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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS5974, FRENCH ELECTION 2007: NICOLAS SARKOZY -- THE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS5974 | 2006-09-06 15:39 | 2010-11-30 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO2589
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #5974/01 2491539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061539Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1063
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 005974
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: FRENCH ELECTION 2007: NICOLAS SARKOZY -- THE
CANDIDATE WHO MIGHT CHANGE FRANCE
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Eight months before France's 2007 Presidential
election, Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy remains the best
positioned of the many contenders for France's presidency.
He is a markedly different presidential heavyweight,
pro-American and committed to free-market principles.
Notwithstanding his evident strengths and popularity, many
French voters are still uncomfortable with the idea of
"President Sarkozy," and questions about his hyperactive
personality, his core law-and-order agenda, and divisions
within the ruling UMP make his election far from certain.
Sarkozy's Gaullist political heritage and his likely "I can
speak frankly to the Americans" refrain mean that France and
Sarkozy would remain an independent and challenging ally.
However, a Sarkozy presidency would certainly bring a new and
welcome tone to U.S.-French relations -- and perhaps, over
time, a French approach to world problems that is less
fixated on reflexively seeking ways to distinguish France
from the U.S. Sarkozy's greatest contribution to France
could be his promise to free the country's latent economic
dynamism from the constraints of statism and labor rigidity.
End Summary.
Timeline to the Election
------------------------
¶2. (U) Eight months ahead of the first round of France's
2007 presidential election, to be held on either Sunday,
April 15 or Sunday, April 22, 2007, Interior Minister and
President of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement
party (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy remains the best positioned of
the many contenders. In the last presidential election in
2002, there were 16 candidates in the first round. Slightly
fewer are expected this time around. The second round
run-off between the top two vote-getters of the first round
will be held two weeks later, either Sunday, April 29 or
Sunday, May 6. Sarkozy has served as Interior Minister in
the government of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin since
that government's inception in June 2005. In January 2007
(tentatively scheduled for January 14-15) the UMP will hold a
party congress expected to designate Sarkozy, the party
leader, as its presidential candidate. Shortly before that
congress, Sarkozy may well leave the government to dedicate
himself full-time to pursuing the presidency. In recent
weeks Sarkozy has been careful to signal that he is keeping
all his options open in this connection, pointing out that
nothing prevents him from remaining in the government while
he pursues the presidency. Sarkozy himself will make the
final decision -- and will not hesitate to ignore the advice
of others -- as he did when he chose to rejoin the government
in June 2005.
The Best Positioned Contender
-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Ever since his first tenure as interior minister
(2002 - 2004), when he emerged as a top-tier national
political figure, Sarkozy has been highly popular with a
large segment of the French electorate. The most recent
polling figures show that popularity holding steady.
Sarkozy's unchallenged control of the Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP) party (which was founded by President Chirac)
also increases his election chances. Sarkozy has worked to
turn the UMP into a formidable electoral machine, complete
with focus groups for keeping his message tuned to voters'
concerns and volunteer organizations for turning out the
Sarkozy-for-president vote. Since he became president of the
party in 2004, Sarkozy has also increased the number of party
members from 100,000 to 250,000 today. This political
organization gives Sarkozy a powerful advantage, and should
ensure his presence in the second round of the election.
Moreover, Sarkozy is a formidable campaigner, energetic,
quick on his feet and appealingly direct. The combination of
popularity, control of his party, and masterful political
skills, including as a campaigner, is unmatched by any of the
other presidential contenders.
A Different Kind of Presidential Heavyweight
--------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Sarkozy is hard to pigeon-hole; he is not a
traditional French conservative, which is clear from some of
his policy proposals. Sarkozy often speaks of the need for
France to break with policies and attitudes that undercut the
PARIS 00005974 002.2 OF 004
country's economic dynamism. Sarkozy has long called for
lower taxes and more "liberal" (i.e., free-market) economic
policies to encourage entrepreneurship. He has also long
called for a less regulated environment for big business,
something of a novelty in a country in which both left and
right have always been comfortable with a high level of
government regulation of the economy. The untested
popularity of Sarkozy's free-market orientation helps explain
why few commentators at this stage are ready to hazard a firm
prediction on the outcome of the 2007 election other than to
affirm that -- presuming candidates of the center-left and of
the center-right compete in the second round -- it will be
exceedingly close; Sarkozy himself has indicated to us on a
numerous occasions that the election will be "51 - 49."
Sarkozy is well aware of the resistance in France to
shrinking the role of the state in protecting the economic
security of both individuals and businesses.
¶5. (C) Sarkozy's proposals in the field of social policy --
for example, affirmative action in employment and education
for immigrants who are discriminated against, and limited
voting rights for non-citizen residents -- are not policies
traditionally associated with the right of the political
spectrum in France. Sarkozy's proposals for reforming French
government institutions -- making the president answerable to
the legislature and responsible for the domestic policies of
the government, while giving the legislature more oversight
over France's foreign policy -- also break the mold of
traditional, center-right French Gaullism. Most of all,
Sarkozy is associated with tough, firm enforcement of
anti-crime and counter-terrorism measures.
Doubts about a "President Sarkozy"
----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Sarkozy is also perceived as a different kind of
political personality. Recent polls point to the austere De
Gaulle and the imperturbable Mitterrand as by far the most
revered of French presidents. That the edgy, intense,
hands-on Sarkozy is so far from the preferred model of
Olympian reserve raises the question of whether, as a matter
of cultural psychology, the French are ready to entrust the
presidency to Sarkozy. Clearly many French people recognize
that a "new model" is needed -- a presidency that directs and
is responsible for domestic policy, especially given the new,
shorter five-year presidential term. The iconoclastic
Sarkozy has the most extensive experience and strongest
credentials for filling that role. The French however, are
also famously hesitant to embrace change, and in a time of
apprehension and self-doubt could prefer a more traditional
and reassuring figure. Some also fear a Sarkozy presidency,
citing his "hyper-active" personality, and persisting
factional splits within his own party, and his polarizing
image as a law-and-order strongman. Electorally, Sarkozy's
law-and-order image is potentially the most significant. It
is this hard-edged profile that makes Sarkozy a divisive more
than unifying figure, generating intense allegiance on the
right and, equally strongly, unsettling so many on the left
and even the center of the political spectrum.
Pro-American at Heart, but Still a French Gaullist
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶7. (C) Sarkozy -- for a French politician -- is forceful and
unabashed about the need for France to get beyond its
anti-American reflexes. With the exception of his
reservations about the wisdom of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
2003, Sarkozy is the French political leader most supportive
of the U.S. role in the world. Sarkozy has told the
Ambassador on several occasions that France needs to help the
U.S. "get out of Iraq." Sarkozy's pro-American orientation
has earned him the sobriquet "Sarkozy the American," and his
affinity for Americans and the U.S. is genuine and heartfelt.
Sarkozy's admiration for the U.S. comes through in one of
his favorite stories: when, as a young boy, he told father
that he wanted to be president, his father told him, "In that
case, with a name like Sarkozy, you'd better immigrate to
America." The young Nicolas replied that he wanted to become
President of France, not the U.S. Sarkozy has always wanted
to make France a land of equal opportunity for immigrants
also.
¶8. (C) Sarkozy's pro-Americanism , however, should not be
interpreted as meaning that Gaullist insistence on France's
(and the EU's) independence from the U.S. in the
international arena will disappear. France's selective
PARIS 00005974 003 OF 004
support for U.S. positions will continue. Nor will Sarkozy
likely abandon France's traditional preference for
strengthening the EU over NATO in the name of trans-Atlantic
rapprochement. As Sarkozy told a visiting Congressional
delegation last year, "We should never forget that we are
loyal friends -- and that friends can disagree." Although
Sarkozy feels close to America (to this day, he recalls with
fondness his "discovery" of America as an International
Visitors Program grantee in 1985), his assertive personality
is such that, as France's president, he would not shy away
from offering firm advice about how the U.S. might best
advance towards shared goals -- up to and including bald
advice to change course. Even so, what Sarkozy would call
the "loyalty" factor in his friendship toward the U.S. would
remain intact, and Sarkozy's articulate, public defense of
that attitude could, over time, result in a greater French
receptivity to America's global outlook and policy positions.
Especially if extended over a two-term, ten-year Presidency,
the result could be a France less resentful of the U.S. --
one less reflexively inclined to taking positions that
intensify and highlight France's differences with the U.S.
Sarkozy's Free-Market Convictions Could Transform France
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶9. (C) Sarkozy's greatest contribution to France could be in
freeing the country's latent economic dynamism from the
constraints of statism and labor rigidity. Sarkozy has,
since the beginning of his long career in politics, been
among the most outspokenly "liberal" (that is,
pro-free-market) of French political leaders. His speeches
on economic and social issues nearly invariably include
paeans to commerce, hard work, and entrepreneurship, followed
by an exhortation to Frenchmen and women to be proud of these
qualities. Sarkozy would like to make the French more
"liberal" than they are, and believes economic forces acting
on France justify his endeavor. Sarkozy often underlines the
inescapability of the global market and exhorts the French to
accept the challenges of competing in it with greater
self-confidence. He is adept at depicting, in ways that
ordinary voters understand, the drag on opportunity and
growth of a bloated state intent on monitoring nearly every
aspect of economic life.
¶10. (C) At the same time, Sarkozy understands that the
French want to be protected and that they are comfortable
with a high degree of state involvement in the economy. The
current controversy over the privatization and merger
involving the national gas company (GDF) and a the energy
giant Suez exemplifies the persisting sensitivity of
loosening state control over the economy in France.
Sarkozy's record -- he is above all a pragmatic politician --
as a "liberalizing" policy practitioner is quite mixed. For
example, during his tenure as Finance Minister
(March-November 2004), when confronted by labor union
resistance to significant privatization of state utilities,
Sarkozy compromised. He worked hard -- and offered
government assistance -- to keep factories threatened with
closure operating in France. Spurred by public complaints
about rising prices in supermarkets, he negotiated
"voluntary" price controls with major chains. He practiced
"patriotic liberalism" in helping engineer the merger of a
large French pharmaceutical company (Aventis) with a larger
French pharmaceutical firm (Sanofi) rather than with Sanofi's
foreign rival (the Swiss firm, Novartis). By and large, the
public approved Sarkozy's protectionist actions.
¶11. (C) It remains to be seen whether economic reform will
be a decisive issue in the upcoming presidential campaign.
(Comment: If the current trend of economic growth and reduced
unemployment continues, this is less likely to be the case.
End Comment.) If it does emerge as the key campaign issue,
and if a victorious Sarkozy moves early and aggressively to
effect reform, then he could push the French past the tipping
point and into a far-reaching and necessary restructuring of
the French social model. An ambitious Sarkozy reform program
would likely include, for example, measures to further loosen
the currently mandated 35-hour workweek, measures to reduce
wealth and inheritance taxes to encourage long-term
investment in family firms, measures to restructure
unemployment and welfare benefits so they act as incentives
to find work quickly, and measures to reform the university
system so it provides students with the skills the job market
requires from them. The result could be a society in which
entrepreneurship, self-reliance and optimism would be more
PARIS 00005974 004 OF 004
highly valued, and in which competition could co-exist with
the cherished notion of "equality." Such changes could
release the latent economic creativity and dynamism of the
French, who, by and large, are highly skilled and
hard-working. But it will be a tall order.
¶12. (C) In Sarkozy, who harbors a more America-like vision
for France, the moment might well meet the man, ushering in
an era of higher economic growth and innovation in France.
Such an economically re-vitalized France would cohere neatly
with Sarkozy's fundamentally Gaullist principles: renewed
economic vitality would bolster both France's ambitions to
lead in Europe and to play a major role in international
affairs.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON