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Great Minds of the Western Intellectual Tradition, Part IV
Philosophy in the Epoch of Ideology

COURSE GUIDE

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Sugrue contributed "Consciousness in the Marxian Conception of History, A Critical Schematization" to *Auslegung* in 1982. He currently has three works in progress: "Portrait of the Artist as Philosophical Oxymoron: The Illusion of Nietzschean Nihilism," "The Kantian Politics of Woodrow Wilson," and "A Theory of Political Party Systems."

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Great Minds of the Western Intellectual Tradition, Part IV
Philosophy in the Epoch of Ideology

Scope: These eleven lectures in the "Great Minds" series continue our examination of the consequences of the scientific revolution for our self-understanding and the many problems that it raises. Human reason appeared to reach its apex in the impressive predictive and productive powers of modern natural science. Consequently, many philosophers applied the scientific method to subjects and problems where it had not before been tested. Auguste Comte founded sociology, which he saw as the queen of the sciences because it represented society's awareness of itself and also entailed society's capacity to create itself. William Graham Sumner applied the evolutionary insight of Charles Darwin to the structure of society, and Max Weber applied the science of historical inquiry to the understanding of the social order.

We will also examine the idealism of G.W.F. Hegel and its subseequent appropriation and transformation by Karl Marx. Both Hegel and Marx applied historical methods to develop a science for understanding the progress of society. Sigmund Freud brought the tools of science in to the philosopher's *sanctum sanctorum*—the mind. During this period the West became aware of its social and psychological origins and purposes. Because almost all such efforts to reveal the working of natural laws in human life tend to deflate traditional sources of virtue and transcendence, this was a period of spiritual turmoil as well as of material progress. Each in his own way, Arthur Schopenhauer and Soren Kierkegaard both exemplified the strained search toward a new ground for the self.

Lecture One
Comte and the Origins of Sociology

Michael Sugrue, Ph.D.

Scope: This series of lectures on nineteenth and early twentieth century thought begins with Auguste Comte, who coined the words "sociology" and "altruism" and is widely seen as the father of both sociology and "positivism." Comte's philosophy of positivism rejects teleology and seeks instead to formulate scientific laws of humanity based on observation. Comte describes three stages in the evolution of the human intellect: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The first stage of development explains the world in religious terms; the second stage describes events in terms of abstract ideas or essences; and the third stage explains the world through science. This lecture will review the main intellectual influences upon Comte, the main tenets of his philosophy of positivism, his three-stage, "Vico-esque" philosophy of history, his grandiose projects to unify all of the sciences and found a new "religion of humanity." It concludes by evaluating Comte's influence upon subsequent philosophy.

Outline

I. Although Auguste Comte is little read today, his early work was profound, and his ideas had great influence on subsequent philosophy and social science.

- **A.** Comte's thought was shaped by four primary influences:
  1. Catholicism. Comte longed for the organic stability and unity of medieval Catholicism. He stressed the need for order, stability, and progress.
  2. Modern natural science. Like Aristotle, Comte was versed in all scientific disciplines. He sought to organize all sciences logically under a single intellectual structure.
  3. The French Revolution. Comte disliked revolution in general and the French Revolution in particular.
  4. French utopian socialism. Like Marx and Dickens, Comte denounced the social dislocations of industrial society.
- **B.** Comte was always an intellectual outsider.
  1. His mental imbalance became apparent early on.
  2. He failed to gain a university position but attracted followers to whom he lectured.
  3. He became an object of ridicule and had little influence, except at the fringes of the Western world (e.g., in Brazil).

II. Comte's six-volume *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (1830-1842) was a logical examination of the origins of human knowledge and self-consciousness. The theoretical aim of positivism was the unification of knowledge, and the practical aim was the perfection of human life.

A. He held that all civilizations necessarily develop in three stages,each of which is a precondition for the next. Every branch of knowledge undergoes triadic movement.

1. During the first or theological phase, all knowledge arises from myth or theology.
   a. The theological phase of knowledge extends from the time of cave-painting through European feudalism.
   b. Fetishism is followed by polytheism and then by monotheism.
2. During the second phase, that of metaphysical knowledge, people appeal to intellectual abstractions rather than anthropomorphic beings to account for the world. This phase runs from Plato to the French Revolution.
3. During the third, or positive, phase of history, all abstractions are discarded in explaining the world. Positivism refuses to distinguish between appearance and reality. It applies empirically verifiable and mathematically expressed laws to explain observed phenomena.

B. Comte's theory of epistemology holds that the sciences are all locally related and refer to the same things.

1. He discerns a logical and historical hierarchy in the sciences, from the most general, simple, and abstract to the most specific, complex, concrete.
2. He regards sociology as the final phase in the historical and logical self-consciousness of the species.

III. Comte's last work was his *System de Politique Positive* (1851-1854), in which he offered a normative theory for improving society.

A. He sought to impose organic unity upon a dynamic society, and in this respect he was reactionary.

B. Comte founded his own religion of humanity—an ersatz Catholicism predicated on his own positivist understanding of right and wrong.

1. He viewed himself as the high priest of this religion and as the very self-consciousness of humanity.
2. Comte held that we exist primarily as a species, not as individuals. Positivism tends toward the abolition of the individual.
3. He instituted a Positivist catechism, calendar, and ceremonies, with Paris as the new Rome. Anxious about the revolutions of 1848, Comte offered to serve as head of "Positivist Council."

C. Unable to achieve the detachment of Hume, Comte succumbed to the Promethean temptation to construct a new secular, ascetic, and repressive religion that combined Rousseau's "civil religion" with the Jacobin "cult of reason."

IV. How should we evaluate Comte?

A. The charitable interpretation holds that Comte's project to unify all of the sciences was noble and humane but also hubristic and tragic. Torn between his desires for moral order and logical clarity, his mental rope snapped, and he became a tragic, Faustian figure.

B. The uncharitable view is that Comte was brilliant but paranoid and unstable from his early years.. Like Hegel, he constructed an intellectual edifice which, however elegant and brilliant, presumed that the entire previous history of human consciousness led inevitably to himself. He attempted the supremely hubristic task of reconciling traditional religion with reason and logic.

V. Despite its disturbing aspects, Comte's thought proved highly influential. He first articulated some of the most important issues and problems in the subsequent history and philosophy of science.

A. The problems of method and the focus on pragmatism in philosophy both date from Comte.

B. Comte influenced Herbert Spencer and the rise of Social Darwinism.

C. Other influential aspects of his thought included his rejection of metaphysics, his technocentric philosophy of history, and his efforts to develop a positivist moral and political theory.

D. Comte's ideas had their most practical influence in Brazil, whose national motto is "Order and Progress." All technocratic tendencies in modern politics owe a debt to Comte.

Essential Reading:

Comte, Auguste. *Introduction to Positive Philosophy.* Hackett, 1988.

Supplementary Reading:

Copleston, Frederick S.J. *A History of Philosophy,* Book III, Vol. IX. New York: Doubleday, 1985 (pp. 74-98).

Gouldner, Alvin. *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Mill, J.S. *The Subjection of Women.* Hackett, 1988.

Mill, J.S. *On Liberty.* Hackett, 1978.

Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies* . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Questions to Consider:

1. How might positivism reconcile the antagonism between liberty and equality?
2. Discuss the totalitarian implications of Comte's positive polity.

Lecture Two
Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Geist*

Michael Sugrue, Ph.D.

Scope: This lecture examines G.W.F. Hegel's response to the Enlightenment celebration of rationality and mechanistic science. The preeminent German thinker of his day, Hegel centralized the notion of spirit (or *Geist*) in his philosophy. As we learn in this lecture, he tried to create a grand philosophical system that would encompass all of human knowledge and add to its store. Although his *Phenomenology of Geist* is not easy reading, its influence can hardly be overstated. This lecture will review the central aspects of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Geist* and assess its significance for later western philosophy.

Outline

I. G.W.F. Hegel was the last of the great German system builders.

- **A.** He tried to build a coherent explanation of the external world of nature, the inner world of consciousness, and the process by which consciousness develops over time.
- **B.** His early theological writings are the best introduction to his thought.
- **C.** Although triads are ubiquitous in his thought, the dialectic (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) is relatively rare.

II. Hegel attempted to solve the Kantian "problem of consciousness"—i.e., if things in themselves (*dingen an sich*) are directly unknowable to us, how do we know that they exist?

- **A.** According to the early German Idealists, Kant erred in attributing existence to *dingen an sich.*
  1. Fichte and Schelling held that "things in themselves" do not exist, but this implies that the mind creates both the form and content of human cognition.
  2. Kant had tried to avoid solipsism (i.e., the idea that nothing exists beyond our own minds) by asserting the existence of *dingen an sich.* His philosophy was critical rather than idealist. For the German Idealists, by contrast, the world is the product of mind.
  3. Fichte and Schelling, however, fell into solipsism by denying external reality.
- **B.** Hegel resolved this problem by treating the universe as the product not of finite human minds, but of Mind—a giant collective subject, the *Geist.*
  1. *Geist* has no good English translation, although it is commonly translated as "mind" or "spirit."

2. *Geist* is etymologically related to "ghost," "gist," and "geyser."
   a. Like a ghost, *Geist* is psychic, mental, immaterial, and relatively more concrete than "spirit."
   b. Like a geyser, it is regular, periodic, and predictable. It has its own internal force and operates by its own laws.
   c. The concept of "gist" connotes well the meaning of *Geist*.

III. In *The Phenomenology of Geist* (1807), Hegel tries to explain consciousness in the absence of the thing in itself.

A. Contrary to Kant, Hegel believed that the mind's categories of understanding evolve over time, allowing for the growth of consciousness. This growth of consciousness is teleological: it moves from finite to infinite consciousness.

B. *The Phenomenology of Geist* is the science of the appearance of self-knowledge, which is the same as reality, since there is no *ding an sich*. The world will disclose itself to us rationally if we examine it rationally.

C. The history of philosophy is the *Geist's* coming to self-knowledge, which proceeds dialectically.
   1. The finitude of human understanding rises through self-contradiction to ever-higher levels.
   2. The end-state is absolute, final self-consciousness. This can be viewed as the reconciliation of God and man, or of human beings with themselves.

D. *The Phenomenology of Geist* is necessarily an account of Hegel's own spiritual odyssey toward self-consciousness, as well as that of all humanity. The *Geist* is animated by an entelechy, a natural purpose: to achieve full omniscience and self-consciousness.

E. The *Geist* constructs reality, which is rational since *Geist* is rational.
   1. To be free is to be rational and autonomous.
   2. Rationality allows the discernment of ends or purposes.
   3. Finitude and abstraction generate contradiction. Nothing partial or finite is truly free, so freedom rationally "sublates" contradictions in the process of realizing infinite self-consciousness.
   4. The end-state of this dialectical process is the transcendence of contradictions and the bounds of finite understanding.

F. Hegel describes the development of subjective *Geist* (in the individual).
   1. Although the categories of understanding are objective, our consciousness of the world is subjective, since we only find in nature what we put there.
   2. Humanity moves from nature to history via the master-slave dialectic.
      a. All people seek power and recognition from others; this is the beginning of history.
      b. Some risk death in the battle for supremacy and recognition. Those who risk death successfully become masters. Those who risk death unsuccessfully die, and those who refuse to risk it become slaves.
      c. Ironically, the slave is forced to become independent, while the master is freed to become dependent on the slave.
   3. This situation generates the stage of the Unhappy Consciousness, which seeks freedom by means of resignation and dependence upon oneself, viz., Stoicism, which leads logically to Skepticism and eventually to despair.
   4. With Christianity (the religion of Spirit), the universality of humanity is recognized.

G. The next stage is Objective *Geist*—i.e., society and its rules.
   1. Like Kant, Hegel holds that freedom requires law. Objective *Geist* develops first within the family, then within civil society, and finally within the state.
   2. The conflict between these different sorts of law is depicted in art (e.g., Sophocles' *Antigone*).

H. Absolute Spirit is the synthesis of subjective and objective Spirit. It consists of art, religion, and philosophy.
   1. Art is the first stage of absolute Spirit. It passes through three phases: symbolic, classical, and romantic.
   2. Religion is the second stage—it presents a pictorial representation of reality, and it evolves from primitive nature-worship to Christianity, where *Geist* is made universal.
   3. Philosophy is the final stage. Self-consciousness develops from the earliest thoughts on nature to culminate in Hegel himself.

IV. How should we interpret Hegel's *Phenomenology of Geist*?

A. Hegel viewed *The Phenomenology of Geist* as "the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit." Is it the vindication or the abolition of religion?

B. The Left or Young Hegelians treated Hegel as an atheist. In saying that God is dead, did Hegel mean that at the end of history, man will be reconciled not with God but with himself?

C. The *Phenomenology* can be read in either theistic or atheistic terms. Hegel was probably a religious thinker and a genuine Lutheran. The left-wing reading of Hegel, however, has probably been more fruitful over time.

Essential Reading:

Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Supplementary Reading:

Copleston, Frederick, S.J. *A History of Philosophy.*, Bk. III, Vol. VII. New York: Doubleday, 1985 (pp. 59-147).

Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972 (pp. 730-745).

Avineri, Schlomo. *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Forster, Michael. *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Kojeve, Alexandre. *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (trans. J.H. Nicholas). Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.

Rosen, Michael. *Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Taylor, Charles. *Hegel.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Questions to Consider:

1. Discuss the pervasive use of triadic structures in the *Phenomenology of Geist.*
2. What is the place of Christianity in the *Phenomenology of Geist*?

Lecture Three
Hegel's Philosophy of History

Michael Sugrue, Ph.D

Scope: Although this lecture covers some of the same ground as the previous one (which is just as well, given the difficulty of the concepts), it emphasizes Hegel's greatest legacy: his philosophy of history. For Hegel, history represents the necessary and rational unfolding of absolute Spirit toward self-consciousness. That is, history is the world or God or the collective spirit of humanity becoming conscious of itself and discovering its own nature. It proceeds in necessary phases, an understanding of which allows us in turn to understand the artistic, scientific, and philosophical products of each phase. Hegel's historicism—the notion that the artistic products and accepted truths of a given era are relative to that era—profoundly influenced Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida.

Outline

I. Hegel was one of the most important thinkers about the meaning and course of history. He is the father of modern historicism and idealism.

- **A.** The concept of *Geist* is central to Hegel's philosophy.
  1. *Geist* refers to a collective subject, a personality larger and more complex than the individual.
  2. All human beings form one giant, collective subject.
  3. Hegel analogizes phases in history to phases in the development of individual human beings. The species proceeds from ignorance and superstition to full understanding of their own nature and potential.
  4. *Geist* is the soul of the whole human race.
- **B.** Hegel wants to present a comprehensive interpretation of human existence.
  1. He wants to discern rationally the goal or purpose of human existence.
  2. Just as Kant develops a logical foundation for the Golden Rule, Hegel translates Christian eschatology into the language of German idealism.
  3. Hegel wants to reveal God's providential plan for the human race.

II. Progress is central to Hegel's conception of history.

- **A.** According to Hegel, the *Geist* develops over time. Each epoch has its own *Geist* and contributes to the overall development of the *Geist.*

B. The *Geist* develops in accordance with its own necessary laws of rationality and freedom.
  1. The *Geist* is the essence of human existence.
  2. The *Geist* of each epoch is revealed in that epoch's cultural products.

C. The *Geist*—the universal soul of humanity—gradually becomes more knowledgeable about itself and the world, and more conscious of its essential freedom and potential for autonomous rationality.

D. As *Geist* becomes more conscious of itself, it learns how to dominate nature. As our knowledge increases, we become more powerful.

E. The ultimate purpose of human existence is to complete this project of gaining knowledge and power—i.e., to achieve the unification of God and man.
  1. Hegel believes that he was the first to understand the purpose of human existence. He believes that *Geist* has coalesced in himself.
  2. He ends human history by reconciling human beings with the divine mind and by understanding what human beings really are.

F. Hegel devised laws of human history.
  1. Marxism is an extension of Hegel's project of discerning the laws of history.
  2. Unlike Marx, though, Hegel does not view these laws in deterministic or inevitable terms. Hegel sees these laws as conducing to freedom and rationality.
  3. Hegel believes that human beings become more self-conscious and free as they understand better the purpose of their existence.

G. Hegel's philosophy of history is essentially Christian theology. For him, the purpose of human existence is reconciliation between God and man.
  1. With the Renaissance, the focus of study shifted from God to man.
  2. With the Enlightenment, nature became the focus of inquiry.
  3. Unlike the great thinkers of the Enlightenment, Hegel's concern was not with nature but with history.

III. Hegel's confidence that we can achieve true happiness and change the world once we understand the purpose of human existence has proven very influential with Marxists, utopian socialists, social Darwinists, and proponents of international understanding. He is the last great synthesizer of Athens with Jerusalem.

Essential Reading:

Hegel, G.W.F. *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (trans. Leo Rauch). Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988.

Supplementary Reading:

Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972 (pp. 730-746).

Copleston, Frederick. *A History of Philosophy*, Bk. III, Vol. VII. New York: Doubleday, 1985 (pp.189-247).

Avineri, Schlomo. *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

McNeill, William. *Plagues and Peoples.* Peter Smith, 1992.

Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Questions to Consider:

1. Compare Hegel's linear view of history with the Christian view of history as articulated by St. Augustine.
2. What ethical views, if any, follow from Hegel's philosophy of history?

Lecture Four
Marx and the Problem of Alienation and Ideology

Michael Sugrue, Ph.D.

Scope: Karl Marx was important not only as a philosopher who elaborated on and attacked Hegel's philosophy of history, but as a political thinker and agitator whose ideas helped to shape the political history of the West in the twentieth century. This lecture will examine the philosophical origins of Marx's thought, especially Hegelian philosophy of history. It also examines Marx's theory of surplus value and his contention that the division of labor gives rise to class conflict, exploitation, and alienation. It closes by evaluating both the shortcomings and the continuing relevance of Marxism.

Outline

I. Karl Marx's philosophy combines three intellectual traditions: English political economy, French utopian socialism, and German idealism. Although Marx never reconciled the tensions among these elements, his philosophy was an influential response to the industrial age.

- **A.** Marx borrowed from English political economy, and especially from Adam Smith, the labor theory of value and the idea that the division of labor divides society into antagonistic social classes. He also borrowed the naturalistic perspective of David Hume.
- **B.** Marx borrowed from the French utopian socialists the idea that fundamental social change can be achieved through an *a priori* plan. He sought to add a scientific component to the utopian elements of French socialism.
- **C.** Marx borrowed from Hegel his view of history.
  1. Hegel viewed history as the progressive realization of the *Geist*. Like Hegel, Marx viewed history as teleological—as the progressive development of the species toward universal human liberation, characterized by the absence of alienation and the achievement of social justice.
  2. Social justice is primarily a matter of redistribution of wealth.

II. Unlike Hegel, Marx viewed the working class rather than the intelligentsia—the doers rather than the thinkers—as the universal class.

- **A.** In primitive society—i.e., in man's natural state—there was no division of labor.
- **B.** The emergence of the division of labor was accompanied by the rise of a hierarchical social structure of producers and exploiters. Marx believed that in every epoch, the ruling class uses oppression to appropriate surplus value from the producers.
- **C.** For Marx, the "end of history" will come when humans exploit only nature, not each other.

III. According to Marx, the ruling ideas in every age are those that reinforce the social relations that benefit the ruling class, i.e., the exploiters.

- **A.** Contrary to Hegel, Marx held that changes in the dominant ideas of any age come not from the *Geist* but from changes in the mode of production.
- **B.** The division of the human species into hostile classes causes alienation, understood as a necessary false consciousness in defense of class interests.
- **C.** As a society's productive forces change, its social structures and the dominant ideas by which those structures are legitimized will also change.
  1. Aristotle's defense of slavery as a natural institution responded to the economic self-interest of the ruling class in ancient Greece.
  2. Aquinas defended monarchy and serfdom by giving them divine sanction. Like Aristotle, he legitimized the exploitive social relations characteristic of his society.

IV. Marx sought to return man to his natural state by eliminating alienation, classes, false consciousness, and exploitation.

- **A.** In his view, Marxism allows one to view the human condition as it really is, with the distortions of alienated thought removed.
- **B.** When Marxism is finally understood and practiced, science will be realized and man will be redeemed. This "secular apocalypse" will bring the end of history.
- **C.** Marx believed that he was the first to explain history accurately. He sought a return to early primitive communism but without forfeiting the abundance made possible by modern technology.

V. Although Marxism had weak predictive power, it identified genuine social problems and had deep appeal.

- **A.** Unlike Smith, Marx was impressed mainly by the negative side of the industrial revolution. He expressed moral indignation over the social and economic condition of the working class in early industrial Britain.
- **B.** He held that the problems of alienation and exploitation are not susceptible to gradual reform. The condition of the working class can be ameliorated only through a global proletarian revolution. This global applicability helps to explain the wide appeal of Marxism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

C. Marx underestimated the ability of the capitalist system to reform itself gradually.

D. Marxism is the last great Christian heresy. Its faith in progress and in the end of history is essentially Christian eschatology with a naturalistic and scientific twist. Marx thinks that his system will bring true human liberation and self-understanding.

E. Marxism has produced both terrible human tragedies and theoretical incoherence.
   1. Where it has been instituted in practice, Marxism has brought not the elimination of exploitation and oppression, but instead the replacement of one ruling elite by another.
   2. The millennial aspect of Marxist theory can lead to the devaluing of individual human lives for the sake of achieving a utopian future goal. That is, it can legitimate totalitarian political practice.
   3. The teleological aspect of Marxism is mythological—a holdover from Christianity, which Marx otherwise rejected.

F. As the practical political influence of Marxism wanes, it is worth remembering that Marx attempted an impossible intellectual task, the reconciliation of the materialistic and metaphysical traditions in Western philosophy.

VI. Marx was one of the great social theorists of the nineteenth century and the source of many progressive reforms in modern capitalist society. The development of the welfare state is homage to Marx.

Essential Reading:

Marx, Karl. *Selected Writings.* Hackett, 1994 (pp. 40-186).

Supplementary Reading:

Copleston, Frederick, S.J. *A History of Philosophy*, Bk. III, Vol. VIII. New York: Doubleday, 1985 (pp. 368-389).

Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972 (pp. 782-790).

Avineri, Schlomo. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Cohen, G.A. *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Kamenka, Eugene. *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism.* Routledge, 1972.

Korsch, Karl. *Marxism and Philosophy.* Books on Demand, 1970.

Questions to Consider:

1. What are Marx's main objections to Hegel?
2. What kind of distortions does capitalism produce in the consciousness of those it oppresses?

Lecture Five
Marx's Historical Materialism

Darren Staloff, Ph.D.

Scope: Perhaps Marx's deepest influence on contemporary thought has been the epistemological view, described in this lecture, that even the most sincere beliefs and most widely-held truths of a given epoch may be produced to justify or "naturalize" the economic structure of that epoch. As Professor Staloff explains, this perspective opens up a completely new way to understand intellectual history.

Outline

I. Karl Marx's historical materialism is an attempt to answer Hegel's idealist explanation of history in purely naturalistic or scientific terms. It seeks to identify the scientific laws that causally determine human history.

II. A rational reconstruction of Marx and Engels's historical materialism begins with Marx's reference in *The Communist Manifesto* to the problem of history. This problem involves three critical issues that constitute the background assumptions and themes of the unfolding account of human evolution.

- **A.** The first issue is one of philosophical anthropology, i.e., what distinguishes man from other species?
  - **1.** According to Hegel, man is distinguished by consciousness. But why did consciousness emerge? What evolutionary function does it serves?
  - **2.** Marx notes that only human beings constantly reshape their environment; only they produce with cognitive forethought.
- **B.** The second issue is anthropological and natural-historical. Marx observed that the division of labor is present in all organized human production.
- **C.** The third issue is the scarcity of goods to supply all the material and cultural wants of society's members.
  - **1.** As a result of this scarcity, one part of society establishes itself as a ruling stratum so that it can "enclose" a disproportionate share of social income.
  - **2.** Marx offers no moral evaluation of this behavior. He views it as necessary and inevitable.

III. Marx's historical materialism posits two fundamental entities: actual historical persons and the "forces of production." The forces of production are comprised of two elements: the means of production and abstract labor power.

- **A.** The means of production are comprised of tools, facilities or productive spaces, and "raw materials" or the objects of labor.
- **B.** Abstract labor power includes the various techniques and skills of labor as they develop over time. For Marx, science is the most important component of abstract labor power.

IV. Persons and productive forces stand in various relations called "relations of production."

- **A.** These relations include ownership, mastery (over slaves), renting or leasing.
- **B.** The productive relations are strongly determined by the stage of historical development of the forces of production.
  - **1.** Societies in which the forces of production are primitive are likely to have severe forms of labor control.
  - **2.** In technologically sophisticated societies, owners find it more efficient to hire rather than to own their workers.
- **C.** The sum total of these productive relations constitute the economic structure or "base" of the society.
- **D.** The rest of the social structure Marx called the society's "superstructure" which is epiphenomenal to, or determined by, the economic base.
  - **1.** This superstructure includes law, culture, philosophy, fine arts, and political institutions (but not science).
  - **2.** This cultural superstructure will serve to legitimize the existing economic structure.

V. Based on his historical research, Marx offers several laws of development of the "modes of production" (i.e., the economic structure and its relation to the forces of production).

- **A.** Marx identifies three distinct modes of production in Western history: slavery, characteristic of the ancient world; feudalism, characteristic of the Middle Ages; and capitalism, characteristic of the modern bourgeois epoch.
- **B.** Marx proposed several laws of development of the modes of production.
  - **1.** Every mode of production persists as long as it can foster the further development of the forces of production.
  - **2.** When the social relations of production fetter the productive forces, a revolution will usher in a new mode of production.
  - **3.** Every new mode of production gestates within society while the old mode of production is still regnant. "History never poses a problem that it cannot solve."

C. The capitalist mode of production is the first truly dynamic economic structure.
   1. Marx had profound respect for the bourgeoisie and for the productivity of capitalism.
   2. Competition forces the bourgeoisie constantly to revolutionize the means of production and become more efficient. Wealth creation becomes possible at an exponential rate.

D. The bourgeois mode of production makes it technologically possible to sole the problem of scarcity.
   1. Unfortunately, given disproportionate distribution of incomes, most people lack the material resources to consume the commodities that industrial capitalism can produce.
   2. This condition results in periodic recessions and depressions, which suggests that the existing relations of production have begun to fetter the development of productive forces.
   3. The inevitable result will be communist revolution.

VI. Communism represents the solution to the problem of history.

A. By redressing the problem of disparate incomes, the last fetter to the development of productive forces is removed and the problem of scarcity is solved on a global basis.

B. Under communism, there is no need for the state, which will wither away.

C. The strengths of Marx's historical determinism include its identification of law-like regularities in history and its ability to unify large parts of history.
   1. We judge past events on the basis of their present outcomes.
   2. Marx viewed capitalism as insufficient when he compared it to the perceived advantages of a hypothetical future state—communism.
   3. This prophetic quality of Marxism undermines its standing as a political project but not its standing as a mode of historical understanding.

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Questions to Consider:

1. Why does Marx believe that communism is the "solution of the problem of history"?
2. How does Marxian historicism differ from Hegelian?

Lecture Six
Kierkegaard's Christian Existentialism

Michael Sugrue, Ph.D.

Scope: Soren Kierkegaard was almost unknown in his own time outside of his native Denmark. He stands, however, as a profound Christian thinker, the founder of existentialism, and a leading critic of Enlightenment rationality. He despised Hegel, abusing him continually and with great wit. Kierkegaard is best known for his view that one must take a "leap of faith" and believe in God without recourse to reason. This lecture focuses on Kierkegaard's disjunction between the aesthetic and ethical life, his insistence that we must choose one or the other of these lives without reference to rational criteria, and the contrast between Kantian rationalism and Kierkegaardian reliance on blind faith.

Outline

I. Kierkegaard's philosophy, like Marx's, is a reaction to the Hegelian synthesis—the idea that philosophy came to an end when Hegel comprehended the ultimate purpose of human life.

- **A.** Kierkegaard rejected the smug certainty, the megalomaniacal comprehensiveness, the Promethean rationalism of Hegel's system.
- **B.** Unlike Marx, Kierkegaard was both a religious believer and a comic poet, and these personal elements saturate his writings as a combination of caustic wit and morbid introspection.
- **C.** He denied that it was possible to completely desystematize human existence. He saw as problematic the mixture of Promethean, humanistic Greek rationality with the strictly understood tradition of Biblical faith and religion.
  1. He refused to accept the facile compromises of Christianity with Greek rational philosophy; he insisted that we must choose between the life of faith and that of rationality.
  2. What criteria should govern this choice? What possible grounds for this decision would not presuppose the decision itself?

II. Kierkegaard sought to understand how humans make this choice between faith and rationality. He insisted that all people must choose whether to pursue the aesthetic life or the ethical life.

- **A.** By the aesthetic life he means that of both physical/sensual and intellectual pleasure. It is the rational life identified with Athens.
- **B.** By the ethical life he means that of faith, of one who pursues moral righteousness independent of pleasure.

- **C.** Kierkegaard saw the aesthetic life as man's natural orientation. He saw this predisposition as an analogue of original sin.
- **D.** Although Kant sought to synthesize reason with faith, Kierkegaard saw reason as at best superfluous to the life of faith.
- **E.** Kierkegaard held in *Either/Or* that individuals must choose either the aesthetic or the ethical life.
  1. The effort to forge this compromise is the mark of the aesthetic man *par excellence*.
  2. Kierkegaard denies the existence of any rational decision procedure for making this supremely important choice. By adopting the criterion of rationality in making this decision, one presupposes the outcome. For this reason, he is considered the founder of existentialism.
  3. Kierkegaard was a tortured and agonized person who relished irony. He felt that those who have not suffered for their beliefs have no right to make the existential choice between faith and reason.
- **F.** In *Either*, he sought to show the reader the distractedness of the aesthetic life.
  1. The aesthete eventually succumbs to boredom with the nothingness that pervades reality. Boredom is the root of all evil.
  2. The natural outcome of the aesthetic life is suicide.
  3. Kierkegaard saw himself as a joker who is deadly serious but is not taken seriously.
- **G.** In *Or*, Kierkegaard described the life of the ethical man.
  1. Religious belief is attractive, but there is no proof. Arguments which purport logically to demonstrate God's existence are blasphemous attempts to make God's inscrutable nature seem accessible to human reason.
  2. The ethical man chooses to believe for its own sake, not for pleasure or for any reason. It is a criterionless choice and requires a "leap of faith."

III. Kierkegaard and Kant were Christians who worshipped different Gods.

- **A.** In the Kantian view, the life of faith can be justified on rational grounds. In fact, God always operates in accordance with the categorical imperative.
- **B.** There is an element of Promethean, Greek rationality in this Kantian view. It is not consistent with simple, arbitrary subjection to the will of God.
- **C.** As described in *Fear and Trembling*, Kierkegaard takes a Romantic view of God. He urges the reader to reject rationality and do as God asks, without question. He believes that faith in God is reason enough.

D. Kierkegaard has relevance because he forces us to confront the implications of being free, autonomous, and rational subjects. We face many subjective choices but lack rational criteria for making them.

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Questions to Consider:

1. Discuss Kierkegaard's intellectual debt to the Book of Job.
2. Discuss the connection between the aesthetic and ethical approaches to life as developed in *Either/Or.*

Lecture Seven
Schopenhauer: *The World as Will and Idea*

Michael Sugrue, Ph.D.

Scope: Arthur Schopenhauer resembled Kierkegaard in his talent and wit as a literary stylist and in his hatred of Hegel. Schopenhauer's philosophy was famously pessimistic: he argued that the best thing is extinction and, failing that, art. His view that with art and the deepest ethics we come up against the limits of language has influenced such philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein. Schopenhauer also had great influence on Freud and Nietzsche. This lecture will examine Schopenhauer's thought as set forth his great work, *The World as Will and Idea.*

Outline

I. Schopenhauer differs from other nineteenth-century Romantic writers in the pessimistic and morose character of his work.

A. His unfortunate family background contributed to the grimness and disturbed quality of his psyche and world-view.

1. His father committed suicide.
2. His mother was cold and distant and eventually broke with Schopenhauer, leaving him almost perfectly alone.

B. The German idealists, and especially Kant, had deep influence upon Schopenhauer's thought.

C. Schopenhauer might have drawn his negative view of the human condition from his wide reading in Indian philosophy and religion, including the Upanishads and the works of the Buddha.

D. Schopenhauer's teachers included Fichte and Schliermacher.

E. The misogyny and racism evident in Schopenhauer's writings make them hard to read today. While he writes in a plesaing literary style, the content is often unpleasant and offputting.

F. Schopenhauer hated Hegel and competed with him for students at the University of Berlin during the 1820s. Eventually Schopenhauer left the university, complaining that he had not been understood.

II. Schopenhauer's great work—*The World as Will and Idea* (1818)—inverts the main ideas of German idealism. As is characteristic of German idealism, he distinguishes between subject and object, and he examines what it means to be a self-conscious entity. He resembles Kierkegaard in his relentless negativity but departs from him in denying the possibility of redemption.

A. The first part of Schopenhauer's book is entitled "The World as Representation" (*Vorstellung*).

1. Hume and the British empiricists viewed the mind as a *tabula rasa* and denied the existence of abstractions such as space, time, and causality.
2. Kant rejected this Humean skepticism, arguing that the mind does not passively receive but actively constructs the external world. By means of the *a priori* forms of cognition, it imposes form and structure on our experience of the external world.
3. A good Kantian, Schopenhauer viewed the phenomenal world as a "Vorstellung"—as one big idea. The subject cannot know the *noumena* or *ding an sich*—the world as it really is—but only phenomena, the world as we experience it.

B. The second part is entitled "The World as Will."
1. Here Schopenhauer inverts and departs from Kant. He argues that the subject can know as *noumen* his own self-consciousness or will. The external world is mediated by the *a priori* forms of cognition, but the internal world of one's own will can be known directly.
2. Schopenhauer agrees with Hobbes that human beings are primarily desiring animals, and he rejects the Enlightenment confidence that reason can subdue and control the will. The will is more powerful than reason. It leads us where *it* would go, not where *we* would lead it.
3. Will is a blind, ateleological force that animates all nature, including the human psyche. This idea contains the anti-Socratic implication that we cannot know ourselves; we cannot know what we will until we have already acted. This idea greatly influenced Freud.
4. Schopenhauer views in wholly negative terms man's condition as a desiring animal. Our desires are incessant, and our satisfaction of them is only ephemeral. We would be far better off without them—i.e., it would be preferable not to exist at all.

C. The third section addresses the problem of the world as idea and is entitled "Beyond Representation/Phenomena." In it, Schopenhauer proposes two avenues of escape from our prison of subjectivity.
1. The first is aesthetics or art, which in the absence of spiritual redemption can provide an ersatz transcendence of subjectivity. Aesthetic apprehension and genius are purely objective.
   a. In an inversion of Plato, Schopenhauer views art as the highest cognitive activity. However, his idea of tragedy is perverse: terrible events that befall average people through no fault of their own. In Schopenhauer's view, this situation conveys the highest objectivity because it portrays the world as it really is—meaningless, chaotic, and filled with pain.
   b. Schopenhauer saw music as the direct apprehension and statement of the will. His musical ideas were very influential, especially with Richard Wagner.

2. Ethics provides the other means of escape from subjectivity. The practice of Buddhist or Christian universal compassion can break down the illusory bonds of the ego. The saint's compassion overflows the boundaries of the self; as he recognizes his own suffering in that of others.

D. The final section is entitled "Beyond Will"—i.e., beyond our noumenal self.
1. Schopenhauer finds nihilism to be edifying; it is good to know how horrible our condition is.
2. He proposes two solutions to the problem of desire.
   a. The first is asceticism, i.e., the abolition of self through denial of one's will.
   b. The second is mysticism, which collapses the distinction between will and idea.
3. Schopenhauer draws two conclusions from his view of the human condition.
   a. First, this is the worst of all possible worlds, since it is only with infinite suffering and striving that we continue to exist at all.
   b. Second, it is better not to have been born,. We are bundles of desires and questions, but our desires cannot be satisfied and our questions cannot be answered. Since no God exists to whom we can pray, our only option is psychological suicide.

III. Schopenhauer made important contributions to modern psychology, philosophy, and aesthetic theory.

A. Freud derived from Schopenhauer the idea of unconscious motivation, the problem of desire, parapraxis (i.e., "Freudian slips"), and the idea of sex as the focus of the will.

B. Schopenhauer is also responsible for the idea that artistic creativity can provide a sort of secular redemption in the absence of Christian spirituality. He offered a philosophical formulation of German Romanticism revisited.

C. Schopenhauer's ideas regarding the primacy of the will influenced Bergon's Vitalism and Sorel's Voluntarism.

D. Schopenhauer is less important for his own achievements than he is for his posthumous influence on German high culture. :
1. His thought influenced Freud's ideas regarding unconscious motivation and the problem of desire.
2. Nietzsche borrowed from Schopenhauer his irrationalism and exaltation of the will.
3. The chronically morose Ludwig Wittgenstein took from Schopenhauer the idea that aesthetics is at the boundaries of language and that ethics consists of myth, symbols, gestures, and noise.

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Questions to Consider:

1. How is Schopenhauer's philosophy indebted to Kant?
2. How does Schopenhauer's view of tragedy differ from that of Aristotle?

Lecture Eight
The Classical Doctrine of Liberal Democracy: John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and *Utilitarianism*

Darren Staloff, Ph.D.

Scope: This lecture examines utilitarianism, an empiricist ethical system devised by Jeremy Bentham and heavily influenced by the ideas of Epicurus and David Hume. Its greatest advocate—and the main subject of this lecture—was John Stuart Mill. The basic principle of utilitarianism is this: "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Happiness is in turn understood to be the greatest possible balance of pleasure over pain. This sort of position is often termed "teleological"—it judges acts by their consequences. Such positions contrast with "deontological" positions, such as that of Kant, which judge acts by their adherence to a set of rules or duties. Mill famously argued from his ethical system to democracy, liberty, and tolerance, and he was an early advocate of equal rights for women and other social reforms.

Outline

I. John Stuart Mill was the mature spokesman for utilitarianism, the dominant moral theory in the Anglo-American world.

- **A.** Utilitarianism reflected English Enlightenment beliefs in the universal efficacy of education; the need for social reform; the possibility of improving human life by reforming laws and institutions; the ability of reason to effect progress; and in the primacy of consequences rather than intentions as the key to moral judgments.
- **B.** Utilitarianism is a political as well as moral doctrine. Reforms advocated by the British "Radicals" included abolition of capital punishment in most cases, universal suffrage, and liberation of women.
- **C.** Utilitarianism provides a philosophical justification for democracy, in that it regards the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the highest good. It remains one of our own most familiar moral doctrines, and its presuppositions are present in much of our political discourse and criticism.

II. Mill did not invent utilitarianism. Instead, he systematized and amended the pioneering work of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham's utilitarianism was fundamentally an empiricist theory of morality, following in a long line of such theories within British empiricism. Bentham identified David Hume as the principal influence on his thought.

A. Hume held that our moral judgments are based on sentiment, and that these sentiments are triggered by an instinctual recognition of utility. This theory was descriptive and not prescriptive; it sought to explain *how* we actually arrive at moral decisions, not *what* we ought to do.

B. Bentham was primarily a legal reformer. He argued that the only legitimate criterion for law was whether it promoted the greatest happiness for the greatest number. His theory rested upon two premises:
   1. The Epicurean "greatest happiness" principle holds that one situation is desirable over another if it brings a greater degree of pleasure. All peoples' pleasures are presumed to be equal in value, and all people are presumed actually to desire pleasure as their primary good.
   2. The "principle of association" holds that we are subject to a psychological determinism based on the constant concurrence of conjoined ideas or events.
      a. We desire things that do not directly give pleasure because we associate with them a pleasure that we derived from similar things in the past.
      b. At the public level, the legislator must use the laws of psychological behavior to create legal codes that naturally induce individuals to act for the public good. In this way the law can harmonize the public and private good.

C. Mill addressed several problems associated with Benthamite utilitarianism.
   1. The principle of utility does not preclude sacrificing the pleasures of a minority for the majority, nor does it value liberties in themselves, except as they conduce to pleasure.
   2. The calculus of utility does not recognize qualitative differences among kinds of pleasures.
   3. Bentham's system is unsystematic and incomplete.

III. Mill's contribution to utilitarianism was to address the problems with Bentham's theory and flesh out the doctrine.

A. Mill's *On Liberty* attempted to deal with the first problem of utility by proposing the "principle of harm."
   1. The only justification for abridging one's freedom is to prevent physical harm to another.
   2. Mill acknowledges certain exceptions: e.g., one can exert "paternal" control over those who lack rational faculties.

B. Mill countered the second problem of utilitarianism by arguing that distinctions between higher and lower pleasures can be made only by those who are capable of experiencing both kinds of pleasures.
   1. If there is not unanimity regarding the choice of pleasures to pursue, the majority should prevail.

   2. According to Mill, almost everyone is capable of enjoying higher pleasures, assuming they have adequate education. Thus utilitarians emphasize the need for universal education.

C. Mill argued that his principle of utility could be deduced from certain facts of psychological life.
   1. We can discover what is desirable by observing what people in fact desire: i.e., pleasure, happiness, or utility.
   2. People do not always desire utility directly, but they desire it indirectly through the principle of association.
   3. In this way Mill explains the origin of our system of virtues: they are associated either with our own or with other people's pleasures.

D. Mill beleived that we live in a causally determined universe. With sufficient information, one should be able to predict any person's decisions and behavior.
   1. One consequence of this view is that human beings become freedomless automatons.
   2. Mill tried to escape this problem by offering a limited notion of human freedom. Although our actions are caused, a large part of that cause is our own character, which we shape through our own choices.
   3. However, those choices are themselves determined by other causes, such as one's upbringing or external society.

IV. Mill's improved version of utilitarianism presents several problems.

A. Utilitarians seek to generate a system of ethics from the contingent fact that we desire pleasure.
   1. But although we might desire something, it does not necessarily follow that the object of desire is in fact desirable.
   2. Put another way, if in fact we both do and ought to desire happiness, then there is no problem for ethics to resolve, and Leibniz was correct that we live in best of all possible worlds. This situation is counterintuitive.
   3. An ancillary problem posd by empiricist utilitarian ethics is the relation of the individual to society. If we each desire our own happiness, why should we care about the happiness of others?

B. The doctrine of higher pleasures undermines one of the principal goals of utilitarianism, i.e., to create an objective calculus to inform policy and action. How can you calculate the utilities of pleasures that are different in kind?
   1. Why should we conclude that the majority is correct in its preferences?
   2. Moreover, Mill is blind to the possibility that those who share higher pleasures might not be able to offer unbiased judgments about those pleasures.

C. Another problem concerns the inconsistency of liberty and utility.
   1. It is arguable whether the "principle of harm" is compatible with the principle of utility or is instead just an *ad hoc* addendum.
   2. If we desire pleasure above all, why should we not sacrifice our liberty in pursuit of maximum pleasure for the majority? Why should not we exchange our liberty for pleasure, as Huxley portrayed in *Brave New World*?

D. Like all consequentialist moral theories, utilitarianism suffers from the incalculability of consequences. It is very hard to calculate precisely the outcome of individual actions, to say nothing of social ones. Because we are very rarely, if ever, able to calculate satisfactorily the consequences of an action, we might be deterred from ever making a decision.

Essential Reading:

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Questions to Consider:

1. What, if anything, distinguishes utilitarianism from other eudaemonistic moral theories?
2. What are the implications of the psychological principle of association and the "greatest happiness" principle for the making of just laws?

Lecture Nine
William Graham Sumner: The Darwinian Revolution in Social Thought

Darren Staloff, Ph.D.

Scope: This lecture examines the social-scientific movement known as Social Darwinism and the thought of one of its premier exponents, the Yale University sociologist William Graham Sumner. We will review the contribution of Darwinian evolutionary theory to Social Darwinism, the Social-Darwinian conception of capital and its central role in promoting social development, and Sumner's understanding of the proper role and moral standing of the state. The lecture concludes by examining Sumner's advocacy of liberty as the supreme social value and his critique of social reformism.

Outline

I. Charles Darwin's evolutionary theories made possible the emergence in the late nineteenth century of a tremendously influential social-scientific movement called Social Darwinism.
   A. Darwinian evolutionary theory undermined Christianity and its moral tradition by contradicting the Biblical account of creation as set forth in Genesis.
      1. While the Newtonian universe was mechanical, its orderliness and lawlike behavior encouraged a belief in an intelligence behind the creation.
      2. Darwin portrayed nature, by contrast, as wasteful, capricious, irrational, and "red in tooth and claw."
   B. Darwin's evolutionary theory naturalized man by tracing his lineage to non-human primates.
      1. Thus human intelligence is not *sui generis*; aspects of it are evident in other higher primates.
      2. Human society also became "naturalized." It was seen as "inherently" dominated by the competitive struggle for survival that also characterized nature itself.
      3. Darwin was very influenced by Malthus' argument that higher wages would ultimately drive down wages by expanding the supply of workers.
   C. Social Darwinism achieved a level of influence in the American academy and culture that it never achieved in Great Britain. Late nineteenth-century America best approximated a Social Darwinist polity.

D. The Social Darwinism of William Graham Sumner combines several distinct cultural strains.
   1. His sociological writings epitomize late nineteenth-century American "positivism" in social science.
   2. Social Darwinism represents a "scientifically" grounded defense of industrial capitalism and the traditional doctrine of laissez-faire.
   3. It asserts the inevitability of social, political, and moral progress.

II. Sumner's Social Darwinism is based on a historically materialist conception of the relationship between capital and labor. Elements of this conception are shared by classical political economy and Marxism.
   A. Sumner's definition of capital resembles that of Marx and Engels. According to Sumner, capital includes all of the basic factors of production except labor.
   B. Sumner regards capital as the key to social development.
      1. It allows a society to use its productive forces as efficiently as possible in order to achieve mastery over nature and prevail in the struggle for existence.
      2. Capital in the form of tools and other technology is what distinguishes human beings from the beasts.
      3. Sumner concludes that civilized life and human progress depend ultimately on private property and capital.
      4. An industrial society must employ its capital in the most efficient manner possible in order to ensure that its poorest members do not lose the struggle for existence.
   C. The history of labor indicates a slow but steady increase in the freedom and dignity of worker.
      1. Slavery predominated in primitive society, and serfdom predominated in medieval times. Serfdom was eventually supplanted by gild organization.
      2. Free labor based on voluntary contract is the characteristic labor form of the modern world. This sytem is the triumph of Freedom.
      3. Whereas feudal society was based on hierarchy, status, birth, and sentiment, the new system of free labor is based on contract and rationality. The new system is cold and abstract and lacks the ennobling sentimentality of feudalism, but its greater freedom and productivity make it far superior to serfdom.
   D. Supply and demand in the labor market determines the wages of labor in modern society. Self-interested workers will realize that their best interests require them to limit the supply of workers, via birth control.

III. Sumner and other Social Darwinists examined the proper role and moral status of the state.
   A. Sumner seeks to demystify the state, which Hegel had enshrined as the essence of spiritual and moral life.
      1. Sumner avers that the state's principal legitimate concerns are the defense of the life, liberty and property of its citizens.
      2. According to Sumner, the defense of property allows one to accumulate capital and thus pursue happiness. Unlike utilitarians, who expected the state to provide happiness, Social Darwinists looked to the state to make the private pursuit of happiness *possible*.
   B. Sumner insists that civil liberty is desirable for its own sake, not as a means to achieve some other social goal.
      1. Civil liberty accrues only to individuals, not to groups or institutions.
      2. The purpose of the system of liberty is to restrain any class from using state power to exploit another class and restrict its liberty.
      3. This system of liberty is the key to modern democracy.
   C. The key to ensuring a sound polity is to maintain an equilibrium between rights and duties.
      1. Under democracy, the majority might be tempted to retain rights for themselves while shifting duties to others—i.e., they might want to plunder the wealthy minority.
      2. Nevertheless, Sumner believed that the plutocracy rather than the masses posed the biggest threat to American society in his time. He decried efforts by the rich to win public subsidization of their private ventures, and he looked mainly to the courts to restrain these efforts.
   D. Free men owe each other nothing more than civility and voluntary, self-interested cooperation. Under a free society, one cannot be *obliged* to help others who have misused their own freedom.

IV. Perhaps the most polemical part of Sumner's text is his critique of various schemes of social reform, especially those that rely on state intervention.
   A. He argues that social reformers are at best naive do-gooders who are sentimental and unscientific, despite their good intentions.
   B. Reformers invariably fail to distinguish natural from social ills. Much scarcity of income and wealth results from technological limitations rather than from social organization.
   C. All attempts to ameliorate social ills and fight for equality under the banner of social justice ignore the fact that equality of condition is incompatible with liberty.

D. The costs of social/state activism are ultimately borne by the "forgotten man," which today we call "the middle class." Sumner's observations about the "forgotten man" highlight the injustice of the parable of the Prodigal Son, which he sees reflected in social welfare and tax legislation.

E. Sumner's most damning critique of efforts to use state power to effect social reform is that large-scale social improvement is never won directly. Instead, it results indirectly from the growth of our productive powers through advances in technology.

V. What is the legacy of Social Darwinism?

A. It rejects the traditional Christian idea of organic social hierarchy. Like Nietzsche and Dewey, Social Darwinists revel in the individual and his or her willful self-creation.

B. Social Darwinism embodies the classic liberal critique of the state and political power.

C. It also affirms the productive powers of mankind and expresses an optimistic faith in progress.

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Questions to Consider:

1. Do we have a duty to support those in society who are less capable than ourselves?
2. Can we fruitfully apply Darwin's theory of natural selection to social policy making?

Lecture Ten
Weber's Historical Sociology

Darren Staloff, Ph.D.

Scope: Max Weber is regarded by many as the founder of modern sociology. He studied power relations in societies as part of his effort to "demystify the world." His writings examined the structure and development of capitalism, world religions, and bureaucracies. His greatest insights were into the varieties of authority (he distinguishes among charismatic, traditional, and formal-legal authority), and he offered a profound diagnosis of the ways in which power is legitimated and administered in modern bureaucratic societieis. Weber's greatest works included *The Protestant Ethic and the Theory of Capitalism* (1920), *General Economic History* (1924), and *Economy and Society* (4th ed. 1956).

Outline

I. Max Weber is the principal architect of modern sociology. In *Economy and Society*, he formulates three pure types of legitimate domination or authority.

A. Weber differs in important ways from the sociologists who preceded him.

1. His historical materialism is broader than that of Marx and Engels. Weber viewed power rather than economic relations specifically as the basic medium of human interaction and exchange.
2. The form of Weber's theory was shaped more by the Darwinian than by the Newtonian revolution. Weber's sociological taxonomies resemble those of biology and other natural sciences. They allowed him to perform cross-historical analysis.
3. He advocated value-neutral, politically unbiased, and passionless sociology.

B. Weber defined domination as "the probability that certain specific commands will be obeyed by given group of persons."

1. Domination is just one species of power. It can be supported by custom, by personal material interest, or by an ideal goal of solidarity. *Legitimate* domination, however, also requires that those subject to it believe in its legitimacy.
2. Because domination over many people requires the ruler to possess a "staff," such domination involves a three-way relationship among ruler, staff, and subjects. Different sorts of domination will involve different types of staff, obedience, and modes of exercising authority.

C. Weber identifies three distinct grounds for claims to legitimacy.
   1. Rational grounds rest on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those in authority to issue commands. This form of legitimate domination is called *legal authority*.
   2. Traditional grounds rest on a belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority (*traditional authority*).
   3. Charismatic grounds rest on a devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, and exemplary character of an individual and the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (*charismatic authority*).

D. These three archetypes are not mutually exclusive. They range over all imaginable institutions—private and public—in any given society.

III. Legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff (as opposed to a "collegial staff") is the archetype of legal domination.

A. This pure type of authority rests upon five beliefs.
   1. The staff must internalize the norm of obedience.
   2. The law must be seen as a consistent system of abstract rules that have been intentionally created.
   3. The staff officials and the ruler himself are subject to the universal legal norms.
   4. Those who obey do so as "members" of the organization. They obey not the ruler but the law.
   5. Superiors command obedience by virtue of their office, not ties of personal loyalty with the "members."

B. The pure form of legal authority has seven features.
   1. There is continuous rule-bound conduct.
   2. Legal authority has a specified sphere of jurisdiction.
   3. It is characterized by hierarchical officialdom with no overlapping jurisdictions.
   4. Officials have specialized training,a nd office is not inheritable.
   5. Staff members and owners are clearly distinguished.
   6. Staff receives a fixed salary, which promotes career orientation.
   7. The ruler issues written orders.

C. This pure form of bureaucratic administration is "monocratic." It is technically the most efficient and formally the most rational means of exercising authority over people.

D. This pure type is found in a wide variety of institutions: corporations, hospitals, schools, priests in churches, political parties, and modern armies.

E. Bureaucratic domination has three social consequences.
   1. There is a social "leveling" in favor of technical competence.

   2. It produces "plutocracy" as bureaucratic officials prolong their training.
   3. Bureaucracies are characterized by cold, formalistic impersonality.

IV. The archetypal traditional ruler is not a "superior" but a personal master. The staff consists of personal retainers rather than officials, and the ruled are either "comrades" or "subjects," but not "members."

A. Personal loyalty binds the staff to the master, and one obeys not a set of rules but a person who holds a position of authority by tradition.

B. Some of the master's actions are bound by tradition, and his power is exercised with an awareness of such constrictions. If the master exceeds his customary authority, he might provoke a "traditionalist revoution."

C. New law requires not adoption by a legislature but an antique precedent that can endow the new law with customary legitimacy.

D. The traditional ruler's staff can be recruited either patrimonially or extrapatrimonially.
   1. The former sort of staff members are recruited from those who owe personal loyalty to the ruler: kinsmen, slaves, household officials, physicaians, eunuchs, clients, freedmen.
   2. The latter includes personal favorites, vassals, freemen who voluntarily become officials.

E. Jurisdictions overlap under traditional rule, and the master or lord personally adjudicates conflicts. Officials do not receive rational or technical training.

F. Another form of traditional authority is "estate domination."
   1. This is a form of patrimonial domination in which the staff appropriates particular powers and assets of administration and governance, which limits the lord's discretion in choosing his staff.
   2. Patrimonial retainers receive support from any of five sources: the lord's table; allowances from the lord's magazine; service land; appropriation of taxes, fees, or property income; or fiefs—a form of service land in which one owns his lands and can deed them to his heirs.

G. Traditional authority encourages traditional attitudes toward the economy—e.g., just price, just wage, natural income. Attitudes of *noblesse oblige* undermine the formal rationality of economic decisions and inhibit capitalism.

V. Pure charismatic authorities are accorded superhuman, supernatural, or at least exceptional powers and qualities.

A. Charismatic authorities include prophets, shamans, berserkers or warrior "heroes," and certain political "demagogues."

B. An organized group subject to charismatic authority is called a "charismatic community" rather than a staff. Community members are not promoted and have no real "career"; they respond to the leader's call.

C. New judgments are made on a case-by-case basis and are considered divine judgments or revelations. One can retain charismatic authority only by continually demonstrating his efficacy.

D. Because charismatic authority is "other-worldly," it opposes traditional or rational economizing and regular income or employment. Members of a charismatic community gain their means of sustenance through voluntary gifts, begging, or booty.

E. Charismatic authority is inherently unstable and tends to turn into either legal or traditional authority.

F. Charismatic leaders are identified in any of six ways: special indications of status (e.g., the Dalai Lama); designation by the previous leader; designation by a charismatically qualified staff with recognition by the community; hereditary charisma; or office charisma.

Essential Reading:

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*, Vol. I. University of California Press, 1978 (pp. 212-306).

Supplementary Reading:

Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Sayer, Derek. *Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber.* Routledge, 1990.

Questions to Consider:

1. What effect does charismatic authority have on economic norms?
2. Why is charismatic authority inherently unstable?

Lecture Eleven
Freud and Philosophy

Michael Sugrue, Ph.D.

Scope: Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is best known as the founder of psychoanalysis. This lecture will examine Freud's theory of the unconscious and his efforts to discern the purported meaning in apparently meaningless activity; his pessimistic view of human nature; his tripartite theory of the human psyche; his social theory and its relationship to the individual human psyche; and the unresolved tension between Freud's pretensions to scientific status and the inability of psychoanalysis to satisfy the criteria of scientific certainty.

Outline

I. The Freudian project marked a departure both from Cartesian epistemology and from Rousseauistic optimism in the benignity of human nature.

A. The work of Sigmund Freud fused the positivistic tendencies of late nineteenth-century German science with the introspective tendencies of nineteenth-century German speculation.

1. Freud was neither a pure idealist nor a pure materialist.
2. He rejected Descartes's belief that one can have certain knowledge of his own mind. For Freud, self-knowledge is ambiguous and problematic. He treated the manifest data of consciousness as systematically unreliable, partial, and distorted.
3. Freud's investigation of the self entailed splitting the subject (the monadic Cartesian *cogito*), which is analogous to splitting the atom in the sense that it generated unexpected epistemological problems.

B. Freud naturalized and problematized the Cartesian *cogito*.

1. He tried to discern the deep structure of the soul, especially the part that is unknown even to the individual.
2. Freud thought that he could solve the problem that perplexed Descartes (i.e., how one can know other minds besides his own) by solving the problem of understanding one's own mind.
3. We unconsciously keep our true desires a secret from ourselves as well as others, but we disclose our true motives in an encoded form in systematically distorted communicative behavior. This includes speech, but also dreams and parapraxes.
4. Freud attempted to construct a translation scheme which allows the reading of the manifest accounts of intention (conscious desires) as latent accounts (unconscious desires).
   a. He "read" what his patients said and failed to say. He also "read" the symbolism in behavior that had previously been considered meaningless, like repeated hand washing.

b. Freud thought that the translation scheme he devised solved the problem of knowing the self and others because he had cracked the code of the unconscious.

C. Freud's thought entails a rather pessimistic, anti-Rousseauistic view of human nature. Humans are originally not benign and innocent but tyrannical and pleasure-seeking.

II. Freud never resolved the tension between his desire for scientific certainty and the fact that biochemical science cannot explain all human emotions and behavior.

A. Freud and other psychologists sought to explain the origins of hysteria, a material condition with apparently psychological origins.
1. In 1895 Freud published his *Studies in Hysteria*, which discussed the case of Anna O.
2. In 1896 he developed a seduction theory of hysteria, which attributed this condition to repressed sexual trauma.
3. Freud abandoned the seduction theory in 1897 after concluding that his patients had fabricated their stories of seduction. He came to view hysteria as a symbolic representation of women's unconscious sexual fantasies.
4. Freud developed a "talking cure" for hysteria.

B. In 1896 Freud undertook self-analysis and began his research on dreams.
1. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), Freud held that dreams are the royal road to the unconscious. They are the means by which we project our otherwise censored feelings.
2. Freud argues that the real meaning of dreams is rooted in the dreamer's unconscious sexual desires, which are censored by the superego during waking hours.
3. Dreams are "condensed," i.e., various psychic states or longings can be condensed into one symbolic structure. Dreams are also "over-determined," i.e., they have a plurality of causes.
4. The unconscious reformulates the content of suppressed desires symbolically and thus gratifies those desires. This gratification maintains the economy of the psyche by releasing pressure on the psyche's repressive mechanisms.

C. Freud's theory of parapraxes held that one's mistakes are meaningful symbolic representations of one's unconscious desires. He set forth this theory in *Jokes and Relation to the Unconscious* (1901) and *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1904).

D. In *Three Essays on Sexuality* (1905), Freud developed his theory of infantile sexuality (undertood broadly as pleasure). Driven by an instinctual demand for pleasure, the infant passes through oral and anal phases, then latency, puberty, and resolution of oedipal feelings. This progression culminates in the genital phase.

E. Freud's theory of the unconscious was the heart of his system. He did not originate the concept of the unconscious, which he borrowed from Schopenhauer, but he did originate the idea that the unconscious follows predictable law-like patterns.

F. In the *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1923), Freud developed a tripartite model of the psyche.
1. The id is the repository of psychic energy.
2. The ego is the conscious self, the cogito, which mediates between id and superego.
3. The superego is the internalization of socially prescribed norms.

G. Late in his career, Freud extrapolated his pessimistic social theory from his ideas about the individual psyche.
1. In *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), Freud explained monotheistic religion as a collective anxiety neurosis. We project onto a God our unconscious longings for love, security, and moral order.
2. In *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), Freud elaborated his pessimistic social theory.
a. The pleasure principle is the sole determinant of human behavior until it conflicts with the reality principle. Because the frustration of our desires is intrinsic to civilization, we develop "defense mechanisms" to mediate the inevitable conflict.
b. We cannot find happiness either within civilization or outside it. At best, we can sublimate our unconscious sexual and violent desires into beautiful and socially desirable things such as art, philosophy, and religion.

III. Freudian psychiatry cannot attain scientific certitude.

A. It does not offer a set of falsifiable hypotheses, as is required of science. At best, it offers various possible interpretations rather than a single, certain interpretation.

B. Psychoanalysis requires judgment or *phronesis*, which is a subjective element

C. The German word for science—*Wissenschaft*—denotes a concept much broader than "science" as understood in English. *Wissenschaft* refers to any organized body of knowledge. Freud offers a Wissenschaft of the mind: an organized body of knowledge that interprets phenomena that had not previously been seen as meaningful and that connects various meaningful phenomena with one general idea.

D. Freud does not adequately explain the origins of the psyche and of such things as incest taboos. To explain the latter, he posits in *Totem and Taboo* (1914) the existence of the Primal Horde, who the killed the Primal Dad and raped the Primal Mom, creating the Primal incest taboo. This explanation has as much empirical reality as Santa Claus.

Essential Reading:

Freud, Sigmund. *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.* New York: Norton, 1977.

Freud, Sigmund. *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud.* New York: Random House, 1977.

Supplementary Reading:

Abramson, Jeffery. *Liberation and Its Limits: The Moral and Political Thought of Freud.* New York: Free Press, 1984.

Freeman, Lucy, and Herbert S. Strean. *Freud and Women.* New York: Continuum, 1987.

Marcus, Steven. *Freud and the Culture of Psychoanalysis: Studies in the Transition from Victorian Humanism to Modernity.* New York: Norton, 1987.

Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff. *The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory.* New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giraud, 1984.

Sulloway, Frank J. *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend.* New York: Basic Books, 1979.

Questions to Consider:

1. How does Freud's tripartite theory of mind compare with Plato's theory of soul?
2. Compare Rousseaus' and Freud's views of life in civil society.

Glossary

bourgeoisie: the class of owners in industrial capitalism.

consequentialism: the position that an act is to be assessed morally by its consequences. Hume, Bentham, and Mill advanced consequentialist ethical systems.

dialectic: In the writings of Hegel and Marx, this term refers to the progress from thesis through antithesis to synthesis.

ego: according to Freud, that part of the psyche which experiences the external world, or reality, through the senses, organizes the thought processes rationally, and governs action. It mediates between the id and superego.

entelechy: natural purpose. The notion is central to Aristotelian scholasticism, where it refers to the final cause of some object.

forces of production: For Marx, the forces of production are the means of production (tools and so forth) and labor power (both muscle power and skill).

Geist (German): Essentially untranslatable, it has been rendered as "mind" or "spirit" or "essence." For Hegel, it encompasses all of reality and most particularly collective human consciousness. English derivatives include "ghost," "gist," and "geyser."

historicism: a theory of history that holds that the course of events is determined by unchangeable laws or cyclic patterns.

id: according to psychoanalysis, the desiring and instinctive aspect of the human psyche, necessarily repressed in civilization.

mode of production: For Marx, the mode of production is the economic structure of a society in relation to the forces of production. He identifies three modes: slavery, feudalism, and capitalism.

***noumena*:** things in themselves apart from any possible experience. According to Kant, such things are unknowable. According to Schopenhauer, one can know directly as *noumen* his own will or self-consciousness.

overdetermination: the condition of having more than one cause, each of which might be sufficient for explanation of the event or entity in quesiton.

parapraxis: an action in which one's conscious intention is not fully carried out, as in the mislaying of objects, slips of the tongue and pen, etc. Freud thought that these mistakes were generally due to a conflicting unconscious intention.

phenomena: In the philosophy of Kant, phenomena are the contents of sense experience, arranged by rational subjects through the a priori conditions of possible experience, including space, time, and causation.

phronesis (Greek): practical judgment.

positivism: the philosophy of Comte, which holds that the highest or only form of knowledge is the description of sensory phenomena.

proletariat: the working class in industrial capitalism.

relations of production: for Marx, the relations of production are the relations of persons to the means of production. The latter include ownership of factories, slavery, leases, and wage contracts.

solipsism: the position that the only thing that exists is oneself, or that the only thing that can be shown to exist is oneself.

sublimation: In Freudian psychology, sublimation is taking repressed unconscious drives and channeling them into creative activity.

superego: according to psychoanalysis, the internalized parent or perhaps cultural "conscience" that restrains one from unbridled pursuit of pleasure.

surplus value: according to Marx, surplus value is the difference between the product of labor and the compensation of the worker. This surplus is siphoned off as profit by the capitalist.

Wissenschaft (German): science. However, in German, the notion encompasses any systematized body of knowledge.

Biographical Notes

Comte, Isidore Auguste Marie Francois (1798-1857). Comte, the founder of "positivism," was born at Montpellier, France, into a devoutly Catholic family. He strained relations with his family by declaring his atheism at a young age. After two years at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris, Comte became secretary to the reformer and social theorist Saint-Simon, but the mentorship ended in a bitter dispute. In 1844 Comte fell madly in love with Madame Clothilde de Vaux; their romance lasted until her death in 1846. Comte never found a position teaching the history of science at a university. He spent the last years of his life in relative obscurity, relying on the goodwill of friends. In his later years, Comte sought to organize his secular "Religion of Humanity" and declared himself High Priest of Humanity.

Freud, Sigmund (1856-1939). Freud was born into a middle class family in Frieberg, Moravia. When Freud was five, his family moved to Vienna—the city in which Freud was to live, with some exceptions, for the next seventy-eight years. In 1885, Freud graduated from medical school and became a lecturer in neuropathology. After briefly studying hypnosis in Paris under Jean-Martin Charcot, Freud abandoned his earlier biological research and turned toward clinical practice. In 1893 Freud and the physician Josef Breuer published what is often considered the first paper on psychoanalysis: "On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena." Freud later incorporated their "cathartic method" into his own theory. Freud published *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1900, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* in 1904, and *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* in 1905. Although Freud's work was at first poorly received, he collected he collected a small group of devoted followers by 1906—among them Carl Jung and Alfred Adler. During the 1920s Freud increasingly wrote about culture and religion. When the Nazis occupied Austria in 1938, Freud fled to London, where he died the following year.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831). Hegel was born at Stuttgart, the son of a civil servant. In 1788 he enrolled at the University of Tubingen, where he studied philosophy and theology. For six years after college, Hegel served as a private tutor. In 1801 he accepted an appointment teaching philosophy at the University of Jena, where in 1805 he attained the rank of professor. At Jena, he and Friedrich Schelling edited the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. While at Jena, Hegel finished his *Phenomenology of Mind*. Hegel edited a newspaper during the Napoleonic occupation of Prussia, and from 1808 to 1816 he served as headmaster of an academy in Nuremburg. In 1818 he became a professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, where he completed his architectonic philosophical system and published his *Philosophy of Right* (1821). Hegel died of cholera in 1831 at age 61.

Kierkegaard, Soren (1813-1855). Considered by many to be the founder of existentialism, Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen, Denmark into an austere Lutheran family. He earned a master's degree in 1841 from the University of Copenhagen; his thesis was entitled "On the Concept of Irony." Although he gave sermons for a time in the Lutheran pulpit, he appears to have been unwilling to enter the pastorate full-time. Instead, he led an heremitic and melancholy life. Among his most influential works are *Fear and Trembling* (1843) and *Either/Or* (1843). In 1844 he published his *Philosophical Fragments*, and, in 1846, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Kierkegaard signed many of his books with pseudonyms, in part because he wished to attack his own work.

Marx, Karl (1818-1883). Marx was born in Trier. When he was six years old, his father converted from Judaism to Lutheranism. After studying law for one year at the University of Bonn, Marx transferred to the University of Berlin, where he studied philosophy. He received a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Jena in 1841, having written his dissertation on the ancient Greek thinkers Democritus and Epicurus. He then became editor of the newspaper *Rheinishe Zeitung*, but the German authorities closed down the newspaper in 1843 because of the radical views expressed in it. Marx and his wife then moved to Paris. In 1844 Marx began a life-long friendship with Friedrich Engels, author of *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844* (1845). Marx was expelled from France in 1845 because of his radicalism. He settled in Brussels, from which he was expelled following publication of *The Communist Manifesto* (1848). He and his family finally settled in London, where they depended on Engels for money while Marx conducted his research. During the 1850s Marx wrote for *The New York Daily Tribune*. In 1864 he helped found the International Working Men's Association (subsequently known as the "First International"). Marx became a leading authority among European radicals following the publication of the first volume of *Das Capital* in 1867.

Mill, John Stuart (1806-1873). Mill's father , the historian and philosopher James Mill, was a disciple of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham. John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* (published posthumously in 1873) recounts his extraordinary education, which took place entirely at home. At fourteen he spent a year in France at the home of the brother of Jeremy Bentham. Back in England, Mill established the Utilitarian Society in 1822. The following year he assumed a position in the East India Company, which he held for 35 years. He wrote often during the 1820s for the Benthamite *Westminster Review*, joined discussion clubs, and was active in the London Debating Society. In 1843 he published his *System of Logic,* and in 1844 his *Principles of Political Economy*. In 1831 Mill met and became an intimate friend of Harriet Taylor, the wife of a prosperous merchant. He married Mrs. Taylor in 1851 after her husband's death. Their years of marriage (she died in 1858) was a joyous and inspirational time for Mill. She may have collaborated with him in writing *On Liberty*. She also influenced Mill's *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), *Utilitarianism* (1863), and

The Subjection of Women (1869). Mill served in parliament during the mid-1860s and then retired to France, where he continued his writing and study.

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860). Schopenhauer was born in Danzig, the only child of a talented novelist and wealthy merchant. Schopenhauer was educated in Hamburg, Austria, England, France, and Switzerland. After his father's suicide, the teenage Schopenhauer and his mother moved to Weimar, where relations between them were strained and bitter. Having gaining his inheritance and independence at age 21, Schopenhauer studied medicine at the University of Gottingen. He later abandoned medicine for philosophy, moving in 1811 to Berlin, the center of philosophical inquiry on the Continent. *The World as Will and Representation* (1818) established Schopenhauer's reputation as a distinguished philosopher and helped to gain him a lectureship at the University of Berlin. Schopenhauer's difficult personality expressed itself at Berlin—he never married and appears to have had no friends. Vexed by Hegel's superior popularity, he left the university after a year. Living comfortably off his inheritance, Schopenhauer dedicated himself to his writing. He published *On the Will in Nature* in 1836, *The Basis of Morality* in 1841, and *Essays from the Parerga and Paralipomena* in 1851. He died at age 72, having achieved the recognition he believed he deserved.

Sumner, William Graham (1840-1910). The leading proponent of "Social Darwinism," Sumner was was born in Paterson, New Jersey. After graduating from Yale University, he continued his studies at Oxford University and in Switzerland and Germany. An Episcopal minister, Sumner took an interest in theology and political science. In 1872 he was appointed professor of political and social science at Yale, where he promoted his Spencerian interpretation of Darwinism in political science and economics. He developed the notion of "ethnocentrism" and outlined the development of human customs in *Folkways* (1907). His *What Social Classes Owe Each Other* (1883) was a provocative assertion of his ultra-*laissez faire* approach to political economy. His other works included *Science of Society* (with Albert G. Keller, 1927), *Protectionism: the -ism which Teaches that Waste Makes Wealth* (1888), *Problems in Political Economy* (1888), and *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man* (10th ed., 1887).

Weber, Max (1864-1920). Weber grew up in Berlin. His father was a lawyer active in the liberal politics of the day. His mother was a woman of humanitarian religious commitments. Weber received an excellent education in languages, the classics, and history. During his college years he studied law, philosophy, economics, and history, at universities in Heidelberg, Berlin, and Gottingen, as well as undergoing a year's military training. He passed the bar examination in 1886. He received his Ph.D. in 1889 and was married four years later. During these years he served as a government consultant, lectured in law at the University of Berlin, and continued a grueling schedule of research. In 1894 he was appointed to a professorship at the University of Freiburg and in 1896 to a similar position at the University of Heidelberg. He suffered, however, from a debilitating nervous illness, culminating in a nervous breakdown in 1898. Completely debilitated for

more than three years, he was never able to resume teaching. Instead, in 1903 he became the editor of a social science journal. During World War I he directed army hospitals at Heidelberg, and after the war he helped draft the memorandum on German war guilt and advised the commission that prepared the first draft of the Weimar constitution. He served briefly as a professor at the University of Vienna. At his death he had recently been appointed professor of economics at the University of Munich.