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Jung's very twentieth-century view of myth

Robert A. Segal, *Lancaster, UK*

Abstract: It is commonly assumed that Jung's view of myth, like his view of everything else, is best understood vis-à-vis Freud's. I argue that Jung in fact positions himself much more broadly, not merely against other psychologists of myth but more fundamentally against non-psychologists altogether. Undeniably, Jung pits his theory against Freud's, but only *after* pitting both his theory and Freud's against those theories that assume the subject matter of myth to be the external world rather than the human mind and that assume the function of myth to be either the explanation or the description of the external world rather than the expression of the human mind. The theorists whom Jung challenges are called 'nature mythologists', for whom myth is either a literal explanation or a symbolic description of the natural world. Which element of the natural world myth is about varies from nature mythologist to nature mythologist. The two leading nature mythologists, both of whom Jung cites, were Edward Tylor and James Frazer. Their theories epitomize the nineteenth-century approach to myth. For them, myth is the 'primitive' counterpart to science, which is entirely modern. For them, myth and science are incompatible, science is true and myth false, and myth must therefore go when science comes. Jung's rejection of the external world as the referent of myth and of explanation or description of that world as the function of myth epitomizes the twentieth-century response to nineteenth-century theories. For not merely Jung and Freud but also twentieth-century theorists generally, myth is anything but the 'primitive' counterpart to modern science. Consequently, myth and science are not rivals, so that myth need not go when science comes.

Key words: explanation, modern, myth, primitive, projection, religion, science, synchronicity.

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C. G. Jung is eager to trace the psychologizing of the world all the way back to ancient Gnostics and in turn to medieval alchemists (see Segal 1992, pp. 8–11). For Jung, and also for Freud, the twentieth century has been distinctive in its clear-cut separation of the psychological from the physical and the metaphysical – the separation of the inner from the outer. What has preceded this differentiation has been not merely the projection of the inner onto the outer but, in at least one famous case, the reduction of the outer to

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the inner. In Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus* Mephistopheles describes hell as a sheer state of mind:

> Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscribed
> In any one self place; for where we are is hell,
> And where hell is, there must we ever be.
>
> (1604 ed., Act I, 553–55)

For Mephistopheles, whether or not for Marlowe himself, the world *is* the mind. Jung often cites Goethe's Mephistopheles but not Marlowe's and therefore not these lines.

In an even more famous case the outer is reduced to the inner yet still retained as outer. In *Paradise Lost* (1667) Milton somehow combines riveting descriptions of hell and paradise as places 'out there' in the world with characterizations of them as sheer states of mind. Rather than reducing hell and paradise to states of mind, he makes them at once physical places and states of mind, though never disclosing how they can be both. Jung cites *Paradise Lost*, most of all in analysing the Miller fantasies, but he considers different issues from this one (see Jung 1967, paras. 60–84 passim; see also Jung 1969d, paras. 468–73).

On the one hand for Milton, hell, into which Satan and his retinue land after their fall from heaven, is a lake of fire, the light from which only makes the place darker. The beach is itself on fire and so offers no respite from the heat:

> At once as far as Angels' ken he [Satan] views
> The dismal Situation waste and wild,
> A Dungeon horrible, on all sides round
> As one great Furnace flam'd, yet from those flames
> No light, but rather darkness visible
> Serv'd only to discover sights of woe,
> Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
> And rest can never dwell, hope never comes
> That comes to all; but torture without end
> Still urges, and a fiery Deluge, fed
> With ever-burning Sulphur unconsum'd
>
> (I, 59–69)

On the other hand for Milton, hell is a state of mind. Satan, upon awakening in hell, actually boasts that both heaven and hell are the product of mind and can therefore be established anywhere at will:

> The mind is its own place, and in itself
> Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.
>
> (I, 254–5)

Later, Satan says the same, but now in self-doubt rather than arrogance, as he recognizes what he has lost and recognizes that, as evil, he turns everything into hell:

Me miserable! which way shall I fly
Infinite wrath, and infinite despair?
Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell

(IV, 73–5)

It is not just Satan the character who makes hell and paradise into mental states. As author, Milton writes of Satan that

. . . from the bottom stir
The Hell within him, for within him Hell
He brings, and round about him, nor from Hell
One step no more than from himself can fly
By change of place . . .

(IV, 19–21)

What for Milton is true of hell is also true of paradise. On the one hand it is a place 'out there', lovingly and lushly described:

Thus was this place,
A happy rural seat of various view:
Groves whose rich Trees wept odorous Gums and Balm,
Others whose fruit burnisht with Golden Rind
Hung amiable, Hesperian Fables true,
If true, here only, and of delicious taste.

(IV, 246–51)

On the other hand the archangel Michael, having consoled Adam with knowledge of the virtues that human beings can acquire only in the wake of the fall – Faith, Patience, Temperance, Love, and Charity – concludes:

then wilt thou not be loath
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess
A paradise within thee, happier far.

(XII, 585–87)

For Freud and Jung alike, the modern psychologizing of the world has not meant the reduction of the world to the mind, as in idealism, in Marlowe's Mephistopheles, and in one side of Milton. Nor has it meant the reduction of the world to a human creation, as in social constructionism. On the contrary, it has meant the *differentiation* of the world 'out there' – a world independent of humans – from the imposition upon the world of elements belonging to humans *rather than* to the world. Projections onto the outer world, which had taken the form of gods, have by now largely been withdrawn. The outer world has come to be recognized as a natural rather than a supernatural domain, to be explained by impersonal scientific laws rather than by the decisions of gods. This position is different from Milton's, for whom there is no projection and so no conflation of humans with the world.

For Milton, there is, instead, at once the reduction of the world to the mind, as in idealism, and the retention of an independent world 'out there', as in realism.

For both Freud and Jung, the modern rise of science has spelled the fall of religion. Writes Freud in *The Future of an Illusion*:

> Let us consider the unmistakable situation as it is to-day. We have heard the admission that religion no longer has the same influence on people that it used to.... Let us admit that the reason – though perhaps not the only reason – for this change is the increase of the scientific spirit in the higher strata of human society. Criticism has whittled away the evidential value of religious documents, natural science has shown up the errors in them...
>
> (Freud 1961, p. 38)

Writes Jung:

> They [alchemists] did not find a solution, nor was this possible so long as their conceptual language was not freed from projection into matter and did not become psychological. Only in the following centuries, with the growth of natural science, was the projection withdrawn from matter and entirely abolished together with the psyche. This development of consciousness has still not reached its end. Nobody, it is true, any longer endows matter with mythological properties. This form of projection has become obsolete.
>
> (Jung 1968, para. 395)

For Jung, the 'development of consciousness' is not yet finished because projections remain, but they are 'now confined to personal and social relationships' – that is, to other persons and peoples, not to animals, plants, and stones (Jung 1968, para. 395).

For the Freud of *Totem and Taboo*, religion not only incorrectly explains the physical world but, worse, harms adherents psychologically by aggravating rather than alleviating the guilt felt over sexual and aggressive drives. Freud therefore rejoices in the demise of religion. By contrast, Jung laments that the loss of religion as an explanation of the world has simultaneously meant the loss of an effective means of tending to the unconscious. Alternative venues must therefore be found. Yet Jung does not thereby propose the rejection of science as the explanation of the world.

Admittedly, Jung's position on the relationship of religion and science is, unlike Freud's, ambiguous, and has been variously interpreted. At one extreme lies Richard Noll (1994), for whom Jung is atavistically striving to resurrect pre-Christian paganism to fend off modern science. For Noll, Jung is defiantly anti-scientific. At the other extreme lies Anthony Stevens (1982), for whom Jung is striving to make his psychology biological and therefore presumably as non-religious as possible. For Stevens, Jung is not merely scientific but presciently so, anticipating biologists' discoveries by decades. In between Noll and Stevens lies, for example, F. X. Charet (1993),

for whom Jung enlists spiritualism as a way of reconciling religion with science.[1]

Without presuming to have deciphered Jung's ultimate convictions, I would simply caution against any easing of the place of science for him. First, Jung's medical training, his psychiatric discoveries, his clinical writings, and his litany-like characterization of himself as an empirical scientist all bespeak beholdenness to science. Second, it is religion as psychology, not religion as metaphysics, that grabs him. He appeals to ancient Gnosticism and to medieval alchemy as precursors of his analytical psychology, not as precursors of some modern brand of philosophy (see Jung 1963, p. 205). He subjects them, and religion generally, to the same relentless psychologizing to which everything else he touches gets subjected. Third, in *Psychological Types* Jung seeks to psychologize psychologies competing with his own. Fourth, while he indisputably wants to broaden science to encompass Chinese science and, with it, synchronicity (see Jung 1966b, para. 80–81), he thereby wants to place them *within* science, not outside it.

Fifth, in all his writings Jung is mainly addressing those who no longer believe in the religious explanation of the world and who must, then, seek secular substitutes for religion – but for religion as psychology, not for religion as explanation. Sixth, the fullest substitute that Jung offers is his psychology itself, which provides an encounter with oneself, not with the physical world. Finally, even when Jung writes that 'In itself any scientific theory, no matter how subtle, has, I think, less value from the standpoint of psychological truth than religious dogma' (Jung 1969c, para. 81), he is referring to psychology, not to biology, chemistry, or physics. For an explanation of the physical world, he, no less than Freud, turns to natural science, to which religion must defer.[2]

Yet for neither Jung nor Freud does the surrender of religion to science mean the surrender of myth. Even though for Freud and Jung alike myth has traditionally been part of religion, they are able to sever myth from religion and thereby save it from science. While Freud clearly cares less about saving myth than Jung does, if only because for Freud myth perpetuates rather than cures neurosis, he, too, makes myth possible in the modern age by extricating it from religion. Freud and Jung do so both by widening the range of myth to include secular myths and, more, by interpreting myth as other than a literal explanation of events in the physical world. Their preservation of myth in the face of science exemplifies the twentieth-century approach to myth – and is the opposite of the nineteenth-century one.

[1] For a careful presentation of Jung's varying positions on the relationship between religion and science, see Main 2000.

[2] On this take on Jung on religion and science, see Segal 1995 and 1999a.

Myth as the 'primitive' counterpart to science: Tylor and Frazer

The nineteenth century saw myth as really, not just seemingly, about the physical world. The most famous nineteenth-century theorists were the English anthropologist Edward Tylor, whose chief work, *Primitive Culture*, first appeared in 1871, and the Scottish classicist and anthropologist James Frazer, the first edition of whose main opus, *The Golden Bough*, was published in 1890. Both Tylor and Frazer take for granted that myth is part of religion and, as such, serves to explain physical events. The explanation is always a decision by a god and is therefore always a reason, not a 'mere' cause. For example, a myth says that it rains because a god decides to send rain, with the myth often explaining how the god became responsible for rain and how the god exercises that responsibility.

For Tylor, myth provides knowledge of the physical world as an end in itself. For Frazer, the knowledge that myth provides is a means to control over the physical world. For both, myth is the 'primitive' counterpart to science, which is wholly modern. 'Modern myth' is a contradiction in terms. By science is meant natural science, not social science. The events explained by myth are primarily external ones like the falling of rain and the rising of the sun, though also human events like birth and death. Myths about customs, laws, institutions, and other social phenomena are regarded as secondary.

For Tylor, myth and science are identical in function. Both serve to account for all events in the physical world. Yet more than redundant, the two are incompatible. It is not simply that myth is no longer *needed* once science arises. It is that myth is no longer *possible*. For both myth and science offer direct accounts of events. According to myth, the rain god, let us suppose, collects rain in buckets and then, for whatever reason, chooses to empty the buckets on some spot below. According to science, meteorological processes cause rain. One cannot reconcile the accounts by stacking a mythological account atop a scientific account, for the rain god acts directly rather than through natural processes. Taking for granted that science is true, Tylor unhesitatingly pronounces myth false.

Tylor would likely concede that even in myth causation is never exclusively personalistic. The decision of the rain god to dump buckets of rain on a chosen spot below presupposes physical laws that account for the accumulation of rain in heaven, the capacity of the buckets to retain the rain, and the direction of the dumped rain. But to maintain his rigid hiatus between myth and science, Tylor would doubtless note that myths themselves ignore physical processes and focus instead on decisions.

Again, science here means natural, not social, science. For Tylor, personalistic explanations of *human* actions are not unscientific, and the social sciences readily provide them. Mythic explanations of human phenomena like customs and institutions may be fantastic and in that looser sense unscientific, but they are not unscientific because personalistic. Today behaviourism in the social

sciences has long peaked, and cognitive science demonstrates constraints on decisions rather than rules them out. Whatever the mix of personalistic and impersonal ingredients in contemporary explanations of human actions, only personalistic explanations of events in the physical world are usually considered unscientific. There is thus a disjunction between the kinds of explanations permitted of human behaviour and the kinds permitted of the behaviour of the physical world. In myth there is no disjunction. The physical world operates the same way the human world does, simply on a grander scale.

For Frazer, myth is false because it is tied to magic, which stems from the failure to make basic logical distinctions. As illustrated by voodoo, magic fails to distinguish between a symbol and the symbolized: a voodoo doll is assumed by practitioners to be identical with the person of whom it is an image rather than merely symbolic of the person. Otherwise what one did to the image would not affect the person. Voodoo works by imitating on the image what one wants to happen to the person.

For Frazer, magic puts myth into practice in the form of ritual, which is an attempt to gain control over the physical world, especially over crops. Typically, the king plays the role of the key god of the pantheon, that of vegetation, and acts out the key part of the myth, or biography, of the god: his death and rebirth. As with voodoo, so here, imitating the rebirth of the god of vegetation is believed to cause the same to happen to the god. And as the god goes, so go the crops. Strictly, the cause of the rebirth of crops is thus not a decision by the god, as it would be for Tylor, but the physical condition of the god: a revived god automatically spells revived crops. The ritual is performed at the end – the desired end – of winter, presumably when stored-up provisions are running low.[3] Myth still explains the state of the crops, as for Tylor, but for the purpose of reviving them, not just for the purpose of explaining their revival. For Frazer, myth is the 'primitive' counterpart to *applied* science rather than, as for Tylor, the 'primitive' counterpart to *theoretical* science. Myth is even more blatantly false for Frazer than for Tylor because it fails to deliver the goods.

In the twentieth century Tylor's and Frazer's theories have been spurned by fellow theorists of myth on many grounds: for pitting myth against science and thereby precluding both traditional myths and modern ones, for subsuming myth under religion and thereby precluding secular myths, for deeming the function of myth explanatory, for deeming the subject matter of myth the physical world, and for deeming myth false. Nevertheless, Tylor's and Frazer's

[3] Frazer also offers an alternative scenario, according to which the king, now himself divine, is actually killed at the first sign of weakening and is immediately replaced, thereby ensuring that the god of vegetation residing within the incumbent promptly regains his health. As the king goes, so goes the god, and so in turn go the crops. On Frazer's dual scenarios, see Segal 1998a, pp. 3–5.

theories have remained central to the study of myth, and subsequent theories can be taken as rejoinders to them.[4]

The overarching twentieth-century rejoinder to Tylor and Frazer has been the denial that myth must go when science comes. Twentieth-century theories have defiantly sought to preserve myth in the face of science. Yet they have not done so by challenging science as the reigning explanation of the physical world. They have not taken any of the easy routes: 'relativizing' science, 'sociologizing' science, or 'mythicizing' science. Rather, they have recharacterized myth itself as other than a literal explanation of the physical world. Myth for them is compatible with science because of their reconfiguration of myth, not because of any reconfiguration of science.

I divide twentieth-century theories into three groups: (a) those which maintain that myth, while still about the world, is not an explanation, in which case its function runs askew to that of science; (b) those which maintain that myth is not to be read literally, in which case it is not even referring to the physical world; and, most radically, (c) those which maintain both that myth is not an explanation of the world and that myth is not to be read literally. I place both Freud and Jung in this third camp.

The issue for twentieth-century theorists has never been whether 'primitives' have myth. That they do, it is taken for granted. The issue is whether moderns, who by definition have science, can also have myth. Twentieth-century theorists have argued that they can and do. Only at the end of the century, with the emergence of post-modernism, has the deference to science been questioned. I myself stop with modernism, for which the main divide is into 'primitive' and modern, not into modern and post-modern. Raya Jones (2003) offers a distinctively post-modern assessment of Jung on myth.

[4] To be sure, much recent theorizing about myth has been a variation on either Tylor or Frazer. Led by the French anthropologist Pascal Boyer (1994), 'cognitivists' follow Tylor in seeing myth as a 'primitive' explanation of the world, but they focus on how the mind constrains mythic explanations rather than, like Tylor, on the explanations themselves. Similarly, the German classicist Walter Burkert (1996) and the French literary critic René Girard (1972) have given new twists to Frazer's myth-ritualism. Where in Frazer's alternative scenario, myth is the script for the ritualistic killing of the king, whose death and replacement ensure the rebirth of crops, for Burkert myth reinforces the ritual that commemorates the past hunting of animals for food. The function of myth is not physical but psychological and social: to cope with the guilt and anxiety that members of society feel toward their own aggression. Where in the alternative scenario of Frazer's the king is willing to die for the sake of his subjects, for Girard the king (or someone else) is selected as a scapegoat to blame for the violence in society. Rather than directing the ritualistic killing, as for Frazer, myth for Girard arises afterwards to cover up the deed by turning the victim into a criminal and then into a hero. The function of myth is social: to preserve the ethos of sociability by hiding not only the killing but also the violence endemic to society – violence stemming ultimately from the 'mimetic' nature of human beings. While Boyer, Burkert, and Girard do offer revivals of the theories of Tylor and Frazer, the variations they introduce do not bring myth back to the external world. For all three, myth is about human nature, not about the nature of the external world. The trio therefore typify rather than challenge what for me has been the standard twentieth-century rejoinder to Tylor and Frazer.

In so far as twentieth-century theories have not challenged the supremacy of science, the pressing question to be raised is why even seek to reconcile myth with science. Why not simply accept the nineteenth-century incompatibility of myth with science and dispense with myth? The twentieth-century answer is that the restriction of myth to a literal explanation of physical events fails to account for the array of other *functions* and *meanings* that myth harbours. The tell-tale evidence of these other functions and meanings is that myth has survived the rise of science. If Tylor and Frazer were right, myth would by now long be dead.

Observing that Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* still stirs present-day audiences, even though they do not believe in Fate, Freud argues that the story must therefore be about other than the impact of the supernatural on our lives:

> If *Oedipus Rex* moves a modern audience no less than it did the contemporary Greek one, the explanation can only be that its effect does not lie in the contrast between destiny and human [free] will, but is to be looked for in the particular nature of the material on which that contrast is exemplified.
>
> (Freud 1953, p. 262)

Were Tylor and Frazer right, moderns, no less than ancients, would be attributing Oedipus' behaviour to determinism from without rather than from within, and moderns, no longer believing in Fate, would therefore be unmoved by the myth. That even moderns are moved means for Freud, and also for Jung, that the myth must be taken as other than a literal, or religious, explanation of Oedipus' behaviour.

Myth as other than an explanation of the physical world: Malinowski and Eliade

Among the twentieth-century reinterpreters of the function, not the literal meaning, of myth, the most important have been Bronislaw Malinowski and Mircea Eliade. It is not clear whether for Malinowski (1926), the Polish-born, English-resident anthropologist, moderns as well as 'primitives' have myth. If not, then admittedly his theory provides a less than ideal foil to that of Tylor and Frazer. But his theory remains a foil because for him 'primitives', at least, have science as well as myth. Therefore myth cannot be the 'primitive' counterpart to modern science, theoretical or applied. According to Malinowski, 'primitives' use science, however rudimentary, to explain and, even more, to control the physical world. They use myth to do the opposite: to reconcile themselves to aspects of the world that cannot be controlled, such as natural catastrophes, illness, old age, and death. Myths root these woes in the irreversibly past actions of gods or humans. (Malinowski does not rigidly subsume myth under religion, the way Tylor and Frazer do, and so allows for myths in which the agents are mere humans.) Equally important, myth reconciles humans to *social* unpleasantries – to the restrictions and obligations imposed by laws, customs, and institutions. Far from unalterable, these unpleasantries *can* be

cast off. Myth helps ensure that they are not, by rooting them, too, in a hoary past, thereby conferring on them the clout of tradition. If for Malinowski moderns have myth, then a myth about the British monarchy would trace the origin of the monarchy back as far as possible, so that to tamper with the monarchy would be to tamper with tradition.

In so far as myth for Malinowski deals with the social world, it turns its back on the physical world. But even when myth deals with the physical world, its connection to that world is limited. Myth may explain how flooding arose – a god or a human brought it about – but science, not myth, explains why flooding occurs whenever it does. And science, not myth, says what to do about it. Indeed, myth says that nothing can be done about it. Whether or not Malinowski succeeds in keeping the mythic and the scientific explanations distinct and therefore compatible, at least he tries to do so.

Eliade (1968), the Romanian-born, ultimately American-resident historian of religions, tries as well. For him, myth explains the origin of both physical and social phenomena, just as for Malinowski. And the explanation, as for Malinowski, is that a god – though never a mere human – brought it about. (For Eliade, in contrast to Malinowski, myth is a part of religion.) But the payoff of myth is not, as for Malinowski, reconciliation to the unpleasantries of life. Quite the opposite: the payoff is escape from the world and return to the time of the origin of whatever phenomenon is explained. Myth is like a magic carpet. Because all religions, according to Eliade, preach that gods were closer at hand in days of yore than now, to be whisked back in time is to be able to brush up against the god at work in the myth. Myth is a medium for encountering god.

Eliade goes beyond Malinowski and, even more, Tylor and Frazer in proclaiming myth panhuman and not merely 'primitive'. He cites modern plays, novels, and movies with the mythic theme of yearning to leave the everyday world and enter another, often earlier one. If even moderns, who are professedly atheistic, have myths, then myth must be universal. Yet as much as Eliade wants myth to be compatible with science, social science or natural science, he, like Malinowski, never explains how they are. And he certainly never explains how modern myths, in which the agents are *human*, can effect an encounter with god.

Myth as other than literal in meaning: Bultmann and Jonas

Among twentieth-century reinterpreters of not the function but the literal meaning of myth, two of the most prominent have been the German New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann and the German-born philosopher Hans Jonas, who eventually settled in the United States. Both offer existentialist readings of myth. While they limit themselves to their specialities, Christianity and Gnosticism, they apply a theory of myth per se.

Bultmann (1953) acknowledges that, read literally, myth *is* about the physical world, *is* incompatible with science, and *should be* rejected as uncompromisingly as Tylor and Frazer reject it. But unlike both Malinowski and Eliade as well as

both Tylor and Frazer, Bultmann proposes reading myth symbolically. Taken symbolically, or 'demythologized', myth is no longer about the external world. It is now about the place of human beings in the world. Myth no longer explains but describes, and describes not the world itself but humans' experience of it. It describes the alienation from the world that humans experience before turning to God and the at-homeness in the world that they experience upon turning to God. It depicts the human condition. Myth thereby ceases to be merely 'primitive' and becomes universal. It ceases to be merely ancient and becomes eternal. It ceases to be false and becomes true. Like Eliade, Bultmann desperately wants moderns to have myth, but unlike Eliade, he actually tries to work out how myth can be compatible with science. Yet even when demythologized, myth still refers to God, albeit of a non-physical kind. In order to retain myth, moderns must still believe in God.

Like Bultmann, Jonas (1963) seeks to show that ancient myths retain a message for moderns rather than, like Eliade, to show that moderns have myths of their own. For Jonas, as for Bultmann, myth, read symbolically, describes the alienation of humans from the world prior to their acceptance of God. Because ancient Gnosticism, unlike mainstream Christianity, sets immateriality against matter, humans remain alienated from the material world even after they have found the true God. In fact, the true God can be found only by rejecting the false god of the material world. Gnostics overcome alienation from this world only by transcending the world.

Unlike Bultmann, Jonas writes merely to compare ancient Gnosticism with modernity, not to proselytize for Gnosticism among moderns. He seeks to show that the Gnostic outlook is comparable, not identical, with the existentialist one, and the comparison is with secular, not religious, existentialism. Jonas isolates the Gnostic description of alienation from the material world and parallels it to the secular existentialist description of permanent alienation from the sole world. Because he confines himself to Gnostic descriptions of the experience of the world and skirts Gnostic explanations of the world itself, he, like Bultmann, avoids any encroachment of myth on science. Why moderns should embrace the Gnostic depiction of even the experience of the world is a question that Jonas, like Bultmann on Christianity, leaves unanswered.

A less abstract example of the demythologizing of myth is to be found in Albert Camus' (1960) celebrated interpretation of the myth of Sisyphus. While Camus was not a theorist of myth, his interpretation presupposes the same secular existentialist theory as Jonas'. Among the figures that Odysseus encounters in Tartarus, the part of Hades reserved for those who have offended Zeus, is Sisyphus, whose eternal punishment is to have to push a huge stone up a steep hill, only for it every time to roll back down just as he nears the top. As Odysseus describes the sight,

> Also I saw Sisyphus. He was suffering strong pains, and with both arms embracing the monstrous stone, struggling with hands and feet alike, he would try to push the

> stone upward to the crest of the hill, but when it was on the point of going over the top, the force of gravity turned it backward, and the pitiless stone rolled back, back down to the level. He then tried once more to push it up, straining hard, and sweat ran all down his body, and over his head a cloud of dust rose.
>
> (Homer 1968, p. 183 [*The Odyssey*, lines 593–600])

Homer does not disclose what Sisyphus' misdeed was, and ancient mythographers differ. Still, for all ancients, Sisyphus was to be pitied. For Camus, he is to be admired. Rather than embodying the fate that awaits those who defy the gods, Sisyphus symbolizes the fate of all human beings in a world without gods. He is admirable because he accepts the absurdity of human existence, which is less unfair than pointless. Instead of giving up and committing suicide, he toils on, even while fully aware that his every attempt will prove futile. His is the only kind of heroism that a meaningless, because godless, world allows.

Myth as both other than explanatory and other than literal: Freud and Jung

The most radical departures from Tylor and Frazer have transformed both the explanatory function and the literal meaning of myth. The most influential theorists here have been Freud and Jung. For both, the subject matter of myth is conspicuously a state of mind – and not a conscious state, as for Marlowe's Mephistopheles and for Milton, but an unconscious one. For Freud, the function of myth is to vent the unconscious. For Jung, the function is to encounter the unconscious. For neither Freud nor Jung does myth make the unconscious conscious. On the contrary, myth ordinarily operates unconsciously and, at least for Freud, must operate unconsciously. Freud and Jung differ sharply over the nature of the unconscious and in turn over the reason that myth is needed to express it.

Because the Freudian unconscious is composed of repressed, anti-social drives, myth releases those drives in a disguised way, so that neither the myth maker nor the reader of the myth ever confronts its meaning and thereby the myth maker's or the reader's own true nature. Myth, like other aspects of culture, serves simultaneously to reveal and to hide its unconscious contents. Myth is a 'compromise formation'. The classical Freudian approach to myth takes myth as wish fulfilment. Focusing on myths of male heroes, Freud's one-time disciple Otto Rank, in *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (1914), sees the myths as providing a partial fulfilment of, above all, Oedipal drives. By unconsciously identifying oneself with the named hero, one gains a vicarious, mental fulfilment of one's own lingering desires. Myths serve neurotic adults fixated at their Oedipal stage:

> Myths are, therefore, created by adults, by means of retrograde childhood fantasies, the hero being credited with the myth-maker's personal infantile [i.e., childhood] history.
>
> (Rank 1914, p. 82)

The real hero of the myth is not the named hero but the myth maker or reader. At heart, myth is not biography but autobiography.

Spurred by the emergence of ego psychology, which has broadened psychoanalysis from a theory of abnormal personality to a theory of normal personality, contemporary Freudians see myth as contributing to psychological development and not just to neurosis. For them, myth helps one grow up rather than, like Peter Pan, remain a child. Myth abets adjustment to society and the physical world rather than childish flight from them. Myth may still serve to release repressed drives, but it serves even more to sublimate them and to integrate them. It serves the ego and the superego, not merely the id. Moreover, myth serves everyone, not only neurotics. To quote Jacob Arlow:

> Psychoanalysis has a greater contribution to make to the study of mythology than [merely] demonstrating, in myths, wishes often encountered in the unconscious thinking of patients. The myth is a particular kind of communal experience. It is a special form of shared fantasy, and it serves to bring the individual into relationship with members of his cultural group on the basis of certain common needs. Accordingly, the myth can be studied from the point of view of its function in psychic integration – how it plays a role in warding off feelings of guilt and anxiety, how it constitutes a form of adaptation to reality and to the group in which the individual lives, and how it influences the crystallization of the individual identity and the formation of the superego.
>
> (Arlow 1961, p. 375)

In his best-selling *The Uses of Enchantment* (1976) Bruno Bettelheim says much the same, but he insistently says it of fairy tales *rather than* of myths, which he continues to interpret in a classically Freudian way.

The telling phrase from Arlow is 'adaptation to reality'. For contemporary Freudians, no less than for classical ones, myth presupposes a divide between the individual's wishes and reality. Where myth for classical Freudians functions to satisfy in the mind what cannot be satisfied in reality, myth for contemporary Freudians functions to help one accept the inability to be satisfied in reality. Still, for both varieties of Freudians, myth is not about reality – that is, the external world. It is about the individual, who comes smack up against reality. It is about the clash between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Myth either shields the individual from reality (the classical view) or foments acceptance of reality (the contemporary view). Rather than explaining reality, myth takes reality for granted and responds to it, either negatively (classical view) or positively (contemporary view). To explain reality, one turns to natural science. Myth taken literally is incompatible with science, and in the same way that it is for Tylor and Frazer. Myth psychologized is compatible with science because it is no longer about reality.[5]

[5] On classical and contemporary Freudian approaches to myth, see Segal 2003, pp. 143–52.

For neither Tylor nor Frazer does myth arise from any confrontation between the individual and reality. It arises from the experience of reality, which the individual wants either to explain (Tylor) or to manipulate (Frazer). Whatever role the individual plays in creating myth, the subject matter of myth is still the world, not the individual. Even though for Tylor, especially, mythic explanations stem from the analogy that 'primitives' hypothesize between the behaviour of humans and that of the world, myth is still about the world, not about humans. Myth arises not from the unconscious projection of human personality onto the world but from the conscious application of the explanation of human behaviour to the world. Tylor is not even intrigued by the subsequent kinship between human behaviour and that of a deified world – a key issue for those who, like Bultmann and Jonas, are concerned with the experience of the world. Frazer, for his part, does attribute myth, as part of religion, to the experience of the failure to control the world through impersonal magic – an experience which leads to the assumption that the world operates instead at the behest of gods. But myth is still not about how the world is experienced. It is about the world itself.

For Freudians, myths project human nature onto the world in the form of gods – for Freud himself, largely father-like gods. To understand the world is to withdraw those projections. The world really operates according to mechanical laws rather than according to the wills of a divine family. There is no symmetry between humans and the world. There is a disjunction. Even myths about heroes, who can be either human or divine, involve projection: the plot of hero myths is the fantasized expression of family relations, with the named hero playing the role of the idealized myth maker or reader. There are no comic-book heroes in the real world. There are only human beings, some better than others.

For Jungians as well as for Freudians, myths project human nature onto the world in the form of gods and of heroes, who, similarly, can be either human or divine. To understand the world is, similarly, to withdraw those projections and to recognize the world as it really is. Jungian projections are more elusive than Freudian ones because they cover a far wider range of the personality. After all, there are an endless number of sides of the personality, or archetypes. Almost anything in the world can be archetypal – that is, can provide a hook for the projection of an archetype.

Unlike Freudians, Jungians have taken myth positively from the outset. For them, the unconscious expressed in myth is not a repository of repressed, antisocial drives but a storehouse of innately unconscious archetypes that have simply never had an opportunity at realization. Myth is one means of encountering this unconscious. The function of myth is less that of release, as for classical Freudians, than that of growth, as for contemporary ones. But where even contemporary Freudians see myth as a means of adjustment to the demands of the outer world, Jungians see myth as a means of the cultivation of the inner world. The payoff is not adjustment but self-realization. Myth is a circuitous,

if nevertheless useful, means of self-realization exactly because it involves projection: one encounters oneself *through* the world. Ordinarily, projections are recognized and thereby withdrawn only in the course of analysis – a point that holds for Freudians as much as for Jungians. If, for either, myth can still be employed once the projection has been recognized, then the middle man – the world – has conveniently been eliminated.

Both Freudians and Jungians bypass the power of myth at the conscious, usually literal, level. While both appreciate the need to be moved by the life of the named hero or protagonist, that figure can be fictional. One does not have to accept the historicity of Oedipus to be moved by his saga. Moreover, the named figure is a mere peg onto which to hang the autobiography. As Freud writes, 'Oedipus' destiny moves us only because it might have been ours – because the oracle laid the same curse [i.e., the Oedipus complex] upon us before our birth as upon him' (Freud 1953, p. 262). Jung would concur. For both, a story that can never be imagined as happening to oneself will not work. In short, myth for Freudians and Jungians alike never takes one outside oneself. No theory of myth is more solipsistic than theirs.

Freudians and Jungians against nineteenth-century theorists of myth

It is conventionally assumed that Jung, on myth as in general, is arguing against Freud. It is also commonly assumed that Freud or Freudians on myth are arguing against Jung and Jungians. But in fact both are arguing at least as much against nineteenth-century theorists like Tylor and Frazer. Freudians and Jungians alike must first show that myth is not about the physical world before they debate with each other over what psychologically myth is about. Both must show that myth is not to be read literally before they can argue with each other over how symbolically myth is to be read.

In 'The theme of the Three Caskets' Freud comments snippily on an interpretation made by one E. Stucken of the choice of the caskets in *The Merchant of Venice*:

> He [Stucken] writes: 'The identity of Portia's three suitors is clear from their choice: the Prince of Morocco chooses the gold casket – he is the sun; the Prince of Arragon chooses the silver casket – he is the moon; Bassanio chooses the leaden casket – he is the star youth'.
>
> Thus our little problem has led us to an astral myth! The only pity is that with this explanation we are not at the end of the matter. The question is not exhausted, for we do not share the belief of some investigators that myths were read in the heavens and brought down to earth; we are more inclined to judge with Otto Rank that they were projected on to the heavens after having arisen elsewhere under purely human conditions. It is in this human content that our interest lies.
>
> (Freud 1958, pp. 291–92)

Rather than originating in the experience of the natural world, myth for Freud originates in the experience of the family and is then projected onto the world.

Along with Rank's *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, to which Freud is referring, the other classic Freudian analysis of myth is Karl Abraham's *Dreams and Myths* (1913). Like Freud, both Abraham and Rank dismiss those theorists, called nature mythologists, who either take myth to be about the physical world rather than about the human mind or, worse, turn myths about humans into myths about the physical world. Rank is especially disdainful of those who, for example, turn the life of Oedipus into a symbol of the daily course of the sun: 'as given by a representative of the natural mythological mode of interpretation, Oedipus, who kills his father, marries his mother, and dies old and blind, is the solar hero who murders his procreator, the darkness, shares his couch with the mother, the gloaming, from whose lap, the dawn, he has been born, and dies blinded, as the setting sun' (Rank 1914, pp. 9–10). Here myth is not a literal explanation of the course of the sun, as it would be for Tylor, but a symbolic description of the course of the sun. Still, myth is about the sun, not a family.

At times both Rank and Abraham, rather than dismissing the view that myth is a depiction of the natural world, accept it but attribute it to projection from the human world; Rank writes: 'We also hope to demonstrate that myths are . . . structures of the human faculty of imagination which may be secondarily transferred to the heavenly bodies with their baffling phenomena' (Rank 2003, p. 9). Abraham writes: 'Creation is nothing but procreation divested of the sexual' (Abraham 1913, p. 41). Rank goes beyond Abraham to attribute the failure of nature mythologists to acknowledge the true subject or source of nature myths to, in stereotypically Freudian fashion, resistance (see Rank 1914, pp. 8–9).[6]

Toward nature mythologists, Jung is at least as dismissive as Rank. Jung's criticism of Tylor, who is cited only occasionally, is not wholly clear. Apparently, Tylor, and Frazer as well, are guilty of mischaracterizing 'primitive' religious beliefs. They deem the key belief that of individual souls, or spirits, in natural phenomena – the notion of 'animism' – rather than that of an underlying universal spirituality. This criticism is not specifically psychological and was regularly made by fellow anthropologists, who contended that 'primitives' believe in a divine power, often called *mana*, that only in turn is separated into distinct spirits.

Jung's psychological criticism of both Tylor and Frazer is that they misconstrue the source of this power, which comes not, as they assume, from conscious reflection but from the unconscious. Jung combines both criticisms as follows:

> [T]he idea of energy and its conservation must be a primordial image that was dormant in the collective unconscious . . . [T]he most primitive religions in the most widely separated parts of the earth are founded upon this image. These are the so-called dynamistic religions whose sole and determining thought is that there exists a universal magical power [i.e., *mana*] about which everything revolves. Tylor, the well-known English investigator, and Frazer likewise, misunderstood this idea as

[6] See Rank 1914, pp. 8–9. On nature mythologists, see also Rank 1992, pp. 224–25; Rank & Sachs 1916, pp. 37–42.

> animism. In reality primitives do not mean, by their power-concept, souls or spirits at all, but something which the American investigator Lovejoy has appropriately termed 'primitive energetics' . . . So this idea has been stamped on the human brain for aeons. That is why it lies ready to hand in the unconscious of every man. Only, certain conditions are needed to cause it to appear.
>
> (Jung 1966a, para. 108–9)

The experience of the external world provides the 'condition' for the appearance of the unconscious: the awesome grandeur of the external world provides an ideal peg onto which to project the unconscious, which is always experienced as extraordinary rather than ordinary, as magical rather than natural, as divine rather than human.

Like many others, Jung often turns to Frazer for example after example of myths worldwide, but he always psychologizes whatever examples he uses. Above all, he cites examples of Frazer's own key myth, that of the death and rebirth of the god of vegetation. Unlike Tylor, who stalwartly reads myth literally, Frazer, like Rank's nature mythologists, reads the myth as symbolic of the course of vegetation itself. Thus

> the story that Adonis spent half, or according to others a third, of the year in the lower world and the rest of it in the upper world, is explained most simply and naturally by supposing that he represented vegetation, especially the corn, which lies buried in the earth half the year and reappears above ground the other half.
>
> (Frazer 1922, p. 392)

True, Frazer, like Tylor, assumes that 'primitives' themselves take their myths literally and must do so for their myths to explain events in the world. But Frazer breaks with Tylor in asserting that myths about either the decisions or the actions of gods are in fact, albeit unrecognized, symbolic descriptions of natural processes themselves.[7]

Against Frazer, Jung offers his own symbolic rendition of these myths: the myth of the death and rebirth of a god is a symbolic description of a process taking place not in the world but in the mind. That process is the return of the ego to the unconscious – a kind of temporary death of the ego – and its re-emergence, or rebirth, from the unconscious:

> I need only mention the whole mythological complex of the dying and resurgent god and its primitive precursors all the way down to the re-charging of fetishes and churingas with magical force. It expresses a transformation of attitude by means of which a new potential, a new manifestation of life, a new fruitfulness, is created.
>
> (Jung 1971, para. 325)

[7] Also popular in the nineteenth century was the opposite view: not that gods symbolize nature but that nature symbolizes gods. The classic exponent of this view was the Indologist Friedrich Max Müller, who is often taken as arguing that the sun was god but who in fact argues that the sun and other celestial phenomena symbolize the 'Infinite'. See Müller 1878, lecture I.

Jung does not deny that the psychological process of the death and rebirth of the ego *parallels* the physical process of the death and rebirth of vegetation. Like Freud, Rank and Abraham, he denies that the physical process *accounts for* the psychological one, let alone for the mythic one. For Frazer, as for Tylor, the leap from vegetation to god is the product of reasoning: 'primitives' observe the course of vegetation and hypothesize the existence of a god to account for it – even if, again, for Frazer himself the god is a mere symbol of vegetation. For Jung, the leap is too great for the human mind to make. Humans generally, not merely 'primitives', lack the creativity required to concoct consciously the notion of the sacred out of the profane. They can only transform the profane into a sacred that already exists for them. Humans must already have the idea of god within them and they can only be projecting that idea onto vegetation and the other natural phenomena they observe:

> This latter analogy [between god and natural phenomenon] explains the well-attested connection between the renewal of the god and seasonal and vegetational phenomena. One is naturally inclined to assume that seasonal, vegetational, lunar, and solar myths underlie these analogies. But that is to forget that a myth, like everything psychic, cannot be solely conditioned by external events. Anything psychic brings its own internal conditions with it, so that one might assert with equal right that the myth is purely psychological and uses meteorological or astronomical events merely as a means of expression. The whimsicality and absurdity of many primitive myths often makes the latter explanation seem far more appropriate than any other.
>
> (Jung 1971, para. 325)

Even early Jung, who was prepared to give more weight to experience than later Jung, distinguishes between the experience of the sun itself and the experience of the sun as a god. Experience of the sun provides the *occasion* for the manifestation of the sun archetype but does not *cause* that archetype:

> I have often been asked where the archetypes or primordial images come from. It seems to me that their origin can only be explained by assuming them to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity. One of the commonest and at the same time most impressive experiences is the apparent movement of the sun every day. We certainly cannot discover anything of the kind in the unconscious, so far as the known physical process is concerned. What we do find, on the other hand, is the myth of the sun-hero in all its countless variations. It is this myth, and not the physical process, that forms the sun archetype . . . The archetype is a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas.
>
> (Jung 1966, para. 109)

It is not only allegories of physical processes that Jung rejects as the real subject matter of myth. It is also literal interpretations of myth like Tylor's, which still make the subject matter outer rather than inner. For Tylor, myths are actual *explanations* of natural phenomena and not merely, as for Frazer, colourful *descriptions* of them. As, indeed, Tylor bemoans of those who would interpret myths allegorically, 'When the Apache Indian pointed to the sky and

asked the white man, "Do you not believe that God, the Sun, . . . sees what we do and punishes us when it is evil?", it is impossible to say that this savage was talking in rhetorical simile' (Tylor 1871, I, p. 262).

Jung conflates Tylor's theory with Frazer's in stating that 'People are very loath to give up the idea that the myth is some kind of explanatory allegory of astronomical, meteorological, or vegetative processes' (Jung 1969a, para. 71). The phrase 'explanatory allegory' equates Tylor's theory – myth as explanation – with Frazer's – myth as allegory. Jung asks rhetorically 'why', if myth is really about the sun, 'the sun and its apparent motions do not appear direct and undisguised as a content of the myths' (Jung 1971, para. 748). But the question is rhetorical only for Frazer's theory. For Tylor, a myth describes the sun god and not merely the sun because the myth is about the sun god and not merely about the sun. Yet even if Jung were to distinguish Tylor's view from Frazer's, he would still invoke his fundamental claim that human beings are incapable of consciously inventing gods and can only cast onto the world gods already in their minds.

For Jung, myth is no more about gods than about the physical world. It is about the human mind. Myth must be read symbolically, as for Frazer, and the symbolized subject is a process, as likewise for Frazer, but the process is an inner rather than outer one. If on the one hand Jung would doubtless prefer Frazer's symbolic reading of myth to Tylor's literal reading, on the other hand he would surely prefer Tylor's appreciation of the divine referent of myth to Frazer's reduction of it to something natural, or the reduction of the unconscious to consciousness.

Jung takes as projections not only nature myths but all other kinds of myths as well. He states that 'in fact, the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious . . . Just as the constellations were projected into the heavens, similar figures were projected into legends and fairy-tales or upon historical persons' (Jung 1969b, para. 325). One might suggest that once Jung uncouples myth from the natural world, he is free to look for myths elsewhere. No longer confined to myths that at face value are about the external world – creation myths, flood myths, myths of the seasons, myths of paradise, and myths of the end of the world – he can now fix his psychological gaze on myths that at face value are about human beings – for example, children, old persons, kings, and queens.

Hero myths, of which Jungians are especially enamoured, are projections onto mere human beings of a quasi-divine status: 'the hero myth is an unconscious drama seen only in projection, like the happenings in Plato's parable of the cave. The hero himself appears as a being of more than human stature' (Jung 1967, para. 612).[8]

[8] For Jung, heroes are mythical because they are more than human. For Lord Raglan, who extends Frazer's theory of myth to heroes, heroes are mythical because they are not historical. That is, Raglan concentrates on disproving the historicity of hero stories in order to make them mythical, where Jung takes for granted that heroes cannot be historical because they are quasi-divine. See Raglan 1936, pt. 2.

Moderns, even while often professed atheists, still create myths by projecting onto their fellow human beings exaggerated qualities that turn them into superhuman figures – not only into heroes but also into saints and demons:

> [T]he archetypes usually appear in projection; and, because projections are unconscious, they appear on persons in the immediate environment, mostly in the form of abnormal over- or under-evaluations which provoke misunderstandings, quarrels, fanaticisms, and follies of every description. Thus we say, 'He makes a god of so-and-so', or, 'So-and-so is Mr. X's *bête noire*'. In this way, too, there grow up modern myth-formations, i.e., fantastic rumours, suspicions, prejudices.
>
> (Jung 1966b, para. 152)

For Jung, traditional myths – those focused on by nature mythologists – have been religious myths. They have been either about gods acting in the world (Tylor) or about the world as symbolized by gods (Frazer). The decline of religion in the wake of science has obliged moderns to seek secular myths, such as myths about heroes, who, if superhuman, are still not quite gods. The decline of religion has also spurred moderns to forge their own, private myths. Jung had the creativity to forge – or to find – his own myth, and he announces at the outset of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* that he will proceed to 'tell my personal myth' (Jung 1963, p. 3), which refers either to the course of his whole life or, less likely, to his speculations about life after death. Far from an inferior alternative to a group myth, under which would fall all religious myths, a personal myth for Jung is the ideal, for it alone is geared to the unique contour of one's personality. A personal myth seeks to nurture unrealized aspects of one's personality.

At times, Jung even defines myth as personal: 'Myth is more individual and expresses life more precisely than does science. Science works with concepts of averages which are far too general to do justice to the subjective variety of an individual life' (Jung 1962, p. 3). Seemingly, a passage like this undoes my claim that for Jung science rules and that myth must accommodate itself to science, just as religion must be abandoned because it cannot be accommodated to science. But I think that this passage, which in fact parallels the one already cited in part on the superiority of religion to science,[9] by no means says it all. Whatever the superiority of a personal myth or even of a group myth to science, Jung still employs science – psychology – to decipher myth. If Jung's personal myth led him to his psychology, his psychology is not itself his myth. Rather, it is the key to his and every other myth. In short, I take Jung, no more than any of the other twentieth-century respondents to Tylor and Frazer, to be turning science *into* myth. The accomplishment of twentieth-century theorists

[9] The sentence 'In itself any scientific theory, no matter how subtle, has, I think, less value from the standpoint of psychological truth than religious dogma' continues: 'for the simple reason that a (scientific) theory is necessarily highly abstract and exclusively rational, whereas dogma expresses an irrational whole by means of imagery' (Jung 1969c, para. 81). Where science is abstract, religion is concrete, just as where science gives averages, myth gives specifics.

of myth, not least of Jung himself, lies in recharacterizing myth to accommodate science, not in subsuming science under myth. It cheapens both science and myth to fuse them.[10]

Once Jung differentiates a psychological interpretation of myth from a non-psychological one, he turns to differentiating his particular psychological interpretation from Freud's. But he cannot take on Freud until he has taken on the nature mythologists. He cannot confront his twentieth-century rival until he has defeated his nineteenth-century ones. So ingrained was the nineteenth-century view that it took at least as much effort on the part of Freudians and Jungians alike to defeat it as it did to defeat each other's twentieth-century views.

Yet Jung, for all his insistence on rejecting the physical world as relevant to myth, does return to the world through the concept of synchronicity. Synchronicity restores a link between humanity and the world that the withdrawal of projections still insisted upon by Jung removes. The term refers, of course, to the coincidence between our thoughts and the behaviour of the world, between what is inner and what is outer. As Jung writes of his favourite example of synchronicity, that of a resistant patient who was describing a dream about a golden scarab when a scarab beetle appeared, 'at the moment my patient was telling me her dream a real "scarab" tried to get into the room, as if it had understood that it must play its mythological role as a symbol of rebirth' (Jung 1973–74, II, p. 541). Here the world apparently responds to the patient's dream, but understood synchronistically, the world merely, if most fortuitously, *matches* the patient's dream rather than is *effected* by it. Synchronicity is not like astrology, in which the planets determine personality. The patient's conscious attitude, which dismisses the notion of an unconscious, is 'out of sync' with the world. The unconscious is using this coincidence to impress on the patient the kinship between humans and the world – exactly the kinship that myth, as a person-like account of the world, presupposes.[11] While synchronicity is not itself myth, which would be an account of a synchronistic experience, Jung's fascination with the concept shows that even he, who psychologizes myth (and everything else) more relentlessly than even Freud, cannot resist the allure of the external world.

Translations of Abstract

Il est couramment supposé que le point de vue de Jung sur le mythe, comme son opinion sur toute chose, est mieux compris en juxtaposition avec Freud. Je soutiens que Jung en réalité a une plus grande ouverture d'esprit , non seulement en ce qui concernent

[10] For a subtle argument that Jung is actually trying to bridge the gap between his personal myth and, as they say nowadays, grand narrative, see Rowland 2002, pp. 25–29.

[11] On synchronicity, see Aziz 1990 and Main 1997.

les autres psychologues du mythe, mais aussi de façon plus fondamentale vis à vis des non-psychologues en général. Il y va sans dire que Jung oppose sa théorie contre celle de Freud, mais c'est seulement après avoir comparé la sienne et celle de Freud avec d'autres theories qui attribuent le contenu des mythes au monde extérieur plutôt qu'à l'esprit humain et que la fonction du mythe est soit l'explication, soit la description du monde extérieur plutôt que l'expression de l'esprit humain. Les théoriciens que Jung met en question sont connus comme les 'mythologues de la nature'; pour eux le mythe est tantôt une explication litérale tantôt une description symbolique du monde naturel. De quel element du monde naturel il s'agit varie d'un mythologue de la nature à l'autre. Les deux mythologues de la nature les plus connus, et dont Jung fait mention, sont Edward Tylor et James Frazer. Leurs théories résument les vues du dix-neuvième siècle sur le mythe. Pour eux, le mythe est la contrepartie 'primitive' de la science, lequel point de vue est tout à fait moderne. Pour eux, le mythe et la science ne sont pas compatibles; la science est vraie et le mythe faux, et le mythe doit s'en aller quand la science arrive. Le rejet de Jung du monde extérieur comme un rappel du mythe et de l'explication ou la description de ce monde comme une fonction du mythe incarne la réaction du vingtième siècle aux théories du dix-neuvième. Ce n'est pas seulement pour Jung et Freud mais aussi pour les théoriciens du vingtième siècle en général que le mythe est tout autre chose que la contrepartie 'primitive' de la science moderne. Par consequence, le mythe et la science ne sont pas des rivaux, de sorte que le mythe ne doit pas s'en aller quand arrive la science.

Im allgemeinen wird angenommen, daß Jungs Sicht des Mythus, wie seine Sicht von allem anderen, am besten verstanden wird in der Gegenüberstellung zu Freuds Sicht. Ich führe aus, daß Jung seinen Platz tatsächlich breiter definiert, nicht nur in Gegensatz zu anderen Psychologen des Mythus, sondern grundsätzlicher im Gegensatz zu Nicht-Psychologen insgesamt. Zweifellos stellt Jung seine Theorie gegen die Freud's auf, dies aber nur nachdem er sowohl seine Theorie als auch Freud's gegen die Theorien aufstellt, die annehmen, daß das wesentliche Thema des Mythus die Außenwelt sei und nicht die menschliche Psyche, und die weiterhin annehmen, daß die Funktion des Mythus entweder in der Erklärung oder in der Beschreibung der Außenwelt bestehe und nicht im Ausdruck der menschlichen Psyche. Die Theoretiker, die Jung angreift, sind ‚Naturmythologen', für welche der Mythus entweder eine wörtliche Erklärung oder eine symbolische Beschreibung der natürlichen Welt darstellt. Von welchem Element der natürlichen Welt der Mythus handelt, das variiert vom einen Naturmythologen zum anderen. Die zwei führenden Naturmythologen, die Jung beide zitiert, waren Edward Tylor and James Frazer. Ihre Theorien geben einen Abriß des Zugangs zum Mythus im 19. Jahrhundert. Für sie stellt der Mythus den ‚primitiven' Gegenpart zur Wissenschaft dar, die vollständig als modern angesehen wird. Für sie sind Mythus und Wissenschaft unvereinbar, Wissenschaft ist wahr, Mythus ist falsch, und der Mythus muß daher verschwinden, wenn die Wissenschaft kommt. Jung's Zurückweisung der Außenwelt als Bezugspunkt für den Mythus und der Erklärung oder Beschreibung dieser Welt als Funktion des Mythus verkörpert die Antwort des 20. Jahrhunderts auf Theorien des 19. Jahrhunderts. Nicht nur für Jung und Freud, sondern auch für Theoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts im allgemeinen stellt der Mythus fast alles andere als den primitiven Gegenpart zur modernen Wissenschaft dar. Daher sind Mythus und

Wissenschaft keine Rivalen, so daß der Mythus nicht gehen muß, sobald die Wissenschaft kommt.

Si è soliti pensare che la visione junghiana del mito possa essere meglio compresa in un faccia a faccia con Freud. Io sostengo che di fatto Jung si posiziona in modo molto più ampio, non semplicemente contro gli altri psicologici del mito, ma specialmente contro i non-psicologi nel loro insieme.Innegabilmente Jung oppone la sua teoria a quella di Freud, ma solo dopo aver opposto sia la sua che la teoria freudiana contro quelle teorie che sostenevano che l'oggetto primo del mito fosse il mondo esterno piuttosto che la mente umana e che considerava la funzione del mito in quanto spiegazione o descrizione del mondo esterno piuttosto che espressione della mente umana. I teorici che Jung contesta vengono chiamati 'mitologi della natura' e per loro il mito è sia una spiegazione letterale che una descrizione simbolica del mondo naturale. Di quali elementi del mondo naturale i mitologi parlaino varia dall'uno all'altro. I principali mitologi della natura, e Jung li cita entrambi, furono Edward Tylor e James Frazer. Le loro teorie rappresentano l'approccio del 19° secolo al mito. Per costoro il mito è l'equivalente 'primitivo' della scienza, che è interamente moderna. Per loro mito e scienza sono incompatibili, la scienza è vera, il mito è falso, e il mito deve quindi andarsene quando arriva la scienza. Il rifiuto di Jung del mondo esterno come referente del mito e della spiegazione o della descrizione di quel mondo come funzionedel mito rappresenta la risposta del 20° secolo alle teorie del 19° secolo. Non solo per Jung e Freud, ma generalmente anche per i teorici del 20° secolo il mito è tutto tranne che l'equivalente primitivo della scienza. Di conseguenza scienza e mito non sono rivali, così che il mito non deve andarsene quando arriva la scienza.

Se asume corrientemente que los puntos de vista de Jung en relación al mito, así como en todo lo demás, son mejor comprendidos si se los compara vis-a-vis con los de Freud. Yo argumento que de hecho Jung se coloca en una posición mas amplia, no solo contra otros psicólogos del mito sino mas fundamentalmente contra todos los no psicólogos. Indudablemente, Jung fundamenta su teoría en contra de la de Freud, pero solo después de fundamentar la propia y la de Freud contra aquellas teorías que asumen que el sujeto de la materia del mito es el mundo exterior mas que la mente humanay las cuales asumen que la función del mito es o bien la explicación o la descripción del mundo exterior en lugar de ser la expresión de la mente humana. Los teóricos que Jung desafía son los llamados 'mitólogos de la naturaleza', para los cuales el mito es o bien una explicación literal o una descripción simbólica del mundo de la naturaleza. Sobre a cual elemento del mundo natural se refiere el mito varia de uno a otro mitólogo de la naturaleza. Los dos principales mitólogos de la naturaleza, ambos citados por Jung, fueron Edward Tylor y James Frazer. Sus teorías epitomizan las ideas que se tenían en el siglo diez y nueve sobre el mito. Para ellos, el mito es la contraparte primitiva de la ciencia, la cual es enteramente moderna. Para ellos, mito y ciencia son totalmente incompatibles, la ciencia es verdadera y el mito es falso, y el mito debe desaparecer cuando llega la ciencia. El rechazo de Jung al mundo exterior como el referente del mito y de la descripción y explicación de ese mundo como la función del mito epitomiza la respuesta del siglo veinte en contraposición a las teorías del siglo diez y nueve.Por cuanto no solo Jung y Freud sino también generalmente los teóricos del siglo veinte,

el mito no es sino la contraparte primitiva de la ciencia moderna. Consecuentemente, mito y ciencia no son rivales, así el mito no tiene por que irse cuendo la ciencia aparece.

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