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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BOGOTA2063, LIBERAL PARTY CANDIDATE RIVERA ON PRESIDENTIAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA2063 | 2006-03-08 14:02 | 2011-03-10 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks |
VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #2063/01 0671434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081434Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2871
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 6603
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 7290
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 7764
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3333
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 8836
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 3969
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 3481
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002063
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CO
SUBJECT: LIBERAL PARTY CANDIDATE RIVERA ON PRESIDENTIAL
CHANCES
Classified By: Political Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis.
Reasons: 1.4 (b,d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Liberal party presidential candidate and Senator
Rodrigo Rivera Salazar, in a March 3 breakfast with poloffs,
reviewed his campaign strategy, forecast the future of his
party, and discussed how he would improve Colombia's role in
the region. Rivera predicted that he would he would win the
March 12 primary for the Liberal Party (PLC) nomination and
go on to defeat President Uribe in the May 28 election.
Rivera characterized himself as in the mold of President
Clinton, a "moderate outsider" who planned to surprise
everyone with a "David and Goliath-like" type victory. He
said the Liberals had not yet developed a party line on the
FTA, but he personally viewed the FTA as predominately
positive, with a few reservations on how it might affect
displaced farmers and anti-narcotic efforts. Rivera is
highly unlikely to win the PLC primary, but is a future
presidential contender, particularly popular with young
voters. He is likely to finish behind HoracioSerpa but
should make a strong enough showing to be considered a
serious Liberal option in 2010. End summary.
---------------------
Climbing in the Polls
---------------------
¶2. (C) Rivera told Poloffs March 3 that he was confident of
victory in the March 12 primary despite trailing in the
polls. He acknowledged that he trailed both HoracioSerpa
and Rafael Pardo in some polls, but claimed there were others
that had him in the lead. On March 5, a poll in "El Tiempo,"
Colombia's most widely-circulated newspaper, showed Rivera in
second place with 9 percent, behind Serpa's 57 percent, and
ahead of Pardo's 8 percent. In most previous polls, he has
trailedPardo. The poll showed 22 percent of voters were
still undecided. (Note: all eligible voters are permitted to
vote in the Liberal Party primary, not just PLC members.)
Assistant Secretary of the PLC Boris Zapata, responsible for
PLC internal polling, told Poloff on March 7 that internal
party information showed Rivera doing even better. Zapata
saidSerpa was expected to garner 45-50 percent, Rivera 15-20
percent, Pardo 10-12 percent, and Andres Gonzalez 3-4 percent
of the vote. Of the two promising candidates expected to
finish behind Serpa, Zapata predicted that Rivera would be
the stronger candidate for the Liberals in 2010.
-------------------------
Making a Name for Himself
-------------------------
¶3. (C) Rivera said his strategy to employ television as a
means of securing votes nationally would lead him to victory.
He claimed that Serpa and Pardo dominated exposure in
leading newspapers and magazines such as "El Tiempo" and "La
Semana," due to "family connections." He was convinced that
19 million television viewers, from all parts of the nation,
would far outweigh the few who follow the "biased"
print-media. He predicted that his strong performances in
televised debates and interviews would translate into votes
on election day. Serpa and Pardo's weakness, he claimed, was
focusing too heavily on the Bogota electorate. Rivera
calculated he would need 1.5 million votes to win the primary.
--------------------------
Trying to Not Make Enemies
--------------------------
¶4. (C) Rivera said he was good friends with two his main
challengers, Serpa and Pardo, and was determined not to
engage in personal attacks or negative campaigning (Note:
Pardo and Rivera reportedly had a brief shoving match last
week. End Note). He claimed that if Serpa won, it would be
disastrous for the PLC, since Colombians had "turned the page
onSerpa," who has lost twice already in presidential
elections. Rivera believed Pardo had a much better chance
against Uribe, but despite his being an excellent politician,
he was "about politics," while Rivera was "about issues."
Rivera expressed frustration at the lack of issues being
discussed, but said it was Colombian tradition to focus more
on personalities than platforms. He claimed that Uribe won
in 2002 on the sole issue of security, whereas Rivera
championed a platform of reducing corruption, universal
health care, and mandatory education, in addition to security.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Liberals On the Rise; Number of Parties Declining
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶5. (C) Rivera said the future of the Liberal party was
excellent and the PLC would be in extraordinary shape if
Serpa lost the primary. He predicted that the PLC would gain
the most seats overall in the House and the Senate, but that
parties supporting Uribe would have slight control in both
houses by forming a tenuous coalition. Rivera said if he did
win, he would be inclusive, and work with Uribistas,
particularly since many were former PLC members. Rivera
foresaw the number of parties in Colombia declining
dramatically following elections as a result of new electoral
rules dictating that a party must garner 2 percent of votes
cast for either House or Senate to maintain its official
party status (ref A). He said eight parties would remain
from the current 59. According to Rivera, the eight parties
weretheLiberals, Cambio Radical, Partido Conservador,
Partido de la "U," Polo Democratico Alternativo, Colombia
Democratico, Colombia Viva, and Convergencia Ciudadana, (Ref
B). (Note: Embassy predicts that 8-12 recognized parties will
remain following the election).
---------------------------------------
Colombia's Foreign Policy in the Region
---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Rivera criticized Uribe for distancing himself from
the region's leaders and said regional cooperation on
anti-terrorism and anti-nacotrafficking had suffered as a
result. He pointed to Colombia's growing importance in the
region, and said that as President, he would ensure Colombia
served as a "bridge of confidence" between the United States
and countries like Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In
Rivera's view, Uribe had chosen an adversarial approach with
leaders in the region, whom he believed had the potential to
assist Colombia in defeating the FARC, a group he styled the
"Al-Qaida of the region." On the topic of the FTA with the
United States, he said he saw the benefits, but worried that
the farmers who lost their jobs would turn to coca
cultivation if the government did not develop an alternative
plan for crop diversification. He admitted that the PLC had
not yet established a party line on the FTA, but if they were
to support it, the Government needed to offer more economic
support for Colombian farmers.
-----------------------------
Comment and Biographical Note
-----------------------------
¶7. (C) Rivera, a 14-year Congressional veteran, has no shot
at winning the PLC primary. He is popular, however, among
younger voters, who view him as articulate and knowledgeable.
He might be able to build on that support in 2010 or beyond.
Rivera (along with Pardo and Gonzalez) placed himself at
personal risk by taking a strongly anti-paramilitary stand in
the national debate on the Justice and Peace Law. He is also
a leading supporter of the U.S.-Colombian extradition
relationship. A former IVP grantee, Rivera has been open to
dealing with us on major issues.
WOOD