

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KABUL1377, CODEL LEAHY: CRITICAL TIME IN BILATERAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KABUL1377.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KABUL1377 | 2009-06-01 08:08 | 2011-01-28 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO7120
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1377/01 1520814
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010814Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9178
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
209437
2009-06-01
09KABUL1377
Embassy Kabul
CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001377
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER USAID
SUBJECT: CODEL LEAHY: CRITICAL TIME IN BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP
Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The members of CODEL Leahy told President
Karzai during a 5/26 meeting that this was a critical time
for the Afghan-U.S. relationship. Americans needed
assurances, especially in this economy, that the money they
are spending in Afghanistan is being well spent, and that the
people of Afghanistan are benefiting from it. Karzai replied
that Afghanistan had made much progress in the past seven
years, but needed continued U.S. assistance, particularly in
building capacity in the areas of agriculture and security.
-----------------------------------------
Important Point in Bilateral Relationship
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) CODEL Leahy (Senators Leahy, Whitehouse and Warner),
accompanied by Ambassador Eikenberry, met for approximately
one hour with President Karzai. Senator Leahy told Karzai
this was a particularly critical time in the Afghan-U.S.
relationship. President Obama was strongly committed to
continuing assistance to Afghanistan, but the American people
needed assurance that such assistance was being used
appropriately, wisely and for the benefit of the Afghan
people, especially in light of the troubled world economy.
Karzai insisted that Afghanistan would do all necessary to
convince Americans their investment in Afghanistan's future
was a sound one. Afghanistan had already made substantial
progress in recent years, but still needed assistance in
building its capacities in areas such as agriculture,
security, finance and other areas.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Must Promote Capacity Building in the Ministries
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C) Senator Whitehouse said that he had been impressed by
the Ministers of Agriculture, Finance and Rural
Rehabilitation and Development at an earlier meeting,
referring to their demonstrated commitment to accountability
and transparency in their ministries. The more progress in
good governance and transparency, he said, the more goodwill
Afghans would see from the American people, and the more
support they would see from the American government. Karzai
replied that he had a very good cabinet of technocrat
ministers and advisors. The problem, he said, lay below the
senior level, and was caused by a lack of capacity in the
ranks. Karzai referred to India's program of training 1,000
young Afghans each year for civil service and suggested he
would like to model an Afghan program along those lines.
------------------------------------------
Need to Promote Development of Rule of Law
------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Karzai asserted it would take a long time to restore
the judiciary because it had been so thoroughly destroyed
during the war years. Many Afghans still relied on informal
or community-based systems for swift justice, rather than the
courts. He believed, however, that it was an encouraging
sign that Afghans had a higher expectation of justice than
ever before. The Afghan government was committed to removing
corrupt and incompetent judges. Karzai cited progress in the
anti-corruption and rule of law areas, though he was still
concerned about widespread corruption among officials and
police, and its impact on the average Afghan.
-------------------------
Karzai's Campaign Message
-------------------------
¶6. (U) Karzai said his campaign message would be to stress
Afghanistan's progress during his seven years as president.
Most importantly, Afghanistan had been made into a country
for all Afghans again, and had become a proud member of the
world community, actively participating in multi-lateral
talks with nations such as Iran and Pakistan - something he
could not have imagined six years ago. Average per capita
income had risen from $180 six years ago to more than $500
now. Afghanistan had amassed $3.6 BN in foreign reserves,
and established banking and accounting systems to prevent
theft and misuse of public funds. Karzai had encouraged the
establishment of a strong and independent media to hold the
government accountable. Regarding the narcotics threat,
Karzai acknowledged serious challenges remained, but noted 22
of Afghanistan's provinces were free or mostly free of poppy,
up from just three poppy-free provinces in 2005.
¶7. (C) Karzai said when he assumed the presidency, there
were 4,000 - 5,000 students in Kabul's five universities -
today there are approximately 75,000 in the nation's
universities, 45,000 of whom entered the university this
KABUL 00001377 002 OF 002
year. Of those 75,000 university students, 25 percent were
women. The nation, he said, had seven million students in
its schools, mostly in areas not controlled by the Taliban.
Over the next 10 years, he expected that population to grow
as areas were increasingly wrested from insurgent control,
and new schools opened. He proudly pointed to a program
initiated four years ago in which female students were sent
overseas for advanced education, and were now returning to
Afghanistan with advanced degrees to teach in the schools and
universities.
--------------------------------
Poppy Production Still a Problem
--------------------------------
¶8. (C) Karzai said that Afghanistan had always had poppies,
but forty years ago, poppy was not an important crop in
comparison to apricots, pomegranates, and other agriculture
products. He believed the people could be turned from poppy
production, but feared limited opportunities and poverty
served to increase the temptation of easy money through poppy
cultivation. He also criticized some forms of aid or NGO
gifts. Afghans, he said, needed to take on the work of
repairing Afghanistan for themselves, rather than having the
NGOs do it for them. The NGOs were not helping the Afghans'
work ethic though gifts, but through training.
---------------------------------------
Iranian Attitudes Towards U.S. Changing
---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Karzai said the purpose of his May 24 trip to Tehran
was to participate in Afghanistan's first tri-partite summit
talks with Iran and Pakistan, on the issue of
counter-terrorism, among other regional issues. Karzai told
Iran's leadership the U.S. was a good country and the
Iranians should seek better relations with the Americans.
President Ahmadinejad indicated he would be willing to
improve relations; Karzai believed Iran's attitude towards
the U.S. was changing.
EIKENBERRY