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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10KABUL628, MINISTER OF INTERIOR REVIEWS POLICE TRAINING, CN POLICING
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10KABUL628 | 2010-02-18 16:04 | 2011-01-20 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO6962
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0628/01 0491657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181657Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5708
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000628
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL PINS PK RU AF
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF INTERIOR REVIEWS POLICE TRAINING, CN POLICING
AND REGIONAL RELATIONS WITH DRUG CZAR
Classified By: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne reasons 1.4 b & d.
REF: 10 KABUL 575
¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 2 meeting, Director of the White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) R. Gil Kerlikowske
joined by Ambassador Wayne, discussed a range of current issues with
Afghan Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar. Atmar expressed
satisfaction with the steady development of the Major Crimes Task
Force (MCTF), especially on corruption, but hoped to see more
progress on kidnapping, an area where the GIRoA needed better
intelligence. Atmar hoped to begin sending 12-15,000 Afghan National
Police (ANP) to train outside of Afghanistan each year, and to
receive NATO funding and support to use a training facility
constructed in Jordan for training Iraqi police for Afghan police
officers. Atmar commended DEA's success in developing elite, vetted
units of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), supported
expansion of the CNPA eradication force despite the termination of
the U.S.-funded Poppy Eradication Force; and welcomed greater U.S.
and coalition support to develop CNPA investigative capacity at the
provincial level. Atmar was supportive of existing limited training
exchanges with Russia, noting that other regional relationships would
be more effective if pursued through a subject-specific task force
structure, and requested U.S. support in pursuing such an approach
with Pakistan (which Kerlikowske agreed to convey to FBI Director
Mueller). He also commented on recent raids against hawalas
(reftel). End Summary.
MAJOR CRIMES TASK FORCE
------------------------
¶2. (C) Minister Atmar expressed satisfaction with progress on the
Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), observing that it was slowly emerging
as a key law enforcement institution in Afghanistan and that he was
working with the FBI as well as the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA) to accelerate progress. While good progress had been made on
the MCTF Corruption and Kidnapping Units, not as much progress had
been made on specific kidnapping cases, which require better
intelligence assets than the Afghan government currently possesses.
POLICE: LOOKING FOR TRAINING ABROAD, INCLUDING IN JORDAN
------- --------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C) Turning to the Afghan National Police (ANP), Atmar sought help
from international partners to train a new generation of police
leaders (and noted he planned to raise this issue with FBI Director
Mueller during his upcoming visit in late February). Since the
maximum annual training capacity in Afghanistan was about 30,000
trainees, and there was a need to train 50,000 per year to meet
expansion targets and offset attrition, Atmar expressed that hope
that U.S. and European officials could train 12-15,000 officers per
year outside of Afghanistan. As the U.S. had constructed a big
facility for police training in Jordan, which he had heard was
under-utilized, he thought it would make a good site for ANP training
and especially for officer candidate training. The opportunity to
study abroad would boost the appeal for ANP recruits, while training
in safer Jordan would make it easier for the Europeans to provide
trainers. EUPOL, he noted, had missed its trainer targets for the
past two years due to the reluctance of European police trainers to
come to Afghanistan.
¶4. (C) Noting that he had sought Ambassador Holbrooke's help in
lining up the Jordan facility, Atmar expressed hope that the ANP
would hope to obtain rights to use the facility free of charge, with
international donors providing meals and incidental expenses to the
Afghan trainees with NATO transporting the trainees. The Minister
said he planned to raise this proposal at the NATO Summit in
Istanbul. He said he also hoped the UAE might contribute to paying
expenses.
DEVELOPING THE COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE
--------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Minister Atmar expressed his commitment to strengthening the
Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), especially in the
area of intelligence, adding that he had recently authorized its
expansion. He said the CNPA Counter-narcotics Training Academy was
one of our best training facilities. Atmar characterized the CNPA
as having three tiers: the top end, where vetted units developed by
DEA (our most trustworthy partner) and SOCA were doing a great job;
the eradication force, which Atmar said planned to expand despite the
termination of the U.S. Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) program (We
need to keep that force to demonstrate that we are serious); and the
CNPA officers on the ground, responsible for investigating narcotics
cases, which faced the greatest challenges, especially in the area of
intelligence. Ambassador Wayne noted that DEA and INL were working
with DoD's Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
(CSTC-A)on how to build capacity within the CNPA, including: using
some of the personnel from the former PEF, working with the vetted
National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and providing more training. Atmar
welcomed this, commenting that his goal was to obtain enough
resources to establish a functioning CNPA presence in all of
KABUL 00000628 002 OF 002
Afghanistan's 365 districts. To that end, he had already allocated
several hundred more tashkiel (approved personnel register) slots to
the CNPA, adding that 95 percent of CNPA positions were filled.
Noting that the drug mafia needs to know the police are after them,
he observed that while production was concentrated in the South,
trafficking continued to be a problem even in the North that had
largely beat back poppy cultivation.
REGIONAL RELATIONS - MOVING TO A TASK FORCE BASED APPROACH
------------------ -------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Noting that his next stop would be Moscow, Director
Kerlikowske asked if there were any areas of cooperation he might
suggest to the Russians. Atmar responded that Russia had offered to
provide training, and while there was initially some Afghan
resistance, he was prepared to expand that, although I don't want to
send everyone to Moscow. He said it is essential to maintain a
relationship with Russian law enforcement to foster regional
cooperation on narcotics and weapons trafficking, particularly with
the Central Asian republics. Regional cooperation has been
unsuccessful over the last eight years because of the inadequacy of
institutional arrangements, not because of the lack of political
will. He expressed the desire to form working level joint task
forces with Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, to look
at issues like trade/smuggling, weapons and narcotics.
¶7. (C) Minister Atmar also commented on the difficulty of working
with the Iranians and Pakistanis. Iran's support for insurgents has
made cooperation difficult, and Atmar had encountered resistance from
the Afghan Border Police to working with their Iranian counterparts
because they resent Iran's support for insurgents. With Pakistan,
Atmar had had limited success in establishing a joint task force, as
agreed with FBI Director Mueller and GOP Minister Malik. The key to
progress on these issues would be to move them from normal diplomatic
channels to police-centered task forces, away from the bureaucracy,
he argued. Atmar said he would appreciate U.S. assistance in
establishing such an approach; Kerlikowske pledged to discuss this
with Director Mueller in Washington.
¶8. (C) Director Kerlikowske asked whether Interpol had a role to play
in addressing these issues. Atmar responded that it should, for
example, on drugs, money-laundering, threat finance, and
counter-terrorism. DEA had told him that people were smuggling
thirty million dollars a week through Kabul Airport, so Interpol had
a key role in determining where that money was going (with Afghan law
enforcement entities responsible for identifying where it came from).
Another useful role for Interpol would be to arrange the deportation
of criminals with outstanding arrest warrants who were working
against Afghanistan in Quetta and Karachi, he stated.
¶9. (C) Atmar and Wayne also discussed recent threat finance
enforcement actions, and next steps (septel).
¶10. (SBU) This message has been cleared by ONDCP Director Kerlikowske.
EIKENBERRY