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Viewing cable 06SANJOSE444, MORAL POWER:" ARIAS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
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VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0444/01 0552113
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 242113Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4367
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM J1 MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000444
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PINS PREL MASS SNAR SMIG SOCI PBTS NI CS
SUBJECT: "MORAL POWER:" ARIAS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
REF: A. SAN JOSE 204
¶B. SAN JOSE 88
¶C. 05 SAN JOSE 2909
¶D. 05 SAN JOSE 2265
Classified By: DCM Russell Frisbie for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
--------
¶1. (C) National security in an Oscar Arias administration
will be pursued at three levels: (1) Internationally, Arias
will use his prestige as a Nobel laureate to be an advocate
for multilateralism, international law, and disarmament. (2)
At home the principal external security issues will be
protection of Costa Rica's maritime zone, including from use
by drug traffickers, and resolution of border and immigration
problems with Nicaragua. (3) Internally, Arias will focus on
crime prevention, police training, and streamlining the
criminal justice system. Conspicuously absent from an Arias
security strategy is any specific reference to civil unrest
and the capacity of the police for dealing with it. We
expect international issues to be handled personally by Arias
himself, and his first vice president Laura Chinchilla to
play a primary role in those security matters touching
directly on Costa Rica. End summary.
Costa Rica as a "Moral Power" in the World
------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) In his campaign for president, Oscar Arias urged
Costa Ricans to "think big," to make their small country a
"moral power" in the world and a voice for international law,
human rights, multilateralism, and disarmament. He
criticized the Pacheco administration for abandoning these
principles, especially in supporting the "illegal war" in
Iraq. According to the National Liberation Party (PLN)
Program of Government 2006-2010, an Arias administration will
oppose "the unacceptable and illegal doctrine of preemptive
war" and will be an advocate for the enlargement and
"effective democratization" of the UN Security Council to
include permanent members from the developing world. (Note:
The Pacheco administration has said that new "permanent"
members should serve 8-year renewable terms.)
¶3. (C) Arias is a fervent supporter of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and has complained to us about USG
"unilateralism" with regard to U.S. refusal to join the court
or support certain landmine bans and nonproliferation
initiatives. Arias has noted that Costa Rica contributed to
the ICC's creation, and, in the words of the PLN Program of
Government, its existence is "an extraordinary achievement of
humanity and the beginning of the end of impunity for
dictators and those who commit genocide and violate human
rights."
¶4. (C) During the interregnum between his 1986-1990
presidency and his candidacy in the 2006 election, Arias used
his status as a Nobel laureate to campaign for the abolition
of national armies in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
and for disarmament, focusing on conventional weapons (ref
C). Arias has expressed to us his disappointment about the
lack of U.S. support for his Arms Trade Treaty proposal. In
his upcoming presidency Arias has told us he plans to launch
a debt-forgiveness initiative designed to provide incentives
for low and middle-income countries to reduce military
spending (ref A).
Defending Costa Rica from External Threats
------------------------------------------
¶5. (U) In a 2004 roundtable discussion on "Security Policies
and Strategies for the 21st Century," Laura Chinchilla, a
recognized expert on security and now Arias's running mate
for first vice president, enumerated what she considers to be
the main external threats to Costa Rica. First is the
problem of drug trafficking (along with trafficking in arms
and persons) in Costa Rican waters and across the land
borders. Costa Rica, because it is a natural bridge between
drug-producing and drug-consuming countries, has seen an
increase in associated crimes, corruption, and local drug
consumption.
¶6. (C) A second problem area is the tension on the border
with Nicaragua because of a dispute concerning Costa Rican
navigational rights on the San Juan River (ref D) and Costa
Rica's efforts to control Nicaraguan immigration. Arias has
advocated a conciliatory approach to the San Juan River, but
he has also expressed concern that in the event of a
Sandinista victory in Nicaraguan elections, Nicaraguans will
stream over the border to Costa Rica in numbers greater than
ever.
¶7. (U) Finally, though perhaps not an "external" threat, is
the problem of preventing and responding to natural
disasters, such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions, and
floods. Costa Rica's National Commission on Emergencies
(CNE) has relied heavily on the Red Cross and the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) during recent floods.
NASA's aerial mapping of the entire territory of Costa Rica
and sampling of the atmosphere can be of great utility in
planning to avoid or minimize the consequences of natural
disasters.
¶8. (C) Chinchilla believes that multilateral and regional
cooperation is essential for Costa Rica to cope with security
threats. The illicit activities of international criminal
organizations require an international response and close
ties between the affected countries' police and judicial
authorities. In Costa Rica, Chinchilla wants to "rejuvenate"
the intelligence service, which is directly under the
president, to make it "less secret and more analytical."
This concern of Chinchilla's appears to be born of her
oft-expressed distrust of security organs that are not under
strict democratic political control. Chincilla was
noncommital at best in response to Embassy calls to make it
easier for the police to conduct wiretaps. (Note: Current
law requires a judge not only to authorize wiretapes, but to
monitor them personally.)
Criminal Justice
----------------
¶9. (U) Chinchilla has written numerous articles detailing
her views on the need to reform the criminal justice system
and improve crime prevention. As deputy, she worked on a
thoroughgoing revision of the penal code which is still not
complete. Her positions have been adopted by Arias and will
inform the law enforcement policies of the Arias
administration. Chinchilla emphasizes that it is not enough
to crack down on international trafficking of drugs; there
must also be a focus on the sale of drugs on street corners,
parks, bars, and schools. Alcoholism is another serious
threat to the nation's youth, and tough enforcement of laws
must be combined with prevention and rehabilitation programs
for alcoholics and drug users.
¶10. (U) In addition to the proliferation of drugs and
firearms in Costa Rica, Chinchilla sees multiple other causes
of crime, including growing economic inequality, violence in
the media, an ineffective judicial system, and poorly trained
police. She has also pointed out that the number of police
in the country has not changed in the last three decades and
that it is necessary to organize citizens to prevent crime in
their communities. She has suggested the establishment of
specialized police task forces for the identification and
capture of habitual criminals who prey on citizens and are
responsible for the lion's share of crimes.
¶11. (U) An overriding concern of Chinchilla's has been the
"professionalization" and "demilitarization" of the police.
Chinchilla has noted that the line between police and
military and internal and external security is blurred in
some Central American countries. Because of their inability
to fight crime effectively, the governments of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras have used the armed forces to enhance
police patrols for common criminals and gang members. In
Chinchilla's opinion, the police function must be
unambiguously civilian and police must be trained constantly
to respect democratic values and the rule of law. Chinchilla
opposed the establishment of a U.S.-sponsored International
Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Costa Rica because it would
involve training some members of Latin American armed forces
whom she believes are inappropriately carrying out police
functions in their countries.
Civil Unrest
-----------
¶12. (C) Civil unrest is a serious security problem in Costa
Rica not because it occurs often, but because the fear of
unrest thwarts governmental policies and programs. Because
public sector trade unions threatened massive demonstrations
against the U.S.-Central American-Dominican Republic Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), President Pacheco dallied 14
months before submitting the treaty to the Legislative
Assembly for ratification. He kept a telecommunications bill
bottled up permanently in his office because of his fear of a
violent reaction by the telecom labor unions. Pacheco's
Minister of Public Security constantly counseled the
president against taking any actions that might anger the
unions because he believed he could not handle strikes or
civil disobedience on a large scale.
¶13. (C) An Arias administration will face even greater
challenges than Pacheco has with regard to civil unrest.
Because of his support for CAFTA-DR and other free-market
reforms, Arias has already been branded enemy number one by
the public sector labor unions. In April 2005, the so-called
National Liaison Committee, which includes many unions,
declared that it would not recognize the legitimacy of an
eventual Arias presidency (05 San Jose 944). Further,
prominent union leaders have chosen to interpret the
lower-than-expected vote for Arias in the February 5 election
as "a deafening defeat of the neoliberal oligarchy supporting
CAFTA-DR" and have said that further action on treaty
ratification and implementation in the Legislative Assembly
would be "an extremely dangerous provocation" and result in
"fiery" street confrontations (San Jose 331).
Comment
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¶14. (C) The security agenda of the incoming Arias
administration does not deal directly with the issue of civil
unrest. Chinchilla blithely condemns other Central Americans
for "militarizing" their police and weakening the
independence of the judiciary in order rein in dissidents.
She does not, however, conceive of threats to the established
order in Costa Rica or detail methods of control. This
appears to be an important void in the stated Arias security
strategy.
¶15. (C) The other gap in the strategy concerns the lack of
resources, exacerbated by the rejection of ILEA and refusal
to sign an Article 98 agreement. Arias had unrealistic
expectations as to possible U.S. assistance in his
administration, which we have tried to dampen. Instead of
hoping for outside material assistance, the Arias
administration would do well to plan an effective national
security strategy that might include reconsideration of
current policies (e.g., on wiretaps) that encourage passivity
on the part of the country's police and intelligence services.
LANGDALE