

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KABUL3890, KANDAHAR POLITICS COMPLICATE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KABUL3890.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KABUL3890 | 2009-12-06 09:09 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO8779
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3890/01 3400953
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060953Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3740
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 of 03 KABUL 003890
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE SCA/FO, SCA/A
STATE PASS USAID ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: KANDAHAR POLITICS COMPLICATE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. KABUL 3748
¶B. KABUL 3595
Classified By: Coordinator Director for Development and Economic Affair
s E. Anthony Wayne, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: As we step up engagement with GIRoA
leadership in Kandahar, it is important to understand the
dynamics of political power and how fundamental Kandahar is
to the fortunes of the Karzai regime. It is from Kandahar
that President Karzai's claim to national legitimacy
originates and from the province that the Karzai family's
position as a semi-modern aristocracy stems. As the kingpin
of Kandahar, the President's younger half-brother Ahmed Wali
Karzai (AWK) dominates access to economic resources,
patronage, and protection. Much of the real business of
running Kandahar takes place out of public sight, where AWK
operates, parallel to formal government structures, through a
network of political clans that use state institutions to
protect and enable licit and illicit enterprises. A dramatic
example is the Arghandab river valley, an agriculturally rich
and heavily-populated district strategically located at the
northern gate to Kandahar City, where the President's direct
intervention in the Alikozai tribal succession increased
Karzai political dominance over two of the most valuable
resources in Kandahar -- fertile land and water. The tribal
power structure in Kandahar seriously complicates our efforts
to bring formal justice and modern governance to the region.
In the absence of GIRoA initiatives to bring key individuals
closely linked to the Karzai regime to justice, RC South is
pursuing a bottom-up approach to the Arghandab shura. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) As we step up engagement with GIRoA leadership in
Kandahar in pursuit of U.S. security, stabilization,
development and anti-corruption goals, it is important to
understand the dynamics of political power and how
fundamental Kandahar is to the fortunes of the Karzai regime
(Ref A). It is from Kandahar, not Kabul, that President
Karzai's claim to national legitimacy originates, and where,
through leadership of the royal Durrani Popalzai tribe, he
has a true political base. In Kandahar, political clans
consisting of personal, tribal, marriage and economic
alliances engage in balance of power competition and
cooperation. At the pinnacle of Kandahar's political clans,
the Karzai clan functions as a semi-modern aristocracy, with
the President ultimately presiding over the nation.
¶3. (C) As the kingpin of Kandahar, the President's younger
half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, rules over political deal
and decision-making at the provincial level and thereby
dominates access to economic resources, patronage and
protection. The overriding purpose that unifies his
political roles as Chairman of the Kandahar Provincial
Council and as the President's personal representative to the
South is the enrichment, extension and perpetuation of the
Karzai clan, and along with it their branch of the Popalzai
tribe. This applies equally to his entrepreneurial and his
alleged criminal activities. AWK derives authority and
legitimacy from his relationship to President Karzai, from
the relative discipline and elite position of the Popalzai
tribe and from his access to resources. In Kandahar's
political realm, he is an unrivaled strongman. For example,
the Kandahar Provincial Council, which is made up largely of
individuals who are personally beholden to him, wields
serious influence, despite its lack of statutory powers. It
is currently going about its business unhindered despite the
fraud charges that have prevented the IEC from certifying the
recent Provincial Council election results (Ref B). xxxxxxxxxxxx
¶4. (C) Much of the real business of running Kandahar takes
place out of public sight, where AWK operates parallel to
formal government structures through a network of political
clans that use state institutions to protect and enable licit
and illicit enterprises. At its core, this clan network has
a caste-like division of labor. The Popalzai occupy the
leadership pinnacle. The Barakzai, with Gul Agha
Sherzai as their leader, compete for power and business,
which includes, for example, contracting at Kandahar Air
Field and transport on Highway 4 from the Pakistan border at
Spin Boldak. The Noorzai occupy key positions in the ANSF
and are the traditional racketeers (with ties to narcotics
trafficking). The Achekzais along the border are the
traditional smugglers, and the Alikozai are the traditional
Kabul 00003890 002 of 003
warriors.
¶5. (C) Among Karzai family-run businesses are alleged
control of trucking on Highway 1 (the Ring Road) through
Kandahar Province and beyond, private security contracting
and real estate. The last notably includes Ayno Mina, an
ostentatious Karzai property development for Afghan elites
east of Kandahar City, built on land obtained from the
government at rock bottom prices, with financing guaranteed
by OPIC. In a land of popular strongmen, AWK is widely
unpopular in Kandahar, because he rules exclusively rather
than inclusively; he is not perceived as caring about the
population at large but rather, as a traditional Pashtuns
Khan using his power to "feed his tribe."
¶6. (C) A good example of how the Karzais' power plays out in
Kandahar can be found in the Arghandab river valley, an
agriculturally rich and heavily populated district
strategically located at the northern gate to Kandahar City,
where the Alikozai tribe makes up 60 percent of the
population. They received the valley as a reward for
assisting the founder of Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Durrani,
conquer Kandahar in the mid-1700s. As the guardians of
Kandahar, the Alikozais have prevented all invaders from
occupying Arghandab. The Soviets fought hard but never took
it and as a result were never secure in Kandahar City. The
Taliban's rise to power began in Kandahar, when the powerful
Alikozai leader Mullah Naquibullah decided to give them the
keys to the city, and he turned on them to assist their
overthrow in 2001. When Mullah Naqib died of a heart attack
in 2007, President Karzai took the unusual step of flying to
Kandahar, where he anointed Naquib's son Karimullah as the
new leader of the Alikozai. However, the move had
significant blowback. Mullah Naqib had never designated his
young and inexperienced son as his
successor, and Karzai's intervention generated resentment
among senior Alikozai elders. The resulting split weakened
tribal unity, a vulnerability the Taliban quickly exploited,
and it remains a present source of instability.
¶7. (C) The Arghandab story appears on the surface to be a
case of bungled tribal exploitation. On the contrary, by
intervening in the Alikozai succession, the Karzais linked
the most important tribal faction to control over the
provincial government in a line that runs from AWK to their
putative leader Karimullah, who in turn holds sway over the
District Administrator and local shura. The Karzais also
increased their influence over two of the most valuable
resources in Kandahar (which is largely desert) -- fertile
land and water. The Arghandab river valley, contains some of
the best agricultural land in Afghanistan; it famously
produces 80 percent of the country's pomegranates.
Production and land values there will increase greatly as a
result of Canada's "signature" rehabilitation of the Dahla
Dam and irrigation works, originally constructed by the U.S.
in the 1950s. Karzai businesses are also set to
acquire multiple patronage benefits from Dahla Dam
construction and security contracts, but the main prize will
be political control over long-term allocation of water
flows, including to Popalzai and Barakzai areas that lie well
downstream, via underground canals to the south.
¶8. (C) It is no accident that AWK lobbied the project's
Canadian sponsors on behalf of the Watan Group, the eventual
winner of the Dahla Dam security contract, whose CEO is his
cousin, U.S. national Rashid Popal. More than business is
involved; most of the project lies in Alikozai majority
areas, but the Popalzai will control security, and Alikozai
leader Karimullah was incensed over this treatment by his
Karzai sponsors when he found out. A follow-on to warlord
militias, private security companies today also serve
personal interests as camouflaged vehicles for protection
rackets in construction, transportation and drug smuggling.
AWK's determined but so far unsuccessful efforts to acquire
MOI-sanction to license all contractors and their weapons
through the Provincial Council has the potential to arm the
Karzai clan with a non-state entity that can insure against
whoever should come to power in Afghanistan.
¶9. (C) Comment: The traditional tribal power structures in
Kandahar have many implications for U.S. objectives in the
region. Initiatives that rely on GIRoA to take the lead in
bringing to justice major corrupt figures or negative
influences in Kandahar contain a serious dilemma: they would
include some of Karzai,s closest relatives and allies and
require the prosecution of people on whom we often rely for
assistance and/or support. Second, any efforts to bring
these individuals to justice could compromise the informal
Kabul 00003890 003 of 003
governing networks to which Kandaharis have become
accustomed, without necessarily replacing them with effective
GIRoA officials or improving the delivery of services. A
focus on bottom-up local solutions, such as identifying and
reaching out to the multiple factions in Arghandab as well as
the official shura, which RC South is pursuing, could offset
this problem to some degree. End Comment.
¶10. (U) This assessment, derived from multiple sources
including information provided by over a dozen
knowledgeable Afghans, presents a perspective that is widely
perceived among the Afghan public and consistent with
documentation in open sources and intelligence analyses.
Mussomeli