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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE731, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: SWAYING THE DUTCH
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE731 | 2009-12-04 17:05 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXRO8136
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0731/01 3381754
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041754Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3536
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000731
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: SWAYING THE DUTCH
REF: A. STATE 124188
¶B. USNATO 563
¶C. THE HAGUE 726
D...
238255,12/4/2009 17:54,09THEHAGUE731,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,09STATE124188|09THEHAGUE718|09THEHAGUE726|09USN
ATO563,"VZCZCXRO8136
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0731/01 3381754
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041754Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3536
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02
THE HAGUE 000731
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: SWAYING THE DUTCH
REF: A. STATE 124188
¶B. USNATO 563
¶C. THE HAGUE 726
¶D. THE HAGUE 718
Classified By: Pol Deputy Eric G. Falls for reasons 1.4(b,d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: All evidence suggests the Dutch will
not/not retain a significant number of troops in Uruzgan, and
the coalition government could fall over this issue. Pushing
the government to collapse on this matter is not in our
interest. Accepting Dutch compromise proposals is to our
advantage. END SUMMARY.
DUTCH LEAVING URUZGAN
---------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador pressed Development Minister Bert
Koenders (Labor Party) to retain a Dutch military
contribution in Afghanistan in a meeting December 4. Koenders
observed that the pressure after the President,s speech is
logical. He gave no insights that have not been in his
recent, public statements. Koenders repeated that there will
be no Dutch troops in Uruzgan after 2010 and flatly stated
the Dutch would also not lead the PRT in Uruzgan. However,
he did acknowledge that it is important for the Netherlands
to continue to do its part for NATO and said there were
""discussions"" within the cabinet on committing Dutch troops
elsewhere in southern Afghanistan.
¶3. (S/NF) D/PM / Finance Minister / Labor Party leader Wouter
Bos recently declined a requested meeting with Ambassador
Levin to discuss Afghanistan. He referred the Ambassador
instead to Koenders, Bos's primary adviser on Afghanistan.
In all public statements during the past several months, and
repeated publicly as recently as two days ago, just after
President Obama's speech, Bos has consistently stated the
Dutch will leave Uruzgan in 2010.
¶4. (S/NF) Even Ministers that support continued involvement
in Afghanistan at the most aggressive level have been clear
about this basic point. FM Verhagen stated ""the U.S. knows
that we will hand over the lead in Uruzgan"" in 2010.
¶5. (S/NF) Comment: The Labor Party has left no room for their
own maneuvering on pulling everyone out of Uruzgan except for
a few (12) development personnel. We expect the Labor Party
could well bring down the government rather than extend the
Uruzgan mission. The Labor Party's ""bread and butter"" is the
economy, but the party is looking for an out to rally their
rank and file. The Labor Party's poll numbers have been low
for months, suggesting a steep loss of seats in a near-term
election. Accompanying this poor performance has been
criticism of Bos's leadership and his willingness to flip
flop. We expect that rather than reverse course again and
support a robust Uruzgan mission, Bos would opt to pull out
of the coalition and campaign on Afghanistan. End Comment.
GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE NOT IN OUR INTEREST
---------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) A collapse of the government hurts our chances for
Dutch contributions and would delay any prospective Dutch
contributions.
¶7. (S/NF) A collapse hurts our chances for significant Dutch
military contributions. If Labor pulls the plug on the
governing coalition at this time, it would likely make
Afghanistan one of the central campaign issues. Dutch public
support for the mission continues at a low level (33% as of
October 30), suggesting that advocates for a deployment will
lose seats in parliament. On the other hand, Geert Wilders'
Qlose seats in parliament. On the other hand, Geert Wilders'
far-right, isolationist Freedom Party stands to gain
significant seats in parliament. In turn, a new governing
coalition will likely be forced to include more parties to
reach a majority. It's likely the coalition could shift to
the left and include parties who are likely to oppose
deployment after the elections' ""referendum on Afghanistan.""
¶8. (S/NF) A collapse of the government will delay additional
Dutch contributions. New elections and the formation of a
new government will take 5-10 months, possibly longer due to
Wilders' popularity and the corresponding difficulty in
forming a new government. Until the new government is
THE HAGUE 00000731 002 OF 002
formed, the caretaker government would not be able to approve
a new military mission. Considering that Dutch troops are
scheduled to depart this summer, as well as the planning
required for an extension, withdrawal from Uruzgan will
proceed as scheduled and a new deployment could easily be
delayed until 2011.
ACCEPTING DUTCH PROPOSALS IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE
---------------------------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) The new Dutch proposal -- maintaining a civilian
PRT with protection by another ally, plus troops elsewhere in
southern Afghanistan -- is better than waiting for a new
coalition government that might not give us anything more,
and could well give us less. Embassy counsels patience,
deference and openness with Dutch government's efforts to
sustain their Afghanistan deployment. PM Balkenende's
consistent support for the Afghanistan mission and his
success in leading his party to four consecutive wins in
national elections give us confidence. We recommend
deferring to the advice of Balkenende's National Security
Adviser on not publicly pressuring the Dutch on Afghanistan.
LEVIN