

Currently released so far... 12689 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AEMR
AMGT
AE
AU
AID
AORC
APER
AS
AM
AFIN
AMED
AJ
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
ABLD
AL
AA
APECO
AGAO
AY
AGMT
APEC
AINF
AG
ACS
AECL
AFFAIRS
ABUD
ASUP
ADANA
AADP
AMCHAMS
ARF
ASEAN
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
APCS
ADCO
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ADM
AN
AIT
BU
BR
BL
BO
BA
BB
BG
BM
BBSR
BH
BEXP
BK
BD
BTIO
BT
BE
BY
BF
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BILAT
BIDEN
BC
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CH
CG
CF
CU
CE
CVIS
CASC
CO
CS
CA
CIDA
CBW
CW
CMGT
CI
CODEL
CY
CPAS
CJAN
CD
CWC
CDG
CIA
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CT
CR
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CFED
CV
CACS
CARSON
CLINTON
CN
CONS
CM
CAC
CIC
COPUOS
CDC
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CHR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EG
EZ
EUN
ECON
ETRD
ECPS
EFIN
ENRG
ETTC
EPET
EINV
EAID
EAIR
EWWT
EU
EAGR
EC
ELAB
EIND
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
EFIS
ELTN
ET
ECIN
EFTA
ES
EINT
EI
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
ELN
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
EXIM
ETRO
ENIV
ESA
ER
EK
EUR
EFINECONCS
EUMEM
EUREM
EPA
ERNG
ENERG
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
IS
IZ
IR
IC
IO
IN
ID
IGAD
IT
ILC
IAEA
ITU
ICAO
IMO
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
IAHRC
ITF
INRA
INRO
IWC
IQ
IV
ICRC
ICTY
INRB
IEFIN
ILO
ITRA
ITALY
IBET
ISRAELI
IL
INTELSAT
IRC
IDP
ICTR
IRAQI
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
INDO
IDA
ISLAMISTS
KSPR
KNNP
KWBG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KN
KS
KIPR
KCRM
KDEM
KIRF
KJUS
KHLS
KSCA
KOMC
KAWC
KV
KFRD
KWMN
KTIP
KPWR
KSUM
KGHG
KTIA
KTFN
KIRC
KCOR
KACT
KMDR
KGIC
KOLY
KUNR
KIDE
KMPI
KPKO
KCFE
KVPR
KRAD
KPAL
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTEX
KTDB
KFSC
KZ
KSEP
KFLU
KE
KU
KPLS
KRVC
KRIM
KSTH
KG
KFLO
KPOA
KICC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KBCT
KSAF
KMOC
KDRG
KBIO
KREC
KSTC
KVRP
KBTR
KMIG
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KWAC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KWMM
KPRP
KNEI
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KX
KMCA
KCRS
KMFO
KID
KCIP
KNAR
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KHDP
KFIN
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KTER
KRCM
KCFC
KSAC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KCOM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KAID
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KHSA
MPOS
MOPS
MARR
MTCR
MNUC
MASS
MX
MCAP
MAR
MTRE
MASC
MK
MG
MTCRE
MI
MD
MA
MO
MY
MU
ML
MRCRE
MAS
MEDIA
MC
MR
MIL
MW
MARAD
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
NATO
NG
NL
NZ
NT
NW
NO
NU
NS
NPT
NASA
NI
NK
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NP
NATIONAL
NSSP
NSF
NA
NGO
NV
NR
NDP
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NEW
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NPG
NSC
NPA
NSFO
OPDC
OPRC
OEXC
OTRA
ODIP
OIIP
OVIP
OPIC
OPCW
OAS
OREP
OSCE
OSCI
OES
OFDP
OECD
OCS
OIC
OPAD
OVP
OHUM
OFFICIALS
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PTER
PHUM
PK
PREF
PM
PHSA
PA
PINS
PE
PBTS
PCI
PO
PL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PGIV
PROP
PP
PBIO
POL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PBT
PMIL
POV
PTBS
PG
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PROV
PNAT
PINF
PRL
PAS
PDOV
PRAM
PREO
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PAO
PREFA
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PGOC
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PHUMPREL
RS
RU
RW
REACTION
RCMP
RSO
RO
RP
ROOD
RM
ROBERT
RICE
REGION
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
RFE
REPORT
SY
SP
SOCI
SMIG
SNAR
SCUL
SC
SU
SO
SI
SENV
SZ
SW
SA
SR
SF
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SEN
SG
SYR
SWE
SK
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SCRS
SYRIA
SL
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SHI
SHUM
SIPRS
TSPA
TSPL
TU
TBIO
TRGY
TPHY
TS
TP
TW
TBID
TI
TF
TZ
TD
TT
TN
TNGD
TC
TX
TH
TL
TIP
THPY
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
US
UNSC
UNGA
UK
UP
UNCHC
UN
UNMIK
UNCSD
UY
USTR
USOAS
UNHRC
UNFCYP
UG
UNAUS
UNESCO
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
USUN
UZ
USNC
UNCHR
UNCND
UNEP
USEU
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO551, SAO PAULO POLICE STRIKE BACK
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO551.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO551 | 2006-05-18 20:05 | 2011-02-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO9980
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0551/01 1382005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 182005Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5090
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6229
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2934
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7119
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2584
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2257
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1992
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2812
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1721
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000551
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/OSAC, WHA/BSC
NSC FOR CRONIN
DEA FOR OEL/DESANTIS AND NIRL/LEHRER
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/PDA, DRL/PHD, INL, DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA
BRASILIA FOR RSO AND LEGAT;
RIO DE JANEIRO FOR RSO
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCRM CASC SOCI SNAR ASEC BR
SUBJECT: SAO PAULO POLICE STRIKE BACK
REF: (A) Sao Paulo 532;
(B) Sao Paulo 526;
(C) Sao Paulo 319;
(D) Sao Paulo4 2;
(E) 05 Sao Paulo 975
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In reaction to a wave of violence orchestrated by the organized crime gang First Capital Command (PCC) which left over 100 persons dead including over 40 law enforcement officers, Sao Paulo police stepped up patrols and checkpoints on Tuesday and Wednesday (May 16-17) in certain areas of the metropolitan area. The sweeps resulted in the deaths of nearly 40 suspected PCC members, and the arrests of up to a dozen others. PCC elements, in turn, launched several new attacks (of lower intensity in comparison to recent events) on the night of Wednesday, May 17, burning eight buses across Sao Paulo state and tossing Molotov cocktails at police stations and schools. No new police deaths have been reported. Meanwhile, a contract audio engineer working for the national legislature admitted to selling to the PCC recordings of secret testimony by high-ranking Sao Paulo police officials that outlined the State's plan to transfer incarcerated PCC leaders to more isolated facilities with higher levels of security. In large part those transfers sparked the wave of violence that began on Friday, May 12, and lasted four days. The PCC's known lawyers are also under fire for allegedly facilitating the corruption and aiding and abetting the gang's criminal activities. State government officials are moving ahead with plans to block cellular telephone traffic near some prisons to weaken the PCC's capacity to mobilize and run illegal operations from the prison system, but prison workers are threatening a strike over pay, which could weaken an already precarious security situation. (NOTE: We have new information that the American Citizen prisoner reported in refs A and B was not, in fact, incarcerated at the time of the riots, but rather, had been released in March, with notice reaching the Consulate only yesterday. END NOTE.) END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------- POLICE PERSERVERANCE AND PAYBACK --------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) As normalcy returned to Sao Paulo after a four-day wave of violence perpetrated by the organized crime gang PCC mostly against public security personnel and public buses (refs A-B), the Sao Paulo police regrouped, redeployed, and tried to regain control over areas of the cities most affected by the violence. Over a twelve-hour period between Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday early morning, the police reportedly arrested 24 persons and killed another 33 suspected of involvement in the weekend attacks. Overnight Wednesday, approximately eight more suspects were killed in several attacks against police positions in the northern, southern and eastern zones of Sao Paulo's metropolitan area. On Wednesday night, the Band News television news service calculated that one suspect had been killed every two hours by police over a two-day period since the PCC halted most of its attacks on the evening of Monday, May 15. State officials say they are trying to dismantle the PCC by searching for persons suspected of participation in the weekend attacks at checkpoints and barricades.
¶3. (SBU) In the northwestern suburb of Osasco, for example, police were seen searching motorists at several checkpoints Tuesday and Wednesday, with particular attention paid to drivers and passengers of the ubiquitous small motorcycles that buzz in and out of traffic lanes throughout greater Sao Paulo. (NOTE: Known as "motoboys," these cycle drivers provide much-needed courier services in the sprawling city where gridlock is a common and daily curse. But the cycles are also used by criminals to rob drivers and passengers of vehicles stuck in traffic, and police say that several officers killed in Osasco were the targets of assassins riding with motoboys. END NOTE.) Subsequently, on Wednesday night, several armed individuals presumed to be associated with the PCC attacked a police station in Osasco, and at least one of the attackers was shot and killed by police. Four other attacks on police stations throughout greater Sao Paulo were reported Wednesday night, but no officers
SAO PAULO 00000551 002 OF 004
appear to have been killed.
¶4. (U) Likewise, five buses were set on fire Wednesday night in two areas within metropolitan Sao Paulo's northern and southern zones. The two companies operating those lines took their remaining buses off the road overnight, but transportation appeared to be running normally for the Thursday morning commute. Another two or three buses were reportedly torched overnight Wednesday in outlying cities within the state of Sao Paulo.
¶5. (SBU) Human rights groups have begun to seek more details from the state government regarding the names and circumstances of suspects killed by police since the wave of violence began last Friday (May 12), and especially in the last few days after the supposed truce was called (ref. B). While the state government has released the names of law enforcement personnel killed during this period, it has said almost nothing about the circumstances surrounding the deaths of suspects, other than to give aggregate statistics of those detained and of those killed. The overall death toll of suspects at the hands of police since last Friday is hovering between 90 and 100. (NOTE: There are also reports of another approximately 150 deaths associated with battles between PCC factions. END NOTE.) Some police sources have told RSO that officers are acting within the bounds of the law, albeit perhaps with a more aggressive posture in the context of the casualties inflicted on their colleagues. Other police officers have suggested that a certain amount of retribution upon known PCC members could and should be expected. (NOTE: An uncorroborated report is circulating that police have murdered family members of at least one gang leader in an act of pure revenge, an accusation the police deny. If proven true, such an escalation of the current stand-off would almost certainly result in bloody retaliation by the PCC, and could truly spin the situation out of control. END NOTE.)
-------------------------------------- CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND CALL-WAITING --------------------------------------
¶6. (U) The circumstances leading to the current conflagration in Sao Paulo are becoming clearer, as new evidence is uncovered regarding various players in this all too real Brazilian drama. Specifically, on May 17, an audio technician who worked as a contract employee for the national house of the federal Congress, the Chamber of Deputies, admitted in public hearings that he had sold copies of recordings to the PCC that contained secret police testimony to a Parliamentary Investigative Committee (CPI) on arms trafficking outlining the planned transfer of PCC leaders to more secure prison facilities in an attempt to weaken the gang's organizational structure.
¶7. (U) The recordings were apparently made on Wednesday, May 10, when two high-ranking Sao Paulo police officials testified regarding the planned prison transfers at a closed meeting of a congressional commission on arms trafficking. The technician said he burned two CDs containing the testimony, and, for 200 Reals (less than USD 100), handed them over to two of the PCC's known lawyers in a Brasilia shopping mall. It is believed that the lawyers then gave the CDs to the PCC leadership or played the contents for the gang's leaders over the telephone. On May 11, Sao Paulo prison officials transferred 765 suspected PCC members to isolated and more secure prison facilities in rural Sao Paulo state. But police immediately suspected that the PCC's reputed leader, Marcos Willians Herba Camacho, or "Marcola" (see ref B), knew of the transfers in advance, which appears to have been true. On Friday, May 12, he was transferred to facilities of the Anti-Organized Crime Unit (DEIC) of the Sao Paulo Military Police (PM) in the Santana district of northern Sao Paulo for questioning. After violence obviously orchestrated by the PCC broke out later that night, he was transferred on Saturday to the maximum security prison at Presidente Bernardes in the far western part of the state. The police and organs of Congress are investigating the technician's actions and those of the two attorneys accused of paying for the CDs and passing the privileged information to the PCC.
SAO PAULO 00000551 003 OF 004
¶8. (SBU) At the same time, more attention is being paid to the allegation that the Sao Paulo State Government cut a deal with the PCC to end the attacks that have killed almost 150 people and brought much of Sao Paulo to a standstill on Monday afternoon (refs A-B). While now admitting they had met with the PCC's lawyers on Sunday, May 14, and allowed the lawyers to see Marcola even though he was under special guard with no visitation privileges, State government officials (including Governor Claudio Lembo) continue to deny that they negotiated with the gang for peace (ref A). Many in Brazil are skeptical, given the fact that the attacks and associated prison riots stopped rather suddenly on Monday. Furthermore, television sets purchased by unknown parties have been delivered and set up in various prisons, and the color of prisoner uniforms has been changed - two conditions set out by Marcola during his first meeting with government officials last Friday. Nonetheless, President Lula's point man on the crime wave, Minister for Institutional Relations Tarso Genro, has backed off his earlier criticism of Sao Paulo leaders (who belong to opposition parties) and said on Thursday that he believes no one in government made any deal with leaders of the organized crime ring. More government investigations may take place on this issue, but in yet another bizarre twist, it appears Marcola himself has denied making a deal with government officials.
¶9. (U) On Wednesday evening, TV Bandeirantes ran a segment that purported to be a recorded interview with Marcola via cellular telephone from prison. The segment showed a reporter conducting the interview in a sound booth by holding a cell phone to a microphone. During the interview, the man on the cell phone purporting to be Marcola admitted that he had planned and ordered over 100 attacks to begin last Friday, May 12, with the intention of calling attention to the plight and conditions of prisoners in the Sao Paulo penitentiary system. He said that he did not order the killing of any police officers - claiming the murders were the acts of opportunists -- but that future actions may be forthcoming because the police are not willing to resolve their disputes with the PCC without resorting to brutality.
¶10. (SBU) Sao Paulo Governor Lembo called for an investigation to authenticate the voice in the interview. If the interview proves real, even more embarrassment will be heaped on the Sao Paulo prison system, because Marcola is currently in the Presidente Bernardes prison facility, which, until now, has been thought to be the most secure facility in Brazil and impenetrable to cellular phone transmissions. A state judge has meanwhile ordered the National Telecommunications Agency (Anatel) to suspend all cellular telephone transmissions for a period of 20 days in areas near six of Sao Paulo state's 144 prisons, in an attempt to curtail the planning and execution of criminal acts by incarcerated PCC leaders.
--------------- WHO'S TO BLAME? ---------------
¶11. (U) In an opinion poll released by Datafolha on Wednesday, May 17, 55 percent of Sao Paulo residents said the criminal justice system was at fault for the current crisis, while 39 percent blamed President Lula, 37 percent blamed former Sao Paulo governor and current presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin, and 30 percent placed blame with current governor Claudio Lembo. 65 percent of those interviewed said they believed the government negotiated for peace with the PCC, but only 21 percent of those thought such a course of action was proper. Only 17 percent felt that President Lula has made significant strides to combat crime, while 46 percent said that the president has not made an effort at all. In reaction to the violence in Sao Paulo, the national Senate passed a package of 11 crime bills, including measures to hold prisoners liable for damage to prison facilities, restrictions on cell phone usage, and a requirement for lawyers to be searched before meeting with inmates.
¶12. (U) For his part, in an interview with the newspaper Folha de
SAO PAULO 00000551 004 OF 004
Sao Paulo, conservative Sao Paulo Governor Claudio Lembo called upon the "white elite" to change their attitudes toward social welfare. He said the "bourgeoisie" needed to open its pocketbooks and offer more education, jobs, and solidarity to the Brazilian "misery class" before there can be any meaningful reduction in crime. He shrugged off comments made by his predecessor, current presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin, which suggested Alckmin would have accepted federal assistance during the weekend crime wave. Lembo said that had Alckmin still been in office, he would have done what he thought was best, and that is what Lembo did when he declined the federal government's offer to send more armed personnel to Sao Paul state to help quell the violence. Lembo was more pointed in reacting to comments attributed to former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso that the Lembo administration was wrong if it made deals with the PCC. Lembo said that Cardoso should have remained silent on a subject so sensitive and important about which he had no personal knowledge.
--------------------------------------------- ---------- COMMENT: SAO PAULO CONTINUES DAY BY DAY, NIGHT BY NIGHT --------------------------------------------- ----------
¶13. (SBU) Sao Paulo is operating normally day-to-day, but the nights are not yet in anyone's control. Wednesday night's clashes and criminal acts appeared sporadic and almost random, and were certainly not as well-orchestrated as those of the weekend. Some of the actions may have been residual, carried out by local PCC factions continuing the fight in their own neighborhoods, and some of them may have been opportunistic, conducted by unrelated criminal elements taking advantage of the sometimes chaotic situation. The efforts to block cell phone transmissions may serve to undercut PCC operations in the short term, but there are reports that the gang is already using hand-held radios to overcome this barrier. Further, a prison employees union in Sao Paulo is threatening a strike over pay and personal safety issues, making it even less likely that Paulistanos will feel comfortable - at least at the level prior to May 12 - with their city's security situation any time soon. END COMMENT.
¶14. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.
WOLFE