

Table of Contents
The American Civil War
Part II

Professor Biography	i
Foreword	1
Lecture Thirteen The Seven Days’ Battles.....	3
Lecture Fourteen The Kentucky Campaign of 1862.....	6
Lecture Fifteen Antietam	10
Lecture Sixteen The Background to Emancipation	14
Lecture Seventeen Emancipation Completed.....	17
Lecture Eighteen Filling the Ranks.....	20
Lecture Nineteen The Sinews of War—Finance and Supply.....	24
Lecture Twenty The War in the West, Winter 1862–1863.....	27
Lecture Twenty-One The War in Virginia, Winter and Spring of 1862–1863	30
Lecture Twenty-Two Gettysburg	37
Lecture Twenty-Three Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and Tullahoma.....	41
Lecture Twenty-Four A Season of Uncertainty, Summer and Fall 1863....	44
Maps	32
Timeline	47
Glossary	60
Biographical Notes	64
Bibliography	in Parts I, III, IV

The American Civil War

Scope:

This course examines the era of the American Civil War with emphasis on the period from 1861 to 1865, four years during which the United States endured its greatest national trauma. The lectures address such questions as why the war came, why the North won (or the Confederacy lost), how military campaigns unfolded, and how the war affected various elements of American society. The principal goal is to convey an understanding of the scope and consequences of the bloodiest war in our nation’s history—a struggle that claimed more than 600,000 lives, freed nearly 4,000,000 enslaved African Americans, and settled definitively the question of whether states had the right to withdraw from the Union. The course also will address issues left unresolved at the end of the conflict, most notably the question of where former slaves would fit into the social and political structure of the nation.

Leading participants on both sides will receive extensive attention. Interspersed among discussions of military and nonmilitary aspects of the war will be biographical sketches of Abraham Lincoln, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, Frederick Douglass, “Stonewall” Jackson, William Tecumseh Sherman, Thaddeus Stevens, and several dozen other prominent figures. Although this is not a course on Civil War battles and generals per se, approximately half of the lectures will be devoted to the strategic and tactical dimensions of military campaigns. It is impossible to understand the broad impact of the war without a grasp of how military events shaped attitudes and actions on the home front, and there will be a special effort to tie events on the battlefield to life behind the lines.

Part I traces the prelude to the war by discussing the key issues of the antebellum period, starting with the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and continuing for 40 years to the election of 1860. The secession crisis that election precipitated turned into armed conflict in early 1861. Early lectures size up the two opposing sides of the military conflict, including a consideration of the men who manned the armies. The final five lectures of Part I trace the early fortunes of war from the Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) through the Peninsula and Shenandoah Valley campaigns of early 1862, when first one side, then the other seemed to be in ascendancy.

Part II picks up the military narrative with the pivotal Seven Days’ Battles before Richmond, when the Union advance in the East was halted by the newly appointed General Robert E. Lee, and continues up to the crucial Battle of Antietam in September. Lectures on the issue of emancipation, military conscription, and financing of the war provide a look at political and social issues that came to the fore in this period. Part II concludes with more discussion of major campaigns and battles, including Gettysburg and Chickamauga, bringing the narration up to the fall of 1863.

Part III begins with the campaign for Chattanooga that saw the ascendancy of Ulysses S. Grant as the top Union general. The emphasis shifts to the diplomatic front, as both sides vied to present their case before the world (i.e., European) audience. The war from the African American perspective comes next, followed by a discussion of northern wartime “reconstruction” policies. We devote two lectures to the naval war, both that conducted on the high seas involving the northern blockade and southern commerce raiding, as well as that which took place on the “brown water” of rivers and bays. Two lectures cover the experience of women in the war, on the home front, as medical workers on the field, and even (in a few cases) as soldiers. The focus then shifts back to the military events of 1864, moving the narrative forward to the Overland campaign up to the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania in the spring of 1864.

Part IV brings us to the finale of the Overland campaign and the siege of Petersburg and Richmond. This offers an excellent opportunity to discuss the home front, in both the North and the South, and consider the differences in the wartime experience between the two sections. After one lecture on the issue of prisoners of war, we turn back to the military front to investigate how Grant’s strategy to envelope the South and eliminate its ability to fight militarily played out in Sherman’s Atlanta campaign and his inexorable pressure on Lee at Richmond. With the conclusion of the war in April 1865 came the chance for peace and reconciliation, but the assassination of Abraham Lincoln dominated the immediate period after the cessation of hostilities. A final lecture sums up the lessons and legacies of this great national trauma and reminds us that, in a larger context, the issues that divided the nation during the era of the Civil War continue to resonate in modern America. This course will attempt to make those issues clear while providing a sense of the drama and tragedy of this tumultuous period in the life of the nation.

Lecture Thirteen

The Seven Days’ Battles

Scope: This lecture continues our discussion of McClellan’s campaign against Richmond, bringing Robert E. Lee to the central position in Virginia that he would occupy for the remainder of the conflict. As “Stonewall” Jackson maneuvered and fought in the Shenandoah Valley, Johnston launched an offensive against McClellan in the battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks on May 31, 1862. Two days of inconclusive tactical action left the armies in approximately the same positions they had occupied at the outset of the fighting, but the battle had one momentous result: Johnston was wounded and replaced by Lee. Lee spent about three weeks preparing his force, which he christened the Army of Northern Virginia, to seize the strategic and tactical initiative from McClellan. In the Seven Days’ battles, fought between June 25 and July 1, the Confederate army pressed McClellan’s force southward across the peninsula to the shelter of Union gunboats on the James River below Richmond. Few Civil War military events had greater consequences than the Seven Days. Although his army suffered higher casualties than McClellan’s, Lee saved Richmond, dramatically improved Confederate morale, and in one stroke helped offset six months of Union success in the Western Theater. As Shiloh had done in the West, the Seven Days introduced fighting on a massive scale to the Eastern Theater. The victory at the Seven Days also began a process by which Lee and his army, over the course of the next year, would become the principal national institution in the Confederacy and the main rallying point for southern civilians.

Outline

- I. The Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines (31 May–1 June 1862) set the stage for the Seven Days’ Battles.
 - A. General Joseph Johnston ended a pattern of Confederate retreat up the peninsula with a poorly executed attack against McClellan’s divided forces on May 31.
 - B. The battle ended as a tactical draw but had long-range consequences:
 1. McClellan was upset by the scale of the carnage and became more timid.
 2. Johnston was wounded during the battle and was replaced by Robert E. Lee.
- II. Lee took command under difficult circumstances.
 - A. Robert E. Lee was the scion of one of the greatest families in Virginia—indeed, in the United States.

1. Lee attended West Point and graduated with distinction in 1829.
 2. He had a dazzling record in the Mexican War, with three brevet promotions.
 3. He served as Superintendent of West Point (1852–1855).
 4. He was offered command of the Union army in 1861, but he cast his lot with Virginia and the Confederacy.
 5. His early military experience serving the South was not too successful.
- B.** When Lee assumed command, Confederate civilian morale was at a low point because of defeats in the West and McClellan's proximity to Richmond.
- C.** The Confederate army required considerable reorganization before it would be ready to assume the offensive, which was Lee's preferred mode of fighting.
1. Reinforcements had to be integrated into the army, which grew to 100,000 men, the largest Confederate army ever fielded.
 2. Lee had to coordinate with Jackson's troops that would be marching toward Richmond from the Shenandoah Valley in mid-June.
- III.** The Seven Days' Battles reversed the strategic picture in Virginia by placing McClellan on the defensive.
- A.** Lee decided almost immediately that he should take the offensive.
1. He was never comfortable reacting to an enemy.
 2. He believed he could counter the North's greater numbers by seizing and holding the initiative.
- B.** The Seven Days' Battles consisted of five significant engagements in which the Confederates were the aggressors. McClellan's forces were still divided by the Chickahominy River, and Lee chose to hit his exposed right flank under Fitz John Porter. Following are brief descriptions of these five engagements:
1. Mechanicsville (June 26)—Jackson's failure to arrive on time upset the Confederate plan.
 2. Gaines's Mill (June 27)—the largest battle of the Seven Days. Again Jackson was late to deploy. Lee launched 50,000 men in the largest single attack of the war against Porter's position.
 3. Savage Station (June 29)—Porter was reunited with McClellan's main body south of the Chickahominy, and McClellan changed his base of operations.
 4. Glendale or Frayser's Farm (June 30)—marked by uncoordinated attacks by Lee's forces.
 5. Malvern Hill (July 1)—McClellan occupied an easily defensible position. Lee's attack was poorly coordinated. Frontal assaults took a high toll on the Confederates. McClellan failed to take the opportunity to counterattack against Lee.

IV. The Seven Days had enormous consequences.

- A.** War arrived in the Eastern Theater on a much bloodier scale than ever before, with 20,000 Confederate and 16,000 Union casualties.
- B.** The strategic initiative passed to Lee and his army.
- C.** Confederate morale rebounded after a dark period of reversals in the West.
- D.** European nations interpreted the Seven Days as evidence that the South was winning the war.
- E.** Lee's replacement of J. Johnston placed in command the soldier who would do the most to drive the Confederacy toward independence over the next three years.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 7.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 15.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *Mr. Lincoln's Army*, part 3.

Dowdey, *The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee*.

Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 1, chapters 30–43.

Sears, *To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign*, chapters 6–13.

Questions to Consider:

1. Contingency often looms large in warfare. Speculate about how the conflict might have been different if Joseph E. Johnston had not been wounded at Seven Pines and replaced by Robert E. Lee.
2. Should the Seven Days' Battles be interpreted as a major missed opportunity for McClellan?

Lecture Fourteen

The Kentucky Campaign of 1862

Scope: The Confederacy faced a difficult strategic situation in July 1862. In the Western Theater, Corinth had fallen and Federals stood poised to move against Chattanooga, the vital rail link to Atlanta, and the Georgia hinterlands. In Virginia, McClellan's 100,000-man Army of the Potomac remained within easy striking distance of Richmond, and a new army under John Pope, who had recently won success along the Mississippi River, prepared to push southward into the central part of the state. Jefferson Davis and his generals decided to respond to these threats by mounting a pair of invasions, which together represented the most impressive Confederate strategic offensive of the war. Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith led two small armies into Kentucky while Lee crossed the Potomac River into Maryland with the Army of Northern Virginia. Confederates expected to find friendly populations in both border states, hoped to recruit for their armies, and counted on gathering desperately needed food and fodder. The invasions crested in September and October, and by November, the Confederate armies had withdrawn into Tennessee and Virginia. The importance of the two operations extended far into the future, however, because of the ways in which they influenced diplomacy, politics, and the debate over emancipation in the North. This lecture will focus on operations in Kentucky between August and October 1862 that culminated in the Battle of Perryville on October 8; the next lecture will cover the Antietam campaign.

Outline

- I. The Confederacy faced a difficult strategic situation in July 1862.
 - A. Union armies posed threats against several crucial parts of the Confederacy.
 1. McClellan's 100,000-man Army of the Potomac remained just a few miles southeast of Richmond.
 2. John Pope's new Army of Virginia (comprised of Frémont's, Banks's, and McDowell's old commands) was prepared to move along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad into central Virginia.
 3. Union forces menaced Chattanooga and the railroad that connected it to Atlanta and the interior of Georgia.
 4. Henry W. Halleck had been made General-in-Chief of the Union armies on 11 July (replacing McClellan in this role) and would henceforth coordinate all northern efforts.
 - B. Nonmilitary factors also loomed large as these campaigns began.
 1. England and France were watching closely to see how the next round of campaigns unfolded, following the Confederate success in the Seven Days' Battles.
 2. Abraham Lincoln was looking for a battlefield victory that would permit him to announce his Emancipation Proclamation.
- C. The Confederacy responded to these threats by invading Kentucky and Maryland.
- II. Two Confederate armies marched into Kentucky in August and September.
 - A. Braxton Bragg commanded the larger of the two forces.
 1. Bragg was a West Pointer and a decorated artilleryist in the Mexican War.
 2. Loyal to Jefferson Davis, he rose rapidly from Brigadier to full General after Shiloh.
 3. Bragg replaced Beauregard in command of the Army of Mississippi (later the Army of Tennessee) after the fall of Corinth and trained his army near Tupelo, Mississippi.
 4. A strict disciplinarian, Bragg had a number of physical ailments. His personality was argumentative and often short-tempered.
 5. His plan called for taking half the army to Chattanooga for a movement northward and leaving the other half under Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price to defend Mississippi.
 6. Bragg was helped when Don Carlos Buell abandoned plans to strike at Chattanooga, because Confederate cavalry disrupted Federal supply lines.
 - B. Edmund Kirby Smith commanded the smaller of the Confederate armies and would lead the march into Kentucky.
 - C. The Confederates hoped to accomplish several things by this campaign:
 1. Gather food and fodder in Kentucky.
 2. Recruit among Kentuckians assumed to be friendly to the South.
 3. Remove Federal forces from parts of Tennessee.
 4. Create problems for the Republicans during the elections of the fall of 1862.
 - D. The campaign began on a successful note for the Confederates.
 1. Smith marched into Kentucky in August and captured a Federal garrison at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30. He then moved deeper into the bluegrass region.
 2. Bragg followed Smith northward and also enjoyed success; he captured a Federal force at Munfordville on September 17.
 3. He drew Buell out of Nashville with much of his Union army.
- III. The campaign unraveled in late September and early October.
 - A. Bragg marched into the bluegrass region after waiting at Munfordville for Buell to attack him.

- B. Buell moved on to Louisville. He hoped that Van Dorn and Price would march north from Mississippi and capture Nashville (vacated by Buell).
- C. The Confederates took time to inaugurate a Confederate governor of Kentucky at Frankfort on 2 October.
 - 1. This move was designed to give legitimacy to Kentucky's place in the Confederacy.
 - 2. The Confederates also hoped to boost enlistment in Kentucky.
- D. Van Dorn and Price were defeated at the Battle of Corinth (Mississippi) on October 3–4, ending hope that Nashville would be liberated.
- E. The campaign climaxed at Perryville in Kentucky's largest Civil War battle.
 - 1. A reinforced Buell moved lethargically from Louisville toward Bragg starting on 1 October.
 - 2. The armies made contact about 35 miles southeast of Louisville on October 7, engaged in combat into the night, and fought a major battle the next day.
 - 3. Neither army commander understood what was happening or had a clear picture of the other force's strength. Each side enjoyed some tactical success before night ended the fighting on October 8, with the Confederates gaining momentum.
- F. Bragg decided to abandon the field, reunite with Smith, and abandon Kentucky. He failed to achieve any of his goals for this campaign, including the recapture of Nashville and the liberation of Tennessee. Possible explanations for his decision include:
 - 1. Bragg lacked a good grasp of how the Battle of Perryville had actually gone.
 - 2. The Confederates lacked a safe supply line.
 - 3. Kentuckians had failed to flock to the Confederate colors.
 - 4. The campaign did not affect the northern elections as hoped.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 8.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 17.

Supplementary Reading:

Connelly, *Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861–1862*, chapters 10–14.

Cozzens, *The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth*.

McDonough, *War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville*.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. Do you think better military leadership would have yielded a more positive result for the Confederates in Kentucky? Or was the negative result a failure of political leadership in misreading the state of public opinion in Kentucky and supporting an invasion in the first place?
- 2. Did the fact that Bragg's army withdrew only into Tennessee after the Battle of Perryville justify a sense of some Confederate accomplishment?

Lecture Fifteen

Antietam

Scope: This lecture shifts the spotlight from Kentucky to Virginia to complete our consideration of the great Confederate counteroffensive in the autumn of 1862. However important the campaign in Kentucky might have been militarily, the Virginia theater continued to command greater attention. This gave special urgency to the events that followed McClellan's retreat from Richmond after the Seven Days. The initial confrontation pitted Lee against John Pope. When Lincoln recalled McClellan's army from the peninsula to Washington, Lee hurried to confront Pope along the Rappahannock River. Three weeks of probing, punctuated by a stirring march around Pope's western flank by "Stonewall" Jackson's command, brought the armies to the old Manassas battleground on August 28–30. Three days of combat left Lee and his soldiers with a major victory in the battle of Second Manassas or Bull Run, after which the Army of Northern Virginia quickly marched north and crossed the Potomac River into Maryland. With Lee on Union soil, Lincoln reluctantly returned McClellan to field command. Fighting in the gaps of South Mountain on September 14 and Jackson's capture of 12,000 Federals at Harpers Ferry preceded the horrific battle of Antietam, where more than 23,000 men fell in the bloodiest day in American history. Lee soon withdrew to Virginia, but McClellan declined to press his advantage. Although Lee's last thrust had been blunted, his army had logged three months of hard marching and fighting that reoriented the military frontier from the outskirts of Richmond to the Potomac River. Beyond the battlefield, Antietam emboldened Lincoln to issue his preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation and prompted the British and French to back away from plans to try to mediate an end to the war.

Outline

- I. John Pope held center stage in Virginia after the Seven Days.
 - A. Pope was born into an important family and was related by marriage to Mary Todd Lincoln.
 1. He was a graduate of West Point and had enjoyed some success in the Western Theater under Halleck.
 2. He was arrogant and a braggart. As a Republican, he was attuned to congressional feelings.
 - B. Pope brought a harsher type of war to Virginia.
 1. He threatened to execute guerrillas, arrest citizens who harbored irregulars, and drive from their homes civilians in Union lines who refused to take the oath of allegiance.
 2. He also vowed to take whatever his army needed from civilians, thus earning the enmity of white southerners in Virginia.
 - C. Pope planned a campaign toward the rail junction at Gordonsville that would sever Lee's rail connections to the Shenandoah Valley via the Orange and Alexandria and the Virginia Central Railroads.
- II. Lee reacted to Pope's movements by first reorganizing his army, then dividing and then reuniting it.
 - A. Longstreet's wing kept an eye on McClellan below Richmond.
 - B. Jackson's wing marched to meet Pope along the Rappahannock.
 1. Jackson defeated part of Pope's army (under Banks's command) at Cedar Mountain on August 9, 1862.
 2. Jackson probed along the Rappahannock after Pope's troops withdrew.
 - C. Lee and Longstreet joined Jackson along the Rappahannock after McClellan was recalled to Washington.
 - D. The reunited Army of Northern Virginia defeated Pope's army at Second Manassas (August 28–30).
 1. Jackson's wing flanked the Federals, destroyed their main supply base at Manassas Junction, and engaged them on the old Manassas (Bull Run) battlefield.
 2. Longstreet's wing arrived on the battlefield opposite Pope's left flank. Pope didn't realize that these CSA forces had arrived to face him.
 3. The Confederates delivered a decisive attack on August 30 that drove the Federals from the field. The Union troops withdrew in good order back to the defenses of Washington, D.C. This battle resulted in approximately 9,000 Confederate and 16,000 Union casualties.
 4. Pope was removed from command and posted to Minnesota to fight the Sioux; McClellan was reinstated by Lincoln as the field commander.
 - III. Lee retained the strategic initiative by moving across the Potomac into Maryland.
 - A. He had a range of goals:
 1. He wanted to dictate the action and not react to northern moves.
 2. He planned to gather food and fodder in Maryland and perhaps Pennsylvania.
 3. This move would give Northern Virginia a respite from the presence of the armies and allow farmers to get their crops in.
 4. Lee hoped to recruit Marylanders to the Confederate cause.
 5. He wanted to influence the North's fall elections (cf., Bragg's objective in Kentucky in this same general time frame).

6. He thought that success would perhaps gain foreign support for the Confederacy.
 - B. Lee counted on a slow response from McClellan; he divided his forces by dispatching Jackson with more than half of the army to capture the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry, a key strategic point.
 - C. However, the campaign quickly turned against Lee.
 1. His army suffered from large-scale straggling and desertion after crossing the Potomac, because many of the men were reluctant to leave their homes in Virginia. Furthermore, many were sick and all were tired from the heavy campaigning.
 2. A copy of his Special Orders 191 for the campaign fell into McClellan's hands on 13 September. He moved more rapidly than anticipated and took control of the gaps in South Mountain on September 14.
 3. Jackson took longer than expected to capture Harpers Ferry, which finally fell on 15 September.
- IV. The campaign reached a climax at Antietam on September 17.
- A. Lee recalled Jackson and concentrated his nearly 35,000-man army near Sharpsburg, Maryland (along Antietam Creek, a tributary of the Potomac River). One division (A. P. Hill's) remained in Harpers Ferry to guard the 12,000 Union prisoners.
 - B. McClellan, with nearly 70,000 men, launched heavy assaults in three sectors of the battlefield.
 1. His goal was to grind Lee down and cut him off from the Potomac River, his line of retreat.
 2. The Union assaults were not coordinated, however.
 3. A. P. Hill's Light Division made a forced march from Harpers Ferry and arrived in time to turn the tide of the battle.
 - C. Lee barely held his position on the 17th but remained on the field for another day before retreating across the Potomac.
 1. The battle resulted in over 23,000 casualties (10,500 Confederate and 17,500 Union), making this the bloodiest single day in U.S. history.
 2. Photographs from the battlefield caused a sensation.
- V. Few campaigns matched the impact of Antietam.
- A. The military consequences of this tactical draw were mixed.
 1. Lee retreated but held his ground just south of the Potomac for some time.
 2. McClellan elected not to press the retreating Confederate forces and was removed from command the day after the fall 1862 elections.

- B. England and France decided to await further military results before attempting some type of intervention in the American war.
- C. Lincoln used the battle as a pretext to issue his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.
 1. This move forestalled foreign intervention.
 2. This proclamation also marked a change in northern war aims.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapters 8–9.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 17.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *Mr. Lincoln's Army*, parts 4–6.

Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 2., chapters 1–15.

Gallagher, ed., *The Antietam Campaign*.

Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas*.

Jones, *Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War*.

Sears, *Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Was Lee too aggressive in invading Maryland and remaining north of the Potomac after September 14?
2. How would you handicap the Confederacy's chances for independence in the aftermath of the Maryland campaign?

Lecture Sixteen

The Background to Emancipation

Scope: This lecture will examine the debate over emancipation from the beginning of the war through the spring of 1862. Slavery was at the heart of sectional tensions that eventually brought on the Civil War. The South seceded in large measure to protect its slave-based society from a perceived threat posed by the Republican Party. For at least the first year of the conflict, the issues of slavery and emancipation remained in the background. The North went to war to save the Union and, as long as restoration of the Union remained the one war aim, remarkable unity existed among northerners. But a debate over war aims grew steadily more heated as the war progressed, centering on what type of Union would follow northern victory. Would it be a Union with slavery, as northern Democrats and some conservative Republicans favored? Or a Union without slavery, as black and white abolitionists and most Republicans preferred? The resolution of this debate hinged on the question of whether the war would be an all-encompassing struggle that struck at the social fabric of the South or a limited contest that sought merely to restore the Union as it had been in 1860. Some who favored emancipation, including Abraham Lincoln, insisted that it would be best to send freed slaves abroad to avoid racial tension in the United States. Most black people opposed this, insisting that they were Americans and deserved to be allowed to stay in their homeland. Many slaves helped push the debate forward by fleeing to Union military lines and forcing the United States government to make decisions about their status.

Outline

- I. The North went to war to preserve the Union rather than to destroy slavery.
 - A. The Republican platform of 1860 explicitly stated that slavery would be protected where it already existed.
 1. This position was repeated in Lincoln's First Inaugural Address.
 2. Lincoln reiterated the position in his July 4th message to Congress.
 - B. A Congressional Resolution, offered by John Crittenden, reaffirmed the position in 1861.
 1. This effort was made to help maintain the border states in the Union.
 2. It was passed almost unanimously.
 - C. Lincoln also declined to call for emancipation.
 1. He stated that the Constitution protected slavery and that only the states controlled it.

2. He worried about the loyalty of the border states and feared antislavery rhetoric might lead them to join the Confederacy.
 3. He knew the North was divided about emancipation and knew he would alienate Democrats if he called for emancipation.
 - II. The Republican Party was divided over how best to address emancipation.
 - A. The conservatives wanted slavery to end but insisted on a gradual process controlled by the states and supported colonization of freed slaves.
 - B. The moderates (including Lincoln) sought an earlier end to slavery, accepted a cautious approach in the beginning, and supported colonization but moved closer to the radicals as the war grew increasingly bitter and costly.
 - C. The radicals favored outright emancipation as a war aim from the outset.
 1. They pointed to the "war powers" clause of the Constitution as giving the North the right to free slaves, arguing that the southern states did not enjoy constitutional protection while in secession.
 2. The radicals were a minority of the party but held disproportionate power in Congress. Such senators as Charles Sumner (MA—Foreign Affairs), Henry Wilson (MA—Military Affairs), John P. Hall (NH—Naval), Benjamin Wade (OH—Territories and the Committee on the Conduct of the War), Zacharia Chandler (MI), and others held key committee posts. Members of the House of Representatives, such as arch-radicals Galusha Grove and Thaddeus Stevens, both of Pennsylvania, also had great influence in their chamber.
 3. The radicals used the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to press their agenda of punishing slaveholders. They gradually persuaded many moderates to support their views.
 - III. Most Democrats supported a war for the Union but violently opposed emancipation.
 - A. They feared black competition for jobs and the specter of racial intermarriage. Many Union soldiers held similar views.
 - B. The idea of black colonization appealed to many northerners. This idea went back to the early part of the nineteenth century; proponents said it would avoid a race war and would protect white laborers from black competition.
 - C. Lincoln met with a group of free black men in 1862 to urge them to support colonization.
 1. He argued that they would never be equal in the United States.
 2. They refused to support the idea.

3. Lincoln supported a trial expedition to an island off the coast of Haiti. However, conditions proved to be terrible and the expedition failed miserably.

IV. Slaves furthered the process of emancipation by escaping to Union lines.

- A. Historians have argued about the impact of this phenomenon.
 1. Those who support the concept of “self-emancipation” insist that slaves were the crucial actors in bringing about emancipation.
 2. Others insist that the Union Army, Congress, and Lincoln played greater roles.
- B. Whatever the merits of the different historians’ arguments, there is no doubt that runaway slaves weakened slavery in the Confederacy and forced Union military and political leaders to consider their status.

Essential Reading:

Berlin et al., eds., *Free at Last: A Documentary History of Slavery, Freedom, and the Civil War*, chapter 1.

Supplementary Reading:

Cox, *Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership*, chapter 1.

McPherson, ed., *The Negro’s Civil War: How American Negroes Felt and Acted during the War for the Union*, chapters 1–2.

McPherson and Cooper, eds., *Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand*, Gallagher essay.

Questions to Consider:

1. If slavery lay at the heart of sectional tensions, why did the North choose not to pursue emancipation from the beginning of the war?
2. Would the Confederacy have benefited from stronger efforts to place emancipation on the North’s political agenda before the summer of 1862?

Lecture Seventeen

Emancipation Completed

Scope: This lecture completes our examination of the process by which emancipation was accomplished. Emancipation moved forward on several fronts simultaneously. Abolitionists lobbied for action but typically understood that emancipation must be tied to the war effort if the people in the North were to embrace it. Several generals made sweeping efforts to strike at slavery in 1861–1862, only to have Lincoln overrule them. Congressional Republicans, aided by the fact that the war ground on at rapidly increasing cost, skillfully struck at the margins of slavery with a series of measures. Lincoln steadily moved toward the position that emancipation was a necessary step on the road to Union victory. But Lincoln understood that he lacked the constitutional power to strike at the institution in loyal areas, and his famous proclamation deliberately cast emancipation as a war measure designed to undermine the Confederate military resistance. For most northerners, emancipation represented a means toward the larger end of Union rather than an end in itself.

Outline

- I. Abolitionists pressed for emancipation from the outset of the war. They acknowledged that the Constitution protected slavery in the loyal states and argued that slavery was a military necessity to the South and should be attacked on that basis. Several Union generals attempted to strike at slavery in 1861–1862.
 - A. Benjamin F. Butler, a so-called “political general,” refused to return runaway slaves to their masters on the Virginia peninsula in May 1861, declaring them to be “contraband of war” and, thus, liable to seizure under international law. This action meant that the conflict was a war between two nations, not just a rebellion or civil war.
 - B. Butler set a precedent followed by many other commanders. For example, John C. Frémont declared slaves of all rebels in Missouri free in August 1861.
 - C. Abolitionists hailed Frémont as a hero, but Lincoln forced him to amend the order to bring it into line with congressional legislation regarding rebel property (and to keep the border states in the Union).
 - D. David Hunter ordered all slaves to be freed along the South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida Atlantic coasts in May 1862.
 1. Lincoln likewise ordered him to revoke the order, because it overstepped Hunter’s authority
 2. Abolitionists roundly condemned Lincoln’s action.

- II. Congress passed several antislavery measures in 1861–1862.
 - A. The first Confiscation Act (6 August 1861) stipulated that owners of slaves engaged in Confederate military service forfeited ownership of those slaves.
 - B. In March 1862, Congress prohibited the use of military power to return escaped slaves to rebel masters.
 - C. In April 1862, Congress abolished slavery in the District of Columbia with compensation to the owners.
 - D. On 19 June 1862, Congress emancipated all slaves in the territories without compensation to the owners, thus fulfilling a plank of the 1860 Republican platform.
 - E. In July 1862, Congress passed the second Confiscation Act, which freed all slaves who escaped from rebel owners to Union lines.
- III. Lincoln decided by the spring of 1862 that the war would bring emancipation.
 - A. He had a clear plan for emancipation:
 - 1. As a “domestic institution,” slavery would have to be abolished by the states.
 - 2. Owners should be compensated for the loss of property and the federal government should help pay for the cost.
 - 3. The process should be gradual to avoid social dislocation, and freed slaves should be urged to colonize abroad.
 - B. In March and May 1862, Lincoln pressed the border states to adopt a plan along these lines, first by arguing that they would be compensated and later, in July, by warning that they would lose everything if they dragged their feet.
 - C. By 22 July 1862, Lincoln announced to his Cabinet that he had decided to issue his proclamation but held off making a public announcement until he had a military victory (this was right after the reverses of the Seven Days’ Battles).
 - D. He issued the preliminary proclamation on September 22, 1862, after the Battle of Antietam, explaining his reasons to his Cabinet:
 - 1. The border states would never take the initiative, as the events of March through July had shown.
 - 2. Increasing numbers of black people in Union lines demanded attention on their status.
 - 3. Great Britain and France would be favorably impressed.
 - 4. Most of the northern people were ready to wage a harsher kind of war against the Confederacy.
 - 5. Northern Democrats would oppose whatever course he took and, thus, could be ignored.

- IV. The final Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, was offered as a measure of military necessity.
 - A. It freed only slaves in rebel territory not controlled by U.S. troops.
 - 1. Lincoln lacked the Constitutional power to free slaves in loyal states.
 - 2. He interpreted any area under Union military control (e.g., Northern Virginia) as a loyal part of the United States.
 - 3. He had the Constitutional power to strike at rebel slaves as a war measure.
 - B. Lincoln’s announcement was criticized by a variety of people as an empty gesture.
 - 1. Abolitionists and many foreign observers said it did not go far enough.
 - 2. Democrats said it went too far and that Lincoln was being hypocritical.
 - 3. Confederates said it was designed to incite servile insurrection.
 - C. Its real importance lay in the fact that it marked the addition of emancipation to the Union’s war strategy and meant that Union armies would carry freedom with them as they penetrated into the Confederate heartland.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 16.

Supplementary Reading:

Franklin, *The Emancipation Proclamation*.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. Does Lincoln deserve his reputation as the “Great Emancipator”?
- 2. Were Union armies the practical agents for emancipation?

Lecture Eighteen

Filling the Ranks

Scope: This lecture examines the search for manpower in the Confederacy and the Union. Roughly three million men served during the war, more than two million in northern forces and 750,000 to 900,000 in Confederate forces. A huge number of men volunteered during the first year of the conflict, after which both sides used a combination of incentives and the threat of compulsory service to keep the ranks filled. Facing a disadvantage in manpower of five to two, the Confederacy resorted to extreme measures sooner than the North. The Confederate Congress passed a national conscription act in April 1862 that extended the service of all men then in uniform and made all other military-age white males between the ages of 18 and 35 eligible to be drafted for three years' service. Subsequent legislation expanded the pool to include all men between the ages of 17 and 50. The North instituted its national draft in March 1863, creating a pool of men between the ages of 20 and 45.

The Confederate draft allowed individuals to avoid service by purchasing a substitute until the end of 1863; various occupations were also exempt. The North allowed men to hire substitutes or pay a commutation fee. The federal government, states, and localities in the North also offered bounties to attract volunteers. Both drafts were designed to spur enlistment rather than compel service, and they operated quite effectively in that relatively few men were conscripted on either side. Although complaints about a "rich man's war but a poor man's fight" arose in both the North and South and the drafts triggered significant opposition (the New York City draft riots being the most extreme example), all classes were well represented in Union and Confederate armies. Overall, the Confederacy mobilized about 80 percent of its available manpower (only the presence of slaves to keep the economy going allowed this impressive mobilization) and the North mobilized about 50 percent of its military-age men.

Outline

- I. The Confederacy turned to conscription first.
 - A. The South fought the war without a regular army, per se.
 1. For one thing, the South had no professional military in place when the war began, although some professional former United States Army officers served the Confederacy.
 2. The South relied on volunteers for national service who would return to private life at the end of the war.
- II. The Confederate Conscription Act of 1862 was controversial but necessary for the southern war effort.
 - A. As noted, it retained in service for three years all those who had volunteered for twelve months in 1861, thus averting a potential military problem in early 1862.
 - B. Revisions of the 1862 Act extended the age limits to 17 to 50, added new categories of exemptions (e.g., blacksmiths, tanners, and salt workers), ended substitution, and extended service of all men in uniform to the duration of the war.
 - C. Opponents attacked conscription as contrary to individual and state rights and unduly favorable to wealthy people.
 1. A provision exempting one white male on any plantation with twenty or more slaves was especially unpopular.
 2. Groups of draft resisters and deserters found refuge in remote parts of the Confederacy.
 3. Some governors appointed hundreds of their friends to the civil service to help them avoid the draft.
 - D. The draft spurred enlistment and helped keep the Confederate armies strong.
 1. The Confederacy placed 80 percent of its white military-age male population in uniform.
 2. Approximately 80 percent of the Confederacy's soldiers volunteered for service.
 3. The continuance of slavery behind the lines was one factor that enabled this figure to be reached.
- B. Volunteers were plentiful early in the war, but less so within a year.
 1. Hundreds of thousands volunteered in 1861—about half for three years and half for twelve months.
 2. These twelve-month men were eligible to get out of the army as the second spring's campaign approached in 1862.
 3. Incentives (e.g., \$50 bonuses, one month's leave, and transfers to other units) passed by the Confederate Congress in December 1861 failed to inspire reenlistment.
- C. The CSA Congress responded to the looming manpower crisis with the first conscription act in U.S. history, passed in April 1862 and providing for the following:
 1. All white males between the ages of 18 and 35 were conscripted for three years.
 2. All original twelve-month enlistees were retained in the service. This led to a rise in the number of desertions.
 3. Men in war production industries, the civil service, and the clergy and teachers were exempted from service.
 4. Men were allowed to hire substitutes.

- III.** Although far richer in manpower, the North, too, experienced difficulty keeping its ranks filled.
- A.** Hundreds of thousands of men volunteered in 1861, after which the number declined markedly.
 - 1. The first call to arms was for 75,000 men for three months.
 - 2. Subsequent calls sought many more men for much longer terms of service.
 - B.** In July and August 1862, the Lincoln Administration sought more volunteers.
 - 1. It issued a call for states to supply 300,000 three-year men.
 - 2. In August, the Administration ordered states to supply 300,000 nine-month militiamen or face the prospect of a militia draft.
 - 3. States used bounties and other means to meet the July-August quotas.
 - 4. These measures did yield a large number of voluntary enlistments.
 - C.** The North resorted to a national draft in 1863 that proved as controversial as the Confederate version. The Enrollment Act of March 1863 cast a wide net but allowed many men to avoid service.
 - 1. All males between 18 and 45 were eligible.
 - 2. States were given a grace period before each draft call in which to meet their quotas.
 - 3. Men could purchase a substitute and be released from all obligations.
 - 4. Men could pay a \$300 commutation fee to avoid any one draft call (this provision was abolished in 1864).
 - D.** Bounties played a prominent role in the operation of the northern draft. Federal, state, and local bounties were offered. Bounty brokers acted as middlemen and bounty jumpers collected their money, then deserted.
 - E.** Draft resistance broke out across the North. Thousands of men fled to Canada and riots occurred in New York City and elsewhere.
 - F.** Despite problems, the draft operated largely as intended.
 - 1. Nearly one million men volunteered during the period of the draft.
 - 2. Only 162,000 were conscripted or purchased substitutes.
- IV.** It is instructive to investigate some differences between the northern and southern experiences with manning their armies.
- A.** Confederates had proportionally more veterans in their ranks, because the North had, over time, more manpower flooding in.
 - B.** The Confederates, as attrition occurred, usually filled up their original regiments, mingling recruits with veterans. The North usually created new regiments with new recruits.
 - C.** This practice often led to high casualties when new regiments encountered veteran regiments on the battlefield.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapters 14, 20.

Supplementary Reading:

Cook, *The Armies of the Streets: The New York City Draft Riots of 1863*.

Geary, *We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War*.

Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Do you find it ironic that the Confederacy, with its rhetoric about the sanctity of state rights, would embrace a national draft to help maintain its independence?
2. Can you imagine a crisis that would allow the modern United States to mobilize its citizenry in a way comparable to Civil War mobilization?

Lecture Nineteen

The Sinews of War—Finance and Supply

Scope: This lecture will examine the Union and Confederate efforts to finance the war and supply their armies. The conflict forced both contestants to undertake spending on an unprecedented scale. The federal budget in 1860 was less than \$65,000,000; in 1865, the North's budget alone totaled more than \$1,250,000,000. Both sides resorted to selling bonds, taxing their citizens, and printing paper money to meet financial obligations; however, the Confederacy proved far less able than the North to do so without suffering economic hardship. Lacking a well-developed prewar financial infrastructure and without substantial reserves of hard money, the Confederacy relied too heavily on paper currency and experienced spiraling inflation that eventually reached more than 9,000 percent. The northern economy, in contrast, proved able to raise necessary money and produce military and nonmilitary goods in profusion while inflation reached only about 80 percent (slightly less than the United States would experience in World Wars I and II—and the North's accomplishment came without government controls over the economy). Yet despite its weak economy, the Confederacy managed to feed and equip its soldiers. Union soldiers generally ate better and were better armed and clothed, but the Confederacy never lost a battle because its armies lacked necessary ordnance or other material goods.

Outline

- I. The Confederacy struggled to finance its war effort.
 - A. Its antebellum economy had not been geared to support a modern technological war.
 1. Most southern capital was invested in land and slaves.
 2. The South lacked a substantial financial infrastructure.
 - B. The Confederacy resorted to three methods of financing the war:
 1. A series of property, income, consumer, and profits taxes contributed about 5 percent of the needed funds. Christopher Memminger, CSA Secretary of the Treasury, supported this option, but the Confederate Congress resisted it early in the war.
 2. Various bond issues brought in another 35 percent.
 3. Paper Treasury notes constituted the final 60 percent and proved disastrous.
 - C. Several factors contributed to soaring inflation, including over-reliance on paper currency, shortages of goods caused by the Union blockade, the presence of invading armies, and disruption of the transportation

network. By the end of the war, it took \$92 to buy what \$1 had purchased at the outset in 1861.

- II. The North, by contrast, easily met the test of financing the war and producing all necessary goods. During the war, the federal budget grew from 2 percent to approximately 15 percent of the GNP.
 - A. The North used the same three methods of financing the war as the Confederacy did but with far more success.
 1. Various types of government bonds (many sold to individuals rather than to banks) raised 66 percent of needed funds and tied investors to the national effort. The bond most widely used was the "5/20" bond at 6 percent interest. Over one million people bought northern bonds.
 2. Treasury notes, known as "greenbacks" and guaranteed as legal tender by the Legal Tender Act passed on February 25, 1862, accounted for another 13 percent. This money did not devalue like the money in the Confederacy. It was initially issued when the Union Army was doing well in the Western Theater.
 3. Income, excise, and other taxes made up the final 21 percent of revenue.
 - B. The Republican Congress enacted legislation designed to help foster a modern capitalist system
 1. The aforementioned Legal Tender Act of 1862 created a stable paper currency.
 2. The National Bank Act of 1863 sought to drive state bank notes (of which there were over 7,000 different ones) out of circulation and replace them with more stable national bank notes.
 3. Northern inflation during the war was only 80 percent, compared to the 9,000 percent experienced in the South.
- III. The Confederacy fought at a disadvantage in most areas of supply but managed to keep its armies adequately armed, clothed, and provisioned.
 - A. Neither side had a decisive edge in shoulder weapons.
 1. Most Union and Confederate soldiers had rifled muskets by 1863 (the South produced some of its own and obtained others by capture or import).
 2. The North produced 160,000 breech-loading and 175,000 repeating weapons for a small percentage of its troops, an amount that the Confederacy could not match.
 - B. The North enjoyed a wider edge in ordnance.
 1. Confederate production was sufficient but quality was not (this was especially true for artillery ammunition). Josiah Gorgas was in charge of southern ordnance; his major factories were in Augusta, Georgia; Selma, Alabama; Richmond, Virginia; and Charleston, South Carolina.

2. Union ordnance was almost always abundant and of much higher quality.
- C. The North also enjoyed distinct advantages in clothing and feeding its soldiers.
1. Breakdowns in transportation infrastructure hurt the Confederacy, as did damage to its agricultural areas as Union forces pushed into the interior of the southern states.
 2. Union armies began an American pattern of overwhelming opponents through massive production.
 3. Confederate soldiers sometimes found themselves poorly clad and with skimpy rations.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 14.

Supplementary Reading:

Goff, *Confederate Supply*.

Nevins, *The War for the Union: The Organized War, 1863–1864*, chapter 1.

Paludan, “A People’s Contest”: *The Union and the Civil War, 1861–1865*, part 2.

Questions to Consider:

1. Do you believe the disparity in resources or a smaller pool of manpower was more damaging to the Confederacy?
2. Given its advantages, should the North have won the war more quickly? Or did compensating factors offset some of the material superiority?

Lecture Twenty

The War in the West, Winter 1862–1863

Scope: This lecture takes us back to the military front in the winter of 1862 and the spring of 1863. We left the armies in the wake of Perryville and Antietam, a period that seemed to hold great promise for Union forces that could harry retreating Confederates. But weeks passed with no decisive movements in the West or in Virginia, which bred dissatisfaction in the North. While McClellan remained immobile north of the Potomac in Maryland, Don Carlos Buell engaged in the most tepid pursuit of Braxton Bragg’s army as it left Kentucky and marched into Tennessee. Lincoln understood the importance of positive news from the battlefield and implored his generals to act. Eventually, he replaced both McClellan and Buell, promoting Ambrose E. Burnside to command the Army of the Potomac and William S. Rosecrans to oversee the effort against Bragg. The president also urged the new commanders to strike blows immediately.

This lecture, the first of two on the winter of 1862 and the spring of 1863, will concentrate on two major campaigns west of the Appalachians. In December, Rosecrans mounted an offensive against Bragg in middle Tennessee and Ulysses S. Grant began his long campaign against Vicksburg. Rosecrans managed to win the narrowest of tactical victories in the battle of Stones River or Murfreesboro, a two-day bloodbath that straddled the new year, but Grant experienced immense frustration as his plans to reduce the rebel stronghold on the Mississippi came to nothing. Throughout the winter and spring, operations in the West provided scant comfort to the northern public and their political leaders.

Outline

- I. The North craved decisive news from the battlefield in the autumn of 1862.
 - A. McClellan had failed to follow up his narrow success at Antietam and Buell had done equally little to pursue Bragg after Perryville.
 - B. Lincoln decided that new leadership was necessary and replaced both McClellan and Buell.
 1. William S. Rosecrans took command of the newly christened Army of the Cumberland.
 2. Lincoln made it clear that he expected action before the year ended.
- II. Rosecrans and Bragg fought one of the biggest battles of the war near Murfreesboro (Stone’s River) in middle Tennessee on December 31, 1862, and January 2, 1863.

- A. In late December, just after Christmas, Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland marched toward Bragg's Army of Tennessee, which lay a short distance southeast of Nashville near Murfreesboro.
 1. The Confederate cavalry harassed his advance.
 2. Rosecrans nevertheless made rapid progress in this unusual (for the Civil War) winter campaign.
 - B. The armies made contact on December 30.
 1. Both commanders planned to hit the other's right flank.
 2. Massed bands from both armies engaged in a famous exchange of music.
 - C. Fighting on December 31 favored the Confederates.
 1. Bragg launched his attacks first and drove Rosecrans's army back.
 2. Rosecrans exhibited great courage and steadiness in putting together a defensive line, and one of his subordinates, Phillip Sheridan, held his division together to stabilize the line.
 3. Bragg notified Richmond that he had won a victory.
 - D. After a day of tense inaction, fighting on January 2 favored the Union.
 1. Bragg ordered desperate frontal assaults that were easily repulsed.
 2. Bragg decided to retreat deeper into southeast Tennessee on January 3–4, 1863.
 - E. Stones River or Murfreesboro was a bloody, but essentially indecisive, military contest.
 1. Casualties for the Union (13,000 or 31 percent) and Confederacy (12,000 or 33 percent) made up the highest combined percentage for any major battle of the war.
 2. The two armies settled into winter quarters and left the strategic situation in middle Tennessee similar to what it was before the battle.
 3. Lincoln praised Rosecrans because this was the best news from any major Union commander during the winter of 1862.
- III.** Grant attempted without success to mount a major offensive against Vicksburg in December 1862.
- A. He planned for a two-pronged approach.
 1. He would move overland from Tennessee through northern Mississippi.
 2. William Tecumseh Sherman would move down the Mississippi River against Vicksburg from the north.
 - B. Confederates frustrated both prongs of the offensive.
 1. Cavalry raids under Nathan Bedford Forrest disrupted Grant's supply lines and forced his retreat back into Tennessee. He learned a lesson on this retreat about subsisting off the land.
 2. General Earl Van Dorn destroyed a major Union supply base at Holly Springs on 20 December.
 3. Confederates easily repulsed Sherman's assaults north of Vicksburg at Chickasaw Bayou on 29 December 1862.
 - C. Grant spent the remainder of the winter mounting a series of failed attempts to get at Vicksburg from the south and east.
 1. He tried unsuccessfully to dig canals to bypass the city's four miles of gun batteries that commanded the river.
 2. He tried unsuccessfully to maneuver through tributaries of the Mississippi River to attain the same end.
 3. He mounted a failed attempt to approach Vicksburg via Yazoo Pass.
 - D. Finally, he decided to run his naval forces past the batteries of Vicksburg and shift his infantry across to the west bank of the Mississippi beyond the range of Confederate guns and troops.
 1. His subordinates opposed the plan as too risky.
 2. Success in the maneuver would allow Grant to shift his army back to the east bank of the Mississippi below Vicksburg, where he could live off the land.
 3. On 16 April, David Dixon Porter ran his gunboats past the defenses of Vicksburg, despite suffering hits on all thirteen vessels and having one sunk.
 4. Troop transports ran the batteries a few nights later. Grant now had the capability to get his forces back across the Mississippi.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapters 11–12.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 19.

Supplementary Reading:

Bearss, *The Campaign for Vicksburg: Vicksburg Is the Key*.

Cozzens, *No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Try to imagine the state of Union civilian morale after the high hopes raised by Antietam and Perryville dissolved in the disappointments of the winter of 1862–1863. What would you have done as Commander-in-Chief to turn this situation around? What if these battles had occurred before the elections?
2. What does the first phase of the Vicksburg campaign tell us about Grant as a general?

Lecture Twenty-One

The War in Virginia, Winter and Spring of 1862–1863


Scope: Our last lecture examined the Union’s frustrating campaigning in the winter of 1862 and spring of 1863 along the Mississippi River and in middle Tennessee. Now we turn our attention to Virginia, where northern arms suffered two devastating setbacks along the Rappahannock River that sent tremors of doubt and anger through the North. Ambrose E. Burnside, whom Lincoln has selected to replace McClellan in early November 1862, understood that he was expected to move against Lee. He did so in a campaign that opened with some promise but ended in ignominious failure in the Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862. A series of seemingly pointless frontal assaults against well-positioned Confederates made the defeat at Fredericksburg all the more bitter, and the infamous “Mud March” in January ended Burnside’s brief tenure at army headquarters.

Joseph Hooker succeeded Burnside, bringing a combination of talent and extreme ambition to his post. He displayed formidable organizational skills, re-inspired the Army of the Potomac, and planned a brilliant offensive that got off to a promising start in late April. But Lee and “Stonewall” Jackson countered Hooker’s moves with a dazzling response that seemed to drain all energy and daring from the Federal commander. Having seized the initiative, the badly outnumbered Confederates won a remarkable victory that sent the Union army reeling back across the Rappahannock River in early May. Northern morale dropped sharply, as opposition to Republican direction of the war mounted. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia cemented their position as the premier military force and leading national symbol in the Confederacy. Confederate success came at a high price, however, because Jackson was wounded on the second day of the battle and died of complications a few days later.

Outline

- I. The Lincoln Administration was hungry for aggressive action in November 1862.
 - A. McClellan failed to exploit his success at Antietam and spoke out politically.
 1. He said more men and material were necessary before the army could advance.
 2. He also criticized the Emancipation Proclamation.
 - B. Lincoln replaced McClellan with Ambrose E. Burnside on 7 November, the day after the 1862 elections.

1. Burnside was reluctant to take this high command.
 2. His career before the Civil War was undistinguished. He did design a breech-loading rifle.
 - C. Burnside understood he was expected to mount an offensive.
 1. He planned a campaign predicated on beating Lee to the Rappahannock River, crossing, and getting between Lee and Richmond.
 2. Poor logistical support prevented his crossing before Lee dug in opposite Fredericksburg with 75,000 men.
 3. On 11 December, Union engineers began to push pontoon bridges across the river. Union artillery largely destroyed the old city of Fredericksburg.
- II. The Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13 was a Union disaster.
 - A. Burnside’s hopes to get around Lee’s right flank (held by Stonewall Jackson) came to nothing because of poor execution, although the Union forces very nearly broke through.
 - B. The Federal commander resorted to unimaginative frontal assaults against a very strong Confederate position on Marye’s Heights.
 - C. The Union lost heavily (12,000 casualties) and gained nothing tactically or strategically as the result of this battle.
 1. The army returned to its pre-battle lines.
 2. The northern public expressed great indignation about the battle and Republican direction of the war.
 - D. The aftermath of Fredericksburg marked a low point for the Army of the Potomac.
 1. Some of Burnside’s subordinates, including Joseph Hooker, lobbied with Congress for a change of command.
 2. Lincoln replaced Burnside with “Fighting Joe” Hooker.
- III. Hooker initially showed great promise as commander of the Army of the Potomac.
 - A. He reorganized and reinvigorated the army, correcting Burnside’s shortcomings in many areas.
 1. He improved delivery of supplies.
 2. He improved medical care.
 - B. He developed a strategic plan that shifted the bulk of his army to an advantageous position behind the Confederate lines at Fredericksburg by the end of April.
 1. Lincoln wanted him to focus on Lee’s army, not Richmond.
 2. He planned a cavalry raid toward Richmond, demonstrating with a large force in Lee’s front, and swinging the bulk of his army around Lee’s left flank and in behind his positions.



- IV. Hooker's planning and splendid early movements reach a shattering climax in the Battle of Chancellorsville on May 1–4.
- A. Hooker abandoned his offensive intentions when Lee (after dividing his forces) attacked on May 1, instead of retreating toward Richmond.
 - B. On May 2, Lee split his army again as "Stonewall" Jackson marched around Hooker's right flank and delivered a crushing attack against the XI Corps (O. O. Howard). Jackson was wounded by his own men while returning from nighttime reconnaissance.
 - C. On May 3–4, Confederate attacks against two parts of Hooker's army persuaded the Union commander to retreat back across the Rappahannock.
 - D. The Battle of Chancellorsville, with 17,000 Union and 13,000 Confederate casualties, had significant short- and long-term consequences:
 - 1. It depressed northern civilian morale and gave impetus to critics of the Lincoln Administration.
 - 2. Jackson's death on May 10 dealt a blow to the Confederacy.
 - 3. The manner in which Lee won the victory made him and his Army of Northern Virginia the focus of Confederate national morale.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapters 11–13.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapters 19, 21.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *Glory Road*, parts 1–4.

Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 2, chapters 20–23.

Gallagher, ed., *The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock*.

Sears, *Chancellorsville*.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. Lee expressed disappointment with the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, because he did not inflict crippling damage on the Army of the Potomac. Was this a reasonable evaluation? Or did Lee overlook the positive nonmilitary effects of his victories?
- 2. How do you think you would have reacted to events in Virginia during the winter of 1862 and the spring of 1863 as a Union soldier? As a northern civilian?

Lecture Twenty-Two

Gettysburg

Scope: This lecture covers the Gettysburg campaign, an operation often described as the great turning point of the Civil War. It took place against a background of uncertainty and unrest in the North prompted by defeats at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville in the Eastern Theater, stalemate in Tennessee, and failure along the Mississippi River. As Abraham Lincoln looked for good news from some theater, Jefferson Davis and his advisers discussed how best to allocate precious southern military resources. Many Confederates argued for weakening Lee's army to reinforce commands west of the Appalachians, but Lee successfully lobbied for a second invasion across the Potomac. The campaign carried out in June and July 1863 resulted in a clash at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, that turned out to be the war's largest battle and the last major engagement fought on northern soil.

Lee contended against a pair of Union commanders of the Army of the Potomac—first Joseph Hooker, who exhibited no desire to face the Confederates in battle again, and George G. Meade, who replaced Hooker just days before the armies collided at Gettysburg. Lee fought a typically aggressive tactical action at Gettysburg, winning a striking success on July 1, pressing the Federals to the limit on July 2, and ordering the disastrous assault known as Pickett's Charge on July 3. Meade conducted a sound defense throughout the battle. Our review of this important campaign will focus on the reasons Lee went north, assess the soundness of his strategic thinking, describe some of the main episodes of the three-day battle, and suggest that Gettysburg, although certainly important, did not loom as large at the time as it has in retrospect.

Outline

- I. The war in May and June 1863 was a time of danger for the North and major strategic debate for the Confederacy.
 - A. The Lincoln government faced serious political and military problems.
 - 1. Antiwar sentiment among civilians was growing and the antiwar Democrats ("Copperheads") became more vociferous.
 - 2. The new Union draft law of 1863 (see Lecture Eighteen) alienated many northerners.
 - 3. Lincoln had little faith in Hooker after Chancellorsville.
 - B. Confederate leaders engaged in hot debate over allocation of military resources.

1. Many politicians and generals favored stripping troops from Lee to reinforce Braxton Bragg in Tennessee or John C. Pemberton at Vicksburg.
 2. Lee argued for concentration of troops in Virginia for an invasion of the North.
- C. Lee won the debate and promised a range of possible benefits.
1. The invasion would relieve pressure against Richmond.
 2. It would strengthen antiwar sentiment in the North.
 3. It would allow the army to provision itself in the rich Pennsylvania countryside and take pressure off southern agriculture.
 4. It might compel the Federals to shift troops from the West to deal with Lee's army.
- II. The initial phase of the campaign generally went well for the Confederates.
- A. Lee reorganized the army after Stonewall Jackson's death in May. There were now three corps: the First, under Longstreet; the Second, under Ewell; and the Third, under A. P. Hill.
- B. A huge cavalry battle at Brandy Station on June 9 caused a short delay in Lee's advance.
1. This battle was the first time that the Union cavalry had fought on even terms with the Confederate cavalry.
 2. Southern papers criticized the cavalry commander, J. E. B. Stuart, after this battle.
- C. Lee's infantry marched quickly northward after Brandy Station.
1. The Confederates won a small victory at Second Winchester en route to the Potomac.
 2. By the third week of June, the Army of Northern Virginia was spread out across southern Pennsylvania, almost as far north as Harrisburg.
 3. Lee was moving without firm intelligence because "Jeb" Stuart and much of his cavalry lost contact with the army.
- D. Meanwhile, Lincoln replaced Hooker with George G. Meade on 27 June 1863.
1. He was the fourth commander in seven months for the Army of the Potomac.
 2. He was an engineer and a capable, but not brilliant, professional officer.
- III. The armies made contact near Gettysburg on June 30 and fought the largest battle of the war on July 1-3, 1863.
- A. The first day was a striking Confederate success, despite the fact that Lee's forces were not concentrated or coordinated.
1. Two Union infantry corps were badly mauled.
 2. The Federals just managed to hang onto high ground south of Gettysburg.

3. Meade himself arrived on the field that night; more troops from both sides also arrived.
- B. Lee continued the tactical offensive on the second day (July 2).
1. He has been much criticized for this decision.
 2. Despite poor execution, Lee's attacks pushed the Union defenders to the limit on both ends of Meade's line.
- C. Lee mounted a last major tactical offensive on the third day.
1. Pickett's Charge against the Union center was not his first plan.
 2. Pickett's Charge failed completely and nearly one-half of the attackers became casualties.
- D. Casualties in the battle were enormous.
1. At least 25,000 Confederates fell, representing nearly one-third of the army.
 2. One-third (12 out of 53) of Lee's generals were killed, wounded, or captured.
 3. More than 20,000 Federals fell; Meade's subordinate command also suffered heavy losses.
- E. Lee retreated on July 4 and crossed the Potomac into Virginia a few days later.
1. Meade drew criticism for not pressing Lee's beaten army.
 2. The Confederates hoped Meade would counterattack near the Potomac.
- IV. At the time, Gettysburg was seen as an important, but not necessarily decisive, battle.
- A. The North expressed a mixture of happiness and disappointment.
1. Lee undoubtedly had been beaten and driven from Union soil.
 2. Lincoln and many others believed Meade should have hounded the Confederates after July 3.
- B. Most Confederates did not consider the battle an unequivocal disaster.
1. Confederates maintained faith in Lee and saw Gettysburg as a big and bloody battle that represented a temporary setback at worst.
 2. Some Confederates did express disappointment in Lee, but overall his reputation did not suffer.
- C. Gettysburg was not the great turning point of the conflict. It represented a setback to the Confederacy and stopped momentum in the Eastern Theater generated by Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.
1. Lee's losses could not be replaced easily.
 2. The campaign probably killed any hope that European powers would intervene in the war.
 3. It gave the Army of the Potomac a badly needed victory over Lee's army, which nonetheless remained strong and helped carry the Confederacy to the brink of success a year later during the Overland campaign (see Lecture Thirty-Six).

- D. A number of factors combined to make Gettysburg seem more important in retrospect.
1. It turned out to be the bloodiest battle of the war.
 2. It represented the last major Confederate invasion of the North.
 3. Lincoln's benediction over the Union dead in November 1863 gave Gettysburg a special status. The battlefield is now the most visited Civil War site in America.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 13.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 21.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *Glory Road*, parts 5–6.

Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command*.

Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 3, chapters 1–10.

Questions to Consider:

1. How did your previous understanding of Gettysburg compare to what you have heard in this lecture?
2. Do you think it is important for Americans to have one Civil War event that is considered to be the watershed of the conflict?

Lecture Twenty-Three

Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and Tullahoma

Scope: We continue our military focus on the summer of 1863 with this lecture on events along the Mississippi River and in Tennessee. As spring approached in 1863, Grant continued his efforts to capture the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg, and Rosecrans and Bragg faced each other in middle Tennessee (they had engaged in no major action since the battle of Stones River). A third Union force, under Nathaniel P. Banks, was closing in on Port Hudson, Louisiana, the Confederacy's other remaining strong point on the Mississippi River. Lincoln and Union planners believed the Mississippi, which figured prominently in the Anaconda strategy laid out by Winfield Scott two years earlier, along with middle Tennessee would witness the crucial action that summer.

Undaunted by his previous lack of success against Vicksburg, Grant put together one of the war's most impressive military campaigns between mid-April and early July. Against the advice of many subordinates, he ordered supporting naval vessels to run past the powerful Vicksburg batteries; mustered his troops south of the city; marched inland to seize Jackson, Mississippi; and advanced against Vicksburg from the east. He then laid siege to the city, which surrendered after six weeks. Banks captured Port Hudson shortly thereafter, which together with Grant's success, fulfilled a major part of the Anaconda Plan by establishing northern control of the entire Mississippi River. Rosecrans's Tullahoma campaign in late June added to the roster of Union successes. In a series of deft maneuvers carried out with minimal losses, Rosecrans forced Bragg's army into Chattanooga and set the stage for a strike against that city and into Georgia. A dismal winter and spring for the North had given way to a splendid summer. The northern populace took heart from events in the West, which together with Meade's victory at Gettysburg, seemed to promise a successful end to the war. On the Confederate side, the loss of an entire army at Vicksburg delivered a significant, if not fatal, blow to national morale.

Outline

- I. Three major Union forces prepared for a spring 1863 campaign in the West.
 - A. Grant would strike at Vicksburg.
 1. Confederate armies under John C. Pemberton at Vicksburg and Joseph E. Johnston near Jackson would oppose him.
 2. A naval force under David D. Porter would assist Grant on the Mississippi.

- B. Meanwhile, Nathaniel P. Banks would strike at Port Hudson.
 - C. Rosecrans would move against Bragg in middle Tennessee, aiming at Chattanooga.
- II.** Grant planned and carried out a daring campaign against Vicksburg.
- A. As we saw at the end of Lecture Twenty, he ordered Porter to run vessels past the artillery batteries at Vicksburg so that Union troops could be ferried from the west to the east side of the Mississippi below the city.
 - 1. Many Federal officers considered this to be too risky.
 - 2. Part of Grant's greatness lay in his willingness to take chances.
 - 3. The Navy passed the batteries with minimal losses.
 - B. Grant then crossed to the eastern bank and marched inland toward Jackson before moving against Vicksburg from the east.
 - 1. Confederates failed to unite their forces, while Grant and Sherman did hook up successfully.
 - 2. Grant cast off from his base and won victories over various parts of Johnston's force of 16,000 and Pemberton's army of 32,000 at Port Gibson (May 1), Raymond (May 12), Jackson (May 14), Champion Hill (May 16), and the Big Black River (May 17) before pinning Pemberton inside the defenses of Vicksburg.
 - 3. Federal assaults against Vicksburg's works failed on May 19 and 22, after which Grant laid siege to the city.
 - 4. A six-week siege ended in Pemberton's surrender of the city and his entire army on July 4, 1863.
 - 5. Pemberton was a Pennsylvanian who had married a Virginian and cast his lot with the South. He was not a particularly capable general officer.
 - C. Grant's campaign ranks among the most brilliant in American history.
 - 1. He abandoned his supply lines in moving toward Jackson.
 - 2. He marched quickly and defeated the enemy in detail (first Johnston, then Pemberton), capturing a 30,000-man army and vast Confederate military material.
 - 3. His victory achieved one of the North's major strategic goals.
 - D. On the Confederate side, there was backbiting and recrimination.
 - 1. President Jefferson Davis blamed General Joseph Johnston, while most others blamed Pemberton.
 - 2. Confederate morale sank after this complete defeat of their arms in the West.
- III.** Generals Banks and Rosecrans supplied additional good news for the Union in July.
- A. Banks, in cooperation with Navy forces under David Farragut, captured Port Hudson on July 9, removing the last Confederate obstacle to Union command of the Mississippi.

- 1. Two frontal assaults in May and June had failed.
 - 2. The Battle of Port Hudson marked one of the very first times that black troops were used in combat by the North.
 - 3. Banks laid siege and when Vicksburg fell, the garrison at Port Hudson capitulated.
- B. Rosecrans befuddled Bragg in the Tullahoma campaign.
 - 1. He used maneuver rather than combat and accomplished his mission with fewer than 600 casualties.
 - 2. Bragg found himself hemmed in at Chattanooga by the beginning of July.
 - 3. Atlanta and the Georgia hinterland thus became vulnerable to Union advances.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 13.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 21.

Supplementary Reading:

Bearss, *The Campaign for Vicksburg: Grant Strikes a Fatal Blow*.

Bearss, *The Campaign for Vicksburg: Unvexed to the Sea*.

Connelly, *Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862–1865*, chapters 4–6.

Hewitt, *Port Hudson: Confederate Bastion on the Mississippi*.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. Ulysses S. Grant is often referred to as a straight-ahead slugging general who overwhelmed his opponents with superior resources. How does this image square with his conduct of the campaign against Vicksburg?
- 2. If you were asked to project the outcome of the war based on an accurate understanding of the military and political situations in late July 1863, what would you predict? Support your answer.

Lecture Twenty-Four

A Season of Uncertainty, Summer and Fall 1863

Scope: This lecture continues our look at military events in 1863. It examines the relatively quiescent fronts along the Mississippi River and in Virginia, as well as the Battle of Chickamauga, which ranked as the largest engagement of the war's Western Theater. Union victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and in the Tullahoma campaign seemingly had prepared the way for knockout blows in both Virginia and the West. Lincoln and Union war planners labored diligently to achieve this result, only to see their efforts end in stalemate in Virginia and a major defeat at Chickamauga in the Western Theater. Lee's and Meade's armies settled into positions along the Rappahannock River, testing each other on several occasions but avoiding a full-blown battle. Well before the end of the year, Lincoln had given up on Meade's accomplishing anything noteworthy and hoped merely that the Army of the Potomac would keep Lee pinned down. Far to the west, Grant found himself without a major goal after the fall of Vicksburg. Union leaders debated the best strategy in his theater, leaving Grant to send Sherman on a quick strike toward Jackson, Mississippi, and otherwise pursue a number of small operations.

The autumn's principal military action developed near Chattanooga. Rosecrans maneuvered Bragg out of that city and marched into northern Georgia in early September (a smaller Union force under Ambrose Burnside captured Knoxville on September 3, thus "liberating" heavily Unionist East Tennessee). Given reinforcements from Joseph Johnston's forces in Mississippi and from Lee's army in Virginia, Bragg responded with a counteroffensive that resulted in the Battle of Chickamauga on September 19–20. The two days of heavy fighting gave Bragg the Confederacy's only tactical victory on an important western battlefield. Slow to realize what his soldiers had accomplished, Bragg allowed Rosecrans's army to regroup in Chattanooga. Chickamauga temporarily slowed the Union momentum generated by the summer's earlier triumphs, but the final fate of Chattanooga remained uncertain.

Outline

- I. The late summer and autumn of 1863 saw only minor military action in Virginia and Mississippi.
 - A. Meade and Lee maneuvered and feinted but fought no large battles in Virginia
 1. Lincoln lost confidence in Meade, who had failed to follow up his advantage after Gettysburg.

2. He was directed to watch Lee but not necessarily take any offensive action: the thinking was that Virginia was now a secondary theater of operations compared to the West.
3. Lee was weakened by the transfer of two divisions under James Longstreet from the Army of Northern Virginia to Bragg's Army of Tennessee.

- B. Union planners debated their next move in Grant's theater.
 1. Halleck wanted to concentrate on the Trans-Mississippi region embracing Arkansas, Texas, and parts of Louisiana.
 2. Grant and Banks unsuccessfully argued for the capture of Mobile, Alabama, the last major Confederate port on the Gulf of Mexico.
 3. Lincoln also favored the Trans-Mississippi for a combination of political, diplomatic, and military reasons.
 4. Grant eventually busied himself with an expedition against Jackson, Mississippi, commanded by Sherman, and other minor operations.

II. The Chattanooga-North Georgia Theater assumed center stage by late summer.

- A. Rosecrans moved slowly on 16 August after the Tullahoma campaign.
 1. He led a force into eastern Tennessee and "liberated" Knoxville on 3 September 1862.
 2. His skillful maneuvering caused Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga, a vital gateway and rail junction, on 9 September. Bragg retreated into Georgia.
- B. The Davis Administration had decided to reinforce Bragg in preparation for a counteroffensive.
 1. Two divisions from Joseph Johnston's army joined Bragg,
 2. Two divisions (Hood's and McLaw's) from the Army of Northern Virginia were ordered to north Georgia by rail.
- C. Rosecrans entered north Georgia after the capture of Chattanooga on 9 September and placed his army in a somewhat scattered and vulnerable position.

III. The Battle of Chickamauga gave Bragg a striking tactical victory.

- A. Rosecrans concentrated his army just south of Chattanooga in the valley of Chickamauga Creek by 18 September.
- B. Bragg's reinforced Army of Tennessee of almost 70,000 men, which outnumbered Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland, attacked on September 19 and 20.
 1. Bragg wanted to cut Rosecrans off from Chattanooga.
 2. Then Bragg planned to trap and envelop Rosecrans.
 3. Fighting started on the 19th as it had at Gettysburg, with a cavalry and infantry skirmish that escalated into a general engagement. There was no decisive result after the first day.

4. Confederate assaults on the 20th, although not developing as planned, shattered part of the Union line; the breakthrough was spearheaded by Longstreet's forces.
 5. After Rosecrans and about one-third of the Union army fled the field, George H. Thomas conducted a tenacious defense on Snodgrass Hill on the Union left and withdrew in good order.
 6. Bragg was not certain of his victory. Casualties numbered 18,500 CSA and 16,000 Federal.
- C. Although it was a tactical victory, Chickamauga failed to convey any long-term advantage to the Confederates.
1. Bragg allowed the Union army to reach Chattanooga and begin to dig in.
 2. Confederate civilian morale experienced only a momentary rise.
 3. The ultimate fate of Chattanooga remained uncertain.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 14.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 22.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *Grant Takes Command*, chapters 1–2.

Connelly, *Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862–1865*, chapters 8–9.

Cozzens, *This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga*.

Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 3, chapters 11–15.

Questions to Consider:

1. In Jefferson Davis's position, would you have elected to weaken Lee's army to reinforce Bragg's in late summer 1863?
2. Can the battle of Chickamauga be used as support for an argument that Civil War military engagements often had little real impact on the course of the war? Would shifting the lens to include all major battles between April and September 1863 change your answer?

Timeline

General

1787.....	Framers of the Constitution compromise on issues related to slavery.
1820.....	Missouri Compromise admits Missouri as a slave state but prohibits slavery elsewhere in the Louisiana Purchase territory above 36°36' north latitude.
1831.....	Nat Turner's rebellion in Virginia sends shockwaves through the South.
1831.....	William Lloyd Garrison founds his abolitionist newspaper <i>The Liberator</i> .
1840.....	Liberty Party fields a presidential candidate.
1845.....	Texas admitted to the Union.
1846–48.....	War between the United States and Mexico.
1846.....	Wilmot Proviso calls for barring slavery from lands acquired from Mexico.
1848.....	Free Soil Party fields a presidential candidate.
1850.....	Compromise of 1850 includes admission of California as a free state (giving free states a permanent majority in the United States Senate) and enactment of a tough Fugitive Slave Law.
1852.....	Whig Party fields its last serious presidential candidate, signaling breakdown of the second-party system.
1852.....	Publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe's <i>Uncle Tom's Cabin</i> makes many previously unengaged northerners sensitive to the issue of slavery.
1854.....	Kansas-Nebraska Act inflames sectional tensions.
1856.....	Abolitionist Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts is caned by Preston Brooks of South Carolina on the floor of the Senate

Biographical Notes

Baker, Edward Dickinson (1811–1861). Republican senator from Oregon and friend of Abraham Lincoln, he was killed at the battle of Ball’s Bluff in October 1861. His death helped spur creation of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which spent much of the conflict investigating Democratic generals.

Banks, Nathaniel Prentice (1816–1894). One of the most prominent Union political generals, he served throughout the war without achieving any distinction on the battlefield. No match for Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862, he similarly came to grief during the 1864 Red River campaign.

Barton, Clara (1821–1912). The most famous northern nurse, her excellent work at Antietam and elsewhere earned her the nickname “Angel of the Battlefield.” Appointed head nurse of Benjamin F. Butler’s Army of the James in 1864, she later helped identify and mark the graves of Union dead at Andersonville. She is most famous as the founder of the American Red Cross.

Beauregard, Pierre Gustave Toutant (1818–1893). One of the ranking officers in the Confederacy, he presided over the bombardment of Fort Sumter in April 1861, led the southern army at the opening of the battle of First Bull Run or Manassas, and later held various commands in the Western and Eastern Theaters.

Bell, John (1797–1869). Tennessean who ran as the presidential candidate of the Constitutional Union Party in 1860. A former Whig with moderate views, he gave lukewarm support to the Confederacy after Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the rebellion.

Booth, John Wilkes (1838–1865). Member of the most celebrated family of actors in the United States and a staunch southern sympathizer. He first planned to kidnap Abraham Lincoln, subsequently deciding to assassinate him. He mortally wounded the president on April 14, 1865, and was himself killed shortly thereafter by pursuing Union cavalry.

Bragg, Braxton (1817–1876). A controversial military figure who led the Confederate Army of Tennessee at Stones River, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga. Intensely unpopular with many of his soldiers and subordinates, he finished the war as an adviser to Jefferson Davis in Richmond.

Breckinridge, John Cabell (1821–1875). Vice President of the United States under James Buchanan and the southern Democratic candidate for president in 1860, he served the Confederacy as a general and Secretary of War. He fought in the Eastern and Western Theaters, winning the battle of New Market in May 1864.

Brown, John (1800–1859). Abolitionist whose violent activities during the mid-1850s in Kansas Territory and raid on Harpers Ferry in October 1859 gained

him wide notoriety. He was hanged after his capture at Harpers Ferry, becoming a martyr to many in the North.

Buchanan, James (1791–1868). Long-time Democratic politician who was elected president in 1856 and watched helplessly as the nation broke up during the winter of 1860–1861. During the last months of his presidency, he sought without success to find a way to entice the seceded states back into the Union.

Buell, Don Carlos (1818–1898). Union army commander in the Western Theater in 1861–1862 who fought at Shiloh and led the northern forces at Perryville. Reluctant to conduct vigorous campaigns against the Confederates, he was relieved of command in the autumn of 1862.

Burnside, Ambrose Everett (1824–1881). Union general best known for commanding the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862. His wartime career also included early service along the North Carolina coast and later action with Grant’s army during the Overland campaign. After the war he served Rhode Island as governor and United States senator.

Butler, Benjamin Franklin (1818–1893). Union general who coined the term “contraband” for runaway slaves in 1861 and commanded the army that approached Richmond by moving up the James River during U. S. Grant’s grand offensive of May 1864. A prewar Democrat who supported John C. Breckinridge in 1860, he became a Radical Republican during the war.

Cleburne, Patrick Ronayne (1828–1864). Confederate general who compiled a sterling record as a division commander in the Western Theater before his death at the battle of Franklin in November 1864. He caused a major controversy in 1864 with his famous circular recommending that slaves be armed and placed in Confederate service.

Cooke, Jay (1821–1905). A brilliant financier who raised hundreds of millions of dollars for the Union war effort through the sale of government bonds. Sometimes accused of receiving special treatment from the Lincoln Administration, he had powerful defenders who insisted that his actions helped keep northern armies in the field.

Crittenden, John Jordan (1787–1863). Politician from Kentucky who worked hard to avoid the break-up of the Union in 1860–1861. He proposed reinstating the Missouri Compromise line, called for a national convention to discuss the secession crisis, and later worked hard to keep Kentucky in the Union.

Davis, Jefferson (1808–1889). Colonel during the war with Mexico, Secretary of War under Franklin Pierce, and prominent senator from Mississippi in the 1840s and 1850s, he served as the Confederacy’s only president. He and his nationalist policies triggered great political debate among Confederates.

Dix, Dorothea Lynde (1802–1887). An antebellum advocate of improved care for the mentally ill, she served as superintendent of Union army nurses during

the war. She rendered solid service, despite a personality that often placed her at odds with both subordinates and superiors.

Douglas, Stephen Arnold (1812–1861). Prominent senator from Illinois in the 1850s who favored the doctrine of popular sovereignty and ran unsuccessfully as the regular Democratic candidate for president in 1860.

Douglass, Frederick (1817 or 1818–1895). Born a slave, he escaped to freedom in 1838, became an abolitionist and newspaper editor, and by 1860 was the most prominent African American leader in the United States. He pressed tirelessly to add freedom as a war aim in the North.

Early, Jubal Anderson (1816–1894). Confederate general who compiled a solid record as an officer in the Army of Northern Virginia. He ended the war a disgraced figure in the Confederacy because of his defeats in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign. After the war, he became one of the leading architects of the Lost Cause interpretation of the conflict.

Farragut, David Glasgow (1801–1870). The most famous Union naval figure of the war, he was promoted to rear admiral in 1862 (the first officer to hold that rank). He led naval forces in successful operations against New Orleans in 1862, Port Hudson in 1863, and Mobile Bay in 1864.

Forrest, Nathan Bedford (1821–1877). Although completely without formal military training, he became one of the best Confederate cavalry generals and proved to be a major thorn in the side of numerous Union commanders in the Western Theater. After the war, he became the first grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan.

Frémont, John Charles (1813–1890). Famous as an antebellum western explorer, he ran as the first Republican candidate for president in 1856 and served as a Union general in Missouri and Virginia during the war. While commanding in Missouri in 1861, he attempted to free the state's slaves by issuing a proclamation that abolitionists applauded but Lincoln ordered him to rescind.

Grant, Ulysses S. (1822–1885). The most successful Union military commander, serving as general-in-chief for the last fourteen months of the war and twice winning election as president during the postwar years.

Greenhow, Rose O'Neal (1815–1864). A well-known resident of Washington, D.C., who became a Confederate spy. She supplied useful information to the Confederates before the battle of First Manassas, was later jailed in Washington, and eventually was released and sent to the Confederacy. She published an account of her imprisonment in 1863 and died when the vessel on which she was a passenger ran aground off North Carolina.

Halleck, Henry W. (1815–1872). An important Union military figure who presided over striking successes in the Western Theater in 1862, served as general-in-chief of the Union army in 1862–1864, and was demoted to chief of

staff when Grant assumed the top military position in March 1864. His administrative skills outstripped his abilities as a field commander.

Hood, John Bell (1831–1879). Confederate commander who fought effectively in the Army of Northern Virginia in 1862–1863 but is best known for his unsuccessful defense of Atlanta against Sherman's army and the disastrous campaign in Tennessee that culminated in the battle of Nashville in mid-December 1864.

Hooker, Joseph (1814–1879). Union general nicknamed "Fighting Joe" who commanded the Army of the Potomac at the battle of Chancellorsville. Replaced by George G. Meade during the Gettysburg campaign, he later fought at Chattanooga and in the opening phase of the 1864 Atlanta campaign.

Hunter, David (1802–1886). A Union general who, as commander along the south Atlantic coast, tried to free all slaves in his department in May 1862, only to see Lincoln revoke his order. He later led an army in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.

Jackson, Thomas Jonathan (1824–1863). Nicknamed "Stonewall" and second only to Lee as a popular Confederate hero, he was celebrated for his 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign and his achievements as Lee's trusted subordinate. He died at the peak of his fame, succumbing to pneumonia after being wounded at the battle of Chancellorsville.

Johnston, Albert Sidney (1803–1862). A prominent antebellum military figure from whom much was expected as a Confederate general. He compiled a mixed record in the Western Theater before being mortally wounded on April 6, 1862, at the battle of Shiloh.

Johnston, Joseph Eggleston (1807–1891). A Confederate army commander who served in both Virginia and the Western Theater. Notoriously prickly about rank and privileges, he feuded with Jefferson Davis and compiled a record that demonstrated his preference for defensive over offensive operations. His wound at the battle of Seven Pines in May 1862 opened the way for R. E. Lee to assume field command. (He and A. S. Johnston were not related.)

Lee, Robert Edward (1807–1870). Southern military officer who commanded the Army of Northern Virginia for most of the war and became the most admired figure in the Confederacy.

Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865). Elected in 1860 as the first Republican to hold the presidency, he provided superior leadership for the northern war effort and was reelected in 1864 before being assassinated at Ford's Theater on the eve of complete Union victory.

Longstreet, James (1821–1904). Lee's senior subordinate from 1862 until the end of the war, he compiled a generally excellent record while under Lee's eye but proved unequal to the demands of independent command during the East

Tennessee campaign of 1863–1864. He became a controversial figure in the South after the war, because he refused to embrace Lost Cause ideas.

McClellan, George Brinton (1826–1885). One of the most important military figures of the war, he built the Army of the Potomac into a formidable force and led it during the Peninsula campaign, during the Seven Days battles, and at Antietam. Often at odds with Lincoln because of his unwillingness to press the enemy, he was relieved of command in November 1862 and ran as the Democratic candidate for president in 1864.

McDowell, Irvin (1818–1885). Military officer who commanded the Union army at the battle of First Bull Run or Manassas. The remainder of his wartime career was anticlimactic.

Meade, George Gordon (1815–1872). Union general who fought throughout the war in the Eastern Theater, commanding the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg and for the rest of the war. U. S. Grant's presence with the army after April 1864 placed Meade in a difficult position.

Pope, John (1822–1892). Union general who won several small successes in the Western Theater before being transferred to the Eastern Theater to command the Army of Virginia. His defeat at the battle of Second Bull Run or Manassas in August 1862 ended his important service during the war.

Porter, David Dixon (1813–1891). Union naval officer who commanded the Mississippi River Squadron during 1862–1863 in support of various army operations, including the campaign against Vicksburg. He later served along the Atlantic coast and on the James and York Rivers in Virginia.

Rosecrans, William Starke (1819–1898). Union military commander who fought in the Western Theater and led the Army of the Cumberland at the battle of Chickamauga and during the early phase of the siege of Chattanooga. His removal from command at Chattanooga by Grant in mid-October 1863 ended his important wartime service.

Schofield, John McAllister (1831–1906). Union general who fought in the Western Theater, commanding the Army of Ohio during the Atlanta campaign and winning the battle of Franklin on November 30, 1864.

Scott, Dred (1795 [?]-1858). Slave who stood at the center of legal proceedings that culminated in 1857 in the Supreme Court's landmark *Dred Scott v. Sandford* decision. The Court declared that, as an African American, Scott was not a citizen and, therefore, could not institute a suit. The Court also declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional and seemingly opened all federal territories to slavery.

Scott, Winfield (1786–1866). One of the great soldiers in United States history, he performed brilliantly in the war with Mexico and remained the ranking officer in the army at the outbreak of the Civil War. He devised the "Anaconda Plan" in

the spring of 1861, a strategy that anticipated the way the North would win the conflict.

Semmes, Raphael (1809–1877). The most celebrated Confederate naval officer, he captained the commerce raiders *Sumter* and *Alabama*, the two of which captured more than 70 northern ships, and later commanded the James River Naval Squadron.

Sheridan, Philip Henry (1831–1888). Ranked behind only Grant and Sherman as a Union war hero, Sheridan fought in both the Western and Eastern Theaters. His most famous victories came in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign; at the battle of Five Forks on April 1, 1865; and during the Appomattox campaign.

Sherman, William Tecumseh (1820–1891). Union military officer who overcame difficulties early in the war to become Grant's primary subordinate. An advocate of "hard" war, he is best known for his capture of Atlanta and the "March to the Sea" in 1864.

Sigel, Franz (1824–1902). German-born Union general who was popular among German-speaking troops but ineffective as a field commander. His most famous service came in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864, ending in defeat at the battle of New Market on May 15.

Smith, Edmund Kirby (1824–1893). A Confederate general who participated in the 1862 Kentucky campaign and later commanded southern forces in the vast Trans-Mississippi Theater.

Stephens, Alexander Hamilton (1812–1883). A moderate Democrat from Georgia who supported Stephen A. Douglas in the 1860 presidential campaign and embraced secession reluctantly, he served throughout the war as Vice President of the Confederacy. Increasingly at odds with Jefferson Davis over issues related to growing central power, he became an embittered public critic of the President and his policies.

Stevens, Thaddeus (1792–1868). Radical Republican congressman from Pennsylvania who chaired the House Ways and Means Committee. He favored harsh penalties for slaveholding Confederates and pushed to make emancipation a major focus of the Union war effort.

Stuart, James Ewell Brown (1833–1864). Known as "Jeb," he commanded the cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia from June 1862 until his death at the battle of Yellow Tavern in May 1864. His role in the Gettysburg campaign generated a great deal of controversy, but overall he compiled a superb record as the "eyes and ears" of Lee's army.

Sumner, Charles (1811–1874). Radical Republican senator from Massachusetts who was caned on the floor of the Senate by Congressman Preston Brooks of South Carolina after delivering his famous "Crime against Kansas" speech in 1856. During the war, he chaired the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and consistently pressed for emancipation.

Taney, Roger Brooke (1777–1864). Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1835–1864, he antagonized abolitionists with the *Dred Scott* decision in 1857. During the war, he sought to curb Abraham Lincoln’s power to suspend the *writ of habeas corpus*, opposed northern conscription, and argued that governmental assaults on civil liberties posed a greater threat to the nation than secession of the southern states.

Thomas, George Henry (1816–1870). A leading Union military officer who spent his entire Civil War career in the Western Theater. Earning the nickname “Rock of Chickamauga” for exceptional service on that battlefield, he later commanded the Army of the Cumberland during the siege of Chattanooga and decisively defeated John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee at the battle of Nashville. A Virginian outside Grant’s inner circle, he never received his full measure of credit for superior accomplishments.

Tompkins, Sally L. (1833–1916). Established Robertson Hospital in Richmond, Virginia, in July 1861 and supervised it for the duration of the war. Commissioned a captain in the Confederate army when all private hospitals were placed under military control, she was the only woman to hold official rank in the southern armed forces. Her hospital earned the distinction of returning the highest percentage of its patients to active service.

Vallandigham, Clement Laird (1820–1871). Congressman from Ohio and a leading Copperhead who staunchly opposed emancipation and most of the rest of the Republican legislative agenda. Exiled to the Confederacy by Lincoln in 1863, he returned to the United States and helped draft the peace platform at the 1864 Democratic national convention.

Wade, Benjamin Franklin (1800–1878). Radical Republican senator from Ohio who chaired the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, urged Abraham Lincoln to dismiss George B. McClellan, and called for the emancipation of all slaves. In 1864, he co-authored the Wade-Davis Bill and the Wade-Davis Manifesto that attacked Lincoln’s actions relating to Reconstruction.

Yancey, William Lowndes (1814–1863). Prominent Alabama fire-eater whose “Yancey Platform,” calling for the protection of slavery in all federal territories, helped break up the Democratic Party in 1860.