

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANAA1015, SALEH SEES FOREIGN HAND BEHIND YEMEN,S INTERNAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANAA1015.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANAA1015 | 2009-05-31 12:12 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Sanaa |
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #1015/01 1511217
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311217Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2022
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0089
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1642
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SANAA 001015
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG
RIYADH FOR ASTEINFELD
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN
EO 12958 DECL: 05/30/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, YM
SUBJECT: SALEH SEES FOREIGN HAND BEHIND YEMEN,S INTERNAL
WOES
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. During a 40-minute meeting at his residence in Taiz, President Saleh confirmed to D/D CIA Kappes his intention to permit Yemenis to enter the Saudi rehab program upon their release from Guantanamo, an issue that he said he will discuss King Abdullah during a visit to Riyadh on May 31. Saleh also ranked the threats to Yemen’s security in the following order: AQAP, the Houthi rebellion, and the Southern Movement, all of which he suggested were being driven by external forces. End Summary.
¶2. (S) D/D Kappes and his traveling party, accompanied by the Ambassador and PolMil chief, flew on May 28 to Taiz, some 200 km south of Sana’a, in a Yemeni Air Force M-171 helicopter, to meet with President Saleh at his quarters there. Saleh appeared relaxed, greeting his visitors in an open-collar white shirt and dark trousers. (Note: over Saleh’s left eye were visible the traces of a cut he suffered mid-May in a fall on the deck of the swimming pool at the Presidential Palace in Sana’a. End note.) After opening pleasantries, Saleh referred to the ongoing debate in the U.S. regarding the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, especially criticism of the plan to transfer some detainees into U.S. prisons, noting that “we have agreed to send Yemenis to Saudi Arabia.” Kappes said he understood POTUS was very grateful for Saleh’s support in this matter, and added that details of the prisoner transfer to Saudi Arabia were being worked out. Saleh said that he would discuss the issue with King Abdullah when he travelled to Riyadh on May 31. (Note: We understand that GCC foreign ministers also will meet in Riyadh next week and that, on the margins of that meeting, they will convene a separate session on Yemen, to which Foreign Minister Qirbi has been invited. End Note.)
¶3. (S) Saleh then noted what he characterized as an “agreement” by the Bush Administration to finance construction of an extremist rehabilitation facility in Yemen, the estimated cost of which is $11M. Saleh expressed his understanding that the Yemeni detainees would be placed first in the Saudi rehab program and then transferred home once the facility here was built and ready to receive them. Saleh also mentioned his “appointment with President Obama,” which he said the two had discussed during their recent phone call. As to the timing of this visit, Kappes suggested it was most likely that the invitation would be extended once the transfer of Yemeni detainees to KSA was underway. Saleh replied: “Send them all to Saudi Arabia now. They already have a facility.”
¶4. (S) Turning to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Kappes praised cooperation between U.S. and Yemeni intelligence agencies. He noted that the USG remains as determined as ever to destroy AQ worldwide, to which Saleh replied, “I hope this campaign continues and succeeds. We’re doing the same here. Our position is unshakable.” Kappes expressed concern that AQAP was targeting Saleh himself, a point Saleh agreed with, asserting that ROYG security services had recently arrested an individual they believe was going to fire a surface-to-air missile at the Presidential plane during a recent trip to Aden. (Comment. We hadn’t heard of this incident previously, although there were reports of plans to attack Saleh’s plane in a similar manner earlier this year as he prepared to depart Sana’a for Kuwait. End Comment.)
¶5. (S) On current unrest in the south, Saleh asserted that “we are not that worried. This is not new. These are the same people who tried to break away in 1994. Then, even with an army and an air force, they failed. They will fail again without external assistance.” He noted that one difference now is that the secessionists are exploiting international media such as Arabic-language satellite channels Al Jazeera and Al Hurra. (Note: Saleh was referring to an interview with Haidar al-Attas, a former southern leader, that Al-Hurra aired earlier this month. End Note.) Kappes noted that U.S. policy in support of Yemen’s unity remains unchanged, and Saleh said that such support was “most important.” He asked that the U.S. pressure other countries to do the same, referring to the U.K. which, he said, is housing the movement’s leaders and providing them media access. “Leave the internal situation to us,” Saleh said. “We’ll handle it.” Asserting that the military option was a last resort, he said that the ROYG strategy will rally the voices of
southerners in support of unity, which he described as the majority of the population, as a counterweight to the minority in favor of independence. He also sought USG support for ROYG efforts to persuade GCC countries to permit Yemenis to enter their labor markets. “Our young people need jobs,” he said, especially if they are to be immunized against the lure of extremist ideology. (Comment. At a dinner for Kappes on Wednesday night, the Saudi Ambassador said that his embassy has issued 36,000 visas to Yemenis seeking work in KSA in the last two and one-half months. End Comment.)
¶6. (S) Kappes said that the latest economic figures from Yemen must be a cause for concern, a point Saleh didn’t dispute, characterizing the current economic situation as “very bad.” Kappes then asked Saleh to rank-order the threats to Yemen’s security, noting a conversation last fall when discussion focused on Al-Qaeda, the Houthi rebellion and southern unrest. Saleh initially said that all three were “on the same level,” then corrected himself to prioritize AQAP as the most severe threat, followed by the Houthis and then the situation in the south. “Even if we told the south tomorrow, ‘You are free to separate,’ they would turn around the next day and start to fight with each other,” he said, adding that such a lack of internal cohesion greatly diminished the risk to Yemen’s security. On the other hand, he said, AQAP terrorists prepared to detonate explosive vests pose a much greater risk to internal security, as does the Houthi rebellion, given the external support the ROYG insists it receives from Iran and Hizballah.
¶7. (S) Comment. Saleh’s decision to reverse himself and characterize AQAP as the most serious threat facing Yemen was almost certainly taken with his USG interlocutors in mind, as was, one suspects, his dismissal of the risk posed to his regime by the increasingly militant southern-independence movement. Nor was it coincidental that Saleh was quick to blame foreign powers for the nation’s woes. From the U.K., Qatar and Libya aiding the southerners, to Iran and Hizballah engineering the Houthi rebellion in the north, to an international terrorist conspiracy fueling AQAP’s growth, the implication is that Yemen is beset by forces that it will be hard-pressed to repel without substantial external support. This argument is, of course, also tailored to Saleh’s USG audience, and meant to elicit the necessary level of political, economic and military assistance to forestall Yemen’s collapse, and the negative effects it would have on regional stability and security. End Comment. SECHE