

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08LONDON1862, SUDAN/ICC: UK STRATEGY WITH POTENTIAL BASHIR ICC
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08LONDON1862.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08LONDON1862 | 2008-07-15 16:04 | 2011-02-04 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy London |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLO #1862/01 1971606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151606Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9197
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0105
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1225
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001862
SIPDIS
NOFORN
USUN FOR JANA CHAPMAN-GATES
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO PHUM SU UK
SUBJECT: SUDAN/ICC: UK STRATEGY WITH POTENTIAL BASHIR ICC
INDICTMENT
REF: LONDON 1841
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Following Foreign Secretary Miliband's July 9 visit to Sudan, ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo's July 14 request for indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, and Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor's July 14 assurances to the UK that the GoS will "engage legally" with the ICC, a July 15 UK Cabinet-level meeting approved a UK strategy to continue HMG's constructive engagement with the GoS and press for progress on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Darfur political process while also maintaining HMG credibility in support of the ICC. Ministers said HMG should continue to press the GoS to cooperate with the ICC while not taking any options off the table and without espousing a hard-line approach in support of the ICC. While there is no current movement to pursue an Article 16 suspension of the ICC's investigation of Bashir, a "card not to sell cheaply," the UK wants that option to remain on the table. Although HMG will not acknowledge it publicly, the UK is doing every thing it can to remain flexible on the ICC and to use Bashir's potential indictment as a lever to change the dynamic on the Darfur political process and to spur CPA implementation. End Summary.
Miliband and Alexander Outline the UK's Policy --------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (C/NF) According to FCO contacts, Foreign Secretary David Miliband and Development Secretary Douglas Alexander outlined a UK strategy to continue HMG's constructive engagement with GoS and press for progress on the CPA and the Darfur political process while maintaining the UK's credibility during a Cabinet-level meeting on July 15. Ministers agreed HMG should continue to press the GoS to cooperate with the ICC while not taking any options off the table and without adopting a hard-lined approach in support of the ICC. There is no current movement to pursue an Article 16 suspension of the ICC's investigation of Bashir, a "card not to sell cheaply." Ministers said there would have to be significant movement on both CPA and Darfur to warrant a move on Article 16 and the UK should try "to use intelligently the political space created by the ICC announcement," in concert with the U.S. and France.
¶3. (C/NF) Ministers also agreed that the CPA should be central to HMG policy and that Prime Minister Brown's offer to help in the Darfur political talks should remain on the table, but not be an active element of the UK's policy. Supporting the newly appointed UN/AU Chief Mediator and encouraging civil society integration in the process will be the main focus of the UK's policy for Darfur.
Sudanese Say They will Engage with the ICC ------------------------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) In a July 14 meeting between Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor and the UK Ambassador to Sudan, Alor said the GoS Council of Ministers had met on July 13 to determine its response to Ocampo's request for indictment of Bashir. Alor said Bashir was "surprisingly calm" and that the Council agreed to engage legally with the ICC; to work for a rapid broad-based solution to the conflict in Darfur, including establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and to work for a united position with other political parties to promote national reconciliation and help turn the indictment into something positive. At the meeting, First Vice President Salva Kiir reportedly agreed the SPLM would remain in the Government of National Unity and work with the NCP to address the crisis caused by the ICC announcement. The two parties agreed to establish a joint crisis management committee, chaired by Kiir and to include Second Vice President Taha, Foreign Minister Deng Alor, and the Ministers of Justice and Information.
¶5. (C/NF) In the short-term, Alor told the UK Ambassador that he would like to stop by London and Paris on his way back from the July 16-17 Dakar Contact Group meeting in Senegal. In addition, the GoS plans to send government lawyers to the ICC to engage the Court quietly but officially. (Note: Ocampo had previously told FCO legal advisors that Sudanese legal engagement could prolong the indictment process by months or even years. Since then, the FCO has been aggressively pushing the Sudanese to engage the Court. End Note.) Other UK reporting indicates that the SPLM has been trying to engage the NCP on creation of a Roadmap on Darfur in consultation with other political parties and civil society.
The Foreign Secretary's Visit to Sudan --------------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Foreign Secretary Miliband made a whirlwind trip of less than 24 hours to Sudan on July 9, where he discussed the CPA, 2009 elections, Darfur, Sudan-Chad relations, and the 2011 referendum on South self-determination. His meetings included calls on President Bashir, Foreign Secretary Deng Alor, Senior President Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie, and National Security and Intelligence Director Salah al Gosh. 7. (C/NF) FCO contacts described Miliband's meeting with Bashir as "largely constructive and cordial." Bashir made his usual refrains about the Sudanese not receiving the deliverables promised by the international community in return for signing the CPA (i.e. removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, etc.) and about the UK's one-sided policy in support of Darfur rebels. Miliband underscored the need for political settlement of Darfur and stability in the South so that HMG could spend its time and resources on development rather than humanitarian assistance. On the CPA, Miliband welcomed the Assessment and Evaluation Commission's adoption of the mid-term report and emphasized the need to begin work on long-term issues like oil wealth-sharing. Both Bashir and Alor were reportedly positive about the progress on the Abyei Roadmap, but noted that there were still problems in deciding the top posts in the interim administration.
¶8. (C/NF) Miliband said the GoS should work with the newly appointed UN/AU Chief Mediator to bring about a new dynamic to the Darfur political talks, even though the rebels remained fragmented and hesitant to engage. He also highlighted the need to engage civil society and all Sudanese political parties in development of a common platform on Darfur in the run-up to the 2009 elections.
¶9. (C/NF) Miliband privately raised the ICC with Bashir in a one-on-one meeting to communicate the urgency for the GoS to engage the ICC, encouraging Bashir not turn his back on the international community.
Comment -------
¶10. (C/NF) As an architect of the ICC and one of its most staunch supporters, HMG is in a difficult position over the ICC's potential indictment of Bashir, which it sees as unhelpful. Although there is no clear end-game in mind, HMG seems happy to walk the fine line of pushing GoS engagement with the ICC while also looking to make Bashir's potential indictment the element that changes the dynamics on Darfur and encourages CPA implementation. HMG's public message on the ICC will likely remain supportive, while the UK will likely pursue a more flexible policy at the UN and in its dialogue with Khartoum. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX TUTTLE