

Table of Contents
The American Civil War
Part IV

Professor Biography	1
Foreword	1
Lecture Thirty-Seven Cold Harbor to Petersburg.....	3
Lecture Thirty-Eight The Confederate Home Front, I.....	6
Lecture Thirty-Nine The Confederate Home Front, II.....	9
Lecture Forty The Northern Home Front, I.....	12
Lecture Forty-One The Northern Home Front, II.....	16
Lecture Forty-Two Prisoners of War.....	19
Lecture Forty-Three Mobile Bay and Atlanta.....	23
Lecture Forty-Four Petersburg, the Crater, and the Valley.....	26
Lecture Forty-Five The Final Campaigns.....	29
Lecture Forty-Six Petersburg to Appomattox.....	32
Lecture Forty-Seven Closing Scenes and Reckonings.....	35
Lecture Forty-Eight Remembering the War.....	43
Maps	36
Timeline	47
Glossary	In Parts I, II, III
Biographical Notes	60
Bibliography	67

The American Civil War

Scope:

This course examines the era of the American Civil War with emphasis on the period from 1861 to 1865, four years during which the United States endured its greatest national trauma. The lectures address such questions as why the war came, why the North won (or the Confederacy lost), how military campaigns unfolded, and how the war affected various elements of American society. The principal goal is to convey an understanding of the scope and consequences of the bloodiest war in our nation's history—a struggle that claimed more than 600,000 lives, freed nearly 4,000,000 enslaved African Americans, and settled definitively the question of whether states had the right to withdraw from the Union. The course also will address issues left unresolved at the end of the conflict, most notably the question of where former slaves would fit into the social and political structure of the nation.

Leading participants on both sides will receive extensive attention. Interspersed among discussions of military and nonmilitary aspects of the war will be biographical sketches of Abraham Lincoln, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, Frederick Douglass, “Stonewall” Jackson, William Tecumseh Sherman, Thaddeus Stevens, and several dozen other prominent figures. Although this is not a course on Civil War battles and generals per se, approximately half of the lectures will be devoted to the strategic and tactical dimensions of military campaigns. It is impossible to understand the broad impact of the war without a grasp of how military events shaped attitudes and actions on the home front, and there will be a special effort to tie events on the battlefield to life behind the lines.

Part I traces the prelude to the war by discussing the key issues of the antebellum period, starting with the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and continuing for 40 years to the election of 1860. The secession crisis that election precipitated turned into armed conflict in early 1861. Early lectures size up the two opposing sides of the military conflict, including a consideration of the men who manned the armies. The final five lectures of Part I trace the early fortunes of war from the Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) through the Peninsula and Shenandoah Valley campaigns of early 1862, when first one side, then the other seemed to be in ascendancy.

Part II picks up the military narrative with the pivotal Seven Days' Battles before Richmond, when the Union advance in the East was halted by the newly appointed General Robert E. Lee, and continues up to the crucial Battle of Antietam in September. Lectures on the issue of emancipation, military conscription, and financing of the war provide a look at political and social issues that came to the fore in this period. Part II concludes with more discussion of major campaigns and battles, including Gettysburg and Chickamauga, bringing the narration up to the fall of 1863.

Part III begins with the campaign for Chattanooga that saw the ascendancy of Ulysses S. Grant as the top Union general. The emphasis shifts to the diplomatic front, as both sides vied to present their case before the world (i.e., European) audience. The war from the African American perspective comes next, followed by a discussion of northern wartime “reconstruction” policies. We devote two lectures to the naval war, both that conducted on the high seas involving the northern blockade and southern commerce raiding, as well as that which took place on the “brown water” of rivers and bays. Two lectures cover the experience of women in the war, on the home front, as medical workers on the field, and even (in a few cases) as soldiers. The focus then shifts back to the military events of 1864, moving the narrative forward to the Overland campaign up to the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania in the spring of 1864.

Part IV brings us to the finale of the Overland campaign and the siege of Petersburg and Richmond. This offers an excellent opportunity to discuss the home front, in both the North and the South, and consider the differences in the wartime experience between the two sections. After one lecture on the issue of prisoners of war, we turn back to the military front to investigate how Grant’s strategy to envelope the South and eliminate its ability to fight militarily played out in Sherman’s Atlanta campaign and his inexorable pressure on Lee at Richmond. With the conclusion of the war in April 1865 came the chance for peace and reconciliation, but the assassination of Abraham Lincoln dominated the immediate period after the cessation of hostilities. A final lecture sums up the lessons and legacies of this great national trauma and reminds us that, in a larger context, the issues that divided the nation during the era of the Civil War continue to resonate in modern America. This course will attempt to make those issues clear while providing a sense of the drama and tragedy of this tumultuous period in the life of the nation.

Lecture Thirty-Seven

Cold Harbor to Petersburg

Scope: This lecture completes our examination of military events in the first half of 1864 by following Grant’s and Lee’s campaigns from Cold Harbor through the beginning of the siege of Petersburg. After the battles at Spotsylvania, the armies continued their southward movements, pausing for several days at the North Anna River before marching to the ground where McClellan and Lee had fought two years earlier during the Seven Days’ campaign. Lee took up a strong position at Cold Harbor (near the old Gaines Mill battleground), where the armies probed each other’s lines on June 1–2. Grant launched a massive assault on June 3 that gained nothing but cost thousands of northern casualties. Long lists of casualties (36,000 USA versus 24,000 CSA) and little apparent success on the battlefield generated criticism of Grant in the North, but he remained focused on the military front. On June 12, he began one of the most impressive movements of the war. Slipping away from the lines at Cold Harbor, Grant transferred the bulk of his army across the James River and attacked a small force of Confederates defending Petersburg on June 15. Fooled by Grant’s move, Lee waited several days before rushing reinforcements to Petersburg. Exhaustion, poor leadership, and reluctance on the part of Union soldiers to assault breastworks all worked to frustrate Union attacks at Petersburg. By June 19, the opportunity for easy success had passed, and Grant began a siege that would last for the next nine months. The Overland campaign was over. Grant had lost more than 64,000 men and Lee, more than 30,000. In effect, neither army was the same organization that had clashed at the Wilderness during the first week of May. The North entered a very difficult period, during which the absence of good news from Virginia and Georgia sent morale plummeting and set up a late-summer crisis of serious proportions.

Outline

- I. Grant continued his relentless movement southward after the battles of Spotsylvania.
 - A. The armies clashed at the North Anna River in late May.
 1. Lee secured Hanover Junction, a key rail center, and entrenched behind the river.
 2. Grant placed his army in a difficult position with three pieces divided by the North Anna.
 3. Illness caused Lee to miss an opportunity to strike Grant’s vulnerable army.

- B. The armies shifted to Cold Harbor near Richmond (and the 1862 Gaines Mill battlefield), engaging in inconclusive action on June 1–2.
- II. Grant launched famously futile assaults on June 3 at Cold Harbor against well-entrenched Confederate positions.
- A. Several factors may have influenced his decision.
 - 1. He hoped to hold Lee’s attention while other Federal forces under General Hunter operated in the Shenandoah Valley, carrying out a strategy of exhaustion, and under General Sheridan nearer to Richmond.
 - 2. He may have been frustrated by Lee’s ability to counter previous moves and persuaded to try brute force.
 - 3. He may have believed that Lee’s army was reeling and could be defeated by headlong attacks.
 - 4. He knew the northern people were anxious for an unequivocal battlefield victory.
 - B. Fifty thousand Union attackers failed to dislodge 30,000 defenders and suffered heavy casualties in trying. The Union endured 7,500 casualties in this attack alone.
 - C. Grant resumed maneuvering on June 12 with the intention of capturing Petersburg, south of Richmond.
 - 1. He slipped away from Lee and crossed the James River with most of his army.
 - 2. His advance units (the XVIII and II Corps) reached Petersburg, a key rail and water juncture that lay twenty-five miles south of Richmond and was essential to the southern capital, while it was lightly defended.
 - D. P. G. T. Beauregard put up a good defense and called for help from Lee.
 - 1. Lee, thinking that Grant was merely maneuvering as before in this campaign, realized belatedly that Grant had left his front.
 - 2. Reinforcements from the Army of Northern Virginia stabilized the Petersburg defensive line by 19 June.
 - E. The Union lost a major opportunity at Petersburg on June 15–18.
 - 1. Grant’s troops far outnumbered the Confederates.
 - 2. Union attacks failed miserably for a number of reasons: veteran corps commanders failed to coordinate well and many northern troops refused to attack breastworks.
- III. The Overland campaign had taken a terrible toll on both armies and on the northern home front.
- A. The armies together averaged more than 2,500 casualties a day from May 5 through June 18. In other words, they suffered the equivalent of a First Manassas every day for a month and a half.

- 1. The armies had few respites from fighting and skirmishing, unlike in earlier campaigns.
 - 2. Huge numbers of officers were killed or maimed on both sides.
 - 3. Eighteen thousand “three-year men” went home at this time.
 - 4. Despite the bloodshed, there were no decisive results on the battlefield.
- B. Northern civilians suffered a serious decline in morale.
- 1. The high expectations of April and May made the absence of victories and the high casualties all the more damaging.
 - 2. No good news came from any other front (e.g., the Valley, the Red River, Atlanta) to offset news from Virginia.
 - 3. As a result, northern home front morale dropped to its lowest point in the war.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapters 17–18.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 24.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox*, chapter 3.

Freeman, *Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 3, chapters 23–25.

Trudeau, *Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May–June 1864*, pp. 220–318.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. What do you think Americans in mid-July 1864 would think of the modern idea that the Confederacy was doomed after Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg the preceding summer?
- 2. What does the campaigning of May–July 1864 tell us about the importance of individual victories as determinants of popular morale?

Lecture Thirty-Eight

The Confederate Home Front,I

Scope: Southern society experienced dramatic change during the conflict. As the Confederate people struggled to keep armies in the field, their political and social structure experienced enormous strain and their economy finally proved unable to produce and distribute a regular supply of food, clothing, and other necessities to many citizens. Consciously choosing to avoid party politics in establishing their new nation, the founders of the Confederacy hoped to return to a revolutionary-era ideal. As the war progressed, bitter divisions arose between those who supported the Davis Administration, which pressed for a range of central governmental powers designed to further the war effort, and those who trumpeted the necessity of protecting state and individual rights as they attacked the president and his policies. Congress did not forge a strong record and won only lukewarm support from the people. Intensely personal and filled with bitter invective, the Confederate political scene often seemed chaotic and counterproductive to the war effort.

Economically, the southern people suffered enormous hardship and dislocation. Over-reliance on paper money, loss of territory to Union forces, the effects of the blockade, and the disintegration of the transportation system contributed to shortages and inflation. Everyday necessities eventually became extremely expensive (inflation reached 9,000 percent in some instances), and poorer people suffered terribly. Various levels of government tried to organize and provide relief for those hit hardest but lacked the resources to cope with an escalating crisis. Rampant inflation encouraged a barter economy and caused many citizens to question their ability to continue the struggle for independence. Although most Confederates remained firmly committed to defeating the Yankees, economic woes raised doubts in many people about their ability to continue the war.

Outline

- I. The Confederacy began with a hope to avoid partisan party politics.
 - A. Confederates saw themselves as true heirs of the revolutionary tradition. Seeming agreement about goals and methods during the secession crisis and early months of the war suggested a unanimity of outlook.
 - B. The war quickly brought strains that exposed weaknesses and rivalries.
 1. The CSA Congress proved to be a mediocre body, lacking any real vision or leadership. The Congress was reluctant to make hard decisions, held lengthy private debates about minor questions (no

public records of deliberations were kept), and witnessed considerable violence, absenteeism, even public drunkenness from its members.

2. Several factors may help explain the inadequacy of the CSA Congress: the tradition of southern political obstructionism during the late-antebellum years may have continued; many able leaders went into the army (Howell Cobb and Robert Toombs of Georgia are two notable examples); and the war naturally enhanced the power of the executive at the expense of Congress.
- C. Jefferson Davis and his policies became the focus for intense and often vitriolic political debate. Davis had strengths and weaknesses as a chief executive:
 1. He was a meticulous thinker, a hard worker, and completely dedicated to the Confederacy.
 2. He had wide experience as a politician, administrator, and soldier.
 3. He could be too loyal to friends (e.g., Braxton Bragg), too attentive to small details, and unbending when he thought he was right (which was most of the time).
 4. He tried to combine military and political leadership rather than concentrating on politics and giving his best commanders wide latitude.
 - D. Two factors helped end a brief period of broad support for Davis (despite the official absence of political parties in the Confederacy).
 1. The defeats in the Western Theater in the spring of 1862 prompted criticism.
 2. The growing power of a central government that conscripted men, taxed citizens in various ways, and suspended the writ of *habeas corpus* alienated many Confederates devoted to state and individual rights.
 - E. Davis was a realist who saw the need for extreme measures if the Confederacy were to win.
 1. Lee agreed with him, but Vice President Alexander H. Stephens and many others did not.
 2. Some southern governors strongly opposed Davis, but we need to be careful in assessing the historical record on this point.
- II. The southern economy suffered immense dislocation during the war.
 - A. Four factors played crucial roles in this process:
 1. An over-reliance on paper money fueled inflation.
 2. The loss of productive industrial and agricultural areas to invading northern armies created shortages.
 3. The tightening blockade also created shortages.
 4. Military campaigns and shortages of repair materials disrupted the transportation network and frustrated distribution of goods.

- B. Every class but debtors and speculators suffered from inflation, which eventually reached 9,000 percent in some areas.
- C. Economic hardship created social tension.
 - 1. Women rioted for food in several cities.
 - 2. Poorer women urged soldiers to desert to help feed their families.
 - 3. Real wages declined by about one-third and caused labor unrest.
 - 4. Soldiers' pay was poor and inflation eroded virtually all of its buying power.
- D. Inflation caused citizens and the government to adjust.
 - 1. Many citizens pursued an economy based on bartering and simply did without many goods.
 - 2. Congress passed a tax-in-kind that required producers to give 10 percent of their production of various crops to the government.
 - 3. The Impressment Act also imposed hardships, and such legislation alienated many people.
 - 4. Economic hardship caused some (but not most) Confederates to lose heart for the war.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapters 14, 20.

Thomas, *The Confederate Nation, 1861–1865*, chapters 5–6, 9.

Supplementary Reading:

Gallagher, *The Confederate War*, chapters 1–2.

Rable, *The Confederate Republic: A Revolution against Politics*.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. Do you see any advantages to a democratic political system without political parties? Was this a misguided goal for the Confederacy?
- 2. Do you believe defeat made some of the flaws in the Confederate system seem larger than they really were?

Lecture Thirty-Nine

The Confederate Home Front, II

Scope: This lecture continues our look at the southern home front and addresses the topics of white refugees and the phenomenon of disaffection with the government and the war. The war created two kinds of refugees in the South—slaves who went to Union lines and white people who were displaced by northern armies. We have discussed black refugees in an earlier lecture, and the focus here will be on the thousands of white people who abandoned their homes in the hope of protecting their families and salvaging at least some of their property. This phenomenon appeared almost as soon as the war began (Mrs. Robert E. Lee was among the earliest refugees), as people moved to cities or remote areas where they believed they would be safe from Union armies. Although they could not know it at the time, most refugees lost more than if they had remained in their homes.

Among those who did not become refugees, increasing hardship and an intrusive central government undoubtedly caused distress and anger as the war progressed. Historians have looked at various factors that seemed to indicate widespread alienation among the people: unhappiness with conscription, desertion from the armies, concealment of goods from government impressment agents, and hoarding and profiteering. All these actions clearly show that tensions and conflicts existed in the Confederacy that caused some people to mitigate or withdraw their support for the war effort. Too often, however, these factors have been used to suggest that internal dissension caused the death of the Confederacy before Union armies had defeated southern armies in the field. Most Confederates endured profound disruption in their lives and continued to sacrifice in the name of winning independence. As a people, they suffered far greater social and economic turmoil because of the war than did their northern counterparts (or any other segment of white American society in our post-Revolutionary War history)—including the presence of huge invading armies, the displacement of thousands of civilians, and widespread and persistent shortages of goods. It is quite remarkable that the Confederate people maintained their resistance for four years in the face of enormous loss and dislocation.

Outline

- I. The war produced thousands of white refugees in the Confederacy.
 - A. This phenomenon began very early in the conflict.
 - 1. Mrs. Robert E. Lee's departure from Arlington in the spring of 1861 was an early example.

2. Thousands of people faced the difficult choice of staying and trying to protect property or taking what they could to a safer place, although no reliable numbers exist to show exactly how many fell into this category.
 3. Those who stayed proved better able to protect their property.
- B.** Refugees often moved several times, often in reaction to military operations.
1. They initially tried to stay as close to their homes as possible.
 2. They ended up moving to cities that were better protected, such as Richmond, or to remote areas that were seemingly safe from Union incursions.
- C.** The refugee experience was often harrowing.
1. Leaving home was traumatic. Some people had time to plan, but others (such as General Polk's wife) had only a few hours' notice. Trains were often packed beyond capacity.
 2. The initial escape marked the beginning of the ordeal; Federal troops and Confederate deserters and "bushwhackers" often preyed on refugees.
 3. People in safer areas often resented newcomers who placed additional stress on local resources.
 4. Most refugees experienced a decline in standard of living once they resettled.
 5. Texas became a haven for refugees, many of them from Louisiana.
- D.** Few refugees recouped their losses and, as a result, constituted one of the groups most severely affected by the war.
- II.** The Confederacy experienced considerable disaffection during the war.
- A.** Although most men served in the military, opposition to conscription was widespread.
1. Some men refused to serve when conscripted.
 2. Most of these individuals engaged in passive resistance. Georgia and Alabama had a record of this, showing that only 50 percent of draftees reported for duty. However, because many enlisted to avoid conscription, we need to be careful in evaluating this figure.
 3. Some men took a more active stance against conscription officers.
- B.** About 100,000 Confederate soldiers (or 13 percent) deserted.
1. An unknown proportion of these men left service because they had lost faith in the Confederacy.
 2. Others left the ranks to help at home, then returned to the army.
 3. Some formed guerrilla bands, but most stayed at home and worked.
- C.** Some citizens concealed goods from government impressment agents.
1. Much of this activity represented an effort to keep food and other goods necessary for a family's survival.

2. Some of this activity represented deep unhappiness with the Confederacy.
- D.** Other citizens hoarded goods or engaged in profiteering.
1. Many Confederates unfairly blamed Jewish merchants for high prices.
 2. Blockade runners often helped profiteers by bringing in luxury items rather than war-related goods.
- III.** Disaffection has been exaggerated by many historians and blamed for the defeat of the Confederacy.
- A.** Most white southerners remained loyal Confederates who might oppose some measures but retained their willingness to struggle for independence.
- B.** The level of loss and sacrifice attests to southerners' devotion to the Confederacy.
1. Southerners lost a far higher percentage of their military-age males than any other segment of white society in American history (including the North during the Civil War).
 2. They similarly suffered far higher property losses.
 3. They maintained their resistance despite massive dislocation of population and increasing physical hardship.

Essential Reading:

Gallagher, *The Confederate War*, chapters 1–2.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 20.

Supplementary Reading:

Berenger, Hattaway, Jones, and Still, *Why the South Lost the Civil War*.

Massey, *Refugee Life in the Confederacy*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Was military defeat or disaffection behind the lines more important in bringing Confederate defeat?
2. What comparative standard should we use in trying to estimate the degree of Confederate devotion to the cause?

Lecture Forty

The Northern Home Front, I

Scope: This lecture begins our consideration of the northern home front by looking at political developments during the first three years of the war and the presidential election of 1864. Although the war did not bring the type of dislocation to the North that was characteristic of the Confederate experience, it did produce great political change. The Republicans moved to solidify their position as the majority party after several decades of Democratic dominance. The Democratic Party split into factions for and against the war and suffered because of a common perception that many of its members harbored pro-Confederate, treasonous sentiments. Republicans faced crises in the autumn of 1862 and the spring of 1863 because of Union failures on the battlefield and the unpopularity of emancipation, the draft, and other Republican policies. The most radically antiwar faction of the Democrats, known as Copperheads and associated with Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, achieved their greatest prominence just before the northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Lincoln and his party faced another crisis in the summer of 1864 because of the failure of Union armies to capture Richmond and Atlanta, the enormous lists of casualties that poured out of Virginia, and the success of a small Confederate army under Jubal A. Early in reaching the outskirts of Washington. Sherman's capture of Atlanta and Philip H. Sheridan's decisive victories over Early in the Shenandoah Valley in September and October revitalized the Republicans just in time for them to reelect Lincoln and win huge majorities in both houses of Congress. One of the most important elections in American history, the contest in 1864, guaranteed that the North would continue to press the war to a conclusion that restored the Union and eliminated slavery.

Outline

- I. The war brought a major realignment in American politics.
 - A. The Democrats saw their power erode dramatically.
 1. For six decades before the war, only Democratic presidents had been reelected to a second term.
 2. Democrats had controlled Congress for most of the antebellum period; in the seven decades after 1860, only two Democrats were elected president.
 3. The Republican Party solidified its win in 1860 during the course of the war.
 - B. The Democratic Party split into factions during the war.

1. The "War" Democrats joined Republicans in pressing for a vigorous prosecution of the war against the Confederates. Some joined Lincoln's cabinet and, in 1864, they united with Republicans under the banner of the Union Party.
2. The "regular" or "Peace" Democrats (some popularly known as "Copperheads") opposed the Lincoln Administration. They preferred to retain their party organization and take power from the Republicans. They initially supported the war while seeking to overthrow the Republicans.
3. As Republicans pressed for emancipation and Lincoln approved arbitrary arrests and other policies, the Copperheads began to oppose the war and seek restoration of the Union through compromise and negotiation.
4. These Democrats were never pro-Confederate, though Republicans tried to paint them as such.
5. The Copperheads were strongest in the southern Midwest and among the Irish in eastern cities.
6. They opposed wartime financial measures and hated the "reforming" tendencies of the Radical Republican leadership.
7. The South made some efforts to exploit the Copperhead opposition to the Lincoln Administration.

II. Policies and military events influenced Republican fortunes.

- A. The off-year elections of 1862 gave Lincoln and his party a scare.
 1. The Republicans lost five states (including Lincoln's home state of Illinois) that they had carried in 1860 but retained control of Congress, where the edge in the House came from the border states.
 2. Many voters were unhappy with arbitrary arrests, the Second Confiscation Act of July, the move toward emancipation, and Union failures on the battlefield in 1862, especially in the East.
- B. Copperheads gained strength in the spring of 1863. Ohio politician Clement Vallandigham was especially vocal in his opposition.
 1. They attacked emancipation and called the war a bloody failure after Fredericksburg and the infamous "mud march." They argued for a negotiated settlement to the war.
 2. They accused Lincoln and the Republicans of trampling on individual rights and freedoms.
 3. They even hinted at a Midwestern Confederacy.
- C. Soldiers arrested Vallandigham in May 1863, after General Burnside issued a proclamation against "treason."
 1. Morale was down, and Vallandigham actively exploited the crisis.
 2. He was tried by a military commission and convicted. This action prompted an outcry.
- D. Republicans rebounded in the summer of 1863.

1. Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg were crucial.
 2. Lincoln deftly handled the Vallandigham crisis by commuting his prison term to a sentence of banishment to the Confederacy.
- III.** The election of 1864 marked a final wartime political crisis for the Republicans.
- A.** Lack of decisive success in Grant's and Sherman's campaigns created widespread war weariness and opposition to the Republicans. In addition, General Jubal Early's Confederate army had marched to the gates of Washington, D.C., in the summer of 1864.
 - B.** The Democrats nominated George B McClellan for president.
 1. Their platform appeased the Peace Democrats, calling for an armistice followed by peace negotiations, denouncing emancipation, and criticizing Lincoln's arbitrary arrests.
 2. McClellan refused to embrace the emphasis on peace, insisting that the Union be preserved before peace could come, but he agreed to head the ticket.
 - C.** The Republicans re-nominated Lincoln and ran under the banner of the Union Party to broaden their appeal.
 1. They insisted on restoration of the Union and emancipation.
 2. Radical Republicans and abolitionists reluctantly supported Lincoln as preferable to McClellan.
- IV.** The campaign offered a clear choice and a decisive result. A Republican win would continue the war toward unequivocal victory, with restoration of the Union and emancipation as the goals. Democratic victory promised a more muddled result: a possible peace, a possible independent Confederacy, a possible Union with slavery.
- A.** The Republicans won because of successes on the battlefield.
 1. Mobile Bay fell in August 1864.
 2. Sherman captured Atlanta in early September, causing tremendous excitement and rejoicing in the North.
 3. General Phil Sheridan won three major victories in the Shenandoah Valley in September and October: 3rd Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek.
 4. Actions by Confederate agents in Vermont and New York City also helped to swing support to Lincoln and away from the Copperheads.
 - B.** The returns from this first wartime election in U.S. history were decisive.
 1. The electoral count was 212–21; McClellan carried only New Jersey, Kentucky, and Delaware.
 2. Lincoln carried 55 percent of the popular vote.
 3. The Republicans took control of all the state legislatures lost in 1862.

4. The Republicans would control the Senate 42–10 and the House 145–40.
 5. Of note, hundreds of thousands of soldiers voted in the field and approximately 80 percent went with the Republicans.
- C.** The message from this election, arguably the most important in U.S. history, was clear: the war would be pressed to a conclusion.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapters 18, 23, 26.

Supplementary Reading:

Klement, *The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War*.

Long, *The Jewel of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln's Re-election and the End of Slavery*.

Paludan, "A People's Contest": *The Union and the Civil War, 1861–1865*, chapters 4, 10.

Silbey, *A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860–1868*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What is the role of the "loyal opposition" during a war? Did elements of the Democratic Party go too far in opposing Lincoln and Republican policies?
2. What might the United States have looked like in the late nineteenth century if the Republicans had not won the election of 1864?

Lecture Forty-One

The Northern Home Front, II

Scope: This lecture continues our look at the northern home front with an examination of the economy and the nonmilitary Republican legislative agenda. Unlike the Confederacy, the North proved able to outfit and provision its armies while producing ample consumer goods. It accomplished this with only modest inflation and minimal government interference. Labor-saving machines allowed agricultural production to soar despite the absence of hundreds of thousands of men. Water transport increased, and railroads carried far more goods and improved their tracks and rolling stock. The textile industry suffered because of reduced access to southern cotton, but other segments of the industrial economy exceeded prewar production, and mechanization in factories increased. Most of the technology that allowed the economy to do so well was already in place when war broke out. The conflict did mark a radical shift of national wealth toward the North. While the southern economy largely lay in ruins in 1865, northern production was healthy and growing. The Republicans passed important legislation designed to make the United States a free-labor, capitalist power. The absence of southern members of Congress opened the door for enactment of this legislative program, which included the National Banking Act, Homestead Act, Land Grant College Act, and Pacific Railroad Act. As a body, this legislation helped create a stable national currency, spur development of the West, train farmers and engineers, and provide land for those who sought to pursue a life in agriculture. The Republicans succeeded in both fighting a massive war and pointing the nation to the economic path it would follow for the next several decades.

Outline

- I. The northern economy performed very well during the Civil War, producing and distributing military and nonmilitary goods in profusion.
 - A. Agricultural production increased significantly.
 1. Wheat, corn, and meat production were impressive (the North grew more wheat in 1862 and 1863 than the entire nation had grown in the previous record year of 1859).
 2. Labor-saving machines, such as reapers and mowers, made up for the loss of a third of the agricultural labor force to the military.
 3. Production of canned foods expanded greatly to meet the military market.
 - B. The transportation system carried more traffic and was modernized.
 1. Water-borne trade on the Great Lakes and canals increased dramatically, offsetting the loss of the Mississippi River as a reliable route until the summer of 1863 and the fall of Vicksburg.
 2. Railroads increased their volume of traffic while standardizing gauges and improving rolling stock.
 3. The United States military railroad that ran in the occupied South became the largest railroad in the world, with over 2,000 miles of track, 400 locomotives, and 6,000 cars.
 - C. The war affected various industries in different ways.
 1. Cotton textiles suffered from the loss of southern cotton.
 2. Woolen production increased.
 3. Shoe production initially dipped but recovered as a result of military demand.
 4. Iron and coal exceeded prewar outputs after an early slump.
 5. Military-related industries, such as firearms, leather (for horse and mule harnesses), and copper (for percussion caps), experienced booms.
 6. Mechanization spread in such industries as firearms and ready-made clothing.
 7. The experience of labor was mixed. Jobs were available, but wages didn't keep up with inflation, which resulted in strikes.
 - D. The war did not cause economic growth in the later nineteenth century.
 1. The technological groundwork was already laid by 1860.
 2. The war did accelerate the concentration of wealth in the North.
 3. The war left the southern economy in shambles, while the northern economy grew and became modernized. This disparity continued for many decades, even into the twentieth century.
- II. The Republicans passed a series of acts designed to make the United States a great economic power, a capitalistic country with a national banking system.
 - A. The absence of southern members of Congress helped make this possible.
 - B. The National Bank Act of 1863 helped create a stable currency.
 1. It helped drive state banks and their plethora of currencies out of business.
 2. It encouraged the spread of national banks that issued uniform national bank notes (known as "greenbacks").
 - C. The Homestead Act of 1862 made cheap land available.
 1. Southern members of Congress had opposed this before the war.
 2. This legislation made 160 acres of government land available to anyone (i.e., free white farmers) who lived on it for five years. Three million acres of land were given out during the war.

- D. The Land Grant College Act of 1862 (Morrill Act) encouraged the growth of schools devoted to teaching mechanical arts and agriculture.
 - 1. The states received government land grants keyed to their number of U.S. Senators and Congressmen to establish at least one college.
 - 2. This legislation sought to make education more relevant to the lives of most Americans and prepare them to be productive members of the economy.
- E. The Pacific Railroad Bill of 1862 began a series of grants that helped fund the transcontinental railroads.
 - 1. The route went from Omaha to San Francisco.
 - 2. A total of 120,000,000 acres was eventually provided for railroads. The Union Pacific, Central Pacific, Southern Pacific, and Northern Pacific railroad companies grew from this Act.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 14.

Paludan, “A People’s Contest”: *The Union and the Civil War, 1861–1865*, chapters 5–7.

Supplementary Reading:

Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877*.

Curry, *Blueprint for Modern America: Nonmilitary Legislation of the First Civil War Congress*.

Richardson, *The Greatest Nation of the Earth: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil War*.

Questions to Consider:

- 1. In terms of their handling of the respective economies, do you think the Union or Confederate government more closely fit a “modern” model?
- 2. Where would you place the northern economy on a roster of factors that contributed to Union victory?

Lecture Forty-Two Prisoners of War

Scope: This lecture examines prisoners of war and their treatment. Few aspects of the conflict were as emotionally charged; both sides accused the other of atrocities and failure to provide adequate care. Much of the literature on the topic—especially the memoirs of men held as prisoners—is so overtly political as to be virtually worthless as historical evidence. More than 400,000 men were captured, many of whom were not imprisoned early in the war. Under a compact signed in July 1862, the two sides agreed to exchange equal numbers of prisoners, with the surplus on one side to be paroled until officially exchanged. This system broke down for several reasons. The Emancipation Proclamation and the appearance of black soldiers in the Union army prompted the Confederate government to announce that these men and their white officers would not be treated as prisoners of war. In addition, after the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July 1863, a number of captured Confederates violated their paroles. In 1864, Ulysses S. Grant decided that exchanges helped the manpower-starved Confederacy.

With exchanges on hold and enormous casualties resulting from the Overland campaign and other operations, each side’s prisons filled up in 1864. Not until early 1865 did large-scale exchanges resume, by which time untold thousands of soldiers had been held under terrible circumstances. Conditions were quite similar in northern and southern prisons, although a few, such as the South’s Andersonville (in Georgia) and the North’s Elmira (in New York State), stood out as especially hellish. Poor sanitation, bad water, rampant disease, and brutal guards were common on both sides. Food and shelter tended to be slightly better in the northern camps. Andersonville came to symbolize the horrors faced by prisoners of war. Nearly 30 percent of the Federals held at Andersonville died (25 percent of the Confederates held at Elmira, the worst of the northern camps, perished), and Henry Wirz, the camp’s Swiss-born commandant, was the only Confederate executed for war crimes. Although Andersonville indisputably was the worst of the camps, ample brutality and blame could be apportioned to both sides.

Outline

- I. The scale of the prisoner-of-war problem was immense.
 - A. The North captured at least 215,000 Confederates, while the Confederacy captured at least 195,000 Federals.
 - B. Both sides established a number of camps for prisoners.

1. The most prominent northern camps included Camp Douglas near Chicago, Johnson's Island in Lake Erie, Point Lookout in Maryland, and Elmira in upstate New York.
 2. The most prominent Confederate camps included Andersonville in Georgia, Salisbury in North Carolina (which had a mortality rate of about 33 percent among its 10,000 prisoners—the highest of any camp on either side), Libby Prison in Richmond, and Belle Isle in the James River.
- C. Five basic types of camps existed:
1. Previously constructed fortifications (e.g., Fort Warren, Castle Pinckney).
 2. Old buildings converted to prisons.
 3. Tents in a guarded area (e.g., Point Lookout, Belle Isle).
 4. Stockades (e.g., Andersonville, Salisbury).
 5. Enclosed barracks (e.g., Elmira).
- II. Conditions at camps in the North and the South were quite similar.
- A. Poor sanitation, bad water, and disease were nearly universal, and the quality of guards was often poor.
- B. Food and shelter were somewhat better in the North.
1. Northern prisoners suffered from some of the same shortages that plagued Confederate civilians and soldiers.
 2. In May 1864, Union Secretary of War Stanton ordered rations for southern POWs in northern camps reduced to the same level as rations in Confederate armies.
- C. Medical care was about the same and mortality rates were similar.
1. Thirty thousand Federal prisoners died (a rate of 15.4 percent, of whom 13,000 were at Andersonville).
 2. Twenty-six thousand Confederate prisoners died (a rate of 12.1 percent).
- III. The breakdown of the exchange system greatly aggravated the problem of prisoners of war.
- A. The July 1862 agreement worked well for several months.
1. Equal numbers of prisoners were exchanged.
 2. Excesses on one side were paroled until enough men were captured for them to be exchanged.
 3. Few prisoners were held at the end of 1862.
- B. The agreement broke down in 1863–64.
1. After the Emancipation Proclamation, the Confederacy said that it would not treat captured black soldiers and their white officers as prisoners of war (it would return the black men to slavery and execute the officers). U.S. Secretary of War Stanton ordered reprisals if this were to happen.
2. Some Confederates captured at Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July 1863 violated their paroles.
 3. Some 40,000 prisoners were held at the end of 1863.
- C. Prisons filled in 1864.
1. The exchange system no longer was in effect.
 2. Huge numbers of men were captured in the Overland campaign and other operations.
 3. U. S. Grant decided in 1864 that exchanges favored the Confederacy, because the South needed the manpower more desperately.
- D. Exchanges resumed in late 1864 and early 1865.
1. Some sailors were exchanged regardless of color in late 1864.
 2. Thousands of sick and wounded were exchanged in the winter of 1864–65.
 3. In January 1865, the Confederacy agreed to exchange all prisoners.
- IV. Andersonville stood out as the largest and most infamous camp.
- A. It was built in early 1864 to hold 15,000 prisoners.
1. The camp was an open stockade encompassing 16 ½ acres. The first captives arrived in February 1864 and, by August 1864, about 33,000 men were held. By November, it was emptied (during Sherman's "March to the Sea"), then filled again in early 1865.
 2. The death total at Andersonville was the worst of any camp, North or South.
 3. At the peak, more than 100 men died each day and the total reached 13,000, for a 29 percent mortality rate.
 4. An almost complete absence of acceptable sanitary conditions contributed to the high death toll.
 5. Clara Barton helped compile a list of the Union dead in 1865.
- B. Commandant Henry Wirz was hanged for war crimes in 1865. He was a scapegoat; his superior, General John H. Winder, could as easily have been put on trial.
- C. The North's most notorious camp was Elmira, New York, originally a rendezvous camp for the Union.
1. It covered 30 acres and was designed for 10,000 men.
 2. Its barracks were thrown up quickly and, on 6 July 1864, the first prisoners arrived.
 3. The death rate among the more than 12,000 prisoners was 25 percent.
- V. Neither side compiled a good overall record for handling prisoners.
- A. The Union blamed the Confederacy for the thousands of dead at Andersonville and elsewhere.

- B. The Confederacy blamed the Union for starving prisoners in the midst of plenty and attacked Grant for ending the exchange system.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 26.

Supplementary Reading:

Hesseltine, *Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology*.

Hesseltine, ed., *Civil War Prisons*.

Marvel, *Andersonville: The Last Depot*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Do you think it would have been possible for the two sides to handle huge numbers of prisoners in the course of a long and bitter war without acrimony and accusations?
2. How do you think the modern American press would treat a topic such as this one?

Lecture Forty-Three Mobile Bay and Atlanta

Scope: This lecture covers crucial Union victories in August and September 1864. The military situation in the summer and early autumn of 1864 had enormous implications for northern elections in November. Civilian morale in the North had been severely tested by the perceived failures of Grant's five-pronged offensive of May and June. Republicans grew increasingly nervous as summer weeks went by without a major battlefield success. The North needed victories if Lincoln and the Republicans were to retain power. On the Confederate side, many believed that keeping the Federals at bay in Richmond and Atlanta beyond the November elections might result in a Democratic victory that would open the door to a negotiated peace with Confederate independence (this was a misreading of Democratic sentiment).

The first breakthrough for the North came at Mobile Bay in August, when Admiral David G. Farragut seized control of the bay and closed the last major Confederate port on the Gulf of Mexico. Far more important news soon followed from Atlanta. After a series of failed Confederate tactical offensives in July, Sherman tightened his grip on the city by striking at its rail links to the rest of the Confederacy. A well-conceived Union movement toward the railroads near Jonesboro in late August sealed Atlanta's fate and, on the night of 1-2 September, the Confederate army abandoned the city. News of Sherman's success triggered an outpouring of joy in the North. Atlanta had become such a symbol that its capture probably assured Republican victory in November. Caught up in the long-awaited triumph, most northerners overlooked the fact that Sherman allowed John Bell Hood's Army of Tennessee to escape from Atlanta to fight another day. Despite Hood's escape, people across the Confederacy knew they had suffered a potentially disastrous setback.

Outline

- I. The military and political stakes were high in the summer of 1864.
 - A. The North needed victories badly.
 1. The Republicans faced difficult elections in November, and northern morale was at its low ebb as the result of the Overland campaign (see Lectures Thirty-Six and Thirty-Seven).
 2. Emancipation and a vigorous prosecution of the war might be in jeopardy if the Democrats won.
 - B. Northern morale was tested between May and mid-July.
 1. High casualty lists in Virginia generated concern and criticism.

2. Grant and Sherman remained stalled outside Richmond and Atlanta, respectively.
 3. Butler was inert at Bermuda Hundred.
 4. Banks was discredited and immobile in Louisiana.
 5. The Confederate port of Mobile, Alabama, remained open.
- C. The Confederates wanted to hold on long enough at Richmond and Atlanta to influence the November election and perhaps achieve a negotiated peace.
- II. David G. Farragut's fleet won a major victory at Mobile Bay in August.
- A. Mobile was a prize Grant had sought to capture since the end of the Vicksburg campaign.
 - B. Its defenses posed a major obstacle to the North.
 1. Three strong forts (Fort Morgan, Fort Gaines, and Fort Powell) and a minefield protected the bay, keeping blockading vessels out and allowing blockade runners in.
 2. Gunboats and the ironclad *Tennessee* added additional power to the Confederate defense.
 - C. Farragut mounted his offensive on 5 August.
 1. He pushed his fleet of fourteen wooden vessels and four ironclad monitors forward, despite the sinking of one ironclad (U.S.S. *Tecumseh*) by a mine (torpedo).
 2. His ships battered the small Confederate fleet (including the C.S.S. *Tennessee*) and took control of the bay.
 3. The forts all fell within the next eighteen days.
 4. The city of Mobile itself remained in Confederate hands, but it no longer functioned as a port.
 - D. News from Mobile cheered the North.
- III. Sherman besieged and captured Atlanta in August–September.
- A. John Bell Hood's Confederate army had tried to drive Sherman away from the city in three aggressive actions in July.
 1. The Battle of Peachtree Creek was fought on July 20. Union General Thomas's Army of the Cumberland fought well, the Confederates didn't coordinate their attacks, and the Confederate initiative failed.
 2. The Battle of Atlanta (to attack the Union right) was fought on July 22. Again, the Union forces fought well and the Confederates were unable to coordinate, leading to the failure of the attack and 8,000 Confederate casualties.
 3. The battle of Ezra Church was fought on July 28. The Army of the Tennessee under General O. O. Howard shifted to the west and blocked Hood's attacks.

- B. Sherman tightened his siege lines after Hood's three failed tactical offensives.
 1. He bombarded the city and attacked the rail lines linking Atlanta to the rest of the Confederacy.
 2. Confederate attacks at Jonesboro on August 31 failed to dislodge the Federals from a key rail line.
 3. Hood abandoned the city on September 1–2, burning remaining military stores.
- C. The capture of Atlanta had enormous impact in the North and South.
 1. It provided the military victory necessary to restore northern civilian morale, even though Hood's army escaped destruction.
 2. It dramatically improved Republican prospects in the November elections.
 3. It correspondingly depressed morale in the Confederacy.
- D. Sherman was now ready to carry the great raid into central Georgia as part of Grant's strategy of exhaustion.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 18.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapters 24–26.

Supplementary Reading:

Bergeron, *Confederate Mobile*, chapters 11–12.

Castel, *Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864*, chapters 7–10.

Kennett, *Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman's Campaign*, chapters 6–10.

Questions to Consider:

1. Do you believe the northern people should have been so pessimistic in July and August?
2. Should the Atlanta campaign outrank Gettysburg in terms of its influence on the course of the war?

Lecture Forty-Four

Petersburg, the Crater, and the Valley

Scope: This lecture continues our examination of military events in the summer and autumn of 1864, shifting the focus from the Gulf of Mexico and Georgia to Virginia. While events unfolded at Atlanta, Grant and Lee confronted each other along a front from Petersburg to Richmond. The armies prepared elaborate fortifications that eventually extended for dozens of miles. A promising opportunity to break the stalemate came in late July at the Battle of the Crater, when the Federals tunneled under a section of the Confederate line and exploded a powder charge that obliterated several hundred yards of the southern defenses. A mismanaged attack allowed a splendid opportunity to slip through Grant's fingers, after which Grant relentlessly probed Lee's supply lines and extended the entrenchments toward the south and west in an effort to stretch the Confederates to a breaking point. In mid-June, Lee detached a corps under Jubal Early to operate independently. Over the next four months, Early marched through the Shenandoah Valley, threatened Washington, and eventually faced a powerful force under Philip H. Sheridan in the 1864 Valley campaign. Sheridan won three smashing victories over Early between September 19 and October 19, taking time in early October to lay waste to significant sections of the lower Valley in the first broad application of Grant's strategy of exhaustion. Sheridan's triumphs in the Shenandoah completed a string of Union successes begun at Mobile and Atlanta that guaranteed Republican success in the November elections. Early's failure in the Valley further depressed Confederate morale, which was already suffering from the lingering effects of the loss of Atlanta. The war would continue for another six months, but the events of August–October 1864 delivered blows to the Confederacy from which it would be hard pressed to recover.

Outline

- I. Grant and Lee engaged in siege operations at Petersburg and Richmond during the summer and fall of 1864.
 - A. Grant sought to pressure Lee's supply lines with cavalry raids.
 - B. Grant constantly extended his lines to the south and west and contemplated swinging around Lee's right flank to approach Petersburg from the northwest. Lee countered by extending his lines.
 - C. The Federals bungled a major opportunity to break the stalemate at Petersburg at the Battle of the Crater on July 30.
 1. The 48th Pennsylvania, a regiment from the coal regions of that state, tunneled more than 500 feet in about a month to get under the Confederate lines.
 2. The Union soldiers placed 8,000 pounds of black powder under the Confederate works.
 3. They detonated the powder and opened a gap 400 yards wide in the Confederate lines. The Federals bungled attacks planned to exploit the gap.
 4. The Union failed to make the best use of black troops specifically trained to spearhead the assault. Poorly led attackers crowded into the crater formed by the explosion and were slaughtered by counterattacking Confederates. Many of the black soldiers were killed when they tried to surrender.
 5. The Confederates fully restored their lines and inflicted 4,000 casualties on the Union forces.
 - D. After the Crater battle, the situation returned to the previous mode of probe and defend, and a stalemate ensued.
- II. Lee detached Jubal Early and the Second Corps for independent operations in mid-June.
 - A. Early, a capable officer with an excellent record, carried out a successful month-long campaign to counter Hunter's move south up the Valley, next to clear the Valley, then to menace Washington, D.C.
 1. He defeated a small Union army under Hunter at Lynchburg on June 18–19, driving Union forces back into West Virginia.
 2. He marched his 14,000 men north down the Shenandoah Valley and crossed the Potomac River.
 3. He won the Battle of the Monocacy near Frederick, Maryland, on July 9, but his advance was slowed.
 4. Early reached the outskirts of Washington, D.C., on July 11, before withdrawing into the lower Shenandoah Valley in mid-July in the face of the VI Corps, which had been withdrawn from the Petersburg siege and rushed north by train.
 5. President Lincoln observed some of the fighting from Fort Stevens on the capital's outskirts.
 - B. Northern morale dropped because of this unexpected evidence of Confederate offensive prowess, and Grant determined to put an end to Early's diversion and destroy the logistical capacity of the Valley.
 1. Grant named Philip H. Sheridan commander of a large force in the Valley.
 2. He ordered Sheridan to attack Early and lay waste to the agricultural economy of the Valley, fulfilling the strategy of exhaustion.

III. Sheridan's 1864 Valley campaign ended Early's threat and gave the Union another important success.

- A. Sheridan won important victories at Third Winchester (September 19), Fisher's Hill (September 22), and Cedar Creek (October 19).
- B. Sheridan carried out "the burning" of a large swath of the lower Valley as far as Harrisonburg in early October and eliminated it as the granary of the Confederacy.
- C. Sheridan's operations had significant political and military impact.
 1. Republican prospects in the November elections were strengthened.
 2. Lee's army lost access to the logistical bounty of the Valley.
 3. Northern morale climbed higher, while Confederate morale absorbed yet another major blow.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 18.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapters 24–26.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox*, chapters 4–5.

Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 3, chapters 26–31.

Trudeau, *The Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864–April 1865*, chapters 1–11.

Wert, *From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864*.

Questions to Consider:

1. If you were a Confederate soldier or civilian in November 1864, where would you have looked to find some prospect for success in your war for independence?
2. As a northern soldier or civilian, do you believe you would consider the war to be won after Union success at Atlanta and in the Shenandoah Valley?

Lecture Forty-Five The Final Campaigns

Scope: This lecture examines the final campaigns waged by the armies in the Western Theater. After the fall of Atlanta, John Bell Hood attempted to draw Sherman northward by threatening the Union supply line to Chattanooga. Hood envisioned moving the war out of Georgia into Tennessee, where he hoped to reclaim territory long lost to the Confederacy. Sherman followed Hood for a brief time before deciding to abandon his supply lines and march into the heart of Georgia. In consultation with Grant, Sherman detached George H. Thomas to protect Tennessee. Hood's Army of Tennessee moved north with the goal of taking Nashville. On November 30, Hood launched precipitate frontal assaults against a force under John M. Schofield at the Battle of Franklin, after which Schofield withdrew in good order to join Thomas's force in Nashville. Hood followed and took a position outside the city, where he waited for two weeks. On December 15–16, Thomas crushed Hood's army in the Battle of Nashville, ending serious military action in Tennessee.

Sherman, meanwhile, had left Atlanta in mid-November to make a slashing raid across Georgia to Savannah. Essentially unopposed on this "March to the Sea," the Federals implemented Grant's strategy of exhaustion by destroying a vast amount of war-related material. After a period of rest and reinforcement in Savannah, Sherman marched northward through South Carolina and into North Carolina in early 1865. His soldiers laid waste especially hard on South Carolina, which they blamed for causing the war. A cobbled together army under Joseph E. Johnston tried unsuccessfully to slow Sherman's advance through the Carolinas, fighting a mid-sized battle at Bentonville, North Carolina, on March 19–20. Sherman's campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas had not only inflicted serious logistical losses but also delivered a psychological blow to the South by demonstrating that Union armies could rampage through the Confederate interior.

Outline

- I. John Bell Hood planned to take the war back to Tennessee after the fall of Atlanta.
 - A. He hoped to draw Sherman north by breaking the Union supply line to Chattanooga.
 1. Jefferson Davis approved of his strategy.
 2. The Confederates hoped to liberate parts of Tennessee and perhaps move into Kentucky.

- B. Sherman declined to follow Hood’s script.
 1. He followed Hood for a short time before turning back to Atlanta.
 2. He detached Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland to deal with Hood.
 3. He planned to march across Georgia, living off the countryside and terrorizing Confederate civilians.
- II. Hood’s Tennessee campaign ended in complete Confederate defeat.
 - A. Hood fought an ill-considered aggressive battle against the Army of the Ohio under John M. Schofield at Franklin, Tennessee, on November 30, 1864.
 1. He was upset at having missed what he considered an opportunity to trap a Union force at Spring Hill on 29 September.
 2. He believed frontal assaults would build spirit in his army.
 3. He lost more than 6,000 men, 12 generals, and 54 regimental commanders in the attacks against well-prepared positions.
 4. Schofield moved on to Nashville with minimal losses.
 - B. Hood suffered a shattering defeat at Nashville on December 15–16.
 1. He placed his army in position near the city and simply awaited Thomas’s moves.
 2. Thomas took so much time getting ready to attack that Grant almost removed him from command for ignoring an order to attack immediately.
 3. Thomas’s attacks on December 15–16 swept Hood’s army from the field and essentially ended the war in Tennessee.
 4. Hood’s force was reduced to only 15,000 men under arms after this battle.
- III. Sherman’s “March to the Sea” was a grand Union success.
 - A. He had two major goals for his 62,000-man army of hardened veterans:
 1. He would strike at the Confederacy’s logistical capacity.
 2. He would strike at Confederate civilian morale by marching at will more than 300 miles across Georgia.
 - B. Leaving Atlanta on 16 November, he met little resistance and reached Savannah before Christmas, averaging over 10 miles a day. His campaign showed Grant’s strategy of exhaustion in full operation.
 1. The army consumed or destroyed millions of dollars worth of agricultural and industrial products and tore up railroads.
 2. Foragers beyond the control of officers (called “bummers”) inflicted considerable damage to private property.
 3. The North rejoiced in, and the Confederacy mourned the results of, Sherman’s operation.

- IV. Sherman’s march through the Carolinas was equally successful.
 - A. His men laid an even heavier hand on South Carolina, the “cradle of secession.”
 1. Fort Fisher fell in January 1865, followed by Charleston (18 February), then Columbia, parts of which were burned.
 2. The Confederates could offer only token resistance.
 3. Joseph E. Johnston commanded a small army drawn from many quarters, including remnants of Hood’s destroyed Army of Tennessee.
 4. The one significant battle of the campaign took place at Bentonville, North Carolina, on March 19–20, but this Confederate stand failed to slow Sherman’s army.
 - B. By April 1865, the war in the Carolinas had effectively drawn to a close, with the armies in position near Raleigh.
 - C. The war in the Western Theater, now also basically drawn to a close, had covered an immense amount of territory.
 1. It began along the Kentucky–Tennessee border and the upper Mississippi River in 1861.
 2. It ended in North Carolina in the spring of 1865.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 19.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 27.

Supplementary Reading:

Glatthaar, *The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns*.

Hughes, *Bentonville: The Final Battle of Sherman and Johnston*.

Kennett, *Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman’s Campaign*, chapters 11–15.

Sword, *Embrace an Angry Wind. The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah: Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Historians disagree about whether the Civil War was a “total” war. How do you think a Georgian or South Carolinian who experienced Sherman’s campaigns would have answered this question? How about one of Sherman’s soldiers?
2. Do you believe there is merit in the argument that until late 1862 or mid-1863, the conflict was a traditional war but thereafter became a modern war?

Lecture Forty-Six

Petersburg to Appomattox

Scope: This lecture follows the war in Virginia to its ending at Appomattox and surveys the other principal surrenders of Confederate forces. While Sherman and Hood maneuvered and fought across four states, Grant and Lee remained largely immobile outside Petersburg and Richmond. By March, the Federals had restricted Lee's supply lines and forced the Confederates to extend their lines many miles to the west. Aware of what Grant was doing and desperate to break free of the suffocating siege, Lee launched his final tactical offensive of the war on March 25, 1865, in the Battle of Fort Stedman. Brief success quickly gave way to bloody failure, and Grant prepared to deliver a final blow. Philip H. Sheridan's crushing victory on April 1 at Five Forks, which lay at Lee's extreme western flank, set the stage for the abandonment of Petersburg and Richmond on April 2–3. Six days of a fighting retreat brought the Confederates to Appomattox, where Grant's pursuing forces blocked Lee's attempt to turn south and link up with Joseph Johnston's army in North Carolina. Lee signed papers of surrender for his 28,000 troops on April 9, and his veterans formally stacked arms on the 12th. In line with President Lincoln's wish to begin the sectional healing process as soon as possible, Grant generously allowed the southern soldiers to sign paroles and return to their homes.

For most people on both sides, Lee's surrender marked the end of the war. Such was the position he and his army held that few believed the war would continue. The final surrenders followed in rapid succession: Johnston surrendered roughly 30,000 men to Sherman at Durham Station, North Carolina, on April 26; Richard Taylor surrendered 10,000–12,000 men to E. R. S. Canby at Citronelle, Alabama, on May 4; Jefferson Davis was captured at Irwinville, Georgia, on May 10; and all forces in the Trans-Mississippi Theater were surrendered under an agreement signed in New Orleans on May 26. All Confederates received the same terms offered to Lee by Grant.

Outline

- I. Grant tightened his grip on Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia during the spring of 1865. The Army of Northern Virginia was the last sizeable Confederate force in the field.
 - A. He choked Lee's supply lines and extended the siege lines westward, forcing Lee to stretch his weaker army.
 1. Desertions started to rise in Lee's army.
 2. It appeared that Lee would have to try for a breakout, perhaps to link up with Johnston's forces in North Carolina.
- II. Grant pursued Lee's 35,000 men and brought him to bay during the Appomattox campaign.
 - A. Lee hoped to march west and turn south to join Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina.
 - B. Grant inflicted serious damage to the retreating Confederates at the Battle of Saylor's Creek on April 6. Union forces captured 7,000 Confederates.
 - C. Federals got in front of Lee's army and forced him to ask for terms.
 1. Lee refused to consider disbanding his army with the idea of pursuing a guerrilla war.
 2. Lee and Grant met to sign surrender documents on April 9.
 3. Grant extended generous terms that allowed soldiers to sign paroles and return home (men who owned their horses were allowed to keep them).
 4. He provided rations for Lee's troops (but not fodder for the horses).
 5. The Confederates formally stacked arms at Appomattox Court House on April 12 (Lee and Grant had left by that time).
 - D. This surrender marked the end of the war for most Americans.
 1. Lee and his army had become synonymous with the Confederacy in the minds of most northerners and European observers.
 2. Confederates had looked to Lee as their principal rallying point for more than two years.
- B. Lee tried to break Grant's grip in the Battle of Fort Stedman on 25 March 1865.
 1. This was the final offensive spasm of the Army of Northern Virginia.
 2. A temporary success gave way to complete Union victory, costing Lee nearly 5,000 men.
- C. Grant exploited the Confederate failure by sending Sheridan against Lee's far right flank.
 1. Preliminary fighting at White Oak Road and Dinwiddie Court House on March 31 was inconclusive.
 2. Sheridan crushed Lee's flank in the Battle of Five Forks on April 1, inflicting another 5,000 casualties.
 3. Lee abandoned Richmond and Petersburg on April 2–3 as Grant attacked along the entire line. The retreating Confederates burned military stores. President Lincoln arrived on 4 April to see the captured city.

- III. Other major Confederate forces surrendered over the next six weeks.
- A. Joseph Johnston surrendered 30,000 men to Sherman at Durham Station, North Carolina, on April 26.
 - 1. Johnston had been waiting to see what Lee did before he acted.
 - 2. Sherman extended even more generous terms than Grant had (e.g., complete amnesty and recognition of the existing state governments), but was forced by the Administration to withdraw them and follow Grant's example.
 - B. General Richard Taylor surrendered 10,000–12,000 troops at Citronelle, Alabama, on May 4.
 - C. Jefferson Davis was captured at Irwinville, Georgia, on May 10. He was imprisoned at Fortress Monroe for two years but never tried for treason.
 - D. Confederates in the Trans-Mississippi Theater were surrendered on May 26.
 - 1. Some Confederates in the far West did not officially surrender.
 - 2. The last land battle of the war was fought at Palmito Ranch, near Brownsville, Texas, on May 13, 1865.
 - 3. On 3 June 1865, the commerce raider C.S.S. *Shenandoah* captured eleven whalers.

Essential Reading:

Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, chapter 19.

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 28.

Supplementary Reading:

Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox*, chapter 6.

Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 3, chapters 31–37.

Trudeau, *Out of the Storm: The End of the Civil War, April–June 1865*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Can you think of another example of a bitter civil war that did not end in massive punishment for the losers? How do you account for the North's leniency?
2. Did the Confederacy have military alternatives it could have pursued rather than surrendering its armies?

Lecture Forty-Seven

Closing Scenes and Reckonings

Scope: This lecture first examines the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, then moves on to assess the cost of the war and offer some thoughts about why the North won (or the Confederacy lost). Lincoln had just a few days to savor news of Lee's surrender before John Wilkes Booth mortally wounded him in Ford's Theater on April 14, 1865. The assassination has inspired an enormous speculative literature that advances various conspiracy theories, some of which implicate Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and other prominent northern leaders. The best evidence suggests that Booth decided on his own to kill the president, although he might have had earlier ties to the Confederate secret service establishment.

Lincoln was among the last casualties in a war for which the exact human and material toll will never be known. At least 620,000 soldiers perished, together with an unknown number of civilians. The economic cost vastly exceeded anything in previous American history, amounting to billions of dollars in direct expenditures and untold millions more in the form of postwar pensions and lost productivity. Many parts of the Confederacy experienced far greater destruction than most of the North, and the South as a whole lost two-thirds of its assessed wealth (much of this was in the form of lost slave property). Some areas of the South did not recover fully from the effects of the war until well into the twentieth century.

Historians have debated the relative importance of factors that brought defeat and widespread destruction to the Confederacy. Some argue that a belief in state rights hampered national mobilization. Others believe that internal fissures along lines of class, race, and gender doomed the Confederacy well before Union armies vanquished southern armies. These and other factors certainly played a role in Confederate defeat; however, the overwhelming power of the North, able Union military leadership, and the willingness of the northern people to absorb huge losses and continue to apply that power over the long haul must be reckoned as the major factors that brought Union success. The armies of the United States defeated those of the South, proved that they could march at will through the Confederacy, and thereby convinced the Confederate people that further resistance would be chimerical.

Outline

- I. Abraham Lincoln was assassinated on Good Friday, April 14, 1865, less than a week after Lee's surrender.
 - A. John Wilkes Booth planned the assassination on his own.
 1. He probably had worked with Confederate agents on an earlier plan to kidnap Lincoln.
 2. Booth's intention was to kill Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson, and Secretary of State William H. Seward. Seward was wounded by a co-conspirator, but Johnson was unharmed.
 - B. Many northerners believed that the Confederate government was involved in the assassination.
 1. This intensified sectional hatred for a brief time.
 2. It led to harsh sentences for some of those who worked with Booth. Four people were hanged and four received life sentences. Booth himself was killed by Union cavalry some days after the assassination.
 - C. Assassination literature has put forward various conspiracy theories.
 1. These often implicate Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and other northern leaders who supposedly believed Lincoln would be too easy on the South after the war.
 2. No sound evidence exists to support the idea that northern leaders worked to kill Lincoln.
 3. Conspiracy theories persist to this day, even inspiring TV shows and movies.
- II. The human and material cost of the war was enormous.
 - A. The number of dead soldiers exceeded the total for all other American wars combined from the seventeenth century through the mid-point of Vietnam (including World Wars I and II).
 1. The North suffered about 650,000 casualties out of 2.1–2.2 million soldiers (360,000 dead—two-thirds of them from disease—and 275,000 wounded in action).
 2. The Confederacy suffered about 450,000 casualties out of 750,000–850,000 (260,000 dead—two-thirds from disease—and 200,000 wounded). Between 75–85 percent of Confederate military-aged males served in the armed forces of the CSA.
 3. The North had 65 general officers killed in action compared to 92 for the Confederacy.
 4. There is no way to know accurately how many civilians died because of privation and other factors caused by the war.
 - B. The economic cost reached a level unparalleled in previous United States history.
 1. One estimate placed the cost to the North at \$6.1 billion as of 1879.
 2. The Confederacy also spent billions.

3. Costs continued for decades after the end of the war in the form of pensions (Federal for northern veterans and state for Confederate veterans), lost productivity, and other expenses.
 - C. The South suffered much greater damage than the North.
 1. A much higher percentage of its soldiers was killed or maimed (see above).
 2. It lost two-thirds of its assessed wealth (much in the form of slaves).
 3. Forty percent of all southern livestock was dead.
 4. Fifty percent of all farm machinery was destroyed.
 5. Railroads, levees, bridges, and other parts of the transportation and economic infrastructure were in ruins.
 - D. The war decisively tipped the economic balance in favor of the North.
 1. Northern wealth increased by 50 percent between 1860 and 1870.
 2. Southern wealth decreased by 60 percent between 1860 and 1870.
- III. Historians have offered various explanations for why the North won (or the South lost).
 - A. Some have insisted that state rights sentiment made it impossible for the Confederacy to carry out an effective national mobilization.
 1. In fact, the South went farther down the road to a strong central government than the North did.
 2. The leaders, including Davis and Lee, called for this approach.
 - B. Others have argued that internal divisions along class, racial, and gender lines doomed the Confederacy before southern armies had been truly beaten. Some of the arguments include the following:
 1. Yeomen believed it was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight."
 2. Non-slaveholders resented slaveholders.
 3. Women lost heart well before the military balance had shifted decisively to the North.
 - C. The most persuasive explanation emphasizes the North's advantages and willingness to use them.
 1. Northern manpower and material wealth were enormously important.
 2. The North developed political and military leaders who were willing to use these advantages to the fullest.
 3. Despite some serious setbacks, a majority of the northern people remained committed to winning the war.
 4. A majority of Confederates fought hard and supported the war but ultimately proved unable to match northern power and will.

Essential Reading:

McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, chapter 28 and Epilogue.

Supplementary Reading:

Gallagher, *The Confederate War*, chapters 1, 4.

Hanchett, *The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies*.

Tidwell, *April '65: Confederate Covert Action in the American Civil War*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What echoes from the Civil War can you detect in the modern United States?
2. Why do you think so many Americans are drawn to study the Civil War?

Lecture Forty-Eight

Remembering the War

Scope: This lecture begins by examining the ways in which participants chose to remember and interpret the conflict in the decades after Appomattox and closes with some observations about how modern Americans should try to understand the people and events of 1861–1865. The North remained focused on war-related issues for some time. During the twelve years of Reconstruction, Republicans followed through on emancipation by adding the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution and trying to build their party in the former Confederate states using black voters and white allies. In the North, Republican politicians waved the “Bloody Shirt,” linking the Democratic Party to southern secessionists and inviting northern veterans to “vote as they shot” during the conflict. Gradually, the North lost interest, secure in its belief that it had fought for the right and justly triumphed.

Former Confederates proved more tenacious in focusing on the past. They had suffered utter defeat and seen their social structure pulled apart, and they sought to find a way to make sense of their losses and justify their enormous sacrifices. They constructed what came to be known as the “Myth of the Lost Cause,” which portrayed Robert E. Lee as a perfect product of antebellum southern civilization and an infallible general. The myth played down the importance of slavery as a cause of the war and emphasized northern numbers and fallible officers, such as James Longstreet, as causes of Confederate defeat. Great bitterness toward the North lingered among most white southerners (as it did toward former Confederates among many northerners). By the last years of the nineteenth century, many ex-Confederates had joined the white North in a reconciliation movement that stressed the bravery and sense of purpose on both sides during the conflict, celebrated the strength of the reunited Union, and virtually removed emancipation and black participation from the memory of the war. Some modern Americans study the war for what it can tell them about their own lives and the insights it can yield about current public issues. A larger number probably explore the war in an attempt to understand the actions and motivations of the people who experienced it. These two approaches yield very different types of understanding.

Outline

- I. The North remained focused on issues relating to the war for several years after Appomattox.
 - A. Republicans followed up on emancipation.
 - 1. The 14th Amendment sought to guarantee equal legal protection to former slaves.
 - 2. The 15th Amendment gave the franchise to black men.
 - B. Republicans waved the “bloody shirt” in labeling the Democrats a party of treason responsible for the suffering of the war.
 - 1. Republican military leaders and other veterans often ran successfully for office (four former generals—Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and Benjamin Harrison—won the presidency between 1868 and 1888).
 - 2. The Democrats struggled to regain their position as the majority party in national politics. They did elect Grover Cleveland twice, followed by then Woodrow Wilson in 1912. They had somewhat more success in Congress and statehouse elections after the war.
 - C. The North erected monuments and wrote accounts of the war but gradually turned away from the conflict and focused on other issues.
 - 1. The Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.) was the first huge veterans’ organization in U.S. history.
 - 2. It was a powerful political lobby in the late nineteenth century.
- II. The white South devoted considerable effort to making sense of its profound defeat.
 - A. White southerners had suffered relatively far more than northerners.
 - 1. A higher percentage of their soldiers had been killed or maimed.
 - 2. Their social system had been radically altered through emancipation.
 - 3. Their economy had been disrupted.
 - 4. They lived for several years with occupying troops that reminded them of their defeat.
 - B. The “Myth of the Lost Cause” was an attempt to find something positive in the failed struggle for independence. General Jubal Early was one of the leaders of the “Lost Cause.”
 - 1. The myth held that General Robert E. Lee was the perfect product of the antebellum social system. Lee towered above all other generals in ability and nobility.
 - 2. The myth blamed northern resources and manpower and fallible Confederates, such as James Longstreet (partly in light of Longstreet’s postwar activities and writings), for southern defeat.
 - 3. Southerners who held this perspective insisted that honor was not forfeited in losing to a vastly superior foe.

- 4. The myth also played down the importance of slavery as a factor in secession, instead stressing constitutional issues.
 - C. Bitterness toward the North lingered for many years in the white South.
 - 1. Confederate monuments were erected throughout the South.
 - 2. Birthdays of great leaders, such as Lee and Jackson, were celebrated as state holidays well into the twentieth century.
 - III. A reconciliation movement in the late nineteenth century attracted support in the North and, to a lesser degree, in the white South.
 - A. The movement emphasized the common heritage and characteristics of both sides.
 - 1. It stated that soldiers on both sides were brave and a credit to America.
 - 2. It held that soldiers on both sides fought for what they believed was right and left moral judgements about slavery out of the matter.
 - B. The war was a watershed, because it confirmed the Union and prepared the nation for international greatness.
 - C. Slavery and emancipation largely disappeared from the white memory of the conflict.
 - 1. This fit in with the wartime reality that the Union was far more important than emancipation for most white northerners.
 - 2. Black leaders and veterans protested that their war was being forgotten.
 - 3. A famous example of this reconciliation sentiment is C. F. Adams’s address at the College of Washington and Lee in 1907, the centennial of Robert E. Lee’s birth.
 - IV. Modern Americans study the Civil War for different reasons.
 - A. Some hope to find lessons and information applicable to current issues.
 - 1. Questions and problems related to race remain a major factor in the United States.
 - 2. Debate over the relative powers of national, state, and local governments continues.
 - B. Others examine the war in an effort to understand the motivations and experiences of the people who lived through it.
 - 1. Why would so many northerners risk so much for the Union?
 - 2. Why did the Confederates fight so long and hard, especially the non-slaveholding segment of the population?
 - 3. Where did freedom stand as a northern war aim?
 - C. These two approaches yield different types of understanding.

Essential Reading:

Gallagher, *Lee and His Soldiers in War and Memory*, chapters 12–13.

McPherson, *Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War*, chapters 4, 15.

Supplementary Reading:

Foster, *Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865–1913*.

Questions to Consider:

1. How do you think most modern Americans think of the Civil War? Do they have a view similar to that of the reconciliationists?
2. Could it be said that ex-Confederates won the battle for public memory of the war?

Timeline

General

1787.....	Framers of the Constitution compromise on issues related to slavery.
1820.....	Missouri Compromise admits Missouri as a slave state but prohibits slavery elsewhere in the Louisiana Purchase territory above 36°36' north latitude.
1831.....	Nat Turner’s rebellion in Virginia sends shockwaves through the South.
1831.....	William Lloyd Garrison founds his abolitionist newspaper <i>The Liberator</i> .
1840.....	Liberty Party fields a presidential candidate.
1845.....	Texas admitted to the Union.
1846–48.....	War between the United States and Mexico.
1846.....	Wilmot Proviso calls for barring slavery from lands acquired from Mexico.
1848.....	Free Soil Party fields a presidential candidate.
1850.....	Compromise of 1850 includes admission of California as a free state (giving free states a permanent majority in the United States Senate) and enactment of a tough Fugitive Slave Law.
1852.....	Whig Party fields its last serious presidential candidate, signaling breakdown of the second-party system.
1852.....	Publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s <i>Uncle Tom’s Cabin</i> makes many previously unengaged northerners sensitive to the issue of slavery.
1854.....	Kansas-Nebraska Act inflames sectional tensions.
1856.....	Abolitionist Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts is caned by Preston Brooks of South Carolina on the floor of the Senate