

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI389, IRAN: CLERICAL CONFAB STIFFS RAFSANJANI FOR SUPREME LEADER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09RPODUBAI389.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09RPODUBAI389 | 2009-09-24 14:02 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Iran RPO Dubai |
VZCZCXRO3466
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDIR #0389/01 2671420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241420Z SEP 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0543
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM TELECOM CENTER MACDILL AFB FL
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0426
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0544
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000389
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: CLERICAL CONFAB STIFFS RAFSANJANI FOR SUPREME LEADER
REF: RPO DUBAI 384
DUBAI 00000389 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyer, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Oppositionist hopes that Iran's clerical class
would mobilize to oppose Supreme Leader Khamenei's post-election
policies appear sharply diminished in the wake of the first
Assembly of Experts meeting since the June 12 Presidential
election. Not only did the Assembly, which has the power to
appoint, supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, give a
ringing endorsement of Khamenei's rule and his handling of the
post-election crisis, it did so in the conspicuous absence of
its Chair, Ayatollah Rafsanjani. Moreover, leaks of the
closed-door proceedings to the conservative press indicate that
at least two prominent members of this clerical deliberative
body excoriated Rafsanjani for his failure to support Khamenei
during the unrest. Despite his absence at the closure of the
Assembly of Experts meeting, Rafsanjani was compelled to
publicly endorse the closing statement while seated at the knee
of the Supreme Leader during a September 24 press conference.
END SUMMARY.
Assembly of Experts: A 'Deliberative' Body
2 (C) The Majles-e Khobregan, or Assembly of Experts (AOE), is a
Constitutionally-mandated deliberative body composed of 86
directly-elected senior clerics from across the country. By
law, the Assembly must meet for a minimum of two days twice a
year. Though theoretically vested with the power to appoint,
supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, in practical terms the
Assembly's only real responsibility is to appoint the Supreme
Leader's successor should he die or become incapacitated. As
such, the AOE's last noteworthy act was appointing current
Supreme Leader Khamenei after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1989
death. Every subsequent meeting has ended with the issuance of
a perfunctory statement lauding the Assembly's decision to
appoint Khamenei and praising his leadership. Nevertheless,
according to Article 111 of the Constitution, the Assembly can
find Khamenei unfit for office; accordingly, control of the AOE
remains a (potential) check on the Supreme Leader's otherwise
unbridled power.
¶3. (C) The Assembly is currently chaired by Ayatollah Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was re-elected to the two-year term of
Speaker in March 2009. At the time of his re-election, he
garnered 51 votes, an improvement over the 46 votes he received
in 2007, despite efforts by hardline conservative clerics, led
by Ayatollahs Mesbah-Yazdi and Ibrahim Yazdi, to unseat him.
First Meeting since the Election
¶4. (C) On September 22-23 the AOE convened for the first time
since Iran's disputed June 12 election. Rafsanjani opened the
sixth official meeting of this Fourth Assembly of Experts by
again cautioning that a "suspicious faction" is trying to create
rifts among Iran's leaders and by condemning the "atmosphere of
insults and dispute" that has prevailed since the June
presidential election. He also promised that "system insiders
of good will" are developing a plan to resolve Iran's domestic
political problems. His opening statement was followed by
reports to the body by Judiciary deputy Mohsen Ejei
(Intelligence Minister during the presidential election and its
aftermath) and Revolutionary Guards Commander Jaafari.
According to press reports, at least sixteen Assembly members
spoke.
¶5. (C) Though summaries of the closed-door proceedings released
by Rafsanjani's office did not reflect any discord among the
members and indeed indicated the body's support of him,
conservative Iranian press charged Rafsanjani's office with
'censoring' coverage of the proceeding, reporting that at least
two prominent members sharply criticized Rafsanjani for failing
to support the Supreme Leader after the disputed election. One
quotation prominently featured in conservative news outlets was
Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah al-Hoda rhetorically
asking Rafsanjani, "why after twenty years, have you remained
silent in the face of these unprecedented insults (to the
Supreme Leader)?"
DUBAI 00000389 002.2 OF 002
¶6. (C) More tellingly, Rafsanjani did not attend the second and
final day of the meeting, with recently retired former Judiciary
Head Ayatollah Shahrudi chairing in his absence. Hardline
conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (the same cleric who
replaced Rafsanjani as Qods Day prayer leader - reftel) read the
Assembly's final statement, which was an unqualified if not
fawning endorsement of the Supreme Leader himself and his "wise
policies" for quickly extinguishing the post-election "flames of
sedition." Khatami noted that Rafsanjani, despite his absence,
agreed with "every point" of the final statement, which also
credited Khamenei for dismissing the fraud allegations as part
of a plot to undermine the Islamic Republic. The final
statement was also noteworthy in its perfunctory congratulations
to President Ahmadinejad for his election victory, and its more
sincere admonishment of Ahmadinejad to scrupulously follow
Supreme Leader Khamenei's guidance.
¶7. (C) COMMENT: Following the disputed June 12 presidential
election, many speculated that the axis of a Rafsanjani
counter-attack would focus on rallying clerical support to his
cause. However, the rumored AOE "emergency session" never
convened, and absent such a meeting it remained unclear how much
support Rafsanjani had among this body that reflects the
political leanings of Iran's traditional senior clergy. Now
that the AOE has met, it is clear that the clerical cavalry
isn't coming over the horizon anytime soon. Furthermore, the
AOE final statement, seen in conjunction with the removal of
Rafsanjani as Qods Day Speaker (reftel), indicates in the
clearest terms yet that in the most severe crisis of his career,
Rafsanjani is unable to mobilize his once vast and influential
patronage network to achieve his political ends. And given that
Rafsanjani's presumed power is serving as at least a partial
deterrent to further regime moves against Mousavi, Karrubi and
Khatami, the results of this two-day AOE session bode ill for
the leadership of the oppositionist "Green Path of Hope." END
COMMENT.
EYRE