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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09HAVANA462, OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09HAVANA462 | 2009-07-28 14:02 | 2010-12-16 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Interests Section Havana |
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUB #0462/01 2091401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281401Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4621
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000462
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2029
TAGS: PHUM PREL ECON CU
SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CIVIL SOCIETY IN CUBA
REF: HAVANA 443
Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (SBU) This front channel cable was originally sent as
Official/Informal in reftel. The following is a collection
of observations by outgoing human rights officer on the state
of human rights and civil society in Cuba.
¶2. (C) CONTINUITY: Repeat visitors to Cuba, whether they
have been gone for a matter of months or years, always are
struck by the impression that everything seems exactly the
way it was when they left. Whether it is the absence of
Fidel Castro from the scene or the abrupt discharge of the
two government officials most known to foreigners, the
Government of Cuba (GOC) seems endlessly capable of returning
to a condition of stasis. In the fall of 2008 three
hurricanes severely battered the island's economy prompting
many to speculate that the system could not recover from the
devastation. However, nearly all observers have been amazed
at the steady progress the GOC has made in restoring the
miserable but adequate quality of living in place before the
disasters. The GOC faces serious challenges but its ability
to muddle through cannot be underestimated. The Cuban people
under the numbing effects of decades of repression, have long
been accustomed to adapting, often with remarkable ingenuity,
to whatever new deprivation comes their way. There is no
reason to think that a new round of ration reductions or
rolling power outages will change this fact. Noted
opposition leader Oswaldo Paya has stated quite candidly that
a situation of a growing opposition, in which the Cuban
people become increasingly willing to demonstrate and demand
their rights until the present regime is forced to yield to
popular pressure, is a fantasy that exists only in the minds
of those living off the island. Paya believes that a rapid,
near overnight collapse of the system into total chaos is a
far more likely scenario.
¶3. (C) THE INEFFECTUAL OPPOSITION: The Cuban opposition is
small and divided into dozens of tiny groups, often with
seemingly similar goals, but unable to coordinate their
activities in any significant way. Although several
opposition leaders, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have a great deal of personal courage, they remain largely isolated from the community as a whole. Genuine opposition groups are heavily infiltrated by state
security. Several others are state security fronts. Others
exist only on paper and their only activities consist of
taking photographs of six to ten people in a room holding up
CAMBIO stickers and generating membership lists for the
purpose of filing refugee cases. For the past two years the
GOC has very effectively used the tactic of short term
detentions to prevent any attempts to hold meetings or
demonstrations. People are typically detained on the way to
an opposition activity and then released some hours later
without charges. As a result, the GOC has silenced
dissenting voices without getting the type of international
condemnation that earlier tactics of political trials and
lengthy jail sentences of dissidents engendered. Over the
past several months there has been a concerted campaign to
provoke discord within the opposition that has had a
devastating effect on major dissident organizations. Unity
projects have crumbled, accusations are levied back and forth
that prominent opposition figures are working for state
security, bitter disputes have arisen over tactics, and
organizations have split over rival leadership claims. Many
opposition leaders have been approved for refugee status
recently, and state security is able to dangle the "tarjeta
blanca", an essential document for legal departure from the
country, in front of many people to pressure them into
informing on or sowing dissent among their colleagues within
the opposition. Even though opposition members recognize
these regime efforts at provocation, they still readily fall
into mutual recriminations and bitter personal quarrels.
¶4. (C) In addition, and much like the regime, the
opposition is aging and few younger people are joining its
ranks. Even youthful opposition groups that seemed promising
four or five years ago have been decimated by emigration and
their leaders, now well in their 30's, have not been able to
renew their membership base. Many of the prominent figures
that are critical of the government, such as the independent
bloggers, state that they cannot relate to the traditional
opposition. Frequently they see themselves as part of a
cultural community that has no relation with the political
opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloff that when someone does something challenging artistically, the artist receives no support from the political opposition, and therefore feels no inclination to support dissident activities.
¶5. (C) DISILLUSIONED YOUTH: The most dramatic failure of
the Cuban Revolution has been the creation of the "new man",
as Che Guevara termed him, who would work for the benefit of
society without regard to self interest. Cuban youth are
overwhelmingly bitter and disillusioned and see no future
except the possibility of leaving Cuba. This bitterness is
acute among the professional classes who, after years of
training, cannot pursue employment in their fields at low
salaries, and instead find themselves hustling after jobs in
the tourist sector. After years of indoctrination, young
people are often completely turned off by politics, and do
not relate at all to the traditional opposition. However,
they are hungry for opportunity and dialogue, as long as it
is not done in a heavy-handed way or with anything that
smacks of propaganda and recruitment. When USINT offered
scholarship programs for community college and a summer
institute, more than 600 applicants applied and most had had
no previous contact with USINT. The applicants were
surprisingly technologically savvy considering that in Cuba
only 2% of the population reportedly has access to some form
of the internet.
¶6. (C) THE RACIAL DIVIDE: In spite of official statistics
to the contrary, African descendent Cubans probably
constitute a majority of the population. However, they
occupy few leading positions in government, state owned
industries and academia. They live in the poorest and most
marginal neighborhoods. They rarely occupy jobs with access
to hard currency in the tourist industry. Refugee applicants
are disproportionately white. African descendants have far
fewer relatives in other countries and so by and large do not
have relatives who can either send remittances or pay for
them to be smuggled into other countries. African
descendants rarely take to the seas in rustic vessels, partly
because for years they have been told that racism in the
United States is as brutal as it was 60 years ago. Accounts
from inmates indicate that as much as 80% of the prison
population are of African descent. Due to emigration, Cuban
society is becoming increasingly black resulting in much more
overt racism than was seen in the past. Nevertheless, there
is complete silence from the GOC on the topic of racial
prejudice, the official line being that racism was a problem
solved by the Revolution. There are many people of good will
who fear for the future of their nation, and who are
initiating dialogue aimed at restoring integration and racial
harmony. After all the GOC told African descendants about
life in the United States, they view the election of Barack
Obama as a miraculous event. There is a great desire to
discover what can be learned from the U.S. experience with
race relations.
¶7. (C) THE BATTLE FOR PRIVATE SPACE: Besides the parts of
the cultural community who challenge the status quo, and
those who are working towards racial integration, there are
other not officially sanctioned groups trying to address
social issues. They don't view their work as related to the
political opposition. These include advocates for homosexual
rights and those trying to work on women's issues. The
homosexual advocates, while welcoming statements against
prejudice by Mariela Castro, the daughter of Raul Castro who
heads the Center for Sexual Education, are upset that she
says nothing about employment discrimination and police
harassment. There are local people in Cuba trying to
intervene at the community level in cases of domestic
violence. It is doubtful whether the GOC would allow a much
more organized private effort to confront these and other
insufficiently addressed problem areas.
¶8. (C) RELIGION: The group that has been most successful
at creating space beyond the government's control has been
the religious community. This has been a very slow process
and the leading religious organizations have always known not
to test the limits too far. Considering that only a few
decades ago the GOC sought an eradication of religion, it is
notable how the faith of many Cuban people remains strong.
Even though the GOC is now seeking an accommodation with
religious groups that still allows government control,
religious groups have gradually regained ownership of their
buildings and expanded their facilities. They increasingly
issue their own publications, and conduct adult education and
community service projects. Even though religious
organization avoid confrontation, and look towards achieving
very small goals, such as permission for one additional
procession or a few more minutes of radio time, they are the
only groups within Cuban civil society with absolute
confidence that they will outlast the regime. Religious
organizations should not be overlooked as agents of
transformational change.
FARRAR