International Journal of Jungian Studies
Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2010, 1–20

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Sexuation in Jung and Lacan

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(Received September 2009; final version received December 2009)

In the following article I first situate Lacan and Jung in the broader history of the unconscious: Western esotericism and Romanticism. This contextualization is necessary for the subsequent construction of a Jungian reading of Lacan's theory of sexuation. I will underscore one commonality between Jung and Lacan, and make evident the specific challenge Lacanian theory presents to Jung's notion of *coniunctio*. In conclusion I will suggest that Jung's theory will not only be improved by meeting the Lacanian challenge to a naïve notion of *coniunctio*; it will ultimately be brought into clearer alignment with its Western esoteric (alchemical) sources.

Keywords: Jung; Lacan; sexuation; masculine; feminine; anima; animus; the unconscious; the symbolic; logos; eros; alchemy; contrasexuality

While virtually all major schools of psychoanalysis insist, against the trend of contemporary ideology, that men and women typically manifest different psychologies, disagreement about the structure of sexual difference divides the schools. Jung is represented by his critics as positing a generic human nature which is differentiated into two forms, male and female.[1] His theory of anima and animus is sometimes seen, even by Jungians, to be nothing more than a male fantasy, the construction of an essentialized femininity which 'others', and thereby consolidates an essentialized masculinity.[2] The most formidable challenge to the Jungian *coniunctio* comes from Lacanian psychoanalysis, for Lacan gives a psychological account of traditional masculine–feminine imagery, but in a meta-psychology that does not result in the healing of the split between the sexes. Lacan acknowledges the differences between masculine and feminine structure along lines analogous to Jung. He recognizes that projection and idealization play a crucial role in romantic love. However, according to Lacan, it is a fantasy to conceive of the two sexes as a complementary pair or as two halves of a whole. For Lacan, there is no such thing as a human nature differentiated into two forms, male and female. Rather, masculinity and femininity refer to two opposed ways in which the subject is split by language. Since the splitting is the condition of the possibility of the subject's existence, it is pointless to posit an ideal human nature, composed of the two sets of different sexual attributes, which is either lost in a golden pre-lapsarian age, or still-to-come as the telos of psychological development. To be a human subject is not to possess some kind of essential nature but to be alienated within language in one of two different ways, as masculine or as

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ISSN 1940-9052 print/ISSN 1940-9060 online

DOI: 10.1080/19409050903498311
http://www.informaworld.com

feminine. Masculine structure eclipses feminine structure. Masculine structure only exists (in the symbolic) by repressing and denying the existence of the feminine. The feminine represents the gap in the masculine experience of reality, the 'indivisible remainder' which can neither be conceived nor appropriated.

The masculine is logos-ruled for Jung, or, in Lacanian terms, wholly submitted to the rule of the signifier (the phallus). The feminine is eros-ruled for Jung, or, in Lacanian terms, not wholly submitted to the phallus. Both seek in the other what each most lacks in themself. Where Jung believes that anima/animus projection, when withdrawn, leads to the inner *coniunctio* of the contrasexual polarities in the unconscious, Lacan argues that *coniunctio* is a psychological impossibility. Sexuation is the place where we come up against the incompleteness of subjectivity, the irredeemably fractured quality of the sane human being.

One senses that Lacan represents too much of an enantiodromia for Jungians to either defeat or integrate, like Bluebeard in von Franz's reading: with this kind of violent attack on the paradigm only flight is possible.[3] It might be that in the end the Lacanian approach to the unconscious must be rejected entirely by Jungians. But Lacan's clinical results – for he too was a medical doctor and practitioner, with extensive experience working with psychotics – these surely cannot be so easily discounted. Rather Jungians must give an alternative interpretation of Lacanian phenomena, for example, the mutual exclusion of the real and the symbolic, object *a*, the phallus, etc. In what follows, I will sketch the outlines of a Jungian interpretation of Lacan's theory of sexuation. The appropriation will not leave Jung's theory as it was, but alter it in a decisive way. I will suggest that the weakest link in Jung's meta-psychology, his faith in the power of human nature to achieve the wholeness it longs for, can be removed without essentially changing the theory of contrasexuality. On the contrary, by pointing negatively to something like what the theological tradition calls 'grace', psychological contrasexuality can become even more explicitly aligned with the esoteric traditions upon which Jung relied.

1.

The meta-psychological divide that separates Jung and Lacan can be traced back to opposing attitudes to the historical sources of the notion of the unconscious. The variety of theories of the unconscious operative in psychotherapy today – classical Freudian, Jungian, post-Freudian, and Lacanian – can be grouped into two broad classes: the reactive unconscious, which is an effect of the loss and disowning of the individual's past (of which Lacan's is the most philosophically sophisticated account), and the productive unconscious, which is widely associated with Jung. The productive unconscious is the future-oriented, creative ground of the polymorphous self, a collective layer of potencies and possibilities that are for the most part unrecognized by the ego, but which make possible the developments and transformations the psyche undergoes in its progressive individuation. Where the theoreticians of the reactive unconscious have broken with the theosophico-romantic lineage of dynamic psychology, the advocates of the productive unconscious have actively elaborated and developed it.[4] It is often overlooked that Freud did not discover the unconscious but revised a romantic notion.[5] The romantics constructed the unconscious in order to overcome the modern split between subjectivity and nature, mind and body, a split legislated by Cartesian representationalism. When everything becomes an object for a subject, the subject

becomes worldless, disconnected, without ontological relationship to the things it represents. Early Romantic *Naturphilosophie* displaced Cartesian representationalism by maintaining that consciousness is only the visible half of spirit; the unconscious is its ground, motive force, and life.[6] The only way to avoid the death of nature signalled in different ways by Kant and Fichte was to posit a ground of unity that was neither exclusively human nor natural, a ground which was 'indifferent' to the distinctions between the two, and which therefore could mediate them. To counter the ascendency of representationalism in the thought of Descartes, Kant and Fichte, the early Romantics drew on older, esoteric models of the soul, hermetic, Kabbalistic and theosophical: the soul as 'microcosm', as the heart of the world, beating with natural instinctive rhythms and connected via 'sympathy' with all that is, was, and will be. The microcosm–macrocosm homology is a central theme of Kabbalah, Mesmerism, theosophy, and Renaissance Hermeticism (cherished subjects of romantic research). Paracelsus is pivotal for the modern memory of the theory. Like the universe, which it represents, the human being, according to Paracelsus, is double: the visible, corporeal side is grounded in a hidden, sidereal body (*corpus sidereum*).[7] The invisible side is the source of the human being's implicit knowledge of the universe. Through the natural light (*lumen naturae*) the human being is able to communicate with the invisible side of the macrocosm, the eternal 'virtues' or divine archetypes which constitute the foundation of creation (Goodrick-Clarke, 2008, p. 78). This knowledge of sidereal bodies is, in modern psychological terms, unconscious, that is, unrepresented and unrepresentable. It makes itself known through sympathy. Paracelsus's 'light of nature' should not be confused with reason in the modern sense of the term. It is unconscious knowledge, as Jung puts it in his study of Paracelsus, 'the light of darkness itself' (Jung, 1942, para. 197). It is not daylight but the light of the black sun (*sol niger*) of alchemy, which makes hidden things visible (Marlan, 2005). The media of the natural light are dream, trance, and hallucinogenic drugs.[8] Paracelsus also refers to the natural light as 'animal reason' for it is bound up with the human being's animal life and constitutes the mind's vital contact with the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. The theosophico-romantic unconscious is not a denial of representation and subject–object, but an undercutting of it. Prior to representation there is sympathy between knower and known, a natural connection between soul and cosmos which makes representation possible. This tie was maintained by 'the phantasm', the illuminated mental-image in medieval psychology. The phantasm is not an object, and the one who experiences the phantasmic is not a detached and worldless subject. In phantasmic knowledge, the soul does not categorize, objectify, and distanciate itself from the known but vibrates in atunement with what it knows and participates in its order of being.[9]

Early psychoanalysis follows Schopenhauer rather than the early Schelling. Phantasmic knowledge, imagination, sympathetic intuition, etc., become, strictly speaking, illusory, the product of tragic desire. The goal of philosophy for Schopenhauer is the subject's emancipation from the phantasmic, which is inextricably entwined with eros and self-centred will. The emancipated subject, who, in a certain sense, no longer believes in what he or she sees and feels, becomes 'the pure subject of knowledge' (Schopenhauer, 1998, p. 269). Freud's 'primary process', the image-generating power of the Id, is likewise modulated and restrained by 'the secondary process' which substitutes realistic alternatives for the Id's infinite desires (Freud, 2005, pp. 576–595). Lacan's therapeutic 'destitution' is the enlightenment of one who suddenly realizes that all they hitherto held as most valuable, essential and desirable, is

a meaningless fantasy. The unconscious, which was the ground of unity between the human and the cosmos, becomes, in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the ground for a theory of renunciation. The subject's living connection with nature is now denied: subjectivity is transnatural and must realize that it has no home among phantasms and natural forces. In Lacan the 'unconscious' means exactly the opposite of what it did in the theosophico-romantic tradition. Subjectivity is only possible on the grounds of a severance of man from 'the real' (the cut effected by 'the symbolic'); the unconscious is a residue from this scission, not the remains of nature – as though some dimension of man's natural origin remains on a subterranean level of the psyche – but rather the excluded other necessary to maintaining the bubble of the symbolic, a sign of an absence, a gap or lack, which makes subjectivity not merely tragic, enjoying the consolation of nostalgia for lost meaning, but absurd (Fink, 1995).

Slavoj Žižek has precisely identified the place where Lacanian and Jungian theory part company: on the question of the *who* of psychoanalysis (Žižek, 1996, p. 209). Who is the analysand? Is he or she, as Jung would have it, a 'lost soul', shipwrecked in the disenchanted universe of modernity, trying to rediscover their place in 'the pre-modern universe of wisdom and its sexo-cosmology, the universe of harmonious correspondences between the human microcosm and the macrocosm' (Žižek, 1996, p. 209)? Or is he or she the Cartesian subject, who has no home in nature, for whom all is object, the source of all value and order, a being who is fundamentally adrift in a reality that has no order or meaning? Lacan's analysand is 'the Cartesian subject of science', the empty subject living in a disenchanted world, a subject deprived of roots in 'the pre-modern universe of meaning' (Žižek, 1996, p. 209). However polemical the point, it is well taken. Instead of proving Jung hopelessly naïve (doubtlessly his intention), Žižek proves Jung's continuity with the historical sources of the psychology of the unconscious, with theosophy and the cosmology typical of Western esoteric traditions. Foucault has shown that in the seventeenth century this cosmology was eclipsed by 'representationalism' – the Cartesian subject, for whom everything is object, becomes the orderer of things at the expense of the order of nature (Foucault, 1994, pp. 17–46). The Cartesian subject does not find itself in an order; rather, it orders that which is inherently disordered. The implication of this responsibility is that the subject itself has no place in the order which it constructs. The modern subject is without a cosmos, i.e. homeless. For both Jung and Lacan, this homelessness is the cause of modern neuroses and psychosis. For Jung, neurosis is the suffering of a soul that has lost its place in nature. Neurotic suffering, in Lacan's view, is the inevitable by-product of modernization. To be a subject, in the modern sense, is to be exiled from being.[10] The Jungian unconscious is the site where the natural order denied by modernity returns to subjectivity through disruption, dream, symptom and symbol. For Lacan, by contrast, the unconscious is the memory of primordial disorder, a trauma which is necessarily repressed by subjectivity, but which continues to haunt it as 'the real', 'the excremental remainder', which subjectivity always fails to appropriate (Žižek, 1996, p. 197).

These opposed theories of the unconscious naturally lead to opposed therapies. The therapist of the reactive unconscious helps the client to recognize the futility of his or her fantasies and the ways in which his or her behaviour and attitudes are determined by biography. 'Everything you are you became as a small infant,' the therapist of the reactive-unconscious says. 'Your task is to own as much of your repressed past, your censured desires, as you can (recognizing that total self-appropriation is not possible); only thereby will you become more accepting of yourself as you are and so better adapted to life.' Where Freud sought to convert

neurotic suffering into ordinary unhappiness, Lacan enjoins the patient to accept the ultimate senselessness of the renunciations and displacements of desire essential to his or her sanity, to move from 'subjectivization' to 'subjective destitution', and to 'enjoy' his or her 'symptom'.[11] The 'cured' subject is able to grasp the sheer contingency and absurdity of the events which constitute the narrative of his or her life. The therapist of the productive unconscious proceeds on opposed assumptions. Properly negotiated psychological crises are opportunities for self-differentiation and development. The unconscious throws such obstacles in our way because it is pushing us to become more than what we were. In its drive to become more differentiated, the unconscious troubles our safe identifications, our morals and belief systems, and drives us to 'other' ourselves. The reactive unconscious is the scrapheap of psychological development: what lies there is not a source of creativity and life, but impossible desires that are incompatible with sanity. In the productive unconscious, by contrast, the whole of human history lies dormant. It clamours for recognition through dream, symbol and symptom, urging the self towards a deliberate polymorphism, a healthy 'schizophrenia'. The goal of therapy is not adjustment to the tragic nature of life, but individuation.[12] Psychological collapse is not necessarily an illness, something to be cured and avoided in the future. It may in fact be a sign of health, the occasion for a break, a *cision*, the cut that creates a new past by ejecting a prior state of existence and charting a new series of possible futures.[13]

Crossover happens between these two types. The reactive unconscious also has productive elements to it. The Freudian libido is, in one respect, infinitely productive: it is never satisfied and forever generates new and more alluring objects. Its historical predecessor is the Schopenhauerian will, which produces the multiplicity of things, endlessly varying and repeating forms to keep its hunger alive. Lacan's unconscious also has a productive element. For Lacan, language, which is not a system of stable identities, but a system of differences, is constantly modulating our intentions and ideas. The Lacanian unconscious is not a reservoir of latent images and ideas, but the underside of language, the intrinsic capacity of language to mean other than is meant. Lacan draws his distinction between 'the subject of the statement' and 'the subject of the enunciation' to underscore the unconscious's living, spontaneous ability to differentiate and produce new meaning (Lacan, 1966, p. 677). The subject of the statement is the *who* who speaks, the conscious speaker, with his or her intentions and ideas. The subject of the enunciation is the other speech, always breaking up intended meaning, the unintended associations, meanings, and references, set oscillating by every effort of the speaker to express his or herself. The model is Freud's theory of parapraxis: I mean to say one thing, my language says another. However, just as the productivity of the Schopenhauerian will is at the service of perpetuating suffering and need, this 'surplus of signification masks a fundamental lack' (Žižek & Dolar, 2002, p. 175). It is not as though my unconscious is generating fundamentally new possibilities for being by this deflection of intention. Rather, it is proving that my ideals are unrealizable.[14]

The productive unconscious is not lack but excess, not an eternal repetition of the disowned past, but an ongoing transformation of the past into the future. The productive unconscious does not only *deflect* conscious intention, it *directs* psychic energy. Recovery of this theosophico-romantic insight into the futural attitude of the unconscious sparked Jung's early defection from Freud. It was not 'pan-sexuality' that Jung initially objected to. Rather, it was Freud's insistence that sexual displacement is

merely reactive. For Freud, frustration in the present drives the libido into early modes of satisfaction, like water that is dammed which returns to fill up cavities and canals that it has previously used. Neurotics regress to oral or anal stages of sexual development when adult or genital sexual expression is frustrated.[15] Jung does not deny that the structure of the unconscious is determined by repression, memory, and trauma. He denies, rather, that the displacement of erotic libido cannot have a developmental role to play in the life of the individual. In *Psychology of the unconscious*, Jung explored how sexual neuroses often have a positive and prospective character. The return to the mother is not always and only regressive; it might also signify the hero's 'night-sea journey', essential to his transformation and rebirth (Jung, 1919). Because for Jung, libido is not merely sexual (the 'nutritive' or 'vegetal' form of libido is even more primordial than the sexual), its transformation into non-sexual modes of expression is not necessarily repression or sublimation (the only two option for Freud). Transcendence is once again on the horizon of psychological life. The romantic unconscious, the substructure of material-spirit or spiritual-matter at the root of subjectivity and nature, not only re-inscribed the soul into the natural order and healed the rift between subjectivity and being, it also re-aligned subjectivity with higher forms of consciousness – angelic, demonic, and ultimately divine consciousness.[16] The Schelling school of psychology described the emergence of spirit from material nature as an organic, evolutionary emergence of consciousness from the unconscious.[17] The ultimate telos of this evolution was participation in divine consciousness. Jung's psychology, with its non-reductive approach to religious experience, is clearly related to the mystico-theological psychology of the Schelling school.[18]

We have taken the time to elaborate these distinctions in order to avoid a facile comparison of Jung and Lacan on sexuation. Jung's psyche is the microcosm at the centre of the natural universe; Lacan's theory of the psyche has nothing to do with nature. Lacan is no longer talking about instincts and sublimated animal impulses. Subjectivity is the effect of the expulsion of nature that is necessary for speaking. Language substitutes the 'symbolic order', a network of self-generating meanings and structures of interpretation, for life.[19] The dawning of the logos is a two-edged sword for Lacan. On the one hand, language is the ground of consciousness, of culture, human subjectivity, etc. Psychosis is the psyche's failure to fully situate itself in language. On the other hand, language sets up the tensions and gaps that lead to neuroses and psychoses in the first place. Language makes our life a constant longing for fulfillment, for language is predicated on absence, on lack, which is the condition of the possibility of desire. The gap between subjectivity and nature is summed up in Lacan's claim that there is no animal unconscious, 'there is no unconscious except for the speaking being'.[20] The Lacanian unconscious does not connect the human being to nature. It is not a world-soul or a residue of the animal-mind. Jung's unconscious, by contrast, is wholly a product of nature.[21] Structures that govern the non-human world, such as sexual difference, also govern, on a higher level, the intrapsychic world. Given this decisive difference, a synthesis of Lacan and Jung on sexuation is beset with perhaps insoluble hermeneutic problems. One is tempted to say that all that is possible is either a Lacanian reading of Jung, which, accepting Lacan's assumptions, re-interprets Jungian phenomena in a Lacanian way; or a Jungian reading of Lacan, which does the opposite. It seems that psychology itself cannot decide which of these frames of reference is more adequate; such a decision is meta-psychological in the strict sense of the term – that is, metaphysical.

2.

Lacan's transition from Freud's biological model of the unconscious to a semiological model is impossible to understand without some reference to Saussure's structuralism (Saussure, 1983). Freud, like Jung, assumes a traditional view of the relation of signs to thinking. Linguistic signs 'express' and 'exteriorize' thoughts and meanings that precede them. These thoughts are held to ultimately refer to things, creating a link between the word and the thing, mediated via the thought of the speaker. In structuralism, the sign neither refers to the thing nor to the thought of the speaker. Rather the sign refers to other signs in a closed system of signification, whose presupposition is the absence of the thing. Saussure distinguished the signified (the concept) from the signifier (the phonetic sound or image) and noticed that the signifier was arbitrary. The connection of certain concepts with certain sounds or images was a matter of convention. This did not mean, however, that a region of unchanging essences could be located outside the changing systems of signifiers: the concept was every bit as conventional as the signifier. The meaning of the sign was nothing more than its place within a system of differences. Lacan intensifies the disconnection of signs and things by stipulating that the signifier itself (i.e. not the thing or the thought about the thing) determines the concept.[22]

Consciousness is forced, by virtue of the language without which it could not exist, to expel itself from life, and destined to desire its expelled life as that which alone could complete it. The life from which consciousness withdraws haunts it as the unthinkable 'real'. Because regaining 'what was lost' could only mean the extinction of the subject, the psyche is trapped in a no-win situation of fantasy, desire and denial. The subject is doomed to live in a state of constant desire for a wholeness, an integrity, and an authenticity that must always elude it.[23] Subjectivity is constituted by symbolization, but the symbolic also deprives subjectivity of substance and being: subjectivity is a virtual identity established in and by means of the symbolic. Suffering the inherent and unsurpassable insubstantiality of subjectivity is at the heart of neurosis. Language, with its systems of self-contained and self-generative significations, robs the subject of the possibility of shaping a 'true' self. Every time the subject utters a word – and the subject has no existence without verbalization – his or her utterance is sabotaged by unintended significations. That which is expelled, denied, forever misplaced, the unconscious, is not a source of meaning, creativity, or life; it is the wound left in us by language, by the excision of the infant from pre-symbolic life, necessary if it is to become a normal, i.e. not psychotic, subject. Lacanian consciousness is logos-ruled and meaning-generative; the Lacanian unconscious, on the other hand, is an idiot; it apes the logos, playing with language, without understanding what it says, mechanically proliferating the differences and ambivalences that are as much a part of language as grammar, but without intention or meaning.

From a Lacanian perspective, Jungians are trapped in the initial stage of psychotherapy, which Lacan calls 'subjectivization', a necessary but transitional moment of giving meaning to the often brutal and painful contingencies of life, one which is outgrown as therapy progresses. Amplification, active imagination, and Jungian dream-work are ways of indulging the hunger of subjectivity for meaning, the human being's desperate need for a position in the symbolic. For Lacan, the fantasy must eventually be 'traversed' and the analysand must come to see that his or her narratives and symbols are defences against the meaninglessness of life. Such an

individual moves beyond 'subjectivization' and becomes 'the subject of destitution', paradoxically at home in the absurd.

In Lacan's view, the human finds no sexual satisfaction in life. Human sexuality is tragic, misplaced, a sign of the impossibility of desire and a symptom of the cleft between psyche and nature. '*Il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel*' (Lacan, cited in Fink, 1995, p. 104).[24] The child, coming to consciousness in the love-dyad with the mother, internalizes the mother's desire; the child identifies with the mother's desire, fashions a self around it – a prescription for failure since at bottom what the mother desires is not the child but the father. The mother's desire is the cause of the child's own desire, the desire which constitutes its subjectivity. '*Le désir de l'homme, c'est le désir de l'Autre*' (Lacan, cited in Fink, 1995, p. 59). Man's desire [*sic*] is for the other to desire him; man's desire is the other's desire.

A rift is introduced into the mother–child unity by the primordial failure of the child to satisfy the mother's need. The child is destined to measure itself against its failure to satisfy the mother. The failure, brought home by the intervention of the father, who deflects the mother's desire from the child to himself, ejects the child from its pre-verbal unity with its life. By the prohibition of the father, 'the name of the father' (*le nom/le non du père*), the child enters the symbolic order: it begins to speak and becomes at once alienated from life and a subject. But a residue of the real remains in the child's psychic economy, a trace of the mother–child dyad, a lost object, which Lacan calls 'object *a*'. By cleaving to that object, the last touchstone of non-symbolic life (*jouissance*), the subject, though expelled from the real, can sustain the fantasy essential to sanity.

Object *a* is the point of erotic obsession and fixation in masculine human life, as well as the term of mystical longing: the holy grail in the subject's narrative. The feminine is structured analogously, but with one important difference. Everything the masculine subject says and does positions itself around object *a.* When the analysand recounts dreams and fantasies, the analyst discovers the strategies and idealizations by which the analysand seeks a relation to object *a*. Object *a* is that part of the mother's desire which the child takes with him in separation, not a primal memory but a fragment of a lost life, the residue of symbolization, that which can never be defined or articulated, the trace of the real that remains after the uploading of desire into the symbolic order.

The phallus must be sharply distinguished from object *a* if Lacan's theory of sexuation is to be understood. The phallus is the *signifier* of the mother's desire; the sign that represents object *a*. Object *a* has no place in the realm of language; its absence is marked by a sign, the phallus. As such the phallus is the foundation of the symbolic, the axiom of the system. The entrance of the phallus, which coincides with the emergence of the father in the development of the child, that is, the increasing significance of law, order, reason, and the beginning of separation from the mother, is simultaneous with the expulsion of the infant from the real (or the real from the infant) and the advent of subjectivity as such. The sign does not mediate the signified but replaces it, which means it abolishes it, and substitutes something in its stead. The phallus represents both the loss of being, which is the condition of the possibility of the subject, and the parents' desire insofar as it does not coincide with the child. It is the sign of all that is desirable, and all that is lacking to consciousness, the sign of the desirable/absent itself.

The key to understanding Lacan's theory of sexuation is grasping the alternative relationships of the masculine and the feminine to the phallus. There is no direct

relationship between men and women as such because their desire is elicited by different things. More concretely, the enjoyment left to them in sex (a paltry and inadequate substitute for lost *jouissance*) consists in different, even contradictory, elements of the sexual act. Extracting the formal symbolic significance from Freud's theory of 'penis envy', Lacan holds that feminine subjectivity does not desire object *a* as such; she desires the phallus. She longs for full definition and boundedness in the symbolic. The masculine by contrast is wholly determined by the phallic function. Masculinity is subjectivity which is wholly alienated within language, entirely subject to symbolic castration. He is, of course, left a modicum of *jouissance*. His pleasure is confined to the phallus. But his desire is not the phallus but object *a*. For this reason male sexuality tends towards fetishism, towards an abstracted and dislocated sexual experience.

Feminine subjectivity is also alienated, as all subjectivity must be, but not altogether subject to the symbolic. The phallic function does not in her case reign absolutely. On the one hand, the feminine lacks wholeness, for without the limit of the phallus, the boundary around her is imperfect, permeable, porous. On the other hand, the feminine seems to possess a freedom that always eludes the masculine. Her desire is for the phallus but her enjoyment is more global; she appears to enjoy exactly what he longs for, something more, something which cannot be represented, what Lacan calls 'the Other *jouissance*'. Not all of the feminine falls under the phallic function. She seems to have access to the pre-symbolic pleasure denied to the masculine, the primordial Father's world, which represents sexual enjoyment without bounds.[25]

What is the Other *jouissance* which is apparently allowed to women and denied to men? That which represents a prohibition and a limit for the masculine, the murdered father of Freud's primordial herd who enjoyed all woman and threatened the rest of the male tribe with castration if they challenged him, is a partner for the feminine. Her relationship to the primordial phallus allows her to step beyond the boundaries set by language. But the condition of this enjoyment is ineffability. One only exists to the degree that one has become symbolized; only partially or imperfectly symbolized, the feminine is banished from existence. The feminine is less whole than the masculine, but more real. Lacan expresses this in his paradoxical claims, 'Woman does not exist' (Lacan, 1973, p. 60); there is no signifier for the feminine.

The masculine seeks in sexual love an oceanic, boundless experience of pleasure, precisely that which is denied him by virtue of the phallic nature of his *jouissance*. He objectifies her by fetishizing her. He loves her, not because of who she is, but because of a certain way she looks at him, because of a certain way she flicks the hair from her face, because of the shape of her foot, etc. Fetish objects are substitutes for the boundless and illicit pleasure no longer possible in the symbolic. The feminine seeks something quite different in sexual love. She seeks a relation to the phallus. She longs for full symbolization, to fully exist, to secure her subjectivity. The desire is concretized in her desire for the phallus. She loves him not because of the man he is but because he is a man. It is not that she only enjoys the phallus, quite the opposite. The phallus is not an object of enjoyment for her but a sign of unsatisfiable longing. As much as he instrumentalizes her, she uses him as a prop for her desires. They need each other, this not so royal pair, to sustain the frustration essential to perpetuating desire, but they could never, in Lacanian terms, be partners.

3.

Jung has been widely misrepresented as rejecting the importance of sexuality for human development. He himself believed that nothing could be further from the truth.[26] The problem, as Jung saw it, was locating the function of sex in psychological development. Sex was not a repressed drive but a manifestation of the most fundamental energy of the soul (Jung, 1933, pp. 120–121).[27] Jung believed that even for Freud sexuality meant more than sex; it occupied the place of the holy in Freud's thinking.[28] Jung, too, believed that sexuality was numinous, but not because we are programmed to obsess on sexual pleasure, but because sex was the ultimate symbol of the erotic impulse of the unconscious for consciousness. The phallus was the symbol of darkness reaching toward light, the impulse to transcendence immanent in the earth itself. Jung returned to a pre-Darwinian, ultimately Greek and Patristic notion of *eros*, more proximate to the Schellingian/Schopenhauerian notion of *Wille*, what he described as 'a subterranean God "not to be named"' (Jung, 1963/1989, p. 13).[29] In his 1916 review of Jung's *Symbols of transformation*, Aleister Crowley recognized that Jung was grounding psychoanalysis in older, and to his mind, more promising theories of *eros*, the metaphysical voluntarism of *magia naturalis*. 'Instead of relating will to sex, he [Jung] related sex to will. Thus all unconsciously, he has paved the way for a revival of the old magical idea of the will as the dynamic aspect of the self' (Crowley, 1916, cited in Kerslake, 2007, p. 210, n. 1). According to this tradition, sex is only one of the ways that the energy of the will becomes concretized. *Wille* in fact has other, higher possibilities: art, knowledge, magic, and ultimately mystical transcendence. Thus where Freud argues that the sex drive is *displaced* into these activities – necessarily for the sake of civilization – Jung argues the opposite: sex is a confinement and reduction of libido which has transcendence as its true end. Precisely because it is initially undetermined, libido is capable of assuming many forms.

The self in Jung is protean, mercurial, and alchemical, subject to constant and progressive transformations, recurring oscillation between opposites, as it strives to take up more and more of the 'alien' and 'other' into its conscious life. Jung holds that every masculine consciousness possesses an unconscious feminine side (the anima), and every feminine consciousness possesses an unconscious masculine side (the animus). These compensatory structures render the opposite sex at once alluring, seductive and threatening. Falling in love is largely a projection of this unconscious aspect onto a member of the opposite sex, a non-relationship that is doomed to fail as the beloved inevitably reveals that they are not the one the lover seeks. The withdrawal of the anima/animus projection is the key to individuation, for it leads the individual to appropriate the disowned aspects of themselves (Jung, 1925). The Jungian theory of contrasexuality is at bottom a recognition of the polarity inherent in psychological development, one that is destined to be projected onto other people.

Polarity, androgyny, hermaphroditism, are, of course, *leitmotifs* of Hermeticism, Gnosticism, Kabbalah and other forms of theosophy. In these esoteric religious movements the whole human being is conceived to be neither male nor female but both. The sundered parts of the androgyny long for each other with a passion that is more than reproductive: what the man seeks in the woman (and vice versa) is a return to the divine self, lost at some cataclysmic moment in the mythic past.

The notion of polarity is central to the vision of Heraclitus, for whom 'God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger – all the opposites' (Heraclitus, cited in Betanzos, 1998, p. 170).[30] The Empedoclean theory of the four

elements, the foundation of Western alchemy, is based on the principle of polarity. The whole cosmos rests on the crossing of two sets of opposites: earth/air and fire/water, which repeat in different ways a formal binary. Masculine/feminine is not the basic alchemical polarity but one manifestation of the formal binary concretized in the four elements. The exact nature of the binary is subject to interpretation: boundedness–boundlessness, contraction–expansion, passivity–activity, repulsion–attraction, no–yes – all have been suggested by various esotericists, from Isaac of Luria, through Jacob Boehme, to Isaac Newton. It seems the binary itself cannot be defined. The fundamental point is the fact of opposition, the compensatory relationship, not the content of the opposition.

At the pinnacle of material nature, the human being, the binary is manifest as masculinity–femininity. Plato's *Symposium*, the seed text for most Western thinking on androgyny, describes the primal human being as sexually complete. After a fall the two sexes divide and ever after long to return to each other.[31] Apocryphal writings of the early Christian Church affirm the primal man as neither male nor female. Hermes Trismegistus declares the Creator to be bisexual, infinitely productive because he possesses attributes of both sexes, and imparting sexual polarity to all that exists so that things might themselves be productive.[32] Midrashic texts depict Adam as androgynous. John Scotus Eriugena maintains that the fall from paradise was the beginning of sexuation. The redemption is effected by the androgynous Christ, who reunites in himself that which was divided into Adam and Eve.[33] Jacob Boehme, drawing on the Kabbalah and Paracelsus, also traces sexuation back to original sin, adding that it is part and parcel of the fall into time. That which is united in eternity cannot but appear in time as divided.[34] Other notable contributors to the myth of androgyny include the eighteenth-century 'speculative Pietist' Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–82); the Swedish visionary Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772); and the 'unknown philosopher' who brought Boehme back to the attention of German philosophy, Louis Claude de Saint-Martin (1743–1803). The androgyny ideal resurfaces in Romanticism, Mesmerism, animal magnetism, and *Naturphilosophie*, in Johann Wilhelm Ritter and Franz van Baader (Betanzos, 1998, pp. 170–171). Betanzos connects the Romantic empowerment of the feminine to the resurgence of the androgyny ideal.[35] 'The separation of these two complementary principles into a plurality of individual persons is evidence of an essential "fault" in the cosmos as a whole... the most manifest sign of fundamental disorder in the world' (Betanzos, 1998, p. 172).[36]

Crucial to note in these pre-psychoanalytical accounts of sexuation is that the androgyny ideal is lost through a 'fall', an expulsion from eternity, a degeneration of the *imago Dei*. It can therefore only be restored through grace. The point is vital for mediating Lacan and Jung. For what Lacan describes is the *natural* impossibility of sexual union, the impossibility of the androgyny by natural means. Lacan does not, and cannot, preclude the possibility that *coniunctio* could be *grace*, the gift of a divine power beyond the human psyche. In these two extremes of asserting the absurdity of the psyche and, on the Jungian side, unequivocally affirming the wholeness of the psyche, we witness the history of theology repeating itself. Assuming the personality is divided, from whence comes wholeness? According to Jung, it comes from 'the self'. According to Lacan, wholeness is a fantasy, necessary to the structure of subjectivity, but fundamentally impossible to attain. If one wished to supplement Lacan with a theology, one could perhaps speak of a wholeness that is beyond psychology. This

would be an integration that comes wholly from without. Of this psychoanalysis as such would have nothing to say.

The heart of the grace–nature debate in medieval theology concerns the integrity of human nature in the light of the revelation of sin, the fall, and the redemption. The opposite positions came to be known as 'extrinsicism' and 'intrinsicism'.[37] Assuming humankind is fallen and has lost intimacy with God, from whence comes atonement? According to intrinsicism, from within human nature itself. What is needed is not so much a transformation of being but an example of a holy life (Jesus) to reawaken the possibilities latent in human freedom. The fall is hereby minimized: we are disoriented but not disfigured by sin. According to extrinsicism, the situation is the reverse. Atonement is a transformation of human nature that comes wholly from without. It is not an actualization of a latent potency or an awakening of the moral character implicit in human nature. Rather, grace essentially changes the human being.

Psychologically speaking, the grace–nature debate concerns the human being's experience of division and fragmentation. For an intrinsicist psychology, wholeness is the actualization of a human potency and the completion of psychological development. For an extrinsicist psychology, wholeness could only come from beyond human nature; the soul is essentially divided, against itself and against others. Such a soul has no inner resources for unifying itself. Read through this theological lens, Jung is an intrinsicist, and Lacan, an extrinsicist. Jung's notion of the archetypal unconscious, teleologically directed toward individuation, harbouring within itself the resources it needs to heal itself and develop (just as birds 'know' how to build nests and acorns 'know' how to become oaks) is the apogee of intrinsicist psychology. Lacan's position is, with equal extremity, the paragon of pessimism. To be sure, Lacan does not posit some lost state of unity, which could be restored to the human subject through an act of grace. Unity would in fact destroy subjectivity itself. One could, however, with a few deft moves, make Lacan into Kierkegaard.[38] The psychoanalytical experience of the intrinsically divided subject could be read as the experience of the soul in sin, its 'natural' state. From this position, the soul cannot anticipate wholeness, not even as a fantasy. Grace does not restore the soul in Kierkegaard's extrinsicism but destroys its present state of existence for the sake of remaking it entirely.[39]

Aquinas avoided both extrinsicism and intrinsicism by distinguishing a potency for divinization from a potency for receiving the grace that divinizes us (*potentia obedientialis*). Act and potency are strictly correlative in Aquinas's Aristotelian ontology: the act is the natural and necessary perfection of the potency, as the oak is the perfection of the acorn. If we possessed a potency for it, divinization would be the natural completion of the human being, an act towards which the soul is naturally oriented, like laughter or speaking. An intrinsicist theology in which the human being is characterized as possessing a potency for divinization denies, according to Aquinas, the gift-character of grace. Grace is 'unexacted', neither required as the natural fulfillment of the soul nor anticipated in any concrete sense. *Potentia obedientialis* is the potency, not for divinity, but for the act that makes us capable of receiving divinizing grace. It is the potency for allowing ourselves to be changed by an act of God. Aquinas understands it as the creature's inalienable ability to respond to an ontological intervention from its Creator. Psychologically this potency is experienced as a dissatisfaction with the merely natural ends of the human being. Aquinas describes the fallen soul as stretching toward a wholeness which it cannot achieve on its own resources; all our desires and feelings orient us to a perfection which exceeds

our natural grasp. Essential to Aquinas's middle way between intrinsicism and extrinsicism is his identification of a vague anticipation of wholeness in human nature, a sense for the transcendent, which directs the human being beyond itself. Grace comes from without but it perfects a natural desire.[40]

Something like this theology of grace can be seen in alchemical imagery.[41] Mercurius, the androgyny, the super-fertile being who needs nothing outside of itself to create, is identified with the Holy Spirit as well as the spirit in nature; s/he is thus the very emblem of a transformative energy which is both immanent and transcendent (Jung, 1955–56, para. 22). To reduce Mercurius to nature would be to miss the divine aspect; similarly to identify it exclusively with the divine would be to miss the natural aspect. Mercurius is the mediator of all opposites, not only masculine and feminine, devil and Christ, but nature and divinity. If one follows the alchemical symbolism carefully one sees that Mercurius is not a thing that could be possessed by the alchemist, not simply a substance to be manipulated.[42] S/he comes when s/he wills, or perhaps not at all. At no point can the alchemist claim an absolute command over nature. And yet alchemy is not only a religious attitude, it is also a scientific technique. On the one hand, the alchemist must 'fix the volatile' and 'capture Mercurius', the 'fleeting hart' (*cervus fugitivus*). On the other hand, the alchemist must recognize that he or she participates in processes of transformation that can never be fully commanded. The alchemist therefore exhibits qualities more typical of a monk than a modern scientist.

Jung believes that Mercurius is the individuated self, the one who no longer needs to be made productive by some act from outside, but is productive in and of itself. In Jungian psychology the androgyny ideal is determinative of all normal and abnormal psychological developments. The psyche cannot tolerate one-sidedness but endeavours to include within itself as much polarity as it can manage. The sexual identity of the ego is horizoned by the spectral figure of the other, who embodies all that the ego is not. The psyche drives the personality toward a union of opposites, a *coincidentia oppositorum*: the feminization of the masculine, and the masculinization of the feminine. *Coniunctio* is perhaps never fully realized, yet it remains the goal of psychological movement and development. For Jung, the relations between the sexes, with their inevitable projection and disappointments, serve the purpose of turning individuals back into themselves, into their unconscious, where alone they could find the things they were seeking outside themselves. But a more esoteric interpretation of sexual love is possible: the flawed nature of physical union turns us away from sex altogether toward something more elusive but infinitely more satisfying.

Woman seeks the phallus, Lacan says, but the phallus is not a penis; it is a symbol, *the* signifier, the ground of the symbolic, the foundation of reason and law, in short, the *logos*. Man seeks the lost object, the mother's love, i.e. total relatedness, or *eros*. What his consciousness most lacks hers appears to possess and vice versa. Read through Jung we can say he has suffered a fracture in his eros; she has suffered a fracture in her logos. Each seeks in the other what he or she most lack in themselves. But here is the decisive difference: for Lacan there is no salvation through interiority. The interior is just a mirror of the exterior, a reflection of the lack experienced in the non-relationship between the sexes. Lacan insists that these two sick people do not carry within themselves the things they seek in each other. The Lacanian sees anima–animus as nothing but mythologized images of object *a* and phallus; we could also say that they are traces of the lost androgyny. What Lacan offers analytical psychology is the crucial insight that erotic projection is perhaps not best described as the

externalization of an inner, alienated content; it is an experience of the tragic nature of sexuation. But we need not conclude therefrom that wholeness is impossible, a fantasy. It may be that wholeness is ultimately not a psychological phenomena at all, that its structure, achievement and loss cannot be thematized within the necessary limits of clinical work. Jung on the religious dimension of the libido becomes relevant here, perhaps more relevant than he himself realized (Jung, 1933, pp. 122–124). Libido not only leads beyond sex; it leads beyond psychology. This is not to say wholeness cannot be thematized at all. It is rather to gesture to the possibility of a fully elaborated meta-psychology, one that is inevitably metaphysical, perhaps even theological.

Notes

1. See Žižek, 1996, pp. 104, 155, 209.
2. Susan Rowland (2002) surveys some of these feminist responses to Jung. In fact, Jung's theory of contrasexuality is one of the least original elements of his psychology, for it is deeply rooted in Western esoteric traditions, from ancient Gnosticism, through medieval Kabbalah, to Renaissance Hermeticism. Jung's relationship to Western esotericism has not received the attention it deserves. Scholars of Western esotericism frequently refer to Jung (see Faivre, 2006, p. 825; Goodrick-Clarke, 2008, pp. 246–247; Drob, 2000, pp. 48–51), and scholars of Jung have contributed to the establishment of Western esotericism as a field in its own right by advancing Jung's psychological appropriations of esoteric material (see Schwarz-Salant, 1998). We are still, however, in need of a full-scale reconstruction of Jung's relationship to Western esoteric traditions.
3. There is undeniably a structuralist element to Jung, a point which has been noticed by Jungians who have ventured fusions of Jung and Lacan. See Samuels (1986, pp. 40–41). 'The Symbolic order patterns the contents of the Imaginary in the same way that archetypal structures predispose humans towards certain sets of experiences' (Samuels, 1986, p. 40). Indeed, the fundamental thesis of structuralism, that human cultures must be understood systematically rather than historically – that is, in terms of recurring systems of binaries operating within languages rather than in terms of the genesis of symbols from events in a people's history – is basically in harmony with Jung's archetypal approach to mythology and psychic imagery. Difficulties emerge, however, when the question of ontology is raised. Samuels, for example, suggests that Lacan's 'real' corresponds to 'external reality' (Samuels, 1986, p. 40). In Žižek's Lacan, the real is not 'real', it is not a substance persisting outside language; it is rather the lack or primordial absence which must be excluded from subjectivity in the same way that an axiom must be excluded from a system in Gödel's theorem of incompleteness. To put it baldly, there is no 'external reality' in Lacan. This reading of Lacan troubles Samuels's correlation of Jung's notion of oppositional sexuation with Lacan's notion of differential sexuation (Samuels, 1986, p. 180). On one reading of Jung (the alchemico-ontological reading), masculine and feminine are symbols of natural, ontological, polarities – that is, extrapsychic structures found in both human culture and the natural world. For Lacan, the masculine and the feminine are signs without any 'transcendent' or ontological referent, but which only mean something in differentiation from each other. The masculine is the 'non-feminine'; the feminine is the 'non-masculine'. That is not to say that a structuralist overhaul of Jung is not possible. With a writer as theoretically vague as Jung on key points (epistemology, ontology), multiple readings are inevitable.
4. Both Freud and Jung were well-versed in German romanticism (Gödde, 1999; Zentner, 1995; Shamdasani, 2003). But where Freud sought to sever the ties between psychoanalysis and romanticism (Marquard, 1987), Jung actively researched romantic psychology (Shamdasani, 2003, pp. 164–168). Lacan's claim that the Freudian unconscious has nothing to do with the romantic unconscious (Lacan, 1998) is half-true: Freud's unconscious is not the romantic unconscious, but not because it comes from some other arena of inquiry (some more 'rigorously scientific' field than romantic philosophy); rather, it is because Freud has revised the romantic concept of the unconscious, medicalized it and made it fit into his anti-metaphysical, atheist scientism.

5. Shamdasani (2003) has reminded us of how many theories of the unconscious were afoot when Freud began his clinical work. Kerslake (2007), in his study of Deleuze's esoteric sources, has also made an important contribution to amplifying the non-Freudian unconscious.
6. See the Fichte polemic of the early Hölderlin, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and the early Schelling, masterfully reconstructed in Beiser (2002).
7. 'The world we do not see is equal to ours [the world we do see] in weight and measure, in nature and properties. From this it follows that there exists another half of man in which this invisible world operates. If we know of the two worlds, we realize that both halves are needed to constitute the whole man; for they are like to two men united in one body' (Paracelsus, *Werke*, 1, 9, p. 258, cited in Jacobi, 1951, p. 43).
8. 'This light reaches man, as in a dream' (Paracelsus, *Werke*, 1, 13, p. 325, cited in Jacobi, 1951, p. 181). On the use of hallucinogenics in medieval magic, see Couliano, 1987, pp. 153–154.
9. Phantasmic knowledge was the foundation of natural magic in the Renaissance (see Couliano, 1987, pp. 111–129). On the role of the phantasm in medieval psychology see McGrath, 2007. On Paracelsus's theory of knowledge see Doan, 2009.
10. This is one of the meanings of Lacan's *Vel*, the mathematical sign for an either/or choice. Modern people are faced with an impossible choice, akin to the pseudo-choice of the mugger, 'your money or your life'. The choice is between subjectivity (rationality, symbolic life, etc.) and being (natural life, immediacy, embodiment). Just as one cannot choose to save one's money in the mugger's dilemma, for the one who chooses to save his or her money loses his or her life, and therefore his or her money as well, so too the modern subject cannot choose being or nature over subjectivity because there will be no one left to enjoy that which is chosen (see Lacan, 1998, p. 211).
11. '"Subjectivization" thus consists in the purely formal gesture of symbolic conversion by means of which the subject integrates into his symbolic universe – turns into part and parcel of his life narrative, provides with meaning – the meaningless contingency of his destiny. In clear contrast, "subjective destitution" involves the opposite gesture: at the end of the psychoanalytic cure, the analysand has to suspend the urge to symbolize/internalize, to interpret, to search for a "deeper meaning"; he has to accept that the traumatic encounters which traced out the itinerary of his life were utterly contingent and indifferent, that they bear no "deeper message"' (Žižek, 1996, p. 94).
12. See Jung, 1931, para. 702: 'The unconscious is not just a receptacle but is the matrix of the very things that the conscious mind would like to be rid of. We can go a step further and say that the unconscious actually creates *new* contents . . . it seems to me far more important to find out what really constitutes the *positive* activity of the unconscious. The positive function of the unconscious is, in the main, merely disturbed by repressions, and this disturbance of its natural activity is perhaps the most important source of the so-called psychogenic illnesses.' Jung's anti-Freudian emphasis on the positive quality of unconscious interruptions of conscious life has recently been proven to be a source for Deleuze and Guattari, who reject the negativity of Lacan (Kerslake, 2007, p. 69–102). Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 27: 'The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible.'
13. See Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 8: 'Desiring-machines work only when they break down, and by continually breaking down.'
14. 'One therefore does not speak to the subject. It speaks of him, and that is how he apprehends himself; this is all the more necessary in that, before he disappears, as subject beneath the signifier which he becomes, due to the simple fact that it addresses him, he is absolutely nothing . . . an effect of language, in that he is born of this original split, the subject translates a signifying synchrony into this primordial temporal pulsation that is the constitutive fading of his identification' (Lacan, 1966, p. 265).
15. 'The process of regression is beautifully illustrated in an image used by Freud. The libido can be compared with a river which, when it meets with an obstruction, gets dammed up and causes an inundation. If this river has previously, in its upper reaches, dug out other channels, these channels will be filled up again by reason of the damming below . . . The river has not permanently flowed back into the old channels, but only for as long as the obstruction lasts in the main stream . . . These channels were once stages or stations in

development of the main river-bed, passing possibilities, traces of which still exist and can therefore be used again in times of flood' (Jung, 1955, para. 367).

16. See Carus, 1851, p. 442: 'We have often noted that even in that which we call the unconscious, a higher, divine wisdom emerges in a particular way, a wisdom which our conscious spirit overall and imperfectly strives for.'
17. Building on Schelling's early notion of the unconscious, K. F. Burdach, C. G. Carus, and G. H. Schubert established what could be described as the first school of dynamic psychology. Their work was almost entirely eclipsed by the rise of the Herbart school, the proximate inspiration of Freudian psychoanalysis (see Ellenberger, 1970, pp. 205–208; Orth, 1914).
18. Some scholars of Western Esotericism have gone so far as to describe Jung as the last representative of the tradition of *Naturphilosophie* (Faivre, 2006).
19. 'The symbolic order [consciousness] kills the living being or organism in us, rewriting it or overwriting it with signifiers, such that being dies ("the letter kills") and only the signifier lives on' (Fink, 1995, p. 101).
20. Lacan, television interview, '"Television": Lacan on the unconscious'. Retrieved August 28, 2009 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URsYj-TVFjc
21. Granted Jung's earliest notion of the unconscious was conceived in subjectivistic terms (largely because of a lingering fidelity to a youthful reading of Kant), his mature notion of the unconscious, which leads to the alchemical studies and the theory of synchronicity, is as much extrapsychic as it is intrapsychic. The *unus mundus* is the alchemical trope Jung adopts to articulate a theory of the unconscious as the natural foundation of subjectivity (see von Franz, 1972/1998, pp. 235–252).
22. 'We can take things no further along this path than to demonstrate that no signification can be sustained except by reference to another signification' (Lacan, 2002, p. 141).
23. 'There is no subject without some external "prosthetic" supplement which provides the minimum of his phantasmic identity – that is to say, the subject emerges via the "externalization" of the most intimate kernel of his being (his "fundamental fantasy"); the moment he gets too close to this traumatic content and "internalizes" it, his very self-identity dissolves' (Žižek, 1996, p. 36).
24. 'There is no such thing as a sexual relationship'.
25. Žižek's thesis that femininity itself is a masquerade, a dissimulation, is not universally accepted by Lacanians. According to Žižek, she is as empty as he is, as alienated and shut out as he is, but the illusion comes to prevail that she retains access to the real (Žižek, 1996, pp. 155–161).
26. 'I alone logically pursued the two problems which most interested Freud: the problem of "archaic vestiges" and that of sexuality. It is a widespread error to imagine that I do not see the value of sexuality. On the contrary, it plays a large part in my psychology as an essential – though not the whole – expression of psychic wholeness. But my main concern has been to investigate, over and above its personal significance and biological function, its spiritual aspect and its numinous meaning, and thus to explain what Freud was so fascinated by but was unable to grasp' (Jung, 1963/1989, p. 168).
27. On the significance of sexuality for the early Jung see Kerslake, 2007, pp. 70–82.
28. 'There was no mistaking the fact that Freud was emotionally involved in his sexual theory to an extraordinary degree. When he spoke of it, his tone became urgent, almost anxious, and all signs of his normally critical and skeptical manner vanished. A strange, deeply moved expression came over his face, the cause of which I was at a loss to understand. I had a strong intuition that for him sexuality was a sort of *numinosum*' (Jung, 1963, p. 150).
29. While Schopenhauer is perhaps Jung's most important philosophical influence, his notion of libido is also informed by Bergson's *élan vital* and Schelling's absolute (see Shamdasani, 2003, p. 163).
30. 'And so, when a person meets the half that is his very own, whatever his orientation, whether it is to young men or not, then something wonderful happens: the two are struck from their senses by love, by a sense of belonging to one another, and by desire, and they don't want to be separated from one another, not even for a moment. These are the people who finish out their lives together and still cannot say what it is they want from one another. No one would think it is the intimacy of sex – that mere sex is the reason each lover takes so great and deep a joy in being with the other. It's obvious that the soul of

every lover longs for something else; his soul cannot say what it is, but like an oracle it has a sense of what it wants and like an oracle it hides behind a riddle' (Plato, *Symposium,* 189e–193e, cited in Cooper & Hutchinson, 2002). There are two points worth making about this passage. First: sexual polarity does not exclude homosexual love. Second: the telos of love is not sex.

31. 'He, filled with all the fecundity of both sexes in one, and ever teeming with his own goodness, unceasingly brings into being all that he has willed to generate; and all that he wills is good. . . . You say, then, Trismegistus, that God is bisexual? – Yes, Asclepius; and not God alone, but all kinds of beings, whether endowed with soul or soulless. Nothing that exists can be barren' (Scott, 1985, vol. 1, p. 333, *Asclepius* 20b).
32. 'Brought low by the guilt of his sin, man suffered the division of his nature into masculine and feminine, and because he was unwilling to use the heavenly mode of propagation, a just judgment reduced him to animal-like and corruptible multiplicity, consisting of male and female. This division began to be healed in Christ, who in his own person accorded human nature the beginning of restoration and future resurrection' (John Scotus Eriugena, *De divisione naturae*, cited in Betanzos, 1998, pp. 176–177).
33. Eliade, 1965, pp. 78–124.
34. 'When the tincture of light and water [Boehme's symbols for male and female] was separated from him into a woman, he [Adam] could not exist eternally in the image which he thereby became; for his rose-garden of paradise within him, wherein he loved himself, was taken away from him' (Boehme, 1930, Chapter VI, para. 3).
35. 'As her star rose, polarization between "herself" and "himself" became more manifest' (Betanzos, 1998, p. 170).
36. For Baader, the lost wholeness of the androgyny haunts all of creation. The desire for its restoration animates being. 'Everything that lives and assumes bodily form results from this androgynous desire, which is the secret, impenetrable, and magical workshop of all life' (Baader, *Werke* 1, 46, cited in Betanzos, 1998, p. 175).
37. The term 'extrinsicism' was coined by Maurice Blondel in his pivotal review of the Scholastic notion of the supernatural. We are using the term here in a related but more formal sense.
38. Marcus Pound has done something like this in his *Theology, psychoanalysis and trauma* (2007).
39. At least this is the view of Kiekergaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus in the *Philosophical fragments* (Kierkegaard, 1985). Climacus contrasts Christianity, which teaches that the human being is 'sin' and can only experience truth as interruption and paradox, with Socrates, for whom the human being has merely forgotten truth and must recollect it. The Socratic position as presented by Kierkegaard is intrinsicist: the human being need not undergo a fundamental change in being in order to experience the truth; we simply need to remember that which we have momentarily forgotten, that which we have always already known. There is, therefore, no real moment of beginning in Socratic anthropology. For Climacus's version of the Christian, on the other hand, the moment of conversion is of 'decisive significance': something begins then which is wholly discontinuous with what preceded it.
40. 'Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it' (Aquinas, 1947, question 1, article 8). More specifically Aquinas describes human nature as essentially directed beyond itself: 'Man is directed to God, as to an end that exceeds the grasp of his reason' (Aquinas, 1947, question 1, article 1). The concept of *potentia obedientialis* is well elaborated in the literature. For a recent treatment see Jenkins, 1997, p. 141–144.
41. It is worth pointing out that the medieval Church, in fact, never condemned alchemy. Alchemy was understood to be distinct from sorcery, even if certain alchemists combined the two. Some of the greatest alchemists of the Middle Ages were Christian clerics, e.g. Albertus Magnus. The enemy of alchemy was not medieval Christianity but the Reformation, modernity, and the epistemology of representation associated with Descartes (see Couliano, 1987; Foucault, 1994).
42. See for example the imagery of the seventeenth-century *Mutus liber* in which the alchemists kneel in prayer before the alembic, awaiting the descent of Mercurius from above (McLean, 1991). Jung touches on the gift-character of Mercurius in many places in his alchemical studies (see especially 'The spirit Mercurius', 1948, paras. 239–303). As a

symbol of the self, it is clear that Mercurius cannot be commanded by the ego. In any case, the notion of grace we are articulating here is not well-elaborated by Jung, even though several passages, such as the following, seem to imply it: 'The great difficulty here, however, is that no one knows how the paradoxical wholeness of man can ever be realized. That is the crux of individuation, though it becomes a problem only when the loophole of "scientific" or other kinds of cynicism is not used. Because the realization of the wholeness that has been made conscious is an apparently insoluble task and faces the psychologist with questions which he can answer only with hesitation and uncertainty, it is of the greatest interest to see how the more unencumbered symbolic thinking of a medieval "philosopher" tackled the problem' (Jung, 1955–56, para. 680).

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