministers
drew no conclusions on the juridical challenges
of anti-piracy operations. Finally, our Finnish source was
surprised that ministers did not take up a UK-FR-GE proposal
to develop, under Council General Secretariat, a
civil-military strategic planning structure, which he
described in detail. END SUMMARY
---------------------------
Capabilities la Franaise
---------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) Janne Kuusela (protect), Finnish Defense
Counselor, reading from Finnish reporting cables, told us the
Deauville meeting was unusually dynamic and interesting, not
the normal recitation of goals. The Chief Executive of the
EDA, Alex Weis, made the initial presentation delineating
European priorities derived from the Capability Development
Plan. Weis was then, according to Finnish reporting,
humiliated by the French, who downplayed the EDA's effort and
insisted that the capability goals of the French presidency
were paramount. The French made no mention of the Capability
Development Plan's conclusions nor the fact that these same
ministers had endorsed those conclusions previously. The
French cited their well-known preference for the European Air
Transport Fleet (Kuusela was skeptical this would ever fly),
helicopters, counter-mine warfare in the littoral waters of
Europe, maritime aviation, military space activities, and the
relationship between the EDA and OCCAR, the French hope being
that the
latter would act as a procurement agency for the former.
--------------------------------
Battlegroups: Use it or lose it
--------------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) Kuusela described a robust and useful discussion
at Deauville about the use of EU Battlegroups. After the
Finnish MoD's suggestion that the EU use its Battlegroups or
lose them, the UK intervened to say that it agreed, but that
HMG felt the EU should first discuss whether it ever intended
to engage in major military operations. The UK also pointed
out the very useful transformational aspects of developing
and establishing a Battlegroup. Poland interjected that the
Battlegroup is a Rolls-Royce of rapid reaction that is best
kept in the garage until a sufficiently important operation
warrants its use. Romania said it preferred to get its
transformational benefits from participation in NATO's NRF.
France thought that the EuroCorps was too often overlooked
for operations. The Chairman of the EU Military Committee,
French General Henri Bentgeat, then said that there are a
great many multi-national formations not affiliated with the
EU and that any discussion of their use must take NATO's need
int
o account as well. Further, he said merely establishing a
Battlegroup, especially if it is not used, is too costly as
50% of the cost of a high-readiness unit is just in getting
it ready. Next, it was suggested that the Battlegroup fill
the role as the EU's strategic reserve for operations.
General Bentgeat felt that if the situation warranted the
use of a Battlegroup, then the political will to employ it
would be forthcoming. The real problems of political will
aside, the UK re-iterated the need for the transformational
benefit in capability and mentality that come through the
process of standing up a Battlegroup.
----------------------------
The U.S. as Military Partner
----------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) According to the Finnish Defense Counselor, the
NATO Secretary General, who for the first time attended the
entire ministerial -- fulfilling a French proposal --
remarked that within NATO a similar discussion was under way
with respect to the NRF. Importantly, he reportedly
challenged ministers by asking if Europe or NATO really
contemplated conducting a significant military operation
without the participation of the United States. He said NATO
could not employ the NRF without the U.S. wondering if the EU
could employ a Battlegroup in an emergency without U.S.
assistance. General Bentgeat, reportedly noting the
"wisdom" of the NATO Secretary General's words, discussed the
lessons learned from the Nordic Battelgroup experience. He
cited the lack of lift and political will, and also the
failure to agree on costs, noting that the EU has still not
decided whether rapid reaction operations would be commonly
funded.
----------------
To Catch a Thief
----------------
¶5. (C/NF) Ministers also discussed a French proposal on
maritime surveillance and evacuation (NFI) and were briefed
on the French operation to rescue the crew of the private
yacht seized off Somalia. According to reporting from which
Kuusela was reading, the French paid the ransom at sea and
then using UAVs, helicopters, and other electronic means
tracked the pirates to land at which point the apparently
very numerous pirates split up and headed out in a great many
directions, too many in fact for the French to follow and
intercept. The result was that most of the ransom money was
lost and few of the pirates were apprehended.
----------
Operations
----------
¶6. (C/NF) Somalia: Kuusela related conversations among EU
naval planners at the ministerial who first estimated the
size of the EU's operational area as 300 square nautical
miles, which all thought was well beyond the capacity of a
few ships to patrol, given the small size of the pirate
dinghies. Then the estimate was raised to 500 square
nautical miles to the chagrin of those present. Ministers,
he said, also discussed the well-known list of practical and
juridical issues related to dealing with pirates without
coming to any conclusions, to include the inability to put
them ashore into the hands of a functioning police and
judicial system in Somalia, and the difficulty of identifying
them as pirates in the first place, since they usually claim
to be well-armed fisherman.
¶7. (C/NF) Chad: Relief by a UN operation is imperative,
concluded ministers from six nations, including Finland,
which promised to commit troops to a UN effort. Kuusela said
that current Finnish commitments to UN operations
post-Lebanon needed to be increased and Finland was
positioning itself for key positions in the UN hierarchy;
therefore, offering Finnish troops to a new UN operation in
Chad would have other benefits as well. Now that the rainy
season is coming to a close, he anticipated an increase in
rebel and bandit activity, while remarking that "Sweden left
us during the rainy season."
¶8. (C/NF) Bosnia: Kuusela said Finland favors the least
robust option of all those under consideration for reducing
the size of the EU force in Bosnia, because of the resource
drain of ALTHEA on other commitments. Kuusela added that the
consensus moved quickly in this direction.
-----------------------------
EU OHQ: In the Planning Stage
-----------------------------
¶9. (C/NF) Kuusela next discussed a UK-FR-GE proposal on a
structure for military strategic planning in Brussels that he
had thought would be discussed in Deauville. He reported
that the discussion did not take place as planned, presumably
because President Sarkozy considers the matter to be too
important a decision for defense ministers, preferring to
announce it at December's European Council meeting of Heads
of State and Government.
-----------------
UK-French Win-Win
-----------------
¶10. (C/NF) In laying out the proposal, Kuusela said that it
had to be a tri-partite one in order to gain the necessary
support, but that the Germans were merely bystanders.
(COMMENT: The original Battlegroup proposal was developed in
a similar fashion with the French bringing the Germans in at
the last minute END COMMENT) Kuusela said the effort was to
find a way forward in which the British, who did not object
in principle to strategic or advanced planning at the
European level, and the French, who want a stand-alone
structure at the strategic level in Brussels, could find
common ground. The British proposed a comprehensive
civilian-military center on the compound at SHAPE that could
integrate the work of both the EU and NATO; a proposal
Kuusela believed had U.S. support. The French objected as
this idea did not give France something in Brussels with a
European label. Kuusela's Finnish reporting said that a
UK-French agreement was reached in mid-late September;
however, the Elyse and Whitehall still disagree on some of
the details. The accord calls for a strategic
military-civilian planning and coordination function, with an
emphasis on coordination, under Javier Solana in the Council
General Secretariat. This mechanism is designed to produce
rapid strategic assessments to inform the EU decision-making
process in Brussels, while respecting the chain of command.
The proposal would not add any new billets, personnel or
structure in Brussels (presumably a win for the UK position),
but would enable the EU to function more effectively as a
unitary actor at the strategic political and strategic
military levels within the EU (a win for France).
--------------------------------------------
EU Crisis Management and Planning Capability
--------------------------------------------
¶11. (C/NF) Within the Secretariat and under Solana's Terms
of Reference, the new structure will combine DG E VIII,
Defense Aspects of ESDP, with DG E IX, Civilian Aspects of
ESDP, with the EU Military Staff, the Civilian Planning and
Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Planning and Early Warning
Unit. According to our discussion with Kuusela, the new
structure will lean heavily on the Situation Center (SitCen)
and the relevant offices of the External Relations
Directorate General of the European Commission. The role of
the NATO Permanent Liaison Team to the EU Military Staff in
this arrangement is to be determined, as are permanent links
to NATO's strategic planning staff. This organization will
also have a Deployable Augmentee Cadre, a body of experts
that would detach itself in times of crisis to the
responsible organization, for example, to a framework
nation's Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The Military
Committee and the Civilian Committee will remain as advisory
bodies according to their current functions.
---------------------------
Wind in Sarkozy's NATO Sail
---------------------------
¶12. (C/NF) The UK does not see this as a fundamental change
in the intent of having a Council General Secretariat for
ESDP, but it will be a good way to put wind in the domestic
political sails of Sarkozy to help steer him back into NATO.
The French president will say, according to the Finns, that
this is a physically small change but a giant mental leap
forward.
SILVERBERG
.