

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS1113, UDF LEADER FRANCOIS BAYROU REVIEWS HIS CENTRIST
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PARIS1113.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS1113 | 2006-02-23 12:12 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001113
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: UDF LEADER FRANCOIS BAYROU REVIEWS HIS CENTRIST
STRATEGY WITH AMBASSADOR STAPLETON
REF: A. A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 01FEB06
¶B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 30JAN06
¶C. (C) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 26JAN06
¶D. (D) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 11JAN06
¶E. (E) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 15DEC05
¶F. (F) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 01DEC05
¶G. (G) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 25NOV05
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: At a meeting with Ambassador Stapleton on
February 16, Union for French Democracy (UDF) leader Francois
Bayrou reaffirmed "that France needs a centrist alternative"
(ref B). He admitted, however, that the French persist in
thinking in terms of "right and left," making it unlikely
that voters in large numbers will desert the center-right and
center-left parties for the center. Even so, Bayrou remains
optimistic that, in the first round of the 2007 presidential
election, he can do markedly better than his fourth place,
7-percent showing in the 2002 election. Bayrou pointed out
that he would be the only respectable candidate (that is, not
of extreme left nor extreme right) in 2007 who has "already
presented himself" to the voters in a presidential contest,
and said that that familiarity should count in his favor. He
dismissed Poitou-Charentes region president Segolene Royal
(who continues to lead in popularity polls) as "having no
political influence", and predicted that the "Segolene
bubble" would soon burst. He said that unless Interior
Minister Sarkozy "self-destructs" (which Bayrou said,"has
happened before"), Sarkozy will not be dislodged as
standard-bearer of the center-right by Prime Minister de
Villepin. Bayrou said that, driven by reaction to the recent
urban unrest and mounting anti-Western feeling among Muslims
throughout the world, potential support for Jean-Marie Le Pen
(leader of extreme right National Front (FN) party) is
"stronger than estimated." Bayrou said that France was
"searching for its place" in both an expanded Europe (he said
the rejected EU constitutional treaty was indeed "a vote
against Europe") and an economically integrated world. He
called the French a "political" people, as opposed to an
"economic" one, with a need for a vision and leadership.
Bayrou did not define such a vision, although he said he
would be doing so in coming days. Bayrou compared France to
the U.S., saying both projected "universal values while
seeing themselves as unique." Although accurate in his
diagnosis of French society, Bayrou was less persuasive in
presenting himself as the leader capable of taking France
forward. End summary.
TRAVAILS OF THE CENTER
----------------------
¶2. (C) Saying that "it was very difficult to make the French
listen to something different," Bayrou acknowledged the
difficulties facing him as he continues to pursue his
longstanding dream of articulating a centrist political
vision that attracts enough support to win (ref B). He was
optimistic for the future, however, noting that he had just
been to Israel and citing the success of the centrist Kadima
party as a model. In the first round of the 2002
presidential election, Bayrou placed fourth, garnering 7
percent of the vote. Bayrou expressed determination to do
just as well, if not better, in the next elections.
Unfortunately, he said, French voters still identify
themselves as being of the left or of the right rather than
of the center. Moreover, he implied, this "crystallization"
of political identification is heightened at election time,
notwithstanding public opinion surveys showing that a third
of the electorate in principle (32 percent) favors centrist
policies over leftist (33 percent) or rightist (25 percent)
policies. Bayrou said he was convinced that the French were
"yearning for renewal," which would allow him to do better
this time than he did last time (ref D). In addition, Bayrou
asserted that the new five-year presidential term, with the
presidential election followed closely by legislative
elections, should produce a new electoral dynamic, one more
favorable to centrist candidates with centrist policy
prescriptions.
EXPERIENCE A BIG ASSET
----------------------
¶3. (C) Excluding the far left and the extreme right, Bayrou
called himself the "only other" candidate in 2007 who will
have previously competed in a presidential election. He
called presidential elections in France "savage," saying
press and public feel they have the right to "dismember you."
At the same time, having undergone this "initiation" was
necessary for achieving the status of credible contender in
the eyes of the electorate. Bayrou made clear that his
"having been there before," along with the electorate's
possible openness to a centrist third way, should help him in
the first round of the 2007 presidential election, whereas it
would tend to work against the "new" presidential candidates
on the center-right and center-left. (Comment: While
Interior Minister Sarkozy has a long political history with
which the French electorate is familiar, PM de Villepin, who
has never held elective office, is viewed by some as not yet
having earned his spurs. On the center-left, only former PM
Lionel Jospin has run for the presidency in the past, whereas
current poll leader Segolene Royal is still seen as untested.
End Comment.)
FIRST TIMERS WON'T GO FAR
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Bayrou was unequivocal in dismissing any possibility
that Socialist Segolene Royal, President of the
Poitou-Charentes regional council and darling of current
popularity polls, might seriously compete for the presidency.
He said of her that "she has no political influence;"
indeed, he went so far as to say that she had "no worthwhile
opinions", and that her highly-touted candidacy was backed by
nothing beyond "photos." He was nearly as unequivocal about
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin's chances of dislodging
Interior Minister Sarkozy as the standard-bearer of the
center-right. Bayou observed that "unless Sarkozy implodes"
-- to which Bayrou added, "which has happened before" (Bayrou
cited as an example his defeat of Sarkozy in an early
European parliamentary election) -- Sarkozy's control of the
center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party
virtually guarantees him a place in the race. (Comment: It
is the conventional wisdom in contemporary French
presidential politics that first-time candidates don't win.
Bayrou did not comment on the chances of former prime
minister Lionel Jospin, should Jospin enter the race. 2007
would be Jospin's third presidential contest. End comment.)
STRENGTH OF LE PEN NOT TO BE UNDERESTIMATED
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Bayrou said that potential support for extreme right
National Front (FN) leader (and veteran presidential
candidate) Jean-Marie Le Pen was "stronger than estimated."
Bayrou said that last Fall's weeks of urban unrest, involving
largely immigrant, urban youths of Muslim descent, along with
the current wave of anti-western feeling gripping the Muslim
world and continuing economic turmoil and uncertainty, could
swell the ranks of Le Pen supporters well beyond what might
be admitted to pollsters. (Note and comment: A number of
other experienced observers -- most recently and notably
former prime minister Raymond Barre at a meeting with
Ambassador on February 21 -- have also noted that Le Pen, if
he qualifies to run, stays healthy, and faces conventional,
lackluster establishment opponents could, as in 2002, do much
better than polls might predict. End note and comment.)
STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENT IS KEY REFORM
--------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Bayrou has long been among the National Assembly's
most eloquent and out-spoken defenders of parliament's
prerogatives against the executive. In recent weeks, Bayrou
has led opposition to the Villepin government's recourse to
Article 49-3 of the French Constitution, which permits the
government to "engage its responsibility," absent the passage
of a no-confidence vote, to put an end to parliamentary
debate of its most recent package of labor reform
measures(ref A). Bayrou told Ambassador Stapleton he favored
a mandatory three-month deliberation period before any vote
on legislation. Bayrou asserted that the Constitution needs
to be amended to give parliament more of a balancing role
against the executive, including a stronger role in foreign
affairs issues, particularly European issues. He advocated a
bicameral system, similar to the U.S., in which some of the
seats would be awarded on a proportional basis. Bayou
stopped well short of calling for a parliamentary system,
however. He insisted that the presidency should stay as is,
an office elected by universal suffrage, with the president
accountable directly to the people, not to the parliament.
FRENCH ALIENATED AND FRANCE WITHOUT DIRECTION
---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Bayrou said that the popular mood was edgy and
suspicious -- "the French don't believe in much anymore" --
and that this heightened the attractions of the "answers"
proposed by the far left and the extreme right. He added
that France was "searching for its place" in both an expanded
Europe and an economically integrated world. Bayrou observed
that the French, as manifested in their rejection of the
proposed EU constitution last May, had "lost confidence in
Europe," seeing the European project not as a source of hope,
but as representing feared globalization. Notwithstanding
what many pundits were saying, Bayrou also insisted that the
failed referendum was in fact a vote against Europe. "France
was a nation first, not a European member state," Bayrou
observed. Bayrou mused that, in the past, France saw Europe
as more or less synonymous with its own interests, but that
that was no longer the case in the wake of successive
enlargements. He castigated current French ideas for a
"directoire" of larger countries.
FEARS OF ISLAM AND "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS"
-------------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Bayrou touched on burgeoning tensions among France's
different ethnic and religious groups and placed them in the
context of a larger "clash of civilizations." In Bayrou's
view, the war in Iraq ("a catastrophe the devil himself could
not have better conceived") is largely to blame for
polarizing the Muslim world against the West. The feeling
that a hostile civilization is pressing in on them tempts the
French to fall back on their traditional, societal values.
Bayrou wondered aloud if the values of Islam and Europe were
compatible, speculating that Islamic societies placed
religious conformity, as represented in the Koran, over the
aspirations of ordinary people. He said he feared that the
chasm between those who put man first, and those who saw God
above all, was unbridgeable.
THE FRENCH ARE A POLITICAL PEOPLE
---------------------------------
¶9. (C) As he often does, Bayrou insisted that the French
have been exceptionally shaped by their highly conflictive
history. In Bayrou's view, this has made them a
pre-eminently "political people," not satisfied with mere
co-existence in a national economy, but rather, intent on
articulating a "project for society," founded on universal
values that overcome their differences. He drew out a
similarity between the U.S. and France from this, pointing
out that only the Americans and French claim "universality"
for their social and political ideals, while also seeing
themselves as unique. He also perceived a similar French
need to show leadership and be led by strong leaders.
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (C) In his demeanor and analyses, Bayrou displayed all
the stolid determination and wily cunning that have kept him
in the game of French presidential politics, albeit as a
perennial also-ran. His opponents, President Chirac foremost
among them, along with the establishments of the center-left
PS and the center right UMP would mightily like to write off
Bayrou and the UDF as marginal -- and they can't quite do so.
A volatile electorate, Bayrou's familiarity and
effectiveness as a candidate, and his centrist (indeed,
radically centrist) policy proposals could conspire,
depending on who also runs in the first round of the 2007
election, to swell his 7 percent of the vote into double
digits -- not enough for him to make the second round, but
enough to make Bayrou's support essential for winning the
second round if the two second round contenders are evenly
matched.
¶11. (C) Bayrou has not yet articulated a compelling and
understandable political vision for France; he must do so if
he is to make himself a credible contender for the
presidency. While Bayrou showed himself a remarkably astute
and articulate observer of the political scene, and largely
accurate in his diagnoses of the ills of French society, he
was less convincing when it came to proposing what to do.
When queried on the vision of France's future that he planned
to put before the electorate, he merely invited the
Ambassodor to pay close attention to his speeches in coming
weeks. Similarly, when asked if his strategy for a centrist
alternative was geared toward winning the next election or
directed more toward the future, Bayrou responded that his
strategy was "short-, mid- and long-term."
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Hofmann