

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09LONDON2569, HMG STRESSES U.S.-UK COORDINATION ON AFGHANISTAN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09LONDON2569.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09LONDON2569 | 2009-11-16 17:05 | 2011-02-04 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy London |
VZCZCXRO9446
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHLO #2569/01 3201713
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161713Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3988
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002569
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS AF PK NATO UK
SUBJECT: HMG STRESSES U.S.-UK COORDINATION ON AFGHANISTAN
STRATEGY
REF: 11/16/09 LONDON DAILY REPORT (NOTAL) Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 b and d
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Karen Pierce (Protect), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Director for South Asia and Afghanistan, told the Political Minister Counselor November 16 that HMG is eagerly awaiting President Obama's decision on the way forward in Afghanistan and would appreciate as much insight as possible on when the President would announce his decision. HMG would welcome continued discussions with the U.S. about creating and empowering the most effective "structures" to work with the Afghan government, she stated. HMG seeks Washington's views on a conference in London in early January aimed at reaffirming the international consensus on Afghanistan. The UK supports close coordination and frequent consultation regarding the way forward in Afghanistan among the "Quad" (U.S, UK, France, and Germany), Pierce said. End Summary.
Allied Unity ------------
¶2. (C/NF) The UK favors close coordination and frequent consultation regarding the way forward in Afghanistan among the "Quad" nations, Karen Pierce (Protect), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Director for South Asia and Afghanistan, said during a November 16 discussion with the Political Minister Counselor. Pierce asserted that "taut" and "focused" discussions among U.S., UK, French and German officials would help maintain allied unity. HMG would welcome a "Quad" meeting after President Obama has announced his decision on the way forward in Afghanistan. Pierce stressed the importance of allied unity, asserting that NATO should concentrate on delivering a persuasive public message on the next phase of allied strategy. She commented that "we did not prepare the public well for Operation Panther's Claw," which she characterized as a major operation that should have been more clearly explained to the public before it was undertaken.
Linking the U.S. and UK Messages --------------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) Pierce observed that HMG is eagerly awaiting President Obama's decision and would appreciate as much insight as possible on when the President would announce his decision. "We need information on when the decision is coming," she underscored. The direction of allied strategy is "in a hiatus at the moment," pending the announcement of the President's decision, Pierce stated. "Once we have an announcement on our military strategy, we need to focus on a political strategy," as there remain a broad range of issues to consider, such as addressing corruption, she continued. Pierce expressed concern that "systems that are in place for keeping the Afghan government on track are not very robust." HMG would welcome continued discussions with the U.S. about creating and empowering the most effective "structures" to work with the Afghan government, she said. For example, Pierce continued, "We need to discuss civilian leadership (since) it is still not clear who the most senior civilian official (representing the international community) is in Afghanistan."
¶4. (C/NF) Pierce underscored the importance of linking up U.S.-UK strategies, so that "our public messages will be the same." She expressed concern that there could be a "potential gap between UK and U.S. metrics" used to measure success in Afghanistan. "We need one set of public metrics," she stressed. When asked by the Political Minister Counselor if there were areas where the U.S. and UK did not agree, she replied that it was crucial to synchronize the content of U.S. and UK public messaging. FS Miliband plans to attend President Karzai's November 19 inauguration, she said.
¶5. (C/NF) Thomas Burn (Protect), who covers external Pakistan political issues in the FCO, said the U.S. could play a positive role in persuading the incoming Spanish EU Presidency to "focus on Afghanistan." Pierce concurred, observing that Spain "needs to continue to support an EU-Pakistan summit." She noted that there is "much opposition" in the EU to a "formalized EU-Pakistan process," with many member states preferring an ad hoc approach.
An International Conference ---------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Pierce stated that PM Brown has offered London as a venue for a conference in early January aimed at reaffirming the international consensus on Afghanistan. The LONDON 00002569 002 OF 002 conference could focus on issues such as governance and institution building, she said. HMG would welcome Washington's views on such a conference, she said.
Convincing the British Public -----------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Pierce stated that Prime Minister Brown, Foreign Secretary Miliband, and Defence Secretary Ainsworth will continue their efforts to convince the British public of the strategic necessity of the UK's continued engagement in Afghanistan. All three will deliver speeches on Afghanistan the week of November 16, she stated (Ref). Brown and his top advisors want Afghanistan to "stop being a political issue." Burn observed that PM Brown has been under intense media pressure for his direction of the UK's war effort in Afghanistan. To at least some extent, the unpopularity of the war effort "is bound up in the issue of the PM's own position" in the UK, Burn opined. Pierce agreed, adding that the Conservative Party policy on Afghanistan "looks like government policy."
Comment -------
¶8. (C/NF) HMG sources have underscored that PM Brown is personally committed to and is overseeing the UK's engagement in Afghanistan. This is certainly reflected in his persistent effort to convince the public that Britain's combat mission is both necessary and winnable. This effort occurs against a backdrop of rising casualties and flagging public support. Total British KIA now stands at 233 ) and each fatality receives prominent media coverage. According to a ComRes/Independent poll taken November 11-12, 71 percent of respondents support "a phased withdrawal of British forces from Afghanistan, the aim being the end of combat operations within a year or so." HMG's emphasis on U.S.-UK and overall allied coordination reflects, in part, concern that any perceived differences among allies on the way forward in Afghanistan will be exploited both by PM Brown's political foes and by the increasingly vocal opposition to continued British military engagement there. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX
Susman