THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

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CONTENTS

APPENDICES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BKV: Bibliothek der Kirchenväter.
JTS: Journal of Theological Studies.
R.P.: Ritter and Preller.
RSR: Recherches de Science Religieuse.
SVF: Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, von Arnim.
TWB: Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Kittel.
ZNW: Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft.

References to Clement

Prot. 61; 1, 47, 16 refers to the *Protrepticus,* paragraph 61, and volume 1, page 47, line 16 of the Stählin text.
Strom. 11, 77; 11, 153, 21 refers to the *Stromateis,* book 11, paragraph 77, and volume 11, page 153, line 21 of the Stählin text.
Paed.: Paedagogus.
Exc.: Excerpta ex Theodoto.
Ecl.: Eclogae Propheticae.
QDS.: Quis Dives Salvetur.

Text

The text used throughout is that of O. Stählin, *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte,* vols. 12, 15, 17, 39. Leipzig, 1905-36.

INTRODUCTION

I. LIFE AND WORKS

CLEMENT came to Alexandria in his quest for knowledge. After his conversion he had studied under various Christian teachers.

Of these [teachers], one, an Ionian, lived in Greece, two others who came from Coele-Syria and Egypt respectively were in Magna Graecia. others were in the east -- one was from Assyria, and the other a Hebrew from Palestine. I found the last of them -- he was the first in power -- when I had tracked him down to where he was hiding in Egypt. Here I came to rest. He was a real Sicilian bee who drew from the flowers of the apostolic and prophetic meadow and who engendered a purity of knowledge in the souls of his hearers. [1]

The Sicilian bee was Pantaenus. Clement quotes words of Pantaenus in the *Prophetic Eclogues*, [2] and Eusebius says that Clement refers to Pantaenus as his teacher in the lost 'Hypotyposeis'. [3]

His journeys ended when he found Pantaenus. He stayed in Alexandria for more than twenty years, probably from A.D. 175 to 202. During this time he taught in the catechetical school, first under Pantaenus and later as master himself. [4] This is the period of his life in which he wrote most of his works. Alexandria was the environment in which he lived and thought, and the influences of its learning, culture, syncretism, colour, and mystery were strong. His name has been rightly linked with the name of this city.

Clement left Alexandria during the persecution of Septimius Severus, [5] and we read of him again in two letters of Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem. The first of these letters was written from a prison in Cappadocia to Antioch in A.D. 211. Alexander writes, 'I have sent you these letters by Clement, the blessed presbyter, a virtuous and well tested man. You know him and will recognise him when he comes. While he was with us here by the providence and direction of God, he strengthened and increased the Church

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[1]*Strom.* I, 11; II, 8, 20.
[2]*Ecl.* 56; III, 153, 1.
[3]Eusebius, *H.E.* V, 11, 2; VI, 13, 2.
[4]Eusebius, *H.E.* VI, 6.
[5]Eusebius, *H.E.* VI, 6 and VI, 3, 1.

of the Lord.' [1] In a second letter written from Jerusalem to Origen in A.D. 215, Alexander speaks of 'the holy Clement' as the master who had benefited him and as one of 'those blessed fathers who have gone on before us'. [2] The date of Clement's death may be fixed by these letters somewhere between A.D. 211 and 215.

The description of Clement as 'the blessed presbyter' is the chief piece of evidence for Clement's having been ordained a presbyter. Its validity has been questioned on the ground that if 'presbyter' had a technical sense here the name of a particular church would follow it. [3] A statement of Jerome refers to Clement as a presbyter of the church of Alexandria. [4] However, this objection would not hold if Clement were a presbyter, not of Alexandria, but of Alexander's church in Cappadocia. It would be superfluous for a bishop to specify in a letter of introduction the church of one of his own presbyters. An adequate reason for the ordination of Clement can be found in his economic position. While at Alexandria his means appear to have been ample, but when he fled during the persecution he would have to leave most of his wealth behind him. His ordination by Alexander would provide him with economic security, which he lacked perhaps for the first time in his life.

Other things have been said about the life of Clement, and some of the conjectures that have been put forward are no doubt justified. From the few facts which have been mentioned much can be learnt. Clement had travelled in search of knowledge and had learnt from different teachers. His mental climate was that of Alexandria, and his chief teacher was a converted philosopher. He died a man revered for piety and holiness.

His reputation became that of a man of learning and intelligence. He was eloquent and a lover of learning, [5] and possessed the knowledge of all wisdom. [6] Jerome, who was impressed with his knowledge of Scripture and secular literature, called him 'in my judgement the most learned of all'. [7] In the sixth and seventh

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[1] Eusebius, *H.E.* VI, 11, 6.
[2] *Ibid.* VI, 14, 9.
[3] Hugo Koch, *ZNW* (1921), p. 45.
[4] *De Vir. Ill*. 38, quoted Stählin text, vol. I, p. xii.
[5] Cyril of Alexandria, *C. Jul*. VII, p. 231, quoted Stählin text, vol. I, p. xii.
[6] Socrates, *H.E.*11, 35, quoted *ibid.*
[7] *Epist. 70*, 4, *ibid.* p. xiii.

centuries pseudo- Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor may have had some slight knowledge of Clement, though the former probably confuses him with Clement of Rome and the latter quotes from a spurious work. [1] Clement appears to have been neglected because of his association with Origen, the obscurity of his style, and the later recognition of pseudo-Dionysius as the philosopher who was an associate of the apostles.

We possess only a part of the writings of Clement which are listed by Eusebius. Of these writings three are major works (*Protrepticus, Paedagogus,* and *Stromateis*), three are shorter collections of other people's writings, edited with a commentary by Clement (*Excerpta ex Theodoto,* the 'Eighth Book' of the *Stromateis,* and the *Prophetic Eclogues*), and one is a sermon (*Quis Dives Salvetur*). [2]

The problem of the relation between the three major works has attracted considerable attention during the last fifty years. [3] In the first chapter of the Paedagogus, Clement distinguishes between the divine Logos as Protreptikos, Paidagogos, and Didaskalos. The Protreptikos invites men to salvation. [4] The Paedagogos follows, exhorting the saved to a better life and healing their passions. He is concerned with right action and spiritual welfare. [5] The same Logos is also 'didaskalikos' and will teach, explain, and reveal general principles. [6] The interpretation of symbolic utterances is the work of the 'didaskalos' as distinct from the 'paedagogos'. [7]

It was generally accepted that this threefold economy of divine activity is meant to be reflected in a trilogy of written works -*Protrepticus,Paedagogus* and *Didascalus.* The first two are easily identified with the works that bear that name. The last was traditionally and not so easily identified with the *Stromateis.* De Faye, in 1898, denied that the *Stromateis* were the *Didascalus.* Clement had intended to write a *Didascalus,* a systematic treat-

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[1] See Appendix C.

[2] There are also fragments from the *Hypotyposeis* and other lost works.

[3] Accounts of the controversy are given by Munck, *Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria,* pp. 1-126, Quatember, *Die Christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandrien,* pp. 29-42, and Mondésert in his introduction to *Stromate* I, pp. 11-22.

[4] *Paed.* I, 1; I, 90, 11.

[5] *Paed.* I, 1; 1, 90, 16.

[6] *Paed.* I, 2; I, 90, 22.

[7] *Paed.* III, 97; 1, 289, 22.

ment of Christian doctrine; but contemporary conditions compelled him to write a preliminary work justifying the use of Greek philosophy. The *Stromateis* are this preliminary work [1] and are too unsystematic to be the *Didascalus.*

In 1902 Heussi attacked de Faye's views and advocated a return to a modified traditional view. [2] On the ground that there were references in the *Paedagogus* to the first books of the *Stromateis,* he claimed that the first four books of the *Stromateis* were written before the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus.* The later books of the *Stromateis* were the *Didascalus,* concerned with knowledge and purposely unsystematic in structure. In 1925 F. Prat [3] claimed that the *Stromateis* fulfil at least in part the office of the *Didascalus.* It is not necessary that they should bear this title, and their contents as indicated at the beginning of Book IV are just what the *Didascalus* should contain. Prat denied that the *Paedagogus* was a later work than the first four books of the Stromateis. Munck established this last point beyond all doubt. The alleged references to the *Stromateis* in the *Paedagogus* were demolished. A careful discussion of the problem was put forward. There are two trilogies -- *Protrepticus, Paedagogus, Didascalus,* and *Stromateis* I-III, *Stromateis* - . The final work of both trilogies was never produced. [4]

Lazzati [5] would not accept the second trilogy and accused Munck of looking for too much system in Clement. He divided the works of Clement into those intended for secret and private instruction and those addressed to the public. The esoteric works are the seven books of the *Stromateis* and the three commentary works. The public works are the *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus* and the *Quis Dives Salvetur.* Quatember claimed that the basic text in *Paedagogus* I, I bad been wrongly interpreted. It did not suggest that Clement intended to write another book, called the *Didascalus.* Clement speaks of three stages of instruction, not of written works. [6]

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[1] De Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, p. 104.
[2] *Zeitschrift für wiss. Theol* XLV (1902), pp. 465 et seq.
[3] *RSR* (1925), p. 234.
[4] Munck, p. 111. The second work of the second trilogy was not completed.
[5] Lazzati, *Introduzione allo studio di Clemente Alessandrino*, pp. 1-35.
[6] Quatember, *op. cit*. pp. 29-32.

The fever of controversy is waning. Mondésert points to the lack of a definite solution and suggests that with the limited materials at our disposal this lack is inevitable. The controversy has had its uses. It has shown how necessary it is to read the text carefully and to recognise the peculiar, complex nature of the *Stromateis.* All attempts to define more clearly the order and dates of the works have failed. [1]

II. STYLE AND THOUGHT

(1) Clement's main work, the *Stromateis,* presents three main difficulties. It is unsystematic in its presentation, unsystematic in the thought which it expresses, and expressed in symbolic, enigmatical language. The presentation of ideas is purposely unsystematic for two reasons -- to hide the meaning from the unworthy and to reveal it to the worthy. The sophistic quibblers, for whom Clement had little time, would not get very far with the *Stromateis.* Their favourite trick of isolating a sentence and contradicting it would hardly work if the sentence only made sense when it was joined together with other parts. On the other hand, the patient digger would find a little gold and the persistent hunter would run his quarry to earth.

For I am silent on the point that the *Stromateis,* being the embodiment of much learning, wish to hide skilfully the seeds of knowledge. As he who loves the chase, after seeking, searching, tracking, and hunting with dogs, takes the quarry, so truth when sought and gained through hard work seems a sweet thing. How then did it seem good that this arrangement should be adopted in your notes? Because great is the danger in betraying the truly ineffable word of the real philosophy to those who wish to speak recklessly and unjustly against everything, and who hurl forth quite inappropriately all sorts of names and words, deceiving themselves and bewitching their followers. [2]

The lack of system in Clement's writing appears to increase as one restricts the area of inspection. The books as a whole contain what they are said to contain; but it is often hard to see the connection between chapter and chapter, between section and section,

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[1]Mondésert, *op. cit*. pp. 19-22.
[2]*Strom*. I, 20-1; II, 14, 8.

between sentence and sentence, and even between word and word. This lack of apparent connection is part of Clement's purpose. He writes down what comes into his mind when it comes into his mind.

Let our notes be, as we often said, because of those people who light upon them carelessly and ignorantly, patched together in a motley way as the name itself (*stromateis* or patchwork) declares, continually dropping one subject for another, suggesting one thing in the course of discussion and declaring another. 'For seekers after gold', says Heraclitus, 'dig much earth and find little gold.' But those who really are of golden stock, mining for what is akin to them, will find much in a little. For the writing will find one reader who will understand it. The *stromateis* of notes work together for the recollection and the declaration of truth for those who can rationally inquire. But we must also work out and investigate other things too. [1]

A comparison may be made with the 'stream of consciousness' technique employed by many modern writers. The critical mechanism of logical thought is suppressed. What is written down is what bubbles up from the unconscious mind, governed by the use of words already in the language and basic rules of syntax. The results vary from the other-worldliness of Virginia Woolf *Orlando* to the realism of James Joyce *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. The tone and technique vary because of the greater part played by individual imagination. The aim is to say something which ordinary forms of connected description could not say. The technique gives a greater insight into the mind of the writer than any ordinary technique can give. There are some points of similarity here with Clement. His *Stromateis* go beyond the usual disciplines of study and thought and depend upon his fertile imagination as well as on his logical faculty. He wishes to say something which the normal disciplines of thought have failed to say. We learn a lot more about the mind of Clement in the *Stromateis* than we could in a more systematic work.

(2) It is not merely that Clement expresses his thought in an unsystematic manner. His thought itself is unsystematic in the sense that it is not confined to any previous system of philosophy or structure of explanation and classification. His eclectic en-

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[1] *Strom.* IV, 4; II, 249, 19.

thusiasm accepts whatever any school of philosophy has said well. It would be more accurate to call him 'multisystematic'. He will give several different solutions to a specific problem and not indicate an exclusive preference for any. The ethical system in Book II consists largely of a doxographical account of various philosophers' views on the Good. At the end of this account he gives his ruling idea of assimilation to God, but he does not show systematically how the minor ideas are subservient to this idea. Again, in the problem of the origin of philosophy he puts forward many different solutions without indicating a preference for any particular one.

The refusal to choose and to use one system of thought to the exclusion of others may be an indication of inferior or of superior intelligence. Clement considered that the systems of the various schools were useful and necessary things; but he did not consider that any one of their systems was capable of explaining all that he wanted to explain. The reason for the plurality of systems and explanations is not a muddled mind but a muddled world. [1] Clement's mind is acute, but the world which he faces is complex. In him the heritages of Israel, Greece, and Alexandria meet and do service to the Christian gospel.

A similar attitude to particular systems of philosophy can be seen in the 'meta-philosophy' of the present day. John Wisdom speaks of systems of philosophy as nets spread over the blessed manifold of experience. [2] Experience is described according to the way it fits into the system of definition which the system of philosophy presents. Different systems with their different

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[1] Clement was sensitive to the reasons for sceptical suspense of judgement, though he rejected its conclusions. The evidence on both sides of a question, he says, is often balanced. The world is full of tribunals and councils which try to decide between different views. Libraries are full of books which express conflicting theories. *Strom*, VIII, 22; III, 93, 19 ff.

[2] John Wisdom, "Philosophy and Psychoanalysis", p. 119 (part of an article "Philosophy, Anxiety and Novelty", *Mind*, 1944): 'As we all know but won't remember, any classificatory system is a net spread on the blessed manifold of the individual and blinding us not to all but to too many of its varieties and continuities. A new system will do the same, but not in just the same ways. So that in accepting *all* the systems their blinding power is broken, their revealing power becomes acceptable; the individual is restored to us, not isolated as before we used language, not in it box as when language mastered us, but in "creation's chorus".'

structures are like different nets of differently-shaped mesh. Each will give a different account, a different view of the underlying reality. The only way to get near to the reality is to accept all systems.

An equally interesting view is that which has been expressed by exponents of the 'theology of paradox'. This doctrine, which derives from Kierkegaard, includes the assertion that no single set of consistent propositions can express the truth concerning God. 'The attempt to put our experience of God into theological statements is something like the attempt to draw a map of the world on a flat surface, the page of an atlas. It is impossible to do this without a certain degree of falsification, because the surface of the earth is a spherical surface whose pattern cannot be reproduced accurately upon a plane.' [1] Two contradictory maps (one of the two hemispheres, the other Mercator's projection) are given and from their combined use a working guide can be obtained. The same thing happens when we think about God, not because his nature lacks unity, but because we cannot express that nature in one consistent set of propositions.

(3) Clement's use of symbolism is a distinctive and persistent feature of his thought. [2] Symbolism both hides and reveals the truth. It hides its meanings from the ignorant and arrogant critic who is blinded by sin and is deterred by pride from patient study. It reveals new things to the new eyes of those who believe. Clement's chief interest in symbolism lay in the part which it played in the allegorical interpretation of Scripture; but he found it relevant to all parts of his thought. A great deal of his work is obscure because the meanings of his symbols are in no way linked with our contemporary associations of ideas. Clement is the first person to give a theory of symbolism and to attempt to justify it rationally. The virtues of symbolism are several. It preserves the truth from ridicule and desecration. An oral teaching tradition is necessary to interpret it. It presents the truth in a more impressive form. Each symbol has more than one meaning and expresses more than one idea. It is a bond of union between the

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[1] D. A. Baillie, *God was in Christ* (London, 1948), p. 109.
[2] See ch. XIII.

various meanings or ideas to which it refers. By his symbolism Clement declares the importance of complicated hidden connections between ideas and between things. He points the way to a new synthesis which lays constant emphasis on variety and plurality in unity.

T. S. Eliot has used extensively a symbolic technique to express his message to the modern world. His complexity rivals that of Clement and his symbols are drawn from equally varied sources. For example, in the closing lines of *The Waste Land* Eliot draws his imagery from a nursery rhyme, Dante *Purgatorio*, the *Pervigilium Veneris*, Greek mythology, Gérard de Kyd Nerval *Spanish Tragedy* and the *Upanishads*.

London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down
Poi s'ascose nel foco che gli affina
Quando fiam ceu chelidon -- O swallow swallow
Le Prince d'Aquitaine à la tour abolie
These fragments I have shored against my ruins
Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe.
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
Shantih shantih shantih [1]

Such symbols assist in portraying hidden connections between apparently unrelated things.

When a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary. The latter falls in love or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to do with each other or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new wholes. [2]

The complexity of the syntheses which the poet puts forward is due to the complexity of the world of which he speaks.

From this account of Clement's style it may be seen that the three sources of difficulty and obscurity are not casual faults. Unsystematic presentation, unsystematic thought and symbolism are all used for a particular purpose. Similar techniques are used

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[1]T. S. Eliot, *The Waste Land* (closing lines).
[2]T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays, 1917-1932*, p. 273.

for similar purposes by contemporary writers. Identity of Clement's technique or purpose with those of the modern writers has not been maintained. There is enough similarity, however, to discourage the assumption that Clement used these techniques because he lacked the ability to use ordinary ones. [1]

III. PHILOSOPHY

Philosophers have frequently been interested in three questions: What is real? What is good? What is true? Their philosophy has consisted in their answers to these questions. These questions may be set out more fully:

1. What is real? or what is God like?
1a. How is the world, including man, related to the real or God?
2. What is goodness?
2a. How can a man live a good life?
3. What is truth?
3a. How can men know the truth?

The problems related to these questions are similar. These problems are variations on the theme of the one and the many. In answer to the first question it has been claimed that one thing or one kind of thing is real. It has been necessary to relate this one reality with the many things visible or invisible which were also considered to be real. The second question has been answered by indicating one thing or quality which was good in a unique or absolute sense. The problem lay in relating the one thing or quality to the many things which seemed to form part of a good life. The third question has been answered by indicating one particular true thing, or test of truth. The problem lay in relating this truth to the many things which men considered to be true.

Clement gives the same answer to each question. God is one. Goodness is one. Truth is one. There is a systematic ambiguity

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[1]As was assumed by Patrick, *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 32, and by Tollinton, *Clement of Alexandria, preface*.

in his use of the word 'one'. The two concepts of unity can be briefly described as analogous to the unity of a pin-point and the unity of a spider's web. When we say a thing is one we may mean that it is simple and indivisible, or we may mean that it is a complex unified whole. We reach the first kind of unity by analysis, abstracting from a simple thing like a point in space all qualities and relations until we are left with a unity which is one and nothing but one. On the other hand, we reach a complex unity by taking a complex unity like a human being and adding to it qualities and relations until we have the whole universe itself. The limit cases of simple and complex unity or the limits of analysis and synthesis are equally outside our experience. An imperfect example of simple unity is the point in space. Imperfect examples of complex unity are human beings, the systems of mathematics and musical compositions. The notions of simple and complex unity provide the key to the structure of Clement's philosophy. There is a reality, a goodness and a truth which is a simple unity, and a reality, a goodness and a truth which is a complex unity.

To be introduced to Clement of Alexandria is to be asked a riddle. Here is a man whose thought is scattered and eclectic but whose answers to philosophical questions are illuminating and to the point. The answer to the riddle is that Clement is at once breaking up old systems and creating a new synthesis. The disconnected style and thought of the *Stromateis* deny old connections and the autonomy of old systems. The symbolic style points to new connections and the answers to philosophical questions reveal a new synthesis. The purpose of this study is to set out this new synthesis and to show how Clement used old ideas to convey something new. The previous history of these ideas will sometimes help to explain their new meaning. But the only way to discover the meaning of a word or concept in Clement is to examine the way in which he uses it. His characteristics of style and thought make it unsafe to isolate a statement from its context. The examination and clarification of continuous passages is essential.

Clement's use of the word 'gnostic' may cause some confusion.

He was strenuously opposed to the teaching of Valentinus, Basilides and other heretical gnostics. He put forward a true 'gnosis' in opposition to their false 'gnosis'. He called his perfect Christian 'the gnostic' and denied the heretics the right to use the name. Clement's reasoned criticism of the heretics destroyed their claim to intellectual superiority, for his gnosis was at once more Christian and more rational.

PART I
GOD

CHAPTER I
THE ONE AND THE MANY

Two problems are of importance for the understanding of later Platonism -- the problem of the one and the many, and the problem of divine immanence and transcendence. The first of these is philosophical and the latter theological. In the period that concerns us philosophy and theology are mixed together.

The problem of the one and the many is the problem of all philosophy, and was first explicitly stated by the Pythagoreans. But in Parmenides of Elea and in Plato an important distinction was made. When we say a thing 'is one' we may mean two different things. We may mean that it is one and nothing but one, a simple and bare unity, or we may mean that it is one complex whole of many parts. Parmenides showed that if we consider reality to be a simple unity, nothing can be made of the many things that are left. On the other hand, Plato's world of forms is a complex unity, a whole of many parts, both one thing and many things. The clearest statement of this distinction is found in Plato's dialogue, the Parmenides. The latter section of this dialogue indicates among other things the ambiguity of the terms 'one' and 'being'. [1] The first hypothesis is 'if there is a One' in the sense of simple unity, while the second hypothesis is 'if a One is' in the sense of complex unity.

The simple unity can be described only in negative terms. According to the first hypothesis, 'if there is a One of course the One will not be many. Consequently it cannot have any parts or be a whole.' [2] It is without beginning, end or middle, limits, shape. It is 'not anywhere being neither in itself nor in another (138B)'. It is 'neither at rest nor in motion (139B)'. It 'cannot be other than or the same as itself or another (139E)'.

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[1]The controversy concerning the interpretation of this dialogue does not affect the limited scope of its discussion here.

[2]*Parmenides,* 137C. Cornford's translation, *Plato and Parmenides* (London, 1939), is used in this section.

It 'cannot be like or unlike either another or itself (140B)'. It 'will not be either equal or unequal either to itself or another (140B)'. It 'has nothing to do with time and does not occupy any stretch of time (141D)'. Finally 'the One in no sense is. . . . It is not named or spoken of, not an object of opinion or of knowledge, nor perceived by any creature (142).'

The complex unity has all the positive attributes which were denied to the simple unity. The second hypothesis considers the consequences of 'If a One is'. In this case the One has both unity and being, 'is a whole and also has parts (142D)', and 'must be unlimited in multitude'. Further, 'a "One which is" is both one and many, whole and parts, limited as well as indefinitely numerous (145)'. It will have a beginning, middle and end, and (some shape, straight or round or a mixture of both (145A, B)'. 'As a whole the One is in something else, as all the parts it is in itself; and thus the One must be both in itself and in another (145E).' 'Therefore the One, being always both in itself and in another, must always be both in motion and at rest (146A).' It 'will be like and unlike the Others, like in so far as different, unlike in so far as the same (148C)'. The One 'both touches, and does not touch, both itself and the Others (149D)'. 'The One is alike equal to, greater than and less than both itself and the Others (151B).' 'The One will be alike equal to, and more and fewer than, both itself and the Others in number (151D).' 'This One is in time, has a past, a future and a present, can be known and perceived (155D).'

The value of these two hypotheses is that they bring out the ambiguity of 'unity' or 'oneness'. They show that 'a one' can be 'one and nothing but one', and that 'a one' can be 'one and many. They present us with a pattern of two unities -- a unity which is simple, bare, one and nothing but one, and a unity which is infinitely complex, one and many. These two unities provide the key to an understanding of the later stages of classical philosophy. In Stoicism and Middle Platonism, however, there are not only philosophical but also religious problems. A second question is always present. 'Is the divine transcendent or immanent?' Is God remote from the world, far beyond the

reach of human knowledge, unique and solitary, or is God present in, perhaps even identical with, the world? The two alternatives provide a second pattern of two contrasting parts -- transcendence, immanence. In Middle Platonism the two problems of the one and the one-many and of divine transcendence and immanence are joined together. The two patterns of the one and the onemany, transcendence and immanence, are blended in each philosopher. The one which is simple is transcendent and the one-many is immanent.

A brief account of the development of these ideas in and after Stoicism will show their importance. The Stoics gave to the concept of an immanent deity the form in which it persisted into Neo-Platonism. Yet even for them God was sometimes a being who stood over the world and made all things one. The God of the world is described by Cleanthes [1]
∈íçĕ   . His work of providence is a unifying work, binding together the present and the future. [2] Aratos sees the world as 'full of God'. [3]

Posidonius showed another bond of unity in the cosmos when he formulated his doctrine of sympathy. [4] The all-embracing living cosmic unity is the fundamental feature of his world system. The parts of the world are in sympathy with one another and bound together in a tension which makes them one. Man the microcosm exhibits the unity which the macrocosm strives to achieve. [5] Man does not bind together two separate worlds. The unity of the cosmos is immanent and a quality of its whole

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[1] Cleanthes *apud* Stobaeum, *Eclogae,* 1, p. 25, Wachsmuth.

[2] 'Non seulement tous les êtres du Monde sont liés dans le présent mais tout le sort du Monde, qu'il s'agisse des événements humains ou des événements cosmiques, est lié dans le devenir. Le Monde forme un Tout un.' Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, II, Le Dieu Cosmique, p. 333.

[3] Quoted Festugière, op. cit. p. 338.

[4] Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* 7. 19, and also Sext. Emp., *Adv. Phys.* 1, 75-122. *Cf. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie,* p. 53: 'Erst Poseidonios hat die Sympathie . . . zu einem physikalischen, das ganz Weltbild ganz und gar durchdringenden, bestimmenden, erleachtenden Begriff erhoben.'

Festugière, op. cit. p. 418; 'Le
            ceci que tout ce qui en affecte une partie affecte les autres parties.'

[5] Cf. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, p. 352.

structure. [1] 'The whole of reality was for him [Posidonius] contained within the envelope of fiery aether, one world knit together by a natural sympathy between all the parts.' [2] Just as a cut finger has its effect on the whole body, so what happens to one part of the cosmos affects the whole. [3]

The pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo describes a God who is one, but whose names are many, [4] and whose power produces and sustains the whole universe. [5] God is far above the earth and his power, which is manifest in the order of the heavens, diminishes in its ordering effect as it approaches the earth. [6] God is like the ruler of an army, city, or house. He is a great king who allots inferior tasks to his subordinates. [7] Yet all depends on him, all is his work. All things are one in a harmony [8] which depends upon God as a choir depends upon its choir master. [9]

Our knowledge of Antiochus, the originator of Middle Platonism, is limited; [10] but we can trace the contrast between what is 'simple and of one kind, and such as it is', and what is in a state of constant flux, [11] and we learn that the Platonic forms are thoughts in the mind of the creating god. [12] It was questioned whether matter was a first principle and a reality. While its reality was largely allowed, it was certainly distinct from the other first principles and inferior to them. [13]

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[1] Cf. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, p. 346.

[10] Theiler, op. cit. pp. 37-8. Cicero, our chief source of information concerning Antiochus, was interested chiefly in his ethics and epistemology.

[11] Cicero, *Acad.* 30, quoted Theiler, p. 38.

[12] Seneca, *Epist.* 65, 7: 'haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet . . . ideae. . . . immortales, immutabiles, indefatigabiles', quoted Theiler, p. 15.

[13] See Theiler, part I.

[2] Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, p. 114.

[3]   ìά   ἔοτιν,εϊγε
ἁ   ὂλονονvἁ   ἐ
     ὀ   . The influence of this doctrine of 'sympathy' on Plotinus has been demonstrated by Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, pt. II, especially p. 97.

[4] *De Mundo,* 401, a 12.

[5] *Ibid.* 397, b 20.

[6] *Ibid.* 397, b 24-398, a 1.

[7] *Ibid.* 398, a 8, 10.

[8] *Ibid.* 399, a 12.

[9] The De Mundo combines Stoic immanence with Aristotelian transcendence. The contradictory conclusions of Festugière and Zeller have both some justification. Festugière, op. cit. p. 585, 'Dans le *De Mundo* par exemple, il n'y a point trace de dualisme.'

Zeller, *A History of Eclecticism* (English trans., London, 1883), p. 134: 'Still less, of course, can he admit the identification of God and the world: a Stoic definition which expresses this he only adopts after having altered its pantheistic language.'

In Plutarch, the purely good God is far above the world, which contains good and evil. The good God is not the cause of evil but the opponent of it. [1] The great gap between gods and men is bridged by the demons whose function is to unite. [2] The transcendent God alone has Being [3] and is timeless, eternal, unchanging. What is, must be one, and what is one, must be. [4] God's names emphasise the divine unity -- Apollo (not-many), Ieius (One ἴα), and Phoebus (pure and undefiled). This divine unity is pure and unmixed. [5] Men are made of many different elements of experience which are loosely connected and mixed up together. [6]

Maximus of Tyre echoes the description of God which was given in the De Mundo. [7] God has many names according to his many activities which supply providentially the needs of men. [8] There is one God who is king of all and many gods who are his sons. [9] Man has two faculties, one of them simple which we call mind, and the other multiple and called sense. [10] These work together but are essentially separate. They are similar to their objects, so that what is perceived by the mind differs from what is perceived by the senses, as mind differs from sense. God belongs among the things perceived by the mind, which are more stable and firm, free from change and flux. [11] We must ascend to the acropolis of the intellectual world to find the place for God. He knows all things in an eternal, timeless knowledge. [12] Without name or magnitude he is beyond the reach of all our faculties, being in himself unseen, ineffable, impalpable, unknown. Yet he may be seen by pure mind which ascends beyond the heavens to the place of truth and the calm that is there'. [13] God is the

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[1] *De Iside et Osiride*, 46.
[10] *Ibid.* p. 135.
[11] *Ibid.* p. 137.
[12] *Ibid.* p. 139.
[13] *Ibid.* p. 141.
[2] De Defec. Orac. 10: οἱ   ἐ   ω   ἀ
    ἡ   ἰ   ἐ   .
[3] *De E apud Delphos*, 20.
[4] *Ibid.* ἀλλ' ἕν εἰ+   ὄν, ὥσπερ ὅ   ἕν.
[5] *Ibid.*   + ἕν εἰ   .
[6] *Ibid.* ου+   ἐστι, ὤ   ν ἕκαστος ἐ   ν ἐ   ,
ἅ   ν.
[7] Cf. Soury, *Apercus de philosaphie religieuse chez Maxime de Tyr, platonicien éclectique*, p. 59.
[8] Maximus (Hobein ed.), p. 142.
[9] *Ibid.* p. 132: ὅ   ἰ+

source of all beauty, and it is only by participation in him that anything is perceived. He is found by a process of stripping or abstraction, a via negativa. [1] If one lacks the ability to find God in this way, then one should content oneself with God's works, his many offsprings, his divine children and friends, such as the stars and demons. [2] For there is an ordered series descending from God to earth. [3]

Albinus describes three first principles -- matter, ideas, God. [4] Matter is the indeterminate stuff of the world to which the ideas give form. The ideas are the patterns of things, thoughts in the mind of God. God is eternal, ineffable, completely perfect. He is divinity, being, truth, proportion, and the good. [5] He is all these things in one complex unity, [6] but has no parts. Nothing can be predicated of him, as he has neither genus, species, differentia, nor attribute. He is known by abstraction of all sensible qualities, by analogy [7] and by ascending vision. [8] While God contains nothing, the cosmos contains everything. [9] It is the only begotten of God, modelled on the pattern of unity, untouched by disease or age, in need of nothing, a complete rounded sphere. It is alive. [10]

Numenius speaks of three Gods -- Father, Creator, and Creation. [11] The first God is one, transcendent, remote from material things, ineffable [12] and simple. The second God is the Creator who brings the third God, the Cosmos, into unity in spite of the duality and instability of matter. [13] He is the pilot who steers his ship by the heavenly stars, the ship being matter and the stars being the ideas. In this way he perceives the harmony which keeps the cosmos together. [14] He is himself dependent on the first

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[1]Maximus, op. cit. p. 143.

[10]*Ibid.* XIV, 4. The distinction is later made between the ἐ   .

[11]Numenius, *De Primis Causis.* Test. 24 (XXXVI).

[12]   ἀγαΘοῦ, frag. 11 (X).

[13]*Ibid.* frag. 20 (XXVI).

[14]*Ibid.* frag. 27 (XXXII).

[2]*Ibid.* p. 144.

[3]*Ibid.* p. 145: διαδοχ□ν ἀρᾶς καὶ +   ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ   ῆς.

[4] Albinus, IX, 1: ἀ   Ε+   ἐπεχούσης τῆς ὔ   ì ἄλλας ἀ
                              ν ì   ν καὶ τ□ν τοῦ   ì αì   ῦ.

[5]*Ibid.* X, 3.

[6]*Ibid.*

[7]   ἀ   ἀναλογίαν.

[8]Albinus, x, 6.

[9]*Ibid.* XII, 3.

God in whom he participates. [1] In the cosmos everything is mixed up together and nothing is simple. [2]

In Philo God is very close to us and very far from us, close in his powers, far removed in his essence. [3] God is a simple bare unity. [4] He cannot be named, spoken of, or conceived. [5] On the other hand, God fills all things and is one and all. [6] He is not contained anywhere, but is present everywhere by his powers which bind the world together with invisible, unbreakable bonds. [7] God is the mind of the universe. [8] In this respect he is mostly spoken of as the Logos who is the uniting bond of the universe. Things do not come together by themselves. Their unity is due solely to the Logos. [9]

In the Hermetic writings God is unlike all else in his solitary unity. [10] He who made all things exists eternally and is one alone. [11] He is the monad, the first principle and root of all things, present in them all. [12] He is praised for his perfect purity, and his transcendence as sun, king, father. [13] His immanence and transcendence are found together where he is described as Lord, Creator, Father, and as Encirclement, One-many, Pleroma. [14]

Plotinus distinguishes three hypostases: The One which is a simple unity, and Mind and Soul, which are complex unities. The One is transcendent, [15] beyond knowledge and speech, without name and unnameable (VI, 9, 4-5). It is distinguished by its simplicity and its purity (VI, 9, 5). It is not one and many (v, 5, 4)) but one and only one (VI, 2, 9). On the other hand Mind is one

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[1] *Ibid.* frag. 28 (XXXVIII).

[10] C   δε+   ὅμοιον τῶ+ ἀνομοίω   ω καὶ ἑνί.

[11]   ὶ ἁ   ήσαντος καὶ ἐ   .

[12] C.H. IV, 10: η+   +   ἀρχ□ καὶ ῥί⑂α ἐν πᾶ   ἐστιν ὡς ἄν ῥί3α καὶ ἀρχή.

[13] C.H. XVIII, 11-13; XVI, 10.

[14] C.H. XVI, 3.

[15] Enn. III, 2. VII.

[2] *De Primis Causis.* Test. 28 (XL.). Of Numenius, Ueberweg-Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, p. 521: 'Orientalisch-griechischer Synkretismus, Harmonisierung von Pythagoras und Platon, möglichste Steigerung der göttlichen Transzendenz, die wieder die Setzung eines Mittelgliedes zwischen der (obersten) Gottheit und der Welt veranlasst, Schärfung des Gegensatzes zwischen Höherem und Niederem.'

[3] *Post Cain.* 20.

[4] *Leg. All.* 11, 2.

[5] *Somn.* I. II, 6, 7.

[6] *Leg. All.* 1, 44.

[7] *Conf. Ling.* 136.

[8] Op. Mundi, 8.

[9] *Quis Heres.* 188.

and many (IV, 8, 3), is all things (V, 1, 4), and a multiple god (V, 1, 5). Again Soul is one and many (IV, 8, 3; IV, 8, 1), present everywhere, and penetrating all things.From this survey two things may be seen:

1. (1) The structure of Middle Platonism, as that of NeoPlatonism in which it culminated, is determined by the antithesis of the one and the one-many combined with the antithesis of the transcendent and immanent divinity.
2. (2) While a great part of the story is the ingenious balancing of one and many, transcendence and immanence, the growing tendency was not to look for a *via media* between transcendence and immanence, but to emphasise on the one hand the transcendence of the one, and on the other hand the immanence of the one-many. [1]

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[1]Cf. Ueberweg-Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, p. 590.

CHAPTER 2
GOD

CLEMENT'S philosophical account of God is found chiefly in Book V of the *Stromateis.* This book begins with an account of faith and hope as ways in which the mind perceives objects invisible to the senses, and goes on to speak of symbols and enigmas and the way in which they hide the truth from the uninitiated. Justification is given for the use of the symbolical style when it is applied to sacred things. Plato's 'Seventh Epistle' is quoted: 'I must indeed speak to you in riddles, so that if my letter should fall into wrong hands in any corner of land or sea, the reader will not understand it.' Clement goes on to say, 'For the God of the universe, who is above all speech, all thought, and all concepts, can never be committed to writing, being ineffable by his power.' [1]

Men get wrong ideas of God because they are slaves to their passions. Passions have as their objects material things, and material things are very far removed from God. Using a simile which Philo had used Clement says, 'But the majority of men, being wrapped round with mortal things just as snails are encased in their shells and being rolled like hedgehogs in a ball around their lusts, think of the blessed and immortal God in the same terms as they think about themselves. But although it is so obvious it has escaped their notice that God has given us thousands of things in which he himself does not participate.' [2]

To avoid this mistake men must free themselves from all passions and earthly influence and free their notion of God from anything which is other than bare unity.

We lay hold of the way of cleansing by confession and then the way of vision by analysis, pressing on by analysis to the basis of thought, making a beginning from the things which underlie vision. We take

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[1]*Strom.* v, 65; 11, 369, 24. Plato, *Epist.* 11, 312D.
[2]*Strom.* v, 68; II, 371, 11.

away from physical body its natural qualities, stripping off the dimension of depth, then that of breadth, and after these, that of length. For the point which is left is unity, as it were, with position, and if we remove position from it, unity is perceived. If then, after removing all that belongs to physical bodies, and the things that are called bodiless, we cast ourselves into the vastness of Christ, and from there we go forward through holiness into the void; if we do these things we shall reach in some way the perception of the Almighty, knowing not what he is, but what he is not. But shape and movement, or standing still, or throne or place, or right hand, or left hand, are in no way whatever to be thought of as belonging to the Father of all things, even if these things are written. But what each of these means will be shown in its proper place. The first cause, then, is not in any place, but above place, and time, and name, and thought. [1]

There are three parts to this process -- purification from sin, logical analysis, and union with Christ in holiness. First we must confess our sins and be cleansed from them. Then we must abstract from our notion of a physical object every quality except that of simple unity. Then we throw ourselves into the vastness of Christ and advance through holiness into the void. This brings us to a perception of God, but the mystery remains. We do not know what he is but only what he is not. The first part of the process is called the 'stage of cleansing', and the second is the analysis which leads to the final 'stage of vision'. Analysis and vision are compared respectively with the lesser and greater mysteries. The result of this process is that we know what God is not, but we do not know what he is. We come closest to God in the concept of bare unity, the consequences and descriptions of which are purely negative. We can neither know nor say anything positive about God. God can neither be named nor conceived. He is other than our ideas would suggest. We must therefore deny all the qualities of ordinary things to him until we have the concept of bare unity. Then leaving these things for Christ, and advancing through the unknown void, we reach the concept of God in an unusual way. It is a concept which is not a concept, a knowledge of what God is not and an ignorance of what he is. We must not be misled by the language of the Scriptures about God's right

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[1]*Strom.* v, 71; 11, 374, 4.

hand and left hand and other things because these do not mean what they seem to mean. God is above all these things, outside space and time, beyond the realm of names and concepts.

This passage expresses an element of Middle Platonism which persisted into Neo-Platonism and according to which God can be known only by stripping or abstracting all qualities from our idea of an existing thing. It is found in Maximus of Tyre, [1] Albinus, [2] and later in Plotinus. [3] It is foreshadowed in the simple unity of the first hypothesis in Plato's Parmenides. Clement has expressed this idea in a Christian context. We begin by confession and cleansing from sin. We end in holy union with Christ. In two direct borrowings from Philo which follow, the chief point is not Philonic -- 'The grace of knowledge is from God through the Son.' [4]

After quoting Plato to the effect that it is hard to find the Father and Maker of all things and that, having found him, it is impossible to speak about him, Clement gives his most comprehensive philosophical statement about God. [5]

(1) 'Indeed this is the most difficult question about God. For since the first principle of everything is hard to find, the absolutely first and oldest first principle is in all respects hard to show, which first principle is the cause of all things coming into being and being.'

It is hard to give an account of God. Any first principle is hard to get at. God is the first of all first principles and the hardest to get at and to describe. This idea goes back to Plato and his account of the ultimate first principle of all things. [6] Plato's first principle is the cause of the existence and being of the forms. [7] It is seen last and with difficulty. [8] It is so difficult to express that Socrates says, 'I am afraid I shall not manage it [the account of the good] and if I have the courage to try, my awkwardness will be laughed at.' [9] It has been shown that these views became axio-

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[1]Max. Tyr. 143, II. οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀ   ὶ ἄφελε τῶ+   ῳ τ□ν περιβολ□ν ταύτην. Cf. Theiler, p. 57.
[2]Albinus, X, 5.
[3]ἄφ   , Plotinus, Enn. v, 3. 17.
[4]*Strom* V, 71; 11, 374, 23.
[5]*Strom.* V, 81-2; 11, 380, 14 to II, 381, 13.
[6]*Rep.* 511B.
[7]*Rep.* 509 B.
[8]*Rep.* 517B.
[9]*Rep.* 506B. A. D. Lindsay's translation.

matic for Middle Platonism. Philo describes God as 'the most generic thing'. [1] God cannot be discerned by other things, and it is right that he should not be apprehended by any one other than himself because his pureness, goodness and oldness make him remote from them. [2]

(2) 'For how could that be spoken of which is neither genus, nor differentia, nor species, nor individual, nor number, and on the other hand is neither an accident nor that to which an accident pertains?'

God is neither genus, difference, species, individual, number, accident, nor substance. Therefore God cannot be expressed in words. Aristotle asserted that there were five kinds of predicates which could be asserted of a thing. [3] These five predicables were definition, proprium, genus, difference, and accident. The listwas changed by Porphyry, the Neo-Platonist, to genus, species, difference, property, accident, and this list is still maintained by Scholastic philosophers today. [4] Clement's list differs from both of these. He includes individual, which Porphyry also mentions, and distinguishes quantity (number) and substance from genus. These were regarded by Aristotelians as genera or categories.

Such differences are of historical interest. The important things for us are Clement's suppressed premiss which is stated by Aristotle -- 'Whenever a predicate is affirmed of any subject' it must fall under a limited number of predicables -- and Clement's argument that, since none of these predicables can be applied to God, he cannot be expressed in words. Clement is most definite on this point. Strictly speaking, we cannot talk about God.

(3) 'Nor can one correctly describe him as "whole". [5] For wholeness is applied to magnitude and he is the Father of the whole world.'

God is the Father of the whole world but we cannot call him 'whole'. Wholeness is a quality of physical magnitude, a quality of the things which God brings into being.

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[1] *Leg. All.* 11, 21.

[2] *De Praem. et Poen.* 6.

[3] *Topica,* 1, 8, 2-3.

[4] G. H. Joyce, *Principles of Logic* (London, 1936), p. 121.

[5] ἀνενδεής: *Prot.* 56; 1, 44, 16. *Paed.* in, 1; 1, 236, 1. *Strom.* II, 28; II, 128, 8. *Strom.* II, 68; 11, 371, 16. *Strom.* VII, 14; III, II, 9.

(4) 'Nor are any parts to be ascribed to him. For the One is indivisible.'

God is one, indivisible, without parts. This is still another barrier to his being described. Were he the sum of describable parts, we could furnish a kind of description. This proposition is an explicit statement of the important feature of the first hypothesis in Plato's Parmenides -- 'If there is a One, of course the One will not be many. Consequently it cannot have any parts or be a whole.' [1] God is a simple undivided unity. Similarly the First God of Numenius is 'simple and in no way divisible' [2] and Philo says, 'But God is not a compound, not composed of many ingredients, but unmixed with all else.' [3]

(5) 'Therefore it is infinite, not merely in the sense that one cannot give an exhaustive account of it, but in the sense that one cannot analyse it into parts and that it has no limit and is therefore without form or name.'

God is boundless or infinite in that he has no dimensions or limit. Consequently he has neither form nor name. Like the bare unity of Plato's Parmenides God is without beginning, end, middle, limits, or shape. Were he to have any of these things he would be more than one. This proposition follows from the indivisible unity of God. 'For the One is indivisible, therefore it is boundless.' Dimensions, limit, form, name would entail divisibility and plurality.

(6) 'If we sometimes name it, we do not do so properly, calling it either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or Being, or Father, or God, or Creator, or Lord.'

The names One, the Good, Mind, the Real or Being, Father, Creator, Lord are not used properly (correctly, literally, exactly) of God. God cannot have a proper name. A name would not only destroy his unity, but would bring him down into the realm of ordinary limited things. The next chapter (V, 13) begins, 'Everything then which comes under a name is begotten.' [4] Clement emphasises this point as a way of emphasising the fact that God is beyond names and things with names.

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[1] Plato, *Parmenides*, 137A.
[2] Numenius, περὶ τἀγαΘοῦ, 20 (XXVI).
[3] *Leg. All.* 11, 1.
[4] *Strom.* V, 83; II, 381, 14.

(7) 'We do not speak as giving his name, but because of our lack we avail ourselves of good names, so that the intellect, not going astray in other respects, may lean on these as supports.' [1]

Clement is not here concerned with degrees of truth, nor does he consider these names are nearer the limit of truth than other names. All names are incorrect. A name or names are necessary for discourse. Ethical considerations determine that the names should be good ones. But strictly speaking the names are not names at all. God can have no name.

(8) 'For each by itself does not declare God, but all of them in the mass indicate the power of the Almighty.'

God's 'names' say too much or too little. In so far as he is the abstract One, no name is appropriate. In so far as the One is the first principle of all things and the first cause, no list of names, however imposing, is sufficient. But the names which are used do not apply to God, but indicate the power of God. In so far as anything is predicated of God, it says too much. In so far as anything is predicated of the effects of his power, it says too little.

(9) 'For predicates are applied to things, either from the things which belong to themselves or from their condition in relation to one another. But none of these can be accepted as appropriate to God.'

This is a division of possible predicates into those which apply to a thing in itself and those which apply to it as related to other entities. The first will be those regarded by Aristotle as coextensive with their subject (definition, property), as against those not coextensive (genus, differentia, accident). Clement's division would be species, individual as against genus, difference, number, accident, substance. We cannot speak of what belongs to God in himself, for this would mean a distinction and a duality in the One. We cannot speak of God as having a relation to anything else, because this would mean a loss of remoteness, and a distinction between the One and the One as related to that thing.

(10) 'On the other hand, he is not understood by scientific demonstration, for this depends on prior and more readily known principles, and there is nothing prior to the Unoriginated.'

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[1]Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* II, 9, 1.

Scientific demonstration or explanation means definition in terms of prior and better known principles. God cannot be described in terms of prior and better known principles, because by definition there is nothing before the Unoriginated.

(11) 'It remains for us to perceive the Unknown by the grace of God and by the Logos alone that proceeds from him. Luke in the Acts of the Apostles refers to Paul as saying, "Men of Athens, I perceive that you are very religious people. For in walking about, and looking at the objects of your worship, I found an altar on which was inscribed, To an Unknown God. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you."' [1]

The One, unknown in himself, is understood by what proceeds from him, namely his Logos. In this passage we pass from philosophy to religion. God transcends logical categories and all the names that might be given him. He cannot be grasped by demonstrative knowledge or logical methods of classification and explanation. Other ways of knowledge being excluded, one possibility is left. It is that we perceive the unknown God by his grace and by the Logos that comes from him. The rest of Book V is given to this final thought -- the knowledge of God is a divine gift and cannot be obtained apart from his grace. Philosophy may tell us what God is not, and this is important, for it makes possible the removal of false ideas from our minds and from the minds of others. But to perceive God is only possible outside the limits of logical thought. We perceive God by divine grace or else we do not perceive him at all.

Two Problems

There are two problems which face an account of God as a transcendent unity. The first is in what way language can be applied to a God who is outside language. Every thinker who has called God ineffable has nevertheless continued to speak of him. How can this be justified? The second problem is how this abstract entity can yet be the first cause, the creator of everything. The treatment of these two problems by Clement, Philo and Plotinus will be considered.

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[1] Acts xvii. 22-3.

Clement's treatment of the first problem is marked by a lack of compromise. Nothing can be predicated of God and no name can be given to him -- a name and a predicate would destroy both his unity and his transcendence. All the names that are given to him are strictly not his names at all, but props for us to lean on, good names which keep us from going further astray. Clement's uncompromising statement has given trouble to many of his readers, [1] but it is the only consistent account that could be given. The theory of symbolism [2] reaffirms the inexpressibility of divine things. The written word leads to God not by direct description but by symbol and enigma. The first principles of things are veiled in mystery. The Scripture presents itself in a mysterious form. Clement's own writings are full of symbolism. These mysteries can be penetrated and the symbols can be understood by the man who has received God's gift of knowledge. But the penetration and the understanding are mysterious and are not ways of reducing God into logically intelligible terms. What Clement says about God in any positive statement is not to be taken literally, but understood 'gnostically'. Knowledge of God which is purely rational is purely negative. The *Stromateis* are gnostic notes' which have meaning only for those who have received the gift of divine knowledge. To those who refuse his grace and ignore his Logos, God remains 'the Unknown God'.

The second great difficulty is that of how this abstraction can be 'the cause of all things coming into being' and their Creator. God cannot produce things from within himself, for this would attribute plurality, change, and many other inconsistent things to him. God cannot produce things from a co-existing substratum of matter, for the co-existence of such matter would be inconsistent with his unity and transcendence. There is only one way of creation for such a God, and that is creation *ex nihilo.* By this the inexplicable mystery of creation is recognised.

'Theism must frankly confess that the kernel of positive meaning in the notion of creation . . . is inexplicable. . . . The gradations

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[1] E.g. Bigg: 'It is essentially a heathen conception, and can be developed consistently only on heathen principles', *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 95.
[2] See ch. 13.

between the infinite one and the finite many, devised by Philo, Plotinus, Spinoza, etc., conduct nearer to the abyss but do not bridge it. . . . The *modus operandi* of divine creativity is wholly unimaginable and inconceivable. And this inexplicability is inevitable.' [1] Clement is the first person to state and give reasons for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In the Protrepticus he denounces idol worship and Stoic philosophy for their veneration of material things. God alone is to be worshipped, for he transcends the universe in power and majesty. 'How mighty is the power of God! His will alone is sufficient to create the world. For God alone has made it since he alone is truly God. Through simply willing, he creates. As soon as he merely wills a thing its existence follows immediately.' [2] God's will is omnipotent, and a sufficient cause of anything's existence. When God wills a thing it simultaneously springs into existence. 'Everything takes place at the same time as he commands it. It follows from his bare intention to give a gift that the gift is fully made.' [3] 'What he wills is thereby real and the name for this reality is the world.' [4] The philosophers, says Clement, learnt from Moses that the world had a beginning and owed its existence to something other than itself. [5] Plato spoke of the difficulty of finding the maker and father of the universe. By this he indicated that God produced the universe as a father a son. The universe owed its existence to him alone and came out of what did not exist. [6] Clement adheres to the Biblical view that God moulded man out of dust, [7] but he does not give any justification for the view that the world was made out of pre-existing matter. [8]

For Philo, God is one simple, unique being. He is a simple substance, alone, and unmixed. [9] While he is 'the most generic

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[1] Tennant, *Philosophical Theology* (Cambridge, 1925-30), vol. II, p. 125.

[2] *Prot.* 63; 1, 48, 16.

[3] *Paed.* 126; 1, 105, 30.

[4] *Paed.* 1, 27; 1, 106, 9.

[5] *Strom.* V, 92; 11, 386, 21.

[6] *Strom.* V, 92; II, 387, 2: ὡς ἄν ἐ　　　　　ὶ ἐκ μ☐ ὄντος ὐ　　　　. Plato did not mean this, but Clement evidently does.

[7] *Paed.* 1, 98; 1, 148, 18.

[8] *Strom.* 11, 74; 11, 152, 2: οὔτ εἰ ἐκμ☐ ὄντων ποιοίη οὔτ εἰ ἐξ ὕλης δημιουργοίη gives no indication of Clement's views. He argues against heretics that God has no natural relation to us whether he made us out of nothing or out of matter, because in neither case would we be of the same stuff as God.

[9] *Leg. All.* II, 2.

thing'[1] he is nevertheless without qualities. He is in no way comparable with other things, but is simple being, the concept of existence alone being applicable to him.[2] He is the indivisible Monad. We do not even see God from afar off. All we see is that he is a long way from all creation and that he is far beyond the reach of human thought. He cannot be named, spoken of, or comprehended in any way at all.[3]

This account is similar to Clement's. But Philo was not prepared to write off religious language in the way Clement does. Philo allows the predication of properties to God and restricts his ineffability to qualities.[4] Properties belong to things in themselves, whereas qualities are held in common with other members of a class. 'He is "without qualities", and nevertheless we may affirm that he is eternal, self-existent, omnipotent, omniscient, perfect; for these predicates belong to himself alone and place him outside of every genus.'[5] If God is ineffable then we cannot predicate of him qualities or properties. If he is incomprehensible then his bare existence cannot be comprehended. If he is unnameable then we cannot (as Philo does elsewhere) speak of 'the most holy name' or the 'name' of God.[6] Clement saw these alternatives and made his choice. Philo had not seen the alternatives.

Philo's account of the origin of the world is indebted largely to Plato's Timaeus,[7] and partly to Stoic writings. He considers the pre-existent matter of the world to have been worked on and ordered by God,[8] describes it after Plato as the mother, fostermother, or nurse of created things,[9] and also gives it the qualities of the Stoic inert matter.

There has been a division of opinion as to whether Philo considered this matter to have been created or not. Bréhier's account shows that despite some isolated and puzzling passages,

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[1]*Leg. All.* 11, 86.

[2]*Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis.* XI, 55.

[3]Somn. 1, 11, 66.

[4]   . Cf. ἱ   . Cf. Drummond, *Philo Judaeus or the Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy*, II, pp. 234. Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d,Alexandrie*, p. 72. And see Wolfson, *Philo*, II, 126ff.

[5]*De Agr.* 3, 13. Drummond, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 26.

[6]*Decal.* 19, 93, 94.

[7]Cf. Bréhier, op. cit. pp. 78-9.

[8]*De Plant.* 2, 5.

[9]*De Ebriet.* XIV, 61.

'Creation acts upon matter, but this matter is not the object of a previous creative act. The activity of God remains always that of a demiurge.' [1] The ideas are created without matter and are 'made' whereas earthly things are 'fashioned' [2] out of pre-existing matter. Until recently the consensus of opinion has been that Philo did not think of matter as created. 'Primary matter is, for Philo and for Plato alike, uncreated, a kind of eternal being. . . . Philo nowhere speaks of matter as created.' [3] This view has recently been opposed by Wolfson. Philo's account of creation in the *De Opificio Mundi* has been examined and the evidence shown to be in favour of matter being created by God, '. . . the pre-existent matter out of which the world was created was itself created by God'. [4] But matter was not created ex *nihilo,* so that it remains true to say with Bréhier, 'The idea which Philo introduces into philosophy is not the idea of creation ex *nihilo* but that of creation at various levels and through intermediary beings.' [5] Despite disagreement concerning Philo's account of creation it has not been maintained by any disputant that Philo puts forward a theory of creation ex *nihilo.*

The One of Plotinus is a simple transcendent unity. It is beyond being, [6] essence, and thought (v, 6, 6). It is formless (VI, 9, 3) and neither at rest nor moving (VI, 9, 3). It is everywhere and nowhere (V, 5, 8). It is simple and pure -- unlike a one which is also many and a one which is numerical (V, 5, 4). It is ineffable, nameless, without need, possessions, will or thought (VI, 9, 4-5). It cannot be known because knowledge entails plurality. [7] Though it has no name it is known by its offspring. [8] Plotinus sees clearly the way in which a name would destroy the unity and transcendence of the one and make it merely one thing among other things. He says, 'However, we shall try to designate it as far as possible to ourselves (V, 3, 13).'

Despite the clarity and penetration of Plotinus's account, there appear to be certain inconsistencies. Perception, life, and

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[1] Bréhier, *op. cit.* p. 81.
[2] *Leg. All.* 1, 31. ἐ   .
[3] Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, p. 24.
[4] Wolfson, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 323.
[5] Bréhier, *op. cit.* p. 82.
[6] *Enn.* v, 5, 6.
[7] *Enn.* VI, 9, 4: ἐπιστήμη.
[8] *Enn.*   . . . γεννήματι.

consciousness are attributed to the One (V, 4, 2). It is the power of all things (V, 3, 15-16) and it is identical with the Good (11, 9, 1). These are indications of a readiness to talk about the One which is not consistent with its ineffability. 'However, I will not conceal my opinion', said Inge, 'that Plotinus tells us too much about "the One". The inevitable result is that his successors postulate some still more mysterious principle behind the Monad.' [1]

When we turn to Plotinus's account of the One as first cause and producer of all things, we find again an acute awareness of the problems involved. [2] The One is above speech, thought, and sensation, yet it gives these things to us. How can the One give them to us if it does not have them? How can it have them and yet be simple? We can imagine one thing being derived from simple unity, as a ray of light comes from a point of light, but we cannot in this way imagine the derivation of many things from the One. There is a second first principle which is one and many. The One is all things potentially, while the second first principle is all things actually. But the notion of potentiality is appropriate to passive matter prior to its reception of form and not appropriate to the One. 'How then can the One produce what it does not possess? It produces not by chance nor by reflection, but it produces nevertheless.'

Plotinus then gives an explanation in terms of power. The One is an infinitely great power. [3] It must have produced everything because nothing else has the power to do this and because what produces must be simpler than the thing it produces. Plotinus is not as satisfied with this explanation when he has finished as he was when he began. He passes then to the notion of the One as the Good, the final cause of the world of Nous. In Nous are life and intelligence, which are copied from and caused by the life and intelligence which are in the Good.

These explanations, as that in a previous section [4] which describes the emanation of the many from the One as the over-

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[1] Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. II. p. 116.
[2] Enn. V, 3, 15. A paraphrase of this section follows.
[3] ἀνήχανος °ύναμις.
[4] Enn. V, 2, 1.

flowing of the perfection of the One, do not solve the problem. To say that the One is a great power, is the Good, or is an overflowing perfection, to place a One-many as a second first principle, does not explain the puzzle -- how can a simple Unity produce many things? It is disappointing that despite a clear statement of the problem Plotinus really does imagine that he shows how the many proceed from One. [1]

From this comparison of Clement, Philo and Plotinus it would appear that in Clement's treatment of the problems arising from the ineffability and creative activity of the One the most consistent account is given. Clement is more ready to accept the consequences of the ineffability of the One and the inexplicability of the method of creation. It is possible that Clement was less inclined to put forward bad solutions of philosophical problems because the existence of the problem was less painful to him than it was to Philo and Plotinus. He could tolerate incompleteness because he found completeness and consistency in his Christian experience.

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[1] *Enn.* V, 3, 16: 'We have shown elsewhere . . .'.

CHAPTER 3
THE LOGOS

1. THE SON AND THE FATHER

'GOD, then, is indemonstrable and consequently cannot be the object of knowledge; but the Son is wisdom and knowledge and truth and whatever else is akin to this. Indeed, proof and description can be given of him.' [1]

In *Stromateis* IV, 25 Clement describes the happy position of the Christian gnostic who contemplates eternal things. [2] By his divine knowledge he is placed with Christ far above ordinary mortals. Other men are as lifeless shadows when compared with him. Plato is right in calling such a man a god for he contemplates mind. Mind is the place of the ideas. Mind is God. But this knowledge cannot be of God who transcends demonstration and knowledge. [3] It must be of the Son, who can be demonstrated and described. The Son is wisdom, knowledge, and truth, and whatever else is similar to this. [4]

This idea of the Son as an intelligible revelation of the Father is expressed in many ways. The Son is the stamp of the Father's glory and teaches us the truth concerning God. [5] The Logos is the image, [6] the thought, [7] and the face of God. [8] He is the light by which we gaze on God. [9] He reveals the Father's nature, [10] and is the imitator of God. [11]

The description of the Son as wisdom [12] suggests associations with the Wisdom Literature. In the 'Wisdom of Solomon', an Alexandrine work, Wisdom is identified with the immanent,

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[1] *Strom.* IV, 156; 11, 317, 21. This chapter and the first part of the next chapter are based on this passage of the *Stromateis.*
[10] *Strom.* V, 34; 11, 348, 11.
[11] *Strom.* 11, 136; II, 188, 20.
[12] *Strom.* VI, 61; 11, 462, 18 et supra.
[2] *Strom.* IV, 155; 11, 317, 10.
[3] ἀ δειξις, ἐπιστήμη.
[4] Cf. Exc. 7; 111, 108, 1.
[5] *Strom.* vii, 58; 111, 43, 1.
[6] *Strom.* V, 94; 11, 388, 14.
[7] *Strom.* V, 16; 11, 336, 8.
[8] *Paed.* 1, 7; 1, 124, 4.
[9] *Prot.* 84; 1, 64, 6.

divine power in the world. [1] Clement rejects this. For him wisdom is supplanted by the Son. It is no more a cosmic power than knowledge and truth. All three are united within the Son who is the divine power immanent in the world.

The Logos is the mediator not only of the knowledge but also of the power of the Father. He is the power [2] of God, the arm of the Lord, [3] God's servant. [4] He is the instrument of God, [5] a term which belonged to Middle Platonism. [6] The Son is paradoxically the Father's activity. [7] He is the will of the Father. [8]

The Son became flesh not only to be seen [9] but to suffer upon the Cross for the salvation of men. The theme of the Christian gospel constantly recurs. The Son of God had come to save mankind. This was what Augustine later looked for in Platonism and could not find. [10] Platonism could speak of a son, logos, energy, instrument, but it could not say of the Logos that he became man for man's sake, [11] and poured out his blood for man's salvation. [12]

Clement's account of the Son is governed by two contrasting themes. The Son is distinct from the Father, yet one with the Father. We have seen that the Son is considered as a Being in some way distinct from the Father. He is the oldest among intellectual objects, from whom we learn of the oldest of all. He is a mediator of knowledge and power between God and man. Clement makes a contrasting emphasis on the unity of the Son with the Father. He is of the Father, God in God, [13] and Almighty God. [14] His unity and his being are inseparable from the unity and being of the Father. [15]

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[1]See Knox, *St Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, ch. III, esp. pp. 68 ff.

[10]*Confessions* VII, 9: 'sed quia verburn caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi . . . quod autern secundurn ternpus pro impiis mortuus est et filio unico tuo non pepercisti sed pro nobis omnibus tradidisti eurn, non est ibi.'

[11]*Paed.* 1, 74; 1, 133, 25.

[12]*Paed.* 1, 43; 1, 116, 6.

[13]*Exc.*8; III, 108, 20.

[14]*Paed.* III, 39; I, 259, 25.

[15]*Paed.* II, 75; 1, 203, 22: εἲς ὤν ἐ   . *Prot.* 7; 1, 7, 29: ὁ ἐν τῶ̃+ ὄντι ὤν.

[2]*Strom.* VII, 7; 111, 7, 11.

[3]*Prot.* 120; 1, 85, 7.

[4]*Paed.* 111, 2; 1, 237, 2.

[5]*Prot.* 6; 1, 6, 26.

[6]Philo, *Cherub.* 125. *De Providentia,* 1, 23: instrumentum autern dei est verburn. Cited Theiler, p. 28.

[7]*Strom.* VII, 7; 111, 7, 21.

[8]*Prot.* 120; 1, 85, 7.

[9]*Strom.* v, 16; 11, 336, 14.

There appears to be a confusion in Clement's description of the first principle and the Creator of the cosmos. Both God and the Logos are described as the ultimate first principle and as the Creator of the cosmos.

a.   And God is unbegun, the all-complete first principle (or beginning) of all things and the maker of the first principle. In that respect, therefore, in which he is Being, he is the first principle of physical things; in the respect that he is the Good he is the first principle of ethical things, and again in the respect that he is mind he is the first principle of reasoning and judging. From this also he alone is teacher who is the Logos, son of the Nous which is Father, and who trains mankind. [1]

b.   . . . and in the spiritual world that which is oldest in origin, the timeless and unbegun first principle and beginning of all Being, the Son. From him we can search out the still more ultimate cause beyond, the Father of all things, the oldest and most beneficent of all. [2]

The confusion might be explained by listing the various meanings of 'first principle' and 'Creator'. (Aristotle distinguishes six kinds of first principle in the Metaphysics. [3]) God and the Son are first principles and creators in different senses of the words. This is true and justifiable, but the distinction of senses is not always preserved. Clement both distinguishes and unites the Father and the Son. Clement saw a clear distinction between the Father and the Son and he considered that distinction important. On the other hand he saw a unity of the Father and the Son and he considered that unity important. 'O the Great God! O the perfect child! Son in Father and Father in Son', [4] and 'God in form of man undefiled, servant of his Father's will, the Logos who is God, who is in the Father, who is at the right hand of the Father and with the form (of God) is God'. [5] Clement was concerned to maintain a distinction between Father and Son, to empbasise the transcendence of the former and the immanence and condescension of the latter. But he was also greatly concerned to maintain the unity of the Godhead.

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[1] *Strom.* IV, 162; II, 3:10, 16.
[2] *Strom.* VII, 2; III, 4, 5.
[3] *Metaphysics*, 1013a.
[4] *Paed.* 1, 24; 1, 104, 13.
[5] *Paed.* 1, 4; 1, 91, 23.

II. THE SON AND THE WORLD

1. 'All the powers of the spirit become collectively one thing, and come together in the same point -- the Son.' [1] Clement sees in the Son the final point of union of all the powers of the spirit. He has mentioned three powers and indicated their unity by a singular pronoun. The Son is 'wisdom, knowledge, and truth, and whatever is similar to this'. Now Clement proceeds to show how all the powers come together. The powers are equivalent to the ideas of Plato. The man of vision who gazes on them is divine, for Nous is the place of the ideas and Nous is God. [2] The divine vision which Clement describes is that of the Son who is the circle of the powers. Clement does not use the word 'idea' in the philosophical sense except where he is quoting and discussing Plato; [3] but he speaks much of 'powers' and regards them as fulfilling the function of the forms. [4] God embraces all things by his powers [5] and his power passes through all things. [6] The Logos has filled all things with holy powers. [7] The powers are spiritual powers. Each spiritual entity has its appropriate power and province. [8] The Spirit is the strength of the Logos as blood is the strength of flesh. [9] The Holy Spirit who works through prophets and all just men alike is one and the same everywhere. [10]

   The doctrine of the 'powers' determined the structure of the second hypostasis [11] of Middle and Neo-Platonism. It can be traced back to Posidonius. According to him the cosmos was ordered and governed by a unified system of powers. He explained the existence and nature of things by 'powers' just as Plato had done by "forms" and the earlier Stoics had done by immanent reason or divine fire. [12] The powers were originally natural explanations of physical phenomena. They became, in and after Posidonius, supernatural beings ruling over a world

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[1]*Strom.* IV, 156; II, 317, 24.

[10]*Strom.* V, 38; II, 352, II. *Paed.* 1, 42; 1, 115, 10.

[11]The One-many or complex unity as distinct from the simple One -- in Plotinus ὁ
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[12]Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, p. 11.

[2]*Strom.* IV, 155; II, 317, 10.

[3] *Ibid.* and also *Strom.* V, 16; 11, 336, 8 where he says: η+ δϹ+ ἱ   ἐ   ·μα τοῦ Θεοῦ.

[4]As *Philo did, Op. Mundi,* 4-5

[5]*Strom.* II, 5; II, 115, 23.

[6]*Prot.* 73; 1, 55, 20.

[7]*Prot.* 112; 1, 79, 9.

[8]Exc. II; 111, 110, 20.

[9]*Paed.* II, 20; 1, 168, 2.

which imperfectly reflected their superior reality. [1] The demonic powers became intermediary between a transcendent God and the world. They became the subjects of theurgy and magic. They never wholly lost their unifying significance, and it is this unifying significance that Clement emphasises here.

The powers, says Clement, are collectively one thing. They constitute the whole of the divine activity. They are the thoughts and actions of the one God. They converge on the one point. They come together in the end in the Son who is the instrument of all divine activity. Clement speaks of his true dialectic ascending by the powers to the best essence [2] in the same way as Plato's dialectic ascends to the Form of the Good. Philo describes the Logos as the 'idea of ideas'. [3] This convergence together of the powers has three aspects. It is metaphysical, for the being of subordinate powers as well as of the world which they produce derives from the Son who is the power of God. It is ethical, because the purpose served by each power culminates in the one end of divine beneficent activity. It is logical, because the true dialectic ascends from power to power to the essence which is the rational explanation of all things. The Son is regarded by Clement as the efficient final and formal cause of all the powers. The powers are his powers. He works through them.
'But one cannot describe him with a list of his individual powers. The Son is not simply one thing as one thing nor many things as parts, but one thing as all things.' [4]

All this means that the Son is no ordinary being. He cannot be described in terms of one idea nor by listing the ideas of his many powers. For he is not simply one thing as one thing. [5] Nor on the other hand is he merely the sum of many different parts. He is one thing as all things. He is all the powers. He is all the things which the powers produce. They are joined by him as ultimate cause into a unity which is one thing as all things. Clement goes on to emphasise the two sides of the paradox -- all things and one thing. 'All things come from him. For he is the circle of all the

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[1] Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, p. 249.
[2] *Strom.* 1, 177; II, 109, 6.
[3] Op. *Mundi,* 6.
[4] *Strom.* IV, 156; 11, 317, 26.
[5]   γίνεταιἀ   ὡ   ὡΣ μέρη ὁ υἱ   , ἀλλ ὡ   .

powers rolled into one and united.'[1] There is no qualifying of either the universality or the unity of the Son. Just as many pieces, say, of clay, can be taken and rolled together into a ball, so all the powers are rolled together in the circle of the Son. In him are concentrated all the powers of the universe. Just as the ball consists of the many pieces of clay related in a special way, so the Son is all the powers rolled into one and unified.

The symbolism of the circle points to the perfect unity of the Son. Aristotle says, 'While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form. . . . This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is whole and complete.'[2] The consequences of circularity are stated by Clement. 'Therefore the Logos is called the Alpha and Omega. In him alone the end becomes the beginning and ends again at the original beginning without any gaps.[3] There is no part of the Logos of which it can be said, 'This is the beginning for there is nothing before it', or, 'This is the end for there is nothing beyond it'. There can be no gaps, no breaks in the circle, no incompleteness in the perfection of the Logos. This is why the Logos is called Alpha and Omega. 'I am the Alpha and the Omega, . . . He who is, who was and is to be, the Almighty.'[4] The universal eternal activity of the Logos is a complete unity.

I saw Eternity the other night, Like a great ring of pure and endless light, All calm, as it was bright.[5]

The use of the symbols of the circle and the Alpha and Omega is also found in gnostic literature.[6] For Clement the Son is both above and within the world, both one and all. He is the one point in which the powers come together. He is the circle which embraces them all. He is not just the apex of a dialectic, not just 'one as one'. Nor is he just a

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[1]*Strom*. IV, 156; 11, 318, 1.
[2]Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1016b (Ross translation).
[3]*Strom*. IV, 157; 11, 319, 3.
[4]*Revelation*, i. 8.
[5]Henry Vaughan, *The World*.
[6]See Amélineau, 'Codex Brucianus' in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale et d'autres bibliothhques*, tome XXIX, I (Paris, 1891). Carl Schmidt , *Gnostische Schriften* (Texte und Untersuchungen, VIII, Leipzig, 1892), p. 38.

cosmos which is its own deity, not 'many as parts'. He is supreme over the world and yet he is 'one thing as all things'.

These points may be seen again in Clement's account of the Son in Strom. VII, 2. [1] The nature of the Son is described by seven superlatives. He is the most perfect, most holy, most powerful, most princely, most kingly, most beneficent and nearest to the Almighty. He is the highest point of eminence and all things are subject to his ordering in accordance with the will of the Father. He steers the universe on the best course, guided by the 'hidden ideas'. [2] He never leaves his watch tower, [3] is not divided or localised, but present everywhere at all times. In no way circumscribed, he is, in the terms of Xenophanes' pantheism, [4] perfect Mind. He sees, hears, and knows all things, the angels and gods are subordinate to him, and all men are his, though not all know it.

In conclusion two things may be said. The first thing is that Clement shows an awareness of the problems involved in speaking of one thing as all things. He keeps together the emphasis on the Son as the ultimate cause of all things and the emphasis on his presence in and oneness with all things. It is as ultimate cause that the Son embraces all things. The second thing to be noted is the genuine religious feeling which Clement attaches to this notion. It is difficult for us to rouse any feelings whatever towards 'one thing as all things'; but Clement concludes the *Paedagogus* with a prayer which includes these words:

Grant that we may sing a thankful song of praise to the one Father and Son, Son and Father, the Son who is instructor and teacher, together with the Holy Spirit. All things to the one, in whom all things are, through whom all things are one, through whom eternity exists, whose members we all are, to whom belong glory and the ages of eternity! All things to the Good, all things to the Wise, all things to the just! To him be the glory both now and for evermore. Amen. [5]

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[1] *Strom*. VII, 5; III, 5, 20.

[2] Cf. Numenius, *Concerning the Good*, frag.26 (XXXII), and Heraclitus, frag. 28 *(Bywater)*.

[3] Plato, *Politlcus*, 272 E. When God leaves the helm of the ship of the world, everything goes chaotically backwards until he returns. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the Man and his Work*, p. 396.

[4] οῦλος ὁρᾷ, οὐ λος δε+ νοεῖ, οὐ ' ἀκούει. Sextus Math. IX, 144. R.P. 102.

[5] *Paed*. in, 101; 1, 291, 7.

CHAPTER 4
THE SAVIOUR OF MEN

THE passage under consideration in the last chapter continues with the words, Therefore also to believe in him and through him is to become something unified, being indivisibly made one in him; but to disbelieve means separation, estrangement, and division.' [1] Clement passes from his description of the Son in his relations to his Father and the cosmos to his relation to men. We have here the ethical or religious consequences of the Son being 'one thing as all things'. The man who believes in the Son is made one in him. This is the dominant theme of Clement's account of salvation. Clement found in the philosophical concepts of 'the one' and 'one thing as all things' a useful vehicle for the presentation of Christian truth and a useful weapon against dualistic error. After an introductory passage we shall examine the scheme of salvation (1) beginning with its meaning for individuals (*Strom.* IV, chs. 25 and 26), (2) beginning with its meaning for the human race (*Strom.* VII, chs. 2 and 3).

The importance of being at one with the universe had been recognised throughout Greek philosophy. In the thought of the Stoics, especially in that of Posidonius, we have the notion of a living world, from which separation means the end of existence. [2] From Posidonius the idea passed into Platonism, so that we find in Plotinus an account of the impotence of the soul that has separated from the All. [3] In Marcus Aurelius the same thought is found and the key words ἀποκόπτειν, ἀ   μνειν, ἀποσχίϕειν ἔνωσις are used. [4] The impulse of gnosticism, [5] not to mention of

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[1]*Strom.* IV, 157; II, 318, 5.

[2]Theiler, *Die Vorhereitung des Neuplatonismus*, p. 94: 'die Kraft der Sammlung und das Verderben der Individuation'.

[3]*Enn.* IV, 18, Cited Theiler, *op. cit.* p. 94.

[4]*Meditations,* VIII, 34.

[5]Hans Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist*, vol. I, p. 104: 'Die Zersplitterung -Sind aus dem einen Licht, dern ersten Leben, Teile abgetrennt und in die Finsternis gernischt worden, so ist eine ursprüngliche Einheit zersplittert und der Vielheit überliefert worden.'

Hermetism and the 'mysteries' in general, was to regain the original unity which had given way to plurality.

Clement lived at a time when the age-long quest for harmony and unity was explicit on every side; yet nowhere do we find a unified character portrayed which is the equal of Clement's gnostic. The greatness of Clement's picture of the gnostic [1] lies partly in his constantly recurring emphasis on the unity of the gnostic with God and especially in the way in which this unity is related to the whole of life. [2] Because the presence of God is always with us we do our daily work in a spirit of praise whether we plough the earth or sail the seas. [3] The gnostic never gives way to pleasures and temptations because he knows that God sees everything. [4]

1. ἀ   ἐ   μενον ἐν αὐτῷ

To believe in and through the Son is to become one, to be indissolubly made one in him, while to disbelieve is to be separated, estranged, divided. [5] The meaning of this statement is found in the sections which follow it and which bring the fourth book of the *Stromateis* to its conclusion.

(1) To be one in Christ is to be pure, free from the sin which separates from God. Clement expounds the ceremonial law of Ezekiel xliv. No foreigner who is uncircumcised in heart and flesh, but only the Levites, may enter into the holy places. Uncircumcision means impurity of body and spirit. Foreigners are those who do not want to believe, but want to disbelieve. The real priests are those who live purely. If a priest is defiled by contact with a dead body he must wait seven days (the period of genesis), the seventh day being the day of rest. Then on the

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[1] Especially in *Strom*. VII, ch. 7.

[2] *Strom*. VII, 35; III, 27, 9.

[3] *Strom*. VII, 35; III, 27, 27.

[4] *Strom*. VII, 36; III, 28, 23 and *Strom*. VII, 37; III, 29, 14; cf. *Strom*. VII, 5; III, 6, 1. Cf. Theiler, *op. cit*. pp. 82-4. The repetition of the Xenophanes reference made concerning the Son in *Strom*. VII, 2 is part of another Posidonius theme which is continued in Neoplatonism. Pliny (*Nat. Hist.* 14) had said: 'quisquis est deus si modo est alius . . . torus est sensus, totus auditus, totus animae, totus animi, totus sui.' Cf. also Proclus, *Comment. Tim.*84, 6.

[5] *Strom*. IV, 157; II, 318, 5.

eighth day he must bring a propitiation. The perfect purification, says Clement, is faith in the gospel; the seven days (whether they stand for periods of time or heavenly spheres) represent the genesis and sin which the gnostic must put off. The eighth day or heaven is the gnostic's place, the highest rest, or the fixed sphere that borders on the world of ideas. Here the fear of change which characterises the lower spheres is absent.

(2) To be one in Christ is to be born again to a life of righteousness and of eternal peace in God. Job's nakedness at birth and death was nakedness of sin and the deformities which sin brings. He was naked because he was righteous. We must be as little children, pure in body and holy in soul. God generates us in this condition from our mother, the water of baptism. As a result of our second genesis we are immortal. The wicked are not so. Moses symbolised our state of purity in the virginity of Rebecca whose name means 'the glory of God', which glory is immortality. Righteousness is peace and health. Melchizedek, king of Salem, means 'righteous king of peace', and this shows that righteousness and peace mean the same thing.

To the great relief of his readers Clement now says, 'We must pass from the more theological questions [1] to ethical questions which are clearer', and ends by speaking of the Saviour as our mystagogue. [2]

To be one in Christ is to serve God with our whole being in the world which he has made. God as οὐσία, τάγαθόν, νοῦς is the first principle of all things -- physical, ethical, and logical -and the Son is our Teacher for all of them. Consequently it is wrong to declare that the world and the human bodies, which God made and adapted for right living and of which he is the first. principle, are evil. Such a God will receive from the gnostic a complete devotion which is ethical, physical, and logical. Clement has been speaking of the Ogdoad as the true gnostic's place. He has been speaking of the Son of an unknowable Father as the

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[1] τῶ   πων. See Stählin trans., *BKV*, vol. IV, p. 109 n. 4.

[2] The reference to the mystagogue explains the manner of the passage. The Ezekiel passage is treated in the fashion of Hellenistic Judaism. The Jews described their ceremonial worship in the terms of mystery religion. Cf. W. Knox , *St Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, pp. 29-30.

converging point of all the powers. These statements are consistent with a pessimistic dualism similar to that of the heretical gnostics. It is no accident that Clement now makes an unambiguous statement that God is the first principle of all things, and follows this statement with a criticism of the pessimistic dualism of Basilides.

In God's world man is placed with his members arranged in a way conducive to right action. [1] A complete service of God is fulfilled by the gnostic, logically in the wisdom which is the knowledge of divine and human things, ethically in the justice which is a harmony of the parts of the soul, physically in the holiness which is the service of God. The condemnation of the flesh in the Bible refers not to the physical body but to sin, 'carnal men' being 'men in sin'. The soul is better than the body; but it is not naturally good nor the body naturally bad. Body and soul are ethically neutral, [2] different from one another but not mutually opposed. The soul of the gnostic treats its earthly tabernacle, the body, with respect, but not with warm attachment. [3] Basilides claims that the elect are in essence superior and strange to the world. But this is not so. 'For all things are of one, namely God. It is not possible for anything to be essentially foreign to the world, for being is one and God is one. But the elect man lives as a stranger, knowing that the things of the world are to be possessed and then given up.' [4] We may groan for our heavenly tabernacles. We may wish rather to be absent from the body and present with God, but the word 'rather' implies comparison, which in turn implies likeness. [5] There can be no comparison between things that are wholly dissimilar. That is why St Paul adds, 'wherefore we strive, whether dwelling in the body or out of it, to be well pleasing to God'. [6] Both our earthly and heavenly tabernacles are places of serving a God who is 'the one God, by whom all things are made and created, the world, and things above the world'. [7]

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[1] ππὸς τὸ καΛόν, οὐ ππὸς ἡ   ν εὔΘετα.
[2] *Strom*   .
[3] σΕμνῶς καὶ τμητικῶς. . . οὐ πποσπαΘῶς.
[4] *Strom*. IV, 165; II, 321, 30.
[5] *Strom*. IV, 166; II, 322, 15
[6] 2 Cor. V. 9.
[7] *Strom*. IV, 167; II, 322, 19.

(4) To be one in Christ is to exchange an 'earthly' for a 'heavenly' life. The heretical gnostics have twisted things around the wrong way. Our souls are not sent down from heaven to earth. God always works for the betterment of things. Our journey is from earth to heaven and we can even now exchange earth for heaven by living a life of righteousness. To pass from ignorance to knowledge is to pass from earth to heaven. Scripture calls the man who has chosen ignorance and hardness of heart 'earth', while the Christian gnostic, who has given himself to the contemplation of heaven and divine things, is called 'heaven'. The 'earth' is judged. The unbeliever is condemned. God does not save the wicked who do not want to know him. Men are free to choose. The good God is not the cause of evil and ignorance. This would be absurd. God asks men, in the words of Scripture, to fear him and walk in his ways [1] only because they have the power of choosing. 'He asks this of you because you have the power to choose salvation.' [2]

The result of this choice should be evident to all. We should have works that cry our faith aloud. Our works should shine before men. The gnostic must imitate God as far as possible. Euripides speaks of soaring aloft to speak to Zeus. Clement prays that he may soar by the Spirit of Christ to his new Jerusalem, his heavenly city, the Church in which the will of God is done, on earth as it is in heaven. [3]

This closing chapter of Book IV of the Stromateis shows Clement arguing against the heretical gnostics. He attacks what has been called their 'pessimistic dualism' and 'deterministic naturalism'. [4] Their dualism divided the world and the body as bad from heaven and the spirit as good. Their determinism claimed that in order to be spiritual and elect one had to be born that way. Clement's arguments are based on two propositions -God is the first principle of all existence, God is good. His arguments may be expressed syllogistically.

(*a*) A good God cannot cause evil things. God caused the

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[1]Deut. X. 12.
[2]*Strom*. IV, 170; II, 324, 4.
[3]*Strom*. IV, 172; II, 324, 24 to end of chapter.
[4]Buri, *Clemens Alexandrinus und der Paulinische Freiheitsbegriff*, ch. 1.

world and the body. Therefore the world and the body are not evil.

(*b*) A good God cannot cause evil things. The sinfulness of man is evil. Therefore God does not cause the sinfulness of man.

But the syllogisms leave out the many corollaries and allusions which Clement's arguments contain. This chapter shows how well fitted Clement was to defend his scheme against the objections of heretical gnostics. It shows too how his ideal of unity with God concerns both this world and the next and is fulfilled in the fellowship of the Church, God's city on earth and in heaven. [1] The important thing about a city was its unity and Clement considered the Church to be essentially one. [2]

II. πάντες αῦτοῦ οί ἴ4υθρωποι [3]

We have considered Clement's account of salvation, beginning with its meaning for individual believers. We shall now consider the universal scheme. The Son of God rules over all and all things are his. By his universal and sustaining power he directs and orders the whole universe. God has put all things under him. The angels and divine beings are his, set in obedience under him. All men belong to him; but only some know whose they are. Men differ in their responses to his providence, which is individual, public, and universal. He does not compel anyone but is nevertheless the Saviour and Lord of all. 'How could he be Saviour and Lord if he were not the Saviour and Lord of all?' [4] He came in his great love for men for their common salvation. They who choose his salvation have a common faith. The Son is the cause of all good things and does all things well.

The variable factor in the scheme of salvation is not the Son's almighty power nor his perfect love. It is the will of man. 'For this is the law from of old, that he who wants virtue must choose

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[1] The importance of this idea for Christian thought is considerable. A Stoic (Marc. Aurel. *Meditations,* IV, 28) and Platonic (*Republic,* IX) idea, it had been used by St Paul (Phil. iii. 20; Eph. ii. 20) and was to provide the basis of St Augustine's philosophy of history.

[2] *Strom.* VII, 107; III, 76, 4.

[3] *Strom.* VII, 5; III, 6, 5. We turn now to *Strom.* VII, chs. 2 and 3.

[4] *Strom.* VII, 7; III, 7, 16.

it for himself.' [1] According to a man's faith, he is placed in an order which descends from the one first principle, the Son, through the powers and angels to men. The Son directs the salvation of all through the intermediary powers. Clement pictures a magnet the force of which is spread over a series of steel rings. Some separate pieces of steel are attracted to the magnet itself and to each of the rings, while other pieces drop off and fall away. In the same way, drawn by the Holy Spirit, some men rise to the presence of God, some to places of increasing distance from God, while others, giving way to passions, drop off, spin round and round, and fall away. It is the same power which draws all men through all the 'saving circles' of different times, places, and heritages. The Son has done everything he could towards the salvation of men, short of taking from them their freedom of will. [2] He gave the law to the Hebrews, philosophy to the Greeks, and has arranged the whole universe to facilitate men's salvation. 'Everything, then, which did not in any way obstruct man's free power of choice he made conducive to virtue and showed it to be so. So that in some way or other, even to those who can only see dimly, the true, only, one, almighty, good God might be manifest from eternity to eternity saving by the Son, and in no way whatever the cause of wickedness.' [3]

The apprehending vision of the Gnostic is a state of unity with God. By salvation we are made one with the Logos and with other men. For he is more than an external leader and controller. He lives within the souls of those who believe on him, and by this indwelling presence he draws them together. 'For the soul of a just man is above all "a divine image similar to God". In this soul, through obedience to the commandments, the ruler of all things mortal and immortal is consecrated and set apart. He is the king and the author of good things. He is truly law, ordinance and eternal Logos, and he is individually to each and in common to all the one Saviour. This is in truth the only begotten, the stamp of

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[1] *Strom.* VII, 9; III, 8, 28.
[2] Buri contrasts this recurring element in Clement's teaching with the teaching of St Paul concerning man's slavery under sin. He speaks of 'Die von Clemens nichtheachtete naturhafte Gebundenheit des natürlichen Menschen bei Paulus'. *Op. cit.* p. 77.
[3] *Strom.* VII, 12; III, 9, 22.

the majesty of the king of all and Almighty Father who impresses the gnostic with the seal of perfect contemplation in accordance with his own image. So there is now a third divine image, which is made as like the second cause as possible and made like that life which is life indeed, the life through which we live the true life.' [1]

The last sentence suggests a parallel between Plato's theory of art (in Book X of the *Republic*) as a copy of a copy of reality and the likeness of a likeness of God in the believer's soul. The same notion is found in Athanasius, where man is compared to a painting of the Logos, being made in the image of God. [2] There are the three terms: God, the image of God or the Logos, our image of the image.

This account of art given by Plato was derived from his theory of forms and the notion of participation. What reality a bed or a picture of a bed possessed was the result of a relation between these things and the 'form' of the bed. The relation was called 'participation'. Of the forms Plato said, 'Each in itself is one. . . but they appear everywhere and each seems many.' [3] The one thing is the form, the many appearances participate in it. The man who is awake 'recognises a certain real beauty (i.e. the form of beauty) and is able to discern both it and the objects which participate in it'. [4] There is no difference between this structure of forms and particulars and that of 'individually to each and in common to all the one Saviour'. If F. M. Cornford was right in his theory of the religious origin of the theory of forms, this application of the Platonic scheme to religious experience is very important. The circle is completed, from religion to philosophy, from philosophy to religion. Speaking of participation he wrote,

We understand the problem and its insolubility when we grasp that this relation called 'participation' is from the first a mystical, nonrational relation, which defies rational analysis. The Idea is a groupsoul, related to its group as a mystery daemon, like Dionysus, is related to the group of worshippers, his *thiasos.* The worshippers of Dionysus believed that, when they held their orgiastic rites, the one God entered into each and all of them; each and all became *entheoi;*

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[1]*Strom.* VII, 16; III, 12, 14.
[2]*De Incarnatione*, XIV.
[3]*Republic*, 476.
[4]*Ibid.*

they 'partook' of the one divine nature which was communicated to them all, and 'present' in each. It is thus we must interpret the three terms -- methexis, parousia, koinonia -- by which Plato tries to describe the relation of an Idea to its groups. [1]

Whether Cornford was right or wrong in attributing to the forms this mystical origin, the parallel is obvious. One daemon, many worshippers, one form, many particulars, one Christ, many Christian souls -- the one unites the many by the relation of 'participation', 'presence', 'communion'.

We may now summarise the main points of this chapter. The soul of the individual believer is saved from inward division and strife into a life of unity in Christ. This life is characterised by purity from sin, inward peace in Christ, the service of God in the whole of life and doing the will of God on earth as in heaven. The universal scheme of Christ's salvation extends to all men throughout all ages. It brings men into unity with Christ and thereby into unity with one another.

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[1]Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 254.

CHAPTER 5
POLEMIC AGAINST POLYTHEISM AND DUALISM

Polytheism

In the Protrepticus Clement attacks polytheism, with special reference to mystery religion. He uses arguments which Athenagoras and Justin had used in their defence of Christianity as the true religion; but the tone has changed from defence to attack. [1] Two fundamental criticisms are the plurality and the immorality of the gods. The person who believes in many gods, and not in the one true God, is like a bastard who does not know his one, true father. [2] As for the 'mob of gods', there are three Zeuses, five Athenas, and innumerable Apollos. [3] But the true God is one God. He is not to be confused with his works as the myths and philosophers have confused him. [4] 'I seek after God, not the works of God.' [5] There is in all men some knowledge of the truth, that God is one, eternal, transcendent deity.

For there is a certain divine effluence instilled into all men without exception, but especially into those who spend their lives in thought; wherefore they admit, even though against their will, that God is one, that he is unbegotten and indestructible, and that somewhere on high in the outermost spaces of the heavens, in his own private watch tower, he truly exists for ever. [6]

This knowledge is found in Plato, who calls God the king of all things, the measure and balance of all things, 'who holds the beginning and end and middle of all existence'. [7] Other philosophers are brought forward, 'declaring by his inspiration the one

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[1] Athenagoras says, 'It is not my intention to censure the worship of idols, but to refute the charges made against us and to give reasons for our way of life.' *Presbeia,* 18. Clement's tone is much more aggressive.
[2] *Prot*. 25; I, 18, 27.
[3] *Prot*. 28; I, 20, 30.
[4] *Prot*. 67; I, 51, 17.
[5] *Prot*. 67; I, 51, 25.
[6] *Prot*. 68; I, 52, 2. Butterworth's translation, with minor alterations, is used in this chapter.
[7] *Prot*. 68; I, 52, 21 and *Prot*. 69; I, 53, 8.

only true God to be God'. [1] The unity ascribed to God is not always a transcendent one. The Pythagoreans specifically state that the one God is not outside but in the cosmos. God is both 'overseer' and 'blending of all ages', both Father and principle of life. [2] The poets follow with their testimony to the one true God. 'One, only one, in very truth is God', says Sophocles. [3] Then come the prophets, whose inspiration is the purest. The Sibyl, who says, 'One God there is, who sends the rain and winds', [4] is followed by Biblical writers who denounce the worship of idols and proclaim the worship of the one God who is creator of all things. There is no god beside him. 'The Lord is one', and 'thou shalt worship the Lord thy God and him only shalt thou serve.' [5] Yet despite the many statements of truth and the threats and. promises of the divine Word, men still ignore their God and Father. [6] There follows an exhortation to leave the pagan deities, who are many and bad, for the 'good unity'.

Let us hasten to salvation, to the new birth. Let us, who are many, hasten to be gathered together into one flock in accordance with the oneness of the One Being. Similarly let us follow after unity by the practice of good works, seeking the good unity. And the union of many into one, bringing a divine harmony out of many scattered sounds, becomes one symphony, following one leader and teacher, the Word, and never ceasing till it reaches the truth itself, with the cry 'Abba Father'. This is the true speech which God welcomes from his children. These are the first fruits of God's harvest. [7]

Clement answers the objection that it is not reasonable to throw over the religious customs of one's fathers. It is not reasonable to hold on to such foolish beliefs concerning the gods.

Surely it is plain to every one that they are stones, just as Hermes himself. And as the halo is not a god, nor the rainbow either, but conditions of the atmosphere and clouds, and precisely as day is not a god, nor month, nor year, nor time which is made up of these; so also

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[1]*Prot*. 71; I, 53, 27.
[2]*Prot*. 72; I, 55, 8.
[3]*Prot*. 74; I, 56, 4. See *Prot*. ch. 7 *passim*.
[4]*Prot*. 77; I, 59, 22. See Prot. ch. 8 passim.
[5]*Prot*. 80; I, 61, 20, citing Deut. VI. 4 and 13, and X. 20.
[6]*Prot*. ch. 9.
[7]*Prot*. 88; I, 65, 27, adopting Stählin's suggestion of γέλην for ἀγάπην. Cf. *Prot*. 116; I, 81, 32.

neither is the sun or moon, by which each of the before-mentioned periods is marked off. Who then in his right mind would imagine such things as audit, punishment, right, and retribution, to be gods? [1]

Thunder and lightning, fire and water, comets and shooting stars are not divine. If none of these things are gods, and yet there is evidence of divine providence about us, there is no alternative but to believe in the one and only true God. [2] People who do not see this act as though they were drugged. 'God grant that you may one day recover from this slumber and perceive God, and that neither gold, nor stone, nor tree, nor action, nor suffering, nor disease, nor fear, may appear to you as God.' [3] It is a terrible thing to be blind and deaf to God. How is it that such people Care not grieved, are not pained, have felt no longing to see heaven and its maker'? [4] It is time to stop wriggling about on the earth like a snake (restricting one's interests and devotion to earthly things), time to lift one's head and gaze in wonder at the heavens above. [5]

In the eloquent invitation which concludes the *Protrepticus* [6] Clement portrays the blessedness of unity with the one God through the one Logos of God. Here is crystallised the theme of the *Protrepticus,* which is an exhortation to unity with the one God of whom all men have some innate knowledge, and of whom philosophers, [7] poets and prophets have spoken. Other objects of worship -- gods, demons, idols -- have been criticised because they are so many, so evil, so earthy, and ephemeral. God is one, good, transcendent, and eternal. We can learn what Clement thought about God from the qualities he criticises in false gods, as well as from his explicit descriptions of the true God.

The unity of God, the Logos, and the believer, is described in this closing passage in the terms we have seen elsewhere in Clement and the contemporary philosophy. God is one, the only real God. The eternal Jesus is the one great high priest of God who is also his Father. He calls the whole race of men to receive

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[1]*Prot*. 102; I, 73, 18.
[2]*Prot*. 103; I, 74, 7.
[3]*Prot*. 103; I, 74, 9.
[4]*Prot*. 105; I, 75, 11.
[5]*Prot*. 106; I, 76, 4.
[6]*Prot*. 120; I, 84, 23.
[7]Not all philosophers: some have deified the earth. Not all poets and prophets either, for that matter.

their place under the one God and one Logos of God. He is symphony, harmony, and the archetype according to which men may correct their imperfect image of God.

Dualism

Against the heretical sects who taught there was more than one God, Clement constantly emphasises the unity of the God of both covenants. The same God is proclaimed by the Law, the prophets and the Gospel. The Marcionites separated the Law from the Gospel, and the just God of the Law from the good God of the Gospel. [1] 'One God was a judge imbued with savage militarism. The other God was mild, peaceful and only good and excellent.' [2] Clement directs his attack 'against those who consider that the just is not good'. [3] Elsewhere he says, 'The Marcionites do not say that the law is bad; but they say it is just and distinguish the just from the good.' [4] Clement was not alone in his defence of the divine unity at this period. Tertullian says, 'The chief, and thereby the whole dispute concerns number: whether two Gods may be admitted', and gives his own unambiguous verdict, 'God is not if he is not one'; and 'That Being, then, which is the great Most High, must be unique, by having no equal, lest he should cease to be the great Most High.' [5]

Clement begins by stating the objections that are made against the Lord's goodness 'on account of the rod and threat and fear'. [6] These objections are due to a misunderstanding of the 'fear' of the Lord and a forgetfulness of his love in becoming man. Nothing exists which is hated by the Lord or by God. 'Both are one - God.' God loves what he has made, especially 'man, the most excellent of created things, a God-loving being'. God and Logos are lovers of men. He who loves wants to benefit the object of his love. What benefits is better than what does not benefit. Consequently the Good benefits. God benefits and cares

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[1] Harnack, *Marcion, das Evangelium yore ftemden Gott*, p. 86.

[2] Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem I*, 6; V, II: quoted Harnack, p. 88.

[3] *Paed.* I, ch. 8, is the source of the argument expressed in this section. It begins I, 126, 21.

[4] *Strom.* II, 39; II, 133, 26.

[5] Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem I*, 3.

[6] *Paed.* I, 62; I, 176, 22.

for men. The Good and Justice are good in themselves, coextensive and equal in every way.

If the Lord loves man and is good, how is it that he becomes angry and punishes? [1] He does this for the correct training of his children and for the cure and the surgery of the passions. He makes all things contribute towards the end of salvation and eternal health. The Logos is the general who takes disciplinary action for the benefit and improvement of those who are under him. [2] Reproof may come from a scornful enemy or from a wellmeaning friend. [3] It is clear from the fact that he suffered for us that our Lord would not rebuke as an enemy. [4]

The argument is summed up. [5] God is good -- this is universally agreed. The same God is just -- the Lord says in the Gospel (John xvii. 21) that God is one. God is one and beyond the One and above the quality of unity itself. The pronoun 'thou' is used of God to emphasise his timeless existence as 'he who alone really is, who was, and is, and will be, and who has at all three times the one name ó ωv. [6] This same God is just, for he is addressed in the same chapter of St John's Gospel as 'just Father'. God, who sets some on the left and some on the right, [7] as he is Father is good and is called good. As he is Son, the Logos in the Father, he is called just. The idea of a balance is here associated with justice. There is an equality of mutual love and power between Father and Son. God reveals Jesus as the embodiment of a perfect balance and of justice. We know God through his Son as by a perfect balance. God balances mercy and wrath, both of which serve the common end of the salvation of men.

The Logos has spoken of his Father as good. He also speaks of his Father as Creator. Every one admits that the Creator is just. So that from the words of the Logos himself it can be shown that the same Father is good and just. The identity of the Father and Creator, of the just and the good, is further substantiated. 'God is one, though declared by many powers.' [8] The conclusion is drawn, So that it is in truth evident that the

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[1] *Paed.* I, 64; I, 127, 33.
[2] Paed. I, 65; I, 128, 14.
[3] *Paed.* I, 66; I, 128, 28.
[4] *Paed.* I, 66; I, 128, 31.
[5] *Paed.* I, 71; I, 131, II
[6] *Paed.* I, 71; I, 131, 19
[7] *Paed.* I, 71; I, 131, 29.
[8] *Paed.* I, 74; I, 133, 6.

God of all things is one only, good, just, Creator, Son in Father, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.' [1]

There is nothing inconsistent in the idea that the Saviour should speak severely in love. For this is the medicine which the divine love administers to produce modesty and shame. It is better to cause the soul a little pain than to let it die eternally. The activity of the paedagogus in this respect is described in succeeding chapters. But we must notice the argument with which the present chapter ends. God's anger (to which such strong objection had been made by Marcion) is actually a sign of God's love, for God descended to emotion for man's sake. 'But also the very feeling of wrath is full of love to man, in that God descends to feelings for man's sake. For the sake of man also the Logos of God became man.' [2]

Conclusion: Two Kinds of Causes

Where lay the strength of Clement's metaphysics or philosophical theology? What did he have to say which the philosophers of his time would have done well to hear? With these questions we shall conclude the account of his philosophical theology. The problem which concerned the philosophy of the time was the proceeding of many things from one. The Pythagoreans had claimed that 'The first principle of all things is the One. From the One came an indefinite Two as matter for the One, which is cause. From the One and indefinite Two came numbers . . . and out of them comes to be a cosmos.' [3] Everything came from the One. Parmenides objected that nothing could proceed from the One 'immovable in the limits of its mighty bonds' while 'overmastering Necessity holds it in the bonds of the limit that fences it about. [4] Plato's argument in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides might be regarded as an answer to Parmenides and a statement of reasons for the Pythagorean evolution of the many from the One. [5] Numenius shows the same

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[1]*Paed.* I, 74; I, 133, 8.
[2]*Paed.* I, 74; I, 133, 22.
[3]Alexander Polyhistor, Diog. Laert. VIII, 24. Quoted Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 3.
[4]Parmenides, frag. 8, 30. Cornford, *op. cit.* p. 42.
[5]Cf. Cornford, *op. cit.* p. 204.

awareness of the problem which we have seen in Plotinus. [1] But Numenius, like Plotinus, imagined that the problem could be solved through the greatness of God's power. [2]

God the Father, the transcendent One, is for Clement the first cause, not merely in the sense that he initiates a process or causes his subordinates to bring the world into existence. This was a popular solution of the problem, an attempt to bridge the gap between the One and the not-One. For Clement the ineffable One was none the less emphatically the cause of all things coming into being and being, [3] and was called Creator. [4] The Son of God, the 'one thing as all things', is called the second cause, [5] and Creator of all things. [6] There is not the same problem with the proceeding of many things from a One which is also All.

For a causal process to be at all intelligible, the effect must previously be somehow contained in the cause or causes (*ex nihilo nihil fit*). How then is it possible for one thing to cause many things? If there is no other kind of cause than that which contains its effects, then the One cannot be the cause of the Many. Yet Pythagorean and Platonic philosophers were united in the opinion that the One was the cause of the Many. Is there another kind of cause which does not contain its effects, an 'empty' as distinct from a 'full' cause? Clement maintained there was such a cause, that this cause was God and that his operation was wholly inexplicable. In this way the problem of the One and the Many is not so much solved as shown to be insoluble.

Musical composition affords analogues for the two types of causes. In the one case we have the work of a man like Schubert, who wrote music without premeditation and plan. He 'scarcely ever sketched or altered. Music just poured out of him.' [7] Under the most varying circumstances he wrote songs which were by no means dependent upon his state of mind and breadth of experience. A critic has said of his song 'Gretchen am Spinnrade'

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[1] See ch. 2.

[2] Numenius, *De Primis Causis,* Test. 30 (XIV). Nurnenius attributes his view to Pythagoras.

[3] *Strom.* V, 81; II, 380, 17.

[4] *Strom.* V, 82; II, 380, 26.

[5] *Strom.* VII, 16; III, 12, 24.

[6] *Paed.* III, 99-100; I, 290, 14 and 23.

[7] Bacharach, *The Musical Companion* (London, 1936), p. 79.

that 'it is difficult to understand how any boy of 17 . . . could have written such a song, but it is impossible to offer any rational explanation as to how a raw inexperienced youth like Schubert produced a masterpiece of this kind'. [1] In cases such as this the mind of the composer which produces the song cannot be said to contain it previously. This analogue would help to explain the sense of cause in which '*X* is the cause of *Y*' does not entail '*X* contains *Y*'. This is the sense in which God made the world. Of his bare volition he made it, i.e. he willed it to be and it was so.

In the second case we have the work of one like Mozart whose mind contained the music that he wrote before he put a note on paper. In a much-quoted letter he says, 'And now my soul gets heated and if nothing disturb me the piece grows longer and brighter until, however long it is, it is all finished at once in my mind so that I can see it at a glance as if it were a pretty picture or a pleasing person.' [2] Here the mind of the composer produces something which it has previously contained.

Philo uses a similar analogue to this second one. [3] If a king wanted to build a city, he would not build it himself. He would employ an architect. The architect would not start building immediately. He would get some ideas together. He would plan it in his head and then perhaps put the plans on paper, and then get his engineers and builders to work. God's architect is the Logos who created the world at the divine command. Before he created he made a plan in his mind and then worked from it. His mind was the Divine mind, the mind of God himself. The plan was the world of ideas, which exists in him as the pattern for his work. The creation was in his mind. This analogue and the previous Mozart one would explain the sense of cause in which *'X* is the cause of *Y'* entails *'X* contains *Y'.* This is the sense in which for Clement the Logos made the world and the sense in which God could not make it.

The essential feature of the first kind of cause is that it is inexplicable and wholly mysterious. The musical analogue must

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[1] Bacharach, *op. cit.* p. 438.

[2] Mozart. Quoted by Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (Boston, 1892), p. 371.

[3] *Op. Mundi,* 4-5.

not be considered wholly adequate. Clement's account of creation *ex nihilo* (like all speech concerning the One) is also an approximation, not a scientific description of how God causes things. The essential feature of his account of creation is that in some wholly inscrutable way things come into being, and come into being solely because of God. Clement's recognition of this kind of causality, which is the only kind of causality that can be final, is something which his contemporaries might well have learnt. Clement realised that the introduction of the Logos or any other instrument of God did not solve the final mystery of creation. God remained the ultimate cause of all things in a unique and inexplicable way.

The second kind of causality explains the relation of the Son to the powers which he embraces and the things which he creates and sustains. It is as the cause of the powers that he is all the powers. It is as the cause of all things that he is all things. It is as cause that he unites all things by his powers. By his emphasis on the πάντα of the ὡς πάντα ἕν Clement preserved the unity of the cosmos in a way which the gnostic sects and others did not. [1] By his emphasis on the ἕν of the ὡς πάντα ἕν he unified the cause and controller of things in a way which Philo and others did not. [2]

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[1]E.g. Basilides V, ch. 3.

[2]Philo has six ruling powers, the Logos being the oldest and best. *Prof.* 1819. Cf. also the Amesha Spentas of Zoroastrianism.

PART II
GOODNESS

CHAPTER 6 THE GOODNESS OF GOD AND ITS RELATION TO EVIL AND THE LAST THINGS

I. THE GOODNESS OF GOD

GOD is for Clement the only perfect and good God. [1] He is among other things the Good and the first principle of ethics. [2] Though, strictly speaking, no name or quality is appropriate to him, one of the names which the mind uses as a point of support is 'the Good' and the distinctive feature of all the names is that they are 'good names'. [3] To use good names when speaking of the ineffable God is to describe him as good, when direct description is not permissible.

God's goodness is unique and transcendent, yet active and the source of all other goodness. It is unique because God is unique. The reply of our Lord to the rich young ruler, 'There is none good but God', is cited or hinted at twelve times in Clement's writing. [4] Some of these references state explicitly the uniqueness of the goodness of God. 'Being good he is called that which he alone is -- good.' [5] Others state that the God who is good is unique and one. [6] This implies that God's goodness is unique. If his goodness were the same as the goodness of other things then he would not be unique in all respects. Other passages refer to his unique goodness as the sole Saviour of men. [7] Not to know God is to be bereft of goodness and to be dead. To know the one good Father is life eternal and participation in the power of the Immortal. He alone is good. He alone is Saviour. [8] In one place

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[1] *QDS.* I; III, 159, 8.
[2] *Strom.* IV, 162; II, 320, 17.
[3] *Strom.* V, 82; II, 380, 26-7
[4] Matt. xix. 17. See Stählin, *Register*, p. 13.
[5] *Paed.* I, 71;I, 131, 31.
[6] *Paed.* I, 74; I, 133, 9 (against Marcionites) and Strom. VII, 39; III, 3, 8 (against demon-worshippers). Also *Strom.* VII, 58; III, 43, 5 and *QDS.* I; III, 159, 8.
[7] *Strom.* V, 63; II, 368, 30.
[8] *Strom.* VII, 41; III, 31, 23.

Valentinus is quoted as speaking of the one good God who is revealed by the Son and through whom alone the heart can become pure. [1] There are two ways in which God's goodness transcends the goodness of other things. First, God's goodness is, like all real goodness, intrinsic goodness. He is not good for a purpose, as a means to an end. He is good in himself. Secondly, God's goodness is always active from above. It is as a father, a shepherd, a king, that he does us good. There is a divine order of providence embedded in the world; but this order is only there because God puts it there, because he ordains that it should be so. The first of these points (God's intrinsic goodness) is made explicitly in *Paed.* I, ch. 8, [2] and implied whenever Clement calls God 'the Good' or 'the End'. What does good is better than what does not do good. There is nothing better than what is good. Therefore what is good does good. God is good. Therefore God does good. What is good, in the respect in which it is good, does nothing else than good. Therefore God (who is wholly good) does good in every possible way. God's active goodness is the best kind of goodness, consisting in personal and conscious care and help. But what is good is not called good because it possesses virtue, i.e. because it does good things. Like justice, it is called good because it is good in and through itself. What is expedient is good in a different sense of the word. It is good because it does good. There are two arguments here which concern the goodness of God.

> (i) 'God is good' entails 'God does good in every possible way.'
> (ii) 'God does good in every possible way' does not entail 'God is good.'

The first entailment is not reversible. What is good is beneficent but it is not good because of its beneficence. It is good in itself. God is good in an ultimate, intrinsic way.

The second way in which the goodness of God transcends the goodness of other things is in its mode of operation. God's

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[1] *Strom.* II, 114; II, 175, 1. Cf. Hilgenfeld, *Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums*, p. 297.
[2] *Paed.* I, 62; I, 127, 11. The argument is set out in this paragraph. It shows Stoic influence. *SVF*, 2, 1116.

goodness, by virtue of its perfection, must be active and inspired by personal care and concern for the objects of his beneficence.

It is not that God, in virtue of his essential goodness, remains blessed and immortal, 'neither troubled nor causing trouble'; but because he does good in his own unique way, and, both being and becoming very God and good Father in unceasing beneficence, he remains changeless in the identity of his goodness. For what is the use of good which is not active and never does good? [1]

Nor does God do good by necessity, but chooses to benefit those who choose him. [2] His providence is not a menial thing, [3] arranged for our convenience. God is not an obliging underling who endeavours to give satisfactory service. His goodness works from above, not from below. The continuous dispensations of providence are the result of God's pity for our weakness.

The goodness of God is manifest in unceasing love for and vigilance over men, [4] even though they are separate and alienated from him. [5] It is revealed in the Law [6] as well as in philosophy. [7] His unspeakable goodness ever seeks to lead the nature of things on to what is better. [8] 'God's unceasing purpose is to save the flock of men. For this reason the good God sent the good Shepherd.' [9] The God of love finds a greater place in Clement's thought than the abstract One. It is God's one work to do good. [10] This does not mean that his positive theology excludes his negative theology. For Clement, both are important and have their different parts to play.

God's goodness is perfect and complete. He alone is wholly good. No man except the God-man has ever possessed perfection in all things at once. Men are perfect perhaps in piety or in patience or in other things. 'But I do not know of any man who has been perfect in all ways at once, while he was still a man, except him alone who for our sakes clothed himself with humanity.' [11] We must strive, as St Paul says, towards the fullness

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[1]*Strom.* VI, 104, II, 484, 23.
[10]*Strom.* VI, 159; II, 514, 1.
[11]*Strom.* IV, 130; II, 305, 21.
[2]*Strom.* VII, 42; III, 31, 31.
[3] ∈ὐκῶ, *ibid.* III, 32, 8. Cf. also Strom. VII, 3; III4, 15.
[4]*Strom.* II, 43; II, 136, 2.
[5]*Strom.* II, 74; II, 152, 16.
[6]*Strom.* II, 86; v, 158, 11.
[7]*Strom.* VI, 159; II, 514, 6.
[8]*Strom.* VI, 154; II511, 8.
[9]*Prot.* 116; I, 81, 32.

of Christ. (The charismata are various but it is the one Spirit who worketh all in all.) [1]

A similar idea was later expressed by St Thomas. The goodness of God was for St Thomas a unique and simple unity.

NOW creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God: although each imitates the divine goodness according to its mode. For the divine goodness is simple, being as it were all in one…. In yet another way the creature's goodness falls short from God's. For as we have stated, God in his very being has supreme perfection of goodness. Whereas the creature has its perfection not in one thing but in many: because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. [2]

The perfection to which our Lord calls us does not amount to complete similarity to God. We are to be perfect as our Father by forgiving sins and injuries and living in apatheia. A doctor, a philosopher, a gnostic may be called perfect, but none of these, however great, is to be accepted as likeness to God. [3] The teaching of the Stoics that virtue is the same in man and God is emphatically rejected. No one has the power or ability to become perfect as God is. [4] The perfection which God wills for us is obedience to the Gospel and life which is above reproach. [5]

God is uniquely good, but many powers declare his goodness. [6] It is clear that 'the God of all things is one, alone, good, just, creator, Son in Father', [7] yet 'the wisdom of his instruction takes many forms and many are the ways by which he leads men to salvation'. [8] God's pure and perfect goodness expresses itself in many ways to meet the varying needs of men. 'God is good on his own account and just in this respect on our account, and he is just because he is good.' [9] In this way we are to understand the justice, love, and mercy of God. They come from his goodness, and they find their varying forms because of our varying need.

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[1]*Strom.* IV, 132; II, 307, 17.

[2]*Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 22 (English Dominican translation).

[3]*Strom.* VII, 88; III, 63, 9.

[4]*Ibid.* III, 63, 10. Cf. also *Strom.* II, 135; II, 188, 1 and *Strom.* VI, 114; II, 489, 17.

[5]*Strom.* VII, 88; III, 63, 13.

[6]*Paed.* I, 74; I, 133, 6.

[7]*Ibid.* I, 133, 9.

[8]*Ibid.* I, 133, 18. Cf. *Strom.* VI, 106; II, 485, 19.

[9]*Paed.* I, 88; I, 141, 25. 'This respect' refers to the reproof of sins.

Sick, we need a healer, having strayed from the way, we need a guide, blind, we need one who will guide us in the light, and thirsty, we need the spring of life, the taste of which removes all thirst forever. The dead need life, sheep need a shepherd, children need a teacher; but also all humanity needs Jesus. [1]

II. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Clement makes few attempts to prove the existence of providence. His general attitude is that the questioning of providence should be met with punishment, not with an argument. [2] In one place, however, he presents a deductive argument which excludes the other alternative. Either God does care for all men, or God does not care for all men. That God does not care for all men entails that either he is unable or he is unwilling. The first is untrue, for he is omnipotent. The second is untrue, for he is good and he is not lazy. Therefore it is not true that God does not care for all men. Therefore God does care for all men. [3] On the other hand, the Christian does not come to believe in providence merely from an examination of the world. There is no inductive proof. He admires the creation and therefore believes in providence when he hears of it. [4]

Providence means foreknowledge and omniscience as well as the beneficent exercise of power. 'Christ watches our laughter from above.' [5] Again, 'It is, I think, a characteristic of the greatest power to examine thoroughly all the parts, making even the smallest parts its concern.' [6] There is no limit to this providence. All things are for the best. Philosophy must have some purpose in the scheme of the One who knows even the numbers of the hairs of our heads. [7] The wide scope of God's providence is seen particularly in the descent of our Lord to Hades to give those who had died before his appearance on earth the same opportunities as others. [8]

The nature of providence, the problem of evil, the suffering of the innocent, the meaning of human suffering -- these great

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[1] *Paed.* I, 83; I, 139, 2.
[2] *Strom.* V, 6; II, 329, 12.11
[3] *Strom.* VII, 6; III, 6, 19.
[4] *Strom.* VII, 60; III, 43, 30.
[5] *Paed.* I, 22; I, 103, 18.
[6] *Strom.* VII, 9; III, 8, 12.
[7] *Strom.* VI, 153; II, 510, 24
[8] *Strom.* VI, 48; II, 456, 11.

problems had a special urgency in Clement's century. The Stoics and other philosophers had formed their various answers. The gnostics felt they were driven to their heretical position by these problems. [1] The solutions which they gave made it imperative for the Church to work out a true position. Above all, the problem of evil was a practical difficulty for Clement and other Christians of his time. The sufferings of martyrdom were to some an insuperable objection to the love of God. How could it be for the best that the living of the good life should be attended with the evils of persecution? How could evil happen in a world controlled by God's providence? Why did not God do something about it, or if he was doing something about it, what was he doing? These two things, therefore, intensified the problem of evil for Clement -- the tragedy of Christian martyrdom and the challenge of gnostic dualism.

Clement raises the problem in *Stromateis* IV, II. Christians are asked, 'If God cares for you, how can you ever be persecuted and put to death? Does he give you up for this express purpose?' [2] No, says Clement, our Lord does not wish us to suffer in this way, but he did foretell that these things would happen. When we suffer with criminals who have done wrong, their just punishment shows up the injustice of our punishment and makes clear our righteousness. The injustice of the judge who condemns us is no reflection upon God's providence, for the judge must be a free agent and not a mere puppet. [3] In condemning us the judge judges and condemns himself. We are persecuted, not because we have done anything wrong, but because our Christian profession is supposed to be a sin against life. [4]

To the further question, 'Why are you not helped when you are being persecuted?' Clement replies with a question, 'How can Christians be considered to be ill-treated when they are released by death to go to their Lord?' If we had the right attitude

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[1] Cf. Hal Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis*, p. 14: 'Diese drei Punkte, die Verwerfung des Alten Testaments, der Ditheismus und der Gedanke von der Naturverschiedenheit der Menschen, fundamental für jedes gnostisches Denken, bezeichnen in Wirklichkeit die Antwort der Gnostiker auf das Vorsehungsproblem.'

[2] *Strom.* IV, 78; II, 283, 1.

[3] *Strom.* IV, 79; II, 283, 11.

[4] *Ibid.* II, 283, 18.

we should be grateful to our persecutors for the service they render us. If all had known the truth, all would have rushed at the way of Christ and the way of martyrdom and there would have been no chosen few. Our faith reveals and rebukes the unbelief of men. Socrates knew that death could not hurt him, and we also know that the Lord is our helper, that the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God and there no torment shall touch them.

Basilides, Clement continues, [1] could see no solution to the problem of innocent suffering and claimed that no one who suffered could be innocent. The martyr has sinned unconsciously or in another life, or, if he has not sinned, he has the principle of sin within him, or has wished to sin. 'For', says Basilides, 'I will say anything rather than declare Providence to be evil.' But, Clement objects, what kind of providence is operative in a suffering for sin when the suffering depends on the martyr's choice? If a man chooses to deny his faith and to avoid martyrdom, then the working of providence is subverted and his sins go unpunished. Basilides has deified the devil in attributing the latter's work to providence, and he has called the Lord a sinner by asserting that all who suffer as martyrs suffer because of their sins. If martyrdom is punishment for sin then the faith and doctrine for which the martyr dies co-operate in his punishment. Such absurdities abound in Basilides' theory. There is no place in his system for the martyr's faith, his love to God, his steadfast endurance, his right living, or his obedience to the will of God.

1. *First Argument.* Clement states the problem and gives his answer. God did not will that our Lord and the martyrs should suffer. Yet nothing ever happens which is not God's will.

The only possible solution left, expressed concisely, is that such things happen without the prevention of God. Only this preserves the providence and the goodness of God. We must not think that God actively causes our afflictions. That is quite unthinkable; but we should, be of the conviction that he does not prevent those who cause them. [2]

A distinction is here made between what God causes and what happens without God's prevention. It would be inconsistent with God's providence and goodness for him to cause evil. But

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[1]Ch. XII. *Strom*. IV, 81; II, 284, 5
[2]*Strom*. IV, 86; II, 286, 11.

it is not inconsistent with the providence and goodness of God for evil things to happen without his prevention. Good things are caused by God. Evil things happen without his prevention.

The validity of this solution was questioned in Clement's day and Clement was aware of the difficulties. In *Strom.* 1, ch.17 [1] he speaks of that account of philosophy which traced it to the theft of divine truth by some power or angel. This theft took place with the Lord's knowledge and without his prohibition. The thief did not act with the benefit of man in view, but providence turned the theft to good account. [2] Clement argues in Stoic manner [3] against those who claim that 'What does not prevent is a cause.' These people claim that any one who does not guard against and prevent a theft, a fire, or a shipwreck is responsible for these things happening. It is admitted that in some cases an active neglect of precaution is culpable. But if one neglects the distinction between not preventing and causing, one must attribute the inflicting of a wound to the shield which did not protect rather than to the dart which struck the body.

The devil, says Clement, being a free agent, [4] stole the truth that is in philosophy. The Lord saw that the theft would not have harmful results and did not prevent it. What does not prevent is in no sense a cause; but what does prevent is a cause. (The shield can be the cause of the man not being wounded; his daemon was the cause of Socrates' conduct.) 'Therefore what prevents is a cause, while what does not prevent judges the soul's choice justly; so that God is never in any way responsible for the evil in our lives.' [5] The causes of sins are choice and desire. [6] Not that any one voluntarily chooses evil, but pleasure deludes one into thinking that something bad is good and desirable. It is in our own power to avoid ignorance, the choice of what is base and pleasant, and the deceptions of the devil. Despite the activity of the devil, 'God orders all things from above for good.' Nothing can oppose God, nothing can stand against him, for he is the Almighty Lord. The thoughts and deeds of the rebellious are partial and

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[1] *Strom.* I, 81; II, 52, 24.
[2] *Ibid.* II, 53, 12.
[3] SVF, 2, 353
[4] *SVF*, 2, 353. 4ἁ ∈ |∘ς.
[5] *Strom.* I, 84; II, 54, 14. 6δθ∈ὸς... ἀvàíι| . Cf. Plato, Rep. 617E.
[6] *SVF*, 3, 236.

spring from a bad disposition. Though they originate in a diseased condition the universal providence steers them to a healthy conclusion. [1]

In criticism of Clement's view it must be said that there is something weak about the idea of non-prevention. For a good God to permit the sin of man to bring untold suffering upon innocent and guilty alike, and yet to do nothing about it, is at least puzzling. God's non-prevention of evil may not be the cause of evil, but it is God who gave man freedom of will. Clement constantly insists upon the wilful revolt of man as the cause of evil and on God's complete dissociation from any of this causality. The judge before whom the martyrs are brought must be master of his own judgement and not a mere puppet. [2] A modern thinker has said, 'Without freedom to choose the evil, or the lower good, a man might be a well-behaved puppet or a sentient automaton, but not a moral agent. But the best possible world implies the existence of moral agents; its crown cannot be the puppet or the automaton.' [3] Yet even when this point is accepted, God, who gives man free will, may yet appear not wholly free from blame.

Two ideas strengthen Clement's account of non-prevention against this weakness. First, God does all he can to prevent sin by persuasive, non-arbitrary means. 'Everything, then, which did not hinder man's free choice, he made conducive to virtue.' [4] He has made us for righteousness, not for sin. His Son, our Paidagogos, constantly uses every device to turn us from sin, and died on a cross for our salvation. Secondly, after sin has been committed, God is active to modify the effects of man's sin. He uses up evil for good. These two ideas make non-prevention a more adequate theodicy.

2. *Second Argument.* The transformation of evil into good is the second point of Clement's theodicy. God does not prevent his adversaries from doing evil but 'He uses up for good the wrongs which his adversaries have dared against him.' [5] Clement

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[1]*Strom.* I, 86 II, 55719.
[2]Strom. IV, 79; II, 283, 13.
[3]Tennant, *Philosophical Theology* (Cambridge, 1925-30), vol. II p. 188.
[4]*Strom.* VII, 12; III, 9, 22.
[5]*Strom.* IV, 87; II, 286, 16.

quotes Isaiah V. 5: 'I shall destroy the wall and it shall become a trampling-ground.' This verse refers to the vineyard which produced brambles instead of grapes. God did not destroy it but removed the wall which had protected it. Animals were no longer prevented from trampling the vines under foot. Their trampling, though an act of aggression and destruction, was to have beneficial results. The brambles would be destroyed and the vineyard would be cleared of its wrong contents. God uses the crimes of the enemies of his vineyard for the benefit of the vineyard. For providence, as Clement goes on to say, is a form of correction, which benefits those who experience it.

There are other ways in which God turns evil into good. Philosophy is the result of a crime, wisdom was stolen from God; but God turned the theft to good account.

It is the chief work of the divine providence not to allow the evil which results from wilful revolt to remain useless and unprofitable and to become altogether harmful. For it is the function of the divine wisdom and virtue and power not only to do good (for this is the nature of God, so to speak, as that of fire is to heat and that of light is to give light), but also and above all to bring to a good and useful end what has happened through the evils contrived by any, and to use to good account things which appear to be bad, as is the testimony which proceeds from temptation. [1]

This passage shows Stoic tendencies. For the Stoics evil was an essential part of the good cosmos. It was impossible and undesirable to remove it. [2] It was logically necessary for evil to exist if there was to be such a thing as good. Good things which were necessary for the world's completeness caused incidentally the existence of evil things. It was good for there to be a mind in the head, but it was bad that this desirable position was also a dangerous and vulnerable one. When things were taken all together it could be seen that they were good. Everything had a reason and, however evil, it had a useful place in the sum of things. [3] Passages in plays might be unpleasant, but they added

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[1] *Strom.* I, 86; II, 55, 22.
[2] Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 36, p. 1051 A. *SVF*, 2, 1182.
[3] *Ibid.* ch. 35, pp. 1050f. *SVF*,2, 1181.

pleasure to the whole production. [1] The *locus classicus* for this idea is the Hymn of Cleanthes -- 'But thou knowest how to make the odd even and to order the unordered. And what is not friendly is friendly to thee, for thus thou bringest all things into one and good from bad.' [2]

However, Clement's treatment had another emphasis. The emphasis was on God. Evil was not regarded as a necessity in the world. [3] It was the result of man's sin and was something seriously undesirable. It was God's great work to ensure that this evil came to a useful end. His work was not merely a cosmic shuffle of the cards like that which Cleanthes' Zeus performed. Evils did not charm themselves away like pieces of a play. The Stoics had tried to justify evil. Clement was concerned to justify God. When Joseph said to his brothers, 'Ye meant it unto me for evil, but God meant it unto me for good', the brothers knew that this did not make their crime against their young brother an act of grace. The thief who stole the truth that is in philosophy is still a thief despite God's good use of his theft. But God can use up evil for good.

Evils can by the power of God become the medicine of salvation. [4] These remarks show what could be shown at greater length -that the use of evil in a good economy meant more in Clement than in the Stoics. There are several reasons for this. Providence was not for Clement an impersonal necessity but a living, loving God. Clement had a sense of history as something which moved and had purpose, not as something in one sense static and in another sense circular. As a Christian, with the cross of his Lord before him, he was deeply aware both of the reality of evil and the power of God to overcome it.

3. *Third Argument.* The third part of Clement's answer is, 'Providence is a disciplinary art (or form of correction), in the case of other people because of their own sins and in the case of the Lord and the apostles because of ours.' [5] The presence of this

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[1]Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* ch. 14, p. 1065 D. *SVF,ibid.* Cf. F. H. Bradley account of optimism. *'The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil.' Aphorisms*, p. 3.
[2]Cleanthes*apud* Stob. *Eclog.* 1, p. 25, Wachsmuth.
[3]Except elsewhere in the restricted sense which concerns natural processes of physical weakness and death. *Strom.* VII, 61; III, 44, 27.
[4]*Strom.* VII, 61; III, 44, 27.
[5]*Strom.* IV, 87; II, 286, 17.

explanation of providence is at first bewildering. Clement has argued and goes on to argue against Basilides that martyrs (not only the Lord and the apostles) are not punished for their sins by martyrdom. On examination, Clement's view appears both more complicated and more thoughtful than that of his opponents. Martyrdom does not come to men as God's judgement on their sins. It comes because of the sin and injustice of their persecutors. But when it does come, God does not let even martyrdom pass without beneficial results. The martyr is brought by the discipline of suffering to sanctification. We are brought by the Lord's suffering and that of the apostles to sanctification. Clement quotes 1 Thess. iv. 3-8 which begins, 'For this is the will of God, even your sanctification', and then adds, 'For the sake of this your sanctification, the Lord was not prevented from suffering.' [1]

The last Basilidean argument is now destroyed. It might be claimed that the martyr is punished to expiate the sins of a previous existence and will later receive the reward for his conduct in this life. Clement asks, 'Is the punishment the work of providence or not?' If it is not, it cannot bring about expiation. But if it is, then not only expiation but also the actual punishment is the work of providence. The followers of Basilides say that providence is planted in all substances. They must therefore conclude that persecution is not wrong, and that the persecutors of the martyrs are acting rightly; or else they must conclude that persecutions are wrought by the will of God. Such conclusions are absurd.

Clement describes the discipline of God in two later passages. In the first he is again arguing against Basilides. [2] Basilides restricts God's forgiveness to sins which were committed involuntarily and in ignorance, and claims that voluntary sins are punished. This is the kind of forgiveness of which a man is capable, says Clement, but it is not God's forgiveness. Voluntary sins are chastised not to undo the past, as Basilides thinks, but to amend the future. The good God chastises a sinner for three reasons -- for his own improvement, for an example to others, and for the protection of the person who has innocently suffered

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[1]*Strom.* IV, 87; II, 286, 29.
[2]*Strom.* IV, ch. 24; II, 316, 5.

at his hands. In the second passage [1] Clement describes the improvement or cure of the individual sinner as a twofold scheme of education. [2] Sin arises from ignorance and weakness. These are the results of our willing either not to learn or not to control our passions. Consequently there are two forms of correction -- first, knowledge and clear demonstration from the Scriptures, and secondly, the training of faith and the discipline of fear. Clement fervently wishes that the heretics will learn and be turned to God by the notes which he is writing. But, if they will not learn, may God chastise them and bring them to repentance. God's chastisements are like those of a father or a teacher and are not punishments. Punishment is a retaliation for past evil and looks back. Chastisement is a means to good and looks forward. [3]

Clement makes the training of the Paidagogos the subject of his second main work. The end of this training is not theoretical knowledge but right living. The Paidagogos both heals the passions and directs behaviour. [4] Medical metaphors are often used. [5] Reproof is the surgery which cuts away the abscess of passion. [6] There are times when it is necessary to wound the insensitive soul and at the cost of a little pain to save it from eternal death. [7] Another medical metaphor is also used. When we are reproved, our spiritual condition is diagnosed.

For as the mirror is not evil to the ugly man because it shows him what he is like, and as the doctor is not evil to the sick man when he tells him of his fever, for the doctor is not the cause of the fever but is the reproof of the fever, so neither is he who reproves ill-disposed to the man who is sick in soul. [8]

Origen's account of providence and the problem of evil may be compared with that of Clement. In his work *Pronoia und Paideusis* Hal Koch showed that the theme indicated by his title is central to Origen's view of the world. The main points of Origen's theodicy may be briefly stated. Evil arises not from the activity of God, not from the matter of which this world is made, not from the devil, but from man's misuse of his unrestricted free

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[1] *Strom.* VII, 101; III, 71, 23.
[2] *Strom.* VII, 102; III, 72, 3.
[3] *Strom.* VII, 102; III, 72, 20.
[4] *Paed.* I, 1, and *passim.*
[5] *E.g. Paed.* I, ch. 8.
[6] *Paed.* I, 64; I, 128, 6.
[7] *Paed.* I, 74; I, 133, 12.
[8] *Paed.* I, 88; I, 141, 19.

will. Evil is an absence of good and is, strictly speaking, unreal. The essence of sin is pride. Moral evil takes place with the foreknowledge of God, who limits its effects and blends it in his economy. It is a necessary element in the totality of the universe and it is logically necessary for the existence of its oppositegoodness. Evil both tests and punishes the sinner. God also chastises sinners for their own good, purifying and training them for the good life. Finally, physical evil is something indifferent, is the result of the soul's sin in its previous existence, and is used by God to train men in his way. It is an *exercitium virtutis* and points to a more perfect future life. [1]

The similarity of this account with that of Clement is marked. Most interesting, however, are the elements which Origen includes and Clement omits. Clement does not speak of evil as something unreal, nor of the necessity of evil, whether it be metaphysical necessity for the completeness of the universe or logical necessity for the existence of its opposite. He rejects sin in a previous existence as an explanation of suffering in this. God does not send us down from a better state to a worse one. God always brings us to something better. These omissions from Clement suggest that his account is more practical, less speculative, and more consistent.

There is much that is not new in the various elements of Clement's theodicy. Like those of Origen, his main arguments can be traced to Platonic and Stoic sources. What is new is the consistent and essentially Christian system into which they are thought. His use of the Stoic arguments concerning nonprevention is an example of the way in which he weaves standard arguments into his own treatment of a specific problem. Clement's theodicy is written very largely with the problem of martyrdom in mind. For Clement martyrdom was perfection, the triumphal arch through which the Christian went to reign with his Lord, the means whereby, having suffered with him, he should be glorified together with him. [2]

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[1]For the main points of this summary I am indebted to H. Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis*, and especially to his chapter *'Die Theodizee'*.
[2]*Strom*. IV, chs. 4-19.

III. ESCHATOLOGY

God turns evil into good on earth but his task is not completed here. Clement's account of the problem of evil leads to a discussion of his eschatology. His accounts of death, fire, and 'many mansions' will be examined.

(1) Death

There are two kinds of death, [1] spiritual death and physical death. The first kind of death separates the soul from truth, is bad and to be feared. Ignorance of the Father is death. [2] Sin is, according to Scripture, eternal death, the death of the soul. [3] This view may be considered as a kind of conditional immortality. The second kind of death separates the soul from the body [4] and is neither bad nor to be feared. [5] The Lord crucified death into life [6] and martyrs are released by death to go to him. [7] Knowledge anticipates the separation of the soul from the body by a 'rational death' which separates the soul from passions to the service of God. [8] This is similar to the 'practice of death' at which the Platonic philosopher aims. [9]

(2) Fire

Fire is the most severe form of correction to which the sinner can deliver himself. When persuasion, threatening, and chastisement have each in succession been used to turn the sinner from his sin, and have each in succession failed, then 'the fire consumes'. [10] But this fire is not death, for the Lord's discipline is a means of averting death. It is an alternative to death. [11] It is one of the many ways a loving Saviour uses to bring men to salvation. [12] Among the signs which he used in former times were the burning bush and the pillar of fire. The latter was a token of grace and fear.

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[1]*Strom.* II, 34; II, 131, 2.
[10]*Paed.* 1, 61; I, 126, 8.
[11]*Ibid.* I, 126, 13.
[12]Prot. 8; I, 8, 28.
[2]Strom. V63; II368, 31.
[3]Strom. III, 64; II, 225, 18. Cf. 1 *Tim. V*.6.
[4]Strom. VII, 71; III, 51, 18
[5]Strom. II, 34; II, 131, 2.
[6]Prot. 114; I, 80, 26.
[7]Strom. IV, 80; II, 283, 24.
[8] λογ3|κὸς θάνατος *Strom.* VII, 21; III, 51, 18
[9]*Phaedo*, 67D.

It was a light to the obedient and a dreaded fire to the disobedient. An allusion concerning the destruction of Sodom connects the destroying fire with the fire of lust. [1] The torch-fires of the mysteries expose the iniquity of such celebrations and point to the punishment which must follow. [2].

The fire which sinful souls endure is a beneficial one. This is borne out by a Stoic distinction which Clement and others accepted. Fire is of two kinds -- one which gives life like the sun and another which destroys like earthly fire, [3] one intelligent and one mechanical, [4] or, according to Theodotus the gnostic, one intellectual and one sense-perceived. [5] Clement claims that imperfect souls are sanctified by the intelligent non-material fire. 'But we say that the fire sanctifies not flesh, but sinful souls, speaking not of the ordinary fire that mechanically destroys everything it touches, but of intelligent fire that permeates the soul as it passes through fire.' [6]

The function of fire is to purify, to test, and to sanctify. But the notion of a cleansing fire is not carefully defined in Clement. It moves between two poles -- the idea of the fiery end of the world and the idea of moral shame. [7] It is hard to say how far the idea is spiritualised; but it is certain Clement gives us the beginning of the idea of Purgatory. However, the later development of this doctrine is completely foreign to Clement, for whom

Fire does not have for its goal the punishment of a man for his sins -which is what the Purgatory of the Catholic Church stands for, though the very word shows that this idea is wrong. It seeks rather to destroy the foreign and base elements which have taken root in a man's soul, a painful operation which cannot be carried out without causing suffering. [8]

(3) Many Mansions

In heaven there are many mansions of varying degrees of glory. They are arranged in an ascending scale and allotted to the

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[1]*Paed*. II, 89; I, 211, 18.
[2]*Prot*. 22; I, 17, 17.
[3]*Ecl*.26; III, 144, 16.
[4]*Strom*. VII, 34; III, 27, 6.
[5]*Exc*.81; III, 132, 2.
[6]*Strom*. VII, 34; III, 27, 5.
[7]Anrich, *'Clemens und Origenes als BegrU+00Fnder der Lehre vom Fegfeuer'* (*Theologische Abhandlungen. Eine Festgabe... für H. J. Holtzmann*. Tübingen und Leipzig, 1902, pp. 97-120).
[8]*Ibid.* p. 120.

faithful according to their obedience and manner of life. The gnostic who has attained perfection on earth is already equal to an angel. [1] on his death he soars to the holy mansion and joins the apostles. Enrolment in this elect body is not the result of a peculiar natural property, but of loyalty to the Lord's commands and the quality of one's life. These two things make the gnostic a real presbyter or deacon in a way which no human act can achieve. All may enter by faith the ranks of the elect. All believers may become gnostics. There is only one covenant, one universal gift of salvation, one God, one Lord, one faith, and one elect from Jew and Greek alike. The 'elect of the elect', the four and twenty judges, are chosen because of their perfect knowledge. The three grades of bishops, presbyters, and deacons are imitations of the glory and the economy which await those who have lived in perfection of righteousness. [2] In heaven such people advance in glory through intermediate stages to the perfect man. This final perfection is found in God's holy mountain, the Church above, among God's philosophers, the true Israelites who are guileless and pure in heart. This summit is reached through good works in the likeness of God. Here those who have gained the blessedness of the eighth heaven enjoy the pure vision of unceasing contemplation.

other sheep, who are not of this fold, are allotted another fold or mansion, in proportion to their faith, their obedience to the commandments, and their good works. The believer must divest himself of passions in order to reach his appropriate mansion. It is a greater thing to know than to believe and a greater thing to be honoured after salvation than to be merely saved. The believer when freed from passion by much discipline passes to a better mansion, his greatest chastisement being his own repentance for his post-baptismal sins. He is distressed because he has not attained what others have attained and is ashamed of his sins. These great chastisements are explained. 'For the righteousness of God is good and his goodness is just.' The punishments stop when the penalty has been paid and the believer is purified. There

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[1]*Strom.* VI, 105; II, 484, 29. The following treatment is given by Clement in *Strom.* VI, chs. 13 and 14.
[2]Cf. Ignatius, *Eph.* 6 and *Trall.* 3.

remains, however, a very great abiding sorrow to those who are judged worthy only of the other fold because they have not been glorified.

God's justice is also revealed in his treatment of the heathen to whom he gave the heavenly bodies to be worshipped. In their worship of idols they rejected his gifts and were counted as the dust which the wind drives away and as drops from a jar. They are outside salvation and are like lifeless limbs that have been torn from the body to which they belong. The mansions are described again at the end of this chapter as 'varied according to the worth of the believers'. There are inferior places in the Church and there are three elect mansions hinted at by the numbers 30, 60, 100 in the Gospel. The perfect inheritance is for those who have attained to the perfect man, according to the image of Christ. Likeness to God, the adoption and friendship of God, the inheritance of lords and gods -- these things belong to him who is perfect according to the Gospel. [1]

The 'very great abiding sorrow' [2] of those who do not rise from the lower mansions may appear to limit the final triumph of God's goodness. It seems a frustration of the work of the Paedagogus, which will bring all to one fold and one shepherd. [3] But there is no doubt that for Clement the hierarchy will remain. The bringing of all faithful souls to final unity is maintained by a passage in the *Prophetic Eclogues*. [4] The Lord will come and the faithful and righteous will be made one. 'For the body is one; all [believers], being of the same stock and having chosen the same faith and righteousness, will be restored to the same unity.' But, even here, there is still a hierarchy, and a system of promotion in the angelic ranks. Vacancies caused by 'first-created' retiring from providential service to contemplation should be filled from the immediately inferior rank. One member of each rank moves up to the next rank to fill the new vacancy. Each rank knows God in its own special way. After a thousand years of learning perfect men may become angels. These angels, after teaching other men to be

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[1]*Strom.* VI, 114; II, 489, 23, which is the end of *Strom.* VI, ch. 14. Cf. also *Strom.* IV, 36; II, 264, 7 and *Strom.* IV, 114; II298, 18.

[2]μ∈ίσιη πἀρἀ   ἀ   .

[3]*Paed.* I, 53; I, 122, 1.

[4]*Ecl.* 56; III, 153, 4.

angels for a thousand years, may become (it would seem not undeservedly) archangels. [1]

God's justice is good and his goodness is just. This principle is applied to three classes of people. The unbeliever is spiritually dead and remains so. He is like the chaff which the wind blows away, or a piece of metal which does not respond to the pull of the magnet and falls to the ground. [2] He is outside salvation, a limb which cannot live because it is separated from the body of Christ. He is in the same plight as a branch torn from the true. vine. The gnostic who on earth has reached perfection soars straightway to heavenly bliss and climbs God's holy hill. There he joins the apostles in uninterrupted contemplation of God. Lastly the believers who have not gone on to perfection undergo a purifying discipline before they take their place in a lower mansion. They are conscious of a 'great abiding sorrow' because they know that, had they so lived as to deserve it, they would be in a better place. In each of these three classes, whether through the destruction of evil men, the perfection of good men or the just grief of those who were not good enough, the final triumph of God's goodness is complete.

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[1]*Ecl.* 57; III, 154, 8
[2]*Strom.* VII, 9; III, 8, 21.

CHAPTER 7 THE GOODNESS OF THINGS OTHER THAN GOD -- ITS UNITY

GOODNESS, from man's point of view, consists of three parts-a starting point, an end (or goal), [1] and the good life which joins one to the other. The starting point is, for Plato, [2] the daemon or the ruling rational part of each human soul. The starting point is, for Clement, the image of God which every soul receives at birth. The end is, for Plato, the Good. The end is, for Clement, God. The good life is, for Plato, participation in the Good, eudaemonia, or assimilation to God. The good life is, for Clement, assimilation to God and restoration to perfect sonship. These are the three parts of goodness -- the starting point, the end, and the good life. They are grouped by Clement and Plato in a special way. The good life and the end are joined to form a twofold end or hope. One reason for this is that the process of reaching the goal is itself a goal. The way we reach the end is of equal importance with the end. The two cannot be separated. They are together a two-fold end'. [3]

In the second half of the second book of the *Stromateis* Clement gives an account of the philosopher's opinions concerning the end of human living. In chapter 22 [4] he describes the opinions of Plato concerning the end, and shows the similarity between the two-fold end of Plato and the two-fold hope of the Christian. Plato, he says, has spoken of a two-fold end. On the one hand there is the Good which is participated in, is first, and exists in the forms themselves. On the other hand there is the virtue of men who participate in the Good and receive its likeness. All human goodness participates in the one Good. Socrates always taught the identity of the just and the happy man, and

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[1] 썰oó.

[2] 'Plato' in this chapter means Clement's Plato, to whom later doctrines were attributed. The formulation of the 'two-fold end' is not found in any dialogue.

[3] δ| 썰oς.

[4] *Strom.* II, 131; II, 185, 9

cursed the impiety of the man who separated the just from the useful. Plato said that eudaemonia (well-being) was a good condition of the daemon, the daemon being the ruling part of the soul, and eudaemonia being the most perfect and complete good, a life consistent, harmonious, and perfect in virtue. The good life was to be found in knowledge of the Good and in a state of likeness to God -- likeness being justice and holiness with wisdom.

In the same way, says Clement, some of our people speak of man receiving at birth the image of God and afterwards, by a process of perfection, receiving his likeness. [1] Plato describes this likeness in 'the Laws', speaking of the need for humility and of obedience to the law of the omnipresent God. [2] He says that the conduct which will be dear and pleasing to God is that which is like God, for 'like will be dear to like'. Such conduct will be subject to measure, for what is not measured is unlike all else, whether measured or unmeasured. These views, says Clement, Plato got from the Law of Moses, and he acknowledges his debt. In the *Theaetetus* Plato recognises the need for escape from the evils of this mortal sphere, and describes this escape as assimilation to God. To be assimilated to God is to become just and holy with wisdom. [3] Speusippus says that eudaemonia is the perfect state of those who live in accordance with nature or the state of good men. Every man desires this state, but only the good, as the joint result of their several virtues, attain it. Xenocrates says eudaemonia is the possession of true virtue in the soul, the effect of the virtues and the many elements which go to make them up. Polemon says that eudaemonia is a sufficiency of all good things or of the majority of these. He also discredits the separation of virtue from eudaemonia, and claims that virtue is all one needs for eudaemonia.

In these opinions we have depicted a starting point and a twofold end. The starting point of the good life is the daemon, the ruling part of the soul, or the image of God. These things are present in every man. The two-fold end consists of the good life and the perfect Being, and the former participates in the latter.

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[1] ∈   ίω|ς
[2] *Laws* 715 E-716 D.
[3] *Strom.* II, 133; II, 186, 16. *Theaet.* 176A, B.

The good life consists of eudaemonia -- keeping one's daemon in a good condition, or of assimilation -- making one's image of God more like him. It is the most complete and perfect good, the life of virtue with all the virtues as contributing causes and parts. It is assimilation to God, participation in the Good, the life of righteousness.

Clement continues with a Christian account of the end. Whatever the opinions of the philosophers may be, we must reach the 'endless end' by obeying the commandments, which means obeying God. We must live according to the commandments, blamelessly and intelligently, in the knowledge of the will of God. 'The end is assimilation to the true Logos as far as is possible, and restoration to perfect sonship through the Son.' [1] St Paul tells us that having been freed from sin and made slaves to God, we have fruit to sanctification, and the end is everlasting life. Hope is twofold, what we expect and what we have, the object of hope and our state of hoping. Our hope is not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost. The present possession is one part of the two-fold hope. The other part of the twofold hope is God himself. The present possession is the good life and is a participation in the ultimate hope. God's love is already in our hearts. Because of this love we reach the restoration and the rest which is laid up for us. [2] A passage from Ezekiel [3] concerning the death of the soul that sins and the righteousness of the righteous man speaks further of the connection between what is and what will be. 'He is righteous. He shall surely live, saith the Lord God.' The passage from Isaiah, [4] which tells us to seek the Lord while he may be found, reminds us of the disparity between what is and what will be. His thoughts are not our thoughts, nor his ways our ways. 'God's virtue and man's are not the same.' So, we must seek him, forsake our wicked ways and return to the Lord, to his mercy and his pardon. The noble apostle tells those who have received the hope of righteousness from faith that in Christ only one thing counts -- 'faith made

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[1] *Strom.* II, 134; II, 187, 7. There is a pun on ὀρθὸς λόγος, a Stoic term for 'right reason', which is used here for 'the true Logos'.

[2] ἀποκατάστ|ς ἀκάπανσ|ς.

[3] *Ezek.* xviii. 4-9.

[4] *Isa.* Iv. 6-9.

active by love'. [1] We are urged in the Epistle to the Hebrews [2] to have zeal 'to bring hope to its perfection, even to final perfection', and to be imitators of those who through faith and patience inherit the promises. Abraham, to whom God's self-sworn promise was made, endured patiently and obtained the promise. There is great encouragement for us to lay hold of the hope set before us. This hope is an anchor to our souls, sure and steadfast. It enters within the veil where Jesus our forerunner, a high priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek, entered for us. The allvirtuous Wisdom [3] says, 'He who hears me shall rest, having trusted in hope.' The same word 'hope' is used ambiguously for the good life and its fulfilment in God. The faithful man receives 'the hope which he has hoped'. Again St Paul says quite openly, 'Be imitators of me as I am of Christ.' [4] Through imitating him we are to be imitators of Christ, and through imitating Christ to be imitators of God. The words of Plato are put into the mouth of St Paul, who fixes as the goal of faith 'assimilation to God, as far as is possible becoming just and holy with understanding', the end being the fulfilment of the promise through faith. This is where all the philosopher's ideas of the end find their source.

Assimilation to God was a constantly recurring theme in later classical philosophy. Pythagoras is said to have uttered the words 'Follow God', and Plato to have described an assimilation which was 'physical, ethical, and rational', adding the idea of 'following God'. [5] The famous *Theaetetus* passage, 176B, was frequently cited. The references to this idea in the *Laws, Republic,* and *Timaeus* added the ideas of friendship and following after God, of the philosopher who is 'ordered' [6] through association with a God who is 'ordered', and of harmony and constancy. [7] The Stoics originally made no use of the idea, but it appeared in middle

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[1]Gal. v. 5f.
[2]Heb. vi. 11-20.
[3]Prov. i. 33.
[4]I Cor. xi. 1.
[5] Arius Didymus*apud* Stob. *Ecl.*11, 49, 8 cited Merki, 'oMoIωΣ|Σ θE✝ *von der Platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit*, pp. 1, 2. The next two paragraphs are drawn very largely from Merki.
[6]κόσμ|ος.
[7]*Laws* IV, 716 A-D, *Rep*. VI, 500C, *Tim*. 90D. *Merki*, pp. 5-7.

and later Stoicism. Posidonius is credited with the bringing together of knowledge, assimilation to God, piety and happiness. [1] It was to recur in Plotinus with the notions of the deification of man, [2] and the vision of God in purity and beauty. [3] Philo links the *Theaetetus* passage with obedience to the Law and with Stoic Ὅσ⸾ιγόδ∈|ἁ and ἀυτἁρκ∈ἁ. [4] Man lost his 'aloneness' when woman was created. [5] The wise man strives to regain this quality and in regaining it to become like God. [6] This he does by acting as God acts, doing good and not evil.

The cognate idea of man as the image of God springs indirectly and not directly from Plato. The sun is described as an image of the Good in the *Republic*. The visible world is described as an image of the invisible world in the *Timaeus*. The Stoic idea of man as a microcosm led to the application of this second idea to men. Cicero speaks of the self-knowledge of the divine *similacrum* within man, [7] and Diogenes and Musonius join him in connecting this with virtue. In Plotinus and Neoplatonism the 'image' idea is so spiritualised as to lose all similarity with Plato's original thought. The Bible contributes an essential element to the idea in the account of creation in Genesis. 'And God said, Let us make man according to our image and likeness.... And God made man. According to the image of God he made him.' [8] This description left Philo and the Fathers free to specify the quality which constituted the image and to interpret the image of God as an intermediary pattern, with man as 'the image of the image'. The latter interpretation is found in Philo [9] and Clement. For Philo the quality of the image in man is non-material and concerned with spirit, mind, and intellect. It is an impression and a fragment of the divine image.

Clement says, 'Is it not in this way that some of our people have understood men to have received what is according to the image immediately at their birth, but to obtain what is according

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[1] Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum* 11, 153. Merki, p. 8. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, pp. 106-7.

[2] *Enn.* 11, 6, 2 f. Merki, p. 20.

[3] *Enn.* 1, 6, 7. Merki, p. 24.

[4] *In Virt.* 8. Merki, p. 38.

[5] *De Opif.* 151. *Merki*, p. 40.

[6] *Abr.* 87. Merki, *ibid.*

[7] *De Legibus* 1, 59. Merki, p. 67.

[8] *Gen.* 1, 26, 27.

[9] Heres. 231. Merki, p. 79. *In Virt.* 205. Merki, p. 81.

to the likeness afterwards by a process of perfection?' [1] Irenaeus said that Adam was made in the image and likeness of God. Through his sin he lost for all mankind the likeness of God. The Logos took the nature of man to restore this likeness. Men may, through assimilation to him, become not only in the image, but also in the likeness of God. Men have by nature the image of God in their reason and freewill. But the likeness they can only receive through perfection. [2] Origen's position was slightly different. He interpreted the Genesis account literally. We are told that God said, 'Let us make man in our image and likeness', but we are not told that he did this. We are told that he made man 'in the image' and the omission of 'in the likeness' is significant. [3] The likeness was reserved to be the goal of the process of spiritual perfection. This seems to be Clement's view.

Our Paedagogus, says Clement, having spoken through the Law and the Prophets sketched the outline of true living and educated man in Christ. This was part of a general plan. He formed man out of dust, regenerated him with water, made him grow with the spirit, trained him with the Word, and directs him to sonship and salvation by holy commandments. The purpose behind all this work is that, by his advent, the Logos might. mould the earth-born man into a holy and heavenly man and so fulfil the divine words, 'Let us make man in our own image and likeness.' These words have been fulfilled in Christ alone. The rest of humanity has been only in the image and not in the likeness of God. [4] But we may fulfil our Father's will, have our image of God stamped with the impression of the saving life of our Saviour, and consider the heavenly way of life in accordance with which we are made divine. We have a clear pattern of immortality in the behaviour of our Saviour as we seek to follow in the footsteps of God. Through virtue we are assimilated to God. Let us not give up the struggle, for the prize far exceeds our hopes and our imagination. [5]

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[1]*Strom*. II, 131; II, 185, 25
[2]*Merki*, p. 45.
[3]*De Princ*. III, 6, 1: 'de similitudine siluit.' *Merki*, p. 61.
[4]*Paed*. I, 98; I, 148, 21.
[5]' *Paed*. I, 99; I, 149, 21.

Clement speaks similarly at the end of the *Protrepticus.* Men have reason and in this they are superior to animals; but this is not enough. 'Do not be superior to irrational animals by your reason alone, for to you of all mortal beings I grant the enjoyment of immortality.' [1] Men are made in the image of God but the image needs to be made like the archetype. The exhortation continues, O you who have from of old been images, but not completely like your model, I wish to correct your likenesses of the archetype, so that you may become like me.' [2] Again, the closing prayer of the *Paedagogus* prays for the grace 'to bring to perfection the likeness of the image'. [3]

The image in man is the ruling part of the soul. Plato is said to have called this the daemon and to have placed the highest good in a good condition of the daemon (eudaemonia) and in assimilation to God. The parallel Clement sees is between daemon and image on the one hand and eudaemonia and likeness on the other (the latter term being used both by Plato and 'our people'). This is amplified elsewhere. At creation God breathed into man's face a rational soul. The image of God is the divine and kingly Logos and the image of the image is the human mind. [4] Clement follows Philo in placing an archetypal image between man and God as well as in making man's image rational. The third divine image is manifest in the true gnostic in whom the Saviour dwells. The Logos, who is the stamp of the Father's glory, impresses the gnostic with the seal of perfect contemplation 'according to the image of himself, so that there is now the third divine image made as like as possible to the second cause'. [5]

The distinction between image and likeness entered into the gnostic controversy. The Valentinian Demiurge, who is made in the image of God, makes the visible world in his own image. The Demiurge is 'in the image', but the followers of Valentinus, 'the different race' who are the result of the breathing into the soul of the 'different spirit', are in both the image and the likeness of God. [6] It is an important part of Clement's teaching that all

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[1] *Prot*. 120; I, 84, 35.
[2] *Prot*. 120; I, 85, 8.
[3] *Paed*. III, 101; I, 291, 2.
[4] *Strom*. V, 94; II, 388, 10.
[5] *Strom*. VII, 16; III, 12, 22. Cf. Philo, *Heres*. 231, cited above.
[6] *Strom*. IV, 90; II, 288, 7.

men are made in the image of God and that they all may, if they choose, become like him.

Not all men do, however, become assimilated to God. Some are assimilated to the devil who 'accompanies us through men who emulate his works in this earthly life'. [1] Those who choose salvation may be divided by the manner of their choice into those 'according to the image' and those 'according to the likeness'. This differs completely from the Valentinian division in being a result of choice, not of natural endowment. There are those who choose salvation through fear of punishment or hope of promised benefit and those who choose for the sake of the good itself. [2] The former are the 'hirelings' on the left of the sanctuary. The others are on the right. Those on the left live according to the likeness of those on the right. Those on the right live according to the likeness of the Saviour. The former choose by imitation and the latter by knowledge. They differ as what is set on fire and illuminated differs from fire and light, as the image which is a separate thing differs from the Israel which is the light of the likeness.

This particular view is not fundamental to Clement's thought. His basic tendency is to avoid a division between image and likeness. There is the archetype, the image, and the thing that joins them together -- the likeness. [3] Men are images who need to be put right in correspondence with the archetype. Their moral and spiritual life is a striving to perfect the likeness of the image. [4]

The Law tells its to follow the Lord our God and keep his commandments, For the Law calls likeness "following". Such following assimilates as much as possible.' [5] Our Lord tells us to be compassionate and merciful, as our Father in heaven is merciful. 'Hence also the Stoics define the end as τὸ ἀκολ̈ ἥ ∈| Ǝ , changing inappropriately the name of "God" to "nature".' [6]

This equation of 'following' with 'assimilation' [7] makes it possible

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[1] *Strom.* IV, 95; II, 290, 11.
[2] *Strom.* IV, :29; II, 261, 10.
[3] *Frag.* 33, 111, 218, 3. Cf. also the closing passages of the Protrepticus and the Paedagogus, quoted above.
[4] Sometimes Clement uses 'image' to mean images that are like, e.g. *Strom.* VII, 16; III, 12, 22.
[5] *Strom.* II, 100; II, 168, 6.
[6] *Strom.* II, 101; II, 168, 9, adopting Stählin's emendation, ἄσρ∈σώς.
[7] ἀκολ̈ουθία... δμοίωσ|ς.

for Clement to find a strong Scriptural basis in both Old and New Testaments for his doctrine of assimilation, as well as to link this doctrine with that of the Stoics. [1]

Clement uses the words of Plato to express the central thought of assimilation. The words of Theaetetus 176B [2] recur at least twenty-two times in his writings. They constitute the only ethical element which Clement considered essential to philosophy. [3] Assimilation concerns a disposition of mind which does not change. [4] By assimilation a man becomes spiritual and thereby elect, [5] and ultimately perfect and angelic, [6] finding love and true life. [7] When Plato defined the end in the Theaetetus, he somehow hit on the decree of the Law. [8] This may have been the result of his own great insight, or else he may have learnt it from some oracles in his unceasing thirst for knowledge.

ομοίωσ| ίωσ|ς, ἀκο⁜ουθία, οἰκ∈ίωσ|ς describe a life of increasing likeness, obedience, and proximity to God, a life which possesses certain moral and spiritual qualities -- justice, holiness, wisdom, [9] kindness, love of man, and a grand service of God. [10] The virtues which contribute to the likeness are elsewhere listed as continence, patience, righteousness, control of passions, liberality, and beneficence. [11] Great importance is given to passionlessness, for God is passionless. [12] Purity and holiness lead to the holy vision of God. We must remove all passions, [13] yet, in our assimilation to intellectual things, still maintain wonder and reverence for creation and Creator. [14] Forgiveness seventy times seven and forgetfulness of evil make us like the God who makes his sun shine on the just and the unjust. [15] Simplicity of life which has few needs makes us like the God who needs nothing. [16] Love which is linked with passionlessness brings us to perfect manhood. [17]

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[1]Strom. V, 94; II, 388, 16. Cf. Philo, *De Migr. Abr.*127f.

[10]*Strom.* VII, 13; III, 10, 26.

[11]*Strom.* II, 97; II, *166, 1*.

[12]*Strom.* IV, 147; II, 313, 14: ἄοἀ   .

[13]*Strom.* VII, 86; III, 61, 32.

[14]*Strom.* IV, 148; II, 313, 25.

[15]*Strom.* VII, 85; III, 60, 34.

[16]*Paed.* III, 1; I, 235, 21.

[17]*Strom.* VII, 84; III, 60, 5.

[2] φυῆ̆   ὁμοίωσις ιω θ∈ω κἀτὰ τὸ δυνἀτόν δμοίν κἀὶ ὅσ|ν μ∈   ∈ως γ∈   ἀ|. The passage does not recur in its entirety so many times.

[3]*Strom.* I, 52; II, 34, 12.

[4]*Strom.* IV, 139; II, 310, 7-9.

[5]*Strom.* IV, 168; II, 323, 7-9

[6]*Strom.* VII, 84; III, 60, 7.

[7]QDS, 7; III, 164, 21.

[8]*Strom.* II, 100; II, 167, 24.

[9]*Strom.* II, 136; II, 188, 20.

The process of assimilation, while an end in itself, was yet to reach an ultimate end, the perfection of the likeness. The end or hope was two-fold -- something received and something expected. [1] The end of assimilation to the true Logos, or restoration to perfect sonship, was a state of complete unity with God. It was a state of rest, of immortality, of God. The Logos of God became man that man might learn to become God. [2] So in Strom. IV, ch. 23, we read of the union of the gnostic with his Lord, his drawing near, his complete rest, peace, and trust in God. 'In this way it is possible for the gnostic even now to become God. "I said, Ye are gods and sons of the most High." ' [3] Man is made a spiritual being in physical form. What he becomes depends on his choice. He should become passionless and one, like the one high priest and the God who is one. When he puts aside all passions, he becomes divine and one. Just as sailors who pull at an anchor pull themselves to the anchor and not the anchor to themselves, so those who in the gnostic life draw God to themselves unconsciously draw themselves to God. To honour God is to honour oneself. The contemplative man, who, as he worships God, looks to himself and becomes completely pure, enjoys a holy vision of the holy God. Here the emphasis is on the gnostic's personal holiness and spiritual fellowship with God. He is joined to God as a spiritual being.

The link between man and God is also rational and aesthetic. [4] It is most important to know one's self. For knowing one's self one knows God, and knowing God one is assimilated to him (not by wearing fine clothes but by doing good works and needing very little). The ruling part of man's soul, the intellectual, rational element, is divine. The man with whom the Logos dwells does not beautify himself because he has the form of the Logos, is assimilated to God, and is beautiful. He is true beauty because he is God. He becomes God because he wills what God wills. Heraclitus was right when he said, 'Men are gods and gods

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[1] *Strom*. II, ch. 22.

[2] *Prot*. 8; I, 9, 9. For a discussion of this idea see articles by Butterworth and Lattey in JTS, 1916. The former attributes it to Greek, the latter to Christian, sources.

[3] *Strom*. IV, 149; II, 314, 23 including Psalm lxxxii. 6.

[4] *Paed*. III, 1; I, 235, 20.

are men, for they have the same Logos.' [1] This is a mystery -- God in man and man in God. The mediator is the Logos who is common to both -- God's son and servant, our Saviour and Paedagogus. Clement exploits the ambiguity of 'logos' (the Son or reason) because he wishes to point out the connection between the two meanings.

For Clement assimilation to God is not merely a process of ethical achievement. It is something which God does in us. This is clear from *Strom.* II, ch. 22. The two-fold hope consists of what we have received and what we hope for. Our hope is not ashamed because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost who is given to us. It is through this love that we reach our rest and receive the fulfilment of our hope. Love is given a leading place in Clement's ethics. [2] It finds expression in the various virtues, but remains undivided in itself. In this way Clement gives a Christian account of ἀγάπη. Meifort is right in showing how different Clement's view is from that of Plato. [3] Völker is similarly justified in finding the roots of Clement's ethics in the New Testament, even if he does unnecessarily belittle the influence of philosophy upon their formulation. [4] Clement's distinctive and essential message is that of the Christian Gospel. We do not merely strive towards the Good. We hope in God because God has come down to us in his Son and has entered into our lives. Christ is in us the hope of glory. [5]

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[1] Cf. Heraclitus, frag. 67, Bywater. 'Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals', and frag. 92 '... the Logos is common.'

[2] A fuller treatment of ὁμοίωσⲓς will be given in Part III.

[3] Meifort has a section on this subject in *Der Platonismus bei Clemens. Alexandrinus*.

[4] Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus*, p. 505.

[5] Col. i. 27.

CHAPTER 8
THE GOODNESS OF THINGS OTHER THAN GOD -- ITS DIVERSITY

'BUT there are countless other injunctions which have been found for the gaining of good things and the avoiding of evil things, for there is no peace for the wicked, says the Lord.' [1] In contradiction to his original statement that God alone is good, Clement has spoken of a second goodness which belongs to things other than God. This goodness is one thing -- assimilation to God -- but it expresses itself in many ways. It is a multiple and varied kind of goodness, in contrast to the pure unity of God's goodness. There is evidence on every side of the diversity of this kind of goodness. God does not let us rest in a state of wickedness. He constantly reminds us, through his Son, of the right way of life.

The *Paedagogus* is concerned with practical moral instruction to newly converted Christians. Book 11 tells them, among other things, how to eat and drink and how to behave at banquets, how to laugh and how to sleep, and what sort of clothes, shoes and jewels to wear. Clement denounces gluttony because it mistakes the purpose of eating as pleasure instead of life. Simplicity in food is most suitable. 'We must spurn the different varieties which do us different kinds of harm -- bodily illnesses and stomach disorders -- the sense of taste being perverted by a wretched art, the art of cookery and the futile art of baking cakes.' [2] Gluttons scour the world to find delicacies and cling to matter as fire clings to wood. [3] Clement recommends 'sufficiency, which is set over food measured in just quantity, which nourishes the body in health and gives of its own to its neighbours'. [4] Moderation in drinking is also advocated and the symptoms resulting from neglect of this precept are faithfully described. [5]

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[1]*Paed.* I, 94; 1, 146, 7.
[2]*Paed.* II, 2; 1, 154, 21.
[3]*Paed.* II, 3; 1, 155, 21.
[4]*Paed.* II, 7; 1, 158, 8.
[5]*Paed.* II, 24; 1, 170, 16.

Luxury in any of its forms is not advised. It draws the attention of the soul away from the things which are its own and it clouds the eye of the soul.

But the belching of those who are submerged in wine, and the retching of those who are clogged with food, the snorting of those who are rolled-in bedclothes, and the rumbling of aching bellies, close in upon the soul's clear-sighted eye, filling the thinking faculty with innumerable phantasies. [1]

Book III deals with true beauty and speaks against the beautifying of the body, especially in the case of men. Hairs must not be plucked out, because such a practice would upset the arithmetic of the God who has counted them. The Christian has true beauty and true riches. He is told how and why to have a bath and to take exercise. He and she are told the Christian attitude to a vast number of things like clothes, rings, hair, cosmetics, walking, games, conduct inside and outside church, kissing and the control of the eyes. Luxury is further disparaged as making a practice of falsehood, having no limit, throwing things out of place and being unnatural. Behaviour is to be moderate and sincere, concerned with true spiritual riches.

Having seen the variety of situations to which Clement applies ethical values, it remains to treat, in some system, of the nature of these values. Their diversity and multiplicity presents a serious problem. Different people have pronounced Clement's ethics to be Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic. There is evidence for each of these views, which means that there is also evidence against each of them. This chapter will treat separately of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic values which Clement recommends, showing the connections within the three groups but not attempting to relate the three with one another. The emphasis is on the diversity of this kind of goodness. In no case does the account given of these three systems of ethics claim to be exhaustive or balanced. Anything but a fragmentary treatment is outside the scope of this work. It must also be remembered that these systems had been blended together in different ways before Clement got hold of them. The Stoics managed to say most of the

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[1]*Paed.* II, 81; 1, 206, 29.

things which other people had said before them. Clement, however, is not merely a syncretist. He reinterprets the ideas which he takes over and gives them a Christian meaning.

Plato

Besides determining the framework of Clement's ethics, Plato influences his thought through many subsidiary ideas -- knowledge and virtue, the importance of training and education, the disinterested pursuit of good, the 'tending of the soul' and harmony.

The importance of self-knowledge is emphasised by Clement. 'Therefore it is, as it seems, the greatest lesson of all to know one's self. For if one knows one's self, one will know God. And knowing God, one will become like God.'[1] The beginning of Socratic ethics lay in self-knowledge and the realisation of one's own ignorance. This is the point in the earlier and middle dialogues behind the frequent refutation of those who claim knowledge. 'The knowledge of one's ignorance', says Clement, 'is the first lesson for those who wish to live rationally.'[2] The man who knows his ignorance seeks, finds, believes, hopes and finally loves. 'Follow God, says Clement, 'stripped of false pretence, stripped of the glory which must pass away.'[3] Self-knowledge both humbles and exalts us.[4] It reminds us that we are human, mortal, and that neither wealth nor fame makes us of any account. It reminds us too that God made us for himself, and in his image. The knowledge of the man who knows the Good was described by Plato as Θεωπία, νόησις,[5] and also ἐποπτεία, a term which belonged to the mystery religions. Clement uses these terms to describe the gnost   ος in the *Theaetetus* who, by his vision of divine things, himself becomes divine.

The Platonic identification of virtue with knowledge is explicit in 'reckoning as bad nothing else besides ignorance and action

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[1]*Paed.* III, 1; I, 235, 20.
[2]*Strom.* V, 17; II, 336, 25.
[3]*Paed.* II, 36; I, 178, 23.
[4]*Strom.* V, 23; II, 340, 15 and *Strom.* VII, 20; III, 15, 8.
[5]Cf. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus*, pp. 403, 404.

contrary to right reason',[1] and implicit in the comparison between virtue and the arts. 'For men become honourable and good not by nature but by learning, as they become doctors and pilots.'[2] A defence is here being made of intellectual study. The need for knowledge in addition to faith is asserted. Nothing worth while is gained without hard work. Virtue is no exception to this rule. Unless we are prepared to work as hard in acquiring knowledge of divine and human things as physicians and pilots work in acquiring the knowledge of their art, we cannot hope to be good at the art of living. Our virtue is the result of training. Just as Plato elaborates an extensive and significant system of education for those who are to become wise and virtuous, so Clement insists on a scheme of education for the gnostic. Clement's idea of philosophy as 'knowledge of the Good and of Truth'[3] is also determined by this Platonic theme. Plato describes philosophy as knowledge of the Good[4] and philosophers (as Clement quotes him) as those who love to look on truth.[5] But Clement's teaching on virtue is not purely Platonic and he did not wholly accept the identification of virtue and knowledge. This is seen where he contradicts, for the rational powers are by nature the servants of the will';[6] and where he compromises, in accordance with Aristotle, 'for there are just two beginnings for all sin -- ignorance and weakness'.[7]

That part of man which knows is that which is of supreme importance for ethics. The soul is the knowing, deathless, unchanging, and divine part of man. The chief business of man is laid down in the *Phaedo* as the tendance of the soul.[8] With this goes the notion of the practice of death. 'Those who pursue philosophy rightly study to die.'[9] So Clement mentions 'the discipline of the soul and training in the power to follow what has been judged to be right'.[10] The gnostic is 'a stranger and sojourner

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[1] *Strom.* VI, 113; II, 488, 26.

[10] *Strom.* VII, 98; III, 69, 29. Quoted as Stoic, *SVF*, 3, 490.

[2] *Strom.* I, 34; II, 22, 20. This is quoted as Stoic, *SVF*, 3, 225.

[3] *Strom.* I, 93; II, 60, 7.

[4] *Rep.* VII, 534B, C.

[5] *Rep.* V, 475 E; quoted *Strom.* I, 93; II, 60, 4.

[6] *Strom.* II, 77; II, 153, 21.

[7] *Strom.* VII, 101; 111, 71, 24f. Cf. *Strom.* VII, 16; III, 12, 7f. Cf. Plato, *Laws* IX, 863 C, cited Völker, *op. cit.* p. 128.

[8] *Phaedo* 64.

[9] *Phaedo* 67.

in the whole of life', [1] who despises pleasures and pains alike, [2] having set his hopes on the future, and has anticipated the separation of soul from body by a rational death. The soul is cleansed, by study, from the objects of sense, and kindled so that it may see the truth. [3]

His future hopes are not the motive for his right living. His only motive is disinterested love. [4] As Clement says elsewhere,

This then is the first good activity of the perfect man when it is done not because of any usefulness in his own affairs, but because he considers it right to do good. His activity being borne along with enthusiasm becomes good in every act, not being good in these matters and bad in those. But it is settled in a disposition towards good conduct, not for the sake of glory, nor as the philosophers say for good report, not for the sake of reward whether from men or from God, but to bring one's life in accordance with the image and likeness of the Lord. [5]

This disinterested goodness was the ideal sought by Glaucon and arrived at by Socrates in the *Republic*. There justice is among the class of things good for their own sake and also independently good for their consequences. Clement adds to pure disinterest the separate consideration, 'So that if a man loves himself he loves the Lord and confesses to salvation in order that he may save his soul.' [6]

Goodness was a harmony for Plato and Clement as it had been for Pythagoras and Heraclitus. The supreme God had a divine harmony [7] which men should keep in time with. The souls of men should be harmonised. 'But as rational creatures we are to tune ourselves temperately, harmoniously relaxing the sternness and high tension of our serious pursuits, not discordantly breaking them up.' [8] There are three parts in the soul and they must be made harmonious. This is for Plato and for Clement justice or the good life. For Plato and for Clement the agreement of works and reason was essential to virtue. [9] The harmony of the body helps

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[1] *Strom.* VII, 77; III, 55, 4.
[2] *Strom.* VII, 63; III, 45, 28.
[3] *Strom.* I, 33; II, 22, 5. Plato, *Rep.* 527D, E. Clement uses the words of Plato.
[4] *Strom.* VII, 67; III, 48, 9.
[5] *Strom.* IV, 137; II, 308, 33.
[6] *Strom.* IV, 42; II, 267, 13.
[7] *Prot.* 88; I, 65, 31.
[8] *Paed.* II, 46; I, 185, 25.
[9] *Strom.* II, 4; II, 114, 28.

the mind, says Clement, in argument against the gnostics. He quotes *Republic* III to the effect that the care of the body is necessary for the harmony of the soul. [1]

Aristotle

The ideas of end, purpose, function, measure, mean and right reason are predominant in the ethics of Aristotle and appear frequently in Clement's writing. At the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle discusses the ends of different arts. Of all the ends that exist there must be one end which is desired for itself, otherwise there would be an infinite regress. This is the Chief Good, or the best thing of all. As each art has its end and each man his function, so there is an all-inclusive end to the science of 'politics', and a function of man as man or 'the Good' of man. This end is ευδαιμονία [2] which is described, an active life in accordance with virtue, or, if there are more forms of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and completest virtue in a complete life'. [3] This consists of two kinds -- intellectual and moral. [4] It is necessary both to understand what is right and to be able to do it. For 'that state is virtue, which not merely is in accordance with but which implies the possession of right reason'. [5]

Many of the arguments in the *Paedagogus* are based on the notion of virtue, function, or excellence. Clement speaks of the use of shoes being partly for covering, partly for something else. [6] He shows how the peculiar excellence of each species is indicated by physical propensities and characteristics. [7] He states explicitly the true excellence of man.

For if the proper nature of each thing has its one function, ox and house and dog alike, what are we to say is the proper work of man? He is like, I think, a centaur, the Thessalian figment, fitted together out of rational and irrational, out of soul and body. On the one hand the body works the earth and hastens earthwards, while on the other the soul speeds upwards to God. [8]

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[1]*Strom.* IV, 17; II, 256, 19.
[2]*Eth. Nic.* 1097b.
[3]*Ibid.* 1098a.
[4]*Ibid.* 1103a.
[5]*Ibid.* 1144b: ο+πΘὸς λόγος.
[6]*Paed.* II, 116; I, 226, 28: ε+   σις τῶ   . Cf. αι+   . *Politics* II, 7, 15.
[7]*Paed.* III, 18; I, 247, 4.
[8]*Strom.* IV, 9; II, 252, 10.

For Aristotle, virtue is 'a state of deliberate moral purpose, consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason or as a prudent man would determine it'. [1] The right mean sets a limit on human conduct and is the guide to human action. A similar idea is found in Plato (e.g. in the *Philebus*), but it is more explicit and emphatic in Aristotle. The path of the mean gives to the soul a health similar to that of the body, a balance and equilibrium of parts.

All this is found in Clement. 'The mean must always be our aim.' [2] We should not work too hard, nor should we be lazy. We should not live in luxury, nor be over-thrifty; but we should follow the mean between these. The description of the gnostic or perfect man is a development from the notion of virtue, function, purpose, to that of completeness, that which fulfils a function perfectly, 'the best and completest virtue in a complete life'. Such virtue is complete, balanced, perfect. There is nothing to be added to it. 'Herein I find perfection is understood in many ways in the case of him who excels in every virtue. Wherefore a man is made perfect as pious, as submissive, as self-disciplined, as industrious, as a martyr, and as a gnostic.' [3] The two elements implied in 'right reason' are also found in Clement. Goodness is the result both of rational knowledge and moral rectitude. Right action is in accordance with right reason and sin is contrary to reason. [4] The distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is dealt with by Aristotle in Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. 'Involuntary actions, then, are thought to be of two kinds, being done either on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance.' [5] The importance of the distinction arises especially in the lawcourts, in estimating the guilt of someone who has committed a breach of law. Similarly Clement says, 'What is involuntary is not judged. This is two-fold -- that which happens through ignorance and that which happens through necessity.' [6] The attribution of sin to ignorance of a different, more general kind was an

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[1] *Eth. Nic.* 1107a.
[2] *Paed.* III, 51; I, 266, 6.
[3] *Strom.* IV, 130; II, 305, 18.
[4] *Paed.* I, 101; I, 150, 21. Clement's language is Stoic. Cf. *SVF*, III, 500.
[5] *Eth. Nic.* 1110a.
[6] *Strom.* II, 60; II, 145, 10.

Aristotelian as well as a Platonic and Stoic tenet. [1] Aristotelian language is used to describe the free choice which is the basis of faith, [2] and also the virtue of continence. [3]

The Stoics

The spirit and phraseology of Stoic ethics are generally evident in Clement's writings. His subordinate ethical ideas come largely from this source. They were very widely accepted in the Roman Empire at that time and were strengthened by their absorption of Platonic and Aristotelian elements. It was because Stoicism had this supremacy and had produced many noble characters that Christians such as Clement followed its terminology in expressing their ideas. Moreover, Stoicism was down to earth in a literal and metaphorical sense. It was intelligible to ordinary people in a way which Plato and Aristotle were not. The writings of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius gave it a greater propaganda effect than any other system of philosophy. Above all, its dogmatism, its connection with a metaphysical background, and its prophetic spirit brought Stoicism nearer to the outlook of Christians such as Clement.

The metaphysical background affords the best starting point. Stoics believed without reserve in providence. Everything that happened was determined by God in his divine plan. 'Nothing at all takes place on earth apart from thee, O God.' [4] Clement also believed that everything was ordered by God. This belief in providence could be regarded as the destruction of morals. If God governs all things, we have no real power of choice. If there exists no power of choice, how can the distinction between right and wrong, good and bad, convey anything? If God makes all things good in the end, how can it matter whether we act rightly or wrongly? Neither Stoic nor Christian reasoned in this way. They said that while your action did not affect the ultimate fulfil-

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[1] *Eth. Nic.* 1135b; Völker, p. 128.

[2] *Strom.* II, 9; II, 117, 15. Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1139b: ε+ προαίπεσις α+   *Eth. Nic.* προαίπεσις, cited Völker, *op. cit.* p. 239, and Stählin, translation III, p. 156.

[3] *Strom.* III, 4; II, 197, 4. *Eth. Nic.* 1146b. Völker, *op. cit.* p. 292.

[4] Cleanthes *apud* Stobaeum, Eclogae, I, p. 25, Wachsmuth.

merit of God's purpose, it affected you. It made all the difference to your happiness whether you swam with the stream or tried to battle against it, whether your life fitted in with the way the universe worked or whether it did not. The end of life was eudaemonia and this was obtained by living in accordance with nature. 'They say that the end is to be happy and everything is done for the sake of this, while the end is not done for the sake of anything. . . . Zeno defined happiness in this way.'[1] 'The end, as Zeno put it, was to live harmoniously. . . . For Cleanthes. . . was the first to put it thus -- the end is to live harmoniously with nature.'[2] Elsewhere Zeno is said to be the first to say this.[3] Cicero also claims that Zeno said the end was 'convenienter naturae vivere'.[4] The difference between living harmoniously and living in harmony with nature need not detain us. The way the Stoics understood it, the second contained the first. Clement says, 'Hence also the Stoics have declared that the end is to live agreeably with nature, inappropriately changing the name of God to that of nature, since nature extends also to growing things, to seeds, to trees, and to stones.'[5] We have seen in the preceding chapter how Clement uses the idea of conformity with nature, or harmonious living, as equivalent to the Biblical idea of following God. He attributes importance to 'nature' as the natural condition and natural order of things and as a creating ordering power.[6] He speaks with disapproval of things which are 'contrary to nature'[7] and of doing violence to nature,[8] while he approves of what is 'according to nature'.[9] It is worth noting Clement's account of Stoic ethics.

On the other hand Zeno the Stoic holds that the end is to live in accordance with nature, Cleanthes that it is to live in agreement with nature, and Diogenes believed that it was rational behaviour, which he believed lay in the choosing of things in accordance with nature. Antipater, his

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[1] Stob. *Ecl.* II, 138, p. 77, Wachsmuth.

[2] Stob. *Ecl.* II, 134, p. 75, Wachsmuth: τὸ ο+   σει ∯   ν.

[3] *Diog. Laert.* VII, 87.

[4] Cicero, *De Finibus*, IV, 14.

[5] *Strom.* II, 101; II, 168, 9.

[6] σις: *Paed.* II, 84; I, 209, 2, and *Paed.* II, 87; I, 210, 12.

[7] σιν: *Prot.*39; I, 29, 17; *Paed.* II, 129; I, 234, 4 and elsewhere.

[8] *Paed.* II, 129; I, 234, 5.

[9] σιν: *ibid,* I, 234, 7; *Strom.* VII, 91; III, 65, 11 and elsewhere.

pupil, assumes the end to lie in choosing perpetually and without transgression the things in accordance with nature and in rejecting things contrary to nature. Again Archedamus describes the end to be choosing the things that are greatest and most important according to nature, the things which cannot be surpassed. Besides these, Panaetius declared that the end was to live in accordance with the impulses given us by nature. In addition to all these, Posidonius said that the end was to live contemplating the truth and good order of the universe and seeking to realise them oneself to the best of one's ability, completely uninfluenced by the irrational part of the soul. And some of the more recent Stoics defined the end thus -- to live in conformity with the constitution of man. [1]

This introduces the second element -- virtue. According to Clement, this was Zeno's conception of the end -- 'living according to virtue'. Virtue, according to the Stoics, was 'a harmonious condition which should be laid hold of for its own sake'. [2] According to Clement, it was 'a condition of the soul in harmony with reason in the whole of life'. [3] Here he follows the Stoics thoroughly, accepting also their insistence upon reason as the ruling part of the soul. 'All that is contrary to right reason is sin.' [4]

κον (fitting and due). That which is due is fitting. And obedience is built upon commandments. These, being the same as admonitions and having truth as their goal, guide to the final thing desired, which is thought of as the End.' [5] Clement's definition of virtue as a state of soul which agrees with reason in the whole of life [6] is a Stoic one, as also is his emphasis on virtue as a permanent disposition. [7] Virtue is the result of voluntary choice, not of one's nature. [8] The ἀντασκολουθία of the virtues is expounded with a Christian emphasis. [9] Hope, love, hospitality, philanthropy and other virtues are connected. 'It is evident that if we examine these virtues in turn, we can make this observation concerning them all: whoever has one

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[1]*Strom.* II, 129; II, 183, 1.

[2]*Diog. Laert.* VII, 89.

[3]*Paed.* I, 101; I, 150, 27. *SVF* 3, 293.

[4]*Ibid.* I, 150, 21.

[5]*Paed.* I, 102; I, 151, 12.

[6]*Paed.* I, 101; I, 150, 27.

[7]Cf. Völker, *op. cit.* pp. 455-6.

[8]*Strom.* VII, 19; III, 14, 9 = SVF 3, 224.

[9]ἀ   σιν ἀ   λαις αι ἀπεταί. *Strom.* II, 45; II, 136, 23.

virtue gnostically, has them all because they go together.' [1] Continence was a special concern of Clement, defined in Stoic terms, and used to cover dealings not only with sexual matters, but also with money, luxury, possessions, sights, speech and evil thoughts. [2]

This brings us to the third element. Nothing is good but the good will, i.e. virtue, i.e. living in rational agreement with nature. Things may be good, bad, or indifferent. The good things are virtues, manifestations of virtue. The bad things are vices. Everything else is indifferent. [3] But among these indifferent things, some things have great value and are to be preferred. Others have great 'unvalue' and are not preferred. [4] This gives a guide to co κον, action which is appropriate, incumbent or fitting. [5] κοντα some are perfect, some are not perfect. The perfect actions are right and the others are intermediate. [6] Similarly Clement speaks of plain salvation as the result of medium actions, and right salvation as the result of right action. The action of the gnostic is right, that of the believer intermediate, and that of the pagan sinful. [7] There can be no doubt of Clement's acceptance of the general distinction between good, bad, and intermediate. He says, 'Nor indeed is that which is not good at once bad. For there are some intermediate things, and among the intermediate things some are to be preferred, and some are to be not preferred.' [8]

Stoic ethics have been largely known for their notion of apatheia, passionlessness. 'They say the wise man is passionless.' [9] 'The Stoics place virtue in passionlessness.'' [10] So Clement remarks, In general the Christian is possessed of stillness, quiet, calm, and peace.' [11] He is no longer self-disciplined, but has

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[1] *Strom.* II, 80; II, 155, 1 = *SVF* 3, 275. Cf. *Strom.* VIII, 30; III, 99, 16 = *SVF*, 2, 349.

[10] Pseudo-Plutarch, *De Vita Homeri*, II, 134.

[11] *Paed.* II, 60; I, 193, 29.

[2] *Strom.* III, 59; II, 223, 5.

[3] Zeno *apud Stob. Ecl.* II, 90, p. 57, Wachsmuth.

[4] Stob. *Ecl.* II, 154f, p. 84, Wachsmuth.

[5] Stob. *Ecl.* II, 158, p. 85, Wachsmuth.

[6] Stob. *Ecl.* σα.

[7] *Strom* σε, α+ *SVF* 3, 515.

[8] *Strom.* IV, 164; II, 312, 18

[9] *Diog. Laert.* VII, 117.

reached a state of passionlessness. [1] In the face of disease, misfortune, death, he remains unmoved in his soul. [2] The logical background of apatheia is the recognition of the things which are in our power and the things which are not. [3] This distinction is frequently made by Clement, [4] as is also a distinction between the things which are one's own and the things which are alien to one. 'Wherefore in situations not of his own choice, withdrawing himself from distresses to the things which are his own, he is not carried away with the things that are alien to him.' [5] It is because of this recognition that the Stoic of Marcus Aurelius remains unmoved and unshaken, like the rock about which the seas crash and foam. He is like the gnostic who is 'never put out of his proper habit of mind on a sudden change of circumstance. For the possession through knowledge of the good is steadfast and immutable, being the knowledge of things divine and human.' [6]

Passionlessness was a virtue for the Stoics because the passions were sinful. These passions come from the irrational part of the soul, not from the ruling rational part. [7] Clement uses the Stoic definition of lust as irrational appetite, [8] and classes it with anger and pleasure as passions. [9] The passions are against the nature of the soul [10] and indicate a sickness of the soul. [11] C
ἀ   , a compromise which the Stoics had formulated. [12]

That virtue must be disinterested was stated more emphatically by the Stoics than by any other Greek philosophers. Virtue is to be gained for its own sake, 'not because of fear or hope or anything beyond it'. [13] Clement says, 'We must, I believe, approach the saving word neither from fear of punishment nor through

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[1]*Strom.* IV, 138; II, 309, 11

[10]*Paed.* I, 6; I, 93, 9

[11]*Ibid.* I, 93, 12; *SVF*, 3, 425.

[12]*Strom.* VI, 74; II, 468, 31; *SVF*, 3, 431; see Völker, pp. 528-9.

[13]*Diogenes Laertius*, VII, 89.

[2]*Strom.* VII, 61; 111, 44, 22.

[3]ἐφ ε+   +κ ἐφ ε+   v. Epictetus, *Discourses* I, 1 and 4.

[4]*Strom.* IV, 153; II, 316, 5 and 8; *Strom.* VII, 16; 111, 12, 6; *Paed.* 111, 136; 1, 257, 28.

[5]*Strom.* VII, 62; III, 45, 6.

[6]*Strom.* VII, 70; III, 50, 27.

[7]*SVF*, I, 202 and 208; Clement, *Paed.* III, 53; I, 266, 27; cited Völker, p. 129.

[8]*Strom.* II, 119; II, 177, 22; *SVF*, 3, 391 and 396; cited Völker, p. 130. These points are discussed, Völker, pp. 129-30.

[9]*Strom.* IV, 40; II, 266, 11.

any promise of a gift, but because of the good itself.'[1] 'But only well-doing for love and for the good itself is to be chosen by the gnostic.'[2] Love, disinterested love of God, is the gnostic's motive, and this added much to the Stoic doctrine.[3] Clement's ideal character is like the Wise Man of the Stoics. Such men alone have knowledge,[4] are noble,[5] free, kings[6] and priests.[7]

Two metaphysical concepts are of importance for the ethics of the Stoics and of Clement. First, the logos spermatikos of the Stoics, or the indwelling Christ of Clement, is the source of all that is good. Its sovereignty in the individual is the condition of right living. It is the source of reason for the Stoic, and of love and grace for the Christian. So Marcus Aurelius speaks of 'the daemon, the particle of himself which Zeus gives to each man as his controller and governor,[8] and Clement says, 'In the soul of the just man, through obedience to the commandments, the ruler of all things mortal and immortal is consecrated and set apart.'[9] Secondly, there is the concept of the two cities, later developed by Augustine. Here Clement is his own witness of the debt.

But I shall pray to the spirit of Christ to wing me aloft to my Jerusalem. For the Stoics say that heaven is truly a city, but those 'cities' here on earth are not yet cities. They are so named but they are not. For a city is an excellent thing, and the citizens a fine body, a mass of men regulated by law as the Church is by the Logos. For the Church is a city on earth, a city impregnable and not ruled by tyrants, where God's will is done on earth as it is in heaven.[10]

CONCLUSION

The goodness of things other than God is both one thing and many things. The first account of it was 'likeness to God'. The second account produced results too lengthy and various to

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[1]*Strom.* IV, 29; II, 261, 10.
[10]*Strom.* IV, 172; II, 324, 24.
[2]*Strom.* IV, 135; II, 308, 15.
[3]*Strom.* VII, 67; III, 48, 17.
[4]*Strom.* VI, 162; II, 515, 28. *SVF*, 3, 213, 552. See Völker, p. 315.
[5]*Prot*   +   Cf. *SVF*, 3, 594.
[6]*Strom.* II, 144; II, 192, 21; *Strom.* VII, 22; III, 16, 9. *SVF*, 3, 618; 3, 591; 3, 655. Cited Völker, p. 509.
[7]*Strom.* IV, 158; II, 318, 12. *SVF*, 3, 604; cited Völker, p. 510.
[8]*Meditations*, V, 27.
[9]*Strom.* VII, 16; III 12, 16.

recount. How can the two accounts be reconciled? The answer which Clement gives is expressed in a metaphor at the close of the chapter on the End and its definition as likeness to God.

Therefore assimilation to God, so that as far as possible a man may become just and holy with prudence, he adopts as the goal at which faith aims. And he fixes as the End the restoration of the promise which is through faith. From these things spring the sources of those who have defined the end and of whom we have spoken previously. [1]

The water which gushes from a deep spring may be diverted into different streams with a common source. The definitions which philosophers have made of the End spring from a common source -- the end of assimilation to God. Assimilation to God is a spring which feeds many streams. Each stream is an end or one of the many things that have been called good. Clement's reference is to his preceding chapters on the opinions of the philosophers concerning 'the End'. He has rejected their accounts, but his writings show that he accepts the values which they recommend. He accepts them, but not as 'the End'. He accepts them as parts or partial manifestations of 'the End' which is assimilation to God, justice, holiness and prudence. This End is not a simple unity like the goodness of God. The goodness of things other than God has many aspects, but they are all ways of becoming like God and participating in his goodness. 'Haec est summa lex in virtute exercenda: Deum imitare. Hanc saepissime repetit Clemens. Ex hac pendent praecepta omnia.' [2] The philosophers have made the mistake of most Socratic 'victims'. They have confused one case of goodness with goodness itself. They have seen but one spray of the fountain and called it the fountain. They are elsewhere described as tearing the limbs of truth apart and claiming their part to be the whole. This is what they have done with goodness. Consequently they were wrong, but wrong in a way that is useful.

Clement's account of goodness is of the same pattern as his account of God. There is a unity which is simple and unique, one

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[1] *Strom.* II, 136; II, 188, 20.

[2] P. Hofstede de Groot, *Disputatio de Clemente Alexandrino, philosopho Christiano* . . . (Groningae, 1826), p. 79. Cited by Völker, *op. cit.* p. 585.

thing alone. There is a unity which is complex and manifold, one thing and many things. The goodness of God is one thing, unique, simple and transcendent. The goodness of men is one thing (assimilation to God) and many things (all the Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic values that have been mentioned). As in Part One, the second unity depends on the first unity. The goodness of men, though distinct from that of God, is only good as it participates in the ultimate goodness of God.

PART III
TRUTH

CHAPTER 9
TRUTH

THERE are two main tendencies in Clement's account of truth. The first is to call the essential elements of Christianity true and everything else false. This is the way Clement speaks when he is talking about heresy. The second tendency is to include within truth not only all valid Christian teaching, but also everything that is consistent with it. This is the way Clement speaks when he is talking about philosophy.

I. TRUTH AND HERESY

Section 1. There is such a thing as Christian truth which is distinct from heresy and which can be known in the essential beliefs of a confession, through the canon of the Church and through logical examination.

At the end of Book vii [1] Clement turns to the problem of truth and how it is distinguished from heresy. Both Greeks and Jews object that the presence of so many sects (each claiming to be Christian and each disagreeing with the others) invalidates the claim of Christianity to the possession of truth. Clement points to the many sects among the Greeks and Jews and asks why the objectors never applied this criticism to their own profession. [2] Besides, our Lord foretold that tares would grow among the wheat and a beautiful thing is always followed by a caricature of itself. The unfaithfulness of others gives no reason for us to transgress the rule of the Church [3] in any respect. We keep the confession of the most important articles [4] while the heretics do not. Those who hold on firmly to the truth are to be believed. It is not easy to find the truth and the heretics try to take a short

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[1] Chs. 15-18, beginning *Strom.* VII, 89; III, 63, 19.

[2] Again later he asks why they go to a doctor when there are so many different schools of medicine.

[3] τὸν ἐκκλνωτικὸν κανόνα.

[4] ν μελίωτων ὁμολογίαν.

cut. They do not really learn or receive knowledge, but receive only a false notion [1] of it. Their failure is all the more reason why we should try harder. We should search more carefully for the real truth which alone concerns the real God. If real fruit and wax imitations are put before us, we should decide which is which by apprehending vision [2] and authoritative reasoning [3] and not refuse to touch either. If there were one safe royal road and lots of dangerous by-roads we should not refuse to travel but should choose the royal road. The gardener does not stop gardening because weeds spring up among the plants. We have no excuse if we do not find the sequence of truth and give our assent [4] to the things we should believe, if we do not distinguish what is contradictory, unseemly, contrary to nature and false, from what is true, consistent, seemly and according to nature. [5] These qualities are aids to the discovery of real truth. If the Greeks admit that there can be any kind of demonstration, then from the Scriptures they may learn that only in the truth and in the original church are the most accurate knowledge and the really best school of thought. [6] Some people think that they have found the truth but have not a true demonstration. They steal fragments of the truth and bury them in their man-made systems of thought.

Section 2. Truth is derived from Scripture in such a way as not to be dependent on it, and is found by patient logical examination of the text.

On the other hand, [7] those who are ready to work for the most excellent things will not stop searching for truth until they receive the demonstration from the Scriptures themselves. They will not be satisfied with common tests of truth like the evidence of the senses but will use logical criteria. It is most important to put away self-conceit, to be prepared to work hard, and after receiving the Gospel not to turn away from the true Father and Teacher of the Truth. Truth comes from Scripture in a mysterious way. The Scriptures of the Lord bring forth truth and yet (like Mary) remain virgin, the mysteries of the truth being hidden

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[1] οἴνωισ

[2] θεωπία

[3] όσ

[4] θεωισ

[5] *Strom.* VII, 91; III, 65, 8.

[6] *Strom.* VII, 92; III, 65, 20.

[7] Ch. 16. *Strom.* VII, 93; III, 66, 1.

within them. 'She has given birth and not given birth', says the Scripture, as of one who has conceived from herself and not from coition. [1] For the gnostics the Scriptures are pregnant with truth; for the heretics who have not really learned from them they are barren. The pursuit of truth is a great enterprise and correspondingly great is the failure of those who have not received the canon of truth from the truth itself.

Section 3. Scripture derives its authority from the Lord who speaks through it and is the first principle of truth.

The first principle of instruction is the Lord himself who leads from the beginning to the end of knowledge through prophets, Gospels, and apostles. As first principle he stands in no need of further proof. We receive him by faith without proof and get our proofs from him. We cannot accept men's opinions in this way; but the voice of the Lord is more reliable than all demonstrations. In this way we get a perfect demonstration from the Scriptures. But the heretics do not find the truth, because they do not use. the whole of the Scriptures and do not examine the context of any statement. They pick out scattered, ambiguous phrases and twist them to mean what they want them to mean. Truth is not found in this kind of verbal juggling. The heretics do not learn the mysteries of the Church's knowledge [2] and they are not big enough to receive the greatness of truth. They are too lazy to get down to the bottom of things; so, after a superficial reading, they set the Scriptures aside.

Section 4. Heretics start from other first principles, cannot see clearly, desert their Lord, miss the truth, and are unclean animals.

The heretics do not start from first principles which are necessarily true, [3] but from the opinions of men. Nevertheless they go to a lot of trouble to make their conclusions follow from flimsy premisses and through fear and vanity argue interminably

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[1]*Strom.*   is a citation from the apocryphal Ezekiel and appears to have achieved proverbial use. It occurs in Tertullian, *De Carne Christi,*23, Epiphanius, *Haer.* XXX, 30, *Actus Petri cure Simone*, 24, Gregory of Nyssa, *Adv. Jud.*3. Some account of this extract and of the work from which it comes is given by M. R. James in *JTS*, vol. XLV, p. 236, and by Karl Holl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, vol. II, p. 33.
[2]*Strom.* VII, 97; III, 69, 8.
[3]*Strom.* VII, 98; III, 69, 14.

against the true pnilosophy. On the other hand, the Christian knowledge of the truth provides a sound basis for valid proofs. But as a troubled eye cannot see, so the troubled soul cannot see the truth. (Eels cannot see and are easily caught in water that has been stirred up.)

Christians are bound to the Lord who is their first principle by the bonds of loyalty. It is as wrong to turn from him as it is for a soldier to desert his post. If a Christian feels inclined to heresy he should go to someone who can explain things to him and can show him how the Scriptures fit together. We tend to accept popular beliefs even if they are contradictory rather than to accept the truth which is austere and solemn. The follower of the Lord becomes divine like him, so that deviation means a great falling off.

The heretics [1] have entered into the Church by a side door which they cut secretly, not through the main door which is the tradition of Christ and which is prior to all heresy. The ancient Church is one as God is one and the heretics are doing an evil thing in trying to split it up. Clement ends with a note concerning unclean and clean animals. [2] To have the stability of two-fold faith in Father and Son is to part the hoof. To meditate on God's words night and day is to chew one's cud. Those who do both are clean animals. The Jews chew their cud (i.e. meditate), but have not the double faith and the sureness of foot that it gives. The heretics claim to stand on faith in Father and Son (i.e. part the hoof), but do not examine God's words. Finally there are those who do neither and these are beyond all classification. They are like the chaff which the wind drives away.

Here ends Clement's most prolonged discussion of truth. The main characteristics of this truth will be separately considered and evidence will be drawn from other parts of his work as well as from the above passage.

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[1]Ch. 17, which begins *Strom.* VII, 106; III, 74, 29.
[2]Ch. 18, which begins *Strom.* VII, 109; III, 76, 31.

II. PROPERTIES OF TRUTH
(1) One and only

Clement divides truth from error very sharply. It is distinguished from opinion [1] and from images. [2] The truth itself is distinct from partial truths or names, as things about God are distinct from God. [3] 'Guessing at truth is one thing and truth is another. Likeness is one thing and the real thing another. The one is the result of learning and practice and the other the result of power and faith.' [4] To turn from truth to heresy is a tragic thing. There is only one truth as there is only one Church. Variety, falsehood, and deceit go together and contrast with the simplicity and uniqueness of truth. [5] Truth is to error as wheat is to tares, as real fruit is to wax imitation, as the king's highway to dangerous by-roads, as plants to weeds.

(2) Very powerful

There is nothing greater than this truth. [6] It is strong to deliver. 'Let us bring truth down from heaven above . . . and let her, making her light shine to the farthest point, send out light all around to those who are tossed about in darkness. Let her deliver men from deception, holding out her strong right hand.' [7] Truth cannot be overthrown. People who are afraid that philosophy will destroy their faith are like children who are frightened of hobgoblins. If persuasive argument can dissolve their faith, they cannot believe in the truth, 'for truth is unconquerable but false opinion dissolves?'. [8] Clement's faith in the power of truth made him ready to examine all sorts of teaching without fear of being led into error. The *Excerpta ex Theodoto* provide evidence of 'the audacious optimism of Clement, his confidence in the power and authority of truth'. [9] People who have received the truth are more stable and sure in themselves. 'Faith then and the

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[1]*Strom.* VII, 65; III, 46, 31. See also above.
[2]*Paed.* II, 126; 1, 232, 22.
[3]*Strom.* VII, 94; III, 67, 4. *Strom.* VI, 150; II, 509, 22.
[4]*Strom.* I, 38; II, 25, 13.
[5]*Paed.* III, 53; I, 267, 5.
[6]*Strom.* VII, 105; III, 74, 13.
[7]*Prot.* 2; I, 4, 8.
[8]*Strom.* VI, 81; II, 472, 5.
[9]Mondésert, *Climent d'Alexandrie*, p. 257.

knowledge of the truth make the soul which chooses them always constant in form and manner of life. Shifting, turning aside and revolt are natural to the man of falsehood as stillness, rest and peace are to the gnostic.' [1] The animals who part the hoof have a firm footing. Truth is as necessary for life as bread is. [2] It is eternal, [3] austere and solemn.

(3) Divine Origin

The greatness of truth is due to its divine origin or even its divine identity. Our Lord said, 'I am the Truth.' He is the indemonstrable first principle whose authority gives us a firm basis for our demonstrations. He speaks through the prophets, Gospels, and apostles. Truth is derived from the Scriptures which are of God and of the Lord. [4] The Greeks claim to have the truth but admit that they have only received it from men. But

no man can speak worthily the truth about God, as the weak and perishing cannot speak about the unborn and immortal, nor the work about its maker. . . . For human speech is essentially weak and unable to declare God. . . . The only wisdom then is that taught by God and this wisdom is ours. On it depend all the sources of wisdom which aim at the truth. [5]

Our adherence to the truth is loyalty to our Lord and to abandon the truth is a disloyalty similar to that of the soldier who deserts his post. Part of the work of the Logos was to simplify the truth. [6] The Law was given through Moses, but eternal grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. The law, says Clement, was only 'given' and 'temporary', but truth, being 'grace' of the Father, is the eternal work of the Logos. Truth is not said to have been given, but to have come through Jesus, apart from whom nothing came into being. [7]

(4) Tradition

Clement connects truth very closely with 'the teaching', 'the canon of the Church the confession' and 'the tradition'. The

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[1] *Strom.* II, 52; II, 141, 10.
[2] *Strom.* I, 100; II, 64, 3.
[3] *Paed.* I, 20; I, 102, 7.
[4] θϑ   αι *Prot.*77; 1, 59, 10 and elsewhere. κυπιακαί, *Strom.* VI, 91; II, 477, 34 and elsewhere.
[5] *Strom.* VI, 91; II, 517, 13.
[6] *Prot.*116; 1, 81, 33.
[7] *Paed.* I, 60; 1, 125, 21.

teaching of which he speaks is derived from the Lord as first principle. [1] It is one, apostolic, [2] of the Lord, [3] divine, [4] and kingly. [5] Clement regards the canon of the Church as important for the recognition of truth. Eusebius and others mention a work by Clement called *The Canon of the Church*, or *Against the Judaisers*. [6] Of this work one fragment has survived, an interesting piece of exegesis which is not relevant to the first part of the title. [7] The existence of the work confirms what has been already seen, that Clement used a norm of Church conduct and belief as a standard by which to judge those who were considered to be less orthodox. The Churcfi found itself compelled to set up such standards in order to preserve its identity and maintain its position. [8] Irenaeus and Clement are the first to maintain the importance of a 'canon'. Clement uses the word in each of the phrases which were of importance for the Church of the second and third centuries. He speaks of the 'canon of truth' as the essential truth proclaimed by the Church, [9] of the 'canon of faith' or 'regula fidei', [10] and of the 'canon of the Church' which is both the rule of faith and the rule of Church practice. [11] The canon of the Church maintains against heretics the unity of the Law, the Prophets, and the New Covenant. [12] There are a catechesis and a gnosis [13] according to the rule of the Church. We should not break this rule because other people break their agreements. [14] We should not steal from it as the heretics do, [15] taking parts of it and calling them our own.

The 'confession of the important things' [16] refers to the baptismal creed, a statement of essential Christian beliefs. 'Tradition' is important as providing a ground of unity in the presentation of the truth. Clement has a keen sense of the importance of the one

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[1]*Strom.* VII, 95; III, 67, 16.
[10]*Strom.* IV, 98; II, 292, 2.
[11]*Strom.* VII, 105; III, 74, 22; *Strom.* I, 96; II, 61, 30; *Strom.* VI, 125; II, 495, 7.
[12]*Strom.* VI, 125; II, 495, 5.
[13]*Strom.* VI, 165; II, 517, 3.
[14]*Strom.* VII, 90; III, 64, 1.
[15]*Strom.* VII, 105; III, 74, 22.
[16]*Strom.* VII, 90; III, 64, 6.
[2]*Strom.* VII, 108; III, 76, 22.
[3]*Paed.* II, 61; 1, 194, 9; *Strom.* VI, 89; II, 467, 16; *Strom.* VII, 57; III, 42, 5; *Strom.* VII, 90; III, 64, 17.
[4]*Prot.*87; I, 65, 2.
[5]*Strom.* I, 80; II, 52, 21.
[6]*Frag.*36; III, 218, 23.
[7]Discussed by Mondésert, *RSR*, 1949, p. 580.
[8]   Kittel, *TWB*.
[9]*Strom.* VII, 94; III, 67, 5; *Strom.* IV, 3; II, 249, II; *Strom.* VI, 124; II, 494, 29.

Church as a preserver of this unity. There is something esoteric about this truth. It is unwritten. it is given to us [1] but not to all. [2] It is the wisdom spoken in a mystery. The hidden traditions of the truth are interpreted in a sublime and lofty manner. [3] The uninitiated cannot readily discover them. [4] There are preparatory exercises for the reception of the exact tradition of truth. [5] The gnostic tradition is the fullness of Christ, the revelation of the mystery concealed in all ages, and the spiritual gift which St Paul longed to impart to the Romans. [6] This tradition is one, of the apostles, [7] and of the Lord. [8]

Truth was in this way linked to a living tradition, delivered by our Lord and the apostles, preserved in the unity of the Church, this unity which is not only a unity of social life but a unity of faith, unity of instruction and unity of truth, as also a unity of the means of salvation. Church and Tradition for him are blended into one unique, living, present reality.' [9]

The foregoing description of truth presents it as something which is one, powerful, divine, and part of a living tradition. It can be concisely and simply expressed, though the way to it may be exacting. Deviations from truth can be readily established and there lies a great gulf fixed between truth and heresy. If those outside the Church have any truth it is because they have stolen it. Truth is lofty and exclusive. It is chosen by 'apprehending vision' and 'authoritative reasoning' and its first principle is received by faith. Clement does not give us an account of what he considers to be the essential elements of Christian truth. [10] But he senses the need which Origen speaks of in his preface to the De Principiis.

Many of those, however, who profess to believe in Christ, hold conflicting opinions not only on small and trivial questions but also on some that are great and important; on the nature, for instance, of

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[1]*Strom.* VI, 131; II, 498, 15.

[10] ἀ   ν was not to be a separate work but a part of the Stromateis, and concerned with the way philosophers had talked about ἀπχαί. See Stälin translation, *BKV*, vol. I, p. 40.

[2]*Strom.* I, 55; II, 35, 15.

[3]*Strom.* I, 56; II, 35, 31.

[4]*Strom.* VII, 110; III, 78, 22.

[5]*Strom.* VI, 82; II, 473, 6.

[6]*Strom.* V, 64; II, 369, 15. Rom. i. 11, xv. 29, xvi. 25.

[7]*Strom.* VII, 108; III, 76, 22.

[8]*Strom.* VII, 104; III, 73, 20.

[9]Mondésert, *Clément d'Aexandrie,* p. 117.

God or of the Lord Jesus Christ or of the Holy Spirit, and in addition on the natures of those created beings, the dominions and the holy powers. In view of this it seems necessary first to lay down a definite line and unmistakable rule in regard to each of these and to postpone the inquiry into other matters until afterwards. [1]

Yet Clement does not deny the need for reasoning when dealing with ultimate truth. The Christian uses logical techniques to find the truth in Scripture. He connects the different elements of the truth with the first principle by means of demonstration, and the tests for truth are tests of consistency.

III. TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHY

Elsewhere Clement speaks more widely of truth and regards it as embracing rather than excluding human opinions. This second view of truth is connected with a second attitude which Clement held towards those outside the Christian Church. He was concerned in the first place to vindicate the Church as having the. divine truth and to condemn the heretics as having departed from this truth. He was also concerned to show to the pagan world on the one hand that Christianity was not a narrow isolated religion, which ignored culture and philosophy, and to show to Christians on the other hand that they had nothing to lose and much to gain by appropriating culture and philosophy. He maintained that Christianity included all that was good in non-Christian thought. When he speaks of the heretics, the truth is an exclusive, unique and transcendent thing. When he speaks of philosophy, the truth is an inclusive, all-embracing thing. 'The way of truth is one but into it as into an everflowing river flow rivulets from every side.' [2] We find this view of truth particularly in Book I of the *Stromateis* where Clement describes and justifies his use of philosophy.

(1) Philosophy. Clement's attitude to philosophy [3] was impor-

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[1]Origen, *De Principiis,* Preface. Butterworth translation.
[2]*Strom.* I, 29; II, 18, 8.
[3]De Faye work, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, shows the extent of Clement's contribution to this subject. He tends to exaggerate the importance of the question for the *Stromateis.* Einar Molland paper, "Clement of Alexandria on the Origins of Greek Philosophy", covers the subject well. (*Symbolae Osloenses*, 1936.)

tant, because here he departed from previous Christian tradition. Religion and philosophy had gone together at various periods in the history of the Greeks, but Christians, except for Justin and Athenagoras, had little to do with philosophy. Even these two had practically nothing to contribute to the *rapprochement* of Christianity with classical philosophy. The attitude of most Christians was one of suspicion and antagonism. Tertullian's denunciation was violent and Hippolytus classed philosophy with the heresies. Pagan philosophers, of whom Celsus was an example, were equally hostile to Christianity.

Clement defines the philosophy which he finds acceptable. Philosophy is 'an investigation concerning truth and the nature of things and this is the truth of which the Lord himself said, "I am the Truth"'. [1] 'And philosophy -- I do not speak of the Stoic or Platonic or Aristotelian philosophy, but whatever has been well said by each of these sects, which teaches righteousness with reverent understanding -- this eclectic whole I call philosophy.' [2] Philosophy must teach a Creator God, the mutability of physical elements, the good as assimilation to God, and the dispensation of the Gospel as the chief part of all training. [3] Philosophy is from God but was stolen from him like the fire of Prometheus. [4] It is inferior to truth [5] but it is not worthless. [6] It is necessary because we would have to use it to show that it was unnecessary. It is desirable because a money changer must know what false coins are like if he would distinguish the true.

The problem for Clement lay in the fact that while philosophy was not truth, it was not merely error. A similar problem faced Plato when he was dealing with art. Art, says Plato, is not truth, [7] but it is not error. [8] It is like philosophy for Clement, some kind of intermediate thing. Both Clement and Plato use the same argument. Philosophy or art is a preparatory education for truth. [9] Clement compares philosophy to the Law of Moses, which St Paul had described as a schoolmaster to the Jews to prepare

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[1] *Strom.* I, 32; II, 21, 17.
[2] *Strom.* I, 37; II, 24, 30.
[3] *Strom.* I, 52; II, 34, 9.
[4] *Strom.* I, 87; II, 55, 31.
[5] *Strom*, I, 98; II, 63, 2.
[6] *Strom.* I, 15; II, 11, 22.
[7] *Rep.* x.
[8] *Symposium*, 211. *Phaedrus*, 245.
[9] *Strom.* I, 28; II, 17, 33. Plato, *Rep.* III.

them for the truth. [1] Philosophy was a schoolmaster to the Greeks in the same way. [2] The same idea is conveyed by other similes. Philosophy is the irrigation of the land [3] in preparation for the truth, a stepping stone to the truth. [4] Another justification of philosophy complicates the explanation. The Law and philosophy not only fulfilled the same function but were identical in content. The Greeks stole their ideas from the Hebrews and from one another. The subject of Greek plagiarism is discussed with masses of evidence throughout the *Stromateis.* Clement quotes Numenius: 'For what is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek?'. [5]

Among the remaining descriptions of philosophy which Clement gives, the most important [6] has been analysed as follows:

The four alternatives which Clement puts forward form a climax. He begins with the possibility that the truth contained in philosophy is to be ascribed to an accident involved in God's providential economy. He continues with explanations attributing the element of truth in philosophy to the general revelation or even making the Greek philosophers prophets similar to those of the Old Testament. And he ends by indicating that philosophy owes its existence to a reflection of the eternal truth itself, and that the philosophers have belield God -- an imperfect, vague, unclear, yet true vision. [7]

(2) Truth. We can now examine the different attitude to truth which Clement's treatment of philosophy necessitated.

The truth being one, for falsehood has countless by-roads, just as the Bacchantes tore apart the limbs of Pentheus, so the schools of philosophy, both barbarian and Greek, have done with truth and each claims that the part he has obtained is the whole truth. But all things, I consider, are illumined by the dawning light. It may therefore be shown that all, both Greeks and barbarians, who have sought after truth possess either no small amount or at least some part of the word of truth. Eternity, indeed, unites in one moment present and future time besides the past as well. But truth is more capable than eternity of bringing together its own seeds though they have fallen on foreign ground. For we shall find that many of the opinions entertained by the schools which are not utterly absurd and are not cut off from natural connection, although they seem unlike one another, agree in their

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[1]*Gal.* iii. 24.
[2]*Strom.* I, 28; II, 18, 2.
[3]*Strom.* I, 17; II, 12, 26.
[4]*Strom.* VI, 67; II, 465, 21.
[5]*Strom.* I, 150; II, 93, 10.
[6]*Strom.* I, 94; II, 60, 12.
[7]Molland, *op. cit.* p. 71.

basis and with all the truth (as a whole). For as a limb, or as a part, or as a species, or as a genus, they come together into one; just as the lowest note is the opposite of the highest, but both are one harmony, and in numbers the even number differs from the odd but both have their place in arithmetic. This is the case also in form, where there are the circle, the triangle, the square, and whatever shapes differ from one another. Also in the whole cosmos, all the parts though they differ among themselves preserve their relation to the whole. Similarly, then, barbarian and Greek philosophy have torn off a piece of the eternal truth not from the mythology of Dionysus but from the theology of the Logos who eternally is. And he who brings together again the divided parts and makes them one, mark well, shall without danger of error look upon the perfect Logos, the truth. [1]

This truth is a whole of many parts. The many parts when separated are not the whole truth but are pieces of truth. Their truth in this separated condition depends on what they were originally, and will be, one complex whole. The important thing about them is not that they 'seem unlike' but that they 'agree in their basis and with all the truth as a whole'. They have the same starting point and fit together in the same whole. The different metaphors used -- eternity, genus, species, part, harmony, number, figure, universe, body -- indicate the kind of thing which truth is. Each example is something whose parts preserve their relation to the whole'.

Perhaps the most interesting thing is the conciliatory tone of the whole passage. The truth is as before divine in origin, a consistent system, powerful and one. But each of these qualities is interpreted not (as before) to exclude error but to include it and to regard it as partial truth. The divine truth was contrasted with the human opinions of the heretics. Now the light of Christ shines on all. The heretics were too lazy to think consistently. Now consistency and coherence provide a means of reconciling conflicting views. The power of truth and the stability of those who follow it were contrasted with the weakness of human opinion and the insecurity of those who follow it. Now the power of truth enables it to collect the seeds which have fallen on foreign soil. The unity of truth, like the unity of the Church, was unique

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[1]*Strom.* I, 57; II, 36, 8.

and separate from all else. Now the unity of truth enables it to make all things one.

Clement speaks of the truth of philosophy as partial. Truth, he says, is commonly ascribed to all things whether perceived by intellect or sense-perceived. There is true painting in contrast to vulgar, dignified music in contrast to chaotic, true philosophy in contrast to other philosophy, and a true beauty in contrast to art artificial one. But one should be concerned with the truth itself, not just with true things or partial truths. There is a difference between seeking God and seeking things about God as there is between substance and accidents. Christians have the substance of truth. [1] Others have its accidents. Another description of the truth of Greek philosophy as partial says that it is revealed by the real truth in the same way as the sun shines on colours and shows what they are. [2]

The inclusive reconciling idea of truth never suggests that there is an equality between philosophy and the real truth. Philosophy, says Clement, is a joint cause in the comprehension of truth. [3] Truth is one while many things contribute to its investigation, and it is found through the Son. Virtue is one thing with many forms - - wisdom, self-control, bravery, justice. Truth is one thing, but there is a truth of geometry in geometry, of music in music, and there is truth in the right Hellenic philosophy. 'But there is only one truth, supreme and impregnable -that in which we are instructed by the Son of God.' [4] The truth of Greek philosophy is distinct from our truth in the extent of the knowledge which it gives, its demonstrative force and its divine power. We are taught by God, learning our sacred letters by the Son of God. The saving doctrine is complete and self-sufficient. Greek philosophy cannot make it any stronger. It can only hedge it round. The truth of faith is as necessary to life as bread. Philosophy is like a dessert which is very nice but not essential to the meal.

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[1] *Strom.* VI, 150; II, 509, 18.
[2] *Strom.* VI, 83; II, 473, 14.
[3] *Strom.* I, 97; II, 62, 8. The idea of a joint cause is illustrated by the various virtues which cause happiness and the different ways of getting warm -- through sunshine, fire, bath, clothing.
[4] *Strom.* II, 62, 23.

IV. CONCLUSION

Clement speaks of the truth in two ways -- an exclusive way and an inclusive way. There is a solid core of essential Christian truth. Other kinds of truth may be denied, as when he speaks of the heresies, or they may be given a subordinate place, as when he speaks of philosophy. He may consider the real truth as separate from all else or as embracing all other truth within it in a consistent whole. He never wavers on the unique perfection of the real truth which Christians possess, but he varies in his attitude to the 'truth' which might be found elsewhere. In these accounts of truth may be seen the same pattern as has been seen in the accounts of God and of goodness. The exclusive idea of truth portrays truth as unique, simple, [1] ultimate and transcendent. The inclusive account of truth portrays truth as an all-embracing complex unity. [2]

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[1] *Paed.* III, 53; I, 267, 5; *Prot.* 116; 1, 81, 33.
[2] *Strom.* I, 29; II, 18, 8; *Strom.* I, 57; II, 36, 8.

CHAPTER 10
FAITH

CLEMENT'S account of faith and knowledge has received considerable attention in the past. This attention is well justified, because he was saying something new and because what he said is neither simple nor of one pattern. However, the main points of his arguments are clear, and for this reason we shall look first at these main points and then examine their interweaving in *Stromateis* II and *Stromateis* v. We shall consider the moral and spiritual elements in separation from the logical elements, and then see how Clement blends them all together.

I. THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL ELEMENTS OF FAITH

Faith is an act of the will, a voluntary choice. It is not a natural quality nor the result of a process of reasoning. It is the act of a free soul. For Clement the will is supreme, and the powers of reason are subordinate to it. [1] People disbelieve because they do not want to control their passions. [2] The decision of faith is of two-fold importance. It is necessary for salvation and for knowledge. In the first place it is a choice between death and life, between sin and salvation. 'Faith is strength to salvation and power to eternal life.' [3] Clement's chief desire, seen clearly in the *Protrepticus*, was to save men from a state of sin and death. The same Logos trains men for the one salvation of faith in God, to which exhortation, training and teaching are directed. [4] Clement's reason for refuting philosophers in the *Stromateis* is not, he says, vengeance on his accusers but a desire for their conversion. [5] There is nothing lacking to faith, which is perfect in itself and complete. [6] There are no differences of salvation. 'Faith is the one

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[1] *Strom.* II, 77; II, 153, 21.
[2] *Prot.* 61; 1, 47, 16.
[3] *Strom.* II, 53; II, 142, 12.
[4] *Paed.* I, 1; 1, go, 9.
[5] *Strom.* II, 2; II, 113, 22.
[6] *Paed.* I, 29; I, 107, 17. This is part of a defence of faith against the derogatory attitude of heretical gnostics.

universal salvation of mankind.' [1] There are no divisions into 'gnostic' and 'animal' men. All believers who have put aside lusts are equal and 'spiritual' before the Lord. [2]

In the second place the decision of faith is a choice between perpetual ignorance and the possibility of knowledge. 'Faith is more elementary, being as necessary to the gnostic as breathing is necessary for life to him who lives in this world. As it is impossible to live without the four elements, so it is impossible to gain knowledge without faith. Faith is then the basis of knowledge.' [3] One reason for this is that there is a barrier between us and the important things we want to get at, and nothing we do can surmount this barrier. Consider these antitheses -- 'Guessing at truth is one thing -- the truth is another. A "likeness" is one thing -- the real thing is another. One comes from learning and training -- the other from power and faith.' [4] All our learning and discussion bring us to mere conjecture. On the other hand, 'Born again, we received immediately the perfection after which we had striven. For we were enlightened, which is to know God. Therefore he is not imperfect who knows the perfect.' [5] Faith is something divine which is not easily unsettled. It has two sides -our decision and God's gift, or God's gift and our response.

The first reason why we cannot know without faith is that truth is a gift of God and until we are willing to receive it we know nothing. Human reason is helpless to discover the first principles of knowledge. The second reason why we cannot know without faith is that a kind of perception is necessary to apprehend spiritual objects. Since 'like perceives like' we cannot see. God until we become like him. [6] The linking of faith with perception is very important for Clement. We apprehend things in two ways -- directly, as by perception, and indirectly, as by inference. Ultimate truth is not to be reached by inference. It is reached immediately or directly and is therefore perceived or appre-

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[1]*Paed.* I, 30; I, 108, 10.

[2]*Paed.* I, 31; I, 108, 23.

[3]*Strom.* II, 31; II, 129, 26.

[4]*Strom.* I, 38; II, 25, 13.

[5]*Paed.* I, 25; I, 104, 28.

[6]It was a matter of controversy in Greek philosophy whether 'like perceived like' or 'unlike perceived unlike'. Aristotle said that our sense organs are actually unlike but potentially like the sense data which they receive.

hended. 'Like knows like.' The Greeks have made mistakes in their notions about God, because they were bad in themselves and saw the wrong things. Xenophanes was right in his description of the way in which men make their gods in their own images. [1] If by the miracle of conversion we are made good, then we shall see the goodness of God.

God is love, the God who is known to those who love, and God is faithful who is commended through instruction to the faithful. It is necessary for us to be joined to him by divine love, so that by like we may see like, hearing and obeying the word of truth, guilelessly and purely in the manner of children who obey us. [2]

Using the imagery of the mystery religions Clement says the same thing in a more striking way.

And they will be pleased with nothing more than what is like themselves. For he who is still blind and deaf, not having the comprehension of the steady keen sight of the contemplative soul which the Saviour alone implants, like the uninitiated at a celebration of the mysteries or the unmusical at dances, not yet pure and not worthy of the pure truth, but still discordant, disordered, and material, must stand outside the divine chorus. [3]

The impure cannot perceive the pure, the discordant the harmonious, the disordered the ordered, nor the material the spiritual. The unbeliever is blind and deaf concerning the perception of the truth, for it is pure, harmonious, ordered, and spiritual, and he is the opposite of these qualities. He needs new faculties of perception and he gets these by accepting the salvation of God and being born again. 'Behold I make new things,' says the Logos, 'which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man. With a new eye, a new ear and a new heart, whatever things are to be seen or heard are to be comprehended through faith and understanding, by the Lord's disciples who speak, hear and act in a spiritual way.' [4] To sum up, faith, which is both an act of the will and the results of that act, is necessary for salvation and for knowledge. It is necessary for knowledge because ultimate truth is from God and so cannot be

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[1] *Strom.* VII, 22; III, 16, 5. R.P. 100b.
[2] *Strom.* v, 13; II, 334, 17.
[3] *Strom.* V, 19; II, 338, 21.
[4] *Strom.* II, 15; II, 120, 15.

reached by our own efforts but only revealed to us by God. Again, faith is necessary to knowledge because we cannot see spiritual things until we are like them, and so the natural man needs new eyes and ears.

Most of this is new and different, but the general principle, that only the good can know the truth, had been maintained by philosophers before. In the writings of Plato there is a frequent emphasis on the distinctive life and character of the philosopher. In the *Phaedo*, the philosopher is one who devotes himself to the pursuit of the real. He controls and disciplines his body so that it will not hinder that pursuit. A lover of wisdom cannot be a lover of the body. The way of the philosopher is a way of renunciation, of purification from distracting desires. [1] In the *Republic* the guardians are trained not only as scientific thinkers, but also as saints. The man whose soul is not in harmony will not see the harmony of the good. Nothing evil is allowed to influence the guardian in childhood or in early youth. Unless moral and aesthetic influences were carefully controlled it would *not* be the case that 'when reason comes he would welcome her as one he knows'. [2] Even for those trained in this way a conversion is necessary. 'So this faculty must be wheeled away from that which is becoming until it is able to endure being and the brightest blaze of being.' [3] One passage is similar to that of Clement quoted earlier. 'Then the philosopher, associating with what is divine and ordered, becomes ordered and divine as far as mortal may.' [4] The most striking passage is, 'It [the dialectic] finds the eye of the soul embedded in what is really a swamp of barbarism and gently draws and raises it upwards, using the arts we have enumerated as handmaids in the work of conversion.' [5] The constant insistence on the importance of character in the training of the guardians is based on a belief that no one can have knowledge who is not good. In the *Theaetetus* the philosophic man is described.

In the divine there is no shadow of unrighteousness, only the perfection of righteousness; and nothing is more like the divine than any one of us who becomes as righteous as possible. It is here that a

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[1] *Phaedo* 64C-65A.
[2] *Rep.*402.
[3] *Rep.*518.
[4] *Rep.*500.
[5] *Rep.*533.

man shows his true spirit and power, or lack of spirit and nothingness. For to know this is wisdom and excellence of the genuine sort; not to know it is to be manifestly blind and base. [1]

Here virtue or excellence and wisdom are inseparable and he who lacks them is both base and blind. The eye of his soul is unable to see the truth. Plato not only maintains the general principle that only the good man can know the truth, but links this knowledge with a form of perception as Clement later did.

II. THE LOGICAL ELEMENT IN FAITH

Faith is the logical foundation of all knowledge. There can be no knowledge which is not based on faith. The first principles of knowledge cannot themselves be rationally demonstrated. Until they are somehow accepted there can be no knowledge. The acceptance of them is called faith. This is the view to be explained in the following section. Its precise meanings will appear as the arguments in its favour are considered. We cannot assume that we know what Clement means by 'faith' or any other word. We can assume that his arguments were for him valid, and find the meanings of 'faith' for which each argument will hold. This may be compared with the solving of equations to find the values of an 'x'. One point to be noted is that Clement does not claim that the basic elements of Christian truth can be proved by the light of natural reason. He claims it is logically necessary that they cannot be proved (or disproved) by the light of natural reason. Knowledge must depend on something other than knowledge.

Argument I [2]

Either all things are in need of demonstration, or some are believed of themselves. But if the former is the case, and we ask the demonstration of each demonstration, we shall go on *ad infinitum* and demonstration will be brought to nothing. But if the latter is the case, those very things which are believed of themselves will become first principles of

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[1]*Theaetetus*, 176C. Translation from Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*.

[2]This argument is placed first because it is of basic importance. The other arguments follow in the order of the text.

demonstrations. Indeed the philosophers agree that the first principles of all things are indemonstrable. So that if indeed there is demonstration, there is an absolute necessity that there is something prior which is believed from itself and is called first and indemonstrable. Consequently all demonstration is referred back to indemonstrable faith. [1]

Demonstration is the important part of knowledge. We know a proposition to be true when we give a reason for it and understand it as inferred from true premisses. We know the premisses true by understanding them as inferred from other true premisses and so on. The truth of the conclusion depends on the truth of the premisses, which in the end depends on the truth of the ultimate premiss. This ultimate premiss is called a starting point or first principle. Since it depends for its truth on no other proposition it cannot be known as true in the above sense. It must be received and recognised as true in some other sense. The receiving and recognising is called faith and the first principle is 'believed from itself'.

This argument is derived from a theory of inference which stretched back to Aristotle and to Plato. We find the following passages in Aristotle. 'For demonstration proceeds from what is more certain and is prior . . . we get to know some things naturally through themselves and other things by means of something else (the first principles through themselves, what is subordinate to them through something else).' [2] 'Intellect has to do with the first principles of things intelligible and real. For science has to do with things that admit of demonstration, but the principles are indemonstrable so that it will not be science but intellect that is concerned with the principles.' [3] For Plato, knowledge (which consisted in inferring a proposition from a higher, more general one) depended upon the ultimate first principle, the Form of the Good which was itself unknowable simply because there was nothing beyond it from which it might be inferred. [4]

The validity of Clement's argument cannot be doubted. We may doubt the validity of this theory of demonstration or the possibility of knowledge and demonstration. If these two points

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[1] *Strom.* VIII, 6-7; III, 83, 6.
[2] *Anal. Prior.* II, 16, 64b. Ross translation.
[3] *Magna Moralia*, 1197a. Ross translation.
[4] Plato's position is discussed further at the conclusion of this chapter.

are on the other hand accepted (as they were by Clement and the people for whom he was writing), then there must be an indemonstrable first principle. The meaning of the argument can be best seen in the following story, told by A. A. Milne in his *The Man in the Bowler Hat*. The Chief Villain has captured and is torturing the hero for information concerning the Rajah's Ruby. This, it is disclosed, is in a hat-box in the cloak-room at Waterloo. The ticket for this hat-box is in another hat-box at Paddington. After the fifth hat-box ticket is mentioned:

Chief Villain (quite broken up): Also in a hat-box?
Hero: Yes.
Chief Villain: How much longer do we go on?
Hero (cheerfully): Oh, a long time yet.
Chief Villain (to Bad Man): How many London stations are there?
Bad Man: About twenty big ones, governor.
Chief Villain: Twenty! *(To Hero)* And what do we do when we've gone through the lot?
Hero: Then we go all round them again.
Chief Villain (anxiously): And -- and so on?
Hero: And so on.
Chief Villain (his hand to his head): This is terrible. I must think. *(To Bad Man)* Just torture him again while I think . . .
Chief Villain (triumphantly): I've got it!
(He rises with an air, the problem solved. They all look at him.)
John: What?
Chief Villain (impressively to Hero): There is somewhere -logically there must be somewhere -- a final, an ultimate hat-box.
John: By Jove! That's true!
Hero: Yes.
Bad Man (scratching his head): I don't see it. [1]

Argument 2

This argument begins with a statement of Argument 1 with variations. [2] 'First principles are indemonstrable. For they can

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[1] A. A. Milne, *The Man in the Bowler Hat*.
[2] *Strom.* II, 13; II, 119, 26.

be known neither by art nor by discrimination. [1] For the latter is concerned with things which could be otherwise and the former is practical only and not contemplative.' This statement of Argument 1 is reinforced by two arguments which can be stated syllogistically.

(*a*) All things capable of being taught are founded on what is known before. All knowledge is a thing capable of being taught. Therefore, all knowledge is founded on what is known before.

(*b*) All knowledge is founded on what is known before. Accounts of first principles are not founded on what is known before. Therefore, accounts of first principles are not knowledge. The minor premiss of (*b*) is proved by showing the errors which philosophers have made concerning first principles. They couldn't have made errors if they had previous knowledge. The conclusions which Clement draws from the ignorance of human teachers and their inability to know the first principles of things are, 'The first principle of the universe can be reached by faith alone', [2] and, 'Call no man your teacher on earth.' [3]

Clement continues, For knowledge is a condition which comes from demonstration. But faith is a grace which leads on from indemonstrable things to what is absolutely simple, which neither is with matter, nor is matter, nor is dependent on matter.' Faith lays hold of ultimate truth because it actually sees the objects of this truth. Quoting from Plato *Sophist*, [4] Clement says that those who have not seen by faith

try to drag all things down to earth out of heaven and the unseen, literally grasping rocks and trees in their hands, for they lay hold of all things and vigorously assert that that alone exists which can be handled and touched. They define body and reality as the same thing. Those who dispute against them very cleverly defend their position somewhere above from the unseen world, forcefully declaring that certain intelligible and bodiless forms are the true reality.

Their trouble is not that they have made mistakes in their reasoning, but that they have started from wrong first principles. They cannot 'see' the important things -- 'with a new eye, new ear, new

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[1] ....φπόννωει.
[2] *Strom.* II, 13; II, 119, 20.
[3] *Ibid.* II, 120, 5. Matt. xxiii. 8.
[4] *Sophist*, 246A, B.

heart, all things can be seen, heard, and apprehended by faith and understanding when the Lord's disciples speak and hear and act in a spiritual way'. In this way the logical necessity for faith is linked with its moral necessity and its power of perceiving things not ordinarily seen. The only way to learn first principles is by faith in him who can show them to us and give us eyes to see them.

Argument 3

Clement goes on to speak about genuine and counterfeit money. [1] Untrained people cannot tell the difference. Only the knowledge of the trained professional can differentiate. The application of his trained perceptions is an act of judgement and Aristotle calls this act faith. 'Aristotle says that the act of judging whether a thing is true, the decision which follows knowledge, is faith. Faith is then something superior to knowledge and its test of truth.' Guessing, despite its pretensions, is not faith. Learning and the acquisition of knowledge are essential to the practice of any craft. One must obey one's teacher if one is to learn. 'To obey the Logos, whom we call teacher, is to believe in him and not to go against him in anything.' [2] So that for the process of learning faith is necessary, and for the judgements of faith a background of learning is necessary. 'Faith, then, is to be known and knowledge is to be believed, by a kind of divine reciprocity.' [3]

Argument 4

The next argument is attributed to Epicurean sources.

And indeed Epicurus, who strongly preferred pleasure to truth, assumes faith to be a preconception [4] of the intellect. He defines preconception as fixing the attention on something clear and on a clear notion of the thing. No one can investigate or raise a question, or hold an opinion, or argue without a preconception. How can one, not having a preconception of what he is after, learn about what he investigates? When he has learned he has now turned his preconception into a comprehension. [5]

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[1] *Strom.* II, 15; II, 120, 19.
[2] *Strom.* II, 16; II, 121, 5.
[3] *Ibid.* II, 121, 7.
[4] πρόλνφισ
[5] *Ibid.* II, 121, 8.

Faith is defined elsewhere as a voluntary preconception. [1] This notion was very important to the thought of Epicurus. It was the second of his three criteria of truth -- sensation, preconception, and feeling. It was the source of all general concepts and systematic knowledge. It was a 'clear vision' of something not given immediately in sense experience though derived from it. Without a preconception as to what a 'horse' or a 'cow' is, one could neither ask nor answer such questions as, 'Is that animal a horse or a cow?' [2]

A modern version of this argument is to be found in R. G. Collingwood's 'logic of question and answer'. Examination of any truth depends on seeing it as the answer to a specific question. The specifying of the question implies preconceptions concerning the object of the inquiry. One must know what one is looking for. Collingwood writes of his archaeological work, 'Experience soon taught me that under these laboratory conditions one found out nothing at all except in answer to a question; and not a vague question either, but a definite one. That when one dug saying merely, "Let us see what there is here", one learnt nothing.' [3] Another version of this argument is found in Kant. Kant attributed the advance in physical science to the fact that scientists 'learned that reason has insight only into that which is produced after a plan of its own. . . . Reason . . . must approach nature in order to be taught by it' as 'an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer questions which he has himself formulated. . . . It is thus that the study of nature has entered on the secure path of a science after having for so many centuries been nothing but a process of merely random groping.' [4] Clement did not regard preconception as the whole content of faith. But he did wish to point out the necessity of preconception to any inquiry, doubt or argument. Unless we believe certain things about God, any inquiry concerning him will be nothing but a 'process of merely random groping'. This necessity is not merely the spiritual

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[1] *Strom.* II, 8; II, 117, 9. ππόλνφισ ἐκούωιοσ.
[2] Diog. Laert. X, 33. See C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, p. 247.
[3] *Autobiography* (London, 1939), p. 24.
[4] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason.* Preface to 2nd ed., p. 14 (Kemp-Smith abbrev . ed.).

necessity mentioned earlier, but also the logical necessity in any realm of inquiry for preconception which in some way anticipates the result. We cannot answer a question until we know what it means. We cannot know what it means until we have preconceptions about its terms.

Argument 5

This argument [1] follows the idea brought forward in Argument 3, that faith both follows and is followed by knowledge. Faith in Scripture leads to a demonstration which reacts on faith to confirm and strengthen it. The strength of the demonstration is the strength of the Scripture which is the strength of God. Faith in God learns the Scriptures, obeys the commandments, and is strengthened by the power of God.

Demonstration (like belief) is of two kinds -- that which is scientific or based on reasoned knowledge and that which is based on opinion. [2] The only true demonstration is that supplied from the Scriptures, 'wisdom taught by God'. Learning is obedience to the commandments, which obedience is faith in God. Faith is a power of God and the strength of truth. This is the faith which moves mountains, heals the sick and raises the dead. On. the one hand, demonstration which is based on opinion is not divine but human, mere rhetoric or dialectic. On the other hand, the highest demonstration, which is based on reasoned knowledge, produces faith in the souls of those who want to learn, through examination and exposition of the Scriptures.

Argument 6

This argument [3] repeats the idea of Argument 4 that we determine our beliefs. Not only the Platonists but also the Stoics say that assent [4] is in our power. All opinion, judgement, notion, and learning, by which we live and are ever bound together with the human race, is an assent -- which can be nothing else than faith. This statement may seem hard to reconcile with Platonism. It shows the extent of Stoic influence on Middle Platonism. The

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[1] *Strom.* II, 48; II, 138, 21.

[2] ἐ ϑ .

[3] *Strom.* II, 54, 5; II, 142, 25.

[4]

Stoic theory of perception compared the soul to a 'tabula rasa', yet attributed to it the activity of forming general concepts and of obtaining knowledge from its impressions. The soul had the power to assent to or to deny the reality of an impression or the truth of a proposition. Whenever error occurred, the fault lay with the mind which had assented where it should have denied. Assent is the action of the soul in admitting reality or truth to an impression. [1] It is distinct from preconception which is the formation of concepts spontaneously and independently of experience.

This Stoic theory of perception was the subject of much controversy, especially as the Stoics claimed that some impressions, 'grasping impressions', [2] were such that error was impossible. They are 'representations proceeding from the object and agreeing with it, stamped and sealed upon the soul, such as could have no existence but for the existence of the object'. [3] Such a representation 'takes hold of us by the hair and drags us to assent'. [4] The Wise Man distinguishes between 'grasping' and 'nongrasping' impressions and assents to the former only. It is therefore impossible for him to make mistakes. The story is told of a trick played by a King Ptolemy on a Stoic philosopher, Sphaerus, by placing a pomegranate made of wax before him. When the philosopher tried to eat it, the king claimed that he had assented to a false impression. The philosopher replied that he had just assented to the probability that the king would give him real fruit. [5] This story is perhaps in the mind of Clement when he argues that truth must not be abandoned because of the diversities of heresy. He says, 'For when fruit is placed before us, some real and ripe, and some made of wax and as like the real thing as possible, we must not abstain from both because of the resemblance. We must, at once, with grasping vision and most decisive reasoning, distinguish the real from the apparent.' [6] Logical reasoning by itself will not answer the most important questions

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[1] Cicero, *Academica* 2, 37 and 2, 47.
[2] καταλνπτικαὶ φανταωίαι.
[3] Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* VII, 248.
[4] *Ibid.* VII, 257.
[5] Diog. Laert. VII, 6, cited Davidson, *The Stoic Creed*, p. 78.
[6] *Strom.* VII, 91; III, 64, 30.

for us. We have to decide what is true and what is false. The Stoics called this decision 'assent'. Clement calls their assent 'faith'.

Argument 7

In this argument faith is opposed to logical investigation. A thing which is accepted on faith cannot be submitted to logical investigation. A thing which can be submitted to logical investigation cannot be accepted on faith.

We know that neither are obvious things investigated, such as if it is day (while it is bright day light), nor are obscure things which will never be clear, as whether the stars are even or odd in number; nor are convertible things, and those things are convertible which can be equally said by those who hold the opposite view, as whether what is in the womb is a living being or not. A fourth mode is when from one of the sides is put forward an argument which cannot be disputed or destroyed. If then the reason for investigation is removed in accordance with all these modes, faith is established. For we put before them the indisputable consideration that it is God who speaks and who gives in writing information concerning every single point I want to know. Who then would be so impious as to disbelieve God and to ask for proofs from him as from men? [1]

Some questions cannot be made the subject of a logical investigation and with these faith alone can deal. We cannot argue with God. We must believe or (if we are utterly perverse) disbelieve.The meanings of faith in these arguments may be set out.

    (1) Faith is the acceptance of an indemonstrable first principle.
    (2) Faith accepts this first principle not from man but from God.
    (3) Faith is the judgement of a soul which has been trained by God to distinguish true from false.
    (4) Faith is a preconception which gives a meaning to words like 'God'.
    (5) Faith obeys God's commands and learns from his Scriptures.
    (06) Faith is an assent of the mind.

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[1] *Strom.* V, 5; II, 328, 29.

(7) Faith is the one alternative left when logical means of inquiry are useless.

To these may be added the results of the moral and spiritual account of faith. Faith is an act of the will, a free choice of salvation. Faith is the perception of spiritual things with a new heart and eye and ear. When all these points are brought together we see that the one common feature of them all is that faith is a simple unique thing. It is an act, not a process. While it is connected with a process of examining the Scriptures, or of learning the truth from God, faith is essentially a simple act. We choose, accept, see, assent to God's truth.

III. TWO PASSAGES

The main reasons why Clement considered faith to be necessary have been set out. From these the content of Clement's concept of faith can be seen. A brief examination of the interweaving of the various ideas in the text will now be given. The first half of Book II and the first chapters of Book V of the *Stromateis* present Clement's account of faith.

Stromateis Book II

There are many ways of wisdom that lead to the way of truth, but faith is itself the way of truth. [1] Our barbarian (i.e. nonHellenic) philosophy is really perfect and true. It leads through the whole universe of knowledge visible and invisible to the God who is far distant but who has come very near. Truth is hidden from us but by the Holy Spirit we may search the deep things of God. The multitude, says Heraclitus, do not understand things and do not really know what they have learnt. Understanding is the result of faith. Faith, [2] which the Greeks think is inane and barbaric, is a voluntary preconception and an assent of piety, 'the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen'. It has also been defined as a mental assent to something unseen. [3] It is a choice [4] and as such the first principle of activity. [5]

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[1]*Strom.* II, 4; II, 114, 29 (we begin at ch. 2).
[2]*Strom.* II, 8; II, 117, 8.
[3]ἐ   .
[4]πποαίπεωισ.
[5]   ισ

It develops into a knowledge which rests on firm foundations and which is an enduring disposition. [1] He who believes the divine Scriptures receives in God's voice an irrefutable demonstration. The demonstration follows after faith, not faith after the demonstration.

The heretics think that faith is an innate property which some people possess. They make men mere puppets and exclude the possibility of the sinner's repentance, forgiveness, and baptism in the three-fold Name. 'But we who have learned from the Lord by the Scriptures that freedom of choice or refusal has been given to men, let us rest on the unshakable criterion of faith, displaying an eager spirit, because we chose life and have believed in God through his voice.' [2] The greatness of this faith is shown in Hebrews xi. It is a higher form of sensation, and not a form of opinion. [3] We are ignorant of first principles without faith. We need new eyes to see spiritual things.

Faith is the criterion of knowledge and the preconception which makes knowledge possible. Faith is superior to knowledge. Drawing on Plato, Clement describes the man of faith as kingly and a living law. He is set on high that all may contemplate the excellence of his example. [4] Other Greeks besides Plato said these things, all of them drawing on Moses who foreshadowed Christ. For example, the Pythagoreans believed the αὐτ ἔφα of their master, and Epicharmus wrote of mental sight and hearing as being the only sight and hearing that mattered.

Faith is in the word of God, [5] is our part in the co-operative process of learning, produces repentance, and provides the basis for hope. The faithfulness of God makes assent to him something stronger than assent to the philosophers. Unbelief is the weak negative supposition of a man who opposes him. [6] There is nothing weak about the faith that trusts in the glory and salvation of God. The promises and providence of this God will not fail. Faith stands firm because like its object it is divine. Faith is the first inclination [7] towards salvation and all the virtues follow it.

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[1] εισ.
[2] *Strom.* II, 12; II, 119, 4.
[3] *Strom.* II, 13; II, 119, 25.
[4] *Strom.* II, 19; II, 122, 16.
[5] *Strom.* II, 25; II, 126 8 (ch. 6)
[6] *Strom.* II, 28; II, 127, 31.
[7] ωισ

Faith is elementary and as essential to knowledge as the elements are to life.

Faith is proved from the Scriptures [1] and imparts to the faithful a unique stability and constancy. It is two-fold in that we believe that certain things have happened and that certain things will happen. [2] Faith links past and future together in the present. It is an assent and is in our power.

Stromateis Book V

Some people [3] say that one has faith in the Son and knowledge of God. But, says Clement, we cannot believe in the Son without knowing who and what he is. 'Now faith is not without knowledge nor the Father without the Son.' We cannot believe in the Son without knowing the Father. We cannot know the Father without believing in the Son who teaches us. Only a few believe and know. Only a few have ears to hear. Faith is the ears of the soul. There is a common faith which all believers possess, and from which they go on from faith to faith. This is the faith which like a grain of mustard seed stings the soul into life and grows so greatly that statements about heavenly things can rest upon it. [4] The heretical gnostics deny that faith is the rational assent of a free soul and call it a natural property; but their doctrines are inconsistent. The best form of investigation is that which is built on faith, [5] a faith which is itself established because investigation into its subject matter is impossible. God has spoken and it is unthinkable to question the truth of what he has said. [6] The power of God can save by itself, without proofs, and through bare faitb. [7] Faith must not however be inactive and isolated but must move on through investigation. [8] The clear sight of the soul must be free from the obstructions of sin. [9] We can only see God as we are joined to him by divine love, seeing like by like. Faith and hope both deal with things which only the mind can see. When we say things are just, good, true, we are talking about things

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[1] *Strom.* II, 48; II, 138, 15 (ch. 11).
[2] *Strom.* II, 53; II, 141, 25 (ch. 12).
[3] *Strom.* V, 1; II, 326, 3.
[4] *Strom.* V, 3; II, 327, 16.
[5] *Strom.* V, 5; II, 328, 27.
[6] *Strom.* V, 6; II, 329, 8.
[7] *Strom.* V, 9; II, 331, 19.
[8] *Strom.* V, 10; II, 332, 27.
[9] *Strom.* V, 11; II, 333, 8.

which can be seen only with the mind. [1] Plato speaks of philosophers as those who love to look at truth. [2] He says that it is important to know our ignorance. Those who do not believe can have neither understanding nor the steady clear sight of the contemplative soul. [3] Only the Saviour can implant this vision. Unbelievers are blind and deaf to spiritual things because they can only see what is like themselves. [4]

IV. CONCLUSION

Clement's treatment of faith was more than a defence and justification of an essential Christian idea. It made the weak point of classical philosophy intelligible and sound. The weakness of the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of knowledge was the hook on which their chain of inference must hang. The weak points of Epicurean and Stoic epistemology were 'preconception' and 'assent'. There were some things that could not be proved. These things were unfortunately essential and important things. This was embarrassing because no one likes to live in a house, however well constructed it may be, if that house is built on sand. All this was apparent in Clement's day. He faced an age which had little confidence in reasoned argument. Clement was able to say, 'God tells you all about these things through his Word. What could be more safe than to build on his foundation, and what more reasonable than to believe in him?' Clement says this with subtlety and variety, drawing on previous inadequate solutions.

Plato shows the gap which Clement filled with the idea of Christian faith. Knowledge for Plato [5] is the ability to define a form or idea in terms of a more comprehensive form, showing that the nature of the thing known is logically necessary because of a more ultimate form. Knowledge, then, is like a chain, each link depending on the previous one, or like a series of steps, each

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[1]*Strom.* V, 14; II, 316, 1. This is Platonic. Cf. *Phaedrus* 247c.
[2]   ς ἐ   .
[3]   ῆσ.
[4]*Strom.* V, 19; II, 338, 21. After this Clement goes on to discuss the concealment of truth in riddles and symbols.
[5]*Meno*98.

one leading to a higher and more comprehensive truth. To say 'x is true' means 'x follows from y which follows from z. . . .' At the end of the chain there is that upon which all knowledge and truth depend. But it can hardly be called knowledge or truth itself, for there is nothing for it to be inferred from. The problem is: The first principle must be known and true if knowledge and truth of the above sort are to be valid. But the first principle cannot be known and true in the above sense of knowledge and truth. 'This then, says Plato, 'which imparts truth to the things that are known and the power of knowing to the knower, you may affirm to be the Form of the good. It is the cause of knowledge and truth and *you may conceive it as being known,* but while knowledge and truth are both beautiful, you will be right in thinking it other and fairer than these.' [1] It is the cause of knowledge and truth, but different from them. 'We have *no proper* knowledge of the Form of the good. And if we don't know it, though we should have the fullest knowledge possible of all else, you know that that would be of no use to us.' [2] If we cannot know it, we must get hold of it in some other way. 'Do you think it right to make pretensions to knowledge where one has none? No -- but it is right that you should be prepared to state what you think, as being what you think.' [3]

The Form of the Good cannot be 'known' in the usual sense but is 'seen' in an unusual sense. The education of Plato's 'guardians' is the preparation of souls for the sight of the Form of the Good. This education is a search for the first principle of everything by taking the first principles of each science and inferring them from another first principle. For example, the first principle or set of axioms upon which solid geometry is built may be inferred from axioms of plane geometry, which in turn may be inferred from axioms of arithmetic. This suggests that the whole of mathematics may be inferred from one first principle, or one set of primitive propositions. Plato believed that if you continued destroying your hypotheses, you would get a first

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[1] *Republic* 508. A. D. Lindsay's translation is used here and in the following passages. Italics are mine in each passage.
[2] *Republic* 505.
[3] *Republic* 506.

principle of everything from which the axioms of mathematics and ethics would follow. The first principle cannot be 'known' in the way things are 'known' further down the line. Yet if knowledge down the line is to be valid, it must be fixed in some other way. It is fixed by the perception of a powerful reality.

'Then, Glaucon,' I said, 'is not this at last the real melody played by dialectic? It is intelligible, and its copy is *the power of sight* which we described as at length endeavouring to look at the real animals, then at the real stars, and finally at the real sun. So too when any one tries by dialectic through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses, to attain to what each reality is and desists not until by sheer intelligence *he apprehends the reality of good;* then he stands at the real goal of the intelligible world, as the man in our simile stood at the goal of the visible.' [1]

The education of the philosopher 'leads what is best in the soul up to the vision of what is best in things that are'. [2]

This dependence of knowledge on the vision of a supreme reality shows how much Clement had to give. His account of faith and conversion was a more practicable thing than any system of education. Conversion worked for all sorts and conditions of men while philosophical training was never meant for any but the few. Clement's account of faith as perception of spiritual things was a thing to which Christians could testify. They had been blind but could now see. The supreme reality in which faith found its object was a God who had revealed himself in a living as well as a written Word.

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[1]*Republic* 532.
[2]*Ibid*.

CHAPTER 11
LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

KNOWLEDGE

FOR Clement knowledge means two things. It is a thing of the intellect and a thing of the spirit. Knowledge finds truth by logical procedure and classifies things and concepts by reference to a system of thought. It begins with a faith which must inquire and it ascends to the knowledge of God. On the other hand knowledge is a life of the spirit and a growth in virtue. It begins with a faith which is God's power to salvation and goes on to perfection in the contemplation of God. These two kinds of knowledge start, continue, and finish together. They begin with faith and end in the vision of God. Their practices -- logical inquiry and Christian piety -- are interdependent ways of doing the same thing. This inseparability of intellect and spirit is not easy for us to follow and we may divide the two elements in order to understand better what Clement has to say. But in distinguishing the intellectual from the spiritual, the logical from the moral, it must be remembered that *'sa pensé est à la fois toute rationnelle et toute mystique.En lui le théologien et le "spirituel " ne se séparent pas.'* [1] Three general definitions of knowledge are given at the beginning of the sixth book of the *Stromateis*. [2] Two are accepted and one is rejected.

> Our knowledge and the spiritual paradise are our Saviour himself, into whom we are now planted after being transferred and transplanted out of the old life into good soil. The change of soil conduces to fruitfulness. The Lord, then, into whom we have been transplanted is the Light and true knowledge.
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> Now there are two other ways in which the word 'knowledge' is used.

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[1]Camelot, *Foi et Gnose. Introduction à l'étude de la connaissance mystique chez Clζment d'Alexandrie*, p. 58.
[2]*Strom. VI*, 2; II, 423, 11.

What is commonly referred to as knowledge, like intelligence and preconception, appears in all men universally in the knowing of particular objects. In it not only the rational but equally the irrational faculties participate. I would never call that knowledge which comes from sense-perception. But that which is called knowledge in a special sense [1] is characterised by judgement and reason. Through it rational powers alone will produce cases of knowledge, being directed only to mental objects through the bare activity of the soul. 'That man is good', says David, [2] 'who pities those destroyed by error and lends a share of the word of truth, not in a haphazard way', but -- 'he will dispense his words in judgement' -- with careful consideration. This is he who 'has scattered and given to the poor'.

The second definition of knowledge is rejected because, although it is most generally accepted, it deals partly with senseperceived objects and not solely with intellectual objects. Clement did not regard sense-perception as a means of discovering truth. 'The third definition defines knowledge as Plato and other philosophers would. This may be conveniently called logical knowledge. The first definition is peculiarly Christian and defines our knowledge as Christ himself. This may be called spiritual knowledge.

Clement's terminology [3] is, as usual, not systematic, and beyond these three broad definitions there is nothing fixed. He draws on Stoicism, Platonism and mystery religion for his terms. The resulting diversity may be measured from his description of γνωισ as an ἰδίωμα as well as an ἐ

íαἐπιωτήμηϑεωπία. For Clement ἐπιωτήμη is rational knowledge or understanding, equivalent often to ἀπόδειξισ. It is difficult to translate because the word 'science' is now rarely used to distinguish strictly reasoned knowledge from other kinds of knowledge. The word ἐπιωτήμη is also appl

σις consists of Θίοτις of first principles, and ἐπιστήμη of the Π1ίωτισ which follows from these principles. Θπιωτρμη is used to describe the vision of the

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[1] ἐαιπεέτωσ.

[2] Ps. cxii, 5 and 9.

[3] For the greater part of this paragraph I am indebted to Völker's section on the subject in *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus*, pp. 303-21.

gnostic.   ωισ is not natural θεωπία but ἐΠοΠτικήΠιωημονική and καταληΠτική. ωοφία is the perfection of knowledge, refers chiefly to the state of the knower and echoes the meanings given to it in the Wisdom literature and the Epistles of St Paul.

LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

Some account has already been given of Clement's attitude to philosophy and the mental training of the schools. He regarded some acquaintance with logical disciplines as essential to the Christian.

Some people [he says], thinking that they are 'gifted', deign neither to touch philosophy or dialectic nor to learn physical science. They require bare faith alone. Just as if they expected, after giving no attention to the vine, to pick bunches of grapes immediately from the beginning. The Lord is allegorically called the vine from which, with care and logical husbandry, the fruit is to be gathered. [1]

This logical skill is necessary for the interpretation of the Scriptures. We need it to hunt out the meaning of the complicated utterances of Scripture. We need logic again as a defence against the enemies of our faith. 'It is necessary for us to be familiar with the science of refutation for the sake of rejecting the deceitful opinions of the Sophists.' [2] But we need it for the still more important reason that knowledge is directed towards intellectual objects and results from the exercise of rational powers.

This is the meaning of the third definition of knowledge. Knowledge is distinguished by judgment and reason, the work of the rational faculties which are directed solely to intellectual objects through the activity of the soul alone.

(I) Judgement and reason

The so-called 'Eighth Book' of the *Stromateis* provides evidence of the kind of logic which Clement practised. This book is not part of the *Stromateis,* but is a note-book of extracts which Clement had made. [3] The contents of the book lack continuity

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[1]*Strom.* I, 43; II, 28, 18.

[2]*Strom.* I, 35; II, 23,19.

[3]These and the following critical remarks are based on J. von Arnim, *De octavo Clement is Stromateorum fibro* (Rostock, 1894), p. 12. Cf. Bousset,

but belong to the common field of logic. It appears that the book is based on notes which Clement took from lectures or from written treatises on logic. The notes are not derived from one lecture or course of lectures, nor from the works of one particular school. They were not prepared for publication and were not made public during Clement's life. These extracts show that Clement was interested in logic as an independent discipline. They also show the problems which he considered important. The arguments which are noted in this book are used in different ways throughout the *Stromateis.*

The contents of the book may be briefly indicated. It begins [1] with a statement of the necessity for, and the nature of, philosophical inquiry. This inquiry is necessary for the discovery of truth. It is, however, neither necessary nor desirable if it does not aim at the discovery of truth, but merely contents itself with argument. The most ancient philosophers, says Clement, were not given to sceptical disputation, and much less are we, whom the Scripture tells to seek and to examine for the sake of finding. It is only the more recent Greek philosophers who quibble incessantly and argue to no purpose except that of their own glorification. The barbarian philosophy rejects wordy wrangling and says, 'Seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you; ask and it shall be given you.' When we knock at the door of truth by logical inquiry, the barrier to knowledge is removed. When we ask questions in the Scripture, we receive the gift of knowledge from God. For we only find by seeking, examining, analysing, unfolding, questioning and clarifying. It is impossible not to gain knowledge if we do inquire fully in this way. (There is neither finding without seeking nor seeking without finding.) Those who are conscious of their ignorance should inquire. It is our duty to investigate not only the Scriptures but also common ideas, always working to some useful end. There are hot-headed wranglers and Sophists, but 'it is fitting that the lover

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Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandrien und Rom, p. 199. Pohlenz, *Klemens von Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum*, p. 111. Witt, *Albinus and the history of Middle Platonism*, pp. 31-39. Ernst *(De Clementis Alexandrini Stromatum, libro VIII qui fertur*, Göttingen, 1910) has been available through the references of Bousset and Pohlenz.
[1]*Strom.* VIII, I; III, 80, 3.

of truth should be at the same time a peaceful learner even in his inquiries, proceeding by rational proof to apprehending knowledge, for love not of himself but of truth'. [1]

The first logical term discussed and expounded is ἀπόδειξις. The term is not a meaningless sound but is used by all people as referring to some thing. In all discussion we must start from a clear and generally accepted definition of the term to be discussed. Such a definition of demonstration is: 'Discourse, which, from things accepted, produces belief in things disputed.' Demonstration, like belief and knowledge, may be firm and based on understanding, or else based on hope. [2] Real demonstration is the former kind, as the real doctor is the perfect doctor, and the real gnostic the perfect gnostic. 'For, by considering the perfection of the genus, we arrive at the most exact meaning of the terms.' [3] Demonstration draws conclusions from true premisses. Syllogism merely draws appropriate conclusions from premisses which may be true or false. Demonstration depends on first principles which cannot be demonstrated, but must be accepted by faith. Other first principles of demonstration, which come after that which springs from faith, are the things which appear clearly to sense and intellect, things which are simple, unanalysable or primary. [4] One may demonstrate by drawing conclusions from these first principles. Analysis is the reverse process of demonstration. It follows a train of reasoning back to its source in something believed from itself or something clear to sense and intellect. Every inquiry must start from something previously known. In fact, every inquiry is solved from pre-existing knowledge. This means that when we want to solve a problem we must first find out what the problem is. We must have clear definitions of its terms. If someone asks, Is the foetus an animal?' we must ask, 'What do you call an animal?' for Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics had different ideas as to what animals were. With this discussion and its emphasis on clear starting points, Clement brings his account of demonstration to an end. This account is derived mainly from Aristotelian sources.

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[1] *Strom.* VIII, 2; III, 81, 5.
[2] ἐΠΙωτημονΙκἐλΠΙωτική.
[3] *Strom.* VIII, 5; III, 82, 23.
[4] *Strom.* VIII, 7; III, 83, 24.

The refutation of sceptical suspense which follows is from the Stoic tradition. If nothing is certain then it cannot be certain 'that nothing is certain'. If we must always suspend our judgement, then we should suspend our judgement concerning our suspense of judgement. Suspense of judgement, however, has its place. The dogmatic philosopher is quite used to suspending judgement on particular points because of their obscurity or indecisive evidence, or because of his own inability to penetrate the problem. Scepticism, Clement returns to say in chapter 7, [1] is due to two causes -- the nature of the human mind, and the nature of the world which confronts it. On the one hand men seem to be always changing their minds and disagreeing with one another. Life is full of courts and councils which have to decide between conflicting alternatives, and libraries are full of books written by people who are as sure that they are right as they are sure that others are wrong. On the other hand the world is a very complicated place and it is hard to decide about it. One cannot believe everything nor can one disbelieve everything, and often the evidence is balanced between conflicting views. So we are led to scepticism.

In the chapter [2] between these two references to scepticism Clement gives an account of the kind of definition which he considers so essential. Induction shows that a thing is, division and definition show what it is, and demonstration shows if it is, what it is, and why it is. The definition of man is reached by dividing the genus 'animal' into its species until we reach the simple species which consists of 'man' and nothing else. Disputes often arise simply because people will not define what they are talking about. A definition expounds the essence of a thing -- e.g. 'Man is a rational, laughing animal.' [3] Another chapter deals with names as distinct from concepts and things. [4] Names may be classified in different ways, according to the categories which may apply to them in themselves or in relation to one another. [5] The same name may apply to different things and different names

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[1]*Strom.* VIII, 22; III, 93, 19.
[2]Ch. 6. *Strom.* VIII, 17; 111, 90, 9.
[3]*Strom.* VIII; III, 93, 12 and 14.
[4]Ch. 8. *Strom.*   ὀνόματα τὰ νοήματα τὰ Ππάγματα.
[5]Aristotle's ten and Xenocrates' two.

may apply to the same thing. Some things have the same definition but different names. Other things have different definitions but the same name. This identity of name may be the result of chance or of deliberate intention and may operate in different ways.

The last chapter of the book deals with causes, and uses both Stoic and Aristotelian terminology. Causes are classified into original (those that start off a causal process), sufficient (those that are by themselves sufficient to produce the effect), cooperating (those that work together and assist in producing the effect) and necessary (those without which the effect could not be produced). [1] The word 'cause' may be predicated of three things -- what is a cause, of what it is a cause, and to what it is a cause. [2] All causes are means [3] to an effect, but all means to an effect are not causes. The murder of her children by Medea is the result of a complicated nexus -- her anger, her jealousy, her love, the departure of Jason, the building of the *Argo,* the cutting of the trees on Pelion. These things are all means but they are not all causes of the murder. What does not prevent is not active and not a cause, what does prevent is active and cause. ἐνγὰπτῶ+ ἐ   ν καὶ δπᾱν τι τὸ αἴτιον   ται. The Aristotelian account of causation is introduced and blended with the Stoic account with which the chapter began. A 'cause' cannot be understood apart from what it effects. Creator, maker, father must create, make, be father to something or someone. The interaction and joint action of causes are discussed. Co-operating causes help something else to produce an effect. Joint causes play a direct part themselves in producing the effect.

Of this logic note-book three things may be said. First that the contents are not Clement's invention but come from an Antiochean source, [4] and a later tradition which mixed Aristotle

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[1] *Strom.* VIII, 25; III, 95, 27.

[2] *Strom.* VIII, 26; III, 96, 18.

[3] διὄ.

[4] Antiochus of Ascalon, Academic philosopher who initiated the dogmatic, eclectic reaction against the scepticism which had dominated the Academy and who was the founder thereby of Middle Platonism. Chief source for the study of Antiochus Cicero. See *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, pp. 31-41. R. E. Witt summarises the 8th Book of the Stromateis from a philological point of view and concludes that it has an unmistakeably Antiochean character.

with Stoicism. [1] Secondly, that the contents are Clement's selection and that here as elsewhere obscurity of expression does not imply the absence of penetrating thought. Thirdly, that the contents show where Clement found the logical distinctions which he used to deal with his own specific problems. None of these three points can be fully expounded here; but in connection with the last point three examples might be mentioned. The theory of demonstration gave Clement his key idea of faith, the idea of a co-operating cause as distinct from a sufficient cause enabled him to give philosophy and Christianity a different but real status in the discovery of truth, and the difference between non-prevention and causality was basic to his theodicy.

(2) The objects of thought

Clement's account of dialectic shows how he makes logical procedure not merely a technique for the protection of truth but an important part of knowledge. The dialectic, he says, which is common in the schools is the philosopher's gymnastic. It concerns neither reality nor truth but aims merely at the development of argumentative skill. [2] Such a skill can stop people being seduced into heresies, and while philosophy cannot make truth more powerful it can put a fence and wall around it. [3] Dilaectic can confirm what is true by demonstration and can remove doubts. [4] In *Strom.* I, ch. 28, [5] Clement takes the matter further. The Mosaic philosophy consists, he says, of four parts, the fourth and highest being theology, the vision [6] which Plato ascribes to the really great mysteries, or what Aristotle calls metaphysics. Plato calls dialectic the science which finds the explanations of real things. This is to be acquired not for the sake of sophistical skill but for the sake of being able to say and do what is well pleasing to God.

> The true dialectic, [7] then, is linked with the true philosophy. It examines things and tests powers and authorities, rises from them

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[1] Pohlenz points out how important this later tradition is for the blending of these elements. *Klemens von Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum*, p. 112 (footnote).

[2] *Strom.* I, 39; II, 26, II.

[3] *Strom.* I, 99; II, 63, 28.

[4] *Strom.* VI, 156; II, 512, 9.

[5] *Strom.* I, 176; II, 108, 24.

[6] ἐποπτεία.

[7] *Strom.* I, 177; II, 109, 5.

gradually to the most excellent essence of all, and dares to go beyond to the God of all things. It professes not experience of mortal things, but knowledge of divine and heavenly things. From this there follows an appropriate manner of conduct in speech and action in human relations. Therefore the Scripture is right in wanting us to become such dialecticians, and exhorts, 'Be trustworthy money changers', rejecting some things but holding on to the good.

For this real dialectic is the wisdom which divides the objects of thought and shows purely and clearly the substance of each real thing. Or it is the power which divides the kinds of things, coming down to their most individual characteristic, displaying each real thing to be seen purely as it is. Wherefore it alone leads to the true wisdom, a divine power which knows things that are as they are, which possesses -what is perfect, and is freed from all passion. It does this not without the Saviour who by the divine word has removed from the eye of the soul the dark film of ignorance which is caused by a sinful way of life and who has given us the best faculty of all 'that we may know well whether we are dealing with man or God'.

We can best understand this very important passage by a comparison with Plato. There are two aspects of the Platonic dialectic -- its upward movement and its downward movement. The ascent of the soul to the Form of the Good is described most fully in Book VII of the *Republic.* Plato says, 'So too when any one tries by dialectic through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses to attain to what each reality is, and desists not until by sheer intelligence he apprehends the reality of good, then he stands at the real goal of the intelligible world, as the man in our simile stood at the goal of the visible.' [1] There is little difference between this account and that of Clement above. The 'powers' of Clement fulfil the function of the forms of Plato. In both cases dialectic is a rational process which has nothing to do with sense-experience, but concentrates on the essences of things. The dialectician climbs up the hierarchy of the essences, forms, or powers to the highest essence of all -- the ultimate reality, God or the Good.

The downward movement of the dialectic is described by Plato in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* where the aim is to define the 'kind' or 'form' [2] of the sophist or the statesman.

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[1] *Republic*, 532.
[2] γένοσ. . .εἶδοσ used interchangeably.

Dividing according to Kinds, not taking the same Form for a different one or a different one for the same -- is not that the business of the science of dialectic? . . . And the man who can do that discerns clearly *one* Form everywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and *many* Forms different from one another, embraced from without by one Form; and again one Form connected in a unity through many wholes, and *many* Forms entirely marked off apart. This means knowing how to distinguish, Kind by Kind, in what ways the several Kinds can or cannot combine. [1]

This dialectic is the definition of the essence of a particular thing which Clement describes in paragraph *(b)*. It 'shows purely and clearly the substance of each real thing'. This was the science of dialectics as practised in the school of Plato and parodied by Aristophanes. [2] Sophistry, for example, is defined by Plato as 'the art of contradiction-making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image-making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human of production, that presents a shadow play of words'. [3] These definitions are in a sense unsatisfactory until the first kind of dialectic has been successfully carried out. They depend for their meaning on the ultimate reality and until that has been seen they are insecure. The ultimate term in the above definition is 'art', and 'sophistry' is defined in terms of 'art'. The meaning of 'art' must then be fixed by defining it in terms of another 'higher' entity, which must also be defined, and so on. No definitions are secure until the Form of the Good has been seen. This is the point behind the upward and downward path described in the *Republic.* 'Dialectic, treating its hypotheses not as first principles but as literally hypotheses. . . until it comes as far as that which is not hypothesis, to the first principle of everything. This it grasps and then, reversing its procedure, takes hold of that which takes hold of this first principle until it so completes its descent' [4]

Another element of dialectic which is most important from the practical point of view is the 'examining' and 'testing' mentioned in *(a)*. An example of this testing is in Book 1 of the *Republic.* Various definitions of justice are ejected on grounds of in-

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[1] *Sophist*, 253 (Cornford translation).
[2] Aristophanes, *Epicrates*, frag. II.
[3] *Sophist*, 268 (Cornford translation).
[4] *Republic*, 511.

consistency, inability to stand up to the objections brought forward. It is not until much later that a satisfactory definition of justice is reached -- a definition which is in terms of goodness and which is insecure until the Form of the Good has been apprehended. This testing has sometimes been regarded as the whole of dialectic. It is displayed elaborately in the *Parmenides* and became very popular with Middle and Neo-Platonists. It is linked with analysis in the *Republic.*

Unless a man can abstract the Form of the good from all else and distinguish it by analysis, unless he makes it run the gauntlet of every proof and is eager to try it by the test not of seeming but of reality and finally, unless he emerges from it all with his principle not overthrown, then will you not say that he does not know the real good? [1]

The Form of the Good is reached by analysis by breaking up our common ethical notions until only the notion of goodness is left.

To the Platonic account of dialectic Clement ad   κ ἄ
        σωτῆпος, [2] says Clement. None of this process can take place until the veil of ignorance and sin is lifted from the eye of the soul. 'Some men have too bad hearts to have good heads.' [3] Ignorance is the result of a bad way of life. [4] The life must be changed and the darkness of sin dispelled. This is the work of the Saviour. He brings us to a knowledge of ourselves. He alone reveals the Father. 'For no man knoweth the Son but the Father, nor the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals him.' This is the mystery of Christ revealed according to the ability of those who understand. Those who are men in understanding should distinguish and expound the three-fold sense of Scriptures. 'For the whole Scripture is not to be understood "all alike". It must be approached with the greatest possible dialectical skill by those who hunt for the sequence of divine teaching.' [5]

Secondly Clement refers to 'the *true* dialectic' and 'the *true* philosophy'. The truth in question is ultimate, essential, Christian truth. There might be and there were in Clement's day many

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[1] *Repulic*, 534.
[2] *Strom.* I, 178; II, 109, 21.
[3] John Smith, *Select Discourses* (4th ed.), p. 12.
[4] Cf. Eph. iv. 18.
[5] *Strom.* I, 179; II, 110, 8.

systems of dialectic leading to different first principles. This showed that consistency was not enough to justify the claims of one system over another and to distinguish it from others. To determine a system, its first principle must be fixed. Clement does this by accepting ultimate Christian truth by faith. Let ABCD be a square figure of a fixed size with diagonals intersecting at a point O. The relations between the angles, sides and diagonals are fixed and invariable. There might be any number of figures of this shape and size in the world. But there would be only one sucn figure where O is 3 inches and 6 inches from the side and bottom of this page and B is 2½ inches and 5 inches from the side and bottom. Similarly there might be any number of systems of dialectics but only one which will follow necessarily from ultimate Christian truth.

The chief importance of dialectic is that it leads to a knowledge of real things and of God. The ὄνταα, αἱ , αἱ ἱ . For most Middle Platonists the ideas, powers, or forms were ideas in the Divine Mind. For Clement they exist in the Mind of God, i.e. in Christ. The Son is identified with the world of ideas and with the whole universe of truth. This means that the divine revelation comes not: merely from above but from below -- from the objects of thought themselves. These are the parts of his truth which Christ has drawn together. They are the ideas, the powers which he contains within himself. Whenever the soul knows the essence of anything, it knows a part of the Divine Wisdom, a part of Christ. Hence, even in the humblest knowledge, we receive from God. directly as the light of the sun to our eyes and indirectly as that light is reflected from the objects which we see. This divine origin of knowledge enables us to see clearly the connection between the logical and spiritual. The objects of logical knowledge are, in a sense, divine, and it is their divine origin that makes it possible for them to be part of an experience which is spiritual. The gradual increase of knowledge makes it possible that in the early stages this spiritual character might be missed, while in later stages it becomes increasingly apparent.

CHAPTER 12
SPIRITUAL KNOWLEDGE

'OUR knowledge and the spiritual paradise is our Saviour Himself into whom we are now planted, after being transferred and transplanted out of the old life into good soil. The change of soil conduces to fruitfulness. The Lord, then, into whom we have been transplated, is the Light and true knowledge.'

1. PLANTED IN CHRIST

The metaphor of a garden [1] 1 is used to describe the relation of the gnostic to his Lord. The gnostic must first be transplanted from another place. He is pulled up by the roots and planted in Christ. He must break with his former way of life, put aside godless opinion and turn to the truth. [2] Any man in Christ is a new creature, washed free of the old life, for old things (fornication, incontinence, unrighteousness) are passed away, and new things (purity, continence, righteousness) have taken their place. [3] Knowledge is dependence on and unity in Christ. We climb the upward path by hanging on to Christ in faith, knowledge, and love. To grow in knowledge is to grow in Christ in whom we are planted and from whom we draw our life. Henry Vaughan wrote of *'The seed growing secretly'*:

Slowly and sadly doth he grow, And soon as left, shrinks back to ill; O feed that life which makes him blow And spread and open to thy will! [4]

The garden in which we are planted is the garden of Paradise. Paradise had two main associations for Clement -- it included the tree which was the source of knowledge and it was also a synonym for heaven. The tree of life is the Cross, which is our sole need and

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[1]Παπάδειωοο
[2]*Strom.* VII, 27; III, 20, 16.
[3]*Strom.* III, 62; II, 224, 23 (2 Cor. v. 17).
[4]Henry Vaughan, *'The Seed Growing Secretly'*.

salvation. [1] Its fruit is the knowledge of the truth. [2] It is the divine Logos who was planted in the world as the tree in the garden, and who flowered and gave fruit. By the tree of his cross we find knowledge. 'For our life was hung upon the Tree, that we might believe.' [3]

The garden of Paradise was for Clement, as for most people, also a symbol of heaven. For a Christian to be in Paradise meant nothing else than to be in heaven. Clement speaks twice about being in Paradise. It is remarkable that on both occasions he is talking of a *present* not a future event. 'Who', he says, 'goes hurrying off to hell when he can be a citizen of heaven, when he can farm Paradise, walk around heaven and draw on the pure source of life, when he can fly through the air in the path of the bright cloud, like Elijah, looking at the rain of salvation?' [4] Writing of the wearing of floral crowns and their overpowering scent, he remarks upon the fading beauty of the flower and says, 'It is fitting that we should revel with restraint ὡσὲνΠαπαδείῳῳ.' [5] Consequently when Clement speaks of the Lord as our spiritual Paradise he has in mind the divine source of our knowledge and our present enjoyment of Paradise. These two points recur throughout his account of knowledge.

II. FROM FAITH TO KNOWLEDGE

The transferring of the plant makes it fruitful. The growth of the plant in new soil symbolises the development of the man in Christ. The plant grows continuously and not by a series of intermittent jerks. Leaf follows tender shoot, flower follows bud. So grows the gnostic, quietly and continuously in his Lord. When we believe in God we start to know him. When we know him we

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[1] *Paed.* III, 25; I, 251, II.

[2] *Strom.* III, 104; II, 244, 5.

[3] *Strom.* V, 72; II, 374, 26.

[4] *Prot.* 92; I, 68, 3. Butterworth notes, ' Clement has drawn together the Elijah of the Transfiguration (Matt. xvii. 5) and the Elijah of Mount Carmel' (1 Kings xviii. 44).

[5] *Paed.* II, 71; I, 200, 14. Cf. *Strom.* II, 51; II, 140, 15 where 'Eden' is translated τπυφή, i.e. delight, revel. Cf. Gen. ii. 15. 'And God took the man whom he had formed and placed him in the garden of delight' (ἐντῶ+Παπαδείωφτῆσ τπῆσ). *Paed.* II, 71; I, 200, 14 is not merely an historical reference but an eschatological one.

start to love him. When we know and love him we live as though we were in heaven, and we see his face because our hearts are pure. His face is Jesus Christ. We pray all the time because we know that he is with us all the time. This development is described in *Strom.* VII, ch. 10. [1]

ωισ), says Clement, is the perfection of man as man. This perfection is achieved by the understanding (ἐΠιΩτήμη) of divine things concerning conduct, manner of life and speech, and is harmonious with itself and with the Logos of God. Through such understanding faith is brought to perfection and the believer grows to full manhood. Faith is an intrinsic good. It does not inquire about God but accepts the fact of his existence and glorifies him. To obtain knowledge one must begin with faith and grow in it by divine grace. [2] To put aside doubts and to believe is the foundation of knowledge. Christ is both the foundation and the superstructure. Neither faith which is the starting point nor love which is the goal can be directly taught. The tradition of knowledge is entrusted to those who have shown themselves worthy of it. We pass from knowledge to the splendour of love, from light to light. 'To him that hath it shall be added.' To faith shall be added knowledge, to knowledge love and to love the inheritance.

Depending completely on Christ by faith, knowledge and love, we may climb with him to the very presence of God. All knowledge comes from God, and by knowledge we are led to the perfect end which has no end. [3] We are taught in advance what kind of life we will enjoy when, chastened and purified, we take our place among the gods. For those who have been made perfect and who are pure in heart there is the restoration to eternal contemplation. Knowledge purifies and prepares us for the heavenly place. It leads to this crowning place of rest, and teaches the pure in heart to gaze on God 'face to face'. [4]

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[1] *Strom.* VII, 55; III, 40, 21.

[2] ωισ. The former is restricted to what is spoken. The latter includes σοφία and other things.

[3] τέλοσ. . .τὸἀτελεύτητονκαὶτέλειον.

[4] τὸν καθαπὸν τῆ καρδἱα + ἐΠιωτημονικω + + ς τὸν θεὸν ἐ

A second description of the upward path follows. 'Faith is, as it were, a direct knowledge of the essential things. Knowledge is the demonstration from the things received through faith, built up strongly and firmly on faith through the teaching of the Lord. [1] It leads on from faith to what cannot be shaken and is grasped by understanding.' There is one conversion from paganism to faith and another from faith to knowledge. Knowledge in turn is consummated in love. He who knows anticipates on earth the angelic status which will be his in heaven. When he has climbed. as high as flesh can climb, he continues on through the seventh heaven to the Father's house, the 'mansion' of the Lord where he will remain as an eternal light, changeless and constant. David speaks of this when he says, 'Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath clean hands and a pure heart. . . . He shall receive a blessing from the Lord and mercy from God his Saviour. This is the generation of them that seek the Lord, that seek the face of the God of Jacob.' When David speaks of the Saviour as God, and of the Lord as the face of the God of Jacob, he is emphasising the unity of God. [2] The 'generation of those that seek the Lord' are the elect who seek after knowledge -- the Christian gnostics.

Those who are not gnostics may appear to act rightly by doing the same things as the gnostics do. But however brave they may be, their bravery remains an irrational impulse. Though they give up their bodies, they lack the love which follows from knowledge. Every action of the man with understanding is good action. Every action of the man without understanding is bad action [3] because it is unreasoned. The whole profession of the gnostic is in accordance with his rational piety. [4] There is truth and grandeur in the way the gnostic looks at the universe. He starts with wonder for the world about him. [5] This wonder is proof of his

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[1] Knowledge is the demonstration of faith in that its starting point is faith. Cf. *Strom.* II, 48; II, 138, 17; *Strom.* viii, 8; III, 84, 13. See Camelot, *op. cit.* p. 60.

[2] This is directed against the dualism of the heretics.

[3] *Strom.* VII, 59; III, 43, 18.

[4] ἐΠιωτημονικῆ   ᾳ.

[5] Here begins ch. II. *Strom.* vii, 60; III, 43, 29. Cf. *Theaetetus* 155D: μάλα
    ∯   γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχή φιλοσοφίας ἤ αὔτη.

ability to receive knowledge, and causes him to believe as soon as he bears about God and providence. Driven on from here he learns everything he can and strives in every way towards the knowledge for which he longs.

This busy, vast inquiring soul Brooks no control, No limits will endure, Nor any rest: it will all see, Not time alone; but ev'n eternity. What is it? Endless sure. [1]

The gnostic does not deal with mere words but with the realities which they indicate. He interprets words in a special way.

III. LIGHT AND TRUE KNOWLEDGE

'The Lord then is the Light and true knowledge.' Through knowledge we see our Lord face to face, we pray to him continually and we are joined to him by love.

(1) Face to Face. [2] Quoting I Cor. xiii. 12, Clement distinguishes (in several places) the vision of God through a mirror (δι ἐσόπτρου) from the vision of God face to face (πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον). This distinction is mentioned in Paedagogus I, ch. 6 where Clement is defending the perfection of faith against the heretical gnostics. He quotes the words of St Paul. 'Now we see through a glass, but then face to face.' We are unable to see because we are still carnal, wrapped up in all kinds of lusts. Our carnal condition is not, as some suppose, the result of our being in the body (ἐν σαρκί). 'For with this flesh and the face of an angel we shall see the promise face to face.' [3]

In *Stromateis* I, ch. 19 we are said to see God through a mirror by seeing his reflection in ourselves. [4] 'You have seen your

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[1] Thomas Traherne, *'Insatiableness'*. Cf. Henry More's encounter with his schoolmaster who wanted to know why More was so studious. More replied that it was because he wanted to know. ' "But, young man, what is the reason that you so earnestly desire to know things?" To which I instantly returned, "I desire, I say, so earnestly to know, that I may know." ' Quoted in Inge, *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought* (London, 1926), p. 55.

[2] A treatment of this point is given by Békés, *De continua oratione Clementis Alexandrini doctrina*, pp. 37-88.

[3] *Paed.* I, 36; I, III, 34.

[4] *Strom.* I, 94; II, 60, 22.

brother, you have seen your God', quotes Clement. [1] After putting aside the flesh [2] we see face to face because our heart is pure. The putting aside of the flesh is not physical death but the setting aside of fleshly passions. The gnostic becomes ἄσρκος.

God's face is his Son and the vision of this face belongs to the highest state of blessedness. There are many mansions in the Father's house. The gnostic climbs to the highest mansion.

But I declare also that those gnostic souls, excelling in magnificence of vision the condition of each holy rank, among whom the blessed dwellings of the gods are severally allotted, counted holy among the holy, are transported perfect from among perfect [souls]. They reach places better than better places, holding in embrace the divine vision not in mirrors or through mirrors; but they feast on that clearest and absolutely pure insatiable vision which is granted to greatly loving souls. They pluck eternally the fruit of eternal gladness and remain honoured with unchanging, perfect excellence. This is the apprehending vision of the pure in heart. [3]

This ascent and vision belong to the life after death; but the gnostic anticipates these things while still on earth. [4] He leaves the flesh behind when it has gone as high as it can go, and goes on to the top alone. [5] Knowledge is a rational death, a separation of the body from the soul.

(2) Continual Prayer. We reverence one God in one life. 'We are commanded to worship and adore the Logos, in the conviction that he is our Saviour and Leader, and through him to worship the Father. We do this not on selected days, as certain others do, but continually through the whole of life and in every way.' [6] The gnostic worships in every place, at every time, in gratitude for the gift of the knowledge of how to live. [7] Good company makes good men. How can the gnostic help growing better, when he is always in the company of God? He sings praises as he farms the earth or sails the sea. God knows and sees and hears everything,

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[1] Also quoted *Strom.* II, 70; II, 150, 22 and by Tertullian, *De Orat.*26. There is no ground for supposing that it was regarded as a saying of Jesus, the subject of φησί being probably 'the Scripture' or something similar, not 'the Lord'. J. H. Ropes, *Die Sprüche Jesu* (Leipzig, 1896), p. 49.

[2] μετ   ῆς σαρκὸς ἀπόΘεσιν.

[3] *Strom.* VII, 13; III, 10, 6.

[4] *Strom.* VII, 56; III, 41, 15.

[5] *Strom.* VII, 57; III, 42, II.

[6] *Strom.* VII, 35; III, 27, 9.

[7] *Strom.* III, 27, 18.

not just words and actions but thoughts as well. [1] Prayer is conversation with God. It is the crying, the longing, the upward flight of the soul, to God. God hears all inward speech. [2] He does not need talkative tongues to tell him, for he knows in one eternal glance all the thoughts of our minds. 'It is possible therefore to send up a prayer without speaking, by concentrating the inner spirit alone on mental speech, in undivided attention to God.' [3]

The final state of the gnostic is that of light which shines, unchanging and eternal, in the presence of God. In his earthly anticipation of this state he lives a life that is timeless and unchanging, a life that is always sensitive to the presence of God. Gnosis is the understanding and apprehending of things past, present, and future. [4] Contemplation sees clearly what is, what was, and what is to be. [5] In his daily life there is a timeless constancy of behaviour. He alone acts rightly and he acts rightly in all things. Nothing can throw him off his balance or rob him of his sure knowledge of the good. 'Knowledge never turns into ignorance, nor does good change into evil.' [6] He knows that he is in God's world and as his wonder grows into knowledge he learns to live by the essences, not the appearances of things. [7] He turns from distresses to the things that are really his, attaching no importance to the world's pleasures or its pains. [8] 'His whole life is prayer and conversation with God.' [9] He sees his Lord and looks on things invisible, paying no attention to what his eyes see. [10] Yet he appreciates beauty of body when it is blended with beauty of soul and he lives in love to his brethren. He prays from a pure heart in fellowship with angels and saints. He does good by habit and obeys his Lord's commandments day and night with gladness and thanksgiving. [11] The gnostic is 'the temple of God', divine, God-bearer and God-borne. [12] The believer may act rightly in one or two ways that have been mentioned. Only

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[1]*Strom.* VII, 37; III, 29, 7 and 14.
[10]*Strom.* VII, 76; III, 54, 21.
[11]*Strom.* VII, 80; III, 57, 6 and 13.
[12]*Strom.* VII, 82; III, 58, 25.
[2]*Strom.* VII, 39; III, 30, 15.
[3]*Strom.* VII, 43; III, 32, 25.
[4]*Strom.* VI, 61; II, 462, 21.
[5]*Strom.* VI, 62; II, 462, 21.
[6]*Strom.* VII, 70; III, 51, 1.
[7]*Strom.* VII, 60; III, 44, 9.
[8]*Strom.* VII, 63; III, 45, 28.
[9]*Strom.* VII, 73; III, 52, 22.

the gnostic acts rightly in them all and with complete understanding. [1]

(3) Love. The light of knowledge is absorbed in the fuller light of love. Knowledge ends in love, in the union of the lover and the loved, of the knower and the known. The gnostic does all things from love to God. He is free from passions except those, like hunger and thirst, which are necessary for physical existence. [2] He loves the Creator through the creatures. He is joined to his Beloved through love, and united to him by his choice. Love is divine,

for love is no longer the desire of the lover but a loving union [3] which has restored the gnostic to the unity of the faith, independent of time and place. He who has already acquired his inheritance through love, and has anticipated hope through knowledge, does not desire anything, as he has exactly what he desires. He remains in the one unalterable disposition, knowing and loving. He will not try to be like beautiful things for he possesses Beauty itself through love. [4]

He who has once been made perfect through love and who feasts eternally and insatiably on the unending joy of contemplation can no longer delight in the trivial things of dust. How can a man who has found the 'light inaccessible' turn back to earthly things? The gnostic has anticipated through love the inheritance and the perfect restitution. [5] He is predestined to this end. He has predestined himself through his knowledge and love of God. The future, which he foresees with gnostic faith, is clear, 'and through love the future is already present to him'. He has trusted his future to God. The trustworthiness of God is such that future blessedness is already his. He goes on to meet the future which through love he knows already with complete certainty.

Clement's distinction between desire and love, his connection of timelessness and love are expressed in T. S. Eliot *Four Quartets.*

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[1] *Strom.* VII, 84; III, 60, 2.

[2] *Strom.* VI, 71; II, 467, 7.

[3] στερκτικτ. . .Οἰκείωσις.

[4] *Strom.* VI, 73; II, 468, 17.

[5] Cf. John Smith, *Select Discourses*, p. 420. 'Heaven is not a thing without us, nor is happiness anything distinct from a true conjunction of the mind with God in a secret feeling of his goodness and reciprocation of affection to him, wherein the Divine glory most unfolds itself. . . . Then shall we be happy, when God comes to be all in all in us.'

(a)Desire itself is movement, Not in itself desirable; Love is itself unmoving, only the cause and end of movement, Timeless, and undesiring, Except in the aspect of time, Caught in the form of limitation Between unbeing and being.

(b) Love is most nearly itself When here and now cease to matter.

(c) Here the impossible union of spheres of existence is actual, Here the past and future Are conquered, and reconciled. [1]

There is in love a contentment which overrides time and place, and will remain the same, come what may. The treasure of the gnostic is laid up in heaven.

And he prays that the things which are really good, and which concern the soul, may be his and abide with him. Accordingly he does not reach after any of the things that are absent but rests content with the things that are present. For he lacks none of the things that he thinks are good, being already sufficient for himself through the grace of God and knowledge. But having become self-sufficient he wants for no other things. Knowing the will of the Almighty, and having a thing at the same time as he prays for it, he is come close to almighty power, and striving to be spiritual through infinite love he is made one with the Spirit. [2]

The gnostic loves God through his creatures. He does good more quickly than others speak of their intention to do it. He does not remember who has wronged him but readily and completely forgives. On earth his varied works of love are manifest. In heaven he finds his end in love to God. This love unites him with God and union with God fulfils his final hope. He does not want to be warmed by the heat of a spiritual fire nor lit by the light of a spiritual lamp. He wants to be light himself in the Lord who is Light and True Knowledge.

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[1]Eliot, *Four Quartets* (London, 1944).
[2]*Strom.* VII, 44; III, 33, 13.

CONCLUSION

'The Lord is our Light and True Knowledge.' To know is to know Christ, to be planted in him, and to hang upon him. To know is to be one with Christ in God. 'There is', wrote John Smith, 'a knowing of "the truth as it is in Jesus" -- as it is in a Christlike nature, as it is in that sweet, mild, humble, and loving spirit of Jesus, which spreads itself like a morning sun, upon the souls of good men, full of light and life.' [1] To know is to know Light, to be lifted from the darkness of sin and error into the eternal Light of God. It is to be not illuminated, but to be Light.

To know in this way is to anticipate on earth the splendour of heaven. Such knowledge lies the other side of death.

'They are all gone into the world of light! And I alone sit ling'ring here.' [2]

But Clement believed he could anticipate death by putting off the body with its affections and lusts. This was more than the tuning of the instrument in anticipation --

Since I am coming to that holy room, Where, with thy choir of saints for evermore, I shall be made thy music: as I come I tune the instrument here at the door, And what I must do then, think here before. [3]

It was a present possession of that 'joy which is unspeakable and full of glory': which leads us into the porch of heaven, and to the confines of eternity. It carries up the soul into a mount of transfiguration, or to the top of Pisgah, where it may take a prospect of the promised land, and gives it a map or scheme of its future inheritance: it gives it sometimes some anticipations of blessedness, some foretastes of those joys, those rivers of pleasure which run at God's right hand for evermore. [4]

Such knowledge needs no comment but the prayer of Clement, 'Do thou thyself make us who dwell within thy peace, who have been brought across into thy city, and who have sailed serenely over the angry waves of sin, do thou make us to be borne along in stillness by the soft wind of thy Holy Spirit, the unspeakable Wisdom, by night and by day unto thy perfect day.' [5]

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[1] *Select Discourses*, p. 8.
[2] Henry Vaughan, *'Ascension Hymn'*.
[3] John Donne, *'Hymn to God my God, in my sickness'*.
[4] John Smith, *Select Discourses*, p. 426.
[5] *Paed.* III, 101; I, 291, 3.

CHAPTER 13
SYMBOLISM

'So it seems to me that gnostic ability produces three final results. First, the gnostic knows things, secondly he fulfils the commands of the Logos, and thirdly he can hand on the hidden things of truth in a way that shows reverence to God.' [1]

To complete the account of knowledge we shall examine the third ability of the gnostic -- his ability to hand on to others 'the hidden things of truth'. We shall consider first the 'hidden things' and the justification which Clement gives for hiding truth. Then we shall consider the gnostic tradition' by which these things are handed on.

I. HIDDEN THINGS

The most important parts of truth are 'hidden'. Some are not written down at all but are reserved for the oral instruction of the initiated. Others are written in an enigmatic and obscure way. The Lord did not reveal to the many the things which belonged to the few. He revealed these things to the few by word of mouth and not in writing. [2] On the other hand what has been written about ultimate things is expressed in a mysterious form. In Scripture there is enigma, allegory and symbol. Some things are clear, unveiled, and convey definite moral teaching, but other things are expressed in riddles and parables and there is need of an interpreter. The Paidagogos teaches us clear and definite moral precepts; but we need a Didaskalos to handle the riddles and symbols. [3]

In *Strom. v Clement* examines many examples of symbolism and gives reasons for its use. 'Therefore one may say that all who have spoken of the divine nature, barbarians and Greeks, have hidden the first principles of things and handed the truth down in

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[1] *Strom.* VII, 4; III, 5, 5.
[2] *Strom.* I, 13; II, 10, 3.
[3] *Paed.* III, 97; I, 289, 15-26.

riddles, signs, allegories, metaphors, and similar figures.'[1] Four reasons are given for its use.

(1) Moral. Bad people cannot understand the truth. It is desirable that they should not have a chance to misunderstand it. Their parodies would offend the righteous and mislead others who might otherwise be led into a right way of life. Truth has a sacredness which must not be profaned by evil men. Clement says this symbolically.

Therefore, the method of concealment is truly divine and, because of the pure and holy teaching which it shuts away in the sanctuary of truth, is most necessary for us. The Egyptians signified this by the places they called 'adyta', and the Hebrews signified it by the veil of the sanctuary. Entry was permitted only to those who were consecrated, that is, dedicated to God, circumcised in the lusts of the passions because of their love to the one God. To Plato also it seemed not right for the impure to touch the pure. [2]

Truth is too precious a pearl to cast before swine. It must be hidden from all except those whose faith and manner of life qualify them for knowledge. 'For it is their wish that the really genuine philosophy and the true theology should be the possession only of those who often draw near to them and who have proved themselves in faith and the whole of their lives.' [3]

(2) Traditional. If the truth is veiled in symbols, interpreters will be needed. These interpreters will hand On a tradition which they have received. They will choose the people to whom they hand it on. Tradition and secrecy work together to keep the truth from those who would corrupt it. Personal supervision will make the pupil more industrious and save him from much misconception. 'It is also their intention that we should need an expositor and teacher. For they thought that in this way several things would be accomplished. We should be more energetic in the pursuit of truth, those who were worthy would be benefited; and in learning from those whose knowledge was really good there would be no danger of misunderstanding.' [4]

(3) Power of suggestion. The truth by being veiled possesses

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[1]*Strom.* V, 21; II, 340, 5.
[2]*Strom.* V, 19; II, 338, 27.
[3]*Strom.* v, 56; II, 364, 8.
[4]*Strom.* v, 56; IX, 364, II.

greater powers of suggestion and makes a more vivid impression on the minds of its recipients. 'Moreover all things that shine through an interposed medium show forth the truth in a grander and more venerable form, like fruits which are seen through water and forms which are seen through veils. . . . For complete illumination shows up the defects of a thing.' [1] Fruit that is old and wrinkled looks fresh and splendid when placed in water. Bodies that are veiled not only gain a touch of mystery but hide their defects of form. In the same way, the defects of an idea are hidden and it is given a more impressive form when it is concealed in a mysterious saying.

(4) Variety of interpretations. Not only are symbols more impressive but they can say several things at once. Ordinary language in its effort to describe these things would take more than one proposition: 'forms which are seen through veils which add more allusions to them. . . . Besides, clear things can be understood in one way only. It is possible to receive several meanings at once when we receive sayings with a hidden meaning. In such circumstances the inexperienced and unlearned man falls into error. But the gnostic understands.' [2]

A few examples of symbolism may be considered. ' "According to the grace", he says, "which is given to me, as a wise master builder, I have laid the foundation. Another builds thereon gold and silver, precious stones." This is the superstructure of knowledge on the foundation of faith in Jesus Christ.' [3] This is an intelligible interpretation. Another is more difficult, though eminently laudable. ' "One must not sail on land", is a Pythagorean proverb. It shows that taxes and similar rents, being a lot of trouble and also uncertain, are to be deprecated. Therefore the Word says that tax gatherers will be saved with difficulty.' [4] The meaning of this proverb is, 'Don't take unnecessary risks! Don't try to get rich quick!' The risks which are inevitable at sea can be avoided on land. If you take on the insecure though lucrative job of collecting taxes, you are asking for trouble.

Not only verbal symbolism but also pictorial symbolism is

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[1] *Strom.* v, 56; II, 364, 15.
[2] *Strom.* V, 56; II, 364, 17.
[3] *Strom.* V, 26; II, 342, 10.
[4] *Strom.* V, 28; II, 344, 3.

used. A chapter is devoted to the symbolism of the Tabernacle and its furniture, from which chapter the following example is taken.

The covering and the veil were variously adorned with the colours of the hyacinth, purple, scarlet and yellow. So it was hinted that the nature of the elements contained the revelation of God. For the purple is from water, the yellow from earth; blue is like air, being dark, even as scarlet is like fire. [1]

Another chapter is given to symbolism in numbers, geometrical ratios and music. This begins,

As then in astronomy we have Abraham as an example, similarly in arithmetic we have the same Abraham. For, having heard that Lot has been taken prisoner and having numbered his own home-born servants at 318 (τιη), he attacks and captures a very large number of the enemy. They say then that the figure for 300 (τ) is in its shape the type of the sign of the Lo
ς). [2]

Geometrical symbolism is illustrated: 'For the expression "wooden squares" signifies security in that the square shape forms right angles in all directions.' [3]

Symbolic expression and interpretation is perhaps the part of Clement's thought which is most foreign to modern minds. These things seem at first to savour of the occult and weird, to lack justification, or to seem unnecessary and trivial. What was the point behind this symbolism? One minor point was that, particularly in Alexandria, Christian converts came from a background of which it was a normal feature. It was an inevitable part of their mental machinery. The main point which underlies all the examples is that there are connexions in the world other than those normally seen. These connexions take the form of likenesses, proportions, harmonies. They all point out unities in apparent diversities. They show that the world is a complex unity of far greater complexity than is normally seen. They give point to such studies as astronomy -- 'This science makes the soul

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[1] *Strom.* V, 32; II, 347, 7.
[2] *Strom.* VI, 84; II, 473., 20. Cf. Epistle of Barnabas, ch. IX.
[3] *Strom.* VI, 86; II, 475, I.

particularly quick to understand, of clear insight into truth, and capable of refuting falsehood. It enables the soul to find agreements and relations so as to hunt out likeness in unlike things.' [1] Mondésert says,

At the basis of symbolism, as Clement understands it, there is a profound idea which in their own way the very excesses of the method of interpretation underline. This idea is the relatedness of all things among themselves, the intelligible bond which sets them in order, and brings them together again, which makes them one beneath their multiplicity, *one* by their cohesion and their unity. [2]

II. THE GNOSTIC TRADITION

The gnostic understands riddles, allegories and symbols. He understands the unseen unity to which they all bear witness. Consequently he alone can teach others the meaning of the mysterious text of Scripture. In doing this he becomes a link in the chain of tradition which stretches back to our Lord and the apostles.

This knowledge has come down to us through being handed down verbally from the apostles by a continuous succession of a small number of men. [3]

We dare to say, for such is the gnostic belief, that the true gnostic understands everything, embraces everything, and grasps firmly even what is difficult for us. Such were James, Peter, John, Paul, and the other apostles. For the prophecy is full of knowledge because it was given by the Lord and then again explained by the Lord to the apostles. [4]

The knowledge which the gnostic possesses comes to him through this tradition. [5] It is an unwritten inheritance but written, as foretold by the prophet, on the heart. The tradition is called the 'gnostic tradition' [7] because it hands on knowledge. The ancients did not write because they did not want to use up precious time which might be spent in teaching. [8] We need a teacher to explain

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[1] *Strom.* VI, 90; II, 477, 14.
[2] Mondésert, *op. cit.* p. 151.
[3] *Strom.* VI, 61; II, 462, 28.
[4] *Strom.* VI, 68; II, 466, 5.
[5] *Strom.* VII, 55; III, 41, 4.
[7] *Strom.* V, 63; II, 368, 14; *Strom.* I, 15; II, 11, 19 and elsewhere.
[8] *EcL. 27*; III, 144, 26.

the Scripture to us. The Scripture expresses things in parables or likenesses because the Lord came in the likeness of what he was not. He was not of this world but came as belonging to it. [1] He led men hence to the world of spiritual things and essential truth by means of parables. The real meaning of a parable is different from its apparent meaning. The whole Gospel story may well seem a parable to the ignorant. When Scripture is elucidated and expounded it declares that 'the very agony suffered by the flesh, which the Lord had assumed, is "the power and the wisdom of God" '. [2] When the riddles and parables of the books of the prophets are expounded we find that his suffering was foretold.

Hermas [3] was told to write in a book what the elect should know. He wrote the letters well enough, but could not group them into syllables. Faith, says Clement, reads the individual letters clearly, but only 'the gnostic exposition' reads the syllables. [4] The new book of which Isaiah spoke is the heart of the gnostic. [5] The Saviour taught the apostles the unwritten interpretation of Scripture and this has been handed down from them and written by the power of God on our new hearts. [6]

Clement gives an example of a gnostic exposition of the Ten Commandments. [7] The number ten represents in many ways the whole creation of God. The first and second commandments emphasise the unity and sovereignty of God. [8] The fourth commandment speaks of the seventh day, which is Christ, our true rest. Some cosmological arithmetic follows. The father whom we are to honour (fifth commandment) [9] is God and the mother is divine knowledge and wisdom. Adultery means idolatry, murder means destruction of the truth, and theft means taking what belongs to someone else, particularly the honour and the truth that belong to God. [10]

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[1]*Strom.* VI, 126; II, 495, 22.
[10]*Strom.* VI, 507,8.
[2]*Strom.* VI, 127; II, 496, 9.
[3]*Herm. Vis.* II, I, 3.
[4]*Strom.* VI, 131; II, 498, 2.
[5]*Strom.* VI, 131; II, 498, 11.
[6]*Strom.* VI, 131; II, 498, 15.
[7]*Strom.* VI, ch. 16; II, 499, 12.
[8]*Strom.* VI, 137; II, 501, 9 and 14.
[9]*Strom.* VI, 146; II, 506, 28. *Strom.* II, 507, 8.

CONCLUSION

Knowledge differs from faith as a complex unity differs from a simple unity. Faith is a simple act of acceptance or perception. Logical knowledge is a complex process of reasoning which grasps the unity of the intellectual world. According to Plato it is the ability to see things as a whole [1] that distinguishes the dialectician. Spiritual knowledge is growth in Christ, an awareness of God's universal presence and union with him in love. Symbolism shows the hidden connections between things and points to their underlying unity. Knowledge is always a complex unity, as faith is a simple unity. Faith reads the letters, while knowledge reads the syllables.

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[1]*Rep.*537.

CONCLUSION

AT the beginning of this study we noted two patterns -- the one and the one-many, the transcendent and the immanent. These two patterns were blended, to make one basic antithesis of the transcendent one and the immanent one-many. This antithesis has recurred in each part of Clement's thought. God, the transcendent unknowable one, is distinguished from the Son, the immanent one-many. The goodness of God transcends in its simple purity the varied goodness of created things. The truth which is the sacred and unique possession of the Christian Church transcends the manifold complexity of all other truth as it has been grasped by the minds of men. Faith, which is the simple assent, decision, perception of the soul, transcends the vast complexity of knowledge.

In each case, however, the antithesis breaks down, and the one is not completely severed from the one-many. 'The Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son.' 'Both are one -namely God.' Goodness in created things consists in being like God and in nothing else. The distinction between the exclusive truth of the Christian tradition and other truth is balanced by the claim that all other truth depends for its validity on Christian truth. Faith and knowledge also interact and depend on one another.

The reasons for the presence of the antithesis in Clement's thought may be set out. Clement emphasises the transcendence of the one and the immanence of the one-many. God's being is transcendent, unlike all other things, and far from the ways of men. God's being is immanent, 'closer than breathing, nearer than hands or feet', binding all things together by his sustaining power. The goodness of God is pure, holy, and unchanging; the goodness of men is manifold and faltering. Virtue in God and man is not the same thing. On the other hand, man's goodness forms a complex unity and is everywhere the same thing -- likeness to God. The truth of Christianity is exclusive, for the Gospel is

not just another religion, nor a new syncretism. Its truth is unique, precious, mysterious, guarded by a sacred tradition of holy men. It cannot be tampered with, nor twisted to suit a passing fancy. On the other hand, the whole universe of truth is one. Christ said, 'I am the truth', and to know anything is to know him. The systems of truth which men have known are not outside him but are partial apprehensions of his eluding greatness. Faith is the decision of the soul to take its stand with Christ and not to acquiesce in syncretistic tolerance. The Christian's faith signifies his acceptance of salvation from sin and the trust of his whole life to his Lord. The Christian's knowledge sees the relation of this faith to all that is true and good. By knowledge he goes on to perfection, to see God face to face. The reason for the presence of this antithesis in each part of Clement's thought is that he felt it necessary to say of God, goodness, truth, and men's grasp of truth, that they were both one, simple and transcendent, and also one, many and immanent.

The reasons for the breakdown of the antithesis in Clement's thought may also be set out. He wished to maintain that the one was distinguished but never divided from the one-many. Marcion and gnostic dualists separated the transcendent good God from the creator of the world and the Father from the Son. Clement maintains against them the unity of Father and Son, of the transcendent God with the creator of the world. Heretical gnostics divided the goodness of God and those who were born his elect from the inevitable involuntary badness of most men. Clement maintains that there is no such division among men; that all men are free to choose virtue and all may participate in the one goodness which is of God. Heretical gnostics and also the 'simpliciores' divided the unique Christian truth from the rest of truth and faith from knowledge. Against both parties Clement maintains that all truth is one and that faith and knowledge cannot be separated. His answer to those who have in each case divided and not merely distinguished is the same. 'Neither is faith without knowledge, nor the Father without the Son.' [1]

Clement realises the impossibility of reconciling by logical

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[1]*Strom.* v, 1; 11, 326, 8.

means the one and the one-many, the transcendent and the immanent. But he refuses either to divide the one from the other or to lessen the contrast between the two sides of the paradox. The gnostics had taken the first way and Neo-Platonism was to take the second. Proclus begins his *Elements of Theology* with six propositions which pretend to cover the problem.

(1) Every many in some way participates in unity.
(2) All that participates in unity is both one and not one.
(3) All that becomes one does so by participation in unity.
(4) All that is unified is other than the one itself.
(5) Every many is posterior to the one.
(6) Every many is composed either of unified groups or of henads. [1]

The ordered conciseness of Proclus is but a façade which screens the irreconcilable contrast between the one and the one-many. Clement has chosen the better way of setting out the contrast in the most striking terms, and yet refusing to slide into dualism. God is at once transcendent and immanent. When Isaiah saw the Lord 'high and lifted up' he learned at the same time that 'the whole earth was filled with his glory?'. [2] When a later prophet wrote, 'Seek ye the Lord while he may be found, call ye upon him while he is near', he added these words from the Lord, For as the heavens are higher than the earth so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.' [3] Nothing is to be gained and everything is to be lost by whittling down either the transcendence or the immanence of God.

Clement was able to avoid the two errors of his contemporaries because he had no need to avoid the paradox. It was resolved for him in the Christian gospel -- 'The kingdom of heaven is at hand.' This statement is as paradoxical as any could be and the greatness of the gospel is realised only as the intensity of the paradox is appreciated. Clement drew on the gospel message of the coming of the kingdom in Christ and the teaching that 'this is life eternal that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent'. The believer is made one in Christ who is all things. He exchanges the life of

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[1] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, A.1.
[2] *Isa.* vi, 1 and 3.
[3] *Isa.* lv, 6 and 9.

earth for the life of heaven. In his experience of unity with Christ he appreciates the mystery of the union of the Father with the Son and the unity of all things in the Son. In living a good life he lays hold of the first part of the two-fold End or hope, the second part of which is the eternal goodness of God. God's eternal goodness produces and unites with itself whatever good there is in human lives. By knowledge the true gnostic anticipates on earth the vision of God face to face and the continuous enjoyment of his presence. In each case the anticipation of heaven is a present experience of unity where there would otherwise be division and disunity. In each case (and they are all aspects of the one process) man meets God, not by the effort of his own being, virtue or reason, but by God's coming to him in Christ. It is Christ, not the faith of the believer, who makes all things one. It is Christ who enters men's hearts and renews their image of God's goodness. It is Christ who is the light and true knowledge, who removes the blindness and darkness from men's minds, and who is the truth and the face of God on which they gaze.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
CLEMENT'S AESTHETIC

THIS appendix will set out briefly the main points in Clement's aesthetic.

1. Art copies reality. It produces something distinct from and inferior to the real thing. 'The picture is indeed like. Let art be praised but let it not deceive men by posing as truth.'[1]

   'The Parian stone is beautiful but it is not yet Poseidon. The ivory is beautiful but it is not yet the Olympian Zeus. Matter is always in need of art but God is in need of nothing. Art has come forward and matter puts on form, and while the richness of its substance makes it convertible for gain, it is reverenced solely on account of its form.'[2] Art reproduces the form or shape of an object.

2. Art does not merely copy or represent things. It is powerful and deceitful. It tries to pass itself off as the real thing and it is often successful. The story is told of a man who had intercourse with a statue of Aphrodite. Art deludes in two ways, encouraging either sexual licence or idolatry. 'But art deceives you with another kind of witchcraft if it does not lead you to passionate desire -- it leads you to reverence and to worship images and pictures.'[3] Of its power Clement says, 'The art of the craftsman is effective, but not so that it can deceive reason or those who live according to reason.'[4] But he is not sure of this. 'Sing us, Homer, the beautiful song. . . . Stop the song, Homer! It is not beautiful. It teaches adultery and we are entreated not to defile even our ears. For we are those who bear about the image of God in this living and moving image of our humanity.'[5] The devotees of art in their sensuality 'have done violence to man and have obliterated by shame the divine image in which he was made'.[6]

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[1]*Prot.*57; I, 45, 15.
[2]*Prot.*56; I, 44, 14.
[3]*Prot.*57; I, 45, 13.
[4]*Prot.*57; I, 45, 5.
[5]*Prot.*59; I, 46, 9.
[6]*Prot.*61; I, 47, 14.

The second form of delusion, idolatry, is the height of folly. Images are made of gold, wood, stone or earth. 'I have made it my practice to walk on the earth, not to worship it.'[1] Also, 'You have made heaven a stage. For you the Divine has become a drama.'[2] But God is far above all this. 'For the skill of man makes houses and ships, and cities and pictures. But can I tell you all the things that God makes? Look at the whole universe -- that is his work.'[3] God created it by the bare act of willing. We cannot make him who made us. Let us remember his transcendent position. Clement (unlike Plato) will have no representations of God at all, except the spiritual one which is in the heart of man. Certain kinds of music are censured and here again art is not merely representative. 'For the varied charms of the broken melodies and the mournful measures of the Carian muse are destructive of character, dragging it down to passion, through the uncontrolled and evil art of music.'[4] Lack of harmony in the music destroys the harmony of the soul.

There is a true beauty which is likeness to God, and is spiritual, unchanging and invisible. 'But that man with whom the Logos dwells lives not in varied fashion nor does he forge false features. He bears the form of the Logos -- he is made like God. He is beautiful -- he does not beautify himself. This is the true beauty -- for it is God. That man becomes God, because he wills what God wills.'[5] Ornaments and luxurious dresses are to be avoided, for they are a form of error, taking the image for the reality. Just as a man may be devoted to the true beauty, so he may be devoted to its image. 'Those men who set themselves towards the image of beauty, namely the love of ornament, and not towards true beauty, and who again practise idolatry under a fine name, are to be sent far from truth, as those who with opinion and not with knowledge deal in dreams about the nature of beauty.'[6] 'Our life ought to be anything but a parade.'[7] This account of true beauty, which is God, explains the contra-

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[1]*Prot.*56; I, 44, 20.
[2]*Prot.*58; I, 46, 5.
[3]*Prot.*63; I, 48, 12.
[4]*Paed.* II, 41; I, 182, 16.
[5]*Paed.* III, 1; I, 236, 21.
[6]*Paed.* II, 106; I, 220, 15.
[7]*Paed.* II, 108; I, 222, 13.

diction in the passage quoted concerning Homer's beautiful song which is not beautiful.

No adequate assessment of the above points is possible here. It is worth noting certain parallels with Plato's aesthetic. Note (1) is like *Republic* X, 595-608, Notes (2) and (3) like *Republic* 111, 401 and Note (4) like the *Symposium,* 211 if we accept Taylor's identification of ἀ□1τò τò καλόν andἀγαθόν. [1] The views are parallel, not identical.

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[1]Taylor, *Plato, the Man and his Work*, p. 231.

APPENDIX B
NEGATIVE THEOLOGY

IN his recent work on Clement [1] Völker has raised certain objections to Clement's negative theology.

1. He claims that Clement's interpreters may be divided into two opposed groups (pp. 93-6). One group has recognised him as a philosopher and the other has recognised him as a theologian. The former group has attached importance to his negative theology. The latter group has considered the negative theology to be an unassimilated borrowing from pagan philosophy. Völker attaches himself to the second group. This controversy, as formulated by Völker, rests upon an over-simplification of Clement's thought. Clement is not either a philosopher or a theologian. He is both. The task he set himself was to bring together Greek philosophy and Christian theology, so that if either group were right he has failed. Clement's philosophical account of God is an important part of his thought. It is not, however, the sum of his opinions concerning God.

2. V+00F6lker objects that the negative theology is interpolated and unassimilated in the body of the text (p. 94). This is not the case with the account of Book V which forms the climax of this book. It is true that there are many isolated references to these ideas, but these are never without point. Völker's example, ἔ   ῦ ἐ   άδα, [2] is not well chosen. It comes from a chapter of the *Paedagogus* which is directed against those who consider that the just is not good. Clement's chief point is that God is one and that the Marcionites are wrong in teaching two Gods. Yet Völker describes the above statement as merely an exegetical statement (p. 91).

3. Völker's next objection is that this part of Clement's teaching is not original, but is borrowed from Philo and has parallels in contemporary pagan philosophy (p. 94). The evidence

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[1] *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus.*
[2] *Paed.* I, 71; I, 131, 18 cited Völker, p. 91.

for the dependence on Philo is not given extensively, but seems to consist of the fact that Clement uses certain expressions which Philo also used: τὸν ὄντως μόνον ὄντα, τὸ ἀ   . The passage quoted above as an example of isolated reference is also described as a Philo reminiscence (p. 91). It is rather more like a famous passage of Plato than it is like the passage of Philo which it is said to resemble. [1] The passage from Philo is also a direct contradiction of one of the steps of Clement's reasoning in the chapter concerned. (Is it likely that Clement would be reminiscent of ὅ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ κρεττττον [2]   ἀ   +ν [3]) There is no doubt that Clement has many passages which derive from Philo, as Stählin's footnotes to the text show. But these do not include the chief statements of Clement's negative theology, and are not, in any passage of importance, merely borrowed, but always developed in a way that is Clement's own. Völker comments on this in reference to Abraham's vision from afar off (p. 93). The third objection made by Völker is that these passages are inconsistent with Clement's thought as a whole (p. 95). No such inconsistency exists. The philosophical account is preparatory, clears away false conceptions, and shows that positive knowledge of God is not possible without Divine help. Völker finds no inconsistency, no lack of assimilation and no lack of originality in Clement's account of the true Gnosis. Many elements different in origin are brought, he says, into an original unity, out of which Clement's gnosis grows. This gnosis is something completely new in the history of Christian piety, the first Christian Platonism, and an important development in Christian mysticism (pp. 442 and 608). Where Völker's research has been concentrated he finds consistency and originality in Clement. At the conclusion of his work he goes so far as to say that Clement never borrows anything from Philo without critically examining it and restating it from his own point of view (p. 623).

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[1] *Paed.* I, 71; I, 131, 18 is more like *Republic* VI, 509 D than it is like Philo, *De Praemiis 40*, V344, pp. 16 ff.

[2] Philo, *loc. cit.*

[3] *Paed.* I, 63; I, 127, 12. The alleged reminiscence is on p. 131; 'ultro bonus' was a Marcionite attribute of God. See Harnack, *Marcion, das Evangelium Vom fremden Gott*, p. 86.

Lebreton, whose attention has been given to the doctrine of the Trinity, finds in Clement's theology, both philosophical and revealed, not inconsistency, but consistency at a new and deeper level. [1]

Son effort d'ailleurs ne tend pas seulement comme celui des apologistes, à rapprocher l'hellénisme et le christianisme par un concordisme artificiel, mais bien à les pénétrer intimement l'un par l'autre pour atteindre la source profonde d'où l'un et l'autre dérivent, c'est-à-dire la Vérité première . . . une théologie plus profondément hellénique que celle des apologistes mais aussi plus profondément chrétienne.

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[1] *RSR*, 1947, pp. 55, 57.

APPENDIX C
PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND MAXIMUS CONFESSOR

CLEMENT appears to have received attention in the Eastern Church in the sixth and seventh centuries, in the works of pseudoDionysius, Maximus the Confessor and others. It is tempting to believe that Clement did come into his own at this period and that his writings did, as he foretold, 'find someone to understand them'. In this way the presence of Clement's main ideas in later theology, notably that of Aquinas, could be attributed to a stream of influence which passed through pseudo-Dionysius and others. The evidence does not justify this view.

(1) The one citation of pseudo- Dionysius appears to be genuine. 'And if the philosopher Clement is of the opinion that the more important types in the visible world may be called παραδείγματα When compared with other things, yet his discourse does not proceed in regular, definite and simple terms.' [1] Who is the philosopher Clement? Maximus Confessor and Pachymeres the Paraphraser say specifically of this passage that the philosopher is Clement of Rome. Maximus adds, 'He did not explain where the holy Clement said these things.' [2] Most commentators have followed this view and attributed it to a pseudo-Clementine source. There have been dissenting voices. As early as 1654 one Albertinus maintained that the philosopher was Clement of Alexandria. [3] He was arguing against Baronius who claimed that the person in question was a Platonic philosopher Actius Clemens whom the younger Pliny mentions. Albertinus quoted a passage from *Stromateis* VIII in support of his claim. In the middle of the last century Hipler asserted that there was only one Clement who could and would be called a philosopher and he was the writer of the Stromateis. Hipler also quotes *Stromateis* VIII as

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[1]Dion. Areop. Migne, *S.G.* 3, col. 824; Frag. 52; III, 225, 13.

[2]Migne, *S.G.* 4, col. 329.

[3]For the rest of this paragraph I am indebted basically to vol. III of Stählin text, Introduction, pp. 66-7.

evidence of Clement holding the opinion which Dionysius mentions. Stählin accepted his arguments, though he recognised that the citation from *Stromateis* VIII was not to the point.

Pseudo- Dionysius in his role of an intimate of the apostles could never have heard of Clement of Alexandria. To admit such an acquaintance would destroy his alibi. The philosopher could only be the Clement of Philippians IV, who had long since been identified with Clement of Rome. Maximus and Pachymeres, writing as if pseudo-Dionysius was not 'pseudo', had no alternative but to describe the 'philosopher' as Clement of Rome.

It appears probable, however, that for pseudo- Dionysius Clement of Rome was identified with Clement of Alexandria, the former adding some philosophical works to his expanding list and the latter exchanging his historical identity for a much more exalted one.

This identification is suggested by the fact that Clement the philosopher had the personal identity of the Roman and the philosophic characteristics of the Alexandrine. For pseudoDionysius as for Plato in the *Timaeus* παραδείγματα were the patterns from which the world was made, the universal forms or ideas. For pseudo-Dionysius they existed in God alone. Clement of Alexandria used the word to describe the examples of historical people or things which we should follow. [1] They had an earthly existence. (The Platonic universals within the Logos of God were described as 'powers' or 'ideas'.) To such a view pseudo-Dionysius is bound to reply,

And if the philosopher Clement is of the opinion that the more important types in the visible world may be called παραγμαξα relatively to other things, yet his discourse does not proceed in regular, definite and simple terms. But even if we admit the truth of his opinion, we must remember the Scripture which says, 'I did not show these things unto thee that thou mightest follow after them', but that, through such knowledge of these as is suited to our faculties, we may be led up (so far as is possible) to the Universal Cause. [2]

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[1]There is one example of the technical use -- the city of Plato is a παράδειγμα laid up in heaven. *Strom.* IV, 172; II, 325, 5.

[2]Migne, *S.G.* 3, col. 824. Rolt translation, slightly modified.

Clement has used παράδειγμα in its non-technical sense of moral example and has consequently brought the παραδηίγματα too close to earth for pseudo-Dionysius, who uses the word in its technical sense. Pseudo-Dionysius wrongly imagines that Clement is also using the word in its technical sense. This is not a foolish mistake, for the Platonic παραδείγματα were patterns to guide the creator in making the things below. They were the 'exemplars', the perfect condition of each earthly class of things. Clement's use of the word in its ordinary sense to describe the illustrious examples of those who have gone before also includes the notion of 'exemplar'. Again, the merging of the two Clements on this point is not foolish. Clement of Rome's Epistle to the Corinthians is concerned largely with pointing out the examples of saints and heroes of old. He does not use the word οαράδειγμα and pseudoDionysius could have no quarrel with the statements in this Epistle; but the ideas are the same as those concerning παρτείγματα in the *Stromateis*.The second thing which pseudo- Dionysius tells us about the 'philosopher Clement' is that 'his discourse does not proceed in regular, definite and simple terms'. There are no ' Clements' in the first five centuries who have a better claim to this description than Clement of Alexandria. We are therefore justified in accepting the possibility that ' Clement the philosopher' was both Clement of Rome and Clement of Alexandria.

a.   Clement of Rome was the only admissible contemporary of pseudo-Dionysius.
b.   Clement of Alexandria possessed the opinions and literary characteristics attributed to ' Clement the philosopher'.

Maximus Confessor in his *Scholia* does not contribute anything to our knowledge of the philosopher Clement. [1] He confirms what has been said of the objection of Dionysius -- Clement brought the παραδείγματα down out of the mind of God and into the world. Maximus expands the views of Clement on lines which he does not claim to belong to Clement. To clarify what Clement

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[1]Migne, *S.G.*4, col. 329. The order of the verses in the text which Maximus is using differs in one respect from the text of Dionysius which we have in Migne. This does not alter the general sense.

has said he expounds a certain theory which puts purely intelligible things at the top of a vertical line and purely sensible things at the bottom, but then fills in the intervening part with relatively intelligible and relatively sensible objects. The great Dionysius   were thoughts in the mind of God. Clement rather followed the opinion which says that intelligible things have God's ideas as their causes but sensible things come from the working of form on matter. It seems perhaps that the blessed Clement said this; but sensible things are not properly called παραU+03δείγματα. [1]

Maximus gives us all the existing references but three to what he calls Clement of Alexandria's 'Concerning Providence'. This work is not listed by Eusebius and it savours too much of the systematising and defining practice of Proclus and later NeoPlatonism. Except for the account of God in abstract terms there is nothing in the fragments which violently contradicts anything that Clement said and the metaphysic is similar; but the abstract terminology and the defining technique do not come from an original work of the Stromatist. It could perhaps be a note-book of quotations which Clement had compiled; but if this is so, the quotations are from one source, for they are uniform in style and doctrine. Everything points to the work being that of a later writer who attributed it to Clement.

The description of the author of the work indicates a confusion between Clement of Alexandria and Clement of Rome. Two fragments ascribe it to Clement of Rome, one referring to "the Roman Clement' [2] and the other to ' Clement, the holy and apostolic teacher'. [3] Another ascribes it to 'the most holy and most blessed Clement, presbyter of Alexandria, the Stromatist'. [4] This seems almost to protest too much. Maximus Confessor is unambiguous in his account of the author as 'the most holy Clement presbyter of Alexandria', [5] and 'the Stromatist'. [6] Maximus quotes from the sixth book of the *Stromateis* a passage

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[1]Migne, *S.G.*4. col 329. 4, 332.

[2]*Cod. Ambros. Graec.*1041, III, 221, 6.

[3]Anastasios Sinaites, *Quaest.*96; III, 220, 26.

[4]N. le Nourry, *Apparatus ad bibl. patrum*, I, col. 1336; III, 220, 4.

[5]Maximus Confessor, *Opp.* ed. Combefis. II, p. 144; III, 219, 15.

[6]*Ibid.* II, p. 152; III, 220, 12.

which is not in that book but which is similar in style and content to passages from the 'Concerning Providence'. This passage is ascribed to ' Clement the real philosopher of philosophers'. [1] This emphasis on the authorship of Clement of Alexandria can be best explained by the existence of a confusion between him and Clement of Rome.A similar confusion appears in the description of the author of a book of theological definitions. This work is variously described as a work written by Clement and as a work compiled by Clement from other sources. The author is variously described as Clement, Clement of Rome and Clement of Alexandria. [2]

CONCLUSIONS

1. Clement of Alexandria and his works were possibly known by pseudo-Dionysius and probably known by Maximus.
2. He was not known sufficiently by either to have influenced their thought. Pseudo-Dionysius misunderstands the one point he quotes and Maximus quotes from a spurious work.
3. He was confused by some writers with Clement of Rome. Maximus insists on his separate identity in a way which reflects acquaintance with and disapproval of the confusion.

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[1]Maximus Confessor, *Disput. c. Pyrrho*, ed. Combefis. II, p. 176; III, 220, 20. Maximus speaks highly of Clement because Clement's opinions are useful to Maximus's argument.
[2]Introduction to vol. III of Stählin text, pp. 57-60.

APPENDIX D
ST THOMAS

IT is worth while to note the similarities between Clement's account of God and that given by St Thomas. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles* 1, XIV-XXXIV, we find many of the points of Clement's doctrine mentioned or developed. 'Now in the treating of the divine essence the principal method to be followed is that of remotion. For the divine essence by its immensity surpasses every form to which our intellect reaches; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we have some knowledge thereof by knowing *what it is not.*' [1] We distinguish God from all other things taking them group by group, e.g. from accidents and from bodily substances. This knowledge will not be perfect 'because we shall not know what he is in himself'. [2] By this method we find that God is unchangeable and therefore eternal, that in God there is no passive potentiality, no matter, no composition (i.e. parts), nothing violent or beside nature, and that God is not a body. [3]

'From what has been laid down we are able to conclude that God is his own essence, quiddity or nature.' [4] This is argued: 'If a thing were not its own essence, there must be something in it besides its essence; and consequently there must be composition therein. Now it has been shown that in God there is no composition. Therefore God is his own essence.' Several arguments, including this one, are used to show that in God existence and essence are the same. [5] This is foreign to Clement. He did not regard 'existence' or 'being' as a positive attribute of God. But the argument brings out the important similarity. The identity of God's existence and essence is linked with his bare unity. God is one. If his existence and essence were not the same, he would not be one.

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[1]*Summa Contra Gentiles* I, XIV.
[2]*Ibid.*
[3]*Ibid.* I, XV-XX.
[4]*Ibid.* I, XXI.
[5]*Ibid.* I, XXII.

There is no accident in God. The divine being cannot be specified by the addition of any substantial difference. God is not in any genus. He is not the formal being of all things and not the form of anything. This is similar to Clement's doctrine. The divine perfection is defined and proved on several grounds, e.g.:

And just as excellence and perfection is in a thing according as that thing is, so every defect is in a thing according as that thing in some sense is not. Now just as God has being wholly, so is not-being wholly absent from him, since according as a thing has being it fails in notbeing. Therefore all defect is removed from God and consequently he is universally perfect. [1]

Similarly Clement refers to God as τὸ ὅλου.

There is a difference from Clement in the section concerning the predication of terms to God. These are of two kinds: 'whatever terms denote perfection absolutely and without any defect whatever are predicated of God and of other things; for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth'; also 'those which express these perfections together with the mode of super-eminence in which they belong to God are said of God alone, for instance, the sovereign good, the first being and the like'. However, 'the mode of super-eminence in which the aforesaid perfections are found in God cannot be expressed in terms employed by us, except either by negation, as when we say God is eternal or infinite, or by referring him to other things, as when we say that he is the first cause or the sovereign good'. [2] The divergence is tempered by the assertion that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things. [3] This limitation with what has been said above makes it logically possible for St Thomas to predicate things of God after he has shown that none of the predicables can be applied to God. But this is not very satisfactory. What is said will not be pure equivocation, or we would learn nothing of God from it. There would be no point in saying 'God is good' if we only knew the meaning of 'good' as applied to men and not to God. The final statement on the matter is that 'terms applied to God and creatures are employed analogically'. 'Wherefore he is

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[1] *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, XXVIII.
[2] *Ibid.* I, XXX.
[3] *Ibid.* I, XXXII.

said to be named from his effects', [1] i.e. 'God is good' means that God is the cause of goodness.

We may set out the main points of agreement between Clement and St Thomas in their accounts of God.

Clement	ST THOMAS
God is one.	God is his own essence.
God is not a genus.	God is not a genus.
God is indivisible, without parts.	God is without composition.
God is in himself unknown.	God is in himself unknown.
We 'know' by analysis what God is not.	We 'know' by remotion what God is not.
God is inexpressible.	Nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.
God is first cause.	God is first cause.
God is τὸ ὅλου, perfect.	God is universally perfect.
We understand him by the Logos that proceeds from him.	We predicate of him analogically, the effects of the cause.

This shows the general agreement in structure between Clement and St Thomas on these points. The differences include Clement's refusal to speak strictly of God as τὸ ὅ λυ or Being. Clement is more insistent on the inexpressibility of God. We may 'perceive' God by the Logos that proceeds from him, but we cannot strictly predicate qualities of his effects analogously of him.

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[1]*Summa Contra Gentiles* I, XXXIV.

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