

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AU
AORC
AF
AM
AFIN
AEMR
AR
ASIG
AMGT
AG
APER
AL
ABLD
ASUP
AA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AE
AMED
AS
AGMT
APECO
AO
AFFAIRS
AJ
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
ADCO
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
AID
AC
AVERY
APCS
CASC
CJAN
CVIS
CS
COUNTER
CD
CU
CI
CO
CG
CE
CA
CMGT
CH
CWC
CBW
CKGR
CR
CN
CPAS
CONS
CDG
CLINTON
CT
CJUS
CY
CV
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
CM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CF
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
COM
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EAIR
EAID
ET
EFIS
ENRG
EPET
ETTC
ER
EG
EINV
EAGR
ELAB
EUN
EWWT
ENGR
EMIN
ECIN
ENIV
ES
EC
ECPS
EIND
EI
EU
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELTN
EZ
EINT
ELN
EUR
EUNCH
EN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
ENNP
ECUN
EXTERNAL
EK
EFINECONCS
ECINECONCS
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ENVR
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IR
IZ
IWC
IC
ILC
IO
IAEA
IN
IS
IT
ICRC
INTELSAT
ILO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IMO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ITRA
ISRAELI
ICJ
IACI
INTERPOL
ID
IV
ICTY
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
IA
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KE
KCRM
KDRG
KIPR
KCOR
KSCA
KBIO
KDEM
KMCA
KMPI
KNNP
KJUS
KOMC
KGHG
KSUM
KSTC
KIRF
KTIP
KWMN
KZ
KG
KTFN
KHLS
KPAO
KFRD
KTIA
KOLY
KCFE
KISL
KFLU
KPKO
KWBG
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KUNR
KAWK
KICC
KPAL
KSTH
KN
KS
KGIC
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KBCT
KIDE
KFLO
KWMNCS
KSEP
KU
KNEI
KVPR
KACT
KRAD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCIP
KSAF
KV
KSPR
KPRP
KFSC
KCRS
KR
KRFD
KX
KO
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KHIV
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KLIG
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
KCFC
KREC
KOMS
KWWMN
MASS
MP
MARR
MOPS
MNUC
MX
MO
MCAP
MY
ML
MU
MIL
MC
MTRE
MA
MD
MTCRE
MEPI
MAR
MRCRE
MR
MV
MPOS
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OVIP
OREP
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPDC
OPRC
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OAS
OFDP
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PREL
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PINR
PINS
PARMS
PARM
PHSA
PA
PK
PBTS
PO
PREF
POL
PLN
POLITICS
PROP
PL
PM
PAO
PSI
PG
PEPR
POV
PALESTINIAN
PINT
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINF
PEL
SNAR
SO
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SP
SC
SA
SMIG
SAN
SZ
SW
SN
SY
SR
SL
SEVN
SF
SYR
SI
SG
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TERRORISM
TRGY
TZ
TX
TBIO
TSPA
TS
TSPL
TW
TU
TD
TIP
TURKEY
TP
TI
TC
TPHY
TH
TO
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TT
UG
UK
UP
UNGA
UNHRC
UZ
UN
UNAUS
USTR
UNSC
US
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UNHCR
UAE
UNMIK
USEU
UV
UNO
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
UNDC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 03COLOMBO189, INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER ON SRI LANKA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03COLOMBO189.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
03COLOMBO189 | 2003-02-03 09:09 | 2011-03-20 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Colombo |
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1554016.ece |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000189
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, D, SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL; NSC
FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR PARM CE IN ECONOMICS LTTE
SUBJECT: INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER ON SRI LANKA
Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ASHLEY WILLS. REASONS 1.5 B, D.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: I met for one hour today (2/3) with Indian High Commissioner Nirupam Sen concerning the current state of peace talks in Sri Lanka. To my surprise, we agreed completely on our analysis of the situation (the trend is not positive); on the reasons why (LTTE aggressiveness, cohabitation tensions, the economy and Muslim agitation in the east); and on the need for close Indo-US consultation and cooperation re Sri Lanka. And we came close to agreeing on what should be done to improve matters. We both think the LTTE needs to be told that it must accept phased demobilization of its military; in this regard, a crucial first step would be acceptance by the Tigers of international supervision of their long-range weapons on the Jaffna Peninsula. But whereas Sen believes the government should abandon its economic liberalization in the short run, focusing instead on poverty alleviation and populist measures to curb the cost of living, I believe we should keep the pressure on the GSL to push ahead with reform. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) I called on High Commissioner Sen at the Indian High Commission. I wanted to see how his and our assessments of current conditions in Sri Lanka compare. It turns out we agree completely on our analysis. Sri Lanka's attempt at peace has gone surprisingly well to this point but the sprint-like pace of progress will now slow to a mosey. This slowdown traces to four factors, any one of which by itself could undo the progress made thusfar.
The Tigers
¶3. (C) The biggest danger remains the Tigers. While Sen and I agree that the Tigers have given up their push for an independent Eelam, a de jure state, they want it de facto. This explains their aggressiveness in establishing courts, police forces, ""civilian"" LTTE authority in Sri Lanka's east and their unwillingness to consider disarming or demobilizing until a final peace deal is signed. Tiger aggressivness also traces to their sensing weakness in the south; they trust PM Wickremesinghe still but they worry that his government might not last. If he does fall, they want to get themselves into the best position they can geopolitically in the northeast. And if he doesn't fall and the peace talks proceed eventually to a negotiated settlement, the Tigers hope they will be in a strong enough position to insist upon the maximal devolution of power to the northeastern entity they expect to dominate. (Sen also agreed with our Embassy's ""sloppy scenario"", in which a final peace deal ultimately subverts the Tigers but he, like we, thinks there is much work to be done, and much luck needed, to reach that happy moment.)
Cohabitation
¶4. (C) Sen is convinced, and I now tend to agree, that the President can be expected to do whatever she can to unseat Ranil in the months ahead. If that means doing a deal with the extreme left JVP, so be it. If it means staging demonstrations over the rising cost of living or on privatization, so be it. She will only prorogue Parliament and go for a general election when she is convinced she can win, but in the meantime she can unsettle the south by any of several covert means while professing publicly to be for peace.
The Economy
¶5. (C) Ranil has long acknowledged that the attempt at peace must be accompanied by rapid economic growth. And so far, it has not happened. There was growth in 2002, his first year in power, but not enough to create a sense of well-being country-wide. The President, the JVP and others in the opposition will seize on this issue to put the PM on the defensive and divert his attention away from the peace talks.
Muslims
¶6. (C) Sen presented me with a chart indicating linkages between Muslim groups, mainly in Sri Lanka's east, and Pakistan's ISI. This does not consitute proof, of course, but we on our own have noted growing radicalism among Muslims in the east. This may well be partly because of money coming in from Pakistan and elsewhere in west Asia, but I am convinced an equally important factor is LTTE stupidity in pushing its aggressive agenda in Muslim areas. Meanwhile, the elected leaders of Sri Lanka's Muslims have been too busy vying for power to bother with genuine efforts to improve conditions for their constituents, much less think imaginatively about how Muslim interests could be protected in a final peace deal.
What Can Be Done to Improve the Odds
¶7. (C) Dispensing with any pretense at modesty, Sen and I agreed that India and the US are the two countries that matter most to the GSL and the LTTE. So it is very important that we consult and cooperate closely on Sri Lanka. We both thought the visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Sibal to Washington this week could be a good occasion for the two sides to dwell on Sri Lanka.
¶8. (C) As for specific steps, we reckoned that a positive move by the LTTE on its weapons could have a dramatically positive impact on southern politics and cohabitation. In particular, Sen and I thought it high time for the Tigers to acknowledge publicly that they must begin a phased disarmament and demobilization of their military. If they are truly committed to a peaceful, negotiated outcome, then this should not be too much to expect of them. Full disarmament and demobliziation can await a final deal, but the iterative process should begin now. In this regard, a first step that would be much admired would be their accepting international supervision, presumably through the Scandinavian-staffed Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, of their long-range weapons on the Jaffna Peninsula. (I did not mention to Sen the Deputy Secretary's scheduled speech on Sri Lanka on February 14, but this might present a good opportunity for the US to call for such a move by the LTTE.)
¶9. (C) On cohabitation, we felt that both India and the US, and every other interested external party, should continue to use every meeting with both the President and the PM to emphasize the importance of a southern consensus on peace. The President, in particular, should have no doubts about how her attempts at destabilizing Ranil would be viewed by Sri Lanka's friends. It probably won't deter her, we calculated, but we should be clear with her anyway.
¶10. (C) Where Sen and I disagreed concerned the economy. He understandably worries that continued free-market reforms, which will lead to temporary unemployment and certain price increases, will give the President, the extreme left JVP and others in the opposition convenient pretexts for agitating against Ranil's government. This agitation could at least distract the GSL from pursuing peace and at most precipitate the government's fall, Sen fears. So he believes the government should abandon liberalization, ""at least for three to six months"", and pursue poverty alleviation and populist measures aimed at curbing the rise in the cost of living and creating employment.
¶11. (C) I share his concern but not his remedy. By septel, we will be reporting a conversation I had with Minister Milinda Moragoda this weekend in which he asks for our help in improving the terms of the IMF's planned Poverty Reduction/Growth Program for Sri Lanka. While I think we should urge the IMF to be generous in its PRG loan for Sri Lanka, I believe we must continue to insist on reforms that have the best chance of growing the country's economy. Sen's proposal is a quick, budget-busting fix; liberalization will take longer but it is only through further opening of the Sri Lankan economy that big amounts of foreign direct investment can be attracted. With the government's finances already severely constrained, the only possible source of funds for growth is FDI.
Comment
¶12. (C) Sen is an old-school, Nehruvian Indian diplomat, a Bengali leftist for whom anti-Americanism must be instinctive. But his country has changed and so too has his own attitude. We were so much in accord that it was a little surreal.
¶13. (C) But it is in any case welcome that we and India assess Sri Lanka the same. In the weeks coming, I hope we can come to terms with the GOI concerning how we can jointly or, more likely, separately exert constructive influence on the parties involved in the Sri Lankan peace attempt.
WILLS