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Viewing cable 09PANAMA84, PANAMA: INSIDE SCOOP ON THE QUADRILATERAL SECURITY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA84 | 2009-01-29 12:41 | 2011-04-07 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama |
Appears in these articles: http://www.padigital.com.pa/periodico/edicion-actual/wikileaks-panama-interna.php?story_id=1027140&codeth=1593 |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0084/01 0291241
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 291241Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2915
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2754
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0771
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3775
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1975
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T PANAMA 000084
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: INSIDE SCOOP ON THE QUADRILATERAL SECURITY
MEETINGS
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
-------
Summary
------
¶1. (C) The aim of the recent quadrilateral meeting of the
presidents of Panama, Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala was to
establish the means to quickly extradite Colombian and
Mexican drug traffickers from Panama to their native
countries, Panamanian National Security Advisor Marcel
Salamin told POLOFF January 20. He said the meeting was a
Panamanian initiative, after U.S. officials informed the GOP
that the U.S. could not accept suspected traffickers who did
not have indictments pending in the U.S. Salamin said the key
to the agreement was the development of a quick and simple
mechanism for turning suspected drug traffickers over to
their host countries, since Panama did not have the capacity
to hold high level criminals in its prisons. He said that
once agreement was reached on such a legal mechanism the four
countries would move on to joint targeting of suspects, and
operational planning. The agreement also calls for greater
information sharing from national data bases. Salamin said he
would chair a group to look into how the initiative might be
linked into the Merida Initiative in the future. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- -
Trying to Move Out the Colombians and Mexicans
--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (S//NF) Marcel Salamin, President Torrijos' National
Security Advisor, told POLOFF January 20 that President
Torrijos had asked him to organize the meeting on security
with President Calderon of Mexico, and President Uribe of
Colombia. He said Guatemala had been a later addition. He
said the main focus of the meeting had been to try to develop
mechanisms to quickly transfer high-level drug trafficking
suspects from Panama to Mexico or Colombia. He said the
effort was based on President Torrijos' belief that the
current crime wave in Panama was linked to the presence of
representatives of the Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking
cartels in Panama. Salamin said that after Embassy officials
explained to GOP officials that the U.S. could not accept
suspects who were not under indictment in the U.S., the GOP
began to plan this initiative. He said Panama wanted to
cooperate fully with Colombia and Mexico to arrest these
criminals, but needed a very fast judicial mechanism to get
them out of the country because it did not have the high
security prison capacity to hold them for even relatively
short periods of time. Salamin asserted that the cartels
sent representatives to Panama because drug shipments changed
possession in Panama from the originating cartels in Colombia
to Mexican cartels that transport the drugs to the U.S. He
said Panama was particularly worried about Mexican drug
trafficking cartels bringing more people into Panama by
taking advantage of a "wave of immigration" from Mexico to
Panama, as a result of the economic crisis in the U.S.
Salamin said Guatemala had been an add-on, and that it had
been more trouble than it was worth to bring them into the
process, due to the fact that President Colom did not have
any loyal intelligence service upon which he could rely,
noting that the Army and Police were both penetrated by drug
traffickers and not very loyal to President Colom.
--------------------
Quickie Extraditions
--------------------
¶3. (C) Salamin said the meeting had revealed a legal vacuum
that had to be dealt with before Panama could deliver
suspects to Mexico and Colombia. He said Panamanian law had a
procedure known as "simple and conditioned deliveries"
(entregas simples y condicionadas) that allowed the GOP to
turn over dangerous suspects in Panamanian custody to foreign
governments that have more serious charges against them.
Salamin asserted that the procedure was very fast and not
subject to judicial appeal. He said it was originally
designed to allow Panama to quickly move dangerous drug
trafficking suspects that Panama could not hold to the U.S.
for prosecution. Salamin said Colombian and Mexican law did
not recognize this procedure, greatly restricting Panama's
ability to persue Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers,
since Panama did not have the capacity to hold them in
custody for long periods while a traditional extradition made
its way through the courts. Salamin said that Colombia had
been "assigned" the task, following the meeting, of reviewing
all the existing extradition and legal assistance agreements
and treaties among the four countries, and then presenting
one unified document that all four could adopt that would
bring all the agreements together. Salamin said the idea was
that this document would contain an acceptable mechanism for
the rapid transfer of suspects to Mexico and Colombia.
---------------
Joint Targeting
---------------
¶4. (C) Salamin said the four presidents ordered another
group to follow up after the meeting as well. This group
would be made up of one or two personal representatives of
each president, discuss specific information on possible drug
trafficking targets, and plan operations to arrest them. For
Panama, the representative to this meeting would be the
Director of the National Intelligence and Security Service
(SENIS) Erik Espinosa and possibly Salamin as well. Salamin
said no actual operations would take place until a mechanism
had been worked out to allow them to quickly be turned over
to their native country. Salamin told POLOFF on January 27
that he had given Colombian officials a list of 60 Colombians
that the GOP suspected of drug trafficking and were ready to
arrest and turn over to Colombia once a mechanism had been
found, and assuming Colombia had judicial cases against them.
He said Panama had identified 500 Colombians, Mexicans and
Guatemalans it was prepared to move against eventually.
-------------
Intel Sharing
-------------
¶5. (C) Salamin said that the presidents had also agreed to
greater information sharing from national databases. He said
Colombia would give Panama access to its criminal and civil
databases (not intel data bases), so that Panama could
quickly and easily identify Colombian suspects in Panama.
Colombia would also provide Panama real-time access to a
finger print database that would allow Panama to fingerprint
Colombians and check the results against Colombia's records.
At present, Panama did not have real-time access. He said
Mexico was sending people down next week to look into ways to
allow Panama to connect its database on suspected drug
traffickers with Mexico's larger "Plataforma Mexico"
database. Salamin said he had proposed the creation of a
program like the USG program for visa waiver countries,
whereby visitors had to provide their personal data to
immigration officials on-line before they could get on the
plane. He said this type of program would give them time to
run the names and identify suspicious individuals.
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Comment
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¶6. (C) Last November, First Vice President and Foreign
Minister Samuel Lewis approached the Ambassador and asked
that the USG do more to remove dangerous drug trafficking
suspects from Panama, due to the GOP's fear that Colombian
and Mexican drug trafficking organizations were increasing
their activities in Panama and contributing to an increase in
crime. National Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS)
members later approached Embassy DEA officers with a list of
prisoners in Panamanian jails who they said President
Torrijos considered too dangerous to keep in custody, due to
the risk they would bribe or shoot their way out of jail, and
asked that the USG quickly take them out of the country for
prosecution. While some were under indictment in the U.S.,
others on this list had no cases pending in the U.S., and no
real prospects of being indicted. DEA officers explained that
the USG could not act against anyone if there were no charges
against them in the U.S. The quadrilateral meeting seems to
have been a direct consequence of the GOP's discovery that
the USG could not take all the drug traffickers in Panama out
of the country. The agreement worked out among the three
(Guatemala does not seem to have played an important part,
and Salamin did not seem excited about the idea of adding
more Central American countries to the initiative) is a
win-win proposition. Panama will work closely with Mexico and
Colombia to track down wanted drug traffickers in Panama and
arrest them, as long as a mechanism can be found to allow
them to be sent home rapidly and easily. Panama is not/not
willing or able to hold these prisoners in Panama. For Mexico
and Colombia, the agreement offers the chance to weaken the
cartels, while Panama becomes a much less hospitable place
for them to operate in. The GOP's ability to put this meeting
together so quickly, and to get such good press out of it is
very impressive, and shows what the GOP is capable of when it
sees its interests being served by regional cooperation.
Salamin indicated he would look at how the Merida Initiative
might plug into this quadrilateral initiative in the future.
STEPHENSON