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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI49, GOL PROTESTS AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI49 | 2009-01-23 15:03 | 2011-02-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
Appears in these articles: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/ |
VZCZCXRO3711
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0049/01 0231515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 231515Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4350
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1383
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0814
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0871
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0739
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0987
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0674
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4874
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000049
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM LY
SUBJECT: GOL PROTESTS AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: A senior official with the MFA Americas Department demarched us to protest the Ambassador's remarks on human rights in a recently published interview in which he addressed the state of U.S.-Libya relations and the issues on which he intends to focus. The Ambassador's mention of the case of released regime critic Idriss Boufayed and his call for the release of political prisoners and those of Boufayed's group who remain in detention constituted "unacceptable interference in Libya's internal affairs", our interlocutor said. The Ambassador should be careful in what he discusses publicly, else there would be serious repercussions for the bilateral relationship. Libya was willing to discuss human rights, but such discussions should be restricted to suitable (i.e., private) fora. The timing of the intervention suggests that the GOL wanted to attempt to intimidate the recently arrived Ambassador and reiterate that any public mention of human rights constitutes unacceptable interference in internal Libyan affairs. End summary.
¶2. (C) Responding to an interview with the recently-arrived Ambassador published by Reuters on January 14, which prompted "alot of reaction within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other quarters of the government", MFA Americas Department Director Muhammad Matari delivered a strongly-worded demarche to P/E chief on January 22. Reading from a handwritten set of notes he said had been prepared by Foreign Minister Shalgham in consultation with Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, Matari said that while the article contained positive remarks on the overall U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship, the Ambassador's comments on human rights issues and the case of recently released regime critic Idriss Boufayed were "not conducive to a positive relationship". (Note: The Ambassador's interview with the Reuters correspondent was lengthy and covered a broad range of issues that the Ambassador hoped to focus on during the first several months of his tenure; however, the article focused only on potential military-to-military cooperation and human rights issues. End note.)
¶3. (C) Stressing the GOL's view that U.S.-Libya relations were "very fragile", notwithstanding implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims agreement last October and the recent exchange of ambassadors, Matari cautioned that both sides should be "extremely careful" about whether and how they raised sensitive issues such as human rights, particularly in dealing with the media. It was hypocritical for the U.S. to publicly raise human rights in light of events in Gaza and the fact that detainees remained in Guantanamo Bay.
¶4. (C) Matari took particular issue with mention of Boufayed and his group, characterizing the Ambassador's comments as an "inappropriate interference in Libya's internal affairs". (Note: The Ambassador noted that Boufayed's release to travel abroad for medical treatment was "positive" and, consistent with press guidance and previous remarks by senior USG officials, called for the unconditional release of all political prisoners, including members of Boufayed's group who remain in detention. He did not mention the more sensitive case of detained human rights critic Fathi el-Jahmi in light of progress quietly being made in the Embassy-Qadhafi Development Foundation channel. End note.) Matari stressed that Libya did not have political prisoners; individuals described as such by western media and governments were actually "radicals and terrorists" who had attempted to use religion and violence to gain political power, and who would impose a fundamentalist Islamic regime if they were allowed to come to power. If Libya had political prisoners, then the detainees at Guantanamo Bay must also be described as political prisoners, he said. "We are not angels", he conceded, "but neither are you".
¶5. (C) Characterizing the U.S. approach to human rights and democratization as "naive", Matari claimed that Libya's political thinking had "transcended" that of western countries. Libya remained a tribal society; the proliferation of political voices and parties the U.S. appeared to support could be counterproductive, as it had been in Iraq. Noting that the Ambassador had arrived recently, he urged him to refrain from giving "bold remarks" on human rights and other sensitive issues to the media. If the Ambassador were to persist in making such comments publicly, it would have "serious repercussions" for the bilateral relationship. The GOL's sensitivity on public mention of human rights did not mean that the two sides could not discuss the issue, but such conversations should be restricted to "suitable and appropriate" (i.e., private) fora. Claiming that the most recent iterations of the Human Rights Report, TRIPOLI 00000049 002 OF 002 Religious Freedom Report and Trafficking in Persons Report were inaccurate in their representations of the situation in Libya, he complained that an alleged offer in 2005 to send Libyan officials to the U.S. to brief Department officials had gone unheeded. Saying that the upcoming editions of those reports would be read particularly closely by GOL officials to see whether the recent re-establishment of full diplomatic ties had born fruit, he claimed that negative language could "jeopardize" bilateral ties during what the GOL still regarded as "a delicate period"
¶6. (C) P/E Chief countered that the Ambassador's remarks were consistent with what USG officials, including Secretary Rice, had said previously. Human rights and good governance were key issues that USG officials discussed with all bilateral partners around the world, and the extent to which the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship was able to fulfill both sides' expectations would depend in part on the GOL's willingness to engage with us in a more candid manner on those issues. The Ambassador had stressed that human rights would be part of a dialogue based on mutual respect, and had not mentioned the more sensitive case of Fathi el-Jahmi in light of progress quietly being made on that case in the Embassy-Qadhafi Development Foundation channel.
¶7. (C) The HRR, IRF and TIP reports, P/E Chief explained, were based on Embassy reporting and input, and that engagement by the GOL to refute accusations of human rights violations should in the first instance be with the Embassy. Such cooperation had not been forthcoming; our repeated requests for official information and for meetings to discuss those issues had been ignored. An ideal forum in which to address such issues would be a high-level human rights dialogue, an initiative Libya had endorsed under the agreement by which bilateral ties were restored after Libya abandoned WMD and renounced terrorism. Senior USG officials - most recently former NEA A/S David Welch and Secretary Rice during their visit last September - had raised the issue with senior GOL officials, including Muammar al-Qadhafi. GOL officials had agreed to move forward with the dialogue, but we had seen no movement from the Libyan side. (Note: Matari claimed the GOL was ready to initiate a high-level human rights dialogue and that the Human Rights Committee of the General People's Congress would have the lead; Post will follow up. End note.)
¶8. (C) Comment: One of our less ideological interlocutors, Matari was clearly uncomfortable delivering some of the stronger points (i.e., claiming that detainees at GTMO were political prisoners and that Libya's political thinking "transcended" that of western countries), but was sincere in stressing that human rights remains an neuralgic issue for the regime. The timing of the intervention strongly suggests that the GOL's goals were to:
1) attempt to intimidate the recently arrived Ambassador, and;
2) reiterate that any public mention of human rights, be it of specific cases or general themes, constitutes unacceptable interference in internal Libyan affairs. The Ambassador is scheduled to see MFA A/S-equivalent early next week for a readout of the latter's recent visit to Washington and to discuss next steps in the bilateral relationship, and will underscore with him that while we will make good on our stated intention to be respectful, human rights and good governance will remain a component of our bilateral dialogue. End comment.
CRETZ