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Viewing cable 09ROME355, ITALY READY TO HELP ON GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME355 | 2009-03-26 17:12 | 2011-04-27 11:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRO #0355/01 0851712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261712Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1833
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1431
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4774
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000355
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS KISL IT
SUBJECT: ITALY READY TO HELP ON GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES
Classified By: CDA Elizabeth L. Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------
¶1. (C) Italian Foreign Minister Frattini confirmed to S/WCI
Ambassador Williamson March 24 that Italy is ready to help
the United States resolve the issue of Guantanamo detainees
through resettlement in Italy and advocacy for the U.S.
effort within the EU. Frattini advised that there is
opposition to resettlement by a number of European states due
to security concerns that resettled detainees could take
advantage of the borderless zone created by the Schengen
Agreement. Citing his experience as a former EU Commissioner
for Justice and Home Affairs, Frattini said these concerns
are valid and must be addressed at a national level and by
the EU. He said the EU framework agreement on the subject
would need to reassure the whole that resettlement in
selected European states would not adversely affect
collective European security. At the national level,
Frattini said that Italy would need to enact a law providing
legal status for the detainees and restricting their
movements outside of Italy, and assured Williamson that such
a law could be adopted on a timely basis. He speculated that
other European states that agree to accept detainees would
need to take similar steps tailored to their respective
national laws and regulations. Frattini expressed concern
that the European Commissioners and EU Council officials
charged with handling this matter lack a vision for winning
support, and urged the United States to engage in a public
awareness campaign in Europe, cautioning that the upcoming
European Parliamentary elections could adversely affect
consideration of the matter. He also said that U.S.
agreement to resettle some detainees in America would be
necessary to secure European agreement to accept detainees in
Europe. On the specific issue of Italian agreement to accept
two Tunisian detainees in U.S. custody subject to an
outstanding arrest warrant for terrorism in Milan, a senior
Justice Ministry official agreed to review alternatives to
extradition. Frattini made clear Italy is on board. The
next step will be translating Italian political support into
concrete action at the national level.
Presidential Priority
---------------------
¶2. (C) Williamson met March 24 with Foreign Minister
Frattini and separately with Sergio Barbiera and Marco
Peronaci, respectively the deputy chief of staff and
diplomatic advisor to Justice Minister Alfano, to pursue
Italian agreement to resettle detainees from the Guantanamo
Bay facility, including two Tunisians in U.S. custody subject
to an Italian arrest warrant, and to solicit Italian support
for U.S. efforts to negotiate an EU framework agreement on
the matter. Charge d'Affaires Liz Dibble joined the meeting
with Frattini. Justice Department attach Don Ashley, A/DCM
Barbara Leaf, S/WCI staffer Shaun Coughlin, and RSI officer
Molly Phee participated in the meeting at Justice.
¶3. (C) Williamson explained that on his second day in office
President Obama issued three Executive Orders related to the
Guantanamo Bay facility, signaling the high priority he
attaches to resolving the matter. Among other directives,
the Orders called for the closure of the facility within one
year, and established an interagency review process under the
authority of the Attorney General to conduct ""fresh
assessments"" of the files of the 241 detainees currently held
in Guantanamo. Williamson noted the significance in the
shift of authority for detainee status decisions from the
Defense Department to the Justice Department.
¶4. (C) He explained that the review process will result in a
final recommendation for each detainee and described three
possible courses of action: prosecution in the United
States; transfer to country of origin; or resettlement in
third countries. Williamson estimated that some 50-60
detainees cannot be transferred home because of reasonable
fear of torture. The United States is seeking European
assistance in resettling this latter category of persons.
Williamson added that, in general, this population of
detainees is considered to be at the ""lower end of the threat
scale"" and consequently the United States would not ask
European governments to prosecute or detain them. He noted
that while the USG believed the risks associated with these
individuals are very low, the United States could offer no
absolute guarantees about their conduct. The nationalities
of this category of detainees include Uighers, Uzbeks,
Egyptians, Tunisians, Libyans, Syrians and others. He
reported that 520 detainees had previously been transferred;
all but 15 were returned to their home countries, including
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Algeria. He added
that approximately 20 with European citizenship or legal
residence status had been transferred to Spain, France,
Germany and the UK.
Two Tracks: Bilateral and EU
-----------------------------
¶5. (C) Williamson reported that the United States is in an
advanced state of discussions about detainee resettlement
with Lithuania, Ireland, Portugal, and Switzerland. We are
also engaged in serious discussions with several other states
(including Spain, Belgium, Norway and Sweden). Concurrent
with these bilateral discussions, we are working on a
separate but complementary track with the EU Commission in
pursuit of a framework agreement that would allow individual
states to conclude bilateral agreements with the United
States. Williamson relayed that the Czech presidency agrees
the framework agreement should create a ""permissive EU
environment which allows member states to work out bilateral
agreements with the U.S. to accept detainees."" Given the
one-year deadline for closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility,
the United States hopes to conclude the framework agreement
during the Czech presidency to avoid delay when the
presidency rotates. Williamson said the U.S. was
simultaneously pursuing bilateral
negotiations with a number of governments, and that several
have decided to accept detainees, but will not implement
those decisions until an EU agreement is in place.
Request for Italian Support
---------------------------
¶6. (C) Williamson emphasized the importance to the United
States of Italian support for the resettlement effort given
Italy's size and role in the EU. Referring to last month's
telephone conversation between President Obama and Prime
Minister Berlusconi, during which the Prime Minister
expressed Italy's willingness to be helpful, Williamson asked
for three types of Italian support. First, the United States
seeks Italian agreement to accept additional Guantanamo
detainees who need to be resettled in third countries.
Second, the United States seeks Italian support within the EU
for a framework agreement. Third, the United States seeks
Italian agreement to accept two Tunisian detainees (one held
at Guantanamo and one in Afghanistan) subject to outstanding
arrest warrants for terrorism in Milan. Williamson conveyed
U.S. willingness to be as helpful as possible in providing
Italy with the information it needed to make a positive
decision to accept detainees, including access to relevant
documents and interviews with detainees. In response,
Justice Official Barbiera requested a list of potential
detainees to facilitate GOI review.
FM Confirms Italian Support
but Highlights Security Concerns
--------------------------------
¶7. (C) Frattini assured Williamson of Italy's willingness to
help the United States resolve this matter. Italy will agree
to accept detainees and will support the U.S. effort in
Brussels, but the Foreign Minister counseled that more work
must be done with the EU and at the national level.
Recalling his participation in the January 26 GAERC meeting
that discussed the issue, Frattini reported his sense that
there is a lot of opposition to resettling Guantanamo
detainees in Europe. Citing the expansion of the borderless
zone authorized by the Schengen Agreement, several states had
expressed security concerns about the potential for unlimited
movement of resettled detainees. Frattini agreed that the
security concerns of Interior Ministers are valid and must be
addressed. Therefore, he argued that the framework
agreement, while providing for bilateral agreements with the
United States, must also reassure other European states that
resettlement will not adversely affect their security.
¶8. (C) Drawing on his background as a former EU Commissioner
for Justice and Home Affairs, Frattini further speculated
that most states that agree to resettlement will need to take
national action to define the legal status of the detainees
as refugees, residents or citizens. This special status
should also entail restriction of their movements. Other
matters that need to be addressed at a national level include
surveillance, witness protection programs, and funding for
these security-related activities. Frattini said that Italy
had enacted such a law to handle resettlement of Palestinians
associated with the 2002 siege at the Church of the Nativity,
and asserted that Italy would need similar legislation to
cover resettlement of Guantanamo detainees. Frattini
explained his view that -- absent national action to
implement restrictions on movement -- the Schengen Agreement
would permit the detainees to move throughout the borderless
zone. As an example, he said a former detainee resettled in
Italy could get in a car and drive to Slovenia, a state that
opposes resettlement. The result would be that Frattini
would have to respond to a call of complaint from his
Slovenian counterpart. These situations must be avoided.
When Williamson expressed concern that a Parliamentary
process could complicate and delay consideration of the
matter, Frattini reassured him that Italy could employ a
Presidential decree in a timely fashion.
¶9. (C) Frattini opined that the EU officials who met March
16 in Washington with Attorney General Holder and Deputy
Secretary Steinberg - Commissioner for Justice and Home
Affairs Jacques Barrot, CT coordinator Gilles di Kerchove,
and Czech Interior Minister Ivan Langer -- lacked a mandate
to negotiate the matter and a vision on how to move forward.
Drawing on his past experience as EU negotiator with the
United States over PNR, Frattini criticized Barrot for
failing to consult with the European Parliament, which he
expects will desire to play a role, including adopting a
resolution endorsing an EU approach to resettlement.
Williamson reminded Frattini that the European Parliament had
already adopted a resolution encouraging states to contribute
to resolution of the matter.
¶10. (C) Frattini also recommended that the United States
work with its European partners on an ""awareness raising
exercise,"" warning this issue could run afoul of the
campaign for the European Parliamentary elections in June.
He suggested that the United States tap the European concern
about the importance of human rights in the struggle against
terrorism to win public support for European action on
resettlement. Finally, he stressed that the issue of
resettlement must be decided on the ""basis of solidarity.""
(Comment: By solidarity, Frattini meant that to win support
for European resettlement, the United States must also
resettle detainees. End Comment.)
Tunisian Detainees
------------------
¶11. (C) To date, Embassy Rome's efforts to arrange the
transfer to Italy of two Tunisian detainees held by the
United States (one in Guantanamo and one in Afghanistan) and
subject to arrest warrants for terrorism in Milan have
foundered over the mechanism of transfer. (Note: Milan
prosecutors had approached Embassy DOJ attach to request
assistance in arranging the transfer of the two to Italy.
End Note.) In January, the United States proposed an
exchange of diplomatic notes. After an initially positive
reaction by the Justice Ministry, the Foreign Ministry became
engaged and the Justice Ministry subsequently revised its
position and has since argued the individuals must be
extradited because they are not citizens of Italy.
¶12. (C) Williamson raised this subject in some detail in his
meeting with senior Justice Ministry official Barbiera. In
his talk with Barbiera, Williamson explained that none of the
Guantanamo detainees resettled to date had been transferred
through extradition. He reported that those detainees
previously transferred to Spain, France, Germany and the UK
were either citizens or legal residents. Barbiera asked if
any of the detainees transferred to Western Europe had been
prosecuted. Williamson said that France and Spain had
undertaken prosecutions; Germany and the UK had not. He also
noted that the United States had resettled eight detainees in
Albania who had agreed to go there voluntarily, although none
of them had ties to Albania. None of these detainees were
prosecuted or detained. All of the transfers thus far had
been effected through an exchange of diplomatic notes.
Barbiera asked whether the two Tunisian detainees had
voluntarily agreed to be transferred to Italy. Williamson
said that in preliminary discussions with their attorneys
they had signaled a willingness to be transferred to Italy,
but there was no final agreement. Justice Department attach
Ashley asked Barbiera if the GOI would agree to transfer the
two detainees via an exchange of notes if they voluntarily
agreed to come to Italy. Barbiera said this was an
interesting idea but would require further legal study. He
suggested a treaty as an option; Williamson said the United
States would prefer to avoid the lengthy process of
negotiating a treaty. Barbiera also asked Williamson if the
United States would allow Italy to serve legal documents on
the two detainees. Williamson agreed to consider the
request. He also told Barbiera that the United States would
not be conducting any further transfers of detainees to
Tunisia as we have reason to believe that one detainee
previously transferred there had been tortured.
¶13. (C) In conclusion, Barbiera assured Williamson the
Justice Ministry would provide as much assistance as possible
to resolve the matter of transfer. While this issue was not
discussed in depth in Williamson's subsequent meeting with
Frattini, the Foreign Minister deferred to MOJ's stance that
Italy requires they be extradited.
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) Frattini cleared time on his schedule to meet with
Williamson, and delivered a strong political message of
Italian support for U.S. efforts to resolve the Guantanamo
detainee issue. His views on actions needed at the EU and at
a national level were couched as friendly advice. Italy will
help, but transforming this political support into concrete
action will require more effort. Frattini made clear that
the security concerns of European Interior Ministers carry
weight. This is certainly true in Italy, where the views of
Interior Minister Maroni (a leader of the anti-immigrant
Northern League political party) will need to be addressed.
We believe he is correct in asserting that the government
will not have a problem in enacting the necessary legislation
for detainees resettled here. The specific case of the two
Tunisian detainees subject to Italian arrest warrants remains
problematic due to the government's request for extradition,
but we were encouraged by the Justice Ministry's willingness
to consider alternatives to extradition. We agree with
Frattini that attention to public diplomacy on this matter is
merited. Our contacts want to know why the detainees are not
being resettled in the United States. Continued engagement
with Frattini by senior U.S. officials will facilitate his
advocacy for us in EU circles.
¶15. (U) Ambassador Williamson has cleared this cable.
DIBBLE
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