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Viewing cable 06BAKU1835, GOAJ INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT USG POLICY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BAKU1835 | 2006-12-20 08:08 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baku |
VZCZCXRO9720
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #1835/01 3540807
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200807Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2003
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001835
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PBTS PREL MARR IRAJ
SUBJECT: GOAJ INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT USG POLICY
TOWARD IRAN - ACTION REQUEST
REF: A. BAKU 1761
¶B. BAKU 1819
¶C. BAKU 1700
BAKU 00001835 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge Jason P. Hyland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: President Aliyev stated to the Ambassador
that the USG and international community's policy towards
Iran has "failed," that Iran is "confident, comfortable, and
unconstrained," that he "does not understand USG policy on
Iran" and, consequently, Azerbaijan's policy must be to
"minimize potential risks" to Azerbaijan. Aliyev also said
that Iranian President Ahmadinejad has affirmed that he has
"burned his bridges" on the nuclear issue and warned Aliyev
directly that Iran will "attack from where it is attacked."
President Aliyev believes it is "always possible Iran will do
something against us." President Aliyev's foreign policy
advisor and the Foreign Minister have voiced similar
concerns; the Foreign Minister has again told the Ambassador
that Iran is planning various scenarios in response to
heightened tensions or military action, which the GOAJ
believes will include a provocation against Azerbaijani
interests on the Caspian, where the international legal
framework remains unclear. A recent anti-Azerbaijani
editorial which appeared in the Iranian newspaper Jomhouri
Eslami (reported incorrectly in the Azerbaijani press as
having been written by Supreme Leader Khamenei) appears to be
driving much of the GOAJ's concerns. In sum, the GOAJ at the
most senior levels has communicated to us in stark terms
their concern about the implications for Azerbaijani security
of the current situation in Iran, and their desire to better
understand USG policy to address it - and its implications.
This will impact our ability to work with the GOAJ on a range
of issues; we need to address their concern. End Summary.
------------------------
President Aliyev on Iran
------------------------
¶2. (C) In a 23 November one-on-one meeting with the
Ambassador, President Aliyev raised in stark terms his view
that USG and the international community's policy on Iran has
"failed" and that Iran is "confident, comfortable, and
unconstrained." Aliyev said that he "does not understand USG
policy" in response to this situation, adding that
Ahmadinejad has affirmed he has "burned his bridges" on the
nuclear issue and warned Aliyev directly that Iran will
"attack from where it is attacked." Aliyev said he believes
it is "always possible Iran will do something against us"
(ref a) and Azerbaijan's policy must be to minimize potential
risks to itself. Also as reported earlier, Aliyev's Foreign
Policy Advisor (ref b) and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov have
voiced similar concerns. In a December 14 one-on-one
meeting, Foreign Minister told the Ambassador again that Iran
is planning various scenarios to respond to heightened
tensions or military action, which Azerbaijan believes will
include a provocation against Azerbaijani interests on the
Caspian, where the international legal framework remains
unclear.
------------------------------------
Foreign Minister Mammadyarov on Iran
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) In a December 14 one-on-one meeting with the
Ambassador, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov said that recent
Iranian activities (the fueling of demonstrations in Nardaran
with respect to the anti-Islam article published in Sanat,
recent demonstrations in front of the Azerbaijani Consulate
General and Embassy - ref c) are intended to "send a message
to us that they won't wait" while Azerbaijan moves towards
NATO and the US, and on a possible resolution of the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. He pointed to a recent statement by
Supreme Leader Khamenei that "Azerbaijan should not feel
comfortable with respect to NATO," saying Iran is "watching
our policy in this area very carefully." In addition, he
said Iran "doesn't want us to make a move towards conflict
resolution because they know the conflict is the only serious
problem" facing Azerbaijan, and that if continued it keeps
Azerbaijan off base and under pressure. He also said that
Russia's and Iran's positions on this are very close.
¶4. (C) Mammadyarov repeated what he had told the Ambassador
some months ago, that the Iranians are developing different
"scenarios" for how they will react if the US or Israel
BAKU 00001835 002.2 OF 003
increase the pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue.
Mammadyarov feels that Azerbaijan is a "target" for Iran if
there is the possibility of military action against Iran,
which Iran "definitely" sees as being on the table. The GOAJ
thinks that a provocation of some kind on the Caspian will be
Iran's likely approach because whatever overt step Iran
takes, it will want to be within the framework of
international law, Mammadyarov said. There is no agreement
on Caspian delimitation, the international legal framework is
murky and "that is where Azerbaijan is vulnerable." However,
Mammadyarov also said that Azerbaijan believes Iran is
preparing scenarios for responses with respect to Lebanon,
Iraq and "even in Syria." Iran is "afraid of the Taliban"
and hence slow to consider any steps in Afghanistan. Iran
may also create difficulties with respect to its land border
with Nakhchivan (stopping buses, for example), with the aim
of turning the population against the GOAJ and provoking
"social problems" in Nakhchivan like those in Georgia.
According to Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan is planning to build a
railroad from Nakhchivan through Igdir, Turkey, as the next
stage of the Kars-Alkhakhalaki-Tbilisi railroad in order to
keep Nakhchivan from being cut off by Iran this way.
¶5. (C) Mammadyarov feels that Iran does not want Azerbaijan
to make a move on N-K resolution because the withdrawal of
Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territory will make
Azerbaijan stronger in the region. Mammadyarov believes that
Iran does not want Azerbaijan, as a secular Muslim country,
to succeed as a model. Poverty in the ethnic Azeri provinces
in the north of Iran is "like the middle ages" and as people
travel back and forth from Azerbaijan to Iran the contrast is
evident. Mammadyarov argued that it is in Iran's national
interest to see the conflict continue, and, hence, the
Iranian government is exerting increased pressure at any sign
of steps towards a resolution.
¶6. (C) Speaking to the role of religion, Mammadyarov
asserted that Islam in Azerbaijan is more a matter of
"tradition" than ideology. Iran started playing with religion
with the Sanat article and in Nardaran, hoping for a
"uprising" from the people. When this did not succeed,
Mammadyarov said that Iran's next step was the demonstrations
at the Azerbaijani Embassy and Consulate General (ref b). He
argued that Iran's aim is to portray the Government of
Azerbaijan as bad Muslims, poor followers of Islam.
Azerbaijan is going to continue its westward orientation,
cooperation with NATO and the US but "without rhetoric to the
public," Mammadyarov said. In Brussels, President Aliyev
made clear that Azerbaijan will "continue and deepen our
cooperation with NATO," moving to the second phase of its
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Mammadyarov said
that President Aliyev believes greater cooperation with NATO
and a greater NATO presence and involvement in the region
will bring predictability and stability. He said Aliyev was
"very happy" with paragraph 43 of the Riga Summit statement;
its language on regional conflicts was a "clear message to
everyone north, south, east and west of Azerbaijan;" and, it
helps him push back on those of his advisors who question
what Azerbaijan gains from cooperation with NATO.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Supreme Leader Khamenei's Alleged Anti-Azerbaijan Comments
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶7. (C) A recent anti-Azerbaijani article which appeared in
Jomhouri Eslami, a conservative Tehran daily, appears to have
played a key role in raising concerns about Iran within
senior GOAJ circles. The Azerbaijani press (to include the
opposition newspaper Azadliq) quoted Supreme Leader Khamenei
as having made numerous threats against Azerbaijan, even
claiming Azerbaijan to be part of Iran, characterizing it as
"Northern Iran" (a pointed dig at Azerbaijanis who refer to
Azeri-populated areas of Azerbaijan as "Southern
Azerbaijan"). In fact, the Jomhouri Eslami article widely
disseminated in the Azerbaijani press was an editorial piece,
not an article either written by or quoting the Supreme
Leader. While critical of the Azerbaijani government
(focusing on issues such as the Sanat article and closer ties
with the US), the original editorial did not threaten
Azerbaijan in as dire terms as suggested by the Azerbaijani
media with reported quotes such as "we would like to remind
politicians in Azerbaijan that the IRI has adequate power to
realize the historic will of the people."
-------
BAKU 00001835 003.2 OF 003
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) Given the complex relations between Azerbaijan and
Iran, heated accusations in the press - and even overt
threats by Iran - are not uncommon. The most recent
bilateral spat occurred in March 2006, when Iran accused the
GOAJ of supporting regime change by hosting in Baku a world
congress of Azerbaijanis (including "Southern Azerbaijanis"
who roundly criticized the IRI during the conference).
However, President Aliyev's and Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov's recent statements to the Ambassador reveal
increasing levels of GOAJ concern about Iranian intentions
and USG policy toward Iran. Embassy contacts have also noted
that the level of Iranian rhetoric is sharper than in the
past (although their views likely are based on the somewhat
erroneous Azerbaijani press coverage of Iranian editorials).
The GOAJ at the most senior levels has communicated to us its
in stark terms concern about implications for Azerbaijani
security of the current situation in Iran, and their desire
to better understand USG policy to address it - and its
implications. This will impact our ability to work with the
GOAJ on a range of issues; we need to address their concern.
We also note that the GOAJ has regular and broad contacts
with Iranian officials and Aliyev and his key advisors, if
engaged in regular dialogue, can provide us useful insights
on Iranian officials and intentions as seen from Baku. The
Department's guidance on how to respond to Aliyev's concerns
is requested.
HYLAND