R. H. Ayers

Language,

Logic, and

Reason in the

Church Fathers

This study investigates the writings of these three Church Fathers from the perspective of contemporary semiotics. Such a perspective involves the principles and practices of linguistic and logical analyses. When applied to the works of the Fathers it yields results which are somewhat surprising. It becomes obvious, for example, that Tertullian far from being an irrationalist was one who very skillfully used the semiotic 'tools' of reason. It is seen also that in spite of their differences in metaphysical perspective, the three are very similar with respect to a rather sophisticated semiotics.

In this study the author demonstrates that the similarity between the three is due, at least partially, to their common knowledge of rhetoric. The rhetoricians taught not only semantics but also logic and this logic was not only an Aristotelian syllogistic logic but also a Stoic propositional logic. Examples of the Fathers' use of semantical and logical analyses are given in support of the claim that the considerable clarity in their theologies is due to such analyses. It is also claimed that such analyses are a necessary condition for the intelligible elucidation of any theology.

Robert H. Ayers
Language, Logic, and Reason in the Church Fathers

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Robert H. Ayers

Language, Logic, and Reason
in the Church Fathers

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Language, Logic, and Reason in the Church Fathers:

A Study of
Tertullian, Augustine, and Aquinas

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Preface

It is surely undeniable that there has been a tendency in much con-
temporary theology to disdain human reason, logic and semantics and to
glory in paradox. The zenith of this tendency was reached perhaps in the
popular but short lived American "God is dead" theology with its vicious
paradox that the infinite God literally died either in our times or earlier
in the death of Jesus Christ. There have been and are theologians who have
not followed this tendency. Some have been influenced by movements in con-
temporary philosophy such as "process philosophy" and "logical positivism",
and thus have given attention to semiotic issues in the development of a
theological method. Among them there is the conviction that a method
which includes both linguistic and logical analyses, while not a sufficient
condition, is definitely a necessary condition for the doing of sound
theology.

Having done some very modest work on the thought of some contemporary
theologians and philosophers of religion from this perspective, it occurred
to me that it might be both interesting and informative to investigate some
of the Church Fathers from this same perspective. The demands of time and
space required selectivity but did not dictate the particular selections.
I was motivated to begin my study with Tertullian primarily because I
suspected that the 'popular' view which presents him as one who gloried in
absurdity and paradox is incorrect and indeed my suspicion was verified.
Instead I found that Tertullian had a rather sophisticated view of language,
logic and reason. Being aware that he was as thoroughly trained in rhetoric
as Tertullian, I turned next to Augustine and discovered his views of lan-
guage, logic and reason to be in many respects similar to those of Tertullian.

Finally, I found the same to hold true with respect to Aquinas' views. If nothing else, it is surely the case that the discipline of rhetoric provided a basis for the considerable similarity in the semiotics of these three Fathers. Among other things this study seeks to provide evidence for the truth of this claim and by means of describing and analyzing their semiotics to show that they remain useful for theological construction today.

I cannot conclude this preface without making a few acknowledgements. First, my initial study of Augustine's language theory and logic resulted in a brief article, "Language Theory and Analysis in Augustine," published in the Scottish Journal of Theology, Volume 29, Part 1, 1976. Chapter III of this work, "Language Theory, Analysis of Logic in Augustine" contains some of the same emphases as the previous article but also has been considerably expanded and revised. Secondly, I must acknowledge my special indebtedness to two of my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at the University of Georgia. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor George E. Howard for his providing of encouragement during the time I was researching and writing, for his reading of the entire manuscript and for his making valuable suggestions. I am indebted also to Professor Anthony Nemetz for his generosity in sharing with me out of the wealth of his knowledge of the medievals in general and of Augustine and Aquinas in particular several very important perspectives and insights having to do primarily with epistemology and metaphysics. Finally, I wish to thank Mrs. Lucile A. Epperson, Departmental Secretary, for the efficient way in which she handled the typing of the manuscript.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction: The Importance of Linguistic and Logical
Analyses in Theology

One of the ironies of human existence is that the means by which human

beings bring some degree of order into the world and existence--namely,

language, is the very thing which in itself is a mystery and which may

be used to perpetrate great disorders. It is by his use of language that

man exercises power in the world for good or evil. Time and again thinkers

of the past, including religious thinkers, give testimony to their sense

of wonder that mere puffs of wind or marks by hand should allow men to

discover what they think and feel, to share their attitudes and plans, to

anticipate the future and learn from the past, and to create works that

last through the ages.

In recent years, consideration of the problems of language and logic

has become intensified in theological circles due in large part to the

confrontation between theology and linguistic analysis in philosophy. In

this confrontation some theologians following the lead of certain

philosophers[1] admit that God-talk is cognitively meaningless, and engage

in what William T. Blackstone has called "A shifting ground technique in

order to save religion."[2] That is, they claim that God-talk either

functions in ways other than cognitive or that it has no other cognitive

meaning than talk about man in his existential situation.[3] On the other

hand, a few theologians have attempted to demonstrate that there is at

least a base of cognitivity in God-talk and that such is a necessary con-

dition for the meaningfulness of revealed theology even though the language

of the latter may function in ways that transcend the cognitive.

Surely the contemporary theologian cannot afford to ignore the question concerning the cognitivity of his discourse. At each major point in the theological enterprise he needs to raise this 'first-order' issue, for the language of revelation, the language of God's evaluations of the world, cannot function appropriately unless it can be shown that such language has a base in, or at least implies, sentences expressing cognitive meaning. Just as it is unintelligible to say, "My child is more valuable than my cat", unless there are some assertive sentences that can be made about child and cat, so it is unintelligible to say, "God loves us," unless there are some assertive sentences that can be made about God. Thus, in a consideration of each of the major theological issues such as God's revelation and his relation with the world, the problem of evil, the problem of human destiny, and the problem of the kingdom of God and the Church, there needs to be a section in each of these areas concerned with what might still be called 'natural theology.' While the content of such a 'natural theology' may be rather different from traditional natural theology, it will have a relationship with the concerns of classical natural theology in its conviction that an intelligible faith sustains the human spirit more adequately than one which is incapable of rational explication.

It is rather strange that in their response to the challenge of contemporary philosophers, theologians have given so little attention to the religious thinkers of the past who were concerned either directly or indirectly with the problems of language and logic.[4] Some of these thinkers sound rather contemporary in their understanding of and proposed solutions to the problem, and both their understanding of the problem and their solutions may provide some helpful suggestions to the contemporary theologian.

Several founders of great world religions were often concerned with language, both in terms of clarity of usage and of ontological status. Confucius, for example, is said to have claimed that the first task in the administration of a state is the rectification of names for if words are mis-used, then propriety will not flourish and laws and punishments will not be just. Indeed, there will be chaos in the state instead of order and justice. If the prince does not know the meaning of 'prince', then how can he act as a prince? As Hu Shih put it, "the ideal social order. . .(is). . .a social order, where just as a circle is a circle and a square is a square, so every prince is princely, every official is faithful, every father is fatherly, and every child is filially pious."[5] So it seems that Confucius taught that the exercise of care with respect to the meaning and use of language is a necessary condition for morality.

Apparently there was a similar emphasis in the teaching of the Buddha. Either the Buddha himself or the Buddhist tradition made right speech the first of the three ethical disciplines contained in the middle eightfold path which leads to enlightenment. In this discipline language was regarded not only as an indicator of character but also as a lever by means of which character might be changed for the better. Correct usage and truth-telling have not only a moral but also an ontological value, for deceit reduces one's very being. Thus, in the right speech discipline the Buddha prescribes a stringent meditation in which the disciple becomes aware of his speech patterns, of what such tells him about himself, and of the need for change in his speech, thought, and action.

Jesus also seems to have thought that language was an indicator of character. Indeed, throughout the Bible language is taken with extreme seriousness. In the Old Testament, the Prophets' words were not regarded simply as

the vehicles for the expression of thought and character, but also in some
sense objective entities charged with the power of performance, especially
if one were speaking under the inspiration of Yahweh. Thus, one should not
speak thoughtlessly but with great care. To be sure in the Wisdom literature
the careful use of language is seen as a practical moral discipline but there
is not for that reason any lessening of the sense of language's importance.
Thus, in view of his historical environment, it is not surprising that Jesus,
too, was concerned with the importance of language.

While it is often difficult to unravel Jesus' discourse from the modifi-
cations made by the early church and/or the Gospel writers, it would appear
that his concern with language is reflected at a number of points in the
Gospels. For example, there is the parable of the good and bad trees bearing
good and bad fruit, the statement that "out of the abundance of the heart the
mouth speaks," and the statement that "on the day of judgment men will render
account for every careless (useless, barren) word they utter; for by your
words you will be justified and by your words you will be condemned."[6]
Whether or not Jesus uttered these precise words their presence in the Gospel
record may reflect a recollection of his concern with language as having
ontological significance and as an indicator of character.

When Christianity moved out of its original Palestinian setting into
the Greco-Roman world the problem of language and communication became a
crucial problem. The Church was confronted with the necessity of communicat-
ing the Kerygma (Gospel) in the terms and concepts that would be understand-
able to those of an environment different from that of the original faith
witnesses. Could this be done without corrupting the essential core of the
received tradition? This question began to plague the church as early as
the New Testament period, was a kerygmatically life or death issue during

the period of the heresies and creedal controversies, and has been and will be a continuing problem for the Church. This is not only a question of what concepts and terms to use in the exposition and defense of the faith but also one involving a variety of semantical and logical issues. That is, it is a question of what is today called semiotics, of linguistic and logical theories and practices. As suggested earlier, this type of consideration has received a considerable amount of emphasis in contemporary theology. However, this emphasis is by no means simply a modern and contemporary phenomenon. While the semiotics of the contemporary period may display more refined techniques, it now appears that the semiotics of some of the ancients and the scholastics was relatively sophisticated anticipating much which is fundamental in semiotics today and thus still useful. One of the basic themes of what follows in this study is that this semiotics was known and used by Tertullian (155-222 A.D.), Augustine (354-439 A.D.) and Aquinas (1225-1274).

There is, of course, an attempt to make a case also for certain other important claims. Some of these are as follows: (1) There is a healthy respect for reason and the semiotic 'tools' of reason in the thought of each of these Fathers, including Tertullian. (2) All of them make use of philosophy as a servant of faith even though they may differ as to their metaphysical preferences. (3) There is considerable similarity between the semiotics of the three. Examples of this similarity include the following: (a) An emphasis on distinguishing between the "outer" word or sign, the inner word of the mind or the meaning, and the object of the sign or word; (b) the recommendation to exercise care with respect to definitions and to follow common usage; (c) warnings against ambiguity and

equivocation, and (d) the insistence that figurative expressions or
metaphors function appropriately only when they have a final basis in
literal signification. Further examples of similarity include a unanimity
of emphasis on the modalities of necessary and contingent, possible and
impossible; the distinction between sentences and propositions with only
the latter having truth value, and the use not only of an Aristotelian
categorical logic but also of a propositional logic of inference schemas
having its origin probably in the thought of some of the Stoics.

CHAPTER II

Language, Logic and Reason in Tertullian

A. Tertullian's Semantics and Logic

   Tertullian (155-222 A.D.) was chosen for this study for two reasons.

First, it has been claimed by some that Tertullian's thought is anti-

philosophical and anti-rational. This claim should not go unchallenged.

Secondly, instead of being irrational, Tertullian in fact demonstrates a

rather amazing capacity for semantical and logical analyses in his defense

of the Christian faith against heretics and persecutors. This is not sur-

prising since the educational system in the Carthage of his day made

available relatively sophisticated analytical and rhetorical tools of

discourse. And it is obvious from his writings that Tertullian was highly

educated in the several disciplines of the schools including those of

rhetoric, logic, and philosophy.[7] Indeed, his views of language and his

brilliant linguistic and logical analyses present in many respects inter-

esting similarities with certain modern semantical and logical theories and

analyses, and thus may prove instructive in the contemporary theological

enterprise.

   It appears that the reason why Tertullian often is misrepresented as

anti-philosophical and anti-rational finds its base in the two famous state-

ments which are generally mentioned whenever there is a reference to

Tertullian. Both of them often are treated in isolation from the context in

which they appear and one of them is often misquoted as "I believe it be-

cause it is absurd." These two statements as traditionally translated from

the Latin are: (1) "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem" and

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(2) "And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. And He was buried and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible."[8]

It is a widespread practice to call the second quotation Tertullian's paradox. In some cases it is labelled an "outrageous" or "grinding" paradox. For example, Henry Chadwick claims that Tertullian insisted on "an absolute and radical discontinuity between Christianity and philosophy", that Christianity's supernatural character would be destroyed if it were reduced to "sweet reasonable-ness", and that the "ultimate Christian confession is the grinding paradox 'I believe it because it is absurd'." Then in a parenthetical statement Chadwick says, "We must not, of course, take too literally Tertullian's shrill rhetoric, but it is clear that his notorious utterance is a milestone along a path in Christian thought which leads through Sir Thomas Browne to Kierkegaard and his modern disciples".[9] Another striking example is to be found in the claims made about Tertullian's thought by the philosopher Bernard Williams. Williams views the second quotation above as Tertullian's acceptance of an instransigent and outrageous paradoxical conclusion and says of it, "I think...that we should take Tertullian's paradox seriously; not as just a rhetorical expression of his objections to a particular doctrine, but as a striking formulation of something which I shall suggest is essential to Christian belief".[10]

Admittedly the two examples presented here are somewhat extreme. Yet even those who because they are impressed with Tertullian's brilliant use of rhetorical forms and with the rational force of most of his arguments view the statement as one which is not to be taken literally but as a striking way of making a point or as having a structural function as an exclamatory stop to an argument consciously developed along the lines of traditional rhetorical topics,[11] nevertheless generally regard the statement as a paradox. Certainly,

prima facie it appears to be a paradox. Is it possible, however, that it only

seems so because all along it has been subjected to eisegesis rather than

exegesis, and that Tertullian never intended and in fact did not here produce

a paradox? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, could it not

be the case also, in light of this and other considerations, that Tertullian

viewed reason and certain types and/or aspects of philosophy as the servants

of faith rather than its antagonists, and that there is not, as is sometimes

claimed,[12] a basic inconsistency in his theological thought?

An attempt will be made here to answer these questions in the affirmative.

First, Tertullian's rhetoric, semantics, and logic will be considered briefly

to see if there is evidence which would make it unlikely for Tertullian to be

inclined to the use of paradox. Also in this first section the supposed

paradoxical statement itself will be analyzed to determine whether or not it

could be a rather truncated way of stating a certain type of argument form.

Secondly, Tertullian's attitude toward reason and philosophy will be examined

to see if indeed he thought there could be a fruitful use of such in the

defense of the faith. Thirdly, his Trinitarian and Christological views will

be examined to see if indeed there is or is not a basic inconsistency in his

theological thought. In the very nature of the case there will be consider-

able overlapping among these three sections.

Recent studies[13] have demonstrated convincingly that Tertullian structured

his treatises in terms of the conventional patterns which constituted the

basic rhetorical forms of oratory, and that he used these forms in a creative

way through skillfully adapting form to content. On this basis it is con-

cluded that his knowledge of rhetoric was so deeply ingrained that the

rhetorical forms furnished not merely a matter of stylistic adornment but

rather "provided categories and distinctions which affected the structure of

his thought".[14]

It is well known that rhetoric received much attention by many ancient writers, not least of whom was Aristotle. Its patterns and structure were fully described by Cicero in a number of works and most especially in On Invention which served as a basic rhetoric textbook in the schools of Tertullian's day. These patterns recommended as constitutive of an ideal oration were as follows: (1) There was the exordium which included an appeal to ethical and emotional considerations and was intended to put the audience in a receptive mood. (2) There was a narratio which could contain a description of the events out of which a situation had arisen, a propositio or statement of the question at issue, a partitio or an indication of agreements and disagreements with opponents, a description of the method of treatment, and the main divisions of the speech. (3) The main body of the speech dealt with proof and contained a confirmatio or confirmation of one's own case and a reprehensio or refutation of the opponent's case. (4) Finally, there was the conclusio which contained the "summing-up, the indignatio or exciting of indignation or ill-will against the opponent, and the conquestio or the arousing of pity or sympathy".[15]

R. D. Sider has carefully demonstrated Tertullian's free and creative use of these rhetorical patterns in many of his treatises and especially in On the Flesh of Christ where his supposed famous paradox appears.[16] While this valuable analysis of the overall structure of the treatises must be taken into account, the major concern here is with pattern (3), namely, the proof which, though it may flood over into the other patterns, contains Tertullian's a priori and a posteriori arguments in which he uses semantics, logic, and 'empirical' evidence both Scriptural and otherwise.

First, let us consider Tertullian's semantics. The background undoubtedly had been provided for in the semantics contained within Stoic logic. Recent studies have indicated that Stoic logic and semantics were much more sophisticated than had been thought formerly to be the case,[17] and that there are certain similarities between some Stoic and modern theories, especially with respect to semantics.[18]

Since the notion of meaning was central in Stoic logic, it is not surprising that there is to be found within this logic a linguistic theory of signs. To be sure, the Stoics sometimes used 'sign' in an inferential sense as in Aristotle's Rhetoric, yet in their logic 'sign' is clearly regarded as a linguistic entity. According to Benson Mates a fundamental distinction was made between (1) the sign, (2) the lekton or meaning of the sign, and (3) the existing object to which the sign refers. While to be distinguished, nevertheless these three are connected with one another. Further (1) and (3) are regarded as physical objects but (2) is not. It is "that which is meant," or "It is what the Barbarians do not understand when they hear Greek words spoken."[19] While the lekton can be made known only by means of linguistic signs, it is characterized by the notion of understanding, is entertained by thought, and possessed in the mind. It is clear, then, that in their theory of the functioning of linguistic signs the Stoics proposed a triadic relation and placed emphasis on meaning.[20] Further, in their analysis of meaning the Stoics divided lekta into two kinds, the deficient and the complete. The latter have complete enunciation while the former do not. The complete lekta also were divided into two types, namely, those which are neither true nor false such as questions, imperatives, oaths, salutations, and those which are assertive, consisting of propositions, and thus either true or false.[21] The

latter, of course, are of fundamental significance in logic.

Did Tertullian know Stoic logic and semantics? An affirmative answer to this question finds support in the following considerations: (1) Tertullian, especially in On the Soul , refers to several Stoic philosophers including Chrysippus[22] who apparently wrote on many aspects of propositional logic and developed Stoic logic into a calculus.[23] (2) Most certainly Tertullian was thoroughly familiar with the writings of Seneca and Cicero[24] both of whom discuss Stoic logic to some extent, with Seneca explicitly mentioning the triadic relation of the linguistic sign.[25] (3) The content of Tertullian's treatises demonstrates not only a knowledge of but also a practical application of both Stoic logic and semantics. In his controversies with heretics, Tertullian is led time and again to linguistic considerations which involve him in discussions not only of proper grammatical structure but also of semantics. In the latter he either explicitly or implicitly suggests the Stoic triadic relation of linguistic signs and also pragmatically uses semantical analyses against opponents to indicate their ambiguities, arbitrary stipulations, and general misuse of language.

Only a few evidential examples in support of this third claim can be presented here. In Scorpiace   7 Tertullian in attacking the heretical Gnostics' complaint that the martyrdom of Christians shows the god of this world to be a murderer, charges them with the failure to make a distinction between the meanings of 'kill' and "murder" for, claims Tertullian, even if God kills, He does not thereby become a murderer. Then in this context Tertullian says, "Words are understandable not in sound only but also in signification, and they are to be perceived not merely by the ear, but also in the mind."[26] Surely, there is here an explicit mention of two items in the Stoic triad, namely, sign (sound) and lekton (signification) and the third,

the object, seems implied.

In Against Praxeas Tertullian provides another striking example of his acceptance of Stoic semantics, especially with respect to the lekton. In chapter five not only is he arguing for the evolution of the Word of God from the Father by a divine procession but also for the presence of the word within the eternal Reason of God. The meaning of the latter he illustrates with the following analogy:

> Observe, then, that when you are silently conversing with your-
> self, this very process is carried on within you by your reason,
> which meets you with a word at every movement of your thought, at
> every impulse of your conception. Whatever you think, there is a
> word; whatever you conceive, there is reason. You must needs speak
> it in your mind; and while you are speaking, ...you are [by reciprocal
> action] producing thought by means of that converse with your word.
> Thus, in a certain sense, the word is a second [person] within you,
> through which in thinking you utter speech, and through which also,
> [by reciprocity of process] in uttering speech you generate thought.[27]

It is in On the Flesh of Christ that Tertullian presents some of the most striking examples of his language analysis in action. Here he is on the attack against what he regards as a major heresy of Marcion and the Gnostics, namely, the denial that Christ was really human. As one of the ingredients of his overall argument he appeals to definition and accuses his opponents of grossly misusing language. In this part of his debate there are obvious echoes of Cicero's concern with and understanding of definition as involving the explanation or analysis of the peculiar and proper quality of a thing, the enumeration of its parts, and the providing of an etymology of the term in question.[28] With respect to the function of definition in forensic debate, Cicero had said, "The first topic in the prosecutor's argument is a brief, clear and common usage definition of the word whose meaning is sought."[29] Then the prosecutor should invalidate his opponent's definition by showing that it is not in accord with common belief, is not the accustomed use of such a word

in ordinary writing and speech, is dishonourable and is inexpedient.[30]

What Tertullian's opponents seemed to have had in common was a denial that Christ's flesh was genuinely human flesh. This outraged not only Tertullian's understanding that there must be a genuine incarnation if there was to be real salvation in terms of a genuine remaking of human nature but also it outraged his practical, realistic and empirical mindset. Some of his opponents, most notably Apelles, had admitted that Christ had 'flesh' but had claimed that it was ethereal flesh, not composed of earthly matter. Indeed, they viewed it as of the substance of the soul and claimed that the soul of Christ was composed of 'flesh'. The 'flesh', then, is 'soul' and the 'soul' is 'flesh'. If this is the case, Tertullian affirmed, then it is contradictory and thus literal nonsense to claim, as the Apelleasts did, that the soul was made corporeal in Christ and yet remained invisible. That is, they defined the soul as corporeal and yet affirmed that it was invisible. But by definition 'corporeal' designates that which is perceptible by the senses and thus Tertullian asks, "for if it (the corporeal) possesses nothing invisible, how can it be described as invisible?"[31] If common usage meanings are ignored and stipulation is allowed to run wild, the result can be nothing but confusion and inconsistency. It opens up a Pandora's box of ridiculous and literal nonsense in which all understanding and all discourse become impossible.

Tertullian makes this point rather clearly when he says:

All things will be in danger of being taken in a sense different from their own proper sense, and, while taken in that different sense of losing their proper one, if they are called by a name which differs from their natural designation. Fidelity in names secures the safe appreciation of properties. When these properties undergo a change, they are considered to possess such qualities as their names indicate. Baked clay, for instance, receives the name pitcher. It retains not the name which designated its former state because it no longer has a share in that state. Therefore, also, the soul of Christ having become flesh, cannot be anything else than that which it has become;

nor can it be any longer that which it once was, having become
indeed something else. And since we have just had recourse to an
illustration, we will put it to further use. Our pitcher, then,
which was formed of the clay, is one body, and has one name
indicative, of course, of that one body; nor can the pitcher be
also called clay, because what it once was, it is no longer... .
In Christ we find the soul and the flesh expressed in simple
unfigurative terms; that is to say, the soul is called soul, and
the flesh, flesh; nowhere is the soul termed flesh, or the flesh,
soul; and yet they ought to have been thus (confusedly) named if
such had been their condition.[32]

Another interesting feature in Tertullian's semantics is suggested in the

passage just quoted, namely, his view of the function of figurative or meta-

phorical expressions. For Tertullian such expressions function inappropriately

and are plagued with meaninglessness unless they are capable of implying

literally true statements.[33] Indeed, it appears that Tertullian would have

agreed with the contemporary philosopher, Paul Edwards, in the latter's

contention that a sentence containing metaphors has cognitive meaning only if

it can be "reproduced by one or more sentences all of whose components are

used in a literal sense. If not, then the sentence is devoid of cognitive

meaning."[34]

It is in the treatise On the Resurrection of the Flesh that Tertullian

clearly states this view. Here he is attacking those heretics who, holding

to the thesis that the resurrection of the dead means the moral change of a

new life, support this thesis by allegorizing Scripture passages and by

claiming that all the announcements of the prophets are figures of speech.

Concerning this claim Tertullian says:

Now, if this were the case, the figures themselves could not
possibly have been distinguished, inasmuch as the verities would
not have been declared, out of which the figurative language is
stretched. And, indeed, if all are figures, where will be that
of which they are figures? How can you hold up a mirror for your
face, if the face nowhere exists? But, in truth, all are not
figures, but there are also literal statements.[35]

Having considered briefly Tertullian's semantics, attention will now be given to an item which receives relatively little attention, namely, his logic.[36] While Tertullian occasionally may ridicule the dialectics of the philosophers, including that of Aristotle and the Stoics,[37] he nevertheless demonstrates a rather thorough knowledge of the available logic and especially utilizes it in the confirmatio and reprehensio aspects of the proofs in his treatises. To be sure there is no explicit discussion of the nature and structure of logic as a subject matter, but there is a copious use of logical argument forms. Surely, since Tertullian was so dedicated to the task of defeating the heretics who prided themselves on their intellectual acumen, he could be expected to use all of the rhetorical skills at his command and, as indicated previously, these were considerable. Cicero had advised one "who is attracted by the glory of eloquence... to be thoroughly trained either in the older logic of Aristotle or the newer of Chrysippus."[38] There should be knowledge of the force, nature and classes of words both singly and in the sentence, of different modes of predication, and of the method of distinguishing truth from falsity and the proper deduction to be drawn from each.

According to Benson Mates the "older" logic of Aristotle was a logic of classes and logically true matrices while the "newer" logic of the Stoics was a logic of propositions and inference schemas.[39] Basic to this logic of propositions were the five types of undemonstrated arguments mentioned by several ancient writers including Cicero who said that "from these forms innumerable conclusions are derived; in fact almost the whole of dialectic consists of this."[40] These five forms may be listed and described as follows:

(1) <u>Modus</u> <u>ponens</u>

    If the first, then the second.

    The first.

    Therefore, the second.

(2) <u>Modus</u> <u>tollens</u>

    If the first, then the second.

    Not the second.

    Therefore, not the first.

(3) <u>Modus</u> <u>ponendo</u> <u>tollens</u> or affirmative disjunctive syllogism

    Not both the first and the second.

    The first.

    Therefore, not the second.

(4) Another form of <u>modus</u> <u>ponendo</u> <u>tollens</u>

    Either the first or the second.

    The first.

    Therefore, not the second.

(5) <u>Modus</u> <u>tollendo</u> <u>ponens</u> or negative disjunctive syllogism

    Either the first or the second.

    Not the first.

    Therefore, the second.[41]

An analysis of Tertullian's treatises indicates that he knew and utilized both the "older" and "newer" logics. Evidence that this is the case will be confined to a few brief examples. One example which shows Tertullian's combination of both logics in one argument will be taken from his treatise <u>Against Hermogenes</u>. The others are taken intentionally from "On the Flesh of Christ" where his purported paradox appears.

In Against Hermogenes Tertullian is dealing with the argument that matter must be eternal and the source of evil, else God if he had created out of Himself or out of nothing, would be the Creator of evil. In chapter twelve Tertullian's demonstration that Hermogenes'argument is inconsistent can be formalized in the following way. It is to be noted that the first syllogism is Aristotle's categorical syllogism while the second is modus tollens.

    I. 1. What is eternal is immutable.

        2. Matter is eternal (according to Hermogenes).

        3. Therefore, matter is immutable.

        4. Matter is evil (according to Hermogenes).

    II. 1. Since matter is immutable (from I, 3), it must always be evil.

        2. Matter cannot always be evil for, according to Hermogenes, good things have been created out of matter.

        3. Therefore, matter is not immutable nor eternal, and thus Hermogenes' argument is inconsistent.[42]

In On the Flesh of Christ Tertullian, after presenting an exordium in chapter one, deals with Marcion's denial of both the nativity and flesh of Christ in chapters two through five. In chapters two and three he responds to Marcion's claims that a genuine Incarnation or real embodiment would be impossible and that it would imperil God Himself, and in chapters four and five he considers Marcion's charge that embodiment would dishonor God.

The first sentence in chapter four represents a non-simple argument which is a repeated application of the Stoic fifth undemonstrated argument and is as old as Chrysippus.[43] The schema is as follows:

Either one or two or three.

Not one.

Not two.

Therefore, three.

In terms of Tertullian's sentence itself and of what may be assumed in light of what has been said already in chapters two and three, his argument here may be formalized as follows:

1. Marcion rejects embodiment on the grounds either that it is impossible or that it imperils God or that it is undignified.

2. It is not impossible (as shown previously).

3. It does not imperil God (as shown previously).

4. Therefore, the only course left for Marcion is to show that it is undignified.

Then in chapters four and five Tertullian proceeds to argue that instead of providing evidence against embodiment, the very dishonor itself is a causal reason for affirming it.

It is instructive to note in chapter five of On the Flesh of Christ that the sentence which follows Tertullian's famous purported paradox, "It is credible because it is improper", contains a modus ponens argument.

1. If Christ died, he possessed that which is capable of dying, namely, mortal flesh.

2. While Marcion deletes from his gospel the birth and childhood narratives, he retains the passion narrative with its crucifixion, death and burial. (While not explicitly stated at this point, this premise had been stated at the beginning of chapter five and certainly is to be assumed here.)

3. Therefore, (Marcion should admit) Christ possessed mortal flesh and was man.

A few sentences later in this same chapter Tertullian clearly and explicitly expresses a <u>modus</u> <u>tollens</u> argument.

1. If the powers (of Christ) postulate the Spirit (of God), no less do the sufferings of Christ postulate the flesh.

2. (As claimed by Marcion) the flesh along with the sufferings was fictitious.

3. (Therefore), it follows that the Spirit also along with the powers was a fraud.

One other example from On the Flesh of Christ will have to suffice. It has been chosen because it represents a combination of the Aristotelian categorical syllogism with the Stoic fifth undemonstrated argument. This argument occurs in chapter eight where Tertullian is attacking Apelles' view that Christ's flesh was a celestial substance because the created world was the result of a sinful act by an errant angel, and thus earthly flesh was a product of sin. Tertullian's argument against Apelles is as follows:

I. 1. All creation is a product of sin (according to Apelles).

2. Celestial substance (the sky) is a part of creation.

3. Therefore, celestial substance is a product of sin.

II. 1. Apelles must think out for Christ a material of purer brand or acknowledge this (earthly flesh) than which even that from the sky cannot be better.

2. But he cannot think out a material of purer brand (implied premise).

3. Therefore, he should accept the earthly flesh of Christ (conclusion implied already in the first premise).

In the discussion thus far an attempt has been made to describe briefly Tertullian's knowledge and use of rhetoric, semantics and logic in order to provide evidence for the unlikelihood that he would have been inclined to the use of paradox, and, most especially, "outrageous" and "grinding" paradox. It is in the context of the evidence already presented and of one further consideration to be presented below that the purported paradox must be reanalyzed and reevaluated.

So far as I know only one scholar, James Moffat, has suggested that a different estimate of Tertullian might be gained through a comparison of Tertullian's famous statement with a passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric.[44] The context of this passage is a discussion of the topics useful in forensic debate. Aristotle recommends that attention be given to such items as definitions of terms, the logical divisions of a subject, the proper syllogism for sound argument, inductive proofs including considerations of time and place, previous decisions on analogous situations, motives people have for doing or avoiding the action in question, etc. In this context Aristotle refers to a further type of argument in the following words:

> Another line of argument refers to things which are supposed to happen and yet seem incredible. We may argue that people could not have believed them, if they had not been true or nearly true: even that they are the more likely to be true because they are incredible. For the things which men believe are either facts or probabilities: if, therefore, a thing that is believed is improbable or even incredible, it must be true, since it is certainly not believed because it is at all probable or credible.[45]

As Moffat points out the assumption in this argument is that all objects of human belief are either facts or probabilities. If a statement cannot be classified under the category of probabilities, then it must represent an actual fact. To quote from Moffat, "We are invited to believe that if some statement is wildly improbable, it is more improbable still that anyone

should have invented it; in other words, that it would never have been made... unless there had been some evidence for it, and consequently that such evidence must be strong."[46]

Surely, the similarity between this argument form or "topic" recommended by Aristotle and Tertullian's, "It is straightforwardly credible because it is improper; it is certain because impossible",[47] is striking. Moffat while affirming that this similarity should modify some of the exaggerated views of Tertullian's psychological idiosyncrasy, yet admits that this parallel may be only a curious coincidence and that the paradox is as pointed as ever. Nevertheless, in the judgment of this writer there is strong circumstantial evidence in support of the claim that, however briefly stated, Tertullian consciously is using an Aristotelian argument form. This evidence is as follows: (1) As indicated previously, several other argument forms are used in chapter five of On the Flesh of Christ where this statement appears. It seems reasonable to suppose that in this context Tertullian intended to present yet another type of argument. (2) Rhetoricians undoubtedly were familiar with Aristotle's Rhetoric. In his Topica Cicero presents several of the topics which are found in Book II, Chapter twenty-three of Aristotle's Rhetoric and this is the chapter in which the topic or argument form quoted above appears. Further, in On Invention Cicero affirms that arguments drawn from the topics "will have to be either probable or irrefutable." [48] (3) As indicated previously, Tertullian had a thorough knowledge of and skill in the use of the rhetorical forms and so even if he had never studied Aristotle's Rhetoric, he could have gained a knowledge of this topic from Cicero and other rhetoricians among whom this argument form was quite probably current. (4) In Tertullian's treatises there is internal evidence indicating that he knew Greek and was acquainted with a wide range of classical Greek writers

including Aristotle.[49] For example, in On the Soul there are twelve references

to Aristotle and three quotations from Aristotle's De Anima.[50] It would seem

unlikely, then, that he had never studied Aristotle's Rhetoric. (5) In On

Baptism , Chapter two, there is a strong echo of the Aristotelian topica.

Defending the Sacrament against the claim that it is incredible for mere dipping

in water to result in the attainment of eternity, Tertullian says, "But it is the

more to be believed if the wonderfulness be the reason why it is not believed".

In light of this evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that in his

famous passage Tertullian was using a familiar Aristotelian argument form instead

of uttering an "outrageous" or "grinding" paradox. Therefore, the following para-

phrase which does not seem to do violence either to language or overall context

might well communicate what Tertullian meant by his famous passage:

> The Son of God died. It is straightforwardly credible because it is
> improper, senseless, or improbable. That is, it is not the sort of
> statement that anyone would invent. He was buried and rose again.
> It is certain because it is impossible. That is, it is impossible in
> terms of those things which men imagine as possible.

Of course, one may attack this argument on historical grounds pointing to the

fact that men have believed all sorts of weird things and thus one may regard

the argument as not very convincing. Yet, if the analysis presented here is

sound, it is still an argument however weak it may be as an argument. Further,

in On the Flesh of Christ , as elsewhere, Tertullian was unleashing all sorts

of arguments against the heretics who were threatening seriously what he took

to be the purity of the Christian faith. So this is only one argument among

many, and undoubtedly was put forth at this particular point in the treatise

precisely because it was appropriate to the point at issue, namely, the

Incarnation as a dishonor to God and thus as something which most likely would

not be regarded as probable.

The attempt has been made in the first section of this study to analyze

Tertullian's use of rhetoric, semantics, and logic in order to indicate his

rational methodology. It is the case, of course, that the depth of his
emotion often shines through his writings. He is capable of using bitter
invective and coarse language against opponents. His ad hominem attacks are
scathing. But the issues were crucial and the indignatio was one of the con-
ventional patterns in rhetoric. Further, while depth of emotion and scathing
language may impede careful and logical analyses and argument, this is not
necessarily the case, and with respect to Tertullian obviously was not the
case. Indeed, in view of Tertullian's method alone it would appear that
Chadwick is mistaken when he claims that Tertullian stands in a path of
Christian thought leading through Sir Thomas Browne to Kierkegaard and his
modern disciples. Instead, at least with respect to method, he stands on
that path which leads through Augustine and Anselm to Thomas Aquinas and his
modern disciples. In terms of method alone, then, there are solid grounds for
denying that Tertullian was anti-rational and anti-philosophical. With re-
spect to the latter, it has been shown already that his semantics and logic,
since they had an Aristotelian and Stoic base, were derived from philosophy.
Thus, it follows that he could not have been entirely anti-philosophical.
However, further consideration of Tertullian's stance with respect to philo-
sophy and reason needs to be undertaken.

B. Tertullian's Attitude Toward Philosophy

On the surface it would appear that Tertullian's attitude toward philo-
sophy was ambivalent. Sometimes he attacks philosophy and even ridicules the
philosophers. He claims that among philosophers there is more diversity than
agreement and that even in their agreement diversity is discoverable.[51] What
service to the truth can this be? Often he twits the philosophers with being
stupidly curious about natural phenomena, with proposing inconsistent views
concerning these phenomena, and with declaring many of these phenomena to be
gods.[52] Concerning these speculations he says in Ad Nationes:

Now, pray tell me, what wisdom is there in this hankering after conjectural speculations? What proof is afforded to us, notwithstanding the strong confidence of its assertions, by the useless affectation of a scrupulous curiosity, which is tricked out with an artful show of language? It therefore served Thales of Miletus quite right, when, star-gazing as he walked with all the eyes he had, he had the mortification of falling into a well, and was unmercifully twitted by an Egyptian, who said to him, 'Is it because you found nothing on earth to look at, that you think you ought to confine your gaze to the sky?' His fall, therefore, is a figurative picture of the philosophers; of those, I mean, who persist in applying their studies to a vain purpose, since they indulge a stupid curiosity on natural objects, which they ought rather (intelligently to direct) to their Creator and Governor.[53]

It is to be noted that in the last sentence of the quote above Tertullian does not condemn all philosophy but only what he takes to be fruitless speculations which will tend to lead the unwary and simple Christian into heresy. Indeed, he often sings the praises of reason and philosophy, and utilizes certain philosophical positions in his own arguments. In On Repentance he says that reason "is a thing of God, inasmuch as there is nothing which God the Maker of all has not provided, disposed, ordained by reason--nothing which He has not willed should be handled and understood by reason".[54] While labelling some philosophers with pejoratives, he, even though disagreeing with some of their positions, labels other philosophers with terms of respect. Thus, he speaks of, "the nobility of Plato, the force of Zeno, the levelheadness of Aristotle, the stupidity of Epicurus, the sadness of Heraclitus, and the madness of Empedocles".[55] Further, Tertullian often echoes Stoic concepts such as the world as a prison house, moral evil as irrational, recurrence in the created world, natural elements as reflecting the divine, and the outer and inner nature of man with the latter, the soul, being a body.[56] At points he speaks highly of Seneca, quotes him with approval, and describes him as one "whom we so often find on our side".[57] In many treatises he seems to express also an affinity for Aristotelian realism. Certainly, there is no

adamant rejection of all philosophy on the part of Tertullian.

If this is the case, how is his question, "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" to be understood? It is to be noted that this question is located in the essay On Prescription Against Heretics , the first chapters of which deal with heresies in general. Thus, the burden of Tertullian's concern here, as elsewhere, was with the heresies, especially Gnosticism and its variants which posed a real threat to the church. It was not at all certain that the faith, as it had been received and as epitomized in the "rule of faith", would continue to survive. The speculations of the Gnostics were many and varied but some of their basic beliefs are as follows: (1) A chief characteristic of Gnosticism was the affirmation of a radical dualism between the visible and invisible world. Spirit is good and matter is evil. (2) The creation of the world often is denied to the God who redeems but is attributed to a lesser deity or to some intermediate being. (3) Since matter is evil Christ did not become genuinely human, and was not from the creator but some other higher deity. (4) Man is a divided being, and his good spirit can be saved from the clutches of evil matter only by the supernatural mystical knowledge brought by Christ.

While this brief outline of Gnostic beliefs does not fully cover the scope and variety of views designated by this term and while in the views of some Gnostics there are to be found exceptions to some of these points,[58] these points, nevertheless, were of special concern to such orthodox Christians as Irenaeus and Tertullian. Undoubtedly, these items had several sources of origin, but one important source, at least as far as Tertullian was concerned, was to be found in certain metaphysical notions of the philosophers whom he labels the "partiarchs of the heretics".[59] H. A. Wolfson has described the wisdom of the Gnostics as basically "a syncretism of various heathen beliefs,

in some cases... strewn over with a sprinkling of philosophic vocabulary".[60]
Thus, the Gnostic speculations were rather congenial to the intellectual
atmosphere of the Greco-Roman world and attractive to many, especially those
who prided themselves on being superior men. So Tertullian often isolates
these metaphysical sources and attacks them both for their internal incon-
sistencies and their inconsistency with the rule of faith. Yet it is
primarily heresy which Tertullian is attacking and not philosophy as such.

Indeed in his attack on certain metaphysical doctrines Tertullian often
argues philosophically. For example, in his consideration of Plato's doctrine
of recollection and the Platonic-Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of
souls in the treatise On the Soul , he does not appeal to the rule of faith
but attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency and/or falsity of these doctrines.
With respect to the first doctrine Plato had argued that the soul is unborn,
that it has innate knowledge, and yet at birth in a new form forgets what it
had known and requires experience to bring such knowledge into conscious
awareness. But, says Tertullian, the claim that the soul is unborn, if true,
entails that it is divine, and if that is the case, then surely there would
be no such forgetfulness. With respect to the transmigration of souls,
Tertullian uses an empirical argument. If the transmigration of souls is the
case, then how account for the population explosion?[61]

So, far from rejecting all philosophy, Tertullian often demonstrates a
rather superior ability to argue philosophically. To be sure he insists that
the rule of faith should serve as the dominant norm for the Christian's
thought but this does not mean that all philosophy must be rejected. Instead,
Tertullian would have agreed with Aquinas who, centuries later, claimed that
philosophy is the handmaiden of theology. Thus, what is to be rejected are
certain metaphysical doctrines which inform the heresies, and Tertullian is so

anti-heresy that sometimes he uses extravagant language to make his points more striking than is possible by the rational and philosophical arguments which he has presented on precisely these same points.

It is true, of course, that Tertullian warns the orthodox against entering into arguments with the heretics. Instead, the heretics are to be met with the authoritative rule of faith. Apparently the fundamental features of this rule involved the following:[62] (1) There is emphasis on the one God who has created ex nihilo which entails the essential goodness of all created things, and who is Preserver, Ruler, and Savior of the world. (2) The evil in man is not due to the physical and material aspects of his nature but to an act of his free will. (3) The reality of a genuine Incarnation entailing both the divinity and humanity of Christ is to be insisted upon in the interest of redemption. (4) The Holy Spirit is to be accepted as a guide for believers in the new community. (5) There is insistence upon the resurrection of the flesh. And (6) the total Scriptures are to be accepted as an authoritative witness to the essential content of the faith. This rule is the Praescriptio.

Praescriptio is a legal term which means that the opposite party is out of order and that disputation should not continue. In practice, however, Tertullian himself does not follow the advice which he gives to the faithful. Time and again he argues against the claims of the heretics point by point, and at least on one occasion explicitly states that he is foregoing defense by Praescriptio in order that he might refute Marcion's attacks.[63] In so doing he does not hesitate to make use of what later is to be called "natural theology." This he views as a legitimate enterprise provided it is appropriately used in attacks on heresy and in defense of the faith. Thus, in On the Resurrection of the Flesh he says, "One may no doubt be wise in the things of God, even from One's natural powers, but only in witness to the truth, not in

maintenance of error... . For some things are known even by nature."[64] In

Against Marcion Tertullian is even more explicit when he says, "We maintain

that God must first be known from nature, and afterwards authenticated by

instruction: from nature, by His works; by instruction through His revealed

announcements."[65]

It is quite obvious that in the early chapters of Against Marcion

Tertullian is making a liberal use of natural theology in his defense of the

first statement in the rule of faith concerning the existence of the one God.

Here he identifies God, offering what he claims to be a definition grounded

in common usage. This definition "which the conscience of all men will also

acknowledge," is that "God is the great Supreme."[66] Thus, it follows that

there can be but one God. If there were two, as Marcion claimed, or more,

then either they would be equal or unequal in rank. If they were unequal in

rank, then clearly only one of them, the one occupying the zenith, could

properly be called supreme. But if they are equal in rank, then with respect

to status they become indistinguishable. This is logically necessary granted

the essential nature of supremacy. If there are said to be two supreme

beings, equal in respect to their supremacy, then essential status must be

identical and it follows that there can be but one genuinely supreme Being.

In this argument, Tertullian appeals to the science of numbers and claims

that the essential point of his argument lies here. Marcion had claimed that

there are only two supreme beings rather than a multiplicity. But, Tertullian

objects, once one moves from one to the very next lowest number he is involved

in plurality. "After unity, number commences."[67] If there are two such

beings, there is no reason why there can't be more. Indeed, "if number be

compatible with the substance of deity, the richer you make it in number the

better."[68] On this point, Valentinus with his several deities is more

consistent than Marcion. The latter's inconsistency lies in the fact that
the very principle on the basis of which he would deny the existence of
several deities, of necessity, requires the rejection of two. There can no
more be two great supremes than there can be several.

Whatever may be its sources or origin--Stoic, Philo Judeas,[69] or
Christian--another interesting feature of Tertullian's argument for the
existence of the one God is that at points his thought moves along lines
somewhat similar to that of the later Augustine and Anselm. Two considerations
are of importance in support of this claim.

First, in formulating his common use definition Tertullian takes into
account the requirements and meaning of worship. That is, the very meaning of
'worship' entails an object of supreme worth to which one can accord complete
devotion. So Tertullian says, "number in the deity ought to be consistent
with the highest reason, or else His worship would be brought into doubt."[70]
Worship itself would be futile and meaningless unless the object of worship
admits of no comparison, is absolutely unique, and thus is the great Supreme.
This linking of the definition with the meaning and requirements of worship
is similar to both Augustine and Anselm who often preface their arguments with
prayers and indicate that their purpose is faith seeking understanding.

Secondly, in the development of his argument for the great Supreme,
Tertullian comes close to thinking along the lines found in Anselm's first
formulation of the 'Ontological' Argument in **Proslogion** II[71] where the latter
claims that God is something than which nothing greater can be conceived.
Thus, Tertullian asserts that the main property of God is that there is
nothing which can be compared with him--that as the great Supreme, God must
be a being to which nothing is equal. Tertullian puts it in the following way:

> Our (Christian) verity has rightly declared (as its first prin-
> ciple), 'God is not, if He is not one. Not as if we doubted His
> being God, by saying, He is not, if He is not one; but because
> we define Him, in whose being we thoroughly believe, to be that
> without which He is not God; that is to say, the great Supreme.
> But then the great Supreme must needs be unique. The Unique
> Being, therefore, will be God—not otherwise God than as the
> Great Supreme; and not otherwise the great Supreme than as
> having no equal; and not otherwise having no equal than as
> being unique.[72]

To be sure, Tertullian's main concern here is to demonstrate the logical

impossibility of Marcion's two gods. He does not develop the argument further,

as Anselm was to do in Proslogion III in terms of the inconceivability of God's

non-existence. Yet the similarity with Anselm's first definition of God is

obvious. Further, it is evident that here Tertullian is operating in the

realm of natural theology.

Tertullian also operates in the realm of natural theology when he launches

his empirical argument against Marcion. In this argument the influence of

Stoicism on his perspective is clearly evident. That is, he shares the Stoic

perspective concerning the unity and orderliness of the world resulting from

the pervasive presence of the ordering logos. Both the existence and goodness

of God are known by his works.[73]

In this context Tertullian claims that knowledge of God must come through

experience of a world. Not only the harmony of the whole but also the worthi-

ness of the several parts of creation, which the heathen philosophers invest

with divine attributes, attest not only to the existence of God but also to

his excellence. As far as our knowledge goes there is one world and only one,

and the unity we find in the world argues to the unity of the ground of the

existence of that world and of its ordering. If we deny that God is dis-

cernible from the sensible world, then it follows that there is no basis upon

which we can get knowledge of God.

Against Marcion's claim that there is another hidden god who dwells in a special realm and who makes himself known through a special revelation, Tertullian argues that even if that were the case, this special revelation itself must come within the world of space and time. Only on the basis of what happens in this world is one able to judge even that there may be another world different from this one. The one world which alone we can experience, the evidence of its harmony, the orderliness of its several operations and several portions, point to the one God who is creator and ruler.

With great sensitivity Tertullian demonstrates an appreciation for the smallest and lowliest creatures within this one world. He chides the Marcionites for disdaining the very elements of nature which they use as necessary for their own existence and which, indeed, have been provided by a good creator for man's well-being and enjoyment. Further, Marcion's argument for the unknown god is filled with inconsistencies. If he existed, he ought to have been known from the beginning for it is unworthy of God to have remained hidden. Why was he so tardy in making himself known? Either he was ignorant of the means of his manifestation or else he was unable or unwilling to manifest himself. Surely these alternatives are unworthy of a god and especially of one who is supreme and best. Thus Tertullian puts forth the following rule or principle for Marcion:

> All the properties of God ought to be as rational as they are
> natural. I require reason in His goodness, because nothing
> else can properly be accounted good than that which is rationally
> good; much less can goodness itself be detected in any irrationality.
> More easily will an evil thing which has something rational belonging
> to it be accounted good, than a good thing bereft of all reasonable
> quality should escape being regarded as evil. Now I deny that the
> goodness of Marcion's god is rational.[74]

It is from this perspective that Tertullian castigates the official polytheistic religion of Rome. It is simply irrational. So in the Apology

he points out the inconsistency in the polytheists' position. While they claim that the several gods are gods to them, in practice they contradict this claim by giving preference to some of the deities which entails neglect and/or rejection of others. Further they tend to destroy those deities they fear.[75] In contrast the object of the Christians' worship is the one God who by his word created the one world ex nihilo, who is known both by his works and by his revelation attested in Scripture, and who is named by no other name than "God".

Surely, in light of the above there is considerable evidence to indicate that Tertullian's famous question, "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?", is directed primarily against the heretics, that he rejects only those doctrines of the philosophers which he regards as absurd and/or as informing the heresies, and that he himself makes a rather liberal use of philosophy. While he does advise the faithful, especially those without learning, to refrain from engaging in arguments with the heretics, he also deplores the fact that many Christians are uneducated. Concerning this situation he says, "Because many persons are uneducated; still more are of faltering faith, and several are weak-minded: these will have to be instructed, directed, strengthened, inasmuch as the very oneness of the Godhead will be defended along with the maintenance of our doctrine."[76] And in On the Soul he claims that the soul's conduct, discipline and grace can be benefited by study.[77]

Thus, the claim made in the conclusion of his study by R. D. Sider seems wholly justified. According to Sider:

> In more than one place Tertullian seems actually to have been trying to rewrite pagan themes from a Christian perspective. A. A. Day in his book Origins of Latin Love-elegy has shown that many themes familiar to the love-elegy have had their origin in the rhetorical schools: the evil origin of ornamentation, the

beauty of the unadorned woman, even the letter to one's wife
urging her not to remarry. All of these themes reappear in
Tertullian but with Biblical support. Here he has not dis-
carded his pagan heritage, or even used it as a mere tool,
but has tried to convert it and absorb it in a synthesis of
classical and Christian.[78]

In the judgment of this writer it is obvious that themes from philosophy

as well as from the love-elegy were included in Tertullian's synthesis of the

classical and the Christian.

C. The General Consistency of Tertullian's Thought

It is sometimes claimed that Tertullian's synthesis was not successful,

that he was never able to harmonize fully his views of God's transcendence,

infinity, immutability, and impassibility with his Christian conviction that

God was active in the world, especially in redemption, and that thus there

is a basic inconsistency in his thought.[79] While it may be the case that a

careful analysis of all the writings of one who was so much engaged in the

battle against heresy and on so many fronts would find an occasional lapse

into minor inconsistencies, it does not appear that Tertullian was guilty of

a basic inconsistency. To be sure, a prima facie case for inconsistency can

be made through lifting some of his utterances out of the context both of

his specific arguments and of his general situation and then packing them with

meanings which were not intended. But surely, Tertullian's skillful use of

rhetoric, semantics, logic, and his discriminating attitude toward philosophy

should raise at least a doubt concerning this presumed inconsistency. If for

no other reason, then, a reanalysis and re-evaluation of the purported evidence

supporting the charge of inconsistency should be undertaken.

In terms of the general situation it should be remembered that the claims

in the rule of faith were regarded by Tertullian, and other defenders of the

faith, as crucial in the interest of redemption, the remaking of human nature.

Much like the II Isaiah Tertullian was convinced that men can have full con-

fidence in God's power to redeem precisely because God has demonstrated his

power in creating ex nihilo. Only the Creator can be an effective Redeemer.

The Creator is the Redeemer and the Redeemer is the Creator. It was in the

interest of redemption, then, that Tertullian defended the first item in the

rule of faith which insisted upon the confession of belief in the one eternal

God who is Creator, Preserver, and Savior of the world. This defense was

directed against the claims that there are two gods (Marcion), a multitude

of gods (Valentinus and others), an artisan who fashions the world out of

eternal matter (Hermogenes), or that God literally died in the death of

Jesus on the cross (Praxeas[80]: note the striking similiarity with Thomas J. J.

Altizer's death of God theology[81]). In contrast Tertullian insists upon the

necessary existence, unity, uncreatedness, and supremacy in being and goodness

of God. Nothing can threaten God's existence, being, or goodness. Yet, God

is rich in his experiences, both of an internal and external nature, and

completely free for relations with the contingent beings in this contingent

world. What contradiction is there in saying that the God who is necessary

being, who is the necessary condition for the existence of anything whatsoever,

who is supreme in power and goodness can and does enter into relations with

that which is contingent, creative, relative, and lacking in supreme power

and goodness? Surely, it does not follow that a non-contingent Being must

be necessarily an Epicurean impassive, uninterested, insensitive, and inactive

deity any more than analogously a man of great learning and sensitive moral

character must necessarily insulate himself from relations with the ignorant

or those subject to moral frailty. Indeed, will it not be his very learning

and moral sensitivity which will drive him from self to others, and that such relationships instead of depriving him of learning and moral sensitivity may well contribute to the enrichment of both attributes?

In a consideration of deity would it not be contradictory by definition to affirm that God is supreme in goodness and yet unconcerned and inactive toward the world and the creatures therein? Further, if God is not the one supreme necessary being, what confidence can there be that His goodness is really supreme and agapeistically directed toward the well-being of the contingent creatures in the world? Tertullian saw clearly that non-contingency was a necessary condition for supremacy in power and goodness, and that such non-contingency not only did not prevent but also was not threatened by a genuine relationship with the contingent.

Is this an accurate statement of Tertullian's position? An attempt will be made in what follows to provide evidence that it is. This attempt will involve a consideration of the meanings of certain key terms in the early partistic age, a consideration of certain key passages in Tertullian's writings, and a consideration of his Trinitarian and Christological views where the issue in question is most crucial.

Since a consideration of all the important terms in the writings of the early Fathers would fill several volumes, the discussion here must be limited to a very few which have crucial significance. The first to be considered is the word "God". G. L. Prestige has pointed out that while the ancient etymological theories concerning this term were largely fanciful, they do indicate some of the connotations of the word in the thinking of the Fathers. One theory stemming largely from Plato (Crat. 397c) derives Theos from Theo (run) and thus involves the notion of action, motion and progress of all kinds.[82]

Tertullian clearly is aware of this etymological theory and dismisses it as fanciful. The proof of this, he thinks, lies "in the fact that you actually give the common appellation Theoi to all those gods of yours, in whom there is no attribute of course or motion indicated. When, therefore, you call them both theoi and immovable with equal readiness, there is a deviation as well from the meaning of the word as from the idea of godhead."[83] Yet, it is clear that this concept of "God", implicit in both classical and Biblical traditions, was of prime significance for Tertullian. The term "God" is the name of the unique Individual concerning whom a definite description may be given and this description includes, among other things, action as constitutive of the nature of the one so named.[84] Thus, in Against Marcion Tertullian says:

> That God should at all fail in power must not be thought, much less that He should not discharge all His natural functions; for if these were restrained from running their course, they would cease to be natural. Moreover, the nature of God Himself knows nothing of inactivity. . . . It will thus be evident that He had no unwillingness to exercise His goodness at any time on account of His nature. Indeed, it is impossible that He should be unwilling because of his nature, since that so directs itself that it would no longer exist if it ceased to act.[85]

Secondly, there were several terms used to express the notion of God's transcendence, most notably supremacy (hyperoxe in Greek; summum magnum in Against Marcion i.3), uncreatedness (ageneton in Greek; non natam, non factum in Hermogenes 4), and incomprehensibility (akataleptos in Greek; incomprehensibilis, Apology 17). As has been indicated previously Tertullian claimed that all men acknowledged that in meaning the term "God" designated the great Supreme.[86] Thus He is unsurpassable and transcendent. According to Prestige the term transcendent was understood by the early Fathers not in the sense of Epicurean remoteness, but in the sense that God is free from limitations and controls, unsurpassable, free to be Himself, and free to act

in accordance with His own nature. Such freedom is a necessary condition for
His moral perfection and His power to create. Thus, there is an emphasis on
God being uncreated which entails that he is a necessary being and the ground
of all being. The difference between the creatures and the ageneton is that
they are contingent while the latter is non-contingent.[87] As Prestige puts
it, "The ageneton exists per se: its cause lies within its own being".[88]
Since unsurpassable or transcendent, God is immeasurable or incomprehensible
both quantitatively and intellectually. "The idea expresses something that
in the full sense lies beyond the measure of man's mind."[89] But it does not
follow from this that men cannot have any knowledge of God from nature and
revelation, however limited this knowledge may be. It only follows that they
cannot know God entirely in the way in which God knows Himself or attain to
that knowledge which God has of all reality. Thus Prestige says, "When God
is called incomprehensible, it does not mean that He is irrational—a conception
which the Greek Fathers would have considered purely self-contradictory—but
it does imply that His wisdom ranges infinitely further than human wisdom can
compass, just as His power infinitely excells human creative capacity."[90]

Closely associated with the meaning of 'transcendence' is the meaning of
'impassible' (in Greek apatheia, impassibilitas in Against Praxeas 29).
According to Prestige the sense of this term as used by the Fathers was not
that God was lacking in concern for the world, impassive, inactive, "surveying
existence from the shelter of a metaphysical insulation", but rather that He
is consistent and changeless with respect to moral perfection and goodness.[91]
In Prestige's words, "Just as God is supreme in power and wisdom, so He is
morally supreme, incapable of being diverted or overborne by forces and
passions such as commonly hold sway in the creation and among mankind".[92]

Two other terms, since they will receive more complete explication in the discussion of Tertullian's Christological and Trinitarian views, will be mentioned here only briefly. They are _ousia_ or _substantia_ and _oikonomia_ ('administration' or 'economy'). My colleague, Professor William L. Power, has pointed out that there are instances in classical Greek thought where "the nature of a thing" had a dynamic connotation not unlike that of the Hebrew verb form 'to be' which provides the basis for the Tetragrammaton Y H W H. In support of this claim Power refers to a remark attributed to Socrates in the _Phraedrus_ (270 D) "that if one wants to know the nature of a thing he must find out 'what natural capacity it has of acting upon another thing, and through what means; or by what other thing, and through what other means, it can be acted upon'".[93] G. C. Stead claims that _ousia_ also can have this connotation although he thinks the leading idea is that of permanence.[94] Further, Stead indicates that Cicero coined the term _essentia_ by which to render _ousia_ in Latin, while Seneca, in his reproduction of the Stoic contrast between reality and appearance, used _substantia_ to designate _reality_.[95] Even though in Aristotle's _Categories_ (chapter 5) _prote ousia_ and _deutera ousia_ are distinguished as individual thing and species to which the individual thing belongs, in Stoic thought the individual thing is contrasted "with the stuff or material out of which it is made".[96] This accords with H. A. Wolfson's claim that the Stoics used _ousia_ in the sense of "substratum".[97]

In his study of patristic thought G. L. Prestige has shown that a wealth of meanings was associated with the term '_oikonomia_'. In its verb form it carried the meanings of to administer or oversee property, to regulate or control in a general sense, to design, arrange or dispose, and to accommodate or adapt to circumstances.[98] In its noun form it meant ministration,

good management, thrift, function, disposition of parts in relation to one another, organization, and constitution.[99] Further, Prestige indicates that "there is . . . sufficient evidence of a standard Hellenistic usage of economy, in the sense of an organized system",[100] and that for Tertullian who transliterates oikonomia instead of giving a Latin equivalent the major sense of the term seems to be that of "functional organization".[101]

This discussion of the meanings associated with certain key terms suggests already that the purported inconsistency in Tertullian's thought is perhaps more a matter of superficial appearance than of genuine inconsistency. Such suggestion becomes even stronger when certain key passages, in which one or more of these terms appear, are considered in the context of the specific treatises in which they occur and of Tertullian's total work.

First, in On the Flesh of Christ , Tertullian claims, "With God . . . nothing is impossible but what He does not will".[102] Surely, this statement entails the principle of non contradiction. Not even God can both will and not will a thing at the same time. While Tertullian does not make it explicit, he seems to be saying that nothing is impossible for God save that the statement of which involves a contradiction in terms. God's omnipotence means that God is able to do anything which is logically possible to do. If He had wished to do so, God could have furnished men wings to fly with, or he could have extinguished all heretics at once. Since no contradiction in terms is contained in these examples such states of affairs fall within the scope of the divine omnipotence. Yet it does not follow that because God is able to do such things, he has actually done them.[103] One should be careful to distinguish between what it is possible for God to do and what He has actually done. Put in today's terminology, it appears that Tertullian recognized the

distinction between logical possibility, empirical possibility, and empirical

actuality. God's omnipotence, then, is not irrational for 'omnipotence' means

the possession of all possible power in the logical sense of possible. Thus,

when it is said of God that He is supreme in power this expression connotes

the possession of all logically possible power.

Secondly, the issue at stake, of course, is whether or not it is contra-

dictory to affirm that the one eternal God, the great Supreme, has relations

with the contingent and changing world. As noted previously, Tertullian in

Against Marcion explicitly claims that "the nature of God Himself knows

nothing of inactivity" because his goodness is a natural attribute showing

itself in creative activity. Moreover God can have a change of mind which

means a simple change of prior purpose regulated by the occurrence of varying

circumstances.[104]

Marcion's mistaken view that the Incarnation is impossible is determined

by the fact that he argues from the nature of temporal objects to the nature

of God. Temporal objects are contingent, lacking in permanence, and thus come

to an end. If God is related to such, he too must be contingent and finite.

But, says Tertullian, this argument has a wrong starting point. One must

begin with God or else he fails to recognize the difference between God and

the creatures.

It has been indicated previously that in Book I of Against Marcion Ter-

tullian describes God as the great Supreme,[105] from which it follows that there

cannot be two gods or more and that God cannot not exist. So in his On the

Flesh of Christ Tertullian argues that while with respect to temporal objects

change necessarily involves impermanence, the difference between God and the

nature of all things is that "God can be changed into all conditions and yet

continue just as he is."[106] This statement occurs in the context of
Tertullian's response to Marcion's claim that the Incarnation or embodiment
would imperil God since God would then be subject to contingency. But nothing
can threaten God's existence, says Tertullian. Being necessarily existent
God runs no risk of ceasing to be what He is. Indeed, Marcion's view is based
on a serious confusion in thought which arises from the failure to make a
careful distinction between the meanings of "change" and "destruction". The
former does not contain the latter as one of its defining characteristics. In
On the Resurrection of the Flesh Tertullian explicitly argues that change
in a substance does not entail destruction of that substance. As he puts it:

> Now things which are absolutely different, as mutation and
> destruction are, will not admit of mixture and confusion; in
> their operations, too, they differ. One destroys; the other
> changes. Therefore, as that which is destroyed is not changed,
> so that which is changed is not destroyed. To perish is altogether
> to cease to be what a thing once was, whereas to be changed is to
> exist in another condition. Now, if a thing exists in another
> condition, it can still be the same thing itself; for since it
> does not perish, it has its existence still. . . . A thing may
> undergo a complete change and yet remain the same thing. In like
> manner, a man may be quite himself in substance even in the present
> life and for all that undergo various changes.[107]

Thus, God may continue as He is in His supremacy of power and goodness and yet
experience change.

It is the case, of course, that Tertullian elsewhere makes statements
which appear to contradict this idea of God experiencing change. In support
of his charge of inconsistency, R. A. Norris quotes a few of these statements
but apparently without carefully considering the context. Interestingly
enough Norris does not refer to Tertullian's distinction between "change" and
"destruction". One of the chief quotes used by Norris is from Book I,
Chapter VIII of Against Marcion. This passage deals with the absurdity of
Marcion's "second" and "new" God, and the eternality of the genuine God.

According to Norris its language reflects traces of Platonism. Then Norris

offers the following rendering and comment. "'Eternity has no time. It is

itself all time. It acts; it cannot then suffer. It cannot be born, there-

fore it lacks age. . . . God . . . is as independent of beginning and end as

he is of time.' God, then, is timeless and impassible."[108] Thus for Norris

this statement is inconsistent with what Tertullian has to say about God's

active relationship with the world.

In response to Norris' claim two comments seem appropriate. First, he

nowhere refers to the possibility of a dynamic meaning for Theos stemming out

of Plato's Cratylus (397c), nor does he refer to the dynamic connotation of

"the nature of a thing" found in the Phaedrus (270D). Surely, even in certain

strands of Platonic tradition, God's eternity does not necessarily mean, as

pointed out previously, that He is to be regarded as an Epicurean insensitive,

impassive and inactive deity. It simply means that He is not caught in the

contingent, that nothing can threaten His nature and existence, and that with

respect to His nature and existence He is immutable. Yet this leaves it open

for God to be mutable in other respects.

Secondly, attention should be given both to the context and to an equally

sound but variant translation of this passage. Here as elsewhere in Against

Marcion Tertullian is attacking Marcion's claim that there are two gods and

that Jesus Christ brought to light the second previously unknown god. He

opens chapter eight by scornfully charging the Marcionites with stupidity for

holding to the view that there is a "new" god for then he would be similar

in nature to the gentile gods, namely, generate and finite. Quite clearly

the issue is the absurdity of the Marcionite view, and the nature of the

existence of genuine deity. A more extended quotation from chapter eight than

that provided by Norris and one using the translation provided by Ernest
Evans[109] makes this apparent.

> All new gods are false gods. Not even Saturn with his ancientness,
> great as it today is, proves to be a god, because even he was at
> one time brought into being by newness, when it first gave him
> consecration. But living and genuine deity is attested neither by
> newness nor by oldness, but by its own verity. Eternity has no
> time, for itself is the whole of time: it cannot be affected by
> that which it causes to be: that which cannot have birth is
> exempt from age. If a god is old, he will have to come to an end:
> if he is new, he once was not. Newness gives evidence of a
> beginning: oldness holds the threat of an ending. But God is as
> much a stranger to beginning and ending as he is to time, which
> is the judge and divider of the beginning and the ending.

The last sentence of this rendering may still be misleading and perhaps that

in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library is to be preferred. "God, moreover, is

as independent of beginning and end as He is of time, which is only the

arbiter and measurer of a beginning and an end."[110] It is not that God is a

stranger to time in the sense of being unaware of time but that His nature and

existence are not subject to time. In this sense, then, He is not affected

by what He causes to be although in other respects He may be. An example of

the latter is that like Irenaeus, Tertullian insists that man's redemption was

effected through great cost to God.

This exegesis appears sound in light of what Tertullian has to say con-

cerning God's omnipotence and omniscience in Book II of Against Marcion.

Marcion had raised the question as to how this one eternal omnipotent and

omniscient God could have created this world in which there is evil without

being directly responsible for evil and thus lacking in total goodness.

Although Tertullian does not appear to explicitly analyze omniscience in terms

of all logically possible knowledge—that is, God knows everything there is

to be known at any given moment, namely, all past and present actualities and

all future possibilities—yet, as indicated above, he does seem to analyze

omnipotence in terms of all logically possible power. Also he comes close to

saying that 'omniscience' and 'omnipotence' mean all logically possible know-

ledge and all logically possible power. In chapter seven is to be found the

following interesting statement:

> Therefore, it followed that once God had granted the man freedom
> he must withdraw his own freedom, restraining within himself that
> foreknowledge and superior power by which he might have been able
> to intervene to prevent the man from presuming to use his freedom
> badly, and so falling into peril.[111]

Surely, this means that Tertullian recognized that it would be contradictory

to affirm that God granted men freedom and yet guaranteed that they would always

make the right choices. Such a state of affairs would be logically impossible.

Further, he seems to imply here that if God knew every future choice in

an absolute sense, or as in some sense already actual, then freedom of choice

would be an illusion and no one could choose otherwise than he in fact does

choose. If such were the case, then God indeed would be responsible directly

for the evil choices of men. But this would contradict Tertullian's conten-

tion that by nature God alone is perfectly good and out of this goodness has

granted men freedom such that they are not caught forever in childish

immaturity but rather may grow into the divine likeness. Freedom can be

genuine only if there is the real possibility of making evil choices. In

their freedom men do make such choices, but this evil, at least in terms of

direct or antecedent responsibility, is not to be attributed to God.

It would seem to be the case, then, in terms of the larger context that

Tertullian by the expression in the earlier passage, namely, "eternity has

no time, for itself is the whole of time", means to say that God's existence

and nature are not subject to time rather than that time is unreal to God.

True, God is not _in_ time, but the expression in the later passage, namely, "restraining within himself that foreknowledge", seems to imply that Tertullian regarded before and after as being as real to God as to human beings. Perhaps, then it is not stretching the case too far to say that for Tertullian time is in God.

A brief exegesis of one further passage seems required for the purposes of this discussion. This passage is found in _Against Praxeas_ and reads as follows:

> We must needs believe God to be unchangeable, and incapable of form, as being eternal. But transfiguration is the destruction of that which previously existed. For whatsoever is transfigured into some other thing ceases to be that which it had been, and begins to be that which it previously was not. God, however, neither ceases to be what He was, nor can He be any other thing than what He is.[112]

This passage must be interpreted not only in light of the discussion above but also in light of the issue at stake in the treatise _Against Praxeas_.

As understood by Tertullian, Praxeas' position on the Incarnation was monarchian and thus entailed the literal death of God. Indeed, even though there is some variation in language, Tertullian, at three places in this treatise explicitly charges that Praxeas and his followers claimed that God the Father died in the death of Jesus Christ.[113] For Tertullian such a claim was absolutely absurd because it was contradictory. That is, it contradicts the common usage definition or definite description of God. An infinite eternal being cannot die nor not be, even though in a certain sense he may experience suffering. Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that here as elsewhere Tertullian is insisting on God's necessary _existence_ and on His unchangeableness with respect to supremacy of _goodness_. Yet in other respects God may indeed change.

Perhaps, it is the case that Tertullian does not work out a <u>fully</u> <u>developed</u> theory concerning all those respects in which God may be said to be changeless and those in which He may be said to change. Undoubtedly such a fully developed theory should not be expected of him. The fully developed Whiteheadean distinction between the primordial and consequent aspects of God requires an explicit process philosophy presupposing an evolutionary view of nature. Yet, due to Tertullian's grounding in Scripture, the dynamic connotation in the meanings of '<u>Theos</u>' and '<u>substantia</u>', and his definite description of God as the great Supreme, there is in his thought a strong hint of such a distinction. Surely, this hint goes a long way in providing his thought with a basic consistency.

In his arguments for the oneness and supreme goodness of the Creator and thus the goodness of the creation, Tertullian, as suggested above, includes a view of man as created in the divine image. The <u>imago dei</u> is man's freedom, man's capacity to be master of his own will and power. The Fall, then, was the result of man's own free choice. Such freedom of choice makes possible greater good than would have been the case had man been bereft of such freedom and incapable of making evil choices. Here the similarity between Tertullian's thought and that of Irenaeus is striking. Like Irenaeus, Tertullian claims that man as a free agent had been placed in the world in order that he might grow into the likeness of God. Indeed, he explicitly states, "God held converse with man that man might learn to act as God."[114] This echoes Irenaeus' perspective that the purpose of God for man is that he might develop that quality of life which could be termed God-like and that the world is a training ground in which men as free agents under the inspiration of the New Adam, the Christ, might grow into such a quality of life.

It has been argued previously that while Tertullian defines God as the great Supreme, it does not follow from this that it is impossible for God freely to have relations with the created world. In his essay, _Against Hermogenes_ , Tertullian states, "It is liberty, not necessity, which suits the character of God."[115] God's deity, His supremacy, is not some prison in which He can exist only in and for Himself. Rather, it is His freedom not only to be God but also to be for man. The supreme example of God's freedom to be for man is the Incarnation. In contrast to Marcion and the Gnostics, Tertullian, as has been shown, emphatically insists upon the genuine humanity of Jesus, the Christ, for such is a necessary condition without which soteriology collapses. For both Irenaeus and Tertullian the problem is the remaking of human nature as God originally had intended it to be and this is what has been accomplished in the Incarnation. No alien invader from outside could have elevated the human race. Human nature would still have been subject to sin and death. While human nature could not be redeemed unless in Jesus, the Christ, human nature should be genuinely united with the divine nature, it is nevertheless the case that only a full-fledged member of the erring group could remake human nature. Thus, Tertullian, time and again, seeks to expose the absurdity of the view that Jesus, the Christ, was not genuinely human.

While several examples of this have been presented previously, one further interesting argument will be mentioned briefly at this point. In this argument Tertullian points up a glaring inconsistency in Marcion's denial that Christ had actually come in the flesh. In support of this denial Marcion held that only a drastically expurgated version of the Gospel of Luke and the Letters of Paul were to be regarded as Scripture. Yet in Ephesians 2:13 there is a verse

which reads "But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near in the blood of Christ" (R.S.V.) and Marcion had kept this verse intact in his version. Thus, Tertullian points out, "You . . . deny him flesh to whom in the verse above you allowed blood."[116] Empirically a living person is made up of, among other things, flesh and blood. There can't be one without the other. So if Marcion admits that there was blood, he also ought to admit that there was flesh.

This quotation presents yet another instance of Tertullian's insistence upon both a careful use of language and consistency in argument. This is the case also in his attack on the Monarchians. Against Marcion and the Gnostics Tertullian had argued on linguistic, logical and empirical grounds that deity is a unity, is one and not two or more. But this is precisely what Praxeas and the Monarchians claimed. If one accepted their view, he could not properly say that there was any distinction at all between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and thus would have to admit that God, the Father, died on the cross. Therefore, Tertullian wants to say that there is a distinction and he wants to do so without falling into the Gnostic error of proclaiming two or more gods. This, indeed, is a difficult problem, and Tertullian, true to form, attempts to formulate his response by giving attention both to the meanings of terms and to the valid argument forms.

First, Tertullian claims that Praxeas does not understand clearly the meaning of the term 'monarchy' when he insists that a distinction between the Father and the Son destroys the monarchy of God. The meaning of 'monarchy' is that the government is One. Its unity does not require that it be held by only one person. A monarch may allow his son to share in the monarchy without thereby destroying it.[117]

Secondly, the monarchy of God is His supremacy in the whole range of being, existence, and goodness. In Tertullian's definite description of God, supremacy is a fundamental characteristic of the divine substantia. While some connotations of this latter term have been indicated already, its precise meaning for Tertullian is somewhat difficult to determine. Different interpretations have been offered by equally competent scholars. But since this is one of the crucial terms in Tertullian's Trinitarian and Christological positions, it is important, insofar as it is possible, to gain an understanding of what Tertullian most probably meant by the term in the context of these theories. The discussion here will proceed as follows: (1) Variant interpretations of what Tertullian meant by 'substantia' will be considered briefly. (2) An attempt will be made to see if a common strand can be discerned in two or more of these interpretations, and if so, whether this strand could be the preferred meaning in the context of these theories such that they are more intelligible.

In his lectures on the history of doctrines, Robert L. Calhoun, following Adolf Von Harnack, was accustomed in his discussion of Tertullian to indicate that 'substantia' was to be understood in its legal sense.[118] In this sense the term connotes that in respect to which a man's status in the community is determined. With respect to God it means the divine status of supremacy.

Other scholars claim that in Tertullian's writings the connotation of substantia is philosophical, not legal. As noted earlier H.A. Wolfson refers to the Stoic use of ousia or substantia in the sense of substratum. It is this sense which he finds as basic in Tertullian's usage. So Wolfson says:

> In favor . . . of the assumption that by 'unity of substance'
> Tertullian means unity of substratum . . . are the passages in
> which he says that 'the Father is the entire substance but the
> Son is a derivation and portion of the whole' (Adv. Prax. 9) and
> that the Holy Spirit is a 'portion of the whole' (Adv. Prax. 26).
> . . . The description of the Son as a 'derivation' and 'portion'
> of the substance of the Father and the description of the substance
> as a 'source' (Adv. Prax. 4) would seem to indicate that by the
> 'unity of substance' spoken of by him he means the unity of sub-
> stratum and not the unity of specific genus. . . . The common
> substratum . . . is the Father and not something underlying both
> the Father and the Son, in which respect he departs from
> Aristotle's use of unity of substratum, for in Aristotle the
> common substratum of oil and wine is neither the oil nor the wine
> but water, which is something underlying both the oil and the
> water.[119]

On the other hand Ernest Evans, similar to G. L. Prestige,[120] argues that

the meaning of substantia in Tertullian as well as in the thought of other

early Fathers is to be understood in light of the use of ousia in Aristotle's

Categories. Here ousia refers either to deutera ousia (genus or species) or

to prote ousia (an individual thing). Since God is not a species, substantia

must connote a prote ousia or a single existent individual Being.[121]

G. C. Stead has raised serious questions concerning this interpretation.

In a very careful study he points out there is no simple answer to the

question as to what Tertullian meant by 'substantia'. With the warning that

not all instances of Tertullian's use of the term are subject to precise

classification, Stead distinguishes several senses of 'substantia' in

Tertullian's treatises. These senses are as follows:[122] (1) One of the mean-

ings of substantia is that in which it designates some particular kind of

stuff. This may be disclosed by a word in the genitive case (Adversus

Praxean 16.4), or by an adjective which shows its nature (de anima 14.3)

or its possessor (Adversus Marcionem ii. 16.4). (2) In another sense substantia

may designate the general stuff of which all things are composed (Adversus

Hermogenes 9.1). So Stead says, "In this usage substantia means 'stuff of

any sort whatever'; but this is not the same as 'stuff of no sort whatever'".[123]

(3) It may designate a thing not in the sense of that thing having a substance but in the sense that the thing is a substance (Adversus Hermogenes 45.3). Thus it can mean individual thing and has some resemblance to Aristotle's prote ousia. According to Stead, with Tertullian "this sense (is) occasional and peripheral rather than central and typical".[124] (4) Tertullian also uses substantia in the sense of existence, or the fact, status, manner, or mode of existing (Adversus Marcionem ii.5.1;9.3-4; Adversus Valentinanos 15.1; De Carne Christi 17.1; Ad Martyras iii.3). (5) Finally in specific theological contexts substantia may mean simply character or nature (Ad Nationes ii.4.6; Adversus Hermogenes 5.1; De Praescriptione Haereticorum 26.10).

Stead summarizes the results of his investigation into the meaning of substantia for Tertullian in the following words:

> God's substantia might be a mere periphrasis for God himself; it
> might mean his mode of existence (though I do not think it ever
> means merely the fact that he exists); or his rank or character,
> divinity or eternity; or lastly the unique stuff which is, or
> composes, the divine corpus, and which Tertullian denotes spiritus.[125]

So Stead believes that substantia in the sense of prote ousia is atypical in Tertullian. Such meanings as mode of existence, rank, character, and the unique stuff, spiritus, are to be preferred because they are more in harmony with the analogies of root, fountain, and sun which Tertullian applies to the Trinity. Furthermore, these meanings relate Tertullian better to the circumstances of his time and make his thought more intelligible.

Those scholars who argue that Tertullian's use of substantia is more philosophical in connotation than legal are probably correct. Yet, in light of Stead's discussion it does not seem that the former necessarily rules out the latter entirely. It appears that to some extent both are involved. Even if Tertullian himself was not a lawyer, his education, especially in rhetoric,

provided him a familiarity with the legal conventions of his day. While the legal connotation may not be dominant, it, nevertheless, seems to be present and to be correlated with the philosophical. Thus, those interpretations which point to the legal connotation are incorrect only because they ignore the philosophical and imply that the legal meaning is the dominant or only meaning. If I have understood them correctly, both Stead and Wolfson emphasize Stoic "stuff" or "substratum" as the basic meaning of substantia for Tertullian. But this "stuff" or "substratum" which is spiritus also has a unique rank or status, namely, supremacy. God's substantia is that spiritus[126] of power and goodness which alone is supreme in the whole range of being and thus cannot be threatened by contingency, change, and death.

Yet, it is not the nature (substantia) of God to be alone, unrelated, static, or inactive. Tertullian attempts to express this by means of the concept, oikonomia. According to Prestige this concept as applied to the Trinity, the eternal relationships of the divine triad, apparently was employed by no other Father except Hippolytus, and thus seems unique in patristic theology. Further, Prestige believes that it is of even greater importance in Tertullian's thought than 'substance' and 'person'.

Whether this is the case or not, this concept is of great importance and for the following reasons. First, it preserves the notion of the richness of God's nature such that He is not an impersonal absolute caught behind some sort of metaphysical barriers, but rather capable of eternal internal relations and contingent external relations. Secondly, it preserves the divine unity. As Prestige puts it:

> Tertullian's conception of divine unity . . . rests on his doctrine
> of 'economy', that the unity constitutes the triad out of its own
> inherent nature, not by any process of sub-division, but by reason

of a principle of constructive integration which the godhead essentially possesses. In other words, his idea of unity is not mathematical but philosophical; it is an organic unity, not an abstract, bare point. . . . The numerical order and collocation (dispositio) of the triad, Tertullian says (Adv. Prax. 3), was assumed by his opponents to be a division of the unity; whereas the unity, devolving the triad out of its own self, is not destroyed by it, but is 'distributed', or dis-. pensed, or organized, or methodised, or functionally constituted.[127]

Surely, the idea of functional organization is central in Tertullian's understanding of the divine 'economy'. It is in light of this that the formula una substantia, tres personae is to be understood. In a certain sense each 'person' is an eternal mode of the divine being, a functioning unit of the organic whole. While eternal in the Father as Reason, the Logos or Son is put forth as a prolation of the Father just as human words proceed from and reciprocate with human thought.[128] Surely, as indicated earlier in the discussion of Tertullian's semantics, thought and language, especially in the Stoic sense of lekton, are so closely related in the human epistemological and communication enterprise that there cannot be one without the other. In a certain sense there is an organic unity here. Yet, at the same time, thought and language may be distinguished, for in a certain sense they are two things.

In an attempt to make this clear, Tertullian uses the familiar analogies of the root putting forth the tree, the fountain the stream, and the sun the ray. In a description of how these analogies illustrate his argument, Tertullian says:

For these are probolai (emanations) of the substances from which they proceed. . . . But still the tree is not severed from the root, nor the river from the fountain, nor the ray from the sun; nor, indeed is the Word separated from God. Following, therefore, the form of these analogies, I confess that I call God and His Word--the Father and His Son--two. For the root and the tree are

distinctly two things, but correlatively joined; the fountain
and the river are also two forms, but indivisible; so likewise the
sun and the ray are two forms, but coherent ones. Everything
which proceeds from something else must needs be second to that
from which it proceeds, without being on that account separated.
Where, however, there is a second, there must be two; and where
there is a third, there must be three. Now the Spirit indeed
is third from God and the Son. . . . Nothing, however, is alien
from that original source whence it derives its own properties.
In like manner the Trinity, flowing down from the Father through
intertwined and connected steps, does not at all disturb the
Monarchy, whilst at the same time guards the state of the
Economy.[129]

Thus, for Tertullian, the Son and the Holy Spirit share in the divine

monarchy, substantia, spiritus, status, or supremacy of the Father, but

each persona is a functioning unit within the divine 'economy', operating

respectively with respect to redemption, sanctification, and creation. They

are "three, however, not in status (statu), but in degree (gradu); not in

substance (substantia), but in form (forma); not in power (potestate), but in

species (specie); yet of one substance, and of one status, and of one power,

inasmuch as He is one God from whom these degrees and forms and species are

reckoned under the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit".[130]

In the judgment of this writer, H. A. Wolfson has given a sound exegesis

of this passage save for one important and rather crucial exception which will

be noted in the discussion which follows.[131] According to Wolfson, Tertullian

in denying that the persons of the Trinity are three in substance is simply

repeating in negative form what he often claims in a positive form, namely,

the "unity of substance". Similarly with respect to "power" he is stating

in negative form what he often states positively, namely, that the three are

one in power. By this he seems to mean the unity of rule, the one monarchy.

It follows, then, that not being of different "substance" or "power", the

members of the triad do not have a different but the same "status". The

Trinity, therefore, does not destroy the divine monarchy since "it remains so firm and stable in its own status (Adv. Prax. 4)."

Tertullian's statements that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are "three . . . in degree . . . in form . . . in species" must now be considered. According to Wolfson, "degree" is to be understood in terms of a causal relation between the members of the triad. That is, the Father is uncaused, the Son derives his existence from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son (Adv. Prax. 4). So Tertullian affirms that the Father "who has always been alone could never have had order or rank (Adv. Prax. 19)." Thus, the generation of the Son is not eternal. At this point Wolfson's exegesis is sound as far as it goes but due to an omission may give a wrong impression that would tend to lead one to classify Tertullian among the extreme subordinationists or Sabellian modalists or adoptionists. Wolfson fails to discuss an important passage in Chapter five of Against Praxeas . Here Tertullian, although he affirms that "before all things (i.e., the creation of the world and the generation of the Son) God was alone", nevertheless, immediately adds that he means that there was nothing external to God, and that even then God was not alone for He had with him Reason from which the Word was to proceed.

Prestige, as noted earlier, claims that for Tertullian the triad is the eternal 'economy' of the divine nature. Many years ago Professor B. B. Warfield very carefully and clearly explicated this aspect of Tertullian's thought. According to Warfield, while the processions, emanations or prolations from the Father were of great importance in Tertullian's thought, of equal significance was that the triad in a certain sense was eternal. Thus Warfield claims:

>These prolations rested for Tertullian on distinctions existing
>in the Godhead prior to all prolations, as the appropriate
>foundations for the prolations. . . . The Logos existed
>eternally, he asseverates, in God: the prolation of the Logos,
>indeed, had a beginning and will have an end; but the Logos
>Himself who is prolated, is so far from being a derived
>existence, which has a finite element in it, and has an
>origin and is to make an end--that He is just God Himself pro-
>lated, that is, outstretched like a hand, to His work.[132]

What Warfield says here needs to be added to Wolfson's interpretation
in order to do justice to Tertullian. To be sure, there is a strain of
subordinationism in Tertullian but it is not extreme. Surely, such is
necessary in order to avoid the death of God theology contained in Monarchia-
nism. On the other hand, the unity of substance is necessary in order to
avoid adoptionism which entails that human nature has not been redeemed.
Further, his position permits Tertullian to claim this redemption did indeed
cost God something without at the same time threatening His existence nor
supremacy in power and goodness.

According to Wolfson the second of the three terms used by Tertullian
in the passage under consideration, "three . . . in form", refers primarily
to modulus and this term designates the manner of the Son's existence as
being a generation from the Father. The third term "three . . . in species"
seems to designate the members of the triad as individuals rather than as
certain classes of individuals. Further, "species" seems to carry the mean-
ing of 'appearance' in a certain sense of that word, namely, visibility.
Thus, Tertullian speaks of the Father, being of uncaused existence, as
invisible, the Son, being derived from the Father, as visible and the Holy
Spirit, being derived from the Father through the Son, as still more visible.

In summary, it could be said that in his Trinitarian views, Tertullian
is struggling to hold together the idea of the necessary existence of God

with the notion of God's experiencing and suffering. The distinction between

the Father and Son is necessary or otherwise the death of God is entailed.

However, if there is too great a subordination the result would be either a

Gnostic polytheism or a human nature not redeemed. Thus, Tertullian distin-

guishes the eternal Reason from the prolated Word or Son but not in such a

fashion as to make them of different substances. The latter is visible,

suffers and dies, while the former is invisible, eternal, immutable, impassible

in the sense of necessary, deathless, supreme power and goodness. Undoubtedly,

had Tertullian had available Whiteheadean categories such as the antecedent

and consequent aspects of God's nature, he could have expressed this more

clearly, but it is this which he appears to be struggling for and pointing

toward. His notion of the one substance and the divine 'economy' of three

persons enables him to maintain the unity and yet the plurality of the divine.

Further, it enables him to consistently claim that God is actually related to

this world, Incarnate, without becoming contingent or having His existence

nor His supremacy in power and goodness threatened.

My colleague, William L. Power, claims that the Fathers' notion of the

Trinity can make sense and be consistent even when based on the notion of

'substantia' as prote ousia. Such consistency can be obtained through applying

a logic of individuals to such Trinitarian views.[133] This logic, of course,

is a modern development, and, as indicated previously, Tertullian had access

only to Aristotelian and Stoic logic. But, with 'substantia' understood as

active substratum and status, with the concepts of 'economy' and 'prolation',

Tertullian's formula, and development thereof, is surely consistent in terms

of the logic which he knew and used. Surely, there is no logical contradiction

in affirming that a certain substratum or status can be possessed by three

functioning units or personae, nor that one persona can possess more than one substratum or status.

The latter, of course, is precisely what Tertullian does claim in his Christology. Jesus Christ possesses fully both divine substantia and human substantia. They are not, at the Incarnation, fused into some sort of tertium quid . The two retain their own properties. Yet, they are not to be thought of as somehow separated into two centers of personality, a human Jesus and a divine Christ. There is one 'person' with two substances and statuses. Here Tertullian points out to Praxeas that Christos is a descriptive adjective predicated of Jesus.[134] It means Jesus, the Anointed One, and is not the proper or substantive name of a divine being. So just as one substance, spirit, or status may be shared by more than one persona, so may one persona possess more than one substance, spirit, or status. Again, there does not appear to be a contradiction here. Thus Tertullian is able to hold together in a consistent fashion God's necessary existence and supremacy with His compassion and His active involvement with imperfect human beings in the contingent, changing, and finite world.

The attempt has been made in this study of Tertullian to take a fresh look at his thought. If the arguments which have been presented are sound in the sense not only of being valid but also of being supported by the evidence, then the following may be concluded. (1) Tertullian's famous purported paradox is not a paradox at all but a type of argument form. (2) While often based on an appeal to Scripture, which, to an extent, indicates his empirical bent of mind because such appeal to written documents was an aspect of the 'inartificial' argument forms used in rhetorical conjecture, Tertullian's arguments are just as often composed of linguistic and logical analyses which,

as far as they go, are still impressive today. (3) While taking the rule of faith as normative, Tertullian is not against philosophy per se but only against those metaphysical positions which he viewed as informing the heresies. Indeed, he does not hesitate to use philosophy and a philosophically informed type of natural theology in attacking heretics and defending the faith. (4) Finally, there is a basic consistency in Tertullian's thought which provides it with extraordinary force and power. In light of this summary it appears reasonable to conclude that in general Tertullian's attitude toward faith and reason is similar to that found in Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, namely, that a rational and intelligible faith sustains the human spirit much better than one which is irrational and unintelligible.

CHAPTER III

Language Theory, Analysis, and Logic in Augustine

While not ignored as much as it is in studies of most of the early

church Fathers, and most notably in studies of Tertullian, it still seems to

be the case that relatively little attention is given to the language theory,

analysis, and logic of Augustine. In the case of Tertullian, popular attention,

at least in the theological community, generally is fastened on what is supposed

to be his psychological idiosyncrasies, defiant paradox, blind faith, and

emotive language. In the previous chapters of this work, an attempt has been

made to show that this popular view is grievously in error. In the case of

Augustine, on the other hand, popular attention, at least in the theological

community, has been fastened primarily on the profundity of his psychology,

spirituality, faith, Neo-Platonic epistemology, hermeneutics, and doctrinal

expositions. To be sure, these facets of Augustine's thought are not generally

misrepresented. Certainly it is true that even if every aspect of his thought

in these areas is not free of difficulties, it, nevertheless, is the case that

his thought in these areas can be characterized as genuinely profound. Yet,

while these aspects of his thought are not generally neglected nor misrepresented,

there is a tendency to pay scant attention to his language theory, analysis, and

logic. But surely such is basic for his methodology, and an understanding of

his methodology is a necessary condition for an adequate conception of his

total philosophical/theological perspective.

It lies much beyond the scope of this present work to attempt even a

brief descriptive analysis of the full scope of Augustine's magnificent

philosophical theology. Rather our purposes will be served by first character-
izing in general the major thrust of his epistemology and then concentrating
more specifically on the language theory, analysis, and logic which inform
his epistemology and methodology.

A. Augustine's Epistemology.

It is well known that in his epistemology Augustine, influenced by
Neo-Platonism, takes an ontological approach to knowledge. Truth is divine
illumination, and thus the guarantee of knowledge is centered in God. But
on what basis can one come to this conclusion? Augustine suggests a two-
pronged approach and each prong is a necessary condition which when combined
with the other yields a sufficient condition for the conclusion that there is
genuine knowledge of objective reality.

First, in response to the skeptic's doubt concerning the possibility
of having knowledge of objective reality, Augustine claims that the skeptic's
assertion that one might be mistaken concerning the knowledge that one exists
is a self-defeating assertion. In order to be mistaken one would have to
exist, so undoubtedly one is not mistaken in knowing that he exists. Further,
even in raising the question of his existence, one is tacitly affirming his
own existence as the questioner, the doubter. In the very act of raising
the question as to whether he can have knowledge, it turns out that he already
has knowledge of a rather complex kind concerning his own existence as a
rational soul.

The other prong of Augustine's approach has to do with knowledge of the
formal truths of mathematics and logic. Even the skeptics admitted that there
was certain knowledge in this realm but claimed that these necessary truths
were only formal, having no relevance to objective reality. If this is so,

then knowledge of objective reality other than that one exists still would be in jeoparady.

Augustine's solution, based on Neo-Platonism, is to bring the two prongs together and to argue that the necessary truths of mathematics and logic are objective realities finding their source in the ultimate Ground of Being. Briefly stated, his argument is that of all the things known to man the rational soul, the existence of which he has already established, occupies the highest rank. This rational soul is able to discriminate between judgments of greater or lesser degrees of probability. Even the skeptics who claimed that all judgments were probable only admitted that there were degrees of probability among judgments. But for Augustine the admission of degrees of probability implies an absolute standard in light of which it can be determined that judgment A is more probably true than judgment B. The rational soul encounters a rational being superior to itself as the source of this standard and of the rational norms including the truths of mathematics and logic. But if this much can be said about the rational being superior to man, then it also can be said that this Being is the basis of all truth and rational order. Thus, the very content and means of knowledge rest upon God. Without the knowledge God has planted in man's mind there would be no guarantee with respect to man's knowledge of the external world.[1]

In light of this epistemology it would appear incorrect to affirm, as some have done,[2] that Augustine settled on two orders of truth, one having to do with existence in this world and the other with salvation, as though they were entirely separate and distinct. To be sure, for the Fathers ultimate beatitude transcends this mundane world of mutability and imperfection. Yet, as we have seen in our study of Tertullian, there was an insistence on the

doctrine of Creation ex nihilo which means that vestiges of the divine are to be found also in this world, on this world as a necessary prelude to the world of glory, and on the Creator as Redeemer and the Redeemer as Creator. Truth is one and all truths are reflections of this Truth. Later, Thomas Aquinas confronted with Aristotelianism was to accord greater reliability to knowledge gained through the application of reason to the data provided by sense experience,[3] but as we shall see even far Aquinas there were not two separate and distinct orders of truth. Rather, the order of genesis finds both its source and fulfillment precisely in the order of perfection. No matter through what means they may be attained, Truth and Truths arise from a single source, namely, God. For Augustine who was more doubtful concerning the reliability of sense data one must begin with God or take the ontological approach if any reliable knowledge of this sensible world or anything else is to be gained. Thus, Paul Tillich's appraisal seems appropriate when he said, "in Augustine the secular realm was completely swallowed by the religious realm."[4]

In his soteriology as well as his epistemology Augustine held to a 'one realm' view. Some of the Fathers, such as Irenaeus, had distinguished between the image and the likeness of God in man as created. The former was man's capacity to reason and to make relatively free decisions. The latter referred to a certain God-like quality of life and the capacity for immortality and had been lost in the fall of Adam. Salvation was the regaining of this lost likeness. Later, Aquinas was to make this distinction and to acknowledge that since the world was created and is sustained by God man in a state of pure nature can think aright and do aright up to a point commensurate with his abilities. However it is only by means of the added power of supernatural grace that man can attain supernatural beatitude and the likeness of God.[5]

Yet, even for Aquinas there is no dichotomy between the image and the
likeness. Both are from God and find their unity in God with the image
becoming perfected only in the likeness. For Augustine, on the other hand,
the volition of fallen man is so corrupted by the pretensions of self or
the disease of sin that he cannot will aright, think aright or do aright
without the redeeming and energizing supernatural grace of God infused into
his soul.[6] Again, it would seem that here there is further evidence in support
of Tillich's appraisal.

We have seen that Augustine's epistemology requires the grounding of the
necessary truths of mathematics and logic in the ultimate source of being,
namely, God. Since necessary truths are not subject to time and change it
follows that the Reality in which they are grounded transcends the limitations
of time and change. Time is a matter of human consciousness in which memory,
present experience, and anticipation provide the suitable context in which
before and after can be located. But temporal succession, before and after,
cannot characterize God who is the source of necessary truths. Instead he
is the self-existent, self-sufficient, immutable, necessary being who is
unaffected by contingency, change, and time. From this it follows that God's
knowledge is absolute in the sense that God knows all occurrences not as super-
seding one another but as a contemporaneous whole. For God the whole sweep
of history is present. He sees all things together, not successively.[7]

This view of the nature of God's knowledge was destined to become one of
the major ingredients in what might be called classical theology. It was
held also by Thomas Aquinas. Although in his third way Aquinas begins with
man's experience of contingency, he arrives at the conclusion that God is a
necessary being, and for him this has the same implications with respect to
God's knowledge as it did for Augustine. With few exceptions,[8] in "classical

theology" generally there was a failure to recognize that because God's existence qua existence is necessary it does not necessarily follow that the whole content of his knowledge is necessary and absolute. To say that God knows all things as present entails a dilemma which can be escaped only by admitting either that God is not omniscient or that time is unreal. If time is regarded as real, then it is logically impossible for future possibilities to be known as actualities, for there can not be events to be known prior to their happenings. Surely omniscience means to know all that is logically possible to know. The failure to recognize this raises insoluble problems with respect to the reality of time, the freedom of man, and the issue of theodicy.[9]

Whatever difficulties there may be in the Augustinian views concerning omniscience, freedom, and theodicy, it is the case, nevertheless, that Augustine explicates a relatively sophisticated theory of language and logic, and demonstrates a superior skill at language and logical analyses. Certainly this is not surprising in view of the well known fact that like Tertullian Augustine was highly educated and knowledgeable in several disciplines including those of literature, philosophy, rhetoric, and logic. In the Confessions Augustine explicitly states that he achieved the distinction of being at the head of his class in the School of Rhetoric at Carthage, and that later he taught rhetoric at Thagaste, then at Carthage, and finally at Rome.[10]

In Chapter II above it was indicated that the patterns of 'classical' rhetoric included the following: (1) an exordium for the purpose of putting the audience into a receptive mood; (2) a narratio which could contain a background description of the particular situation and statements concerning the issue in question, method of treatment, and main divisions of the speech;

(3) the main body of the speech dealing with proof in terms of confirming

one's own case and refuting the opponents case; and (4) the Conclusio or

summing up which could contain further attacks on the opponent and the arous-

ing of sympathy for one's own position. It was indicated further that while

semantical and logical arguments might appear in any of these patterns,

pattern (3), the main body of the speech, was the one in which such argument

forms were most fitting and numerous. Thus, the rhetorician had good reason

for giving attention to the semantics and logic of both Aristotle and the

Stoics with Cicero claiming that such was a sine qua non for one "who is

attracted by the glory of eloquence."[11] In light of this, it seems reasonable

to suppose that Augustine was thoroughly familiar not only with the patterns

of rhetoric but also with as much of Aristotelian and Stoic semantics and

logic as were available in his day. Granted that this is the case, it may

be of some value not only for a more complete understanding of Augustine but

also for its possible contribution to the current theological enterprise,

to undertake a consideration of these aspects of his methodology.

B. Augustine's Semantics

It has been held by some that Augustine took an essentially referential

view of the function of language. In the first paragraph of his Philosophical

Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein quotes a portion from Chapter VIII, Book I

of the Confessions in which Augustine describes the process through which as

a child he observed the actions of his elders as they spoke and thus came to

use signs (words) to name objects and express his wishes. Concerning this

passage Wittgenstein makes the following comment:

> These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the
> essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in
> language name objects--sentences are combinations of such names--.
> In this picture of language we find the roots of the following

idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.[12]

While Augustine here may have presented a rather apt description as to the process whereby we learn how to use language, Wittgenstein is correct in indicating the inadequacy of this particular description with respect to a full theory of language and meaning. It is not the case that all words have meaning in terms of denotation, of what Gilbert Ryle has called the "'Fido'-Fido mold".[13] There is a variety of types of roles performed by the words or signs we use in saying things. Further, sentences function differently from single words in our utterances. There is no one basic mold into which all significant expressions are to be cast. As Wittgenstein put it, "Augustine . . . does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system".[14] While the referential function is an important part of signification, it does not provide the final explanation of meaning. Rather meaning is to be associated with the roles expressions per-form within the context of discourse. It is the obverse of the nonsensical rather than the non-denotative and is a compact of rules concerning the employment of expressions. Expressions may be correctly employed (according to the rules of the language game) to refer but also they may be employed in many other ways as well. Meaning is to be associated with use rather than confined to denotation or reference.

Two things need to be said in appraising Wittgenstein's critique of Augustine's language theory. First, while it is the case that the passage from the Confessions does seem to reflect a narrowly referential view of language, it is nonetheless an essential function if we are to be able to talk about things in the world. Even Wittgenstein's 'use' theory of language does not ignore the importance of this function. Secondly, in other writings,

especially in <u>Concerning the Teacher</u> and <u>On Christian Instruction</u>, Augustine, although he does not develop it fully, does suggest a language theory not totally inconsistent with that of Wittgenstein.

In the two treatises mentioned above Augustine's theory concerning the nature and function of signs both betrays its Stoic base and is not unlike that of the American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce.[15] For Augustine a sign is that which stands for something else to somebody. There are two fundamental types, natural and conventional. Natural signs "are those which, apart from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of something else, as for example, smoke when it indicates fire".[16] Interestingly, Augustine here uses a favorite Stoic illustration of natural signs. Conventional signs, on the other hand, are those which have been made to stand for other things by living beings "for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their thoughts".[17] Among the latter words hold the chief place. In addition to these two types of signs, there is for Augustine, as there is for the earlier Stoics, the church Father, Tertullian, and the later modern philosopher, Peirce, a triadic relation in the functioning of linguistic signs. As indicated in Chapter II above this triad includes the object for which the sign stands, the sign, and what the Stoics called the <u>Lekton</u>, namely, the meaning of the sign for some subject or interpreter. It is well known that Peirce designates these as "Object", "Representamen", and "Interpretant".[18]

Augustine's insistence on the triadic relation in the functioning of linguistic signs is clearly indicated in <u>On Dialectic</u>. While it is the case that the authenticity of this work has been seriously questioned in modern times, Darrell Jackson in a very careful and critical quantitative linguistic study using statistical techniques has made a convincing case in support of

the claim that Augustine wrote On Dialectic.[19] In this work Augustine says

the following:

> Now that which the mind not the ears perceives from the word and
> which is held within the mind itself is called a dicibile. When
> a word is spoken not for its own sake but for the sake of signifying
> something else, it is called a dicto. The thing itself which is
> neither a word nor the conception of a word in the mind, whether or
> not it has a word by which it can be signified, is called nothing
> but a res in the proper sense of the name.[20]

It is clear that the meaning Augustine attributed to dicibile is the same

as that which the Stoics attributed to lekton, namely that it refers to the

meaning of the word or that which is understood in the mind. Dicto refers

both to the word itself and that which is brought about in the mind by means

of the word. Res refers to the actual objects labeled by the word or sign.

In On the Trinity there is further evidence that Augustine accepted the triadic

nature of linguistic sings. In this work Augustine spoke of the word which

"gives light inwardly" and concerning which the word which sounds outwardly

is a sign.[21]

R. A. Markus claims Augustine to have been the first to stress the

triadic nature of the signifying relation, and that his originality lay in

his use of the theory of signs as a theory of language.[22] However, in light

of recent studies of Stoic semantics and logic with their emphasis on the

Stoic conception of the triadic nature of the signifying relation, the indi-

cation in Chapter II above that Tertullian knew and used Stoic semantics, and

the strong probability that such semantics found continuing expression in

rhetorical studies, Markus' judgment appears to be incorrect.[23] Indeed, this

appraisal of Markus' claim is supported by Darrell Jackson who presents a

considerable amount of evidence in support of the conclusion that Augustine's

theory of 'signs' and his logic owes much to Stoic semantics and logic.[24]

According to Jackson, Augustine's view of 'sign' is in agreement with the

Stoic tradition and his originality consists in his application of this sign-theory to the new task of Scripture interpretation. In the treatise On Christian Instruction Augustine clearly describes the triadic nature of the signifying relation but develops fully only the dyadic relation between the sign and thing. This is the case because he is concerned with the hermeneutics of Scripture and in this endeavor the important thing is to move from the sign to the thing which the sign designates.[25]

Already it begins to appear that Augustine's language theory was much richer in scope than one would have suspected from Wittgenstein's description. Indeed, Augustine expressed perspectives which indicate that he would not have been unsympathetic to the further development of language theory such as that suggested by Wittgesntein and other modern philosophers. As already indicated in the description of his view of the triadic nature of the functioning of linguistic signs, Augustine, emphasized the category of "meaning". The outer word is a sign of the inner word. "He who speaks expresses the sign of his will by means of articulate sound".[26] In conventional signs there is a relation of dependence between the sign and the subject who uses the sign. "Nor is there any other reason for signifying, or for giving signs, except for bringing forth and transferring to another mind the action of the mind on the person who makes the sign."[27] Also in some cases signs are signs of demonstration rather than of things signified and thus it could be said of them that their meanings are to be found in their functions.[28]

Augustine, like Tertullian before him and Aquinas after him, emphasized the following of common usage with respect to the meanings of words. Of course, where required for the sake of clarity, to remove an ambiguty and/or obscurity, one may stipulate. In general, however, common usage is to be preferred. Augustine's emphasis upon common usage is clearly evident in the following:

> To use an analogy, one figure of a letter X set down in the
> form of a cross mark means one thing among the Latins, another
> among the Greeks, not because of its nature, but because of
> agreement and consent to its significance. And thus he who
> knows both languages does not use that sign with the same
> signification when he wishes to convey something in writing to a
> Greek that he implies when he writes to a man who speaks Latin...
> Therefore just as all of these significations move men's minds in
> accord with the consent of their societies, and because this consent
> varies, they move them differently, nor do men agree upon them
> because of an innate value but they have a value because they are
> agreed upon... Signs are not valid among men except by common
> consent.[29]

Common consent is one basis for the force which words may have. Due in large

part probably to his training in rhetoric Augustine gave attention not only

to what today we call "semantics" but also to what we call "pragmatics". Not

only linguistic factors but also cultural, historical and psychological factors

must be considered in the process of communication. The speaker, the Christian

teacher, should use all possible resources including that of adapting his style

to his audience in order to communicate the meaning and truth of the Christian

faith.[30]

While for Augustine some words functioned as signs both of things and of

meanings held in the mind, he nevertheless made the distinction between the

meanings of words and the meanings of things for which words stand. The

former has to do with definitional meanings in terms of common usage. The

latter has to do with things in terms of their causes, purposes, explanations,

and what these things as the vestiges of God's creative and providential

care signify. Thus, there is a two fold signification in the sense that

names of things signify the things and in turn the things themselves signify.[31]

Of course, not all words refer to things in the strict sense of "thing."

There are verbs which stand for actions, adverbs which usually stand for

manners of doing things, prepositions which stand for relations, conjunctions

which serve to connect other words, and in logic especially there are the

syncategorematic words such as "if....then", "either...or", "both...and", "all", "some", etc. With respect to these classes of words meaning is determined in terms of the functions they perform. Also there is the use of words to refer to words. Augustine displayed an awareness of the distinction which today we designate as "mention" and "use". In On Dialectic he said:

> Words are signs of things whenever they refer to them even though those [words] by which we dispute about [words] are [signs] of words. For since we are unable to speak of words except by words and since we do not speak unless we speak of some things, the mind recognizes that words are signs of things, without ceasing to be things. When, therefore, a word is uttered for its own sake, that is, so that something is being asked and argued about the word itself, clearly it is the thing which is the subject of the disputation and inquiry; but the thing in this case is called a verbum.[32]

Just as not all words label actual things so not all sentences label actual states of affairs. Augustine was clearly aware of the distinction between sentences and propositions, a distinction which had been made by the Stoics. Sentences serve a number of functions. Some of them make assertions or express propositions which may be either affirmed or denied because they are either true or false. Some sentences serve other functions such as the interrogative, the exclamatory, the imperative and are neither true nor false. Thus, it is nonsensical to either affirm or deny them. So Augustine said:

> For either a statement is made in such a way that it is held to be subject to truth or falsity, such as 'every man is walking' or 'every man is not walking' and others of this kind. Or a statement is made in such a way that, although it fully expresses what one has in mind, it cannot be affirmed or denied, as when we command, wish, curse and the like.[33]

In light of the evidence presented above it seems obvious that Augustine's language theory and analysis were not confined to the "'Fido'-Fido mold." This is not surprising both becasue of Augustine's liberal education which culminated in rhetoric and because of his conviction that a Christian should

make use of the knowledge and skills available in his culture in the service

of the Christian faith. In Concerning the Teacher and On Christian Instruction

he recommends utilizing the skills of rhetoric, logic, mathematics, and science

in the interpretation of Scripture and in the development of a theology.

Whatever is not inconsistent with the faith may in some way or other be made

to serve the faith. After all, the world, including the sciences, is not alien

to God since he had created the world ex nihilo.

It has been argued here that Augustine's semantics involves a triadic

relation similar to that both of the earlier Stoics and Tertullian on the one

hand and to Peirce on the other. It is the case also that their views are

similar with respect to how knowledge of the meaning of signs is obtained.

For both Augustine and Peirce there must be knowledge of the things signs

stand for if there is to be knowledge of the meanings of sings. As Peirce

puts it:

> The sign can only represent the object and tell about it. It can-
> not furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for
> that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign;
> namely, that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to
> convey some further information concerning it.[34]

So also for Augustine the sign is learned from the thing rather than vice

versa. In order to know the meanings of signs one has to know, in the last

resort, the things signs stand for.[35] For Augustine, as for Tertullian,

this has an important role to play in the interpretation of Scripture. If

there is to be an understanding of the figurative expressions, metaphors,

and symbols in Scripture, there must be not only knowledge of languages,

numbers, and music but also of things. So Augustine claims, "ignorance of

things . . . renders figurative expressions obscure."[36] This claim would

seem to indicate that figurative or symbolic expressions cannot function

appropriately with meaning unless there is the possibility of specifying on

demand the object symbolized and of saying something about it in non-symbolic language.

Such a view of symbols has been questioned by some contemporary theologians, most notably Paul Tillich.[37] We cannot here give a full anlysis of Tillich's view of symbols but only mention his basic claim. As is well known, for Tillich all discourse about God is symbolic except for either the statement, "God is being itself or the ground of being", or the statement, "All discourse about God is symbolic." Thus, the symbol becomes the primary (and perhaps the only) means of making religious utterances. If this is so, then, for example, it would appear rather difficult to determine the appropriateness of applying the symbol "shepherd" to God, for the doctrine "God cares for his creatures" is a symbol as well and we're in a regress of symbolic explanations. Further, "God is being itself" would present little help since it is so vague and ineffiable. Surely there is nothing in the concept of the infinitely transcending and mysterious "being itself" that necessitates a comparison between it and "shepherds" or "fathers". Indeed God may no less appropriately be said to be a dictator, a slave, a sensualist, and a hater, etc., rather than a shepherd.

In the traditional view the appropriateness of a symbol is determined by the truth of the doctrine it expresses. Unless something literally true can be said, it is impossible to determine whether a particular symbol is appropriate or not. Since Augustine warns against taking figurative expressions in a literal sense and literal expressions in a figurative sense, it seems to follow that he supports this position.[38] While there has been much disagreement over the precise extent of what can be said literally, there is widespread agreement, at least among philosophers, concerning this position in general. Indeed, some go so far as to say that if a sentence contains an

irreducible metaphor (i.e., one which can't be translated into an expression used in a literal sense), then the sentence is lacking in cognitive meaning.

Another important item is Augustine's semantics is his discussion of and warning against obscurity, ambiguity and equivocation. Given the force of words obscure, ambiguous and equivocal expressions prevent the hearer from discerning the truth. In an ambiguous expression more than one thing is presented in such a way that the hearer cannot know which of them is meant. In what is obscure nothing or very little appears to be considered. And in equivocation a multivocal word is used in one sense in the first part of a sentence or paragraph and in another sense in a later section of the sentence or paragraph. Equivocation is possible because ambiguity is possible.[39]

In Concerning the Teacher Augustine shows that questions of the form "What is the meaning of X" or "What is X" can be ambiguious and result in confusing verbal disputes because it is not clear whether what is being asked for is the meaning of the word or the meaning of the thing signified by the word. As an example, Augustine supposes someone in his presence saying that man is surpassed in manly power (virtus) by large animals and that such a claim would be rejected as false. Yet the person was neither lying nor making a mistake about the thing. Rather, according to Augustine:

> He merely calls the thing about which he was thinking by a name which is other than the one by which we call it. We should agree with him at once if we could read his mind and see directly the thought which he was unable to express by the words spoken---. They say that definition can cure this error, so that in this case, if the speaker were to define what virtue is, it would be clear that the controversy is not about the thing but about the word.[40]

The same distinction is made by Augustine also in the Confessions when he says, "I see that two sorts of differences may arise when by signs anything is related, even by true reporters--one concerning the truth of the things, the other concerning the meaning of him who reports them".[41] Further, he

expresses regret that there is a scarcity of good definers.

Another feature of Augustine's semantics is interesting because of its relevance to a controversy in both contemporary philosophical and theological circles. Simply stated the issue is whether or not negatives like 'nothing' are names or descriptions referring to some mysterious and ontological 'something'. Some existentialist philosophers and theologians use 'nothing' as though it refers to some special type of entity, a queer real object that has relations to other types of entities. Again Paul Tillich serves as an example in his claim that "the very structure which makes negative judgments possible proves the ontological character of non-being."[42] Some philosophers have countered that such a claim arises out of a violation of the rules of use and that negative judgments do not imply any transcendent ontological truths. The mistake arises because terms such as 'nothing' and 'non-being' are in form noun-substantives like other noun-substantives which do designate some type of thing or entity, and thus mistakenly it is thought that these negative noun-substantives must be also descriptions of something. But this is not the case. Rather they function as signs of denial and their proper sense is indicated when they are used to mean "not anything of the sort." This error of treating 'nothing' as other noun-substantives is often illustrated by quoting the well-known passage from Alice Through the Looking Glass:

> "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. "I only wish I had such eyes," the king remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to see Nobody, and at that distance too! Why it's as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!"

On this same point Paul Edwards raises the question as to what kind of being can be attributed to holes. Quoting Kurt Tuchalsky he puts the following questions with respect to holes. "When a hole is filled where does it go? If an object occupies a place, this place cannot be occupied by another

object but what about holes? If there is a hole in a given place, can that place be occupied by other holes as well? And why aren't there halves of holes?"[43] Again, this illustrates the confusion and perhaps even absurdity in treating 'nothing' as something.

Augustine clearly recognizes this confusion and absurdity. In a response to Adeodatus' complaint, in Concerning the Teacher, that he, Augustine, should not express 'nihil' if he did not signify anything by it, Augustine suggests that a certain affection of the mind is signified rather than a thing which is not. Then, suggesting that the dialogue proceed, he humorously says, much like the king in Alice Through the Looking Glass, "lest nothing should detain us and we should suffer delay."[44] It would appear that by an affection of the mind, Augustine means denial, and that 'nothing' functions as a sign of denial. In another work he even more emphatically rejects treating 'nothing' as though it designated 'something', and says, "For no attention should be paid to the ravings of men who think that 'nothing' should be understood to mean 'something'".[45]

C. Augustine's Logic

We have noted previously that in On Christian Instruction Augustine considers semantics in the context of developing a proper method for the interpretation of Scripture. This method, of course, is not limited to semantics in the strict sense of the term. It includes also what is true and useful in the various sciences and arts of the "Heathen." Augustine is adamant in his opposition to practices such as astrology, divination, and other forms of magic which he regards as rank superstition and thus incon- sistent with the faith. However, he does recommend the use with caution and moderation of history, natural science, the science of numbers and definitions, the mechanical arts, rhetoric, and dialectics. With respect to the last item

Augustine obviously means logic. He insists that its principles, structures, and forms are divinely ordained, not just invented by men, and that they must be observed if there is to be meaningful communication and true inference. Thus, he warns against many of the common fallacies which plague our reasoning in the "science of disputation". Some of these are as follows: (1) Sophisms which are fallacious arguments used with the conscious intent to deceive. These are often based on contrived ambiguities and/or equivocations. As an example Augustine images a dialogue in which A says to B, "'What I am, you are not'". B, because what A has said is true in part and/or because A is deceitful, agrees. Then A says, "'I am a man'", and when B agrees with this A concludes, "'Therefore, you are not a man'".[46] (2) Another type of fallacy discussed by Augustine has to do with the mistake of affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent of a conditional. Augustine gives an example of this fallacy when he says, "Although it is true when we say, 'If he is an orator, he is a man', it does not follow that we may infer 'He is not a man' if we add to the first antecedent the assertion, 'He is not an orator'".[47] (3) Also Augustine warns that logical validity alone does not prove the conclusion of an argument to be necessarily true. Validity has to do with the rules of inference and not with the truth of propositions.[48] While not using contemporary terminology, Augustine clearly recognizes the distinction between a valid argument and a sound argument. For the latter to be the case both the premises must be true and the inference valid. If either is not the case, then the argument is fallacious and the conclusion is not necessarily true.

As we have already indicated Augustine like the Stoics found it essential for sound argument to make a distinction between sentences and propositions. While sentences may serve many functions, it is those sentences expressing

propositions which may be either true or false and thus of concern to the logician. It is only as his premises are true and his argument valid that the logician can derive <u>sound</u> conclusions. Furthermore, propositions of unknown truth value can be regarded as true if they can be derived by valid argument from propositions <u>known</u> to be true.

Other items contained in Augustine's "science of disputation" is that logic is concerned with the science of definition, division and partition. Also it is concerned with two kinds of falsehoods, namely, the logically impossible and the false that is possible. Augustine gives an example of this distinction when he says, "For he who says that seven and three are eleven says something that cannot be at all; but he who says it rained, let us say, on January 1, even though it did not rain on that day, describes something that might be true".[49]

It seems obvious that Augustine, just like Tertullian, knew and used Stoic logic. Darrell Jackson claims that the reason why Augustine appears to say in <u>The City of God</u> (VIII, 7) that he prefers Platonic logic to Stoic is that at this point he is using 'dialectica' in the sense of 'epistemology' and that with respect to epistemology Augustine was Platonist.[50] There is considerable evidence in support of Jackson's claim in view of the fact that the Stoic five undemonstrated argument forms were well known in antiquity, that Augustine, like Tertullian, could have learned them from Cicero's <u>Topica</u>, and that Augustine mentions several logical doctrines and forms which either are identical with or very similar to those of the Stoics. For example, Augustine gives the Stoic second type of undemonstrated argument in two forms. As described by Jackson these are:

First, metalogically, 'When a consequent is false, it is necessary
that the antecedent upon which it is based be false also'
(50, 9-10). Second, Augustine gives two actual arguemnts (50-
20-22 and 51 4-7).
1) 'If there is no resurrection of the dead, neither was Christ
    resurrected.
    Christ was resurrected
    Therefore, there is a resurrection of the dead.'
2) 'If a snail is an animal, it has a voice
    A snail has no voice
    Therefore, a snail is not an animal.'
I give both (says Jackson) because only the second is an
instance of the simple undemonstrated. The first is really a non-
simple argument which requires analysis, that is, some additional
steps, to reduce it to proof by the simple undemonstrateds. It is
doubtful that Augustine recognized any difference between (1) and
(2), since he states this rule (regula, 50, 12 and 24) in terms
of falsity, not negation. . . . (But) all examples of arguments in
these chapters (i.e., those mentioned above) involve the Stoic
conditional propositions.[51]

In light of the evidence which has been presented, it seems reasonable to

conclude that Augustine, like Tertullian, viewed semantics and logic as essential

tools in all human discourse including theological discourse. Along with other

disciplines they may function as the servants of faith. Indeed, a faith which

is rational and intelligible sustains the human soul much better than one

which is irrational and unintelligible.

Chapter IV

LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND REASON IN THOMAS AQUINAS

If theology is to be anything other than an esoteric enterprise, it must be advanced into the whole world of human experience, especially reasoned experience. No theologian has ever pursued this task more rigorously or fully, nor more effectively utilized the methodologies and knowledge of his own time, than did St. Thomas. He has much to teach us. So the purpose of this brief essay is to take another look at certain salient features of his epistemology, semantics and logic.

Serious difficulties confront us in even so modest a task. The extended length of Thomas' writings is itself forbidding. Coupled with this is the fact that discussions of language, logic and reason are dispersed throughout the corpus rather than being gathered together in one or two treatises.[1] Thomas obviously was interested only in the use of semantics and logic in the pursuit of the clearest and most complete understanding possible of the Christian faith and not in the development of a technical epistemology and logic in and for themselves. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why so little has been written on his semantics and logic.[2] Another reason would appear to be the assumption that Thomas' logic was only an Aristotelian syllogistic logic and thus one which has been superseded by modern symbolic logic. Gilson claims that the logic used by the traditional syncretism upon which Thomas had to do his critical work was entirely Aristotelian.[3] This claim, which is dubious[4] but apparently widely held, leads many philosophers and theologians to

undervalue and/or ignore Thomas' work. While unfortunate in general this
state of affairs is especially unfortunate for theology because it prevents
the utilization of the contributions which Thomas' work can make to our
current theological inquiries, whether they be Catholic or Protestant.

In spite of the difficulties the attempt will be made in this essay
to arrive at some clarity of understanding with respect to Thomas' views
on the use of language, logic and reason, and to indicate briefly certain
features which can continue to perform a valuable service in the theologi-
cal enterprise. The discussion will begin with a consideration of reason
and then proceed to a consideration of language and logic. Reason, of
course, is the foundation for it is only because man is a rational animal
that he is able to develop language and logic.

A. Aquinas' Epistemology

While it is the case that Thomas made extensive use of the demonstra-
tive syllogism and of basic Aristotelian terms and distinctions, he also
surpassed Aristotle by employing other forms of analysis and argument where
needed for his purposes. Moreover, even where Aristotelian terms and
distinctions were used, they served for Thomas a different function, that
of a kind of catalyst for being discursive about the faith. Given a
different context and function there is often a subtle but profound shift
in the meaning of even that which is taken from Aristotle.

A notable example is the term "nature." Even though it had the same
signification for Thomas as it did for Aristotle, it is certainly the case
that the term takes on a larger meaning in the context of Thomas' under-
standing of creation. While sharing the naturalism of Aristotle in his
respect for the world as a thing of movement and causes, there is the
crucial difference that for Thomas this universal play of cause and effect

does not belong in the world simply by nature. It is the result of the
creative and purposeful activity of God. As Anthony Nemetz notes,[5]
instead of imitation constituting the basic relation between motion in the
physical world and the eternal circular motion of the prime mover, Thomas
substitutes participation as the basic relation between God and creation.
In the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas affirms that while God is being by
His own essence, everything else is being by participation.[6] Each thing
exists because it participates in the essence of God. According to
Nemetz, "The character of the participation is determined by the
constitutive capacity of a thing to receive existence, that is, its
existence. Thus, the variety of things not only denotes the conditions
of operational differences but also a hierarchy of possible and real
perfections."[7]

Aristotle's world of motion has become simply a part of a larger
world of beings in an hierarchical schema and in appropriate operations
with respect not only to genesis but also to ends. God gives to things
both their being and their proper activity, "for He operates in each
thing according to its own nature."[8] It is only as there is the continual
providential operation of God that creatures can exist. The very meaning
of "creature" entails that "a creature cannot have an act of existence
without someone keeping it in that act (and) if God's action ceases, the
existence of a creature utterly ceases."[9] God's providential operation
involves not only the model of the order of things which He has in His
intellect but also the execution of this order directed toward the end of
perfection.[10]. Thus, the created order is from God, preserved by God,
and directed toward God. Just as with reason and faith there is in a

sense a two way movement, one from 'below' and the other from 'above.'
While Thomas emphatically insists that both are from God, the one from
'below' finds its sanction and fulfillment precisely in the one from
'above', namely, in the order of perfection. The goal can be nothing less
than the universal good, the fullest possible participation in the know-
ledge and goodness of God.

It is precisely into this context that Thomas places man. That is,
man is created in the image of God, a little lower than the angels, and
at the apex of the hierarchical order in this world. He shares with God
in the execution of the providential order with respect to lower creatures.
His dignity, therefore, consists not only in his supernatural destiny but
also in his present operation.

Since God who is His act of understanding and His knowledge, which
is a perfect mode of knowing and lacking in discursiveness, is the cause
of all things and embraces everything, universal and singular, necessary
and contingent, actual and possible, then whatever knowledge human beings
attain, whether through faith or nature, is a participation in God's
knowledge. With respect to nature the knowledge of God is prior to all
natural things and is their measure, but the natural things which can be
known by man are prior to his knowledge and are its measure." Nature is
God's artifact and man is a microcosm of the universe. So in the Summa
Contra Gentiles Thomas states:

> God embraces in Himself all creatures, and in corporeal
> creatures there is a representation of this, although in
> another mode. For we find that the higher body always
> comprises and contains the lower, yet according to
> quantitative extension, whereas God contains all creatures
> in a simple mode, and not by extension of quantity. Hence,
> in order that the imitation of God, in this mode of con-
> taining, might not be lacking to creatures, intellectual

> creatures were made which contain corporeal creatures, not
> by quantitative extension, but in simple fashion, intelligibly;
> for what is intellectually known exists in the knowing subject,
> and is contained by his intellectual operation.[12]

In the attempt to state Thomas' position succinctly it might prove

helpful to borrow Bishop George Berkeley's formula, provided it is shorn

of its philosophical idealism and altered at one crucial point. For

Berkeley, to be is to be perceived or to perceive. For Thomas, to be is

to be understood or to understand. Since God is His act of understanding,

for Him to be is to understand. For creatures without intellects, to be

is to be understood by God. With respect to man, to be is to be under-

stood by God and to understand through participation in the knowledge of

God.[13]

A basic principle for Thomas is that everything naturally tends to

operate according to its form as, for example, fire giving heat. Since

man is created in the image of God the proper form of man is the rational

soul. It follows, then, that every man is naturally inclined to act

according to reason.[14] In acting according to reason man is the repre-

sentative of God's goodness in the world and has a special role in God's

providential care of the world. Unlike lesser creatures in the created

order man can come to a knowledge of truth and truths, the speculative and

practical resting on the same basis, namely, a participation in the divine

understanding. No one, of course, can know God or His eternal law as they

are in themselves, in their essences, but "every rational creature knows

it (the eternal law) according to some reflection, greater or less. For

every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the

eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth."[15]

In this world human knowledge of truths and truth is always far from perfect, is greater or less. Human intellectual capacities differ. Laziness, irresponsibility and other human moral imperfections hinder the acquisition of knowledge. Often natural evils block illumination. But on the whole Thomas takes an optimistic view of nature and of human possibilities. Evil, both moral and natural, is consequential and privative. It does not have a per se but only an accidental cause. Those things in which natural evils are found are only a small part of the universe. There is a greater degree of evil in man since more men follow the senses rather than reason which is the good of man as man.[16] Even for those who discipline the senses and exercise reason to a greater degree than is customary for men, the ratio between divine knowledge and human knowledge is an indeterminate one such that no one can ever know how close he is to God's knowledge.[17] Yet, man is endowed with reason and capable in the order of perfection of an ever enlarging proximate knowledge of truth and divine illumination. The eschatological goal, the beatific vision, is an ultimately attainable reality and so suffuses the present quest, however inadequate it may be, with zest, hope, confidence, and love for creatures and God.

It is clear from the above that Thomas draws a distinction between knowledge and truth. His basic definition of truth is that it is the adequation or conformity between intellect and things. But the precise nature of this adequation depends upon the intellect in question. If it is God's intellect, then the emphasis falls on the divine exemplars or ideas. Truth is located properly and primarily in the intellect, and things are said to be true in a secondary sense insofar as they conform to God's models and fulfill the ends toward which they have been ordained. If it

is the human intellect, then while there is an emphasis upon truths properly

residing in the mind, they are there secondarily rather than primarily for,

as indicated previously, natural things are prior to human knowledge and

are its measure. Knowledge of the truth of things depends upon the data

provided by the sensitive faculties to the passive or receptive intellect,

upon the proper functioning of the receptive intellect in providing subject

matter upon which the agent or active intellect can work, and upon the

operation of the agent intellect in forming judgments which assert con-

cerning things, so they are or so they are not. An important aspect of

truth, then, is that it is a matter of true propositions, propositions

which assert that what is, is and what is not, is not.[18]

None of this would be possible, however, were it not for the perfection

of truth in the divine intellect and the activity of divine providence.

Clearly, Thomas assigns priority to the order of perfection. Anthony Nemetz

has succintly described this position in the following:

> He (Thomas) goes on to outline the order of cognition in terms
> of measure and measured in such fashion that the sequence is
> God, nature, the human mind, and artifacts. This order is
> clearly not a genetic account of human cognition. Rather it
> is definitely an order of perfection in which the genetic
> efforts of human cognition are made contingent on a universe
> which is necessarily intelligible because it must conform to
> the divine mind. A final way of stating this point is to
> assert that this account of truth is the role of providence in
> human cognition.[19]

Thus, for Thomas, as for Augustine, God is the source, the guarantee, and

the goal of all truth and knowledge. So one cannot spurn nor reject any

truth from whatever source it may come, even a pagan philosopher, without

to that extent spurning or rejecting God's illumination. Since the order

of perfection is the defining principle that specifies the ultimate nature

of truth such that truth and good are ultimately one and the same reality,[20]

it follows that rational apprehension of truth is a primary duty of man. This involves the employment of his rational and analytical powers upon every and any sort of subject matter. Yet, however random and miscellaneous the subject matters may appear to be, there is a coherence in the operation of reason which is provided by the fact that the life of reason has a final goal, namely, the knowledge of God's order of perfection. All knowledge of truths contributes to, is a reflection of, and is consummated in knowledge of truth.[21]

It is within this context that Thomas' so-called 'natural theology' is to be viewed. It is not that it is a separate discipline to be employed in isolation from faith. It is an integral part of faith being discursive. Just as nature and grace are from the same Source, so are reason and faith. Even though man in a state of pure nature needs to be infused with added divine power in order to reach ultimate beatitude, nature and grace cohere in the order of perfection. The Creator is the Redeemer and the Redeemer is the Creator. Thus, grace does not neglect nor suppress the proper activities of nature but presupposes them. Similarly, faith presupposes and makes use of natural knowledge. In terms used previously, the movement from 'below' is sanctioned and fulfilled in the movement from 'above.' 'Natural theology' is the servant of faith. It has the important function of advancing faith into the whole world of human experience. It assists faith in the task of seeking understanding. Some aspects of what faith affirms reason can investigate and demonstrate. Even with respect to those aspects of what faith affirms which reason cannot investigate, there is, nevertheless, an important function for reason. Here reason serves faith in the communication of the articles of faith, in

demonstrating the errors of conflicting views, in showing that what faith
proposes is not impossible, and in drawing valid conclusions from such
principles of faith as the authority of Holy Scripture.[22] Surely, no one
ever was more deeply convinced than Thomas that a rational and intelligible
faith sustains the human spirit much better than one which is irrational
and unintelligible.

Given the centrality of reason as a servant of faith, it follows that
the most careful and effective use possible must be made of the analytical
instruments of reason, namely, language and logic.

B. Aquinas' View of Language

For Thomas language arose because God had created man as a rational
and social animal. Were he a solitary animal individual impressions would
enable him to adjust to his environment. But since he is naturally social
and rational he is able through significant speech to communicate his thought
to others. Where this is not possible, as between groups with different
languages, there cannot be harmonious and happy relationships. It is through
the use of language that human beings discover what they think and feel,
share attitudes and plans, anticipate the future, learn from the past, and
create works which last through the ages. It is through the use of language
that human beings exercise power in the world such as that of controlling
the immediate environment as well as planning for the future.[23]

Language, understood as signification by convention or human institu-
tion rather than natural signification such as the groans of the sick and
the sounds of other animals, is an instrument of reason disclosing the con-
ceptions of the intellect.[24] As Thomas put it:

As used by us (in contrast to God) 'speaking' signified not
merely understanding but understanding plus the expression

> from within oneself of some conception; and we cannot under-
> stand in any way other than by formulating a conception of
> this sort. Therefore, properly speaking, every act of
> understanding is, in our case, an act of uttering.[25]

For Thomas, like Augustine, the exterior or vocal word is a manifestation of the

interior word, the word conceived by the intellect. The latter gives rise

to an interior image of the vocal word which when expressed signifies that

which is understood. In his explication of this point, Thomas uses the

analogy of a craftsman who first intends his goal, secondly thinks out the

form of his product, and then actualizes that product. So with one speak-

ing there is first the word of the 'heart,' then the word which is the

image of the oral word and finally the utterance of the vocal word.[26]

Thus, it seems obvious that for Thomas language and thought are indissol-

ubly related. Without language there could be no reasoning and without

rationality man could not develop a language, the instrument of reason.

The view that the exterior word is an expression of the word of the

'heart,' or an expression of thought, is clearly expressed in Thomas'

commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation. Here Thomas claims that

vocal sounds signify thoughts which in turn signify things. As Thomas

himself put it, "A name is a vocal sound significant by convention of

simple thought which, in turn, is a likeness of the thing," or "Vocal

sounds are related to thoughts as signs but things are related to thoughts

as that of which thoughts are likenesses."[27] This view appears to be

similar to that of Tertullian and Augustine in which there is a recogni-

tion of a triadic relation in the functioning of linguistic signs, namely,

the sign, the meaning of the sign, and the thing to which the sign refers.

This is not to say that these two Fathers, nor the Stoic semantics which

appears to have been their primary source, were Thomas' basic source for

this view. Obviously, it is Aristotle, but Aristotle interpreted in light of later developments. Thus, while Thomas' semantics is largely Aristotelian, it does not seem to be simply or only Aristotelian.

I. M. Bochenski points out that the early scholastic view of the 'properties of terms' was "so much richer and more many sided than the Aristotelian semiotic, that other influences must be supposed."[28] Ernest A. Moody claims that beginning with Peter Abelard (1079-1142) scholastic semantics and logic, while including Aristotelian ingredients, developed along a line which had been opened up originally by the Stoic and Megaric schools and that there is a genuine continuity between the two.[29] In Thomas' writings there is abundant evidence to support the conclusion that he was familiar with these developments. In the Summa Theologica there appear to be as many quotations from Augustine as from Aristotle and these include references to Concerning the Teacher and On Christian Instruction where Augustine clearly sets forth a type of semantics and logic which manifests Stoic influence.[30] Further, there are Thomas' quotations from several ancient and medieval authorities such as Cicero, Boethius, Abelard, Peter of Spain and others who were not simply Aristotelian in their views concerning language and logic.[31]

Even in his commentary on On Interpretation there are at least hints that Thomas was familiar with what Bochenski calls "other influences." For example, he refers to Porphyry's contention that the speaker who uses terms having more than one signification must indicate to the listener which meaning he intends. While Thomas claims that this contention is not relevant to the point in Aristotle's text which is to maintain identity of conceptions in relation to things, he does not reject Porphyry's

contention.[32] More importantly, perhaps, this reference indicates that
Thomas had some familiarity with Prophyry who, although Neo-Platonic in his
metaphysics, had written an Introduction to the Aristotelian categories in
which, according to Bochenski, he developed "(1) a system of classification
which was not to the fore in Aristotle's thought and (2) an extensional
view of terms."[33] Further, internal evidence, as we shall see, indicates
that Thomas made use of a "richer" semantics and logic than that of Aristotle.

It is not surprising to find in Thomas' writings a rather large con-
sideration given to the issue of signification for in the view of the
scholastics this issue was an essential ingredient of logic. So Thomas
himself says, "Since logic is ordered to obtaining knowledge about things,
the signification of vocal sounds, which is immediate to the conceptions of
the intellect, is its principal consideration."[34] However, neither the
scholastic logicians nor Thomas confined themselves to a consideration of
simply the problems of signification or semantics. Rather, they considered
the whole range of what today is often called semiotics.

C. Semiotics and Aquinas

As is well known from the writings of Rudolf Carnap and others
"semiotics" is a term used to refer to three factors which while inextricably
related in an actual speech act or piece of discourse may still be distin-
guished for purposes of analysis and consciously employed in the construction
of a formal system of logic.[35] These three regions which may be investigated
are pragmatics, semantics and syntax (logical). Pragmatics is concerned
primarily with the speaker, the meaning he intends to convey by his use
of language. While other factors may receive some attention, an investi-
gation is classified as pragmatics if there is explicit reference to the

speaker of the language. When the investigation ignores the speaker and
concentrates on the linguistic signs or expressions and the designata of
these signs or expressions, then the inquiry is referred to as semantics.
An inquiry "which makes no reference either to the speaker or to the
designata of the expressions, but attends strictly to the expressions and
their forms (the ways expressions are constructed out of signs in determi-
nate order), is said to be a formal or syntactical investigation and is
counted as belonging to the province of (logical) syntax."[36] Thus,
pragmatics involves a relatively large complex of issues which are related
to the historical, sociological and psychological realms. Semantics has
to do with the significations or meanings of the terms or expressions in
any particular language—with how to understand and use the language, either
a foreign language or one's own. And syntatics is concerned with the rules
governing the formal relations among the signs of the language, not merely
in a grammatical sense but in a logical sense, such as in inference or the
relation of derivability.

     From this description it is apparent that the 'science' of semiotics
is inclusive of a whole range of issues involved in human thought and
speech. Although the professional logician may concentrate on the second
and third domains, namely, semantics and syntax, in developing a formal
and/or symbolic logic, it is surely the case that an effective analysis
of any piece of discourse must give attention to pragmatics as well as
semantics and syntactics. Studies in the field of medieval logic[37]
indicate that for the scholastic logicians semiotic issues were of
dominant concern. While they did not develop an artificial system of
symbols or a 'language' of logic but rather used the 'living' Latin

language of their day, a central endeavor, as Bochenski points out, was to analyze the semantical and syntactical functioning of the signs in language and to formulate rules for the governing of these functions. According to Bochenski, "This endeavor led to the codification of a far-reaching and thorough semantics and syntax; semiotic problems hold the forefront of interest, and nearly all problems are treated in relation to them."[38]

It has been noted above that Thomas did not develop a 'formal' logic but that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he was not only familiar with but also made use of the semiotics of the early scholastic logicians. Even a superficial investigation of the arguments in the objections, replies, and answers to the objections in the Summa Theologica and in other writings of both a similar and different format make this rather obvious. While it seems that he gave somewhat more attention to semantical and syntactical issues, pragmatics received an ample share of attention. Since he was not concerned with constructing a semiotic but rather with its use, Thomas apparently did not draw as sharp a distinction between pragmatics, semantics and syntactics as logicians tend to do today. His remarks which may be classified as pragmatics are often contained in passages which also contain a considerable amount of semantical and syntactical analyses. But since the class words of any particular language may include terms which have several significations as well as those which are univocal, and since even with respect to univocal and singular terms the speaker may intend a meaning contrary to common usage or speak incorrectly, it follows that attention must be given to the speaker if the meanings he intends to convey through his speech act are to be understood.[39] Furthermore, language is used not simply to make assertive or propositional

utterances but also to express imperatives, interrogatives, vocatives
and deprecatives so as to influence the actions of others.[40]   As Thomas
puts it, "the intellect, or reason, does not just conceive the truth of a
thing.   It also belongs to its office to direct and order others in
accordance with what it conceives."[41]   Obviously, if such utterances are
to have the desired effect, then attention must be given to pragmatics
and the recommendation of Porphyry, referred to above, is relevant, namely,
that if the listener understands by the utterance of the speaker something
which the speaker does not intend, then the speaker must explain his utter-
ance so that the listener will "refer his understanding to the same thing."[42]

1. Aquinas' Pragmatics

    Thomas clearly distinguished between the functioning of the demon-
strator's utterance which is assertive or propositional and that of the
rhetorician and poet the purpose of which is to produce assent "not only
through what is proper to the thing but also through the dispositions of
the hearers. . .. This kind of speech, therefore, which is concerned with
the ordination of the hearer toward something, belongs to the consideration
of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its intent but to the consideration of
the grammarian as regards a suitable construction of vocal sounds."[43]

    It is well known that medieval education was based on the trivium
and the quadrivium with the former containing the disciplines of grammar,
rhetoric and logic.   For Thomas, these must be learned prior to the inves-
tigation of the sciences in the quadrivium.[44]   Thus, rhetoric is a funda-
mental and indispensable discipline and plays an important role in his
thought and discourse.   According to E. K. Rand Thomas viewed rhetoric
with respect and was acquainted not only with Aristotle's Rhetoric but also
with Cicero's Ad Herennium, Rhetorica and De Inventione.[45]   As indicated

previously, De Inventione had served as a basic rhetoric textbook from very early times and had been an important influence in shaping the thought patterns and discourse of such Fathers as Tertullian and Augustine.[46] The patterns constitutive of an ideal oration were specified in this work and these included considerations which might be classified loosely as pragmatics, semantics and syntactics. According to Rand there are at least seventy references to the De Inventione in the Summa Theologica and "none of these contains a refutation of any of Cicero's views as wrong, dangerous or ridiculous."[47] In view of the fact that pragmatics was an integral and important concern in rhetoric and in light of the evidence presented above, it is not surprising that Thomas gave attention to pragmatics as well as to semantics and syntactics.

In the well known question thirteen of the Summa Theologica on the names of God Thomas states in the introduction, "For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it." Not only here but elsewhere as well,[48] Thomas acknowledges that often we name things not according to their formal definitions but according to those characteristics and properties of things which interest us, and which we find useful in recognizing things in ordinary life. Thus, the names we use are often abbreviated descriptions rather than abbreviated definitions. Since, due to differences in historical background, life situation contexts, psychological factors and intellectual abilities, our interests may differ, it follows that attention must be given to pragmatics if there is to be effective communication.

Further evidence that Thomas' analyses incorporated pragmatics and a glimpse of his pragmatics in action are to be found in the few brief examples presented below.

In a discussion as to whether passion can overcome reason, Thomas in the objection quotes Aristotle's statement that "'Words express the thoughts of the soul'" in support of the contention that often a man in a state of passion declares that what he has chosen is evil and that thus he has knowledge even with respect to that particular. However, in the reply to this objection Thomas states;

> Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of
> deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to
> judge, since his drunkenness hinders him, so a man who is in
> a state of passion may indeed say in words that he ought not
> to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it.[49]

Here Thomas obviously recognizes that our discourse does not always ade-quately express our thought and intentions and that thus attention must be given to the total context of the discourse.

This is surely just as evident, if not more so, in several of his references to Augustine in which he quotes a statement from Augustine in an objection and then in the reply to the objection indicates that what Augus-tine meant by this statement was something other than that which in isolation from the context it appears to convey. So in a discussion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the issue of their connection, Thomas in an objection quotes Augustine's statement that "'Many of the faithful have not science (knowledge) though they have faith'". But in reply to this objection Thomas insists that given the total context of the statement Augustine is talking about "science" as a gratuitous gift which enables one to give instruction in the faith and to defend it, and not about that prompting of the Holy Spirit to knowledge of things human and divine, which gifts of the Holy Spirit are brought together in those who possess charity.[50]

Another clear example of Thomas' insistence that the total context, including the life situation, of Augustine must be taken into account if the meanings of his statements are to be properly understood is found in Thomas' discussion as to whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal exemplars. Here Thomas points out that while Augustine was informed by Platonism, he adopted from this source only that which was consistent with faith and rejected that which was not. So, even though Augustine claimed that the exemplars (Thomas notes that Augustine sub-stutited 'exemplars' for Plato's 'ideas') of all creatures existed in the divine mind, he did not hold that a mere participation in the exemplars was sufficient for knowledge. This is contrary to faith because God is the Creator of both the matter and form of the world and because only the souls of the blessed are worthy of that exalted vision of the eternal exemplars as they are in the mind of God.[51]

Since it is such a succinct statement of pragmatics, one further and final example will be mentioned. In a discussion concerning the propriety of applying abstract essential names to a person as had been done in the Christology of some of the Fathers (including Augustine), Thomas says, "To express unity of essence and person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Hence, instead of pressing such expressions, we should rather explain them."[52]

Before moving on to a more specific consideration of Thomas' views on semantics, it might be well at this point to summarize briefly the previous discussion. We have seen that for Thomas the order of genesis is sanctioned and fulfilled in the order of perfection. Man, standing at the apex of

the created order, has a supernatural destiny. His knowledge is a parti-
cipation in God's knowledge. For him to be is not only to be understood
but also to understand. Created in the image of God he must use his
reason not only to understand the created order but also his own destiny
in the order of perfection for it is only in light of the latter that the
former can be seen aright. While only faith can bring man to his proper
destiny, reason has an integral and essential role as the honored servant
of faith. It follows, then, that the tools of reason are of fundamental
importance in the task of faith seeking understanding. So Thomas gave
ample attention to the issues in semiotics and used the types of analyses
available in his day which even though greatly influenced by Aristotle
went beyond the Aristotelian position. The three areas of semiotics, namely,
pragmatics, semantics and syntax (logical) were delineated and while some
reference was made to semantics, in particular to the theory of signifi-
cation, special attention was given to Thomas' views in the realm of pragmatics.

2. Aquinas' Semantics

We turn our attention now specifically to Thomas' views in the area
of semantics. As we have seen Thomas held that vocal words (or names) are
signs in our conversations of our thoughts and our thoughts are related
as likenesses to those things which are the objects of thought. These
signs signify by convention and are thus distinguished from natural signs
such as the smoke which is a sign of fire. As Thomas expressed it in the
Summa Theologica, "Words are signs for thought and thoughts are likenesses
of things, so words refer to things indirectly through thoughts. How we
refer to a thing depends on how we understand it."[53] While vocal words
are the signs of ideas or thoughts, written words are signs of vocal
sounds. There is no more likeness between the written words and the vocal

sounds than between the vocal sounds and the objects of thought. Rather,
just as the blowing of the trumpet is by convention a sign of war so vocal
and written words are significant by convention.[54] It is the invention of
a written language which enables human beings to communicate with those
who are absent. Since it is more remote correct usage with respect to a
written language is, strictly speaking, in the province of the grammarian.[55]

Words, then, are significant by convention and thus, according to
Thomas, should be used as most people use them. That is, common usage
should be followed very carefully when it comes to the meanings of words
in order that there may be as much clarity as possible in discourse.[56]
Here Thomas echoes Cicero's admonition to the prosecutor in a law court that
the first topic in his argument should be a brief, clear and common usage
definition of any crucial term in question.[57] Given the fact that many class
words are multivocal and may be used ambiguously and equivocally the
defining of terms and the indication of which sense of the term is meant
is very often an essential practice for the sake of clarity in discourse
or argument. Thomas would have disagreed with Samuel Butler who claimed
that "definitions are useful where things are new to us, but they are
superfluous about those that are already familiar."[58] Indeed, Butler goes
so far as to say that with respect to the latter situation definitions may
be "mischievous." By contrast Thomas never assumes that simply because a
word is familiar the sense in which it is being used in a piece of dis-
course is thereby obvious. Time and again in the Summa Theologica Thomas
indicates that an objection rests solely on some sort of verbal dispute
and/or obscurity. In some cases there may be doubt as to the precise
meaning of a word and in his reply to the objection Thomas gives a proper
definition in light of which the objection dissolves because irrelevant.

In other cases an objection may arise out of the fact that a particular word may be taken in two or more senses, that the objector is unaware of this, and that he is using the word in a sense other than the one used in the argument in question. Again, in his reply Thomas dissolves the objection through the simple expedient of indicating which sense of the term is being used in the argument. Thus, it is often the case that for Thomas a consideration of the definition is important even though the word in question may be a very familiar one.

In the attempt to arrive at greater clarity with respect to the meaning and use of words Thomas sometimes appeals to etymologies. Even though some of these are tentative, obscure, or even wrong,[59] they generally do serve to make for greater clarity in the discussion. For example, in responding to the question as to whether or not matters of faith should be set forth in distinct articles, Thomas appeals to the etymology of the term "article" saying, "The word 'article' seems to come from Greek, where Arthros, in Latin Articulus, means any sort of fitting together of distinct parts."[60] As examples of various referential meanings for the term Arthros Thomas mentions the smaller parts of the body which are conjoined, the parts of speech in Greek grammar, and the arrangements of parts of an oration in terms of the style prescribed in the discipline of rhetoric. Given this meaning for "article," then it is quite appropriate for the content of faith to be explicated in terms of articles or parts having an interconnection.

Sometimes in his analysis of the meaning or meanings of a word Thomas will combine etymology with a consideration of current common usage. This is the case in the following example of Thomas' language analysis in

action, an analysis which in many ways resembles that of Tertullian and

Augustine. In response to the question as to whether or not every virtue

is a moral virtue Thomas says the following:

> In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the
> meaning of the Latin word mos, for thus we shall be able to
> discover what moral virtue is. Now mos has a twofold meaning.
> For sometimes it means custom . . .; sometimes it means a
> natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular
> action, in which sense the word is applied to brute animals
> . . .. For both these significations there is but one word
> in Latin; but in Greek there is a distinct word for each,
> for the word ethos, which signifies the same as the Latin
> mos, is written sometimes with a long e . . . and sometimes
> with a short e . . .. Now moral virtue is so called from mos
> in the sense of a material or quasi-natural inclination to do
> some particular action. And the other meaning of mos, i.e.,
> custom, is akin to this, because custom somehow becomes a
> nature, and produces an inclination similiar to a natural
> one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs
> properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move
> all the powers to their acts . . .. Therefore not every virtue
> is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive
> power.[61]

While etymologies may be used where helpful even greater attention is

to be given to the way or ways in which a term is currently used. Some-

times it is the case that what the term originally signified is different

from that which is signified by the term in current usage.[62] Therefore

it is necessary to delineate the common usage meaning or meanings of the

term. Indeed, Thomas rather emphatically recommends the following of

common usage when he says, "since, however, we should use words as most

people use them, . . . usage should be followed very carefully when it

comes to the meanings of words"[63] and "the usage of the multitude . . .

is to be followed in giving names to things."[64] Of course, on occasion,

whenever greater clarity would probably ensue, one may stipulate that such

and such a meaning is intended.[65] This may be done when the word is a

multivocal class word and one wants it to be clearly understood which of

several significations the word is being used to designate. It may be
done if the common usage meaning is so vague that greater precision is
needed. But while one may on occasion stipulate it is preferable to stick
to common usage as much as possible. Even in the well known second
question of the Summa Theologica Thomas' purpose seems to be that of
explicating the common usage meaning of the term "God" rather than that of
philosophically proving the existence of God. It is true that Thomas uses
the term demonstratio in article two of this question. He claims that
there are two types of demonstration, one dealing with 'why' and the other
with 'that.' With respect to God demonstration from effects can conclude
only that God is. But even here in the reply to objection two Thomas
says, "When proving anything to exist, the central link is not what the
thing is (we cannot even ask what it is until we know that it exists) but
rather what we are using the name of the thing to mean. Now when demon-
strating from effects that God exists, we are able to start from what the
word 'God' means."[66]

In article three of question two, the quinque viae, the term demonstratio
is not used. Significantly, each of the ways ends with one of the
following expressions: "And this is what everybody understands by God" or
""to which everyone gives the name 'God'" or "this all men speak of as
God" or "this we call God." Surely, Thomas is saying by the five ways
that if we want to know the meaning of the word "God" in common everyday
language, then we must begin with experience and find in it traces of a
being to which this name could be applied. That is, the five ways explicate
the basic defining characteristics which determine the meaning of the
term "God" in common usage. Ultimate causality and intelligence which

makes this causality into providence are fundamental and constitute what most people mean by "God." In question thirteen Thomas is rather explicit about this when he says, "For everybody who talks of God uses the word to name that which exercises a universal providence over things. . . . It is used to signify something transcending all things, at the beginning of all things, separate from all things: it is this to which people using the word 'God' wish to refer."[67]

In spite of the emphasis in Thomas' writings on common usage meanings it is often claimed that he held to "real" definitions. That is, it is not merely words but also things which are defined. A definition indicates the essence of a thing by giving its genus and difference. One aim of science should be that of developing an ideal language in which the meanings of nouns would correspond to the definitions of species. So one commentator claims that for Thomas a definition does not merely state the sense of a word or how the word is used, "but also the significance of a thing, i.e. how the word must be used if it is to mean this thing. Defining a thing implicitly legislates for all that may or may not be significantly said about that thing."[68] There is a good deal to be said for this interpretation of Thomas' view. In On Being and Essence Thomas himself says "For it is evident from what has been said that essence is what is signified by the definition of a real thing."[69] Similarly in a longer quotation from the Summa Theologica Aquinas says:

> Essence or nature includes only what defines the species of a
> thing: thus human nature includes only what defines man, or
> what makes man man, for by 'human nature' we mean that which
> makes man man. Now the species of a thing is not defined by
> the matter and properties peculiar to it as an individual;
> thus we do not define man as that which has this flesh and
> these bones, or is white, or black, or the like. This flesh

and these bones and the properties peculiar to them belong
indeed to this man, but not to his nature. An individual
man then possesses something which his human nature does not,
so that a man and his nature are not altogether the same thing.
'Human nature' names, in fact, the formative element in man;
for what gives a thing definition is formative with respect
to the matter which gives it individuality.[70]

While it is true that in the passages quoted above Thomas speaks of
defining things, it would appear that the context indicates Thomas' major
purpose to be that of making the distinction between what today we would
call defining and accompanying characteristics. Defining characteristics
are those characteristics without which we would not use a particular
term to label a particular thing. Accompanying characteristics are facts
about the thing named but do not play a role in the definition of the
term. "A man can fail to have two feet, but not to be a man,"[71] Thomas'
statements of genus and difference comprise the class of defining
characteristics while statements dealing with accidental properties ("this
flesh and these bones") may be classified as accompanying characteristics.[72]
Even though Thomas admits that sometimes we must refer to accompanying
characteristics to indicate what it is that we are talking about precisely
because we do not know what the defining characteristics are, it is still
the case that he places great emphasis on correctly defining terms accord-
ing to common usage in order to make our meanings as clear as possible.
The latter is definitely to be preferred. In light of this and of the
fact that Thomas clearly states, "What a word means is its definition" and
"the meaning signified by a name is its definition,"[73] it seems likely
that what Thomas meant by the locution "to define a thing" is very similar
in meaning to "to state the defining characteristics." A definition is
the intelligible character which the name of a thing signifies.

It makes sense to speak of the <u>meanings</u> of things in terms of sign, cause, effect, purpose and explanation. Yet it is not at all clear that it makes sense to speak of "defining" things. We define words. Of course, in many cases the defining characteristics are certain features which all of the <u>denotata</u>[74] of a class must actually possess whenever it is the case that the class has actual members. Without these features the <u>denotata</u> would not be labelled by the particular term. This is to say that the defining characteristics may be actual features of actual objects whenever the class is not an empty class. Yet it is still the case that decisions about defining characteristics are decisions about the meaning of the word in question. If one says, "Steel is an alloy of iron," one is saying something about the meaning of the word "steel." We simply would not use this word to label a piece of metal if it were not an alloy of iron. To be sure this is a fact about the metal so named. Yet the fact that often some universally present, never absent, characteristic has not been made defining (the black of blackbirds) indicates that there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in the rise of definitions and that thus they have to do with the meanings of words as understood in common usage. Thus to state a defining characteristic is to state something about the meaning of a word while to state an accompanying characteristic is to state a fact about the thing named by the word and the latter is most often a contingent fact.

Put in another way we could say that definitions deal with the intensions (proximate genus and specific difference for Thomas) of words rather than with their extensions. A word may have intension but no extension. That is, we can

give a definition for the word but there are no actual referents or denotata.

An example of this, of course, is "centaur." Also some words and expressions

may have the same extension (denotatum) and different intensions as with

"President of the United States" and "Commander-in-Chief." In light of this

it does indeed seem confusing to talk about defining things unless, of

course, the word "thing" is used so broadly as to include what Thomas called

"second intentions." But these are concepts, meanings, or logical intentions

rather than "things" in the usual and more restricted sense of the term.

Thomas was clearly aware of the fact that some words may have intension

but no extension and that there is no necessity to assume that there is

extension simply because the intension of the term may be given. In his

well known critique of Anselm Thomas says, "And even if the meaning of the

word 'God' were generally recognized to be 'that than which nothing greater

can be thought,' nothing thus defined would thereby be granted existence

in the world of fact, but merely as thought about."[75] While Thomas was

thoroughly convinced that God does exist in fact as well as in thought, he

insists that simply entertaining a concept does not entail the existence

of a referent for that concept. Further, many concepts such as those

dealing with fictional characters and with privations exist only in thought

and not in reality. They have intension but not extension.

Interestingly, Thomas' understanding of the significance of such words

as "nothing" and "non-being" is quite similar to that of Augustine. Even

though these words are in the form of noun-substantives they are not to be

treated as though they refer to something. In one sense of "non-being", that

of privation, it is impossible to conceive of any form for such since non-

existence is included in its definition. In the other sense, that of a

fiction, it is possible to conceive such a form for non-existence is not

included in the definition but there is not in fact any referential
extension. Absence of referential extension is true of both cases, of
the first by definition and of the second by experience.[76]

Just as there are cases of words having intension but no extension
so there are cases of words having extension but no intension. That is,
the word only denotes. A prime example is proper names which denote their
bearers but have no definitional significance. A name used to denote a
particular individual cannot be thought of as applicable to many. It does
not have a set of defining characteristics which provide it with a range
of extension inclusive of several denotata.[77]

In addition to the words which refer in terms of both intension and
extension, there are the syncategorematic words such as "if-then," "same,"
"and," "not," "either-or," etc., which have no reference either to the
world of thought (second intentions) nor to the world of things. That is,
they have neither intension nor extension and yet they have a functional
significance in the roles they perform in formulation of statements and the
structures of logical syntax.[78]

Any inquiry concerning words and their meanings must give some attention
to the meaning and function of metaphors or figurative expressions. Thomas
was not remiss on this issue and took a position very similar to that of
Tertullian and Augustine. He insisted that for metaphors to function
properly there must be a foundation in literal signification. To admit of
a metaphorical use is necessarily to admit of a literal use. Indeed,
the metaphorical sense, as well as the spiritual sense, is based on and
presupposes the literal sense. The word in its literal sense, its
intension, denotes those things included in its extension and these things

in turn can be signs of other things. Thus, if one says, "My love is like a red rose.", the literal sense of "my love" and "red rose" is presupposed in that one could make true descriptive assertions about the person labelled "my love" and about a "red rose." If such could not be done, then no one could know what was being said by this expression. Also the thing, red rose, is itself a symbol for something else and this something else can be specified. This might include, for example, the sweetness suggested by the rose's scent. So for Thomas the Scriptural metaphor "the arm of God" can be 'translated' to mean God's power for making and doing due precisely to the literal intension and extension of the term "arm."

Put in another way, metaphors are univocal terms used in propositions to suppose for things which do not fall under the significations of their names. In God-talk they apply primarily to creatures and only secondarily to God. When we say, "God is a fortress" the term "fortress" does not change its signification and neither do we mean that God is really a fortress. Rather, in this proposition "fortress" supposes for the divine strength and protection. By contrast when we use an analogical predication and say that "God is good," we mean that He is really good. "Good" signifies what God really is but imperfectly because creatures represent God imperfectly. "Good" is neither a univocal (God's goodness is not identical with ours) nor equivocal (God's goodness is not entirely different from ours) predicate. It is analogical having both a certain unity and diversity in its range of meaning. The term "good" as we know it applies first to creatures and secondarily to God but its proper meaning, or goodness in fact, resides properly in God and only secondarily by participation and proportionally in creatures. Thus to say that God is good is to make a statement with

literal signification. It is precisely because of this, plus their own

univocal signification, that metaphorical and figurative expressions can

function appropriately.[79]

For Thomas definitions may be either true or false or neither true

nor false but, of course, in different respects. Some definitions are

related to judgments in the sense that judgments are implied by the

definitions, and since judgments are either true or false so may the

definitions be said to be either true or false. However, some definitions

are not so related. They provide only an explanation of the meaning of the

term according to common usage. In a sense, the giving of even these

definitions may be said to be either true or false. That is, the report

of common usage may be either correct or incorrect. To say that "Centaur"

is defined as a one-legged animal would be to give a false definition in

this sense. Assuming that common usage is followed there is a sense in

which definitions are neither true nor false. That is, a definition in

itself is neither true or false.[80] Rather it enables us to know what it

is that we are talking about, to make appropriate predicates of the particu-

lar subject under consideration, and to be aware of the appropriate

extensional range if indeed there is any extensional range at all. To say

that a definition in itself is neither true nor false seems to mean that

it is by no means necessary so to use a definitional sentence that it

makes a statement or expresses a proposition. Sentences as such are not

necessarily propositional. This is shown by the fact that sentences may

be used to perform a number of non-propositional functions such as the

asking of questions and the issuing of commands. Also in some cases two or

more sentences may be used to express the same proposition. In other

cases one sentence may express more than one proposition.[81] Thus the two sentences, "New York is north of Washington," "Washington is south of New York," express one proposition while the single sentence, "Either it will rain today or it will not rain today," expresses two propositions. Even though Thomas, as we have seen, sometimes speaks of the truth in things insofar as they correspond to the divine exemplars, he also speaks of the truth in the intellect making a judgment (composing and dividing) and this is clearly truth in the sense of true propositions. That is, it is not the sentence which is true or false but the proposition (judgment) expressed by the sentence.[82]

It has been noted above that sentences may be used to perform a variety of non-propositional expressing functions which are neither true nor false (such as questions, commands, rules, etc.). Similarly a sentence used simply to express a definition in itself is not expressing a proposition but a rule of language and is neither true nor false. However, a definitional sentence may be used as a statement of existence. In both cases we are informed as to what function or role the word in question has in the language, but in the first case the definitional sentence is used only to express a rule of language while in the second case it is used to express both a rule of language and a statement of existence. An example of the latter would be, "The human being is a rational animal." There is here a point of contact between definition and things. This sentence used as a statement of existence expresses a proposition. At least, a proposition or judgment is implied and therefore it is either true or false.[83] Thus it is that Thomas can speak of definitions as being either true or false as well as neither true nor false.

A major issue in semantics, of course, has to do with the way words hook onto the world of actual objects. We have seen that while some words have intension but no extension, most have both such that there is a relation to the world of actual objects. Further, we have indicated that for Thomas a definitional sentence may be used not only to express a rule of language but also to make a statement of existence. This was an important function also of supposition which, according to Bocheński, was one of the most original creations of the scholastic logicians.[84] There is ample evidence that Thomas knew and used supposition.

An important function of the supposition of a term is that of reference, but a term supposes only in a proposition. While meaning or significance may be said to be something like a general plan or 'map' of the whole area which can be covered by the word, supposition is the actual meaning given this word in combination with other words in a statement. So the supposition of a term indicates what a term may stand for in a proposition, to its function or use in that proposition. It may be used in different ways in different propositions but its meaning in itself (the dictionary meaning) will remain the same. So there can be no supposition except in a proposition.

Two important functions of supposition were called "material" and "formal" or "personal." The former was often understood in a way similar to what today we call the "mention" of a term. That is, the term stands for itself. Thus, one might say, "The word 'order' contains five letters." or "The word 'order' is a noun." "Formal" or "personal" supposition was often understood in a way similar to what today we call the "use" of a term. That is, the term is used to stand for something other than its

name. Thus, if one says, "Order is necessary for the existence of an institution," then the word 'order' stands for something other than its name. It has reference to actual situations. That this reference is appropriate depends, of course, on the significance of "order," but given that significance it can be used in propositions which are assertive about this as well as some other types of situations. So one can say, "Order is necessary for the existence of institutions." and "The order of nature is sublime.", and in both of these statements the word 'order' has the same meaning but not the same reference. In formal or personal supposition the term is being used in a proposition to refer to something, either a thing or a person.

It is clear that Thomas recognized the distinction between "material" and "formal" supposition in the sense of "mention" and "use." He expressed this distinction in the following way:

> On this point the objection may be raised that verbs of other modes sometimes seem to be posited as subjects; for example when we say, '"matures" is a verb.' In such a statement, however, the verb 'matures' is not taken formally according as its signification is referred to a thing but as it signifies the vocal sound itself materially, which vocal sound is taken as a thing. When posited in this way, i.e. materially, verbs and all parts of speech are taken with the force of names.[85]

Sometimes, however, the expressions "material" supposition and "formal" supposition have another meaning for Thomas. For example, he says, "A term put as subject of a statement is taken materially, that is, for a subsisting subject; but put as a predicate it is taken formally, that is, for the nature signified."[86] It is clear that here Thomas is using 'material' for 'personal' supposition, that is, the subject term stands for an individual, and that he is using 'formal' for 'simple' supposition, that is, the predicate stands for the nature signified. This distinction

assumes a considerable significance for Thomas when in question sixteen of part III of the Summa Theologica he comes to consider statements relating to Christ as existing and as coming into existence. The method here consists largely in detecting what the subjects and predicates stand for in the various statements. Confusion with respect to supposition, such as attributing simple supposition where there should be personal or vice versa, could very well lead to heretical and/or nonsensical utterances.[87]

The discussion above concentrated primarily on the semantical functions of supposition. However, it appears to have had a syntactical function as well and this function was served by simple supposition. It would appear that in order for it to be distributed the middle term of the categorical syllogism required simple supposition. Furthermore, any equivocal use of the middle term, either with respect to signification or supposition, would result in a fallacious argument.[88]

3. Aquinas' Syntactics

Not only does supposition have syntactical as well as semantical import, this is true also of the distinction made earlier between sentences and propositions. Both categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, Aristotelian logic and the propositional logic of inference schemas, required sentences having truth value or expressing propositions. As we have seen Thomas claimed that in an important sense truth has to do with true propositions. The determination of truth or falsity is based on "composing" and "dividing" or affirmation and negation.[89]

In syntactics the various modes in which statements may function play an important role. That is, the distinctions between contingent and necessary, possible and impossible are important. For Thomas a statement may be necessary in two ways, either absolutely or hypothetically (conditionally). The former corresponds to what Kant was to call an

analytic statement, namely, one in which there is some kind of correlation in meaning between the subject and predicate terms. Thus, "All bodies are extended" is an analytic statement because the predicate expresses a defining characteristic of the subject. Statements of this type plus tautologies are necessarily true with what Thomas calls "An absolute necessity." While Thomas' favorite example of a conditional necessity is the statement, "If Socrates sits, then he is sitting" which is necessarily true by supposition, it appears that he regarded the conclusion of any sound argument as conditionally necessary.[90]

Thomas does on occasion talk of _things_ happening by necessity or contingency. Yet in light of the definitions of necessity above, it appears obvious that necessity and contingency are to be detected in the types of statements expressed. In contingent statements the concepts of the predicates add something to the concepts of the subjects and there is no syntactical form which would provide a conditional necessity. Further, truth or falsity is determined by the facts of experience and not simply by the linguistic and logical rules.[91]

The modes of possibility or impossibility are determined by the forms of the statements. A state of affairs is said to be absolutely possible (today we would say "logically possible") whenever the statement affirming that state of affairs to be the case is logically consistent. On the other hand, it is said to be absolutely impossible (logically impossible) whenever the statement affirming the state of affairs to be the case is a self-contradictory statement. The example Thomas gives for the former is "Socrates sits;" for the latter, "A man is an ass." The logically impossible is excluded from the concept of omnipotence for "a contradiction in terms cannot be a word, for no mind can conceive it."[92]

Thomas' use of the Aristotelian categorical syllogism is so well known as to hardly need mentioning. Suffice it to say that this syllogism must contain three and only three terms, and have three and only three propositions. The middle term must be unambiguous and distributed at least once in the premises. No term which was not distributed in the premises may be distributed in the conclusion. No conclusions may be drawn from two negative premises nor from two particular premises. If one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative and if one premise is particular the conclusion must be particular. The basic form of this syllogism is as follows:

M is P

S is M

Therefore, S is P

On the basis of these general rules and stock form the scholastic logicians deduced many more special rules and valid forms of this syllogism. But enough has been said here to indicate the basic apparatus.

Evidence that Thomas used this type of syllogism in his arguments is, as might be expected, very abundant. A basic and straightforward example is as follows:

"'Every whole is greater than its parts.
This whole is a whole.
Therefore, it is greater than its parts.'"[93]

It has been indicated earlier in this study of Thomas that neither he nor the scholastic logicians confined themselves to a purely Aristotelian semiotics. Stoic influence played a role and this included a logic of propositions and inference schemas. There were among other things the argument forms of Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, and the various forms of the disjunctive argument. In chapters two and three of this work I

demonstrated that Tertullian and Augustine knew and used this logic. It
is obvious that this is the case also with Thomas. In addition to what
has already been said in this study of Thomas, a few examples should suffice
to justify this conclusion.

It will be recalled that a non-simple argument which is a repeated
application of the negative disjunctive syllogism has the following schema:

Either one or two or three

Not one

Not two

Therefore, three

Now this non-simple argument is as old as the Stoic Chrysippus and is
called the "dog syllogism." Thomas was familiar with this syllogism and
described it in the following way:

> For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a cross road,
> tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or
> the second road; and if he finds that the stag has not passed
> there, being thus assured, takes the third road without
> trying the scent, as though he were reasoning by way of
> exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this
> way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no
> other road.[94]

While Thomas thought this argument demonstrated the result of divine art
rather than the reasoning of dogs, it nevertheless indicates his familiarity
with the negative disjunctive argument in a non-simple form. Time and
again he used the simple forms of the disjunctive syllogism. This is
evident whenever a crucial word in an argument might have a two fold
meaning. So Thomas would in effect say that word X may mean either P or
Q. The context calls for P; therefore, not Q or Q cannot fit the context;
therefore, P or vice versa.

Thomas had much to say also about the conditional proposition. While
Aristotle had denied scientific value to the conditional proposition,
Thomas viewed it as an expression of a per se statement. That is, just as
there is a necessary connection between subject and predicate in an
indicative analytic statement such as "All sisters are female siblings,"
so there is a necessary connection between the forms of the expressions
within the conditional.[95] Thomas was aware that the "If P, then Q" of
material implication is true if both P and Q are true, if P is false and
Q is true, and if both P and Q are false. The only case in which it is
false is if P is true and Q is false. So Thomas said, "There can be a
true conditional proposition whose antecedent is impossible" and "for
there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though
both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to
say: 'If a man is an ass, he has four feet.'"[96]

Even a superficial glance at Thomas' writings indicates a liberal use
of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Only two examples are presented here:

I. Modus Ponens

If P, then Q

P

Therefore, Q.

If "better" implies the mode of being in things that God has made,
then he can make something better.

"Better" can mean a better manner of being as regards accidents.

Therefore, God can make something better.[97]

II. Modus Tollens

If P, then Q

Not Q

Therefore, not P

If an infinite force were situated in a magnitude, then it
would impart movement of zero time.

But a movement of zero time is impossible.

Therefore, it is impossible for an infinite force to be
situated in a magnitude.[98]

The proper use of valid argument forms was certainly a basic concern
for Thomas. He was aware that in order to have a sound argument one must
have true premises and a valid argument form. As he put it, "Thus in using
a syllogism, mistakes can happen in two ways: either from the use of
false premises, or from faulty construction of the syllogism."[99] As far
as possible the theologian should avoid such mistakes for God is not
honored in fallacious and irrational thinking.

D. Conclusions

In light of what has been said in this study of Thomas' views on
language, logic and reason, it would appear that the conclusions stated
briefly in the following summary are justified: (1) Instead of being
antagonistic to faith, reason for Thomas has an integral and essential role
as the honored servant of faith and thus the tools of reason, language
and logic, are of fundamental importance in the task of faith seeking
understanding. (2) Thomas knew and used the relatively sophisticated
semiotic of the early Scholastic logicians and this included pragmatics,
semantics and syntactics. (3) While Thomas' semiotic was to a consider-
able degree based on that of Aristotle, it also showed definite traces
of other influences, especially with respect to a propositional logic of
inference schemas. And (4) in his respect for reason and in his use of a
semiotic which included but transcended that of Aristotle, Thomas' approach
was in many ways similar to that of Tertullian and Augustine.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

In this final chapter an attempt will be made to do the following

three things: (1) to summarize briefly certain basic conclusions of this

study, (2) to indicate again the themes which provide it with some degree

of coherence and unity, and (3) to note the relevance of this study to the

theological enterprise in general.

One result of this study, at least for the author, was an increased

appreciation for the intellectual genus of each of the three Fathers. It

is impressive and perhaps even a bit surprising to find that the semiotics

of the three possessed such a high degree of sophistication and contempo-

raneity. It is evident that for them theology was not some esoteric

discipline to be practiced in isolation but rather that it was to be

pursued with the greatest rigor using the best intellectual tools available.

In Chapter II we investigated the thought of Tertullian who is often

presented as one who gloried in paradox and disdained philosophy and reason.

This view which is based largely on a misquotation (I believe because it is

absurd) and on other quotations torn out of the context in which they

appear we found to be incorrect. Indeed, just the opposite was the case.

Tertullian was highly knowledgeable not only with respect to philosophy and

classical literature but also with respect to semantics and logic. Further

Tertullian explicitly expressed regret at the prevalence of ignorance and

irrationality even among Christians and held in high regard the human

capacity for making rational judgments.

In contrast to those interpreters who claim that Tertullian loved

paradox and thus belongs to a family of thinkers different from that of

Augustine and Aquinas the evidence presented in this study indicates that

he stands squarely in the tradition which runs through Augustine and Aquinas.

In all three reason has an honored and essential role to play in the

explication and defense of the faith and in the relating of faith to all

the concerns of life. Indeed, all the disciplines of the education of

their times, the thought and methods of the great non-Christian intellectual

geniuses of the past, insofar as they are not indissolubly tied to pagan

and/or superstitutious beliefs, may be used as the servants of faith. This

includes, of course, philosophy, and the thought and methods of the

philosophers. All three of the Fathers, Tertullian, Augustine and Aquinas,

found certain philosophical positions to be useful with respect to their

theologies. While it is the case that Tertullian vigorously attacked

certain philosophical views used by the heretics in support of their positions,

this does not mean, as we have seen, that Tertullian was against philosophy

as such. In his attacks Tertullian used philosophical arguments and

appealed to other philosophical positions. In his own theology he found

much in Stoicism which he was able to use. Augustine, on the other hand,

used much from Neo-Platonism and Aquinas was able to make use of a good

deal from Aristotle. Even though these Fathers differed as to the precise

philosophy and/or metaphysics which they found useful for their theologies,

they did in fact use some sort of philosophy as the "handmaiden of theology."

Revelation and faith as expressed in the rule of faith, the Scriptures

and church tradition were regarded by them as the ultimate authority. Yet,

revelation needs to be understood and faith needs to be related to the whole

world of human experience and our three Fathers were convinced that this
could be accomplished only as all the rational disciplines are utilized
in the development and elucidation of the most comprehensive and relevant
theology possible.

As we have seen some interpreters claim that Augustine and Aquinas
held that there are two orders or realms of truth, namely, that of this
world and that of the supernatural. Those who make such claims would seem
to have given insufficient attention to the Fathers' insistence upon God's
creation of the world ex nihilo. This doctrine entails the view that all
created things in some way or another reflect their creator and cannot be
understood properly unless this relationship is understood. For the
Fathers the unity of truth rests not only upon this but also upon the
further perspective that creation and redemption cannot be relegated to
completely separate categories, for the Creator is the Redeemer and the
Redeemer is the Creator. So there are not two separate and distinct orders
of truth. To claim that there are would be to court heresy for it is
only a short step from this to the radical dualism of the Gnostics who
affirmed that there are two orders of truth and being, namely, the physical
and material which is evil and the spiritual which is good. Not only
Tertullian who attacked the Gnostics during the period of their greatest
influence in the church but also Augustine and Thomas were adamantly
opposed to such dualism. Even though they held to different metaphysical
perspectives, the three Fathers were in agreement that whatever the means
through which they may be attained, truths and Truth arise from one
source, namely, God. Truth is one and all truths are reflections of this
Truth. The order of genesis is not something separate and distinct from

the order of perfection. Rather, it finds both its <u>source</u> and its
<u>fulfillment</u> in the order of perfection.

It was in their attempt to correlate their view of God's omniscience
with their view of human freedom that Augustine and Aquinas placed the
greatest strain on the consistency of their theologies. It is rather
difficult to synthesize Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics of the
divine with the Hebraic outlook on one hand and with the concept of human
freedom on the other. Both Augustine and Thomas understood God's
omniscience to mean His viewing of all things, past, present and future,
simultaneously. The divine simplicity necessitates divine immutability in
all respects. There can be no change in God's knowledge. Therefore, not
only does He know all past and present actuality but also he knows all
future events as <u>actual</u>. To use an analogy, human beings are like a person
standing by the side of the road watching an army division march past.
Since he cannot see around the bend in the road he cannot know precisely
what will next come past his vantage point, calvary, tanks, foot soldiers,
etc. Of course, having seen army divisions previously he can speak about
future possibilities and make predictions which are often rather reliable
although not certain. God on the other hand, is like a person standing
on a high pinnacle from which he can see the entire division at one glance
and thus already knows as actual what will pass a particular point in the
road in the future. To say that human beings are free to make decisions
and that God already knows future events as <u>actual</u> surely yields a contra-
diction. If God knows events which are future to us as already actual,
then what we do tomorrow is already determined today. It is an empty
locution to say that while God knows future events as actual he does not

predetermine them because if He knows them as <u>actual</u> they already are and thus we cannot do anything else when that future becomes present to us. So even though human beings may think they are free that thought is simply an illusion and they cannot do anything other than what God already knows. Such undercutting of the reality of human freedom, even though it is not recognized as such, creates such serious problems that it makes a viable theodicy practically impossible.

As we have seen, Tertullian avoided the inconsistency described above through the expedient of claiming that for the sake of human freedom God <u>restrains</u> His foreknowledge. In principle the "omniscience" of God has the same meaning for Tertullian as for Augustine and Aquinas. However, Tertullian clearly recognizes that there can be a genuine human freedom only if the future is open to possibilities and this cannot be the case if God in actuality knows future events as actual. So, Tertullian claims, God voluntarily limits his foreknowledge so that there can be the value of human freedom. While there may be some problems with this view and while it is preferable to recognize that an acceptable meaning of "omniscience" is that God knows all that is possible to know and that events are not there to be known as actual before they are actual, it is nevertheless the case that Tertullian on this issue of omniscience and freedom avoids the serious inconsistency in the Augustinian-Thomistic view.

Whatever the adequacies or inadequacies of the three views on Divine omniscience and human freedom, it is still the case that Tertullian, Augustine, and Aquinas placed great emphasis upon the rational disciplines and this included not only such disciplines as music, mathematics, and philosophy but also rhetoric. As we have seen all three of these Fathers

were knowledgeable and skillful with respect to this discipline. If there
were no other grounds for agreement among the three, this fact alone would
produce a considerable amount of similarity especially in their approach
to problems and in their style of discourse and argument.

We have seen (Chapters II and III) that the basic rhetoric textbook
was Cicero's On Invention in which the recommended patterns for an oration
included: (1) the exordium which contained an appeal to ethical and
emotional considerations designed to put the audience in a receptive mood;
(2) the narratio describing the situation, the question at issue, agreement
and disagreements with opponents and the main divisions of the speech;
(3) the confirmatio which contain arguments for one's case and refutation
of the opponent's case; and (4) the conclusio containing not only a summary
but also an attempt to excite ill-will against the opponent and to arouse
sympathy for oneself. It seems obvious that these patterns include con-
sideration of what we have labelled the pragmatics, semantics and syntactics
of semiotics. Considerations relevant to pragmatics are certainly involved
in patterns one and four while semantical and syntactical considerations
play a role in pattern three. Given the fact that pragmatical, semantical
and syntactical issues were involved in the discipline of rhetoric and that
the Fathers received a thorough training in this discipline, it is not at
all surprising to find pragmatical, semantical and syntactical issues
being expressed in their writings.

All three recognized the importance of pragmatics and insisted that if
a piece of discourse is to be understood, the total context of the speaker
must be considered. Augustine and Aquinas affirmed that for the sake of
understanding what others say attention should be given to such differences

among people as historical backgrounds, intellectual abilities, life
situation contexts and personal interests. Augustine explicitly recom-
mended that the speaker adapt his style to the audience. Further,
Augustine especially and to a lesser extent Tertullian and Aquinas
recognized the importance of pragmatics in the task of hermeneutics.

Less attention was given in this study to the Fathers views on
pragmatics than to their views on semantics and to their actual language
analyses. These were discussed at greater length and in greater detail.
In this area we found a considerable amount of similarity among them in
the following: (1) All three appeared to recognize the triadic nature of
the functioning of linguistic signs, namely, the sign, the object of the
sign and the meaning of the sign. They definitely spoke of the "outer
word" and the "inner word," the former referring to the sign and the latter
to the meaning of the sign, what the Stoics called Lekton and Augustine,
decibile. There was the recognition, explicitly stated by Augustine and
Aquinas, that one uses the sign or word in talking about the sign or word
itself and thus a distinction is to be made between the mention and the
use of words. (2) Implied in the triadic relation and explicitly discussed
by Augustine and Aquinas is the distinction between the meaning of the
word (definitional meaning) and the meaning of the thing to which the word
refers in terms of cause, purpose, explanation and effect. Also involved
in this distinction is the distinction between intension (designation) and
extension (denotation). (3) In all three there was an emphasis upon using
common usage meanings in discourse. Excessive and uninformed stipulation
destroys communication. (4) There was an instistence upon the part of the
three Fathers that figurative or metaphorical language can function

properly only as there is a basis in something which may be said with literal signification. (5) There was the warning against the dangers of ambiguity and equivocation and thus of useless verbal disputes. The careful defining of terms was recommended as a protection against this danger. (6) There was the warning against treating "nothing" as though it were a noun substantive referring to some sort of mysterious "something" and the nonsense which may arise from this fallacy. (7) As did the Stoics all three drew a distinction between sentences and propositions. While the former have meaning, may be used to perform a variety of functions, only the latter have truth value. That is, only as a sentence expresses a proposition can it be said to have truth value.

It is with this last point that a semantical issue shades over into a syntactical issue for logic deals with sentences only as they function to express propositions bearing truth value. An argument is sound only as the conclusion is validly derived from true premises. Of importance also are the modes of propositions, whether they are necessary or contingent, possible or impossible. The category of the logically possible and the logically impossible as distinct from contingent truth or falsity found expression in the syntactical considerations of our three Fathers.

All three made use of the Aristotelian categorical and syllogistic logic but were not limited to this logic alone. They also knew and made use of a propositional logic of inference schemas which apparently had its origin among the Stoics. This logic enabled them to deal with a wider range of problems including those of hypotheticals and conditionals.

In light of the evidence presented in this study it would seem to be the case that Tertullian, Augustine and Aquinas were concerned with

many of the issues in semiotics which are still of importance today.
Perhaps it is something of an irony that whatever attention has been given
to this aspect of their thought in contemporary times has been done pri-
marily by philosophers (especially with respect to Augustinian and Thomistic
studies) rather than theologians. Yet it was as theologians that the
Fathers made use of semiotics. Those contemporary theologians who do
give some attention to semiotics seem to ignore historical precedents and
to concentrate on recent developments in linguistic and logical analyses.
Yet, even though our three Fathers may not have solved all the semiotic
problems, they do provide us with certain basic considerations which can-
not be ignored with impunity. Indeed, the application of even their
pragmatics, semantics and logic would do much to clear up the vagueness
and confusion which plague a considerable portion of contemporary theology.

[1]A. Flew & A. MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955).

[2]William T. Blackstone, The Problem of Religious Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963) p. 75.

[3]While there are wide-ranging differences among them these statements appear to find examples in those theologians influenced by existentialism. See John Macquarrie, God-Talk (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), Sten H. Stenson, Sense and Nonsense In Religion (New York: Abington Press, 1969). The writings of the so-called 'God is Dead' theologians, Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton and others.

[4]One notable exception is John Macquarrie, op. cit., Ch. 6.

[5]Quoted by John B. Noss, Man's Religions, 4th edition (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969) p. 288.

[6]Matthew 12:33-37, R. S. V.

[7]Cf. T. D. Barnes, Tertullian, A Historical and Literary Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), Chapters XIII-XIV and R. D. Sider, Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). Barnes points out that Tertullian was a learned man, acquainted not only with fashionable authors but also with a forgotten period of Latin literature and with Greek literature including that of the philosophers (pp. 201-206, especially p. 204). Sider claims, "Tertullian lived in an age when rhetoric dominated the educational system. It was regarded as the 'queen of subjects', and it constituted the curriculum for the culminating and thus most signifi- cant stage of a normal education" (p. 11). Sider then proceeds to show how Tertullian creatively and brilliantly uses the forms of rhetoric in his treatises.

[8] On Prescription Against Heretics vii and On the Flesh of Christ v Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. XV (Edinburg: T. & T. Clark), pp. 9, 173-174.

[9]Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) pp. 1-2. Chadwick's interpretation represents a rather popular, almost 'official', view of Tertullian. So Etienne Gilson claims that Tertullian thought there was an "irreconcilable antagonism between Christianity and philosophy", and speaks of a Tertullian "family" of thought to be contrasted with the Augustinian and Thomistic (Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938, pp. 8-9, and Chapters I, II, III). My study, in Chapters II -- IV, attempts to

demonstrate that this 'official' view is incorrect. One error which often
plagues the 'official' interpretation is the misquoting of the passage in
De Carne Christi 5.4 (Gilson does not refer to this passage). This mis-
quoting may be in terms either of the vernacular translation or of the Latin
text or both. So Chadwick renders it, "I believe it because it is absurd".
Professor Hans Von Campenhausen in The Fathers of the Latin Church (London:
Adam & Charles Black, 1964), p. 23, gives the Latin as "credo, quia absurdum
est", and then says it is often misquoted. But insofar as I can discover,
this is not the Latin in any of the texts of De Carne Christi. In Tertulliani
Opera, Pars II of the Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, (Turnholti, MCMLIV)
the text is given as "credible est, quia ineptum est" with a footnote indicat-
ing that some texts contain "prorsus" before "credible". Thus, the text
contained in Ernest Evans, Tertullian's Treatise On The Incarnation (London:
S. P. C. K., 1956), p. 18, is "prorsus credible est, quia ineptum est".
"Ineptus" is the negative of "aptus" (fitting) and thus may be rendered by
"unfitting" or "improper". As will be pointed out below this rendering fits
the context of De Carne Christi 5 better than "absurdum", for here Tertullian
is responding to Marcion's charge that the Incarnation was dishonorable or
unfitting for God. Thus, the proper translation would seem to be, "It is
straightforwardly credible because it is unfitting". This writer suspects
that there is some historical reason behind the popular misquoting of this
passage, but has been unable to discover what it is. In any case, this error
contributes to what this writer regards as a misunderstanding not only of
Tertullian's argument on this particular point but also of his total per-
spective on the relation of Christianity and philosophy, faith and reason.
See my article "Tertullian's 'Paradox' and 'Contempt for Reason' Reconsidered",
Expository Times, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 10, July 1976, PP. 308-311.

[10]Bernard Williams, "Tertullian's Paradox", New Essays in Philosophical
Theology, Flew & MacIntyre (eds.) (New York: The Macmillan Company, Paper-
back edition, 1964), pp. 188, 190, 192.

[11]R. D. Sider, op. cit., p. 58, Note 1.

[12]R. A. Norris, God in Early Christian Theology (New York: Seabury Press,
1965), pp. 112-113.

[13]Cf. T. D. Barnes, op. cit., Ernest Evans, Tertullian's Treatise on the
Incarnation (London: S. P. C. K., 1956), Introduction, pp. X-XI.

[14]R. D. Sider, op. cit., p. 2.

[15]Cicero De Inventione i. 98. Loeb edition.

[16]R. D. Sider, op. cit., especially pp. 24-63.

[17]Cf. I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic (University of Notre Dame
Press, 1961), Section III; W. Kneale & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic
(New York: Oxford Press, 1962), Ch. III; Benson Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1961). The discussion of this and the suc-
ceeding section has been informed largely by Mates' short but excellent study.

[18]Benson Mates, op. cit. pp. 19-26. Here Mates claims that there are similarities between Stoic theories and those of Frege and Carnap.

[19]Ibid., p. 11.

[20]While not mentioned by Mates there is an interesting similarity here with the theory of semantics proposed by the modern American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce designates the three aspects of the relation with the terms "Object", "Representamen", and "Interpretant". Cf. "Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs", Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Justus Bulcher, ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 98-101.

[21]Benson Mates, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

[22]There are four references to Chrysippus in On the Soul and one in On the Testimony of the Soul .

[23]Benson Mates, op. cit., p. 7.

[24]Both are often referred to in Tertullian's writings, especially in On the Soul . In Chapter XX of this treatise Tertullian refers to Seneca as one "whom we so often find on our side". In the discussion of Tertullian's use of rhetoric it has been indicated previously that he was thoroughly familiar with Cicero.

[25]Epistulae 117.13. Cicero's major discussion of Stoic logic is found in Topica, 54-57.

[26]Scorpiace 7.5. The translation is my own. The Latin is as follows: "Verbo non sono solo sapiunt, sed et sensu, nec auribus tantummodo audienda sunt, set et mentibus", Tertulliani Opera II (Turnholti, MCMLIV).

[27]Adversus Praxean 5. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[28]Cicero Topica 83.10.

[29]The italicized words represent my own rendering of "ex opinione hominum" since this is the customary terminology of contemporary philosophers (cf. John Hoopers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, First edition, Prentice-Hall, 1953, pp. 6-8). I do not think this does violence either to the Latin or to H. M. Hubbell's rending of these words by the term "Conventional" in the Loeb edition of De Inventione ii.53.

[30]De Inventione ii.53.

[31] De Carne Christi 11.15. Ernest Evans, Tertullian's Treatise On the Incarnation (London: S. P. C. K., 1956), p. 43.

[32] On the Flesh of Christ 13. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, op. cit., Vol. 15. In my judgment this translation is better at this point than that of some contemporary translators such as Evans, Ibid., pp. 47-49.

[33]There is a similarity here with J. L. Austin's view concerning the appropriate functioning of "performative utterances". cf. How To Do Things With Words, (Oxford University Press, 1962).

[34] Paul Edwards, "Professor Tillich's Confusions", Mind, Vol. LXXIV, April, 1965, p. 199.

[35] On the Resurrection of the Flesh 20. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, op. cit., Vol. 15.

[36]A notable exception is Professor J. H. Waszink's Tertullian's The Treatise Against Hermogenes (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1956), pp. 101-171.

[37] On Prescription Against Heretics 7. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[38]Orator 115.

[39]Benson Mates, op. cit., p. 2.

[40]Topica 57. In Topica 53-57 Cicero lists seven forms, but six and seven are restatements of form three.

[41]Benson Mates, op. cit., pp. 67-74.

[42]This formalizing of Tertullian's argument is informed, to an extent, by J. H. Waszink's discussion, op. cit., pp. 122-123. I differ with Professor Waszink in deriving only two instead of three syllogisms from chapter twelve of Against Hermogenes . and in treating the second syllogism as an instance of modus tollens.

[43]Benson Mates, op. cit., p. 80.

[44] James Moffat, "Aristotle and Tertullian", The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XVIII, Jan., 1916, pp. 170-171.

[45]Aristotle Rhetoric ii.23.21 (1400^a, 5). The Basic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon (ed.)., (Random House, 1941), p. 1426.

[46]James Moffat, op. cit., p. 171.

[47]De Carne Christi 5.5.

[48]De Inventione i.44.

[49]Cf. T. D. Barnes, op. cit., Chapter VIII.

[50] De Anima 12.3.4, 14.3. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[51]Ibid., 2.

[52]Ad Nationes i.4. Adversus Marcionem i.13.3.

[53]Ad Nationes ii.4. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 11.

[54] On Repentance 1. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 11.

[55]De Anima 3.2. The translation used here is from H. D. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy (Van Gorcum & Company, B. V.-- Assen 1973), p. 58.

[56]Cf., H. D. Timothy, Ibid., pp. 47-58.

[57] De Anima 20. Cf. Apologeticus 10. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15 and Vol. 11.

[58]Cf. Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958) and Robert M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), and R. McL. Wilson, Gnosis and the New Testament (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968).

[59] Against Hermogenes 8.3. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[60]H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956), p. 14.

[61] De Anima 23-24.30. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[62]Cf. On Prescription Against Heretics 13. Reinhold Seeberg, The History of Doctrines (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1954), pp. 139-140.

[63]Against Marcion i.22. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 7.

[64] On the Resurrection of the Flesh 3. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[65]Against Marcion i.18. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 7.

[66]Ibid., 3.

[67]Ibid., 5.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Cf. H. A. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 99-100, 288-292, 311-312.

[70]Against Marcion i.5. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 7.

[71]Cf. The Many-Faced Argument, John H. Hick and Arthur C. McGill (eds.) (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967).

[72]Against Marcion i.3. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 7.

[73]Ibid., 17.ii.3. Cf. Apologeticus 17. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 11.

[74]Ibid., i.23.

[75] *Apologeticus* 13. <u>Ante-Nicene Christian Library</u>, Vol. 11.

[76] <u>On the Resurrection of the Flesh</u>   2. <u>Ante-Nicene Christian Library</u>, Vol. 15.

[77] <u>De Anima</u> 6. <u>Ibid</u>., Vol. 15.

[78] R. D. Sider, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 130. This quote contains the reference to A. A. Day, <u>Origins of Latin Love-elegy</u>, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1938). pp. 59-75.

[79] R. A. Norris, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 112-113.

[80] <u>Adversus Praxean</u> 1.16.24. <u>Ante-Nicene Christian Library</u>, Vol. 15.

[81] Thomas J. J. Altizer, <u>The Gospel of Christian Atheism</u>, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), pp. 102-103.

[82] G. L. Prestige, <u>God in Partistic Thought</u>, 2nd edition (London: S.P.C.K., 1959), p. 1.

[83] <u>Ad Nationes</u> ii.4. <u>Ante-Nicene Christian Library</u>, Vol. 11,

[84] <u>Ibid</u>. Tertullian puts "God" in the class of <u>proper names</u> emphasizing His uniqueness. Thus, I have used "definite description" rather than "definition" here.

[85] <u>Against Marcion</u> i.22. <u>Ante-Nicene Christian Library</u>, Vol. 7. The italics are mine.

[86] <u>Ibid</u>., 3.

[87] G. L. Prestige, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 4, 5, 27.

[88] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 46.

[89] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 5.

[90] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 6.

[91] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 7, 11.

[92] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 6.

[93] William L. Power, "Symbolic Logic and the Doctrine of the Trinity", <u>The Iliff Review</u>, Vol. XXXII, No. 1., Winter 1975, p. 41.

[94] G. C. Stead, "Divine Substance in Tertullian", <u>Journal of Theological Studies</u>, Vol. XIV, No. 1, April 1963, p. 47.

[95] <u>Ibid</u>.

[96] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 50.

[97] H. A. Wolfson, op. cit., p. 325.

[98] G. L. Prestige, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

[99] Ibid., pp. 62.

[100] Ibid., pp. 100-101.

[101] Ibid., p. 102.

[102] On the Flesh of Christ 3. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[103] Against Praxeas 10. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[104] Against Marcion i.22; ii.24.

[105] Ibid., i.3.

[106] On the Flesh of Christ 3.

[107] On the Resurrection of the Flesh 4.

[108] R. A. Norris, op. cit., pp. 111-112.

[109] Ernest Evans, Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, Vol. 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 21.

[110] Volume 7, italicizing of independent is mine. The crucial term here, Alienus, has several connotations as follow: unsuitable, inconsistent with, different from, take away, not related to, incongrous, not belonging to one's house. Independent appears to be a good rendering.

[111] Ernest Evans, op. cit., ii.7. p. 107. The italics in this quote are mine.

[112] Adversus Praxean 27. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15. It is interesting to note that transfiguratio may mean metamorphosis and this can carry the connotation of a change in substantia.

[113] Ibid., 1.16, 29.

[114] Against Marcion ii.27. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 7.

[115] Against Hermogenes 16. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[116] Against Marcion v.17. Ibid., Vol. 7.

[117] Against Praxeas 3. Ibid., Vol. 15.

[118] Robert Lowry Calhoun, "Lectures on the History of Christian Doctrine". Unpublished and only for private circulation to students of Yale University Divinity School, pp. 108-109.

[119]H. A. Wolfson, op. cit., p. 326.

[120]G. L. Prestige, op. cit., p. 160.

[121]The brief description of Evan's position depends largely on G. C. Stead's op. cit., p. 47. In his explication Stead refers to the Introduction of Evan's Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas (London, 1948), pp. 38-58. In this context Stead also points out that while in the Categories there is a definite contrast between prote ousia and deutera ousia, Aristotle used ousia in a wide variety of senses in other works. Thus, it is not the case, as assumed by Evans, that there are only two possible meanings of ousia even in Aristotle.

[122]G. C. Stead, op. cit., pp. 58-62.

[123]Ibid., p. 59.

[124]Ibid., p. 66.

[125]Ibid., p. 62.

[126] Adversus Praxean 7, 26, 29. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[127]G. L. Prestige, op. cit., pp. 99, 102.

[128]See above p. 11 and Adversus Praxean 5. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[129] Adversus Praxean 8. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

[130]Adversus Praxean 2. The translation used here is that which appears in H. A. Wolfson, op. cit., p. 328.

[131]H. A. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 328-332.

[132]B. B. Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (Reprinted from original published by Oxford Press, 1930, by Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1970) pp. 53, 67.

[133]William L. Power, op. cit., pp. 35-43.

[134] Adversus Praxean 28. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 15.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

[1]Cf. The Problem of Free Choice 2. The Trinity xv.12. The Confessions
vii.4. The City of God xi.26, vii.29. Soloquies 2.

[2]Louis Dupre, The Other Dimension (N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1972) p. 123-
124.

[3]The Summa Theologica I, Q1, Art. 1, Q2, Art. 3.

[4]A History of Christian Thought (Lectures recorded and edited by Peter H.
John) p. 165.

[5]The Summa Theologica I, Q 109, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

[6]Enchiridion 8, 28.

[7]The Confessions xi.11. The City of God f.9, 10: The Problem of Free
Choice.

[8]If the exposition of Tertullian's thought in Chapter II, C, above is sound,
then Tertullian might be classified among these exceptions. In my judg-
ment, Augustine, due in part to his emphasis on predestination, cannot be
interpreted in this fashion.

[9]Charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology For Our Time (La Salle, Ill., Open
Court, 1967).

[10]Confessions iii.3. iv.2. v.7, 8, 12.

[11]Cf. above, p. 14 or Orator 115.

[12]Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed. (N. Y.: Macmillan Co., 1953),
p. 2, I.

[13]"The Theory of Meaning", The Importance of Language. Max Black, ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1962) p. 162.

[14]Op. cit., p. 3, III.

[15]Cf. R. A. Markus, "St. Augustine on Signs", Augustine, A Collection of
Critical Essays, R. A. Markus, ed. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co.,
1976) p. 86.

[16]On Christian Instruction ii.1, 2.

[17]Ibid., ii.2, 3.

[18] Charles Sanders Peirce, "Logic As Semiotic: The Theory of Signs", *Philosophical Writing of Peirce*, Justus Bulcher, ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 98-101.

[19] *Augustine: De Dialectica*, Translated with Introduction and Notes by B. Darrell Jackson (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975)

[20] *Ibid.* V, P89.

[21] *On the Trinity* XV. 10-11.

[22] *Op. cit.*, pp. 60-65, 74.

[23] Cf. above pp. 9-11; also Benson Mates, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-26.

[24] "The Theory of Signs In De Doctrina Christiana", *Augustine, A Collection of Critical Essays*, R. A. Markus, ed. (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday and Co., 1972), pp. 92-147.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 110

[26] *Concerning the Teacher* 1, 2.

[27] *On Christian Instruction* ii.2,3; Italics are mine.

[28] *Concerning the Teacher* 10, 34.

[29] *On Christian Instruction* ii.24-25, 37-38.

[30] *Ibid.*, iii.12; iv; also *On the Trinity* i, iii, and *On Dialectic* vii.

[31] *Concerning the Teacher* 8, 24; 9, 27; *On the Trinity* iii.10; x.7; xv.9.

[32] *On Dialectic* V; also *Concerning the Teacher* 4 and 5.

[33] *Ibid.* II; also *Concerning the Teacher* 5.

[34] *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

[35] *Concerning the Teacher*, 10.33-34, 11.36.

[36] *On Christian Instruction* ii.16, 23-26.

[37] Cf. *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 238-247; *The Dynamics of Faith*, (N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1957), Chapter III: "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols", *Religious Experience and Truth: A Symposium*, Sidney Hook, ed., (N. Y.:

[38] *On Christian Instruction* iii.5, 9, 13.

[39] *Ibid.*, VIII, IX, X; *Concerning the Teacher* 8; *On Christian Instruction* ii; xii.

[40] _Concerning the Teacher_ 13.43.

[41] _The Confessions_ xii.23.

[42] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. I, p. 187.

[43] Paul Edwards, "Professor Tillich's Confusions", _Mind_, Vol. LXXXIV, April 1965, No. 294, p. 213.

[44] _Concerning the Teacher_ 2.3.

[45] _Concerning the Nature of the Good_ 25.

[46] _On Christian Instruction_ ii.31,48.

[47] _Ibid._, ii.33, 51.

[48] _Ibid._, ii.32, 50.

[49] _Ibid._, ii.35, 53.

[50] Darrell Jackson, _op. cit._, p. 128.

[51] _Ibid._, p. 126.

Chapter IV

NOTES

1. Cf. Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., <u>The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas</u> (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) P. IX

2. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. vi–vii. Schmidt points out that there are many manuals of logic which profess to follow the logic of Thomas but that these manuals are not expositions.

3. Etienne Gilson, <u>The Elements of Christian Philosophy</u> (New York: Double-day and Co., 1960) p. 16.

4. Cf. I. M. Bochenski, <u>A History of Formal Logic</u> (University of Notre Dame Press, 1961); Philotheus Boehner, <u>Medieval Logic</u> (Manchester University Press, 1952); D. P. Henry, <u>Medieval Logic and Metaphysics</u> (London: Hutchinson and Co. 1972); Anthony Kenney, <u>Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays</u> (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969); Ernest A. Moody, <u>Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic</u> (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1953). While the history of medieval logic is still in somewhat of a preliminary stage, there is still sufficient information, as noted in the works cited, to indicate that non-Aristotelian argument forms were developed.

5. Anthony Nemetz, "Logic and the Division of the Sciences in Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas", <u>The Modern Schoolman</u>, Vol. XXXIII, Jan. 1956, pp. 91–109.

6. <u>Summa Contra Gentiles</u>, I, Ch. 81, N. 4; II Ch. 15, N.5

7. <u>Op</u>. <u>Cit</u>., P. 107

8. <u>Summa Theologica</u>, I, Q. 83, A.1, Ad. 3; cf. I, Q.8, A.1, A.3; I, Q.105, A.5. Unless otherwise indicated quotations from the <u>Summa Theologica</u> are taken from <u>Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas</u>, Anton C. Pegis (ed.) (New York: Random House, 1945). Extensive use has also been made of the more recent Blackfriars translation published by McGraw-Hill. Whenever the quotation is taken from this translation such will be noted.

9. <u>Questions Disputate De Veritate</u>, Q.5, A.8, Ads. 8–9, <u>The Disputed Questions on Truth</u>, Translated from the Leonine text by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., Ph.D. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952).

10. <u>Summa Theologica</u>, I., Q.22, A.3

11. <u>Ibid</u>., I, Q.14, As. 1, 4, 7, 8.

12. Book II, Ch. 46, N.7, <u>On the Truth of the Catholic Faith</u>, translated by Anton C. Pegis, et. al. (Doubleday and Co., Image books)

13. This comparison was suggested to me by my colleague Professor Anthony Nemetz.

14. <u>Summa Theologica</u>, I–II, Q.94, A.3

15. <u>Ibid</u>., I–II, Q.93, A.2

16. <u>Ibid</u>., I, Q.49, A.3, Ad. 5

17. <u>Ibid</u>., I, Q.2, A.1; I, Q.12, A.1; III, Qs. 1–6; <u>DeVeritate</u>, Q.2, A.11; <u>Summa Contra Gentiles</u> III, Chs. 38–40. It seems to be Thomas' position that in the natural order <u>meaning</u> is fixed by convention but that <u>truth</u> is opaque. There are of course, the vestiges of God in the natural order but here our cognition is confused. We can know it to be true that the proposition "God exists" is self-evident in itself and yet we are unable to experience this self-evidence for ourselves. On the other hand, in the realm of revelation the fact of truth is determinate and the meaning or explanation is indeterminate. So with respect to the Incarnation there is the truth of this revealed mystery which is held by faith and yet it is beyond our power to describe adequately in terms of meaning. Thus, whether it is in terms of truth or meaning the ratio between divine knowledge and human knowledge is an indeterminate one.

18. <u>Ibid</u>., I, Qs. 14, 16, 78, 84; <u>De Veritate</u>, Q.I, As. 1–4; <u>Summa Contra Gentiles</u>, I, Chs. 49–65; Peri-Hermeneias L. III, 6–9.

19. Anthony Nemetz, "Natural Law and Truth in St. Thomas Aquinas", <u>Studies in Medieval Culture</u> IV/2, John Sommerfeldt, et. al (eds.) (Western Michigan University, 1974) PP. 303–304.

20. <u>De Veritate</u>, Q.21, As. 1–3; <u>Summa Theologica</u>, I, Q.16, A.4

21. <u>Ibid</u>., Q.1, A.4; <u>Summa Theologica</u> I, Q.16, As. 5–6

22. <u>Summa Theologica</u>, I, Q.2, A.2, Ad 1; Q.29, A.3, Ad 1; Q.109, As. 1–2; II–II, Q.1, A.5, Ad 2; <u>Summa Contra Gentiles</u>, I, Chs. 2–4.

23. <u>Peri-Hermeneias</u>, L. II, N.2, <u>Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle on Interpretation</u>, Jean T. Oesterle translator (Marquette University Press, 1962)

24. <u>Ibid</u>., L. II, NN. 4–5; L. VII, N.2

25. <u>De Veritate</u>, Q.4, A.2, Ad 5

26. <u>Ibid</u>., Q.4, A.1, Reply; cf. <u>Summa Theologica</u>, I, Q.34, A.1 and St. Augustine, <u>De Trinitate</u>, Book XV, Chs. IX–X.

27. <u>Peri-Hermeneias</u>, L.X, N.2; L.III, N.7; <u>Summa Theologica</u>, I, Q.34, A.1

28. I. M. Bochenski, <u>A History of Formal Logic</u>, P. 150

29. Ernest A. Moody, <u>Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic</u>. pp. 2-3

30. A few of the references are: I, Q.84, A.5; I-II, Q.99, A.3; Q.101, A.2; Also <u>De Veritate</u>, Q.9, A.4; Q.17, A.1

31. Even a superficial perusal of the indexes of Thomas' writings will verify this claim.

32. <u>Peri-Hermeneias</u>, L.II, N.11

33. Bochenski, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., P. 135

34. <u>Peri-Hermeneias</u>, L. II, N.3; cf. <u>De Trinitate</u>, Q.5, A.1, Ad 2

35. Rudolf Carnap, <u>Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications</u> (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), PP. 78-80. I am using the threefold distinctions generally made in Semiotics between pragmatics, semantics and syntactics as simply a convenient schema to provide a structure for the further discussion of Thomas' views of language and logic. It is obvious, as has already been indicated, that Thomas was not a "professional" logician and did not himself develop a formal system of logic. Even though Thomas sometimes speaks of logic as a 'science' (sometimes he calls it an 'art'), it is to be classed among the disciplines of the <u>trivium</u> and thus <u>preliminary</u> to the sciences of the <u>quadrivium</u> (<u>De Trinitate</u>, Q.5, A.1, Ad. 2). Thus, the use of this schema is not intended to convey any implications with respect to what might be called the science or philosophy of logic, nor with respect to metaphysics. It might be well to point out here that Ernest A. Moody (<u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., P. 6) makes a distinction between the <u>formal</u> logic of the scholastics and their doctrines of epistemology and metaphysics. According to Moody, "Precisely because this logic was a formal logic, it could be accepted and utilized by the scholastics of all parties regardless of the metaphysical or epistemological oppositions dividing Scotists from Thomists, or realists from nominalists" (<u>Ibid</u>.).

36. Rudolf Carnap, <u>Ibid</u>., P. 79

37. See references in note 4 above.

38. Bochenski, <u>op. cit</u>., P. 251

39. <u>Summa Theologica</u> I, Q.13, A.5; I-II, Q.56, A.3; <u>Summa Contra Gentiles</u> I, Ch.1,1; Ch.35,2; Ch.42,12; <u>De Veritate</u>, Q.4, As.1-5

40. <u>Peri Hermeneias</u>, VII, N.4

41. <u>Ibid</u>., VII, N.5

42. <u>Ibid</u>., II, N.11

43. <u>Ibid</u>., VII, N.6 (The italics are mine)

44. <u>De Trinitate</u> Q.5, A.1, Ad.3

45. E. K. Rand, _Cicero In the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas_ (Milwaukee, Marquette Univ. Press, 1946) pp. 8, 11

46. See chapters II, III and V above.

47. Rand, _op. cit._, P. 44

48. _De Veritate_ Q.4, A.1, A.4; _Metaphysics VII_, L.3, NN.1332-1330

49. _Summa Theologica_ I-II, Q.77, A.2, obj.5, Ad.5

50. _Ibid._, I-II, Q.68, A.5

51. _Ibid._, I, Q.84, A.5

52. _Ibid._, I, Q.39, A.5, Ad.1

53. _Ibid I_, Q.13, A.1 (Blackfriars rendering)

54. _Peri Hermeneias_, II.N.9

55. _Ibid._, III, N.3

56. _De Veritate_, Q.4, A.2. Reply; _Summa Contra Gentiles_ I, Ch.1, 1

57. _De Inventione_ II. 53. Also see chapter II on Tertullian

58. Sumuel Butler, "Thought and Language", _The Importance of Language_, Max Black, ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1962), P. 13

59. _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.13, A.2, Ad.2

60. _Ibid._, II-II, Q.1, A.6 (Blackfrairs)

61. _Ibid._, I-II, Q.58, A.1

62. _Ibid._, I, Q.13, A.2, Ad.2

63. _De Veritate_, Q.4, A.2

64. _Contra Gentiles_ I, Ch.1, 1

65. _Ibid._, I, Ch.42, 12

66. _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.2, A.2, Ad.2 (Blackfrairs)

67. _Ibid._, I, Q.13, A.8c & Ad.2 (Blackfrairs)

68. Timothy McDeamolt, O.P., _Summa Theologiae_, Vol. 2. (Blackfrairs 1964) P. 38, N.a.

69. Joseph Babek, _Aquinas On Being and Essence_ (University of Notre Dame Press, 1965) Paragraph 16, P. 59

70. _Summa Theologica_, I, Q.3. A.3 (Blackfrairs)

71. _Ibid._, I, Q.17, A.3.

72. Cf. _Commentary on Metaphysics of Aristotle_, John P. Rowan, translator. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co, 1961) V, L.7, NN. 843–847; VII, L.5, NN. 1378–1379; VII, L.9. NN. 1462–1463

73. _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.13, A.1; Contra Gentiles I, Ch. 12,4

74. By _denotata_ I mean the actual objects in a classification as, for example, all the chairs in the class chair. I will use denotation and extension synonymously and also intension and designation or definition

75. _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.2, A.1, Ad.2 (Blackfrairs), Also see _Contra Gentiles_ I, Ch. 11, 3

76. _Metaphysics_, V. L.9, N.896; _De Veritate_, Q.1, A.8, Ad.7; Q.3, A.4, Ad.6; _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.16, A.5, Ad.3; I, Q.76, A.1, Ad.1; I, Q.45, A.1

77. _Summa Theologica_, I, Q.13, A.9; Q.34, A.2

78. _Ibid._, I, Q.31, A.3

79. _Ibid._, I, Q.1, A.10; Q.34, A.1, Ad.1; Q.13,As 2, 5, 6; _Contra Gentiles_ I, Ch. 30

80. _Ibid._, I, Q.17, A.3; _Contra Gentiles_ I, Ch. 59, N3; _De Veritate_ Q.1, A.3 V _Metaphysics_, L. 22, NN. 1130–1134

81. _Peri-Hermeneias_ L. VIII

82. _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.16, As. 1, 2, 7

83. cf. Herbert McCabe, "Categories", _Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays_, Anthony Kenney (ed.) (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1969) pp. 54–92

84. I. M. Bochénski, _op. cit._, P. 162

85. _Peri-Hermeneias_, L.V, N.6

86. _Summa Theologica_ III, Q.16, A.7, Ad.4. (Blackfriars)

87. _Ibid._, III, Q.16, A.7C

88. _Summa Contra Gentiles_ I, Ch. 33, 5

89. _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.16, A.17; Q.58, A.4; Q.85, A.2, Ad.3; Q.85, A.5, A.6

90. _Ibid._, I, Q.19, A.3

91. _Ibid._, I, Q.22, A.4

92. _Ibid._, I, Q.25, A.3 (Blackfrairs)

93. _De Veritate_ Q.17, A.2

94. _Op. cit._, II, Q.13, A.2, obj. 3

95. _Peri-Hermeneias_, L.1, N.8; L.8; Also see Peter Hoenen, S.J. _Reality and Judgment According to St. Thomas_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1952) PP. 108-103

96. _Summa Contra Gentiles_, I, Ch. 20, N. 14; Summa Theologica I, Q.25, A.3, Ad. 2

97. _Summa Theologica_ I, Q.25, A.6, Ad.1

98. _Ibid._ I, Q.105, A.2, Ad.3

99. _De Veritate_ Q.17, A.2