*Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 2008, 53, 713–726

# Book reviews

Edited by Linda Carter and Marcus West

CLARK, MARGARET. *Understanding the Self-Ego Relationship in Clinical Practice: Towards Individuation*. London: Karnac / The Society of Analytical Psychology Monograph Series, 2006. Pp. vii + 117. Pbk. £9.99.

This is a truly excellent book. A little gem in the series of monographs published by Karnac for the Society of Analytical Psychology.

It is written 'primarily for the benefit of trainees on psychotherapy and psychodynamic counselling courses'. And its guiding principle is taken from Jung: 'How does one come to terms in practice with the unconscious?' (Jung 1957, p. 67). But its scope is wider than the apprentice analyst and I learned much from reading it. I had not, for instance, made the connection Clark does between Kalsched's description of the 'pre-existing images' of figures which can provide a self care system for the very damaged personality, stopping it from falling into permanent psychoses, and Rosenfeld's concept of a type of narcissism which 'often acts as an essential protector of the self' (Rosenfeld 1987, p. 105).

The writing is clear and jargon free, the expression is economical and subtle and often profound thoughts are presented modestly almost as asides which nevertheless do their work in the unconscious and return to mind. When discussing ego and self Clark succinctly summarizes contemporary neuroscientific work and writes, 'Archetypes are the psychic equivalent of what contemporary neuroscientists describe as neural pathways in our brain; we are born with these structures but it depends on our life experiences whether or not they will be activated' (p. 19). Immediately we are in the territory of the mind/brain distinction and psychosomatic symptoms which Clark brings out, underlining the fact that Jung's archetype theory has at its core the link between the physical and the psychic. Where Clark is also clear and helpful is in bringing out fundamental distinctions between Freud and Jung in their conceptualizations of the psyche. In particular the centrality of the self in the Jungian model is brought out clearly in ways which by juxtaposition and contrast deepen our understanding of the differences between Jung's model and Freud's, who gives more prominence to the ego.

Another discrete but important thread which runs through this monograph is the references to the way Jung takes us beyond the individual into realms of human behaviour which are universal, spiritual and necessary for the realization of the self. Clark's deft description (following Jung) of the archetype of the self as an organizing principle both includes Jung's conceptualization and neatly side-steps the more problematic challenges to the idea that the self can be an archetype (see Fordham 1985, p. 23), challenges which arise from Jung's often paradoxical descriptions of the self as the totality of the psyche. Having set out the model in an accessible form Clark continues with examples of what happens when the developmental process goes awry. What does this look like in the consulting room and how can this be understood in the light of the earlier descriptions of the relation between ego and self? This chapter is

0021-8774/2008/5305/713 
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

framed in the Jungian context that behaviours are purposeful, but may need working on to be integrated, or as the quote from Jung at the beginning of the chapter explains, 'The biblical fall of man presents the dawn of consciousness as a curse. And as a matter of fact it is in this light that we first look upon every problem that forces us to greater consciousness' (Jung 1930, p. 388). Clear descriptions of defensive behaviours, psychosomatic symptoms and enactments are presented and clinical vignettes illustrate the points made. Following on from this are careful considerations of the therapist's involvement in the analysis of their patients and the complexities which arise when interpreting behaviour; in particular the level of interpretation and the manner of its delivery are discussed. The aim here is to find ways of facilitating the patient's individuation, helping them become themselves.

Keeping the momentum going on her theme of the self and the ego Clark now uses the image from the Copernican revolution to introduce the shock which occurs as the individuation process unfolds, which is the discovery that the ego is not the centre of the psyche. 'There is a new centre, the self, around which the ego revolves as the earth revolves round the sun' (p. 85). This brings into the frame symbols and symbol formation, and the need for continuing conversations with oneself. Clark ranges over myth, fairytale, physical symptoms and religious stories to bring alive the imaginative ways in which mankind has sought to express these aspects of the psyche. Sometimes she brings us down to earth with a bump. Discussing the contrast in the Christian story between Mary and Eve and how this hampers the integration of a woman's sexuality, Mary 'the bodiless, sexless, obedient, passive and worshipped—and Eve, rebellious, curious, sexual, in league with the serpent/Satan', she writes, 'For psychic health, women and men need a more satisfying image of woman as divine. Princess Diana will not do' (pp. 92–3).

This monograph is enjoyable to read, well presented, and insightful. The IAAP should put it on all prospective trainees' reading lists as required reading. It is an excellent appetizer for the meal to follow which takes a lifetime to digest.

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JUNG, LORENZ & MEYER-GRASS, MARIA (Eds.); ERNST FALZEDER (translator) with the collaboration of TONY WOOLFSON. *Children's Dreams: Notes from the Seminar Given in 1936–1940 by C.G. Jung*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008. Pp. xvii + 494. Hbk. $31.60 / £15.80.

The text of *Children's Dreams* is composed of adult reconstructions of childhood dreams presented by participants in Jung's seminar between 1936–1940, a dark time in European history. No personal context, history or associations are offered and the purpose of the seminar seems to revolve around exploration of the method of amplification. Early on, Jung asserts that dreams are radial and are arranged around a centre of meaning (p. 10). In contrast to Freud's free association method which he

sees as the *reduction in primam figuram* (reduction to the original image or schema), Jung engages in *amplificatio* whereby he amplifies 'an existing image until it becomes visible' (p. 26). He recommends that one should first explore personal amplifications, where subjective significance can be found and only when these are depleted, look for universal images, where one can locate collective resonances. However, given the lack of personal material in analysing children's dreams in the seminar, he states that he and his students are forced to apply an *ethno-psychological method* (p. 28) and is apparently aware that this may be a limited approach with its entire focus on collective material. He provides for his students a fundamental schema for organizing dream content that is used consistently throughout the book (and which will be familiar to those who are well versed in Jung's methodology) (pp. 30–31):

1) Locale: Place, time, 'dramatis personae'.
2) Exposition: Illustration of the problem.
3) Peripateia: Illustration of the transformation—which can also leave room for a catastrophe.
4) Lysis: Result of the dream. Meaningful closure. Compensating illustration of the action of the dream.

Members of the seminar, apparently, used the above structure in presenting specific dreams to Professor Jung and other participants. First, a dream itself is offered, followed by elaboration of motifs with mythological, cultural and historical references accumulated and organized by the presenter. The students clearly did their homework and brought forth an abundance of amplificatory information drawing on comparative religious studies, mythology, ancient history, alchemy, philosophy, psychology and science. Jung then would pick up the ball with further elaboration of the symbols which led to interpretative understanding of the dream. Along the way, participants (such as Lilliane Frey) made comments and posed questions for the Professor. The names of some of the participants (such as Lilliane Frey) will probably be recognizable to readers familiar with Jungian history and I found myself wishing that there were some brief biographical notations so that I could more fully appreciate the composition of this specially selected group. Such background would be relevant to anyone considering relational influences on the development of Jung's intellectual theory.

It is a pleasure to experience (as close to first hand as possible) Jung in a pedagogical role where he is engaged in conversational give-and-take with knowledgeable, well educated people trained in the classics who were intensely committed to exploring the amplification method. Caterina Vezzoli notes that Jung and the students seemed motivated by a pioneering spirit as they researched the validity of what they hoped was a scientific approach to the study of children's dreams. It might be interesting for those attentive to dynamic systems theory to look at the amplifications as possible emergent phenomena arising from conscious and unconscious interaction within the group.

Students and teachers will appreciate the thoughtful explanatory footnotes that define, clarify and interpret the text of this book. They will also appreciate the highly comprehensible form in which Jung discusses his fundamental concepts such as archetype (p. 72) and shadow (pp. 432–33) among many others. However, be forewarned that the index seems to have some flaws; the word *peripateia*, although used many times throughout the text, is nowhere to be found in the index.

A consistent difficulty characterizing the problematic aspects of the seminar and of the organization of the book is that of context, or lack of context. As noted, the dreams were reconstructions by unknown adults and lacked any kind of grounding

in personal history. Although the collective amplifications are fascinating, the actual clinical application is highly questionable and one might guess that the mythological and historical illustrations and so on were more about the presenter and the dynamics of the group than about the (now adult) child. It seems that the group constructed hypotheses in the form of interpretations that could never be understood or verified in a therapeutic context. Or could they? One wonders if the childhood dreams put forward were actually dreamt by the presenter who, in fact, may have been in analysis with Jung, in which case, personal understanding may have been an implicit subtext.

Further questions regarding the rationale for the seminar structure abound. Why not use dreams reported by children rather than adult reconstructions? What was the status of Jungian child analysis at the time of the seminar? What was Jung's expertise with children other than his own reminiscences and what were his experiences with his own children? (His five children ranged in age from 23–32 years in 1936). It is important to consider how one integrates amplificatory elaborations into actual psychotherapeutic treatment with a child, which is quite different from integration of such material with an adult who presents a childhood dream as memory. Capacity to hold and reflect on unconscious material is highly dependent on the individual child, phase of development, family relationships, attachment history and cultural milieu. The seminars, as made manifest in this book, lack this kind of embedded understanding which would normally be present in a typical Jungian approach. Once again, it is quite possible that more personal material was known but not recorded and we are evaluating this work retrospectively with decades of child development research and theory in between.

All that said, the reader will find the specific method of amplification to be instructive and the content should be illuminating with the potential to offer fertile and meaningful perspectives on the dream symbols. However, without active interaction with a patient, Jung's method risks becoming an academic exercise that leads away from the psychic reality of the dreamer. For example, Lilliane Frey presents the dream of a six year old girl in which there is a monster with a big body that 'completely fills up the staircase. It moves sluggishly and clumsily, with short, nearly invisible paws—meaty' (p. 112). The dreamer adds, 'I am terribly afraid' (p. 112). Lilliane Frey suggests that a hippopotamus most closely fits this description (!) and proceeds to associate to Faust, whales, the lamia and concludes that the monster represents the terrible mother. Jung, in a few pages, concurs stating that the devouring mother interpretation is quite correct and links the monster to the Egyptian goddess Tefnut (p. 121).

These amplifications may or may not be clinically dead on. Focus on the archetypal significance can potentially expand an understanding of the personal situation, but without an understanding of the relational context in which the dream is reported and without much description of the dreamer's affect within the dream and while telling the dream ('I am terribly afraid'), verification of therapeutic value of the experience is lost. Specific images can be researched but it is in seeing the *interaction* of symbols that a holistic meaning can emerge. Of course, this is a retrospective reading and it must be kept in mind that the participants did not have the abundance of psychological research that we have today. It should be noted that Jung does aptly demonstrate webs of connections linking motifs and this book may well serve students working on extending their knowledge of, for example, mythology and how to relate to that knowledge psychologically.

The question of context is problematic and pervasive throughout this book. Thinking of concentric circles, beginning at the centre, the personal context is missing, as noted; there is no commentary regarding Jung's life at the time of the seminars; we are given no

sense of this work in conjunction with other aspects of Jung's intellectual development or clinical practice; finally, there is no description of the possible influence of cultural or world events on the dreamer, Jung or members of the seminar. For example, it would have been helpful to have been reminded that these seminars took place prior to the initiation of the training institute in Zürich in 1948. Between 1910–1948, Jung perpetuated analytical psychology through publications, lectures and seminars at the Analytical Psychology Clubs, the ETH and in various other settings (Falzeder, p. 4). The members of the seminar on Children's Dreams (1936–1940) who hoped to become analysts were dependent on a letter of approval from Jung in order to practise as analysts. Additionally, one wishes that the editors might have given an introduction to the placement of these seminars in the evolution of Jung's thoughts; *Interpretation of Visions* (1997), held between 1930–1934, and *The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga* (Jung 1996), held in 1932, followed each other and both were prior to Children's Dreams, while the seminars on Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* (Jung 1988), between 1934–1939, for a period, ran parallel to the volume reviewed here. This would seem fertile ground for future theoretical and historical research.

At the large scale collective level, Caterina Vezzoli emphasizes the historical time in which the seminars took place, just before and at the beginning of the Second World War. She says, 'We can wonder how the approaching destruction of Europe lurking in the background could have affected Jung and his "researchers"'. They were studying 'the history of destruction and recreation of the human psyche while evil monsters of the worst undreamt fantasies ravaged through Europe and took hold of bodies and minds. The erudite enclave of Jung and his "students" was surrounded by the demons of Nazism and Fascism; without mentioning the war, they worked on the symbols of destruction and the darkness of the human psyche'. Failure to note this turbulent world context by Jung et al. in the seminars, or by the editors of this volume by way of introduction, seems remarkable. (For example, it is interesting to note that Jung became vice-president in 1930 and president in 1933 of the International General Medical Society, which was to become a highly controversial political gesture.)

Will this book be helpful to the clinical practice of Jungian-oriented child therapy or analysis? Jung espouses many opinions about children and their dreams throughout the seminars which some may find useful and meaningful. For example, Jung believed that '[t]hese early dreams in particular are of the utmost importance because they are dreamed out of the depth of the personality and, therefore, frequently represent an anticipation of the later destiny' (p. 1). On one hand, one could say that this idea would have been convincing were there actual longitudinal case studies; on the other, validation may have been evident if Jung, indeed, knew intimately those presenting their own childhood dreams. Like many in the early schools of child development and psychology, Jung tended to focus on the parents' psychology as the source of the child's conflicts as is evident in the following:

> They [the children] are forced to do dreadful things, which are not in their nature at all, but have been taken over from the parents. . .when we study the history of a family, and investigate the relations between parents and children, we can often see the red thread of fate. Sometimes there is more than one curse on the house of Atreus in a family.
>
> (p. 110–11)

Contemporary research (Beebe & Lachmann 2002; Stern 1998; Trevarthen 1989; Tronick 2007) has well-documented the bi-directionality of influence between parent and infant; mothers influence babies and babies influence mothers (although these

transactions are certainly asymmetric). Genetics and the biological endowment of the child cannot be underestimated. That children may carry unresolved and unconscious complexes of the parents is certainly credible and worthy of attention, but this aspect should be one of many considered in the psychological evaluation of a child/family. When asked how to deal with children in a practical way, Jung responds: 'We have to pay attention to the child and try to stabilize his or her consciousness. The child should draw to make the phantasies concrete; the freely floating danger will thus be made concrete. Writing and drawing cause a certain cooling off, a devaluation of fantasies' (p. 87). To anyone who treats children, this makes good sense. Concretization through active engagement with the image, within a supportive therapeutic relationship, often binds anxiety and opens the possibility for a sense of mastery over what is fearful. Such lived out experiences allow memories residing in the implicit domain to find expression to become visible to the child and the therapist who can begin to find words for what has been outside conscious verbal understanding. The development of a narrative can eventually lead to integration of right and left brain hemispheres that have become deregulated by trauma. Stories related via amplification have the potential to coordinate verbal, conscious, rational functioning of the left brain with non-verbal, imagistic, affective and non-rational functioning of the right brain. It can be seen that some of Jung's intuitions and careful clinical observations have been borne out through scientific methods not accessible to Jung and his seminar/research group.

Along similar lines, Caterina Vezzoli points out Jung's prescient notion that, 'We are quite probably dreaming all the time, but consciousness makes so much noise that we no longer hear the dream when we awake' (p. 3). She furthers this idea by saying, 'Dreaming all the time means our mental health depends on the possibility of passing from one state of consciousness to the other and of dreaming about our reality. We become conscious through dreaming. Today, neuroscientific research on dreams describes states of consciousness as continuously changing and interacting'. These ideas would seem to be supported by the work of dream researcher Hobson:

> In essence, our view is that the brain is a unified system whose complex components dynamically interact so as to produce a continuously changing state. As such, any accurate characterization of the system must be multidimensional and dynamic and must be integrated across the neurobiological and psychological domains. Both neurobiological and psychological probes of the system must therefore be designed, applied and interpreted so as to recognize and clarify these features.
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> (Hobson 2003, p. 2)

Holding a broad view, Vezzoli points out that, in addition to neuroscientists, other psychoanalytic schools have studied the fluidity of states of consciousness and she quotes Bion: 'Therefore, conscious and unconscious are ceaselessly being produced, which fact significantly alters the status of these two instances, for they can no longer be regarded as two psychic provinces, but as transitory and reversible states of mental experience' (Bion 1962, p. 17). The analogical method of amplification is Jung's highly creative way of both avoiding reductive interpretation from only a conscious point of view and of 'translating the natural process [of dreaming] into psychical language' (p. 2). By circumambulating the dream image through metaphorical elaborations, it could be argued that Jung, assisted by the students, was able to see associative patterns as archetypal configurations resonating between the subjective experience of the dreamer and transcendent objective realities that are timeless and are not bound to any one culture. The analogical method embeds the patient's mind and the analytic

dyad in an emergent system of potential meaning. Personal associations, understanding the dynamic relationship between analyst and patient and appreciation of the dreamer's current family and cultural milieu are layers essential to therapeutic practice and contribute to the complexity of the dynamic system. Although this information is sadly missing, Jung's capacity to map out possible meanings and understandings of the dream material is fascinating and will be useful to anyone wishing to expand their repertoire of amplificatory material. For an amplification to work well clinically it must emerge naturally as a co-created phenomenon of the many-layered analytic relationship. The analyst's depth and breadth of metaphorical knowledge allows for a wide range of possibilities of relevant analogical images to emerge which can then be formulated into language and offered to the patient as hopefully meaningful. To that end, this book is most helpful.

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GRAY, FRANCES. *Jung, Irigaray, Individuation: Philosophy, Analytical Psychology and the Question of the Feminine*. London & New York: Routledge / Taylor & Francis, 2008. Pp. 186. Pbk. £ 21.99.

In this book Frances Gray proposes a revision of the concept of individuation via a 'conversation' between C.G. Jung and Luce Irigaray, based on the commonality of interests between the two theorists. Both Jung and Irigaray regard the sexes as ontologically separate and the concepts of masculine and feminine as central. Luce Irigaray is a philosopher as well as an analyst and, as Frances Gray demonstrates, some of the philosophers with whom she engages have clearly influenced Jung. Each thinker has an interest in Eastern religion and both recognize the fundamental importance of spirituality to human being.

Like Irigaray, Frances Gray develops her thesis in the context of a world of supposedly gender-neutral socio-cultural settings, where traditional associations of 'the feminine' and women with *matter* and *nature* still subtly underlie and inform the social practices of a diversity of collectives, all of which come under a 'patriarchal

hegemonic Symbolic'[1] (Lacan 2006). Jung's conception of the feminine and women are critiqued from this perspective as Gray draws on three cornerstones of Irigaray's project: the conscious development of an embodied feminine identity and the needs for: 1. a female genealogy and 2. a 'feminine divine'. For both Luce Irigaray and Frances Gray, authentic individuation for women is not possible without the actualization of these potentialities. Crucially, for Gray, Jung's individuation is a masculinist 'ideal of reason', which she sets out to deconstruct.

In her preface, Gray refers to a recent event in the academic world where, at first hand, she experienced the near-exclusion of women still active in much of our personal, social and cultural lives. The immediacy of such an anecdote sharply evokes an ethos of projection in which Irigaray's notion of 'femininity' as a patriarchal construction is almost palpable. It also counterpoints the range of philosophical and analytic strategies that Gray brings to bear on her various interpretations of Jung. Philosophical reflections from Plato, through Kant, Nietzsche and Hegel to contemporary philosophical and academic feminist thinkers, contribute to her intricate examination of the conditions, actual and potential, of individuation.

Three basic premises of this book are: 1) the debt that psychology owes to philosophy and their mutual influence over time, 2) the individual human struggle for self-hood via recognition, and 3) the teleological motive force of each writer's view of individuation. The Hegelian master/slave dialectic, and its Greek origin, runs as a sub-theme throughout the book. Frances Gray elaborates the dialectic in the process of individuation, as well as in Jung's archetypal pairs of opposites and indeed in all our relations with 'others' without and within, dreaming and awake, including the dialectic of the clinical situation. Her book can be read as another exercise in such dialectical exchange.

Gray admires Jung as an 'applied scientist', and gives a somewhat token recognition of his sympathy for the feminine, but the logical implications of his unconscious and overt sexisms are intensively analysed as representative of the constitutive power within collectives of dominant masculine discourses. Gray raises anew profound moral questions of identity and the development of an embodied and gendered self. In support of her view of Jung's individuation as ultimately an 'ideal of reason' she postulates links between, for example, Plato's not-to-be-imitated 'disorderly soul' of women and Jung's 'anima feminine'. She suggests that it is the voice of this anima feminine that Irigaray wants women to adopt in their strategy of 'mimesis'. One of the many interpretations of this strategy is as a surface enactment of male-created feminine stereotypes, and Gray takes this up in connection with what she understands by Jung's references to imitation and the different implications of the mother image for the child of each sex. Here the hope is that the development of an authentic feminine syntax may ultimately sufficiently subvert the dominance of the masculine so as to allow the emergence of a genuine feminine individuation and true intersubjective dialogue between the sexes.

Following an account of Kant's ideal God as moral guarantor, Gray elaborates Irigaray's notion of a 'feminine divine' where the appropriation of religious imagery is concerned more with its 'Symbolic/Imaginary' possibilities than with theology. Exploring the implications for women's subjectivity of a masculine Divine, she

[1] Briefly, the 'symbolic' refers to an exclusive representational order in which all linguistically representable reality is constructed according to the 'One' masculine view and one masculine libido. The symbolic structures the unconscious. The 'imaginary', correspondingly, is the field of image and imagination and thus illusory.

persuasively and intricately aligns the coherence of this notion with Feuerbach's 'God-as-mirror'—the proposition of God as the idealized projection of human consciousness. Women need a 'godhead' which reflects their reality rather than a patriarchal deity dominant in a phallocentric 'economy of the same'.

Related to the notion of a feminine divine, in the sense of feminine 'models', is Luce Irigaray's call for attention to feminine genealogy and mother/daughter relationships, to restore integrity to women's relation to each other. In this connection Gray revisits the Demeter and Persephone myth, most persuasively criticizing the failure of both Jung and Freud to acknowledge the betrayal of Persephone by the masculine paternal. Noted here is the disturbing nature of one post-Jungian interpretation of the abduction and rape of Persephone as benignly emblematic of an initiation rite, rather than as an example of the silencing of an authentic feminine voice.

In support of both Irigaray and Jung, Gray adds a most valuable contribution to contemporary deconstructions of 'anti-essentialist' arguments by a cogent re-working of Charlotte Witt's (1995) development of Aristotle's 'essence as cause', proposing what she accordingly calls an Originary Essence View. Her development of Putnam's essence/stereotype distinction, in this case in reference to the word 'woman', is a valuable variation on ideas of the 'stereotype' as a generality which can be used either positively or negatively.

Decisions about criteria of inclusion in a book of this scope clearly demand that much of relevance must be omitted. Even so, the claims on the cover of this book—to intrigue academics and analysts alike as it brings analytical psychology and philosophy together with psychoanalysis—are somewhat belied by the relative lack of consideration of the latter. Contemporary psychoanalysis may have been highly relevant to Frances Gray's take on individuation in relation to Jung and Irigaray. For instance, the preoccupations of relational psychoanalysis for the past two decades are ignored while Gray makes claims for novelty in terms of collective and intersubjective notions of the origins of self. Jessica Benjamin's (1988, 1995) revisioning of Hegelian dialectics and Winnicottian developmental theory, grounded in notions of gendered-collective origins of self, has considerable resonance with both Luce Irigaray and Jung. Similarly, the post-Jungian developmental work of Michael Fordham (1969) may have contributed to the conversation between both analytical psychology and psychoanalysis.

While it seems correct to associate Plato's disordered soul and Jung's 'anima feminine' as the rejected otherness of masculine being, the forceful and somewhat exclusive emphasis on this interpretation appears to engage only Jung the 'master theorist' (Rowland 2002.), all but ignoring the relevance of Jung's oft-repeated valuing of the irrational. An interpolation of this value into the conversation with Luce Irigaray's mimetic subversion of the projected feminine would perhaps have provided a more nuanced approach to the axiological issues suggested throughout the book.

These objections aside, the book certainly intrigued and deeply engaged this reviewer and I do recommend it to academics and analysts alike, misgivings notwithstanding.

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MEYER, RUTH. *Clio's Circle: Entering the Imaginal World of Historians*. New Orleans, Louisiana: Spring Journal Books, 2007. Pp. xiv + 211. Pbk. $ 23.95.

In *Clio's Circle: Entering the Imaginal World of Historians*, Ruth Meyer fully braves the relatively uncharted territory of Jungian psycho-history. There remain, however, many hazards, some of which Meyer successfully surmounts.

The book begins with a recollection of Meyer's journey as an historian, ranging from the difficulties she faced as one of the first female undergraduates at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, to her synchronistic experience while viewing Robespierre's final letter housed at the Conciergerie Prison (pp. 2–3). She goes on to discuss the muse Clio—the feminine representation of historical inspiration—paying attention to particular historians such as Natalie Zemon Davis, for whom this daughter of Mnemosyne no longer serves as an iconic guide for historical research (p. 40). Meyer then examines the way in which Freud and Jung relate to history, contending that personal travels and dreams are the foundation of their respective engagements with the past. Chapter four continues her quest to uncover the origins of historical inspiration. Next, Meyer discusses the connection between Jung and the historian Arnold Toynbee before examining some of the latter's more moving experiences whilst travelling. Chapter six concentrates on the role played by dreams and visions in stimulating the imagination of historians, heightening their feelings of vocation which in turn lead them to dedicate their lives to the historical enterprise. Chapter seven is a short but insightful account of the relationship between historians and archives, while the final section considers the therapeutic nature of engaging with history.

Meyer shows how Jungian theory can elucidate history effectively when she applies a psychological lens as a means to understand the biographical details of famous historians. This demonstrated capacity, however, is overshadowed by some problematic assertions. For instance, she claims to give equal weight to historians with a logos-based perspective as she does to those who embrace 'dreams, altered states and visions' (p. 59). However, this 'balancing' is questionable given her passionate reply to historians who deny the importance of self-expression (p. 19, fn. 66). It is clear that Meyer champions a subjective approach, yet the inclusion of an abundance of personal vignettes—integral to her understanding of historical empathy—leaves one to wonder the extent to which her constant accentuation of the subjective is evidence of a profound distaste for—and not merely a response to—scientific history. Her text, with its ardent denunciation of those who eschew the role of the imaginal in history, undermines her own proposal of a Jungian psycho-biographical focus of balanced opposites held in tension.

Meyer's imaginative quest does, however, attain moments of brilliance, contributing important insights to the historical record. I enjoyed her analytical psychological analysis of historians' experiences in archives, her thoughtful consideration of the role of dreams in forming an inspirational matrix fuelling historical imagination, and her keen psycho-historical examination of both Freud's fascination with Michelangelo's statue of Moses and his choice of artefacts to keep when forced to flee to London. This is when Meyer-as-psycho-historian is at her best, weaving in her vast historical

knowledge with a commanding demonstration of Jungian expertise. She creates a colourful tapestry that embraces both historical and psychological facts. Her exposition of Toynbee's connection to Jung and her defence of the former's work is another strong example. Yet it is exactly at this juncture that I feel Meyer could have gone even further. Rather than merely pointing out how Toynbee's pilgrimage experience facilitated his psychological growth and inspired creative output, why not explore the extent to which Toynbee's idea of the rise and fall of great civilizations is informed by Jungian psychology, especially Jung's notion of archetypes? Such an interpretation, moreover, would be welcome in light of Toynbee's explicit use of Jung in Volume 7 of *A Study of History* (1954, pp. 716–36).

Meyer's Jungian, psycho-historical contribution is limited to an interpretation of the lives of historians who have accepted the role played by the imaginal in their historical creations. This in itself can become quite problematic, as one could argue that the individual lives of these specific group members already invite a Jungian analysis, where the role of imagination and creativity is readily embraced. She does not, for instance, branch out further, addressing the more pressing issue: 'What can analytical psychology do to further our knowledge and understanding of past events?' I believe that this would be the salient question for historians who are considering a Jungian perspective. Meyer could have offered a comparative 'case' example where Jungian and Freudian theoretical understandings might have been presented along with a more traditional approach. One might then be better able to pinpoint the distinctive contribution of a Jungian psycho-history (Andrew Samuels and Roderick Main 2008, personal communication).

In light of Meyer's publication and my own work, I have found—in addition to the possibilities mentioned above—the field of myth history to be an emerging area that could benefit from Jungian ideas. Myth history acknowledges the role myth plays in structuring the way historians compose and imagine the past, and I believe Jung's particular conception of the importance of myths would add a significant psychological dimension yet to be explored by contemporary myth historians. Accordingly, the extent to which some of Jung's texts can be read as myth histories will help determine analytical psychology's role in current debate.

Ultimately, a Jungian intervention into the study of history must consider its relation to, and furtherance of, historiography, historical methodology and the philosophy of history. Most importantly, those inclined to view history through a Jungian lens need to explore the psychological processes that may or may not be working at the collective level of historical events, rather than concentrating on psycho-biographical studies. Meyer has taken the first step in initiating this dialogue and, though I find aspects of her seminal book problematic, she is to be applauded for her groundbreaking study, a work which opens doors for those interested in balancing tradition and innovation in historical research.

## Reference

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LANGS, ROBERT. *Beyond Yahweh and Jesus: Bringing Wisdom to Faith, Spirituality, and Psychoanalysis*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto & Plymouth, UK: Aronson, 2008. Pp. xvii + 201. Pbk. £15.99.

My prolific teacher, Irving Janis, famous for his work on 'groupthink' and how the lack of anxiety before an operation leads to catastrophic reactions afterwards used to say, 'A page a day, is a book a year'. The psychoanalyst Robert Langs has taken this motto to heart and produced at least a book a year. A review of an earlier work of his by William Goodheart (San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal, 1, 4, Summer 1980) led the latter to formulate one of the most important and least known Jungian conceptualizations of the interactive field shared by analyst and patient in terms of the persona-restoring field, the complex-discharging field and the secure symbolizing field. Typologically, these earlier works were characterized by a dogmatic thinking orientation. In this book, Langs discovers death anxiety saying, 'on the deep unconscious level of experience, life is essentially about death ... like a ruling tyrant armed with secret service agents, *deep unconscious death anxiety* stealthily governs our life' (p. x; italics in the original).

Langs confesses he became a psychoanalyst to escape a confrontation with death he had as a medical student. Out of his denial of death, he discovered religion and writes of it with the fervour of a convert, paraphrasing Mark Anthony, 'I come not to bury religion, nor to praise it—I come to understand it' (p. ix). As a classically trained Freudian psychoanalyst, spirituality and religion were not on his radar screen. Not surprisingly, he discovered Jung, the Archetypes and the Wisdom of the Unconscious, a process begun in other recent work.

From that perspective, we Jungians must feel gratified. Yet, this is a very problematic book and one that I cannot recommend to the reader. Like all writers who work in unfamiliar fields, Langs thinks he is providing profound insights when he is writing out of ignorance. He is unfamiliar with literature on psychoanalytic approaches to the Bible, despite a section so named (for an overview, see Abramovitch 1994). Likewise, it is a sad day in the history of depth psychology when a leading, creative and prolific author takes enormous pride (and pages) to announce that he has discovered that reality is at least as important as fantasy. He then proudly gives an example of a woman who dreamed that the butcher was placing his thumb on the scale to dishonestly increase the weight, and links it to his own overcharging her for a session he cancelled by telephone. Unimaginatively, he fails to inquire imaginatively into why he overcharged her, but relishes her subsequent association to a reformed, Catholic thief.

He is at his worst when he discusses the Bible. He has no knowledge of the original Hebrew or New Testament Greek. Using a Christo-centric perspective, he retrospectively attributes a divine theology of love, stating that creation is 'God's first labour of love for humankind' (p. 2), when love is never mentioned in those first chapters of Genesis, or he speaks of 'the punitive God of the Hebrews' (p. 185).

One of my favourite stories and the centrepiece of my forthcoming book (Abramovitch 2009) is the story of the First Brothers. Langs' interpretation, while original, is bizarre. He attributes God's ambivalence toward Cain, punishing and protecting him at the same time, to God's 'deep unconscious guilt for having abetted Cain's murderous act' (p. 80). If you feel that Langs' approach borders on grandiosity and narcissism, you may not be wrong.

The part of the book I enjoyed most were quotes by Jung with which I was unfamiliar and his call for a new profession, *theological psychoanalysis*. I also liked his phrase

'the emotion-processing mind' and the description of three forms of death anxiety: '*existential*—the fear evoked by human mortality; *predatory*—the fear evoked when someone or an act of God or nature is trying to destroy us; and *predator*—the guilty fear of mortal punishment for having harmed others' (p. xvii; italics in the original). Sadly, the promise of these phrases, like the subtitle itself, remains unfulfilled.

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QUINODOZ, JEAN-MICHEL. *Listening to Hanna Segal: Her Contribution to Psycho-analysis*. Translated by David Alcorn. The New Library of Psychoanalysis Teaching Series, ed. Dana Birksted-Breen. London & New York: Routledge, 2008. Pp. 171. Pbk. £19.95.

Hanna Segal is perhaps best known as a close collaborator of Melanie Klein, and as an author of several books about Klein and her work. She is also well known for her theories on symbol formation, which arose in her psychoanalytic treatment of patients with psychosis; it was in this vein, as a former art therapist involved in working with schizophrenia, that I first encountered her work. However what Quinodoz aims to do in this new book is illustrate some of the ways in which Segal has been tremendously influential in her own right, and not just as one of Melanie Klein's followers.

The book takes the form of a series of interviews conducted by the author with Hanna Segal, alongside interviews with psychoanalysts who have been influenced by Segal's ideas, accompanied by a précis of the main clinical and theoretical papers she has written. The richness of this editorial approach allows the reader to meet Hanna Segal in a multitude of ways, firstly as a person, and secondly as a groundbreaking clinician, whose contribution to Kleinian thinking in particular and psychoanalysis in general spans many decades—from her early work on aesthetic experience, to symbol formation and psychoanalysis with schizophrenia, to later work on nuclear war and terrorism. As John Steiner comments at one stage of the book, what seems fundamental to Segal's work is the conflict between the life and death instincts on the one hand, and reality and phantasy on the other. Therefore her work on aesthetic experience, which she views as linked to the need to repair internal damaged objects, is as linked to the concept of the death instinct as her work on symbolic equation and the deadening concreteness of schizophrenia. For example, one of her original contributions was to recognize that what is annihilated is not only what is perceived, but the perceiving apparatus itself—i.e., the mind.

Her original contribution to Kleinian theory is made highly accessible by the structure of the book—especially the transcripts of interviews which illuminate the theoretical passages. This allows certain themes and ideas to keep returning in new and different contexts. There are some thought-provoking passages about the nature of the death instinct running through the book, which convey the deep complexities of the subject matter by their seeming contradictory quality. Therefore we first meet the death instinct in a fairly innocuous guise, merely as 'a protest against the pain of life', but later as an envious Lucifer choosing omnipotently to destroy the world and be the King of Hell, rather than number 2 in heaven. The return of themes and ideas allows an intricate reading to unfold.

At the end of the book one feels that one has gained a very deep insight into not only her ideas but also her thoughts about other Kleinian approaches and psychoanalytical technique. For example, she discusses the difference between her own approach and

that of Betty Joseph, offering a thought-provoking critique on the idea of transference as the total situation. Perhaps more frustrating is the scarcity of discussion on analytic thinking from other schools. Jung is referred to twice, only in order to be dismissed. This is disappointing in the chapter on symbols. Also Susan Isaacs' work on unconscious phantasy as a 'mental correlate and psychic representation of the instincts' is tantalizing to a Jungian reader, and leaves one with the familiar disappointment that Jungian thinking isn't engaged with or included.

However, Segal's forthright and direct way of expressing herself makes good reading—especially when discussing differences in technique or her relationships with other Kleinian analysts. This more human dimension serves to ground the theory of the book and gives one a very clear sense of Segal's own personal contribution and convictions as an analyst. This uncompromising aspect of her personality has a creative strength, and one can see how this would have led her to be the very first analyst to treat a patient with schizophrenia in a classical psychoanalytic way—using a couch and five sessions a week.

In the personal interviews, the subject matter covers an array of topics: reminiscences of her traumatic childhood, anecdotes and frank opinions of other analysts, the presentation of the Kleinian approach to psychoanalysis, through to her personal approach to seminars and supervision. Perhaps what makes this work so well is the quality of the questions. As an interviewer Quinodoz is superb, probing, discursive and illuminating. What I was left with at the end of the book was a very clear sense of Segal as a person, an analyst and a thinker, and a sense that one had indeed encountered her in a multitude of ways.

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