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Viewing cable 09BELGRADE34, SERBIA NOT FANNING INSTABILITY IN BOSNIA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BELGRADE34 | 2009-01-13 08:13 | 2011-05-11 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Belgrade |
Appears in these articles: http://balkans.blog.lemonde.fr http://www.bivol.bg/wldodik.html |
VZCZCXRO5332
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0034/01 0130813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130813Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0861
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000034
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL BK SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA NOT FANNING INSTABILITY IN BOSNIA
REF: A. 08 SARAJEVO 1913
¶B. 08 SARAJEVO 1728
¶C. 08 BELGRADE 1234
¶D. 08 BELGRADE 1189
Classified By: Deborah Mennuti, Political Chief; reasons 1.4 (b, d).
¶1. (U) This cable was drafted jointly by Embassies Belgrade
and Sarajevo.
Summary
-------
¶2. (C) Despite close relations between Belgrade and Banja
Luka, in recent months President Boris Tadic has been
publicly taking a strong stand to encourage all parties to
respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and uphold the Dayton Agreement. When it comes to
engagement, however, Serbia has focused more on its
relationship with the entity of Republika Srpska (RS) than on
engaging with or supporting state-level institutions of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbias special relations with the
RS and inflammatory rhetoric from Bosniak member of the
Tri-Presidency Silajdzic will keep Serbia wary of state-level
Bosnian leadership, but Belgrade will continue to be a
responsible neighbor as along as it sees the preservation of
Dayton as necessary for regional stability and EU membership.
End Summary.
Tadic Publicly Backs Territorial Integrity of BiH
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶3. (SBU) The December 10 visit of High Representative
Miroslav Lajcak to Belgrade showcased the most recent
attempts by President Tadic to underscore his governments
opposition to Republika Srpska secession and uphold the
Dayton Agreement. A statement from Tadics office announced
Serbias undiminished support for the territorial integrity of
BiH, supported a principled approach to constitutional reform
based on consensus of all three parties, and called for EU
membership for BiH. This statement repeated Tadics comments
in early November, in which he stressed that cooperation
between Serbia and Republika Srpska should not be construed
as jeopardizing the integrity of BiH, and called on all
Bosnian officials to consistently implement the Dayton
Agreement as a guarantee of stability.
¶4. (C) Tadics comments mark a significant contrast from a
year ago when Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica was
RS Premier Milorad Dodik,s most reliable Serbian supporter.
Speaking privately to us on December 10, Lajcak said that
while Dodik and Tadic maintained a close personal friendship,
Kostunica was a more reliable source of unconditional
political support to the RS. Lajcak had asked various
European capitals to press Tadic to contain Dodik, and Tadic
had accepted the message. According to recent intelligence
reports, Lajcak said, Dodik returned from his November visits
to Belgrade disappointed with the lack of support Tadic was
willing to offer. An upbeat Lajcak was reassured by Tadics
promise to be a stabilizing force in the region and welcomed
the news that Foreign Minister Jeremic would be sent to
Sarajevo and Banja Luka before the end of the year to repeat
Tadics statements supporting Bosnias territorial integrity
and constitutional reform through consensus. (Jeremic visited
Sarajevo and Banja Luka on December 25-26 (Ref A).) Lajcak
also argued that the real problem was Silajdzic, but that
Dodik makes things worse because he cannot shut up and
instead responds to every Silajdzic provocation.
Limited Contact with State-Level Institutions
--------------------------------------------- -
¶5. (SBU) Despite Tadics comments supporting Dayton,
Belgrade could do more to develop ties with state-level
institutions in Sarajevo rather than pursuing lopsided
engagement with Republika Srpska at the expense of state
institutions. Our Serbian interlocutors frequently point to
good relations with the RS and tepid but improving ties with
the Federation, seemingly ignoring that their natural
counterparts should be neither entity but the state-level
institutions in Sarajevo. One exception is bilateral
cooperation on refugee issues, in which Belgrades
Commissariat for Refugees works closely with the Bosnian
Ministry for Refugees to implement the 2005 Sarajevo
Declaration on resettlement of refugees. Both sides
frequently share data and have cooperated without major
complaint. (There are currently 27,000 Serbian refugees in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.)
BELGRADE 00000034 002 OF 004
Emphasis on Entity-Level Contact
--------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Although Bosnias state-level ministries have some
necessary contacts with Serbias, the fact that Belgrade has
continued to develop close ties with the RS via the 2006
bilateral Framework for Special Parallel Relations between
Serbia and the Republika Srpska may help the RS undermine
Bosnias state institutions legitimate efforts to exclusively
exercise state-level competencies --not least foreign policy.
Since formal ratification of the agreement last year, a
joint Council on Cooperation has met twice and included prime
ministers and presidents of both Serbia and the RS to discuss
areas of cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural,
tourist, and social realms. On the occasion of the Councils
second meeting in November, Tadic publicly noted that the
agreement had led to successful joint projects in the fields
of energy, education, health care, infrastructure, and dual
citizenship. Serbian MFA Neighboring Countries Directorate
officer Vladimir Odavic told us in mid-November that the
Parallel Relations framework was largely restricted to
providing cultural support from Belgrade to the RS because
Banja Lukas economic successes had largely rendered moot the
need to provide extensive economic assistance. Both the RS
and Serbian economies would severely suffer if Dayton
unraveled, Odavic added.
¶7. (SBU) Citing the special parallel relations framework,
the Serbian government in November permitted the opening of
an RS representative office in Belgrade, officially titled
The Agency for the Advancement of Economic, Scientific,
Technical, Cultural, and Sports Cooperation with the Republic
of Serbia. (The RS has similar representative offices in
Brussels and Podgorica.) Tadic, RS President Kuzmanovac,
Dodik, and Serbian PM Cvetkovic attended the November 7
opening ceremony in Belgrade. Headed by former PKB bank
director Mladjen Cicovic, the RS Representative office in
Belgrade consists of four experts who broker contacts between
RS and Serbian organizations in areas of economic, cultural,
scientific, and sports. Cicovic emphatically told us in
December that his office provided only technical assistance
and sought to downplay his knowledge of RS political matters
by stating that he was apolitical and unaware of dealings
between Dodik and the Serbian government. Cicovic was
willing to comment, however, that while the administrative
system created by Dayton was fraught with inefficiencies,
Serbs had to realize that it was the system in which they had
to live and that there will always be a border between the RS
and Serbia.
¶8. (C) The Serbian government also sees cultivating ties
with the Federation, Bosnias other entity, as desirable but
has not launched similar efforts to promote cooperation with
state-level entities. Tadic in November said that Serbia was
starting an initiative to develop ties with the Federation
similar to the special parallel relations framework that
existed with the RS, though Federation Vice President Mirsad
Kebo denied the Federation sought such an arrangement
following Jeremics December visit to Sarajevo (Ref A).
Odavic said that he expected an agreement on cultural
cooperation to be signed between Serbia and the Federation in
spring 2009 that would demonstrate an improved atmosphere of
cooperation between Belgrade and Sarajevo. In both cases,
there was no mention of fostering greater state-to-state
contacts. Accordingly to our diplomatic contacts, Jeremic
likes to mention on trips to BiH that he is half-Bosniak, and
seems to have a personal interest, stemming from his family
background, to improve bilateral ties.
Pampering Dodik, Excoriating Silajdzic
--------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Belgrades focus on cultivating entity-level ties will
impede the development of constructive, state-level relations
with Sarajevo. Our diplomatic contacts indicate that close
relations between Tadic and Dodik have sidelined the Bosnian
Embassy and led to the impression that Tadic is conferring de
facto recognition of RS independence. Our Bosnian Embassy
contacts have complained that Tadic and Dodik have appeared
in public events in Belgrade as equals *- such as at the
opening of the Republika Srpska Park in New Belgrade on April
30 -- and that Belgrade has sent ministers to visit Banja
Luka without informing Sarajevo. Dodik travels frequently to
Belgrade without informing the Bosnian Embassy or using the
embassys services, according to the Bosnian Embassy, which
was not invited to participate in the opening of the RS
Representative office in November. Serbian MFA officials
have claimed that such treatment is only due to the
difficulty of coordinating with Sarajevo, but it continues to
BELGRADE 00000034 003 OF 004
be a constant point of grievance.
¶10. (C) Serbian officials cite the continued inflammatory
rhetoric by Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris
Silajdzic as an excuse to continue special ties with the RS.
Each of our interlocutors mentioned Silajdzic as the key
obstacle to strengthening ties with the Federation and
state-level institutions. MOD State Secretary and Tadic
confidante Dusan Spasojevic told visiting Deputy Assistant
Secretary Stuart Jones in November that he considered
Silajdzic to be similar to Hague-indicted war criminal and
Serbian Radical Party president Vojislav Seselj, because both
employed a backward-looking political framework. Odavic said
that Silajdzic had intentionally sought to impede Belgrades
overtures to Sarajevo and that his efforts since 2006 to
erode Serbian identity in the RS had increased the Serbian
sense of insecurity in the RS. Dodik skillfully exploited
Silajdzics comments for political gain and continues to push
back when he sees the RS has no international allies to
condemn Silajdzics rhetoric, Odavic said. Belgrade did not
consider recent statements by Silajdzic to be representative
of the authorities in Sarajevo, Odavic continued, saying that
the Odzuk Agreement (Ref B) showed that all entities could
constructively work together with Silajdzic out of the
picture.
Lingering Issues: Border and Yugoslav Property Disputes
--------------------------------------------- --
¶11. (C) A lack of engagement between Belgrade and Sarajevo
has precluded the resolution of ongoing border disputes and
the distribution of Yugoslav state property. Bosnian Charge
Amira Arifovic told us on December 30 that border
negotiations had reached a stalemate due to a lack of
high-level political will on both sides. Arifovic described
the Serbian position as seeking to exchange territory before
signing an agreement while the Bosnian side believes a signed
statement is a prerequisite to an exchange. She estimated
that the situation could not be resolved without high-level
pressure from political leadership on both sides.
¶12. (C) Arifovic noted Yugoslavia state property restitution
as the second key sticking point in the bilateral
relationship. The absence of efforts on both sides since
2006 to define and renegotiate details in the Agreement on
Succession Issues forestalled progress on restitution. She
added that the stalemate was exacerbated by Serbian efforts
to effectively seize control of socially-owned Bosnian
property in Serbia through claiming authority under Annex G
of the Agreement, most recently in December 2008. She
lamented the absence of property rights protections for
Yugoslav-registered Bosnian property and mentioned Unix
Genex, BNT, Unis Promex, Zrak, and Bosnalink as among the
most significant Bosnian companies still in Serbia. These
companies, and others, as of December were involved in
roughly 20 property rights cases in Serbian courts.
How Strongly Will Tadic Support Dayton?
---------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Tadics recent combative comments toward Croatia (Ref
C) indicate that he is not immune to playing the nationalist
card when politically expedient. However, most observers
agree that he is unlikely to support RS secession through the
next year for several reasons. First, economic difficulties
at home ) exacerbated by the financial crisis - will
constrict opportunities for offering economic support abroad.
Second, Tadic is boxed in by his position on Kosovo:
recognition of RS secession would give the appearance of de
facto legitimacy to Kosovo independence, an outcome Tadic
cannot accept. Finally, Tadic has very little political
advantage to gain at home for supporting Dodik as the
treatment of Serbs in any part of Bosnia is not the
hot-button issue it is with regard to Croatia, Kosovo, or
even Montenegro. Even ex-Radical leadership of the Serbian
Progressive Party has denounced efforts to separate the RS
from BiH (Ref D). Accordingly, Tadic is likely to hold the
line in support of Dayton unless a rapid deterioration in
living conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina that severely
disadvantages Serbs is coupled with signals from Brussels
that Serbias EU prospects are significantly dimmed.
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) Serbias policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina is
strongly colored by its European aspirations and fears of
regional instability that could hurt Serbian interests.
Calculating that RS secession would lead to instability and
BELGRADE 00000034 004 OF 004
negative economic consequences, Tadic is prepared to use
personal and diplomatic leverage to contain Dodik, up to a
point. Belgrades perspective that the real problem is
Silajdzic, a point reiterated by Lajcak, makes no secret of
where their sympathies lie, but the fact of the matter is
that Dodiks statements and actions over the last two years
have undermined the state more than the most egregious
statements made by Silajdzic. Regardless, Belgrades
continued cultivation of entity-level ties impedes the
development of constructive relations with state-level
institutions, which in turn prevents the resolution of
lingering bilateral disputes. Tadics policy represents an
important improvement over that of Kostunica, but
institutionally Serbia is trying to have it both ways:
supporting Dayton and Bosnias territorial integrity while
lending credibility, even if indirectly, to Dodiks dangerous
rhetoric. Belgrades response to Bosnian requests to restart
the BiH-Serbia Inter-State Cooperation Council (which has not
met since 2005) will demonstrate the degree to which Belgrade
is willing to exercise the regional leadership it claims to
be seeking and move toward resolving more complicated
bilateral irritants involving borders and property.
MUNTER