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Jung's Theory of Dream and the Relational Debate

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The author refers to a roundtable discussion (*Psychoanalytic Dialogues* 10/1, 2000) of dreams to which a Jungian colleague was invited to contribute, along with non-Jungian analysts. The author outlines how in some aspects of Jung's theory the fulfillment of individuality is achieved throughout the relationship; in other aspects, fulfilment seems to be achieved because it is prewired in the individual himself. The author points out that, although Jung himself subscribed to various theoretical concepts, some one-person and others two-person, Jung's clinical stance was almost always relational. If we accept the paradigmatic switch that relational authors refer to, some nonrelational aspects of Jung's theory of dreams are superseded.

In the many-faceted and multifarious culture we live in today, we can no longer justify the concept of a single, absolute truth separate from its context. We are constantly obliged to compare the various psychoanalytic schools (or perhaps it would be preferable to say "traditions").[1] The purpose of the comparison is certainly not to foster a sort of confused eclecticism, but rather to favor a real dialogue under the conviction that every point of view considered, provided it shares certain basic assumptions with the others, enriches a discourse and exploration of psychical reality.

Much time has elapsed since the breach between Freud and Jung when Jung's (1912) *Libido* was published. Freudians today are no longer so closely united around their founder as they were at that time, when every theoretical divergence became a major schism with a backlash

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[1] Mitchell and Aron (1999) used the word *tradition* to point out their common background.

that tended to strengthen orthodoxy. Drive theory is no longer as a shibboleth that reveals the lack of orthodoxy of the unfortunate psychoanalyst who might come under scrutiny for daring to cast doubt on the "mythology of the drives." There are now so many theories that to a careful observer, like Mitchell (1988, 1997) for example, it is evident that none can have total hegemony. In this cultural climate post-Jungian psychoanalysis must also compare itself with the other post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories.

In this changed context, that some Jungian colleagues were invited to contribute to two issues of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* is particularly significant.[2] In one issue, Jungian analysts were asked to respond to a number of important questions for the present debate in psychoanalysis. In a previous issue, a Jungian analyst had commented on three dreams from a case study presented by a non-Jungian colleague (Ipp, 2000) as part of a virtual roundtable with other psycho-analytic colleagues, facilitating a dialogue among different schools of psychoanalysis.

These two issues of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* are a starting point for some of my thoughts on Jungian psychoanalysis and its possible points of contact with contemporary psychoanalysis. I focus, in particular, on Jung's dream theory and dream theory within contemporary psychoanalysis as reformulated by James Fosshage. I posit that there are many points of contact between them, even if some points are less compatible than others.

Some General Reflections

Among the many questions posed by Fosshage and his collaborator, Davies (2000), one particularly interests me. "Are there parallels between changes occurring within analytical psychology and those within psychoanalysis?" (p. 378). Two sets of reasons explain why there has not been in analytical psychology as strong a revolution as the one that has challenged psychoanalysis in these last 20 years. Jungian theory has never been as systematic and compact as Freudian theory. Jungian analysts have always had to come to terms with an extremely fluid system; they have always had difficulty identifying the changes that have taken place within this theoretical corpus. In the course of

[2] While I was writing this article, a Jungian journal (*Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 2002) also published articles by some psychoanalysts

his work, Jung never openly renounced previous conceptions that were in contrast with later proposals, particularly the difficult concept of archetype, defined both as a primordial image (Jung, 1921) and as a structuring form, almost an ethological pattern of behavior and mental functioning (Jung, 1918). Moreover, Jung, always extremely distrustful of theories, always considered them not for their possible truth value but as tools that might be useful on certain occasions (according to a Jamesian pragmatic criterion)—"theories are not articles of faith, they are either instruments of knowledge and of therapy or they are not good at all" (Jung, 1945, p. 88). Jung claimed that Freudian concepts could be used profitably even by a Jungian analyst (even if, in fact, the clinical examples that he left us were always presented according to a well-defined Jungian approach).

While, on one hand, this epistemological position was extremely modern in its perspectival and antipositivistic structure, it also had its drawbacks. One result of Jung's approach was to make his disciples justify their use of psychoanalytic concepts as deriving from diverse schools without having to examine seriously their theoretical underpinnings or trying to make the theories consistent. In fact, many Jungian analysts continue to use theoretical elements deriving from psychoanalysis (theories of Klein, Winnicott, Kohut, Searles, etc.). They embed them within the extremely heterogeneous structure that is analytical psychology, without eliciting a strong, significant reexamination of the Jungian legacy. (Concepts of other schools are generally presented as extensions of intuitions or concepts not fully expressed but as nevertheless already present in Jung's thought.)

In addition, let us remember that Jungian psychology originated in opposition to Freudian psychoanalysis and at its inception had already taken some steps in a revolutionary direction. In fact, Jung split from Freud not only because of sexual drive theory, as is often claimed, but because of many other theoretical and epistemological reasons. I will develop these reasons later, but let me give you, right away, some examples of the fundamental shift from classical psychoanalysis to Jungian psychology: from drive to self-realization; from reductionism to phenomenological attitude; from causality to purpose and meaning; from a sharp division between conscious and unconscious to an ongoing, more dynamic conscious–unconscious system; from analytical neutrality to the inevitability of the analyst's subjectivity.

There have been no radical changes within analytical psychology comparable to the innovation and theoretical debate that have taken

place within psychoanalysis. We could summarize this debate as relational psychoanalysis versus classical drives theory (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000).

Does Analytical Psychology Contain a Two-Person Conception of Therapy and Development?

We can pose for analytical psychology two fundamental questions that Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) have already posed for other psychoanalytic theories: (1) What is the main goal and motivation behind human action? (2) Does analytical psychology contain a two-person or a one-person conception of therapy and of development?

The first question is easy to answer. The main motivation for human action postulated by Jung is a striving for self-realization, presupposing an innate capacity for the self-regulation of the psychic apparatus analogous to that which has been called "self-righting" by Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage (1996). This commonality contributes to the indubitable affinities that can be seen between certain aspects of analytical psychology and self psychology (Jacoby, 1990; Fosshage, 2000). This "individualizing" motivation, as presented by Jung, has received some confirmation in empirical research (Lichtenberg, 1983; Stern, 1985, 1995) and is in harmony with some post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories, for example, those of Guntrip (1961), Kohut (1984), and Winnicott (1989). In the past, the Jungian hypothesis of a fundamental motivation toward the development of the self was in sharp contrast with classical Freudian theory, which hypothesized sex and aggression as primary drives in conflict with the environment (Giannoni, 1999). Today this theoretical aspect of Jungian psychology not only does not prevent a dialogue with contemporary psychoanalysis, but rather facilitates it, especially with self-psychology (Giannoni, 2003).

The second question, whether analytical psychology adopts a one-person or a two-person conception of the development and therapy, is a more difficult and controversial one. In many writings Jung (1931, 1935a, 1946) stated that therapy is certainly interactive and that the involvement of the analyst is indispensable. The concept of "psychic contagion" is presented as prerequisite to any real change in the patient, and the psychotherapeutic relationship is compared to the

combination of two chemical substances that are irremediably altered when combined, giving rise to a new compound. This metaphor is perhaps not far from the concept of interpersonal relationship expressed by Goethe (1809) in *Elective Affinities*. (Goethe was one of Jung's favorite authors, one with whom he himself felt a special affinity.) It is interesting to quote Jung himself when he claims that psychotherapy is a two-person matter: "In the treatment there is an encounter between two irrational factors, that it is to say, between two persons who are not fixed and determinable quantities but who bring with them, beside their more or less clearly defined fields of consciousness, an indefinitely extended sphere of non-consciousness" (Jung, 1931, p. 71). So we draw the conclusion that transference is viewed by Jung not as an intrapsychically generated phenomenon, but as contributed to by both analyst and patient.

Alongside this two-person aspect of Jung's idea of transference we find a markedly one-person theoretical conception of the development. Jung's theory of development, called individuation, states that a person develops his own individuality according to a predetermined plan within himself and without any particular environment responsiveness (Jacoby, 1990; Fosshage, 2002); Jung (1943) said: "The meaning and purpose of the process is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, potential wholeness" (p. 110). We can answer the second question by asserting that both options (two-person and one-person) are present in Jung. Moreover, Jung's theory of development contains many one-person elements, whereas his clinical practice is more relational (Giannoni, 2000)—this gap between theory and clinical practice warrants further investigation.

Barbara's Dream: Two Very Different Interpretations and the Relational Debate

Barbara's dream was as follows:

> Dan [my husband] and I were at the club dancing around the fountain downstairs. I had cooked dinner for my friends Sara and Jacques—he's a French chef. I had made a big white fish and felt proud of my efforts. When we sat down to eat, Jacques announced the fish was still frozen in the middle. I was so

> embarrassed. I wanted to take it from him and put it in the microwave and nuke it. Instead, I just stood there wanting to disappear—wishing I was invisible . . . like I often felt when I was a child [Ipp, 2000, p. 94].

Jungian analyst Michael Vannoy Adams (2000) begins by outlining Jungian dream theory, with an emphasis on the compensating aspect of ego consciousness in the service of the development of the dreamer's individuality. However, when he proceeds actually to interpret the dream, he states that he does not want to know anything about the history of the patient, her associations, or the development of the case, so that he can make what he calls "a blind phenomenological experiment" (p 131). Convinced that the images of the dream speak for themselves (as if they had no need to be placed in relation with the conscious mind of the dreamer in order to have meaning), he interprets the patient's dreams without any associations. The dream is seen as representing the relationship between the ego and the other parts of the personality of the dreamer without any reference to the actual people with whom the patient has relationships. The French chef represents an aspect of Barbara's unconscious that would like to help her. Barbara cooks the fish badly and it is still frozen inside, but her ego is unable to take the French chef's suggestions for cooking the fish; "the ego reacts with borderline anger and aggression . . . produces an explosive chain reaction"(p. 133) after which she tries to get out of the situation defensively by disappearing. Adams believes that the patient's pathology derived from the ego's inability to understand what the unconscious is suggesting through the dream.

The clinical improvement expressed in the dreams that follow is attributed not to the therapeutic interaction but to the fact that the ego has become able to listen to and integrate what the unconscious had to say through dreams. In no way are the dreams connected to the patient's waking life or to the analytic relationship. They represent the development of a predetermined process that the analyst tries not to disturb but rather to foster by, as Adams expressly suggests, listening and not interfering. This clearly appears to be a nonrelational way of carrying out interpretation and therapy in general.

Fosshage (1983, 1987, 1988, 1997; Fosshage and Loew, 1987) has done a lot of research on dreams. His work is "required reading" for anyone who wants to study the subject. Although it would be impossible to summarize his studies in this area in such a brief space

without doing them an injustice, a couple of his thoughts expressed in the article in *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* (Fosshage, 2000) are useful in this context. First of all, I would like to indicate something about Fosshage's method. While remaining very much within the realm of clinical practice, he also makes liberal use of empirical research (in cognitive psychology and neurophysiology).

For Fosshage, psychoanalysis cannot be a completely self-contained theoretical and practical corpus disconnected from other disciplines. He firmly rejects the Freudian tradition that sees dreams and dreaming as regressive. He gives to dream mentation the same dignity as to waking mentation. We could even say that primary-process mode and the secondary-process mode are two ways of thinking, of "processing information," as Fosshage (2000) likes to put it, that are indispensable both for the maintenance and for the development of the sense of self. Variously during waking life, the primary-process mode tends to recede to the background while the secondary-process mode tends to come to the fore; during dreams, the primary-process mode is in the forefront and the secondary-process mode recedes, although it remains present (especially in non-REM dreams). This spatial metaphor of foreground and background, which has been so useful in relational psychoanalysis to describe other psychological phenomena, works equally well in this context. This concept can be found in Jung's (1952a) chapter "Symbol of Transformation," in which, contradicting Freud, he gives full dignity to *phantasieren* (imaginative-thinking) as a creative mental activity indispensable in maintaining psychological equilibrium.

For Fosshage, the two functions of waking and dreaming are complementary. In a footnote Fosshage (2000) gives Jung credit for having introduced this idea, but separates himself from Jung's overevaluation of the unconscious. Just as primary-process is complementary to secondary-process, so is the dream complementary to the consciousness of the dreamer, conceived by Fosshage as within an open system that includes, first of all, the analyst. Both patient and analyst will find in the dream a fertile terrain to nourish the relationship in its deepest sense. The dream moves the accent onto themes of the patient's inner life that would otherwise be accessible only with great difficulty. The dream is therefore an experience that expresses itself in affect-laden images, and the primary task of the analyst is to confirm it as such, broaden it, and make it even more meaningful. The dream is, moreover, an exceptional occasion for the patient to feel that some aspects of his unknown unconscious

subjectivity are understood. In this situation it is as if the tool of empathy were extended and could be more effective.

What does Fosshage have to say about Barbara's dream? First, Fosshage establishes a relationship between the dream and what happens in analysis. As mentioned, for Fosshage waking mentation and dream mentation are two sides of the same coin. He states that the dream of the club came when Barbara was freeing herself from her fears of being criticized and looked down on by her analyst. The first part of the dream, when Barbara, full of vitality, is dancing with Dan, also corresponds to the impression that the analyst had of the more joyful atmosphere that was beginning to develop in the sessions. On the other hand, the dream presents Dan and the relationship between Barbara and Dan as certainly better than they actually were; these images could be the beginning Barbara had of herself in the dream.

Fosshage also says that he would have tried to share and reinforce the emotional experience that Barbara had of herself in the dream. In fact, a dream may be a new psychological organization that is experienced by the dreamer but that, like other self-experience, needs to be validated by whoever in that moment acts as the self-object (in this case the analyst). When, on the other hand, Barbara feels criticized in her dream by the French chef, Fosshage hypothesizes that early negative experiences of humiliation and contempt were activated—using the language of Atwood and Stolorow (1984), we could say that early organizing principles resurface. From this point of view, even the frozen fish could be Barbara's old way of freezing her own emotional world to preserve her self-organization in the face of humiliating and disconfirming experiences.

The dream theory reformulated by psychoanalyst Fosshage is very close to that of Jung—Fosshage's background, as he himself states (Fosshage, 2002), is in some ways Jungian. So Fosshage's interpretation of Barbara's dream might be shared by many Jungian analysts, even though it is very different from that of Adams (2000). Why is Fosshage's interpretation so different from that of Adams if Fosshage shares so many aspects of Jung's dream theory? An exposition of Jung's dream theory may answer this question. Such an exposition as that which follows demonstrate that there are two different kinds of conception in Jung's theory of dreams, one that is one-person, and the other, two-person.

As we know, Jung rejected the distinction made by Freud (1900) between manifest and latent content. According to Jung (1934), the

dream expresses its possible meaning in the best possible way, one analogous to the proposition in contemporary psychoanalysis that "the message contains the message" (Lichtenberg et al., 1996). Dream images, according to Jung, do not refer to a specific latent content covered up by the "dream work" (Freud, 1900). For Jung (1921), the images of dreams are symbols and as such remain semantically undetermined. Symbols are, by their nature, an interpretative problem for consciousness, which has to give them meaning. For this very reason, the meaning of the dream can be coconstructed by the analyst and the patient, who are thus united in a relational event. According to Jung, the images of the dream have to be interpreted not only as aspects of the dreamer's inner world (subjective interpretation), but also as persons existing in the dreamer's real world (objective interpretation). Moreover, the dream is the expression of the activity of self-regulation of the psyche. Jung (1948a) claims that the dream has a compensatory function. In fact, according to Jung, when consciousness deviates too sharply from the unconscious, the dream attempts to get the person back on the track. Here we find what Lichtenberg and his colleagues (1996) call "self-righting."

Moreover, Jung (1943) often considers the unconscious as a mental activity with dignity equal to that of consciousness. The unconscious has great creativity and for this reason contributes in an essential way to the reestablishment of psychic equilibrium, once more in line with modern psychoanalytic research (Fosshage, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1997; Fosshage and Loew, 1987; Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage, 1992, 1996; Bucci, 1997; Fosshage, and Davies, 2000). This is a Jung perfectly suited to dialogue with contemporary psychoanalysis.

A clinical vignette told by Jung (1935b) is an example of how close Jung's dream interpretation and analytical attitude is to contemporary psychoanalysis. He had a young patient in therapy and, after some time, began to feel bored and even to look down on her. The analytical relationship did not progress until Jung had a dream in which the patient appeared to him as a princess, sitting on the balcony of a castle high above him so that he was obliged to straighten his neck to look up to her. The dream—Jung claimed—compensated for his feelings of contempt for the patient, who—we would like to add—probably already strongly looked down on herself. After the dream Jung felt more at ease in the relationship and told the patient about the dream. He admitted that his contempt had been wrong and the impasse was overcome: "That worked miracles, I can tell you! No trouble with the

transference any more, because I simply got right with her and met her on the right level" (p. 146).

So, although there was an analytic impasse, Jung does not blame the patient's resistance for it but examines his own subjective experience as an analyst, what he really is, with all his values and convictions. During this self-investigation, he has a dream that concerns the analytic situation. The dream serves as a psychical self-regulation (or "compensation," as Jung calls it) and enables Jung to change his own conscious point of view. After the dream, Jung's emotional attitude changes and allows him to speak openly with the patient about his contempt and to define it as a personal error (an example of "self-disclosure").

In this clinical vignette, Jung interprets his dream by referring to the real situation—the princess of the dream is the patient and not a part of Jung's inner word. The dream has a self-righting function, regulating both the dreamer (Jung) and the analytical relationship. Moreover, Jung thinks he has to change his own attitude toward the patient because he believes that the analytical impasse is not generated by the patient's unconscious, but by Jung's own wrong attitude. Evidently Jung considered the analytical process not as an unfolding of the patient's inner world, but as a real interplay between the patient's and the analyst's psychical realities. We might say that in this clinical example Jung's analytical behavior fits into a two-person psychology, or even that Jungian psychoanalysis *is* a two-person psychoanalysis. I am saying that we can perfectly place Jung's analytical behavior within a contemporary psychoanalytic framework, even if Jung did not have this theoretical frame of references.

We can now state that Fosshage's interpretation is closer to Jung, whereas Adams's is different.

Let us now examine those aspects of Jung's thought that, on the contrary, really refer to a one-person psychology. In many parts of his work, Jung theorizes a conception of the unconscious as a noun, no longer a function of the mind but an entity with its own life which knows what is best for the individual.[3] The dream compensates according to the preordained plan already contained in the

[3] Some Jungian analysts, aware of this shift in meaning, have introduced the term Guiding Self, thus differentiating it from the self of contemporary psychoanalysis (Whitmont and Perera, 1989)

unconscious, and consciousness is conceived as a part of a "relatively closed psychic system" (Jung, 1948b, p. 7) with a resultant nonrelational and acontextual reading of the theory of compensatory function (Giannoni, 2000). According to such a conception, the unconscious is endowed with the power to save the patient and for this reason must be heard by the dreamer as a *vox dei*. From this point of view, neurosis becomes a signal warning the person that he has strayed from the unconscious but can regain his health by carefully and devotedly listening to what the unconscious has to say.

The deepest layer of the unconscious is the collective unconscious, which is extraneous to the personal history of the subject, and important dreams express this psychic level. According to this concept, dream images have the capacity to speak a universal language outside space and time and as such can be understood regardless of the conscious contribution of the dreamer. The healing process would thus occur thanks to the intervention of this impersonal entity, which has many characteristics that have been attributed to the deity (Jung, 1952b). In this case, however, compensation does not act within a relational perspective; therapy is not a relational event but rather the evolution of a process that leads to the fulfillment of what was already written within the person. The analyst is not merely a partner who builds meaning together with the patient starting from semantically indeterminate material (as we saw before) but is an expert in the language of the unconscious, which at this point has a predefined meaning. The psychoanalyst helps the patient understand what the unconscious is trying to tell him. We must therefore acknowledge that there is in Jung's dream theory also an ahistorical, absolute, nonrelational, and one-person side.

In fact, we already know that Jung, when speaking about development, is often thinking in a one-person way, and dreaming is a mental function that, according to Jung, also plays a primary role in developing individuality through the dialectic conscious-unconscious. Let us have a deeper look at this paradox, which we have already encountered: Jung formulates some theoretical one-person concepts, but he also takes a two-person "stance" when illustrating clinical examples. Elsewhere (Giannoni, 2003) I have attempted to address this "knot" by pointing out the epistemological (metatheoretical) assumptions of Jung's theory.

I should say that Jung's epistemological background is, indeed, quite sophisticated and very different from Freud's. Freud, according to the

epistemological naiveté of his time, wanted to construct psychoanalysis as a natural science and coherently used a causal-explanatory reductionistic method to explain the patient as if she or he were an object. Jung, who was a very cultivated and philosophically sharp thinker, utilized the philosophical debate between "explanation from outside" (*erklaeren*) and "understanding from within" (*verstehen*) highlighted for the first time by Dilthey (1883), who made the well-known distinction between "natural sciences" and "human sciences" (*Naturewissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*).

Therefore, Jung, unlike Freud, tried to analyze his patients by using the empathic-understanding method (*verstehen*), which considers the patient as an individual always looking for meaning and purpose. In fact, the understanding method does not allow the patient to be reduced and objectified (the patient remains a subject), and thus the therapy is always an intersubjective relationship. This methodological aspect, among other theoretical differences, explains why the two analytical attitudes (Jung's and Freud's) were so distant and why Jung broke with Sigmund Freud. But Jung, like every psychologist at that time, wanted to be a scientist as well; that is why some aspects of his theory have naturalistic epistemological underpinnings (Trapanese, 1985). For example, Jung's idea of psychological development as a prewired "plan" is close to some biological developmental hypotheses of German biologists of the 19th century. ontogeny as summarizing philogeny by Ernst Haeckel (1899). Also within Jung's epistemological ground we find two different aspects: on one end, a humanistic conception of the individual as a subject, which allows and fosters a relational "stance," on the other a naturalistic conception of the mind, which is more one-person.

Concluding Remarks

According to Jung, dreams try to help the dreamer to fulfill his individuality, but in some aspects of Jung's theory this fulfillment is achieved throughout the therapeutic relationship; in other aspects the fulfillment seems to be achieved because it is prewired in the individual himself. Therefore it is possible to infer two different perspectives in Jung's theory of dreams: one-person and two-person. Adams interprets Barbara's dream by taking to radical extremes the

nonrelational perspective. From this non-relational viewpoint, the unconscious is an entity that contains within itself everything that the patient's ego needs. From this point of view, consciousness is part of a relatively closed psychic system, and therapy is not a relational event, because healing takes place when the patient is able to hear her inner unconscious voice.

Many Jungian analysts would, of course, disagree with Adams's dream interpretation (for instance, some Jungian analysts participating in the *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* roundtable reveal a real two-person analytical attitude).[4] In fact, within the Jungian school there are many analysts who are close to the relational side of Jung's psychology and therefore differ greatly from the one-person inter-pretation, such as Adams's. We do not have to wonder about this extreme diversity within the same school. From the very beginning, the Jungian movement was far from any orthodoxy. Jungian analysts have always found a strong feeling of identity in not belonging to any orthodox theory. Jung stated that he was happy to be Jung and not a Jungian (Samuels, 1985) and he had many doubts before he founded the Zurich Institute and the Jungian school. This premise determined within the Jungian school the coexistence of a wide variety of analytical approaches and multifarious theoretical ideas. Anyone who wanted to find a clear path within the heterogeneous Jungian movement encountered many difficulties. Samuels (1985) made a fundamental contribution by creating three different groups of Jungian analysts (archetypal school, classical school, developmental school) in which he put in order many theories and analytical approaches.

Going back to our main topic, we can say that Fosshage's and Adams's interpretations of the dream are extremely different and that it is not easy to find points of contact between the two. We find the same sharp difference among Jungian persuasions. In this regard, I have attempted to point out that there are in Jung himself different theoretical concepts, some of which are one-person and others two-person, even though Jung's clinical "stance" was almost always relational.

Adams's and Fosshage's interpretations have stimulated me to debate and to reflect on Jung's work and consequently distinguish

[4] See Jacoby (2000), Kalsched (2000), Samuels (2000), Sedgwick (2000), Young-Eisendrath (2000), and Zabriskie (2000)

more clearly the two different perspectives (relational and nonrelational). As is well known, scientific debate and dialogue always enlighten the theoretical framework because we become more aware of our theoretical horizons (Gadamer, 1960).

We live in an extremely complex and variegated cultural climate that does not make for easy affiliations and simple "longitudinal" loyalties. We now believe in the importance of what Mitchell (1988) called the "relational matrix." Relatedness and thinking contextually seem to have permeated all fields of humanistic learning (philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, etc.). Even empirical research seems to confirm a relational conception of the human being (Lichtenberg, 1983; Stern, 1985, 1995; Goldberg, Muir, and Kerr, 1995; Cassidy and Shaver, 1999). It is as if a new paradigm were being organized that obliges us to take a second look at all preceding theories.[5] According to this new paradigm, some nonrelational aspects of Jung's theory of dreams are superseded. They are like an old bridge with the past, when mind conceived itself as proudly self-sufficient, unconditionally independent. This theoretical point of view is, in any case, significant for it reminds us that individuality is still a major value, provided we are aware, in our analytical work, that individuality without relationship, the "isolated mind" (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992), is an artifice we have conceived of to deny our weakness and dependence as human beings.

But within this new "relational matrix" (Mitchell, 1988) will the various schools cease to exist? With the development of this universal language, will the single dialects fall away? With the coming of an international cuisine, will all our beloved regional flavors and tastes, the very existence of which remind us of variety and diversity, cease to exist?

I think not. Outside the metaphor, I think that even in this new multifarious cultural reality, not flattened by an undifferentiated homogeneity, a particular Jungian psychoanalytic identity will continue to exist among other kinds of psychoanalysis, receiving and giving stimulus and offering opportunities for debate, especially when it has been reexamined and revised.

[5] In the Jungian context, I would point out the interesting work by Mario Jacoby (1999)

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