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Viewing cable 07KABUL3848, AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07KABUL3848 | 2007-11-15 10:10 | 2011-01-23 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO7118
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3848/01 3191054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151054Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1461
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4279
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3705
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003848
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT
DEVELOPMENT
REF: KABUL 3054
Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: Since the fall of the Taliban
in 2001, Afghan National Police (ANP) development has lagged
behind that of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Despite the
training of over 70,000 ANP individuals and advances in
equipping and recruiting, the police remain largely
ineffective and corrupt. At the same time, as security
conditions have deteriorated, the proportion of ANP
fatalities has climbed and is now markedly higher than that
of ANA in high threat areas. To enhance ANP effectiveness
both in the counterinsurgency role and in traditional
policing functions, Combined Security Transition Command )
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is working closely with the Ministry of
Interior (MOI), Embassy, ISAF and international community
(IC) donors to launch a new program that will train and
develop whole police units district by district. With MOI
leadership, the Focused District Development (FDD) Program is
a new strategy that seeks to make the district uniformed
police unit the &building block8 for developing the ANP,
emulating to the extent possible the approach that has proven
effective with the ANA.
¶2. (C) District police units will be removed from their
district as a unit for eight weeks training, reequipped, and
paired with a Police Mentoring Team (PMT) for follow-on
training support. Other police units will be put in place to
provide policing during the unit,s training period.
Consultations are also taking place with IRoA officials,
USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the delivery
of governance and development assistance to the districts
selected for FDD. The FDD program is scheduled to begin its
initial training phase in late December, starting with seven
districts in five provinces. There will be challenges to
address as the program goes forward, including shortfalls in
police mentoring teams, accountability, prioritization and
absorptive capacity for assistance while meeting recruiting
goals. But by focusing train-and-equip resources )
including limited numbers of police mentoring teams ) on a
handful of districts at one time, FDD has the potential over
time to provide an effective platform for security,
development and governance advances throughout Afghanistan.
END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
THE FULL FDD CYCLE AND GOALS: RETRAIN, REEQUIP, RENOVATE
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (C) The FDD program envisions manning, training,
equipping, and providing facilities to an entire district
police unit at one time. Objectives include recruiting to
full authorized levels, replacing ineffective leaders, and
transferring the unit to one of INL,s Regional Training
Centers (RTCs) for training. The full FDD training cycle is
scheduled as follows:
a) assessment and recruiting: approximately 60 days
b) placement of temporary covering security force: 10 days
c) training of district police force ) 8 weeks plus movement
time
d) reinsertion of district police force into district: one
week
e) close PMT overwatch: 2 to 4 months
¶4. (C) CSTC-A's goal under FDD is to train and reform all
police districts in the country in three to four years,
predicated in part on the expectation that the program will
create its own momentum as other districts, seeing enhanced
security and development benefits, will elect to improve
their operations on their own initiative.
KABUL 00003848 002 OF 004
¶5. (C) To allow the staff of an entire police district to be
trained simultaneously, Afghan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP) companies, supported as necessary in some areas by
ANA units, will temporarily replace the entire district
police force while the latter undergo training.
¶6. (C) Those policemen or new recruits who have not had any
training would receive the basic course; policemen who have
already attended the basic course would attend a newly
developed advanced course; and senior officers (second
lieutenant and above) within the district would go through an
officers, course, also newly developed by INL-contracted
civilian police mentors assigned to CSTC-A and approved by
the INL/NAS office in Kabul. All courses are eight weeks in
length. To enhance unit coherence, all ranks will be brought
together in the final week of instruction to train and work
as a single unit. PMTs will remain with the district police
during their time at the Regional Training Center,
supplementing the INL courses with additional and
reinforcement training as required.
¶7. (C) District police units, equipment and vehicles will be
assessed for usability; after the training period, their
equipment will either be returned, refurbished, or replaced
at the end of the course. Even as their weapons are
evaluated for usability, trainees will continue to receive
training with the same type of weapon. At the same time,
CSTC-A and MOI will work in the trainees, home district to
improve facilities, establish connectivity with other
elements of the security sector, and establish both formal
and informal working relationships with local leaders.
¶8. (C) Once the district police complete the eight-week
training cycle, they will return to their district and
reassume their duties. As police units are returned home,
ANCOP units will also remain for a short transition period.
CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs, composed of professional police and
military experts, will remain full time for at least two to
four months with the newly-trained and equipped district
police units.
¶9. (C) In preparation for the initial training phase, CSTC-A
is sending regional assessment teams in mid-November to all
first-tranche districts. Led by an MOI general officer and
the PMT, and consisting of interagency U.S., Afghan
government (IRoA) and IC experts, the teams will assess the
police force, the status of rule of law and governance in the
districts, to determine the number of new recruits, specific
training, equipment, facilities, and other supporting
requirements needed, and to shape the evolution of rule of
law and governance in the district, as well as the linkage to
the provincial government.
--------------------------------------------- ---
DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS TO FOLLOW ENHANCED SECURITY
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶10. (C) Consultations are also taking place with IRoA
officials, USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the
delivery of development and governance assistance to the
districts selected for FDD. This will ensure that as
regional security is enhanced, districts will benefit
directly from energy, infrastructure, rule of law and other
programs that U.S. and allied Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) will help local and regional officials to coordinate.
Ghulam Jelani Popal, the new Director General of the
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and who
reports directly to President Karzai (reftel), has expressed
keen interest in the FDD program. Post is seeking to
facilitate consultations between IDLG and CSTC-A on how FDD
can strengthen local governance in Afghanistan and how the
KABUL 00003848 003 OF 004
FDD program can be linked to Popal's proposal for
district-based local self-defense forces and other governance
initiatives.
-----------------------
FIRST TRANCHE DISTRICTS
-----------------------
¶11. (C) FDD training of the first selected district police
units is scheduled to start in late December, with each full
cycle taking approximately six to eight months for
completion, including monitoring, reassessment, retraining,
and sustainment training. CSTC-A consulted closely with ISAF
HQ, the ISAF Regional Commands, MOI HQ and senior police
officials in developing recommendations to present to
Interior Minister Zarar for choosing the first tranche of
districts. In addition to MOI input on political and
policing factors, ISAF operational planning considerations
will be a significant concern for the first two FDD cycles,
in order to complement -- and not complicate -- other planned
operations. As FDD planning extends further into the future,
it will instead help shape ISAF operational planning and more
readily synchronize with specific development and governance
projects for identified districts.
¶12. (C) The districts chosen for the first training cycle
include:
(a) Qalat, Shah Joy, and Tarang wa Jaldak districts in Zabul
province;
(b) Zurmat in Paktia province;
(c) Tag Ab in Kapisa Province;
(d) Chahar Dara in Kunduz province;
(e) Bala Buluk in Farah Province.
With the exception of Chahar Dara in the relatively quiet
north, these districts pose varying levels of security
challenges, including key strategic infrastructure (e.g., the
ring road running through the three Zabul districts), known
Taliban transit points (Tag Ab, Zurmat), or significant
political import (Bala Buluk lies adjacent to three districts
recently overrun by Taliban forces in Farah).
----------------
CHALLENGES AHEAD
----------------
¶13. (C) MOI officials, initially slow to warm to the FDD
concept, are becoming more involved and actively welcoming
the program. Interior Minister Zarar is taking an active
lead, and this has translated down the ranks; however,
broadening MOI and government-wide support will depend on
achieving early successes in the first seven trial districts.
¶14. (C) The PMTs will play a key role in the FDD program,
including the assessment and validation of the newly-trained
district police units, as well as subsequent periodic
reassessments and retraining. As critical as PMTs are to the
success of police training, personnel resources have thus far
not been available to meet CSTC-A,s request for 2,500
additional military and civilian police mentors to staff the
PMTs throughout the country. These would augment the police
trainers and mentors already working in Afghanistan. At
present, CSTC-A covers this personnel shortfall by
concentrating on approximately one third of districts,
including having a single PMT conduct area coverage of
several districts in some cases. FDD, however, will require
KABUL 00003848 004 OF 004
concentration on specific districts since PMTs will not have
the option of spreading efforts over multiple districts.
¶15. (C) CSTC-A has been consulting with IC players, in
particular the EU Police mission (EUPOL), to build IC support
for the concept and to tap IC resources. EU-member state
embassy contacts tell us they find FDD a credible approach to
putting police development back on track; however, it is
unclear how much concrete support international partners are
willing to lend to the plan. CSTC-A remains open to
incorporating EU police trainers into CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs,
but EU interlocutors have been hesitant, noting that it would
require a change to the EUPOL mandate to place EU police
mentors at the district level, and may have implications for
broader NATO-EU relations. Some individual nations, such as
Norway and Canada, have offered assistance outside of the
EUPOL mandate, and CSTC-A welcomes such assistance because it
is not constrained by EUPOL limitations.
¶16. (C) Corruption remains a concern. Simultaneously with
FDD, CSTC-A will press ahead on separate timelines to
complete in the next six months the issuance of
identification cards to all ANP, ensure all police districts
are using the electronic payment system, and maximize where
possible the payment of salaries through electronic
transfers. FDD will provide an opportunity to press forward
with rank and pay reform and ANP pay parity with the ANA
which, despite having been approved by the international
community in September, have not yet been fully implemented
-- or have been implemented inconsistently -- in many
districts. Also, the presence of PMTs for 2-4 months
following the group training will not only ensure sustainment
training, but will also provide a crucial reinforcement of
accountability requirements for U.S.-provided equipment.
Following the completion of initial training in the
districts, we will have to assess the priority development
and governance needs, and the absorptive capacity of the
districts.
¶17. (C) A critical issue identified in the CSTC-A concept of
operations will be the removal or neutralization of corrupt,
criminal and/or inept district police chiefs. Afghan legal
constraints bar the outright removal of officers except in
the case of a judicial finding, which is a slow and
unreliable process. CSTC-A,s JAG team has prepared a draft
MOI disciplinary instruction that is currently under review
within the MOI; in it, alternative approaches are explored
that could include suspension without pay, demotion by up to
two ranks, and involuntary retirement. Even if new
disciplinary measures are approved, it will remain a
challenge to empower MOI officials to impose discipline
involving rank or pay in the face of inevitable interference
from outside or senior influences. In addition, district ANP
patrolmen are often loyal to their chiefs on the basis of
tribal and other personal relationships. When their district
commanders are either removed or quit, ANP personnel have
sometimes deserted or abandoned their posts as a consequence.
¶18. (C) CSTC-A is working with the MOI on other personnel
issues. FDD success will depend on the ability of the MOI to
recruit new personnel into the ANP. A September 2007 CSTC-A
survey of about 76 percent of police districts indicated a
shortfall of some 5,500 personnel from authorized billets.
With advice from CSTC-A mentors, MOI recruiters are
redoubling their efforts to hire additional recruits. It
will also be critical to ensure that the pace of ANCOP
recruitment and training is maintained, to ensure sufficient
ANCOP strength to provide the back-fill police presence as
district units undergo their two-month training period out of
their district.
WOOD