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Viewing cable 07ABUDHABI187, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07ABUDHABI187 | 2007-02-07 06:06 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
VZCZCXRO0118
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0187/01 0380621
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 070621Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8204
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000187
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH
GENERAL MOSELEY
REF: A. ABU DHABI 97
¶B. ABU DHABI 145
Classified By: Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (S) Summary. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
(MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted Chief of Staff USAF General T. Michael
Moseley on February 1, 2007. MbZ warned Moseley of the
growing threat from Iran, stating that they (Iran) "can't be
allowed to have a nuclear program." MbZ further emphasized
that Iran's nuclear program must be stopped "by all means
available." As expected, MbZ inquired about Predator B.
Moseley informed MbZ that the question of Predator B would
require further discussion within the interagency and with
our MTCR partners, while Ambassador noted that the USG looked
forward to discussion of UAE defense requirements and our
shared security objectives in the context of the Gulf
Security Dialogue. MbZ expressed a desire to have a missile
defense system in place by Summer 2009, and was looking to
add ship-based launch platforms as a part of that system. He
also noted that the UAE had identified a location on the
northern border at an elevation of 6,000 feet that may be
suitable for installation of an early warning radar system.
End Summary.
Iran
----
¶2. (S) Stating that "we are living in a dangerous
neighborhood," MbZ stressed the importance of curtailing
Iran's nuclear program to the overall stability of the Gulf,
the Middle East as a region, and to the world's energy
markets. Pointing out that a nuclear weapon with even a
short-range delivery system puts all the critical
infrastructure in the Gulf at risk -- as well as the oil
shipping lanes -- MbZ asserted: "If Iran can increase oil
production to more than 15 million barrels of oil per day,
let them have nuclear power, but until they can replace (the
Gulf's) oil production they can't be allowed to have a
nuclear program."
¶3. (S) MbZ told Moseley that the US should not focus too much
on Ahmadinejad as the problem, but should focus instead on
"the greater Iranian threat." Calling Ahmadinejad "merely
the driver" of a bus (nuclear program) that has been running
for a long time in Iran, MbZ described Iran's nuclear program
as one that is no longer driven by personalities -- but which
has become part of the Iranian identity. Noting that even if
Ahmadinejad or other leaders were to change, the nuclear
program would still continue, MbZ stated: "Even a siege at
this point will not change anything." In answer to
Moseley's question what should be done, MbZ responded: "Delay
their program -- by all means available." He added: "I am
saying this knowing that I am putting my country at risk and
placing myself in a dangerous spot."
¶4. (S) Speaking about his fears of Iran's growing hegemonic
aspirations, MbZ warned the US not to underestimate the
Iranians characterizing them as "extremely smart." "It
amazes me," MbZ continued, "that the Muslim Brotherhood,
which controls Hamas, has at its core an opposition to all
things Shi'a, and yet they (Hamas) cooperate with Iran. That
shows you how smart they are." MbZ then pointed to what he
called successful Iranian actions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
and Palestine to illustrate how Iran has managed to
manipulate Muslim extremism in order to advance Shi'a and
Iranian goals.
UAV/Predator B
--------------
¶5. (S) MbZ again asked about the status of the UAE request to
acquire Predator B. GeneralMoseley informed MbZ that the
question of Predatr B acquisition would require further
discussionwithin the interagency and with our MTCR partners.
MbZ nodded in understanding: "We are patient." He then
added: "I hope the Iranians give us time; they are aggressive
and are moving fast." MbZ also mentioned that there were
several other countries offering UAVs to the UAE. Ambassador
added that the U.S. and the other 33 MTCR members would be
meeting in March to review the MTCR control list. Growing
demand worldwide for unmanned aerial vehicles had led to the
need for a general discussion of how the MTCR controls UAVs
and cruise missiles, and the USG looked forward to further
discussion of UAE defense requirements and our shared
security objectives in the context of the ongoing Gulf
Security Dialogue (GSD).
Strategic Interests
-------------------
ABU DHABI 00000187 002 OF 002
¶6. (S) Moseley's meeting with MbZ immediately followed a
Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing of MbZ on the ongoing
development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared early warning systems.
Speaking of a time frame for the first time, MbZ said he
wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009. MbZ
expressed particular interest in the possibility of mounting
PAC-3 on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Learning that PAC-3
cannot yet be mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased
to note that SLAMRAAM has already tested successfully on a
wide variety of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh
(Major) Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on
critical infrastructure protection, took particular note of
this fact and asked about upgrading/extending their existing
Hawk/AMRAAM assets. When briefers noted the 32km limit of
unelevated radar, MbZ stated that he has a location
identified on the UAE's northern border at an elevation of
6000 feet that he would like contractors to come back and
look at as a possible location for an early warning radar
system. Also present was International Affairs Advisor to
the Crown Prince's Court Yousef Al-Otaiba, who is a UAE
representative to the GSD.
¶7. (S) Comment: Although MbZ is increasingly talking tough on
Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with
Iran sooner rather than later" (ref A), his comments should
also be taken in the context of strong UAE interest in
acquiring advanced military technology and, specifically,
MbZ's repeated requests for Predator B (ref B). The UAEG is
clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their
much larger and militarily superior neighbor. The UAE's
significant trade relationship with Iran--approximately $4
billion--is another complicating factor in the relationship.
On more than one occasion, the UAE leadership has expressed
trepidation over the prospect of being caught in the middle
between the US and Iran. End Comment.
¶8. (U) POLAD, Chief of Staff USAF, Ambassador Marcelle M.
Wahba has approved this message.
SISON