

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE418, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENROUTE TO YES ON MOST
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09THEHAGUE418.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE418 | 2009-07-13 15:03 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXRO5914
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0418/01 1941545
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131545Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3025
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2825
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0407
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2229
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000418
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENROUTE TO YES ON MOST
"ASKS" POST-2010
REF: A. 09 THE HAGUE 0268
¶B. 09 THE HAGUE 02...
216367,7/13/2009 15:45,09THEHAGUE418,"Embassy The Hague",
SECRET,09SECSTATE31102|09THEHAGUE238|09THEHAGUE268|09THEHAGUE78|09THEHAGUE9
2,"VZCZCXRO5914
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0418/01 1941545
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131545Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3025
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2825
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0407
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2229
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03
THE HAGUE 000418
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENROUTE TO YES ON MOST
""ASKS"" POST-2010
REF: A. 09 THE HAGUE 0268
¶B. 09 THE HAGUE 0238
¶C. 09 THE HAGUE 0092
¶D. 09 THE HAGUE 0078
¶E. 09 SECSTATE 31102
Classified By: Politcial-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (U) This cable follows up on post's ""Netherlands
/Afghanistan: Getting to YES post-2010"" (reftel C).
¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Dutch consensus-based political
process for post-2010 commitments in Afghanistan remains on
track for a Cabinet decision in the fall followed by a
parliamentary review in late 2009 or early 2010. We
understand Labor Party (PvdA) leader/Deputy PM/Finance
Minister Wouter Bos is the only cabinet member not in
agreement with the details of a continued role in
Afghanistan. The Dutch consider this an internal decision;
overt lobbying will likely provoke greater resistance to our
desired goal. Therefore, discreet, coordinated engagement is
necessary to assist committed Dutch leaders in gaining
consensus from Bos and later approval by
Parliament. END SUMMARY.
----------
The Stakes
----------
¶3. (S/NF) Prime Minister Balkenende (Christian Democrats -
CDA), Foreign Minister Verhagen (CDA) and Defense Minister
van Middelkoop (Christian Union - CU) reportedly agree the
Dutch should support most of the ""Afghanistan Asks"" (reftel
E). Specifically they want to retain the Provisional
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan with a force protection
of up to 500 personnel, and provide F-16's, intelligence
assets, airlift and attack helicopters, military trainers and
mentors, police mentors, medical units, special operations
forces, support for counter-narcotics initiatives,
agricultural development, and increased support for
governance and development programs. Bos, however, is highly
skeptical and he has failed to tip his hand as to his actual
position yet. We understand he may be supportive of most
""asks"" except the PRT and helicopter assets.
-------------------
The Critical Player
-------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Verhagen recently expressed great concern about the
Labor Party and specifically Bos, who continues to balk at
the Dutch presence in Afghanistan, particularly in Uruzgan
post-2010. Privately, Verhagen stated the Labor Party could
support ""staying in Afghanistan in some roles but not
continue in Uruzgan."" This contrasts with confidential
comments from the Labor Party defense spokesperson, MP
Angelien Eijsink, who favored continuing the PRT in Uruzgan
because of the investments to date in time, effort, funds and
lives. Additionally, she stated that as a member of NATO the
Dutch have a commitment to remain a viable part of the
mission. However, for the Labor Party to support continuing
with the PRT in Uruzgan, she said there must be a clear
understanding and commitment that the mission is solely
dedicated to ""stabilization and reconstruction.""
¶5. (S/NF) The poor showing of the Labor Party in the June
European Parliament elections (dropping from 23.7% of the
vote in 2004 to 12%, its all time lowest vote percentage in
any election) has put Bos under pressure from the rank and
Qany election) has put Bos under pressure from the rank and
file supporters, who generally oppose the military mission in
Afghanistan. His leadership of the party is questioned
regularly in the press - Labor Party faithful complain Bos
gave in on authorizing the purchase of a JSF test aircraft
earlier this year even in this difficult economic environment
and they are concerned the party leadership will support
raising the retirement age in Cabinet deliberations this
autumn. Still, as the party leader, he is key to the future
of the Dutch engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2010.
THE HAGUE 00000418 002 OF 003
--------------------
Engagement Strategy
--------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Our outreach plan and talking points detailed in
reftel C remain the basis for our engagement with the Dutch:
- We appreciate the long-standing and significant
contribution in Afghanistan, specifically in Uruzgan, that
the Dutch have made.
- The Dutch are a valued partner in NATO's efforts to address
a common threat in a dangerous region.
- While it is an internal decision by the Dutch whether they
will stay in Afghanistan, we hope they will continue with
other NATO allies and other countries in ISAF as it
implements its new strategy.
- We hope the Dutch will continue their stability and
development efforts in Uruzgan to build upon the considerable
Dutch achievements there.
¶7. (S/NF) Bos, as Finance Minister and party leader, does not
deal directly with Afghanistan on a regular basis. Bos is
extremely skeptical of any discussion on this subject by U.S.
officials. He considers any discussion about post-2010
Afghanistan engagement to be an internal Dutch political
decision. Reportedly, Bos ""was not surprised"" but ""not
pleased"" when Afghanistan was brought up in his June 29
meeting with Secretary Geithner. He argued the Netherlands
was a small country which had already been doing its fair
share in Afghanistan. He also suggested other, bigger
countries were not pulling their weight.
¶8. (S/NF) Success in getting the Dutch to keep their PRT in
Uruzgan will hinge upon the Labor Party's recognition that
the Uruzgan mission is developmental in nature and sustained
commitment is needed to ensure the success of their
peacebuilding and development investments there. The Labor
Party could also be influenced by how much other countries
are ""stepping up to the plate"" in support of ISAF's new
strategy.
¶9. (SBU) The Cabinet has started its summer break, until
mid-August. When it returns, it will focus on the budget
which must be agreed on and presented to Parliament by
September 15 (Prinsjesdag). Since Bos is Finance Minister,
he will be pre-occupied until then.
¶10. (S/NF) MFA Deputy Director General Robert de Groot
discussed a plan with POLMILOFF on July 2 for engaging Bos in
forums considered to be ""inclusive"" - to avoid the appearance
of outside pressure. He suggested a cascade of
visits/forums/meetings involving USNATO Ambassador Daalder,
SRAP Ambassador Holbrooke, and perhaps UN Special
Representative Kai Eide. Obviously, we will take our cue
from the discussions PM Balkenende has with the President in
Washington July 14. After that, we suggest using the
courtesy call on Bos by the new U.S. Ambassador to the
Netherlands (whenever confirmed and credentials presented) to
find out what his concerns are, with an offer to put Bos in
contact with those senior U.S. officials who can respond to
them. We anticipate having USNATO Ambassador Daalder give a
public address on the new NATO strategy in Afghanistan in the
autumn. General Petraeus, CENTCOM Commander, is planning to
visit the Netherlands in mid/late September to participate in
commemoration activities for WW II 65th anniversary
Qcommemoration activities for WW II 65th anniversary
liberation events. We hope to have him speak to a small
group of parliamentarians, if his schedule permits. Likely
at the invitation of FM Verhagen or Development Cooperation
Minister Koenders (both of whom he has met), SRAP Ambassador
Holbrooke could then follow up with a visit and talk
effectively about the new strategy, the importance of Dutch
3D efforts in Uruzgan and the contributions other countries
are making.
¶11. (S/NF) We continue to be on the lookout for opportunities
to engage with decision makers locally as well as having
Washington leaders meet with senior Dutch officials.
Furthermore, we continue to engage other members of the Labor
Party who may be able to exert influence on Bos in the run-up
to the cabinet decision. Development Cooperation Minister
THE HAGUE 00000418 003 OF 003
Koenders, Defense Spokesperson Eijsink, Floor Leader Mariette
Hammer, and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson MP Martijn van Dam
to name a few. It will take teamwork and coordinated
engagement with the Dutch at all levels to ultimately obtain
their commitment post-2010.
FOSTER