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The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria

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Hans van Loon

BRILL

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Supplements
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Texts and Studies of
Early Christian Life and Language

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

This study was occasioned by the ecumenical consultations between Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox theologians over the past fifty years. In their discussions they took Cyril of Alexandria and 'his' μία φύσις formula as their starting-point. An initial study made me doubt whether the interpretation given to the christological terms in the ecumenical agreements was in line with what the archbishop himself will have meant. I also found out that present-day commentators are not in agreement on the meaning of the key terms in Cyril's christology. Besides, a systematic study into the meaning of these terms in Cyril's christological works has never been published. This volume is meant to fill at least part of that lacuna.

It is my desire that the ecumenical movement will develop and that Christian unity will grow. If, therefore, the conclusions of my study undermine the abovementioned agreements, I hope that it will lead to intensified consultations, also between Eastern and Western churches.

An earlier version of this book was my doctoral dissertation at the Protestant Theological University in Kampen, the Netherlands. I wish to thank the three people who supervised the work and who, each in her or his own way, have contributed to the improvement of the end result. Prof. Gerrit W. Neven has been a continuous encouragement to me for many years, and with his questions and remarks he made me think through underlying assumptions and possible implications. Prof. Adelbert J.M. Davids has introduced me into patristic theology and his careful reading of the text has led to many improvements. With her expertise on the christological developments in the early church, Prof. Theresia Hainthaler was willing to read the manuscript with a critical eye. I am also grateful to Prof. A.P. Bos for his valuable comments on the chapter about Aristotelian logic.

Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the series *Vigiliae Christianae Supplements* for the time they have given to reading and assessing my lengthy manuscript. And also Ivo Romein and Mattie Kuiper of Brill Publishers, who have helpfully guided me through the publication process.

Culemborg
Hans van Loon
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ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	*Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ed. Eduardus Schwartz, Berlin / Leipzig, I, 1924–1930; II, 1932–1938
CCT	Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, I, London, [1]1965; 2nd rev. ed., 1975; II/1, London / Atlanta GA, 1987; II/2, London / Louisville KY, 1995; II/4, London / Louisville KY, 1996
Chalkedon I–III	Aloys Grillmeier & Heinrich Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Würzburg, I, 1951; II, 1953; III, 1954
CN	*Contra Nestorium*, ACO I.1.6, 13–106
CN ET	Pusey's translation of *Contra Nestorium* in: Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, vol. 47, Oxford, 1881, 1–184
CPG	Mauritius Geerard, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, 5 vols., Turnhout, 1974–1987
CSEL	*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Vienna, 1866 ff.
CSCO	*Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, Louvain, 1903 ff.
De ador.	*De adoratione et cultu in spiritu et veritate*, PG 68, 132–1125
DEC I	Norman P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, vol. 1, London / Washington DC, 1990
Dial. Trin.	*Dialogues sur la Trinité*, 3 vols. (SC 231, 237, 246), 1976, 1977, 1978
DThC	*Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, Paris, 1899–1972
Glaph.	*Glaphyra in Pentateuchum*, PG 69, 9–678
GOTR	*The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Brookline MA, 1954 ff.
In Jo.	*In Joannem*, in: Pusey III–V
In Mal.	*In Malachiam*, in: Pusey II, 545–626
JdChr	Alois Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, Freiburg etc., I, [1]1979, [2]1982, 3rd rev. ed., 1990; II/1, 1986; II/2, 1989; II/3, 2002; II/4, 1990
Lampe	G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, Oxford, 1961(–1968) (9th impression 1989)
Liddell & Scott	Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed., with rev. suppl., Oxford, 1996
LThK	*Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 11 vols., Freiburg etc., 3rd rev. ed., 1993–2001
NPNF	*A Select Library of the Christian Church: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, first series (14 vols.) and second series (14 vols.), Peabody MA, 1994 (first edition: 1886–1900)

ODCC	F.L. Cross & E.A. Livingstone (eds.), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, Oxford, ³2005 (¹1957)
Or. ad aug.	*Oratio ad augustas*, ACO I.1.5, 26–61
Or. ad dom.	*Oratio ad dominas*, ACO I.1.5, 62–118
Or. ad Th.	*Oratio ad Theodosium*, ACO I.1.1, 42–72
Or. ad Th. GT	German translation of *Oratio ad Theodosium*, in: Bardenhewer & Weischer (1984), 12–66
PG	*Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 161 vols., Paris, 1857–1866
PL	*Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols., Paris, 1844–1890
Pusey I–VII	Philippus Eduardus Pusey (ed.), *Sancti Patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini* [opera], 7 vols., Brussels, 1965 (first edition: Oxford, 1868–1877)
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, Leipzig, 1941 ff.
SC	*Sources Chrétiennes*, Paris, 1944 ff.
TDNT	*Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, 10 vols., Grand Rapids MI, 1964–1974
Thesaurus	*Thesaurus de Trinitate*, PG 75, 9–656
TLG	Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, a digital library of Greek literature, University of California, Irvine: www.tlg.uci.edu
TRE	*Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, 36 vols., Berlin etc., 1977–2004

INTRODUCTION

During the past fifty years, representatives of the (Chalcedonian) Eastern Orthodox and of the (Miaphysite)[1] Oriental Orthodox church families have met a number of times to overcome their doctrinal and ecclesiastical differences, first unofficially, later officially. More than fifteen hundred years after the Council of Chalcedon (451), which was the dogmatic cause of their separation, there is a rapprochement between these two traditions. In itself, it is certainly to be welcomed when the unity of Christians is advanced by the overcoming of age-old differences. The way in which the agreed statements are phrased, however, calls for some caution.

From the first meeting on, Cyril of Alexandria's christology, and in particular 'his' μία φύσις formula, has been the starting-point for the consultations. In the agreed statement of the first unofficial consultation it says:

> In our common study of the Council of Chalcedon, the well-known phrase used by our common Father in Christ, St. Cyril of Alexandria, *mia physis* (or *mia hypostasis*) *tou Theou logou sesarkomene* (the one *physis* or *hypostasis* of God's Word Incarnate) with its implications, was at the centre of our conversations.[2]

And the agreed statement of the second official consultation declares:

> Throughout our discussions we have found our common ground in the formula of our common Father, Saint Cyril of Alexandria: *mia physis* (*hypostasis*) *tou Theou Logou sesarkomene*, and in his dictum that "it is sufficient for the confession of our true and irreproachable faith to say and to confess that the Holy Virgin is *Theotokos*" (Hom. 15, cf. Ep. 39).[3]

The centrality of the μία φύσις formula in these ecumenical agreements and the reference to Cyril of Alexandria raise several questions.

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[1] See for the terms 'miaphysite' and 'monophysite' chapter 1, n. 12.

[2] "An Agreed Statement", *GOTR* 10/2 (1964–1965) 14; reproduced in Gregorios, Lazareth & Nissiotis (1981), 3.

[3] "Communiqué of the Joint Commission of the Theological Dialogue", *GOTR* 34 (1989) 394.

First of all, although Cyril of Alexandria's christology has been the subject of various studies over the past one hundred years, this has by no means led to a broad consensus on the meaning of the key terms and expressions in his christology. This is partly due to the fact that his christological writings have not been studied systematically. Instead, isolated passages and phrases are usually adduced as evidence for particular interpretations. This study wants to address this deficiency by an integral investigation of the archbishop's christological works of the first two years of the Nestorian controversy. This will lead to conclusions about the meaning of the key terms and phrases.

Secondly, various, especially Western, theologians have repeatedly warned that too much influence of miaphysite thinking within a Chalcedonian framework may lead to a christology in which the humanity of Christ is curtailed. Although the 'fully human' is upheld theoretically, in practice Christ's passions and his human will do not get the attention they deserve. Some have explicitly criticised the agreements between the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Orthodox for alienating Western Christianity by their emphasis on the μία φύσις formula.[4] Therefore, the present study will pay special attention to the place which the humanity of Christ gets in Cyril of Alexandria's writings under investigation.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA[5]

From his own time to the present day, Cyril of Alexandria has been described as a saint by some and as a villain by others. No doubt, evidence can be forwarded for either judgement. Like all of us, he had a light side and a shadow side. What can hardly be denied, however, is that he has had an enormous influence on subsequent theology, especially christology, through the Councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451), and in the West through Thomas Aquinas (ca 1225–1274). Since

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[4] For example, de Halleux (1990a), 501: "Il serait extrêmement regrettable que le dialogue christologique des deux familles d'Églises orthodoxes, que leurs traditions théologique, spirituelle et liturgique rapprochent singulièrement, puisse donner l'impression de se monnayer aux dépens de la chrétienté 'occidentale' en général et de l'Église catholique en particulier".

[5] Recent studies with considerable biographical material on Cyril of Alexandria include: McGuckin (1994), 1–125; Russell (2000), 3–63; Wessel (2004), 15–111, 138–180. See further: de Halleux (1981); Wickham (1983), xi–xxviii.

this study focusses on Cyril's christological language, a brief history of his life is given in this introduction.

Cyril's maternal grandparents were Christians, who died relatively young, leaving two children, Cyril's mother and her elder brother Theophilus. They went to Alexandria, where Athanasius took them under his wing and started to prepare Theophilus for an ecclesiastical career. When Athanasius died (in 373) Theophilus was still too young for the episcopate, but in 385 he was consecrated archbishop of Alexandria. Cyril's mother married and moved to another town in Lower Egypt, where Cyril was born in ca 378.

It is likely that, under the guidance of his uncle, Cyril received both theological and secular education, including a detailed study of classical literature. The later archbishop writes Attic Greek in an elaborate style, with many obsolete words as well as neologisms.[6] There is a legend that Cyril spent about five years in the monasteries of the Nitrian desert,[7] but since there is no reference to this in his own writings its authenticity is doubtful.

In the year 403, Cyril accompanied his uncle at the Synod of the Oak in Constantinople, at which John Chrysostom was deposed as archbishop. During the first years of his episcopate Cyril stood by this decision and refused to re-enter John's name into the diptychs, but in 430 he included a quotation from John in a florilegium of 'the holy Fathers'.[8] Theophilus's episcopate was fraught with controversies and disturbances, so that, when he died in 412, the secular authorities were not keen to see him succeeded by his nephew, and they supported the candidacy of the archdeacon, Timothy. Even so, after three days of rioting, Cyril was consecrated as the new archbishop.[9]

Cyril of Alexandria has at times been depicted as a potentate with a lust for power, who did not shy away from bribery, intimidation,

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[6] Cross (1950), 392, writes: "The material in our files has disclosed that Cyril coined a highly distinctive vocabulary. There are well over 1,000 words which occur either in Cyril alone or in Cyril for the first time or in Cyril more frequently than in the whole of the rest of Greek literature taken together. These Cyrilline words are compounds of common words or verbal elements with prepositional prefixes. ... These words are so characteristic that their occurrence is a sure test of Cyrilline authorship".

[7] Evetts (1907), 427f.

[8] *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 67[14–24]. See chapter 7, n. 72.

[9] During his lifetime Cyril was called 'bishop' or 'archbishop'. It was not until the sixth century that he was referred to as 'patriarch'. Therefore, the title 'patriarch' is not used for Cyril in this study.

and even murder, to reach his goals. His writings, however, convey a genuine concern for his flock and for the orthodoxy of their faith.[10] It seems to me that this concern was what motivated him above anything else, although he will also have been engaged in power struggles, especially at the beginning of his episcopate. But in order to protect the Christians and the faith, he sometimes resorted to means which by our modern standards are clearly unacceptable.

One of his first acts as bishop was to close the Novatianist churches and to seize their property. This was probably backed up by imperial legislation which had been renewed in 407. Pope Celestine did something similar in Rome, and Nestorius also clamped down on the various 'heretics' soon after he had become archbishop of Constantinople. During these first years (or possibly already before 412), Cyril composed the *Thesaurus* against Arianism.[11] Another group which Cyril regarded as a threat was the large community of Jews that lived in Alexandria. He continued the established custom to write yearly *Festal Letters*, by which the church in Egypt was informed of the dates of Lent, Easter and Pentecost, and which contained teachings and exhortations appropriate for the time. *Festal Letters* 1, 4 and 6 (for the years 414, 416 and 418)[12] denounce the Jews for their impiety, for their disobedience, and for honouring the letter above the spirit. And also in his Old Testament commentaries, at least partly believed to have been written before 420, we find polemical passages against the Jews.

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[10] For example, *Letter to the Monks* (*ep.* 1), ACO I.1.1, 11[11–21]: "But I was greatly disturbed to hear that some dangerous murmurings had reached you and that certain people were circulating them, destroying your simple [ἁπλῆν] faith by vomiting out a pile of stupid little words and querying in their speech whether the holy virgin ought to be called Mother of God [θεοτόκον] or not. It would have been better for you to have abstained altogether from such questions which are only contemplated with difficulty, 'as if in a mirror and an enigma', (*1 Cor. 13:12*) by those whose intellects are prepared and whose minds are advanced, or else they cannot be plumbed at all. For these most subtle arguments exceed the mental ability of the simple [ἀκεραιοτέρων]. But since you have now heard these arguments, …, then I have judged it necessary to say a few things about these matters to you"; trans. McGuckin, (1994), 246. This attitude is confirmed by the fact that the *Festal Letters* for the years 430 and 431 hardly contain any technical christological language. What is more, christology is by no means their main subject, but they are more pastoral in content, and there is no reference to the developing controversy; see sections 5.7 and 7.9.

[11] Wessel (2004), 57–61, argues that there were still Arians in Egypt at that time. See for the dates of the various writings, chapter 2, n. 128.

[12] The traditional numbering of the *Festal Letters* skips number 3: the second letter was for the year 415, the fourth for 416.

The ancient historians Socrates and John of Nikiu recount clashes between Jews and Christians, not long after Cyril had become arch-bishop (possibly in 414).[13] When the Jews were being informed of an edict by the prefect Orestes in the theatre, they spotted Hierax, whom they regarded as a spy of the bishop. On their complaint, Orestes had him arrested and tortured. Cyril then warned the Jewish leaders that more aggression against Christians would lead to reprisals. Shortly afterwards, the Jews in one of the city quarters lured the Christians into the streets by shouting that the church named after Alexander was on fire. Then the Jews ambushed them and killed the ones that fell into their hands. The following day, Cyril led a crowd to the synagogues, which were then devastated. Jews were expelled from their homes and their property taken. This probably applied to a limited part and not to the whole of the city, as Socrates writes, since it is unlikely that such a large part of the city's population would have been driven out, and a Jewish presence in Alexandria is attested to in the sixth century.[14]

Although the prefect was a Christian, their power struggle put him at odds with the archbishop, and he did not respond positively to Cyril's attempts at reconciliation. Then a large group of monks from Nitria entered the city "to fight on behalf of Cyril".[15] They hurled insults at Orestes when he passed in his carriage, and one of them, a monk named Ammonius, threw a stone and wounded him on his head. Most of his guards fled for fear to be stoned to death, but the people of Alexandria came to the rescue of the prefect. When Ammonius was arrested and interrogated so brutally that he died, Cyril declared him a martyr, but the more sober-minded Christians did not accept this, and then Cyril let it slip into oblivion.[16]

During Lent in the year 415, the murder of Hypatia took place. She was a renowned philosopher who had good connections with the authorities in Alexandria. According to Socrates, a rumour was calumniously spread that Orestes's unwillingness to reconcile himself

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[13] Socrates Scholasticus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VII.13–14, SC 506, 48–56. John of Nikiu, *The Chronicle* 84.89–99, in: Charles (1981), 101 f. See for a discussion of the year in which the clashes with the Jews took place: Davids (1999).

[14] Wilken (1971), 57 f.

[15] Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VII.14, SC 506, 54.

[16] John of Nikiu, *The Chronicle* 84.94 (Charles, 101), only mentions the incident in passing: "And Cyril was wroth with the governor of the city for so doing, and likewise for his putting to death an illustrious monk of the convent of Pernôdj named Ammonius, and other monks (also)".

with the bishop was her doing. And "hotheaded men" waylaid her, took her to the church called *Caesarium*, tortured and killed her there.[17] John of Nikiu speaks of a 'multitude'.[18] The neo-Platonist philosopher Damascius involves Cyril personally: seeing many men and horses in front of a certain house, he asked what this was all about, and he was told that the philosopher Hypatia lived there. "When he heard this, envy so gnawed at his soul that he soon began to plot her murder—the most ungodly murder of all".[19] Socrates condemns the deed as utterly unworthy of Christians, and writes: "This brought no little disgrace on Cyril and on the Alexandrian church". And John of Nikiu declares that the people called Cyril "the new Theophilus", "for he had destroyed the last remains of idolatry in the city".

To what extent Cyril was responsible for Hypatia's death is being debated to the present day. Some regard him as a ruthless, power-seeking individual who orchestrated what happened from behind the scenes. Others look more favourably at Cyril, and view him as a young bishop who did not know yet how to keep his more fanatic followers under control. It seems to me that with his actions against the Jews Cyril had set a sad example, and that he will have depicted Greek philosophy—of which Hypatia was the embodiment—as baneful to the Christian soul. Therefore, one can say that he was responsible for creating an atmosphere in which hatred against the philosopher could grow and could eventually lead to her brutal murder. But that Cyril himself plotted her death, as Damascius suggests, seems unlikely to me.[20]

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[17] Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VII.15, SC 506, 58: ἄνδρες τὸ φρόνημα ἔνθερμοι.

[18] John of Nikiu, *The Chronicle* 84.100 (Charles, 102).

[19] Damascius, *The Philosophical History*, 43E, in: Damascius (1999), 130 f. It should be borne in mind that Socrates (ca 380–450) was a contemporary of these events, while Damascius (ca 460–540) and John of Nikiu (*fl.* ca 690) wrote at a later date. And also that Socrates was not particularly positive about Cyril of Alexandria, since he was sympathetic towards the Novatianists, whose churches the archbishop had closed down.

[20] Kingsley, *Hypatia* (1968), is often mentioned as a historical novel in which Cyril is depicted as a scoundrel. However, Kingsley does not write that Cyril plotted the murder, but that he refused to hand over Peter the Reader and his associates—the perpetrators—to the lawful authority of the prefect (pp. 426 f.). And it is not Cyril's motives he criticises, but the means by which the archbishop tried to reach his Christian goals: "And poor Arsenius submitted with a sigh, as he saw Cyril making a fresh step in that alluring path of evil-doing that good might come, which led him in after-years into many a fearful sin, and left his name disgraced, perhaps for ever, in the judgment of generations, who know as little of the pandemonium against which he fought, as they

There is one episode left of Cyril's early years as bishop which is worth telling. Just as several other archbishops, Cyril had his own private militia, the *parabalani* (παϱαβαλανεῖς), whose proper task it was to attend to the sick. Following the clashes with the Jews, both the prefect and the archbishop wrote to the emperor. An investigation was launched, as a result of which new legislation was introduced in 416, placing the *parabalani* under the prefect and restricting their influence. However, as early as 418 Cyril's authority over them was restored, although some of the restrictions were kept in place.[21] Whether the *parabalani* were involved in Hypatia's murder is disputed.[22] It seems that from this year on, the open animosity between the prefect and the archbishop had been laid to rest.

From very early on in his episcopate Cyril wrote commentaries to biblical books, starting with the Old Testament. *De adoratione*, a typological exegesis of a number of passages from the Pentateuch in a different order than that in the Bible, may have been his first commentary. The *Glaphyra* is a complementary commentary on Pentateuch passages, this time in the order in which they appear in Scripture. We also have commentaries on Isaiah and on the twelve minor prophets.[23] And there are fragments of commentaries to many other Old Testament books. All together these books and fragments comprise more than four volumes of Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*.

In his *Festal Letter* 8 for the year 420 we encounter a first warning against a two-Sons christology, while in the seven *Dialogues on the Trinity*, possibly written between 420 and 425, Cyril continues his fight against Arianism, which he had started in the *Thesaurus*. In the second half of the 420s he turned to the New Testament and started with an extensive commentary on the Gospel of John. This work, too, contains quite some anti-Arian polemics, while the archbishop also denounces the

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do of the intense belief which sustained him in his warfare; and who have therefore neither understanding nor pardon for the occasional outrages and errors of a man no worse, even if no better, than themselves" (p. 284).

[21] Rougé (1987).

[22] From the restoration of Cyril's control over them, Wessel (2004), 56 f., concludes that the *parabalani* were not involved in Hypatia's death, but Wickham (1983), xvi–xvii, does implicate them in the philosopher's murder, and infers from the law of 418 that "his [Cyril's] authority could now be trusted or, at least, could not be challenged".

[23] On the basis of the frequency with which Cyril cites Isaiah and the twelve minor prophets in the first ten of his *Festal Letters*, Davids (1997) tentatively suggests that the commentary on Isaiah was written during the first five years of Cyril's episcopate, and that it precedes that on the minor prophets.

separation of Christ into two Sons several times. Fragments are extant
from commentaries on the Gospel of Matthew and on several of the
epistles, and from a series of homilies on the Gospel of Luke. Part of
these will have been written before the Nestorian controversy, and part
after the controversy had started. The New Testament commentaries
fill the better part of three volumes of the *Patrologia Graeca*, about two
thirds of which is taken up by the *Commentary on John*.

Nestorius was consecrated archbishop of Constantinople in 428, and
in that same year the battle over the title *theotokos* started in the capital.
Without explicitly referring to that battle or even using the epithet
theotokos, Cyril already took up his position in *Festal Letter* 17 for the
year 429, written at the end of 428. With his *Letter to the Monks of
Egypt* of early 429 he became involved in the controversy as one of the
key players. In his view, Nestorius's understanding of Christ implied a
separation into two Sons,[24] over against which he emphasized the unity
of the incarnate Word. Cyril wrote a number of letters and treatises
against Nestorius's christology in the period before the Council of
Ephesus.[25] The twelve anathemas which he attached to a letter from the
Egyptian synod to Nestorius in November 430 provoked widespread
indignation in the East. This prompted Cyril to write several more
christological works, both before and after the council.

The emperor, Theodosius II (408–450), had ordered the council
to begin on 7 June 431, the day of Pentecost. When John, the arch-
bishop of Antioch (429–441), and the bishops from the East were two
weeks late in arriving, Cyril opened the council and had Nestorius con-
demned before most of his defenders were there. Having received a
mandate from Celestine, pope of Rome (422–432), he felt secure to do
so. And indeed, the papal legates, who arrived in early July, ratified the
decisions. John and his party, however, set up their own council, known
as the 'Conciliabulum', and condemned Cyril and Memnon, the arch-
bishop of Ephesus.

Seeing that the council had not resolved the crisis, as he had hoped it
would, Theodosius placed both Nestorius and Cyril under house arrest
in Ephesus, and ordered a delegation from both parties to come to

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[24] Since I have not investigated Nestorius's writings in detail, I do not give an
assessment of his christology in this study. I merely describe what he writes in a number
of passages (especially in the quotations Cyril gives in *Contra Nestorium*; see chapter 6)
and discuss Cyril's interpretation of his colleague's christology.

[25] See section 5.2.1 for a brief history of the first two and a half years of the
controversy.

Chalcedon, near Constantinople, to work out a solution. The two sides, however, did not come to a settlement. On Nestorius's request to be allowed to return to his monastery near Antioch, the emperor ratified his deposition in September 431. In October, the aged Maximian, a native Roman who had served as a cleric under John Chrysostom, was consecrated archbishop of Constantinople in his place, while the remaining bishops in Ephesus, including Cyril, were allowed to return to their homes.

In 432, the emperor urged the leading bishops once more to come to an agreement on the doctrinal matters. In the course of these negotiations, Cyril sent 'presents' to the emperor's entourage which have become infamous as a serious attempt at bribery. Although such presents were not uncommon at the imperial court, the scale of Cyril's donations was extraordinary. In 433, an agreement was reached. Cyril accepted the Formula of Reunion, an altered version of a profession of faith which the Antiochenes had drawn up during the colloquy at Chalcedon, while John of Antioch condemned Nestorius's teachings and recognised Maximian as his successor. When the latter died in 434, he was succeeded by Proclus (434–446/7), who had opposed Nestorius from the very beginning.

Peace was restored in the church at large, but it could not be maintained without effort. Cyril had to defend his reunion with the Orientals before the partisans of his own party, but he stood by it. Nestorius was sent into exile, first to Arabia, later to the Egyptian desert, where he died around 450, after having written the *Book of Heraclides*, a sort of memoirs. In the East, attention was moved from Nestorius to his teachers, Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Proclus condemned several passages from Theodore's writings without naming their author. Cyril, on the other hand, wrote explicitly against the teachings of both Eastern theologians, but only fragments remain of this polemical work. He was persuaded, however, not to condemn men who had died in peace with the church.

The archbishop of Alexandria also wrote a treatise *Contra Julianum*, to refute the books *Against the Galileans* which the emperor Julian, 'the Apostate', had written in the fourth century. Since Cyril sent a copy of it to John of Antioch, it has been argued that he must have written it after the reunion of 433. However, it may also have been composed before the Nestorian controversy, and only sent to archbishop John later. Towards the end of his life, Cyril wrote a dialogue containing an overview of his christological views, *On the Unity of Christ*. Besides the

seven volumes with Cyril's commentaries, the *Patrologia Graeca* contains three more volumes with works by Cyril, which may be divided into three parts: sermons and letters, christological works, (other) polemical writings (two anti-Arian works and *Contra Julianum*).

Cyril of Alexandria died in 444, leaving the church re-united. Was there reason for those who survived him to be glad that he had passed away, as one of his contemporaries wrote?[26] That surely is too negative an assessment. Cyril will not have been a likable man, but someone who was aware of his power and used it where it deemed fit. At times he overstepped the boundaries, not just of his authority, but also of ethical behaviour. Especially his actions against the Jews during the first years of his episcopate are to be condemned, and are a lamentable episode of anti-Semitism in the early church. However, when I read his letters and other publications I get the distinct impression that his overriding motive was the protection and building-up of those whom he regarded as entrusted to him and as people for whom he would be held accountable.[27] He did not seek power for power's sake,

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[26] "At last and not without difficulty the villain's life has come to an end. ... His departure has indeed delighted the survivors, but it may have disheartened the dead. And there is some fear that, burdened by his company, they may send him back to us"; Theodoret of Cyrus, *ep.* 180, PG 83, 1489B–1492A (*CPG* 6287), preserved in Latin. It was included as a letter from Theodoret to John of Antioch (which should have been Domnus, since John had already died in 441) in the acts of the fifth ecumenical council of Constantinople (553), as part of the 'Three Chapters'; ACO IV.1 (ed. Johannes Straub, 1971), 135 f. Theodoret's authorship has been doubted by modern scholars.

[27] When Cyril is depicted less favourably, it sometimes goes beyond an estimation of his motives. The events are then portrayed in ways which are not warranted by the sources. So, Athanassiadi, in: Damascius (1999), 131, n. 96, writes: "Both in detail and general spirit Damascius' account of Hypatia is corroborated by Socrates, *HE* VII.15, who also gives jealousy as the motive for her murder". Socrates, however, speaks of jealousy among the Christian population of Alexandria more in general, while Damascius writes that "envy gnawed at his", that is Cyril's, soul, and makes the archbishop responsible for her death. Socrates does not do this.

And Rubenstein (2003), 71, writes: "In the year 415, for reasons that remain obscure, the archbishop incited a large crowd of Christians to attack the Jewish quarter". In an accompanying note (n. 40 on pp. 307 ff.) he refers to the entry on Cyril of Alexandria in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* on the internet (www.newadvent.org) and comments: "The official reason given for the pogrom was an alleged unprovoked 'massacre' of Christians by Jews. ... The report is singularly unconvincing". However much Cyril's actions against the Jews are to be condemned, to say that his reasons "remain obscure" and to suggest that it was not a response to the murder of Christians by Jews, is not taking the sources seriously. Both Socrates and John of Nikiu recount that on the previous day the Jews in the city had lured the Christians into the streets and killed those whom they could catch.

and the extravagant presents were meant to gain secular support for 'the truth'.[28]

Moreover, a theologian's character or actions do not justify or disqualify his teachings (nor the other way round). A man's holiness is no guarantee that his theological views are acceptable, and a man's crimes do not make the doctrines he holds objectionable. However one assesses his behaviour from an ethical point of view, the contribution Cyril of Alexandria made to the theology of the church at large is enormous. In that light, he was rightfully declared a Doctor of the Church by pope Leo XIII in 1882.

Outline of This Study

In the first chapter, the aim of the study will be elaborated on: to get a better understanding of the meaning of the key terms and expressions in Cyril of Alexandria's christological works of the first two years of the Nestorian controversy. Special attention will be given to the μία φύσις formula. In modern literature on Cyril, a distinction is sometimes made between his 'own' christological language and 'concessions' he made to the Orientals, which allegedly led to a different use of the terms. Since any concessions to the Antiochenes will have come after his twelve anathemas (written in November 430) were attacked, in Cyril's writings up to and including the anathemas the terms will have the meanings he himself attached to them. This justifies a limitation to the first two years of the controversy. The first chapter also contains a discussion of the relevance of this investigation, in which the notion of neo-Chalcedonianism and the issue of Christ's humanity play an important role.

In several recent publications, it has been pointed out that Cyril had knowledge of the logical tradition of his time and that he used it in his theological writings. Therefore, in the second chapter, a brief overview will be given of Aristotelian and Porphyrian logic, after which it will be discussed to what extent the Alexandrian archbishop employed the logical categories in his trinitarian writings, the *Thesaurus* and the

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[28] Wickham (1983), xxv, comments: "The bankrupting size [of the presents] is the sincerest testimony to Cyril's wish for a united Church and should, in fairness, bring him credit". It should be added that it was not a united church as such which Cyril sought, but a united church that professed doctrines which in his eyes were orthodox.

Dialogues on the Trinity. The meaning of the key terms and Cyril's metaphysics in these trinitarian writings (and to some degree in the *Commentary on John*) form the subject of the third chapter. This will appear to be an important introduction to understanding the terms in Cyril's christology.

In the fourth chapter, the meanings given to the terms in the archbishop's christology by a number of modern commentators are compared. To facilitate this, first a series of 'small-capital terms'— like INDIVIDUAL NATURE and SEPARATE REALITY—are defined, into which the terms in Cyril's writings as well as those employed by modern theologians are 'translated'. It can then be examined whether, for example, the word φύσις in a Cyrillian text or the term 'nature' in a modern publication refers to an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, to a SEPARATE REALITY, or to something else still.

After this preparatory work, Cyril of Alexandria's christological writings can be investigated. From each publication a summary is made, the occurrence and the meaning of the key terms are studied, and its christology is discussed. Chapter five covers the writings from the beginning of the controversy up to and including Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* (February 430). The sixth chapter is fully devoted to *Contra Nestorium*, and chapter seven deals with the remaining works of the year 430.

In the eighth and final chapter, all threads come together and conclusions will be drawn regarding the meaning of the terms. Two things will be investigated in more detail, in that Cyril's later works will be taken into account as well: (1) the μία φύσις formula; (2) the notion of 'in contemplation only', which, according to some modern commentators, Cyril applies to the natures in Christ, implying that in reality there is only one nature of the incarnate Word. The way in which Cyril speaks of Christ's humanity will also be given due attention.

Language

Finally, a few words on the language employed in this study. In the body of the text, quotations from Greek, Latin, German and French writings have usually been translated into English. Even when an English translation of a Greek text has been published, I have generally produced my own rendering, mainly to get a more precise understanding of how the key terms and expressions are employed. In such cases, I have made

use of the existing translations with gratitude. When a quotation is rendered in a published translation, this is made clear by the reference in the accompanying note. Italics in a quotation belong to the original text, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

Since at times it may be rather awkward to use inclusive language (for example, how to make 'the Word made man' inclusive?), often male nouns and pronouns are employed when in the original the gender is left open, or when both genders are meant. The word ἐνανθρώπησις has been rendered by 'inhumanation', a term borrowed from P.E. Pusey. For Cyril of Alexandria, the word οἰκονομία refers to God's whole plan of salvation, including the Word's incarnation and Christ's life, death and resurrection. It has been translated by 'economy', and the corresponding adjective/adverb by 'economic(ally)'.

AIM AND RELEVANCE

1.1. The Aim of the Study

In response to a preliminary study into Cyril of Alexandria's chris-
tology,[1] one scholar wrote that it "largely follows what is becoming
the current wisdom".[2] This remark suggests that gradually a consen-
sus is developing regarding the interpretation of the various terms and
expressions that the archbishop of Alexandria uses in his christologi-
cal writings. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Even if at
times there is agreement about Cyril's understanding of the incarna-
tion, the terminological foundation of that understanding may differ
considerably. So, theologians may agree that Cyril taught that in the
one person of Christ one can distinguish between divinity and human-
ity, while one theologian says that Cyril normally uses the word φύσις
to denote the one person, and another that he uses φύσις to denote
divinity and humanity. It is the aim of the present study, therefore,
to investigate in detail what the meaning is that in Cyril's christologi-
cal writings is attached to terms and expressions like φύσις, ὑπόστασις,
πρόσωπον, ἕνωσις καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν and μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρ-
κωμένη.

1.1.1. *Various Viewpoints*

A more detailed discussion of the various viewpoints will be given in
the fourth chapter, but in order to refine the aim of this study a broad
outline of them needs to be given first. At the beginning of the twen-
tieth century two opposing opinions were published shortly after each
other. First, there was the well-known dissertation by Joseph Lebon on

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[1] Van Loon (2001). The present study will show that the meaning given to the terms
and expressions in this previous volume is not accurate enough. Neither would I call
the μία φύσις formula "Cyril of Alexandria's Formula" any longer.

[2] Personal communication.

the 'Severian Monophysites' (1909).[3] He claims that the major 'Mono-physite' theologians in the fifth and sixth centuries, Severus of Antioch (ca 465–538) in particular, followed Cyril of Alexandria's christology, and that Cyril's understanding of the terms was the same as that of these anti-Chalcedonians. In Cyril's own christological language, then, the words φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον are always synonymous, and they designate an individual being, subsisting separately from other beings. Therefore, Cyril could never accept dyophysite language, since 'two natures' for him implied two separate persons. After the Council of Ephesus he conceded to the Antiochenes that one could speak of 'two natures', but 'in contemplation only'. And the famous formula μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη means nothing else than 'the one incarnate person of the Word of God'.

Three years later, M. Jugie wrote an article criticizing Lebon's find-ings, taking up ideas from the seventeenth-century theologian Diony-sius Petavius (Denis Pétau, 1583–1652).[4] Jugie cites several examples from Cyril's writings in which the term φύσις is used for Christ's human nature. This implies that in these instances the word cannot mean 'person', but must be closer to οὐσία. This is not to say that Christ's human nature is abstract—it is a real, concrete nature, which Cyril also calls ὑπόστασις. The archbishop of Alexandria would never call Christ's humanity a πρόσωπον, which to him indicates a separate exis-tence, an individual, a person. Thus Lebon's conclusion that in Cyril's christology φύσις is always synonymous with πρόσωπον cannot be cor-rect. Jugie emphasizes that Cyril was never opposed to *distinguishing* the two natures in Christ, but to *dividing* them, since that would result in two separate persons. But there are instances, according to Jugie, in which the word φύσις is indeed synonymous with πρόσωπον, namely, when it is obvious that such a φύσις is separated from other φύσεις. This is the case when a phrase like 'of the Word of God' is added, and, therefore, the word φύσις in the μία φύσις formula means 'a nature-person', a φύσις-πρόσωπον.[5]

These are the two basic positions which, with variations in details, we find throughout the twentieth century, up to the present day. On the one hand, Lebon's view that in Cyril of Alexandria's own christological language φύσις is always synonymous with πρόσωπον, so that in reality

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[3] Lebon (1909).
[4] Jugie (1912a).
[5] Jugie (1912a), 25.

there is only one φύσις of the incarnate Christ, while one can speak of two φύσεις in thought only. On the other hand, Jugie's understanding that it is no problem for Cyril to speak of a concrete human φύσις, as long as it is clear that this human φύσις never existed separately from the Logos. When used in this way, the word φύσις is not synonymous with πρόσωπον, for that term always denotes a separate existence. The real distinction of the two concrete φύσεις in Christ was not a problem to Cyril, as long as the two were not divided into two separate πρόσωπα.

In 1939 appeared Joseph van den Dries's dissertation on the μία φύσις formula.[6] His view is very similar to Jugie's, and he backs it up with much evidence from Cyril's own writings. The term φύσις is not usually synonymous with πρόσωπον, but denotes an 'impersonal substantial reality'. And Cyril accepts the distinction of the two natures in Christ, but rejects their separation. On the meaning of the word φύσις in the μία φύσις formula he is more specific than Jugie: "The φύσις is a φύσις-πρόσωπον, not because φύσις signifies 'person', but because this φύσις is the nature of a Person, the Person of the Word".[7]

When in 1951 the first volume of *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* was published,[8] these differing positions were still in place. Lebon reiterates his view from forty years earlier, with only minor alterations.[9] And Aloys Grillmeier defends a position which builds on the findings of van den Dries.[10] In a later article Grillmeier writes that "Lebon has shown with masterly lucidity that the Severians are nothing else but consistent Cyrillians. They do not want to hold anything else but the pre-Chalcedonian, purely Alexandrian-Cyrillian terminology and theology".[11] However, it seems that with this statement Grillmeier only wants to stress the orthodoxy of the Miaphysites,[12] and that he does

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[6] Van den Dries (1939).

[7] *Ibid.*, 132.

[8] Grillmeier & Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, vol. 1 (1951), referred to as *Chalkedon* I.

[9] Lebon (1951).

[10] Grillmeier (1951), esp. 164–182.

[11] Grillmeier (1958), 380; see also n. 29 on p. 376.

[12] Since 'Monophysites' was originally a polemical title for the non-Chalcedonians by their opponents, and the non-Chalcedonians have never accepted this term as an adequate summary of their view, because they confessed μία φύσις, which was compounded, more and more scholars nowadays refer to them as 'Miaphysites'. Therefore, this term rather than 'Monophysites' is used in this study, while 'miaphysite' is also employed as the counterpart to 'dyophysite'.

not imply that he now agrees that Lebon's interpretation of Cyril's terminology is correct. For in *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche* (¹1979 and ³1990) his description of Cyril's christological terminology is almost literally the same as that of 1951.[13]

Meanwhile, unofficial ecumenical consultations between theologians of the Eastern Orthodox Churches, who adhere to the definition of Chalcedon, and the Oriental Orthodox Churches, the heirs of the Miaphysites, had taken place from 1964 till 1971.[14] To come to an agreement, the participants turned to the christology of Cyril of Alexandria—the saint whom the two families of churches have in common and who had a profound influence on the christologies of both families—, especially to the μία φύσις formula. During these consultations Lebon's interpretation of Cyril's terminology is followed, not just by the Oriental Orthodox, but just as much by the Eastern Orthodox. So, according to Johannes N. Karmiris, "the terms 'nature', 'hypostasis' and 'person' were equated at that time [the time of Cyril and Nestorius] since they were regarded as synonymous and identical".[15] And John S. Romanides writes: "For Cyril *Physis* means a concrete individual acting as subject in its own right".[16]

The official consultations between representatives of the two families of churches took place from 1985 till 1993. There is hardly any direct interpretation of Cyril's christology—although there are references to him—, but there are reminiscences of Lebon's understanding, especially the emphasis that the two natures of Christ are distinguished 'in contemplation only'.[17]

During the ecumenical discussions with the Eastern Orthodox, the issue was raised several times by the Oriental Orthodox. See Samuel (1964–1965), 31 f.: "In fact, the term 'monophysite' has been coined by isolating the phrase 'one incarnate nature of God the Word' from the rest [three other phrases] and substituting the word 'mia' in it by 'monos', a position which the non-Chalcedonian Orthodox Church has never accepted". And Verghese (1968), 196: "*Mia physis* would mean *one* nature, whereas *moné physis* would mean one nature *only*, and there is a great difference. None of the so-called Monophysite Churches hold that there is one nature only in Christ. Their view is that two natures have, by union, become one".

[13] Grillmeier, *JdChr* I, ¹1979, 673–686; 3rd rev. ed., 1990, 673–686. See also: *CCT* I, ¹1965, 400–412; ²1975, 473–483.

[14] The papers, discussions and agreed statements of the unofficial consultations have been published in: *GOTR* 10/2 (1964–1965) 5–160; *GOTR* 13 (1968) 121–320; *GOTR* 16 (1971) 1–209; *GOTR* 16 (1971) 210–259.

[15] Karmiris (1964–1965), 64/32.

[16] Romanides (1964–1965), 86/54.

[17] "Communiqué of the Joint Commission of the Theological Dialogue", *GOTR* 34

During the past fifteen years several monographs on Cyril of Alexandria's christology and/or soteriology have been published. Although not all of them discuss the meaning of the terms in question in detail, most of them do express an opinion as to the meaning of the word φύσις. First, there is John A. McGuckin's study *St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy*.[18] For an analysis of the terms, he refers to du Manoir's study,[19] who in turn bases his view on that of Jugie.[20] In the μία φύσις formula the word φύσις is synonymous with ὑπόστασις, and "[b]oth are referring to individual and real personal subjectivity", according to McGuckin.[21] But he adds that "Cyril was also (though less frequently) capable of using physis to connote 'natural quality'," and that "in the literature specifically relating to the Orientals ... he even admits that there can be two physeis in Christ", but that it is "only possible to speak of two natures after the union in a theoretical or deductive sense".[22] Despite the reference to du Manoir, and thus implicitly to Jugie, we see here an interpretation which differs from the latter's. Jugie maintains that in Cyril's christology φύσις is rather often ("assez souvent") used for the humanity of Christ, and that it is then synonymous with οὐσία, while φύσις and ὑπόστασις are sometimes ("parfois") used as synonyms of πρόσωπον, namely, when they exist separately from other φύσεις or ὑποστάσεις.[23] McGuckin seems to say that Cyril himself uses the word φύσις in the sense of individual subjectivity, while he conceded to the Orientals that it is allowed to speak of two φύσεις after the union, but 'in contemplation only'. This, however, is closer to Lebon's view than to Jugie's.

Gudrun Münch-Labacher's monograph deals more with soteriology than with christology, and thus it is not surprising that she does not

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(1989) 395: "the natures being distinguished from each other in contemplation (*theoria*) only". "Joint-Commission of the Theological Dialogue", *GOTR* 36 (1991) 186: "The Oriental Orthodox agree that the Orthodox are justified in their use of the two-natures formula, since they acknowledge that the distinction is 'in thought alone' ("τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ"). Cyril interpreted correctly this use in his letter to John of Antioch and his letters to Akakios of Melitene (PG 77.184–201), to Eulogios (PG 77.224–228), and to Succensus (PG 77.228–245)".

[18] McGuckin (1994).

[19] *Ibid.*, 176, n. 2; 193, n. 34.

[20] Du Manoir de Juaye (1944). His explicit reference to Jugie's article can be found on p. 115, n. 1.

[21] McGuckin (1994), 208 f.

[22] *Ibid.*, 209.

[23] Jugie (1912a), 20 and 24.

give much attention to the meaning of christological terminology.[24] However, she does discuss the interpretation of the word φύσις: it seems that Cyril understands by φύσις something which exists by and of itself ("in sich und für sich selber"). Cyril does not deny Christ's complete and really existing humanity, but he does deny that it exists separately from the Logos. "Conceptually ["Begrifflich"], on the one hand, one can speak of two Physeis, but in the reality of the salvation of history, on the other hand, there is only one Physis".[25] This, again, is akin to Lebon's view: φύσις means πρόσωπον, and therefore, two φύσεις in Christ can only exist in thought.

Bernard Meunier does not discuss Cyril's christological terminology in detail either, in *Le Christ de Cyrille d'Alexandrie*.[26] But in a section on the μία φύσις formula he writes that Cyril opposes 'in contemplation only' to 'two natures really subsisting', for the latter would imply a separation, and thus two subjects. "The purely intellectual distinction which he admits places φύσις on the side of an abstract concept, that is, of substance, and not of a concrete subject", while Cyril himself usually understands φύσις in a concrete way.[27] Once more, we encounter an understanding which is closer to that of Lebon than to that of Jugie.

The fourth and final monograph is that of Steven A. McKinion, *Words, Imagery, and the Mystery of Christ*.[28] He states that "[w]hen Cyril uses φύσις to describe either the human or divine element in Christ he does not do so in order to explain something about its individuality. Rather, the human φύσις or ὑπόστασις is the human condition, or a human existence that the Word makes for himself".[29] In the μία φύσις formula, on the other hand, the word φύσις means "individual, living being", which shows "the lack of a concrete christological vocabulary". The formula takes a lesser role in Cyril's later publications.[30] Thus, McKinion interprets Cyril's understanding of the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις in a way similiar to that of Jugie, but he regards Cyril's utilization of the μία φύσις formula as inconsistent with this ordinary usage.

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[24] Münch-Labacher (1996).
[25] *Ibid.*, 18 f.
[26] Meunier (1997).
[27] *Ibid.*, 263.
[28] McKinion (2000).
[29] *Ibid.*, 176.
[30] *Ibid.*, 173, n. 180.

1.1.2. *Refinement of the Study's Aim*

The conclusion must be that there is by no means a consensus as to the interpretation of the terms in Cyril's christology. Despite the fact that van den Dries has undergirded Jugie's understanding with much evidence, and that Grillmeier has been persuaded by their view, many theologians still adopt Lebon's view that in Cyril's own christology the word φύσις is synonymous with πρόσωπον and means 'separate individual existence' or 'person'.

From the brief overview above, several factors may be gleaned which probably have played a role in creating this state of affairs:

1. The importance of the μία φύσις formula. There is no doubt that this formula was essential in the controversy between the Chalcedonians and the Miaphysites. But it is often stated that it was also central to Cyril's own christology.[31] And since even Jugie is of the opinion that the word φύσις in the formula indicates a 'person', it is not surprising that if the formula is regarded as a summary of Cyril's christology, this meaning of φύσις is also seen as belonging to his normal christological vocabulary. This study, however, will question the importance that the formula had for Cyril himself.

2. The difference between 'distinguishing the φύσεις' and 'separating the φύσεις', and linked with this the use of 'in contemplation only' (ἐν θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ). Lebon argues that φύσις means 'person', and that the two φύσεις of Christ may therefore only be distinguished in thought; otherwise there would be two 'persons', which would entail Nestorianism. Jugie, on the other hand, emphasizes that φύσις does not usually mean 'person', but 'concrete, natural existence'. According to him, Cyril has no problem distinguishing the concrete φύσεις in the one 'person' of Christ, but separating them would result in two 'persons'. Thus, 'in contemplation only' refers not to the two φύσεις as such, but to separating them. We have seen that in several recent studies the difference between 'distinguishing' and 'separating' is not made: accepting the existence of two φύσεις as such already results in a separation, and therefore one can speak of two φύσεις 'in contemplation only'.

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[31] See, e.g., Romanides (1964–1965), 86; Samuel (1964–1965b), 38; Kelly (1985), 329; Gray (1979), 14.

3. The distinction made by Lebon between Cyril's own christological terminology and the terminology he conceded to the Orientals as part of the reunion of 433. Cyril himself supposedly preferred and continued to prefer μία φύσις language, since φύσις meant 'person' to him. Therefore, before 432 he is said not to have used dyophysite language, but since 432 or 433 he accepted the Orientals' use of 'two φύσεις'—even used it himself at times—, as long as it was added that this was 'in contemplation only'. This view, too, is repeated in more recent publications, for example, in McGuckin's book.

In the light of these findings, the aim of the present study can be narrowed down:

To investigate the meaning of the terms φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσ-ωπον, as well as the expressions ἕνωσις καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν and μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, in the christological writings of Cyril of Alexandria in the first two years of the Nestorian controversy (429–430). The limitation to this period makes it possible to study Cyril's *own* use of the terminology, before concessions to the Orientals allegedly made him alter his language. Special attention will be given to the way in which Cyril employs the notion of 'in contemplation only', particularly whether he applies it to the (distinction of the) φύσεις themselves or only to the *separation* of them. In order to avoid the pitfalls of a 'proof-text method'—in which citations from various publications and differing periods in Cyril's life are brought together without giving attention to their context—each publication will be discussed separately before more general conclusions will be drawn.

1.2. The Study's Relevance

When we consider the relevance of a study into the christology of Cyril of Alexandria we may distinguish between historical, ecumenical and dogmatic reasons why such an investigation is worthwhile.

1.2.1. *Historical Relevance*

From a historical perspective, such a study is already valuable in and of itself: we try to get as accurate a picture of the theological views of Cyril of Alexandria as possible, and thus to do justice to the man himself. But

because of Cyril's influence on theology throughout the ages, a proper assessment of his christology goes well beyond the understanding of one man's personal theologoumena.[32] His influence on present-day theology is not so much direct, but it has come to us by at least five important ways: 1. the Council of Ephesus (431); 2. the Council of Chalcedon (451); 3. the Miaphysite theologians of the fifth and sixth centuries; 4. the 'neo-Chalcedonian' theologians of the fifth and sixth centuries; 5. Thomas Aquinas (ca 1225–1274). The relationship between Cyril's christology and the definition of Chalcedon as well as the concept of 'neo-Chalcedonianism' have been widely debated during the past century. Therefore, they will be discussed in more detail.

1.2.1.1. *The Council of Ephesus (431)*

From the two councils that met at Ephesus in 431, it is the one which was dominated by the Cyrillians that was later to be acknowledged as the third ecumenical council. The definition of Chalcedon states that "we also stand by the decisions and all the formulas relating to the creed from the sacred synod which took place formerly at Ephesus, whose leaders of most holy memory were Celestine of Rome and Cyril of Alexandria".[33] This council decided that Cyril's second letter to Nestorius was the proper interpretation of the Nicene Creed, while it condemned Nestorius's answer to this letter.[34] Sometimes, an 'Ephesian Symbol' is spoken of.[35] By this the Formula of Reunion is meant, which formed the dogmatic basis for the peace between the Alexandrians and the Antiochenes in 433. It is contained in Cyril's letter to John of Antioch, 'Let the Heavens Rejoice'.[36]

The Formula of Reunion is an altered version of an Antiochene profession of faith, which was drawn up—probably by Theodoret

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[32] As de Halleux (1981), 145, writes: "Die Spuren des Einflusses Cyrills von Alexandrien zu verfolgen würde bedeuten, die gesamte Geschichte der Christologie seit dem 5. Jahrhundert zu schreiben". And according to von Campenhausen (1955), 153: "Kyrill hat dem Strom der weiteren dogmatisch-kirchlichen Entwicklung das Bett so tief gegraben, dass sie es, aufs Ganze gesehen, nicht mehr verlassen hat".

[33] The critical text of the definiton of Chalcedon is given in ACO II.1.2, 126–130. The English translation is taken from *DEC* I; the Greek, Latin and English texts can be found on pp. 83–87; the quotation is from p. 84.

[34] ACO I.1.2, 13^{16-25}, 31^{3-17}, 35^{30}–36^6.

[35] See, e.g., Grillmeier, *JdChr* I, 687, and Ritter (1982), 252.

[36] *Ep.* 39; ACO I.1.4, 15–20; PG 77, 173–181; (the first part is left out in:) *DEC* I, 70–74. The Formula of Reunion: ACO I.1.4, 17^{9-20}; PG 77, 176D–177B; *DEC* I, 69–70.

of Cyrus—for the discussions at Chalcedon in the autumn of 431, following the Council of Ephesus.[37] The first change can be found in the second part of the phrase "born of the Father before the ages according to the divinity, in the last days, the same one, for us and for our salvation, [born] of the virgin Mary according to the humanity". The words 'the same one' (τὸν αὐτόν) and 'for us and for our salvation' are missing in the original version. The addition of 'the same one' points to an Alexandrian input, emphasizing that the one born from the virgin is the same one as the only-begotten Son of God. The phrase 'for us and for our salvation' is, of course, taken from the Nicene Creed. The second change consists of the last sentence, on the 'evangelical and apostolic sayings about the Lord', and will have an Antiochene origin, since it is phrased quite differently than Cyril's fourth anathema.

The influence of the Council of Ephesus on later theology has partly been indirect, in that its decisions have been taken over and elaborated by the Council of Chalcedon. The latter synod once more declared Cyril's second letter to Nestorius to be orthodox, now mentioned together with his letter to John of Antioch, containing the Formula of Reunion.[38] And, whether directly or indirectly, a large part of the text of the Formula of Reunion has entered into the dogmatic definition of Chalcedon.[39] Thus, it is also through Chalcedon that Cyril's impact at Ephesus is felt even today.

1.2.1.2. *The Council of Chalcedon (451)*

Despite the already mentioned fact that Cyril's christology, as expressed at Ephesus and in the two officially accepted letters, was affirmed at the Council of Chalcedon, Western theologians for a long time regarded this council as a victory of pope Leo the Great and of Western christology. Harnack calls the council "a memorial of the enslavement of the spirit of the Eastern Church which here, in connection with the most

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[37] The text of the original Antiochene profession of faith: ACO I.1.7, 70[15–22]. In his letter to the monks (*ep.* 151; SC 429, C 4, lines 85–94; PG 83, 1420A), Theodoret of Cyrus gives a profession of faith which differs at significant points from this original text. At the beginning the words 'the Only Begotten Son of God' are omitted, and at the end the sentence containing the word θεοτόκος is lacking. Interestingly enough, it does contain the phrase 'for us and for our salvation'.

[38] ACO II.1.2, 129.

[39] See for the relationship between the Formula of Reunion and the definition of Chalcedon: de Halleux (1976); other references are given in this article. See n. 50.

important doctrinal question, surrendered to the Western supreme bishop allied with the Emperor".[40] And Seeberg states: "Materially, they supported the doctrine of the pope's letter", and: "Nothing has paralysed Cyril's influence in history more than the Council of Chalcedon, although it praised him and condemned Nestorius".[41]

In the first volume of *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* (1951), however, other voices can be heard. Ignacio Ortiz de Urbina discusses the sources of the dogmatic definition.[42] The majority of the text stems from the Formula of Reunion, as contained in Cyril's letter to John of Antioch (*ep.* 39). Important phrases are taken from Leo's Tome, the dogmatic letter that pope Leo I sent to Flavian, archbishop of Constantinople, in 449. One phrase is an almost verbatim quotation from Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*, and according to Ortiz de Urbina, the expression 'and one hypostasis' is the sole contribution that archbishop Flavian of Constantinople has made, through his profession of faith. He stresses that "the majority of the quotations stem from the letters of St. Cyril, so that it seems fully unjustified when the Monophysites reject the Council of Chalcedon as 'anti-Cyrillian'".[43] On the other hand, he adds that "[t]he insertion of Leo's phrases turns out to be decisive in order to say the final word in the controversy over Eutyches and Dioscore".[44]

Paul Galtier goes even further, when, in the same volume of *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, he examines the influence of Cyril and Leo at the council.[45] Repeatedly, he emphasizes the authority that Cyril enjoyed: "Thus from the beginning to the end of its doctrinal activity, the Council of Chalcedon has shown itself intent to safeguard saint Cyril's authority".[46] It is beyond doubt that Cyril's conception of Christ is in line with that of Leo's Tome and with that of the council's definition, Galtier writes. Therefore, when the imperial commissioners made the council choose between ἐκ δύο φύσεων and ἐν δύο φύσεσι, this was not a choice between the christology of Cyril of Alexandria and that

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[40] Harnack (1898), 215. The same assessment can still be found in the fifth German edition, Harnack (1931), 390.

[41] Seeberg (1923), 260 and 265. Also a century ago, though, there were others who assessed Cyril's influence at Chalcedon differerently. For example, Loofs (1887), 50, writes: "Das Symbol von Chalcedon ist cyrillischer, als es vielfach dargestellt wird".

[42] Ortiz de Urbina (1951).

[43] *Ibid.*, 400.

[44] *Ibid.*, 400f.

[45] Galtier (1951).

[46] *Ibid.*, 362.

of pope Leo of Rome. Although Cyril had not used the terminology of ἐν δύο φύσεσι—since his opponent was Nestorius, not Eutyches—materially he was in agreement with its meaning.[47]

After 1951, most scholars followed the assessment that Cyril of Alexandria's contribution to the Chalcedonian settlement was considerable, while Leo's influence was decisive. Two examples may suffice. With an explicit reference to Ortiz de Urbina's article, Jaroslav Pelikan writes: "Even though it may be statistically accurate to say that 'the majority of the quotations come from the letters of St. Cyril,' the contributions of Leo's *Tome* were the decisive ones".[48] And J.N.D. Kelly mentions several "points that underline the substantial truth of the verdict" that Chalcedon was a triumph of Western and Antiochene christology, but he adds that this verdict "does less than justice … to the essential features of Cyril's teaching enshrined … in the council's confession".[49]

In 1976, an important article by André de Halleux appeared, in which he once more examined the sources for the doctrinal definition of Chalcedon.[50] He points out that the backbone of the text is formed by the phrase 'we teach to confess one and the same'. This 'one and the same', followed by titles like 'Son', 'Lord', 'Christ', 'Only-Begotten', 'God the Word', comes at the beginning, in the middle—linking the first, more symbolic, with the second, more theological part of the definition—and at the end of the text. It is further emphasized by a repeated 'the same'. The majority of the phrases is linked with this backbone by adjectives and participles. De Halleux even postulates, not a redactor, but a single author of this central passage, who has written the text with the various sources in mind. He detects in the quotation from Hebrews 4:15 in the first part ("like us in all things except for sin") and in the phrase 'known in two natures' in the second part influences from the profession of faith which Basil of Seleucia had written at the *endēmousa* synod of 448, and which had been read at Chalcedon as part of the acts of that synod a few days earlier.[51] Basil had explicitly stated that he based his profession of faith, including the phrase 'known in two

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[47] *Ibid.*, 366 f., 385.

[48] Pelikan (1971), 264.

[49] Kelly (1985), 341 f.

[50] De Halleux (1976). Besides Ortiz de Urbina's article, he discusses and makes use of the following publications: Richard (1945); Sellers (1953); Diepen (1953); Camelot (1962); Šagi-Bunić (1964); Šagi-Bunić (1965).

[51] De Halleux (1976), 17, gives credit to Sellers (1953), 122, for first pointing out the possible influence of Basil of Seleucia.

natures', on the writings of Cyril of Alexandria. De Halleux suggests that the whole backbone of the Chalcedonian definition with all its clauses was written in a 'Basilian' milieu and thus inspired by Cyrillian christology.[52]

There are three phrases which are not attached to this backbone by adjectives or participles, but inserted as absolute genitives of feminine nouns (while in the backbone the accusatives are masculine): "while the difference of the natures is by no means removed because of the union, the particularity of each nature rather being preserved, and concurring into one person and one hypostasis". De Halleux suggests that these clauses, together with the four adverbs, were added to an originally 'Basilian' second part of the definition, which read: "one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-Begotten, known in two natures, not divided or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son, Only-Begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ". The addition was the result of pressure by the Roman legates and the imperial commissioners to include parts of Leo's Tome. The Illyrian and Palestinian bishops, however, had first wanted to make sure that the Tome was in agreement with Cyril's writings. In the redaction of the addition de Halleux sees reflected the comparison of Leo's Tome with Cyril's letters: it starts with an almost literal quotation from Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*,[53] while in the following citations from Leo's Tome several words from the standard Greek translation of the Tome have been replaced by words from Cyril's letters. In line with this procedure, he regards the words 'and one hypostasis' as stemming from the 'union according to hypostasis' in Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*, not from Flavian's profession of faith.

If de Halleux's analysis is correct—in general, if not in every detail—the definition of Chalcedon is much more Cyrillian than previously had been accepted.[54] Many scholars have taken over this conclusion, but there are others who still regard Leo's influence as decisive. So, for

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[52] *Ibid.*, 156–160.

[53] The Chalcedonian definition reads: οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν (ACO II.1.2, 129[31f.]). Cyril writes in his *Second Letter to Nestorius*: οὐχ ὡς τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν (ACO I.1.1, 27[1f.]). The stronger negative in the definition emphasizes somewhat more that the natures remain after the union.

[54] Gray (1979)—this study was published in 1979, but completed in 1973—had defended a similar conclusion, although he backed it up with much less evidence than de Halleux.

example, Friedhelm Winkelmann: although he refers not just to Ortiz de Urbina's article, but also to that of de Halleux, he writes: "The essence of the actual christological expressions stemmed from Leo's Tome".[55] And Karlmann Beyschlag states: "For to be true, externally, that is in view of the rejection of the threatening heresies from both sides, Leo and Cyril are equal bearers of the Chalcedonian definition, but as for the christological inner side, the Leonine (or Leonine / Antiochene) position is clearly dominant, while the Cyrillian position has been dogmatically reduced since 433 and thus is just as clearly recessive".[56]

Aloys Grillmeier, on the other hand, gives an extensive summary of de Halleux's article in *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*,[57] and comes to the following assessment of the various influences: "Certainly, Latin, Antiochene, and finally also Constantinopolitan theology had already prepared individual elements of the solution. It is remarkable how—as the latest research has shown—the whole has been joined together into a new synthesis only by the spirit of Cyril".[58] But he adds that Cyril's contribution was not recognized, which led to the Miaphysite controversy.

Another scholar who accepts the dominance of Cyrillian influence on the definition of Chalcedon is Adolf Martin Ritter. After giving an overview of de Halleux's findings he concludes: "Thus everything seems to confirm that, when formulating the christological formula of Chalcedon in its final form, they followed Cyril as much as possible and Leo as little as absolutely necessary (in order to avoid an open breach)".[59] In a later article he repeats this view, referring to more recent literature that supports it, and criticizing Beyschlag's rejection of the results of the source analyses, accusing him that he "does not seriously want to enter into this new discussion and to engage by argument with the positions rejected by him".[60]

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[55] Winkelmann (1980), 48. The reference to the articles of Ortiz de Urbina and de Halleux on p. 19.

[56] Beyschlag (1991), 130.

[57] Grillmeier, *JdChr* I, [1]1979 (also [3]1990), 755–759.

[58] *Ibid.*, 761. See also Grillmeier (1984), 89 f., a review article of Gray (1979).

[59] Ritter (1982), 267. See also Andresen & Ritter (1993), 91.

[60] Ritter (1993), 462. Ritter also polemicizes with Ekkehard Mühlenberg, who in a review of a Festschrift, containing an article by Ritter, criticizes the view that Cyril's influence was dominant at Chalcedon; Mühlenberg (1992). In a more recent article, Mühlenberg (1997), 21, once more states his position that "posthumously Cyril is the loser at Chalcedon".

The conclusion may be that even if theologians are not in full agreement on the relative importance of Cyril of Alexandria and Leo I, pope of Rome, for the Council of Chalcedon, it is obvious that Cyril's influence on the council's decisions and through them on christology throughout the subsequent ages up to the present day has been considerable.

1.2.1.3. *The Miaphysite Theologians of the Fifth and Sixth Centuries*

It is virtually undisputed that Cyril of Alexandria was the champion of christological orthodoxy for the Miaphysites of the fifth and sixth centuries, especially for Severus of Antioch, who laid the foundations for the christology of what are now called the Oriental Orthodox Churches. Joseph Lebon concludes in his authoritative dissertation on the subject, *Le monophysisme sévérien*: "The Monophysite doctrine of the incarnation, even and especially in the scientific form which Severus has given it, is nothing else than Cyrillian Christology".[61] In this study he discusses in detail: Dioscorus I (†454), Timothy Aelurus (†477), Philoxenus of Mabbug (ca 440–523), and above all Severus of Antioch (ca 465–538).[62] And in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* he repeats his assessment and calls these theologians "the heirs of saint Cyril of Alexandria's thought and language".[63] Grillmeier accepts Lebon's findings: "Lebon has shown with masterly lucidity that the Severians are nothing else but consistent Cyrillians".[64] V.C. Samuel, himself an Oriental Orthodox theologian, writes that "the anti-Chalcedonian side continued in the Cyrilline tradition", and refers with approval to both of Lebon's works just cited.[65] Thus, Cyril of Alexandria greatly influenced the christology of the Miaphysite theologians in the century following the Council of Chalcedon, and through them the present-day Oriental Orthodox Churches. Whether not just their christology, but also their language is Cyrillian, as Lebon states emphatically, will be discussed later on.

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[61] Lebon (1909), xxi.

[62] Frend (1972) describes the history of the opposition against the definition of Chalcedon and of the development of a separate Miaphysite church family. See also Gray (1979).

[63] Lebon (1951), 472.

[64] Grillmeier (1958), 380.

[65] Samuel (1968), 164; reference to Lebon on p. 160.

1.2.1.4. *The 'Neo-Chalcedonian' Theologians of the Fifth and Sixth Centuries*

The concept of 'neo-Chalcedonianism' was introduced nearly a century ago and has since been a subject of debate: can a group of 'neo-Chalcedonian' theologians be distinguished; if so, what are their characteristics, and what has been their influence on Western theology? It is generally believed that Lebon coined the term 'neo-Chalcedonian' in his book *Le monophysisme sévérien*, although he mentions it twice in passing, without any explanation, as though it were an already accepted term.[66] He calls Leontius of Byzantium (*fl.* ca 530–540) and John the Grammarian (*fl.* ca 510–520) 'neo-Chalcedonians' and links their teaching with the concept of 'enhypostasia'.[67] In the conclusion of his book, Lebon mentions the concept again in a debate with Loofs and Harnack.

Although Loofs regarded Cyril of Alexandria's influence on the definition of Chalcedon greater than it was often depicted,[68] he opposed two possible interpretations of the Chalcedonian symbol: one Cyrillian, the other Western-Antiochene. According to Loofs, Cyril of Alexandria taught that the Word had assumed human nature in general, not an individualized human nature, and Loofs used the term 'anhypostasia' for this. Thus, Cyril would have denied that Christ was an individual human being, while the Antiochenes wanted to stress precisely this. At Chalcedon, this main difference between the two schools was not discussed. In order to solve it, it was necessary to reconcile the Cyrillian and the Leonine phrases, accepted at Chalcedon, and this theological task could only be tackled when, with the end of the Acacian schism in 519, the Chalcedonian symbol was officially accepted again, according to Loofs. The theopaschite controversy, started by the Scythian monks, was a beginning. The main work was done by Leontius of Byzantium and contemporary theologians. Leontius's concept of 'enhypostasia' made it possible to regard Christ's human nature as individualized in the hypostasis of the Logos, writes Loofs.[69] Harnack accepted this outline of Loofs and sums up the result arrived at by "Leontius and his friends", called "new Cappadocians" or "new Conservatives", with

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[66] Lebon (1909), 409 (n. 2) and 411.

[67] Following Loofs (1887), Lebon will have regarded Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem as one and the same person. The distinction between the two men was made plausible by Richard (1944).

[68] See n. 41.

[69] Loofs (1887), 48 f., 52 f., 59 f., 68.

the sentence: "It is possible to accept the Chalcedonian Creed as authoritative and at the same time to think as Cyril thought".[70]

Lebon thoroughly disagrees with Loofs regarding Cyril's christology: for Cyril, too, Christ was an individual human being. Although he did not use the term 'enhypostasia', Cyril had exactly the same view of the union between the Word and the human nature as Leontius.[71] It is dangerous to oppose a theory of 'anhypostasia', attributed to the Cyrillians, to a theory of 'enhypostasia', attributed "to the group of neo-Chalcedonians, whose chief would be Leontius of Byzantium". The Council of Chalcedon itself was following Cyril. The moment at which the council could be presented as the legitimate interpretation of Cyril's views has been pushed forward, Lebon writes. And he sees it as an important result of his study that it has moved this date backwards: already at the beginning of the sixth century the dyophysites quoted Cyril to defend their position. Leontius of Byzantium had predecessors: John of Scythopolis (*fl.* ca 500) and John the Grammarian. "The neo-Chalcedonians have not changed the christology of the Synod; on the basis of its teaching and of its dyophysite formulas, they have erected— thanks to Aristotelian philosophy—the dogmatic and scientific system which is still ours".[72]

Lebon briefly returned to the notion of neo-Chalcedonianism in two later articles,[73] and Charles Moeller took up and elaborated the concept in an article about Nephalius of Alexandria (*fl.* ca 480–510), whom he calls "a representative of neo-Chalcedonian christology".[74] Marcel Richard then criticized the way in which Moeller defined neo-Chalcedonianism and himself gave a definition which became a reference point for the developing debate.[75] He argues that the name 'neo-Chalcedonianism' itself suggests that it concerns a new interpretation of the theology of Chalcedon, over against an older interpretation, which he calls 'strict Chalcedonianism'.[76] The difference between them lies in

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[70] Harnack (1898), 241.

[71] Lebon (1909), 408–411.

[72] *Ibid.*, 521 f.

[73] Lebon (1914), 213 f.; Lebon (1930), 535. Besides the three theologians already mentioned, he now adds the names of Heraclianus, bishop of Chalcedon (ca 537–553), Macedonius, patriarch of Constantinople (496–511), and Ephrem, patriarch of Antioch (526–545), as representatives of neo-Chalcedonianism.

[74] Moeller (1944–1945).

[75] Richard (1946).

[76] *Ibid.*, 156. Moeller (1944–1945), 97, had already used the expression 'strict Chalcedonian'; he also spoke of 'strict dyophysitism' (p. 121).

the attitude towards the writings of Cyril of Alexandria. The Council of Chalcedon had officially accepted Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* (*ep.* 4) and his letter to John of Antioch (*ep.* 39). Strict Chalcedonians wanted to use only these officially accepted writings of Cyril as a basis for doctrinal decisions, while neo-Chalcedonians also used the other writings of the bishop of Alexandria, 'the whole Cyril', as it came to be called in the debate about neo-Chalcedonianism. Cyrillian formulas like ἐκ δύο φύσεων and ἕνωσις καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν were accepted by both groups of theologians alike, writes Richard. Other expressions, though, were accepted by the neo-Chalcedonians, but rejected by the strict Chalcedonians. This applies to the μία φύσις formula and the theopaschite formulas.[77]

In his contribution to *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Moeller gives an overview of neo-Chalcedonianism in the period from the Council of Chalcedon to the end of the sixth century. He accepts—with some minor alterations—Richard's new definition.[78] Citation of the μία φύσις or the theopaschite formulas is an insufficient criterion, since some of the strict Chalcedonians use these formulas as well. For the neo-Chalcedonians it is essential to combine both christological formulas—two natures and one nature—in order to avoid the extremes of Nestorianism and Miaphysitism, according to Moeller. Strict Chalcedonians, on the other hand, refuse to integrate into their dyophysite christology the anathemas, the μία φύσις and the theopaschite formulas.[79] From the fifth ecumenical council at Constantinople (553) on, neo-Chalcedonianism is the standard christology in the East, according to Moeller. The only strict Chalcedonian after that date whom he mentions is the author of *De sectis*.[80]

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[77] A typical representative of the strict Chalcedonians was Hypatius, archbishop of Ephesus (531 – ca 538), who took part in the colloquy with the anti-Chalcedonians in 532. Richard counts among the neo-Chalcedonians: Nephalius, John of Scythopolis, John the Grammarian, the Scythian monks (active from 518 on), Heraclianus of Chalcedon, and also the emperor Justinian (483–565). But, other than Lebon, he regards Macedonius of Constantinople as a strict Chalcedonian. And he distinguishes between Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem (*fl.* ca 540): the latter was a neo-Chalcedonian, the former was not.

[78] Moeller (1951), 648.

[79] *Ibid.*, 658. In n. 58 on p. 660 Moeller adds that the strict Chalcedonians did not object to the theopaschite formulas as such, but that they always demanded a proper explanation, e.g. in '*unus de Trinitate passus*', *unus* means 'one hypostasis' and *passus* means 'suffered *in the flesh*'.

[80] Others whom Moeller—like Richard (see n. 77)—regards as strict Chalcedonians

With Moeller's article in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* the notion of 'neo-Chalcedonianism' had firmly established itself in the history of theology of the fifth and sixth centuries.[81] But it was not long before the whole notion was called into question. One of the first (1953) and most ardent critics of the distinction between 'strict Chalcedonians' and 'neo-Chalcedonians' is H.-M. Diepen. He writes that 'strict Chalcedonians' have been called those

> theologians who refuse to integrate into their christology the anathemas of Saint Cyril and the Catholic 'theopaschism', which has been universally accepted in all times, the only exception being the patriarchate of Antioch at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth centuries.[82]

Thus, in Diepen's view, theopaschism, as later expressed in the formula 'One of the Trinity suffered in the flesh', is part of Chalcedonian christology, and after this had explicitly been established at the fifth ecumenical council in 553, the light of the Chalcedonian faith "shone in all its brilliance in the eyes of the Catholics, who are so unjustly called 'neo-Chalcedonians'".[83]

Both Richard and Moeller responded, defending the notion of neo-Chalcedonianism.[84] One of the arguments forwarded was that when some bishops at the Council of Chalcedon wanted to have read and approved Cyril's third letter to Nestorius with the anathemas (*ep.* 17), the majority refused to do so.[85] Diepen then published a lengthy article

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are Macedonius of Constantinople, the *akoimetoi* (the 'sleepless monks'), Hypatius of Ephesus, and Leontius of Byzantium.

[81] Jugie (1929) used other titles to denote the various groups in the sixth century. He called the Eutychians 'real Monophysites', Lebon's 'Severian Monophysites'—'heterodox verbal Monophysites', and the neo-Chalcedonians—'orthodox verbal Monophysites'. Sellers (1953), xvii, 293, calls those Chalcedonians who 'were influenced by the Alexandrian way of belief' 'neo-Alexandrians'. When discussing the various names, Grillmeier (1958) 382 / 163, clearly prefers 'neo-Chalcedonians'.

[82] Diepen (1953), 100 f.

[83] *Ibid.*, 106.

[84] Richard (1954); Moeller (1954).

[85] Richard (1946), 158, had already written that the council had refused to authorize the reading of Cyril's third letter to Nestorius with the anathemas and of his letters to Eulogius and Succensus (*epp.* 17, 44–46). Moeller took over the argument that the council would have refused to listen to the letter with the anathemas. In his article on Diepen's book, Richard modified his statement and declared that the council 'ignored' Cyril's third letter to Nestorius, while it "positively refused to listen to the reading of his letters to Acacius, to Valerian, and to Succensus, and it is on this refusal that those whom we have called strict Chalcedonians later base themselves" (p. 91). The letters from after the reunion with the Antiochenes, however, occur only once in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, in a quotation from the acts of the Robber Synod, where

on the twelve anathemas.[86] He refutes the assertion that the reading
of the letter with the twelve chapters was refused by the Council of
Chalcedon. What the acts of the council relate is that one of the Illyrian
bishops, Atticus of Nicopolis, was not convinced that Leo's Tome was in
accordance with the christology of Cyril of Alexandria, and he wanted
to compare the Tome with Cyril's third letter to Nestorius. The council
decided to suspend its proceedings for five days in order for "those who
are in doubt" to be convinced.[87] The letter was not read, but that was
neither asked for nor refused.

According to Diepen, the reason why the Council of Chalcedon did
not give the same authority to Cyril's third letter to Nestorius as it did
to his second letter, was "in order to imitate the prudence" of Cyril
himself.[88] The archbishop had never retracted his twelve anathemas,
but when Alexandria and Antioch had made peace on the basis of the
Formula of Reunion in 433, he passed them over in silence and did not
insist that the Orientals openly acknowledge their orthodoxy, Diepen
writes. And since some of the bishops at Chalcedon had bad memories
regarding the anathemas, the fathers of the council wisely followed
in Cyril's footsteps and did not explicitly accept them as a standard
of orthodoxy. But when the participants in the Nestorian controversy
had all died, the anathemas could re-enter the stage. "This 'neo-
Chalcedonianism' will not be a new doctrine, but quite simply a change
of tactics".[89] Implicitly, Diepen accepts here the distinction between
'strict Chalcedonianism' and 'neo-Chalcedonianism', but merely as a
difference in tactics, not a difference in theology.

In his 1962 dissertation, Siegfried Helmer gives a useful overview of
the history of the term and the concept of neo-Chalcedonianism until
the early sixties of the twentieth century. Helmer himself adopts the
definition of Richard, as further developed by Moeller.[90] The "actual
characteristic" of its theology is the assertion that both dyophysite and

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Eustathius of Berytus points to the μία φύσις formula in these writings (ACO II.1.1,
112[10–28]). At the Council of Chalcedon, no one asked to read these letters, so neither
was it refused.

    [86] Diepen (1955), 333–338. See also de Halleux (1992).
    [87] ACO II.1.2, 82 f.
    [88] Diepen (1955), 337.
    [89] *Ibid.*, 338.
    [90] Helmer (1962). He calls neo-Chalcedonianism "the theological and church-polit-
ical group which, since the first decade of the sixth century, tried to build a bridge
between the moderate Antiochene (dyophysite) formulas of 451 and the Alexandrian
(monophysite) christology of Cyril" (p. 158).

miaphysite formulas are necessary.[91] Another typical feature is that its christology is based on the 'whole Cyril', including the anathemas, the μία φύσις and the theopaschite formulas.[92] Helmer sees its theological significance in the elaboration of the hypostatic unity of Christ's person on the basis of Chalcedonian dyophysite terminology.

A second critic of the distinction between 'strict Chalcedonians' and 'neo-Chalcedonians'—besides Diepen—is Patrick T.R. Gray (1979). He emphasizes that the majority at Chalcedon were Cyrillian, so that it is incorrect to regard those who try to harmonize the Chalcedonian and the Cyrillian language as belonging to an innovative school of theology, called 'neo-Chalcedonianism'.[93] He rejects the concept of 'strict Chalcedonianism'; it is better to distinguish two traditions which differ in their interpretation of the christology of Chalcedon: the Antiochene and Cyrillian traditions.[94] Although Gray prefers the expression 'Cyrillian Chalcedonians', he continues to speak of 'neo-Chalcedonians', since the term has firmly established itself in historical theology.[95] But he redefines the term. According to him, John the Grammarian is the only one who insists that dyophysite and miaphysite formulas should both be used—a demand which Moeller regarded as a criterion for neo-Chalcedonianism. Gray himself then defines neo-Chalcedonianism as

> the tradition of thinkers who, as Cyrillians and Chalcedonians, interpret Chalcedon as fundamentally Cyrillian, and in doing so address the problems posed by the seemingly contradictory vocabularies of Cyril and Chalcedon.[96]

Not unlike Helmer, Gray regards the development of the concept of 'union by hypostasis' in a dyophysite context as the "creative quality" of neo-Chalcedonianism.

Fifteen years later, in the article 'Neuchalkedonismus' in *Theologische Realenzyklopaedie*, Gray's views have not fundamentally changed. He now distinguishes a historical and a theological definition of neo-Chalcedonianism.[97] Historically, it signifies

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[91] *Ibid.*, 192. See also pp. 103, 166, and 183.
[92] *Ibid.*, 166. See also pp. 103, 192, and 207.
[93] Gray (1979), 7–12, 104 f., 177.
[94] *Ibid.*, 174 f.
[95] *Ibid.*, 104, 169.
[96] *Ibid.*, 169.
[97] Gray (1994). He may have adopted this distinction from Grillmeier; see below.

the ideas of a group of theologians, mainly in the first half of the sixth century, who developed a consistent interpretation of Chalcedon, according to which the council expressed the conventional Cyrillian christology in a new language.[98]

Theologically—not bound to a particular time in history—, it signifies

specific christological themes (especially the idea of a union by hypostasis, typical of the later neo-Chalcedonians), which were canonized by the church at the Second Council of Constantinople, and which would stamp the Catholic tradition through the influence of Thomas Aquinas.[99]

Initially, Aloys Grillmeier accepted the findings from Richard and Moeller without amendments. In the second volume of *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* (1953), he writes, referring to Moeller's article in the first volume of that series: "We may assume the idea and the formulas of neo-Chalcedonianism to be known".[100] Like Richard and Moeller, Grillmeier opposes it to strict (mostly 'reiner', sometimes 'strenger') Chalcedonianism. Several times he mentions a 'synthesis' of dyophysite and miaphysite formulas as typical of neo-Chalcedonian christology.[101]

In an article of 1958, Grillmeier elaborates on the notion of neo-Chalcedonianism.[102] Since according to Lebon, the christology of the neo-Chalcedonians is still ours;[103] according to Moeller, "through John of Damascus and Saint Thomas, it has stamped, up to a certain point, our modern treatises of the incarnate Word";[104] and according to Grillmeier himself, "the lasting connection of Latin clarity and Greek depth" "was given to Western theology by Thomas Aquinas";[105] Grillmeier distinguishes in 1958 between neo-Chalcedonianism in the sixth century and in our own times, and therefore between its terminology and its theological content. Neo-Chalcedonianism in the sixth century was characterized by the simultaneous use of dyophysite and miaphysite terminology and formulas, but this double language was temporary: "Terminologically and conceptually, we have become strict

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[98] *Ibid.*, 290.

[99] *Ibid.*, 290.

[100] Grillmeier (1953), 791 f.

[101] *Ibid.*, 800, 822, 838.

[102] Grillmeier (1958). The following page references are to the reprint in *Mit ihm und in ihm* (²1978), which differs slightly from the 1958 original.

[103] Lebon (1909), 522.

[104] Moeller (1951), 666.

[105] Grillmeier (1953), 839.

Chalcedonians again", although we still understand and do not reject the μία φύσις formula.[106]

Theologically, however, a continuing change has been brought about, says Grillmeier. Chalcedon was an important step forward, in that it distinguished between nature and hypostasis and thus opened the way towards a metaphysics of 'person'. Besides, it stressed the abiding difference between the two natures. Its weakness was that this could be understood in rather static and symmetrical terms, in which the human nature had the same status as the divine nature. From the Cyrillian— i.e. the neo-Chalcedonian—side came the Alexandrian intuition, in which two aspects may be distinguished: (1) it emphasizes the unity of Christ (although 'one nature' was to be replaced by 'one hypostasis'); (2) it has a dynamic rather than a static view: in the event of the incarnation, the Logos assumed flesh while remaining the same Logos-person. This intuition, however, could be expressed with Chalcedonian terminology. "That *this* synthesis was possible is shown by Thomas and by the development of the later [neueren] christology, at least until a decade ago".[107] Neo-Chalcedonianism, then, as a terminological synthesis belongs to the past, but as a christological synthesis it is still our concern.

Grillmeier here combines two notions of the Alexandrian or Cyrillian intuition which had been mentioned earlier by Moeller and Jouassard. In his article in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Moeller had written that neo-Chalcedonianism had introduced into Chalcedonian christology "Cyril's brilliant intuition of the *one person* of the Word incarnate".[108] And two years later, Jouassard spoke of Cyril's 'fundamental intuition' that the divine in Christ is 'primordial', while his humanity is 'added'.[109] The Word *was* God, and *has also become* man, while remaining what he was, God. Cyril does not deny the full humanity of Christ, on the contrary, he stresses it many times, Jouassard writes, but the profounder truth about him is that he is first of all God.

In a review article of Gray's book, Grillmeier argues that strict Chalcedonianism did exist, and he also defends the use of certain formulas as a criterion to distinguish neo-Chalcedonians from other

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[106] Grillmeier (1958), 380 f.
[107] *Ibid.*, 384 f. The phrase "at least until a decade ago" is missing in the 1958 original, so it should be taken with 1975 as its starting-point.
[108] Moeller (1951), 718.
[109] Jouassard (1953), 179.

theologians in the sixth century.[110] However, in an excursus in volume II/2 of *Christ in Christian Tradition*, Grillmeier relativizes the definition of historical neo-Chalcedonianism, as developed by Richard and Moeller.[111] His own research into the theologians of the sixth century has taught him that the criterion of demanding the simultaneous use of both dyophysite and miaphysite formulas does not apply to all neo-Chalcedonians. Therefore, he now distinguishes between 'neo-Chalcedonians in the extreme or integral sense' and 'moderate neo-Chalcedonians'. The first group indeed regards the combined use of the μία φύσις formula and the two-natures formula necessary for a correct understanding of faith in the incarnate Son of God; the second group does not.

More recently, Karl-Heinz Uthemann has rejected the concept of strict Chalcedonianism and produced his own definition of neo-Chalcedonianism. According to him, the demand that both dyophysite and miaphysite formulas should be upheld does not apply to any of the so-called neo-Chalcedonians, including John the Grammarian, the only exception being Theodore of Raïthu.[112] Therefore, neo-Chalcedonianism has to be defined differently than by reference to certain formulas. Uthemann accepts the findings of de Halleux, that the definition of Chalcedon itself was already Cyrillian. Neo-Chalcedonianism, however, went beyond Chalcedon by 'filling [auffüllen]' the term hypostasis, regarding it as the one subject of the union, maintaining the dynamic perspective of a Cyrillian christology and soteriology. In his view, Helmer was right in seeing this as the theological significance of neo-Chalcedonianism.[113] The alternative was not 'strict Chalcedonianism', but rather a Leonine interpretation of Chalcedon, writes Uthemann.[114] This distinction is elaborated in a second article:

> One could speak of a Cyrillian and a Leonine interpretation, depending on whether it is emphasized that God the Logos, the one hypostasis from the Trinity, becomes man, works miracles and suffers, or whether one emphasizes that Christ, God and man in one person, works miracles in his divine nature and dies at the cross in his human nature.[115]

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[110] Grillmeier (1984).
[111] Grillmeier, *CCT* II/2, 429–434.
[112] Uthemann (1997), 376 f.
[113] *Ibid.*, 378 f., 412 f.
[114] *Ibid.*, 380, 413.
[115] Uthemann (2001), 603.

It is clear that no unanimity has been reached yet on the concept of 'neo-Chalcedonianism'.[116] For this study there is no need to take up a position on this issue, but it is important to establish the influence of Cyril of Alexandria's christology on later theology. Whether one sees this influence already implicitly present at Chalcedon, or whether one regards neo-Chalcedonianism as a (further) Cyrillization of the christology of Chalcedon, all scholars agree that the so-called neo-Chalcedonian theologians of the sixth century used and developed insights and terminology which they adopted from the Alexandrian archbishop. Through the fifth ecumenical council at Constantinople (553) such a Cyrillian interpretation of Chalcedon has become the normative christology in the Eastern Orthodox Church. Its impact on the West has not been as straightforward, and it is to the West that we will now turn our attention.

According to Grillmeier, neo-Chalcedonianism came to the West in two 'waves'.[117] The first wave came with the Scythian monks.[118] These monks from the region south of the mouth of the Danube came to Constantinople at the end of the year 518. They are especially known for propagating the theopaschite formula, 'one of the Trinity suffered', but their christology was neo-Chalcedonian in various respects. They combined dyophysite and miaphysite formulas—'from (ἐκ) two natures', 'in (ἐν) two natures', the μία φύσις formula, 'composite Christ'—, regarding the first as a safeguard against Eutychianism, and the second as a protection against Nestorianism. In the capital, they accused one of the deacons of heresy, and when the papal legates were unwilling to listen to them, they sent a delegation to Rome.

After an initial negative attitude towards the monks, Justinian, then co-regent of the emperor Justin I (518–527), sent several letters in their support to the pope. Nevertheless, pope Hormisdas (514–523) was unwilling to accept the monks' teaching, as was the senate, to which they then appealed. It is noteworthy that at that time, in order to support the cause of his compatriots, Dionysius Exiguus, himself a Scythian, translated several of Cyril of Alexandria's writings into Latin. Among these were the third letter to Nestorius, with the

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[116] See for an overview also Hainthaler (2004a), 237–243.
[117] Grillmeier (1953), 792.
[118] *Ibid.*, 797–805. See also *CCT* II/2, 317–343.

anathemas, the two letters to Succensus, and part of the letter to Aca-
cius of Melitene.[119]

When the Scythian monks were unsuccessful in Rome, they turned
in writing to the African bishops who had been sent into exile to Sar-
dinia by the Vandals. These bishops took the monks' request seriously,
and they responded by letter, written by Fulgentius of Ruspe (468–
533).[120] They accepted the theopaschite formula on the basis of the *com-
municatio idiomatum*, but they added the word 'person': not '*unus ex Trini-
tate passus est*', but '*una ex Trinitate persona*'. For Fulgentius, his contact
with the Scythian monks meant a turn in his christological thinking.
While so far he had used Antiochene terminology with concrete names
like 'God' and 'man' in his exposition of the two-natures teaching, his
understanding now became more Alexandrian. His christology became
less symmetrical and more centred around the divine Logos, but he did
not accept the μία φύσις formula. As a result, Grillmeier concludes that
Fulgentius remained a strict Chalcedonian.

Despite the continuous support for the theopaschite formula by
Justinian, who became emperor in 527, for a number of years the popes
of Rome were unwilling to acknowledge the formula of the Scythian
monks. It was only after the colloquy between the Chalcedonians and
the anti-Chalcedonians in 532 that the highest Roman ecclesiastical
authority finally approved of it.

The second 'wave' of neo-Chalcedonianism to the West came with
the Three Chapters controversy, according to Grillmeier.[121] In 543/544
Justinian wrote his first edict against the Three Chapters—the writings
and person of Theodore of Mopsuestia, the writings of Theodoret
of Cyrus against Cyril of Alexandria, and the letter to the Persian
Mari, whose author, Justinian wrote, is not Ibas of Edessa, but an
unknown person. Since the emperor called for the universal church
to anathematize the Three Chapters, the African bishops took up a
position: they were unwilling to pronounce the requested anathemas.
The reason, however, was more ecclesiological than christological:[122]
they felt that a condemnation of the Three Chapters implied that the

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[119] See also Haring (1950), 4, 6f.

[120] Hainthaler (2004a), 252–258, gives a summary of the views of the Scythian monks
and of Fulgentius's letter.

[121] Grillmeier (1953), 806–834. See for the Three Chapters controversy also *CCT*
II/2, 411–462, and Gray (1979), 61–73.

[122] Diepen (1953), 99–101, stresses that the defenders of the Three Chapters had
ecclesiological, not christological, reasons for doing so.

validity of the Council of Chalcedon was called into question, since that council had reinstated Theodoret and Ibas after their deposition at the Robber Synod in 449. This is clear from writings by the deacon Ferrandus and by bishop Facundus of Hermiane (*fl.* ca 550). Both accept the theopaschite formula, but emphasize that the decisions of an ecumenical council cannot be annulled. According to Grillmeier, Facundus "remained a true [echter] Chalcedonian".[123]

In 553 the Second Council of Constantinople was held, which has become known as the fifth ecumenical council. It condemned the Three Chapters, and the christology in its anathemas "proves to be moderate neo-Chalcedonianism".[124] The Chalcedonian distinction between ὑπόστασις and φύσις is upheld. The μία φύσις formula is accepted only if it is interpreted correctly, that is, if the word φύσις in this formula is not understood as synonymous with οὐσία: Christ's divinity and humanity are not confused, but each has remained what it was. Some of the African bishops, who opposed the council's decisions, were deposed and exiled. In February of 554, pope Vigilius (537–555) gave in to the pressures and wrote his second *Constitutum*, in which he condemned the Three Chapters. He did not deal with the christological questions of neo-Chalcedonianism. In 1953, Grillmeier concludes from this "that the acceptance of the fifth council can be combined with sticking to the purely [reine] Chalcedonian terminology and ideology".[125]

Emphasizing the importance of the 'four holy synods'—Nicaea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451)—, which were sometimes compared to the four Gospels, became a characteristic of Western theology after 553, and illustrates that the Second Council of Constantinople was not as influential in the West as it was in the East.[126] This is not to say that the popes refused to accept the fifth ecumenical council. But in their writings they give much more attention to the ecclesiological than to the christological aspects.

Grillmeier's overall conclusion in his article 'Vorbereitung des Mittelalters' (1953) is that "the sober-simple, purely Chalcedonian christology remains the West's preference".[127] In view of the acceptance of

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[123] Grillmeier (1953), 812.
[124] Grillmeier, *CCT* II/2, 461.
[125] Grillmeier (1953), 823, n. 67.
[126] This is also highlighted by Galtier (1959).
[127] Grillmeier (1953), 837: "die nüchtern-einfache, rein chalkedonische Christologie bleibt die Vorliebe des Abendlandes".

the theopaschite formula by Western theologians, and of the reported changes in the christology of men like Fulgentius of Ruspe under the influence of Greek theology, it is not surprising that in his 1958 article, 'Der Neu-Chalkedonismus', Grillmeier distinguishes between the terminology and the christology of neo-Chalcedonianism.[128] One could interpret the summary, just given, of the impact of neo-Chalcedonianism on the West in the sixth century as follows: terminologically the West remained strictly Chalcedonian, but theologically it moved in a neo-Chalcedonian direction.

In the following centuries, Grillmeier sees only one chance for neo-Chalcedonianism to gain more influence in the West, and that was with John Scotus Eriugena (ca 810–877), since he had great interest for everything Greek, and he emphasized the unity of Christ. He does not seem to have had any knowledge of the 'neo-Chalcedonian system', though.[129] As to Early Scholasticism, Ludwig Ott concludes that "[t]he council's definition of faith played virtually no role in the lively christological discussions of the theologians". Nevertheless, Chalcedonian christology was transmitted through the symbol *Quicumque* and the writings of the Fathers, "especially the Latin Fathers of the fifth and sixth centuries, but also the work *De fide orthodoxa* of John of Damascus (ca 675–749) in Latin translation".[130] This work, a compendium of Greek theology written in the eighth century, the christology of which is neo-Chalcedonian, had been translated into Latin in the twelfth century. When discussing christological writings in High Scholasticism, Ignaz Backes again and again mentions John of Damascus as a source for thirteenth-century theologians.[131] Especially in his treatment of Thomas Aquinas, Backes speaks a number of times of the agreement of Thomas's christology with that of John of Damascus or of direct influence by the latter on the former.[132]

In Grillmeier's phrase, it is Thomas Aquinas who has given to Western theology "this lasting connection between Latin clarity and Greek depth".[133] Therefore, although terminologically neo-Chalcedonianism

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[128] See above, n. 102.

[129] Grillmeier (1953), 838. Gray (1994), 294, gives a similar assessment of John the Scot.

[130] Ott (1953), 921 and 922.

[131] Backes (1953).

[132] *Ibid.*, 929, 935–939.

[133] Grillmeier (1953), 839.

is something of the past, christologically it is still our concern.[134] According to Gray, "the typically neo-Chalcedonian doctrine of the hypostatic union has become the normative christology in the West" through Thomas Aquinas.[135] Thus, Lebon's original statement that, on the basis of Chalcedon's dyophysite doctrine and formula, the neo-Chalcedonians have erected [élevé] "the dogmatic and scientific system which is still ours",[136] is—at least partially—confirmed by later theologians as to its theological content. And since it is the 'Cyrillian intuition'— which starts its dynamic christology with the divine Logos, as expressed in the doctrine of the hypostatic union—which is the hallmark of neo-Chalcedonianism, one can say that also through the neo-Chalcedonian theologians of the sixth century Cyril has influenced Western christology up to the present time. The criticism which during the past fifty years has been uttered by various theologians with respect to neo-Chalcedonian tendencies in Western theology and devotion—which will be discussed in section 1.2.3—affirms rather than denies this influence.

Helmer points to the emphasis Luther laid on the unity of Christ's person and his use of theopaschite language like 'God has suffered'.[137] Although Luther himself had mainly theological, not patristic, reasons for doing so, it is noteworthy that the first quotations in the *Catalogus Testimoniorum*, attached to the *Formula of Concord* (1577), are four of Cyril's anathemas—which are presented as canons of the Council of Ephesus (431)—, including the [theopaschite] twelfth anathema.[138] So, we see that also in early Lutheranism authority is ascribed to Cyril's christology.

1.2.2. *Ecumenical Relevance*

The christological struggles of the fifth and sixth centuries have led to various schisms in the church. On the one hand, the 'Miaphysites' left the imperial church, since they adhered strictly to the μία φύσις formula and refused to accept the Council of Chalcedon. Within this group several splits took place, but the majority are what Lebon called

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[134] Grillmeier (1958), 385.
[135] Gray (1994), 294 f. See also Moeller's statement, n. 104.
[136] Lebon (1909), 522.
[137] Helmer (1962), 245–247.
[138] *Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, [7]1976 ([1]1930), 1104.

'Severian Monophysites'. Their present-day heirs are the 'Oriental Orthodox', which include Armenian, Coptic, Syrian, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Indian churches.[139] On the other hand were those churches which were more Antiochene in outlook and did not accept Chalcedon as an ecumenical council either. Their descendants can be found in the Assyrian Church of the East.

During the past fifty years a number of ecumenical consultations—partly unofficial, partly official—have taken place between representatives of several church families that differ over the reception of the Council of Chalcedon. In a 1995 article, Dorothea Wendebourg gives an overview of these consultations and the publications in which their proceedings and agreed statements can be found.[140] The Oriental Orthodox Churches have been in dialogue with the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. The Assyrian Church of the East has established a dialogue commission with the Roman Catholic Church in 1994. And the churches in whose traditions the Syriac language plays a major role have been meeting in the 'Syriac Consultations'.

It is especially the dialogue between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches in which the christology of Cyril of Alexandria has played an important role. During the first unofficial consultation at Aarhus in 1964 'his' μία φύσις formula was central to the discussions, as is clear from the fact that it was the topic of several key contributions,[141] and as it is explicitly formulated in the agreed statement:

> In our common study of the Council of Chalcedon, the well-known phrase used by our common Father in Christ, St. Cyril of Alexandria, *mia physis* (or *mia hypostasis*) *tou Theou logou sesarkomene* (the one *physis* or *hypostasis* of God's Word Incarnate) with its implications, was at the centre of our conversations. On the essence of the Christological dogma we found ourselves in full agreement. Through the different terminologies used by each side, we saw the same truth expressed. Since we agree in rejecting without reservation the teaching of Eutyches as well as of Nestorius, the acceptance or non-acceptance of the Council

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[139] The Armenian Apostolic Church (of Etchmiadzin and Cilicia), the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria, the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch and All the East (the so-called 'Jacobites', after Jacob Baradaeus, ca 500–578), the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church, and the Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church of India.

[140] Wendebourg (1995).

[141] Samuel (1964–1965b); Karmiris (1964–1965); Romanides (1964–1965).

of Chalcedon does not entail the acceptance of either heresy. Both sides found themselves fundamentally following the Christological teaching of the one undivided Church as expressed by St. Cyril.[142]

In the 'Summary of Conclusions' of the third unofficial consultation at Geneva in 1970, there is again an explicit reference to Cyril of Alexandria: "It is the teaching of the blessed Cyril on the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ that we both affirm, though we may use differing terminology to explain this teaching".[143]

In the agreed statements of the official dialogue, the references to the Alexandrian archbishop became even more pronounced. At the conclusion of the second official consultation, at the Anba Bishoy Monastery in 1989, it was declared:

> Throughout our discussions we have found our common ground in the formula of our common Father, Saint Cyril of Alexandria: *mia physis* (*hypostasis*) *tou Theou Logou sesarkomene*, and in his dictum that "it is sufficient for the confession of our true and irreproachable faith to say and to confess that the Holy Virgin is *Theotokos*" (Hom. 15, cf. Ep. 39).[144]

And in the joint declaration of the third official consultation it is stated:

> The Orthodox agree that the Oriental Orthodox will continue to maintain their traditional Cyrillian terminology of 'one nature of the incarnate Logos' ("μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη"), since they acknowledge the double consubstantiality of the Logos which Eutyches denied. The Orthodox also use this terminology. The Oriental Orthodox agree that the Orthodox are justified in their use of the two-natures formula, since they acknowledge that the distinction is 'in thought alone' ("τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ"). Cyril interpreted correctly this use in his letter to John of Antioch and his letters to Akakios of Melitene (PG 77.184–201), to Eulogius (PG 77.224–228), and to Successus (PG 77.228–245).[145]

The emphasis lies on the μία φύσις formula, the interpretation of which is that of Joseph Lebon. Besides, miaphysite and dyophysite language is confusingly mixed, so that the Chalcedonian two-natures formula is said to be justified, because the distinction between the natures is regarded as 'in thought alone'.[146] If, in line with Lebon's interpretation, 'nature' is understood as 'person', then indeed two natures can exist 'in thought alone', but if 'nature' is understood in the Chalcedonian

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[142] "An Agreed Statement", *GOTR* 10 / 2 (1964–1965) 14.
[143] "Summary of Conclusions", *GOTR* 16 (1971) 3.
[144] "Communiqué of the Joint Commission" (1989), 394.
[145] "Joint-Commission of the Theological Dialogue" (1991), 186.
[146] See van Loon (2001), 46–50.

sense, as distinct from 'person', then the distinction between the two natures must be upheld as real. It is the hypothesis of this study—to be proved—that also for Cyril of Alexandria, the distinction between the two φύσεις in the one 'person' of Christ is real, not just 'in thought alone'; the *separation* of the two φύσεις must be 'in thought alone'. Thus, if the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Orthodox want to follow the christology of the Alexandrian archbishop, they should acknowledge a *real* distinction in (Chalcedonian) natures in the one Christ.

The danger of the agreed statements—produced by representatives of the two families of churches, not ratified by the churches themselves—is that they would become the basis of a re-union of these two families at the expense of their relationships, not just with the Assyrian Church of the East, but also with various churches in the West. This danger was signalled as early as the first unofficial consultation in 1964 by Eastern Orthodox theologian Georges Florovsky:

> Eastern ecumenism is a contradiction in terms. The West also belongs to the oikoumene. We cannot forget the West—and the Tome of Leo. The Christian tradition is universal. ... I have also doubts about agreement on the basis of a one-sided Cyrillian formula. I think it is important to come to terms with the later ecumenical councils.[147]

Commenting on the declaration drawn up at Anba Bishoy in 1989, Roman Catholic theologian André de Halleux writes:

> But wishing to subject the Chalcedonian doctrine to its 'neo-Chalcedonian' rereading is narrowing the christological faith in order to force it into the theological mould of the 'Alexandrian school'. And by doing so it means compromising the full communion in this faith between the Orthodox East and the Catholic Church, not to mention this outstanding heir of the Antiochene christological tradition which is the Church of the East, called 'Nestorian', as yet absent from the dialogue, but which can only be neglected at the detriment of the richness of the approaches to the christological mystery.[148]

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[147] Florovsky (1964–1965), 80. The Eastern Orthodox accept seven 'ecumenical councils', of which the Oriental Orthodox recognize only the first three: Nicaea I (325), Constantinople I (381), and Ephesus (431). By "the later ecumenical councils" Florovsky will, therefore, have meant: Chalcedon (451), Constantinople II (553), Constantinople III (680–681), and Nicaea II (787). The later councils formed part of the discussion at the second unofficial consultation in Bristol in 1967. See *GOTR* 13 (1968) 121–320.

[148] De Halleux (1990a), 500f. Since de Halleux wrote this article, the Assyrian Church of the East has been included in ecumenical consultations. First, a dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church in 1994, which resulted in the mutual recognition

Lutheran theologian Dorothea Wendebourg only mentions this danger explicitly when referring to de Halleux's article,[149] but she is quite outspoken about the one-sidedness of the agreed statements: there is "an unambiguous preference for one of the controversial formulations", viz. the μία φύσις formula. "Not that the Chalcedonian language of 'two natures' is to be excluded by this, but it is regarded as the specific formula of only one side, while the '*mia physis*' formula is what they have in common ecumenically". "Implicitly, the Chalcedonian definition itself is also corrected here".[150] The declaration of Anba Bishoy (1989) can be regarded as 'neo-Chalcedonian'—as de Halleux has done—, since in it miaphysite and dyophysite language are accepted side by side. But in the second agreed statement (Chambésy 1990) miaphysite expressions form the common ground and thus dominate the Chalcedonian language of 'two natures', so that this statement cannot be called 'neo-Chalcedonian', Wendebourg writes.[151]

If—as this study intends—it can be shown that Cyril of Alexandria, whose christology is said to play a central role in the consultations between the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Orthodox, was not the staunch defender of the μία φύσις formula, for which he is usually held, but that his understanding of Christ's person is compatible with speaking of two (Chalcedonian) natures, not just 'in thought only', but in reality, this could have consequences for the ecumenical dialogues between various churches.

1.2.3. *Dogmatic Relevance*

It is not the intention of this section to discuss the dogmatic relevance of patristic studies in general, or of the study of dogmatic statements which use ancient concepts like φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον in par-

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that they are sister churches in the *communio* of the one faith in Christ; see "Déclaration christologique commune" (1995) (Syriac text, French and Arabic translations). A Joint Committee for Theological Dialogue met every year till 2004.

Secondly, also in 1994, the foundation Pro Oriente has started a series of unofficial consultations for churches who share a common heritage in the Syriac language and traditions, known as the Syriac Consultations. Invited are the Oriental Catholic Churches, the Oriental Orthodox Churches and the Assyrian Church of the East, while at times observers from other churches have also been present. From 1994 till 2004 there were seven consultations. They have resulted in several joint declarations.

[149] Wendebourg (1995), 231, n. 124.

[150] *Ibid.*, 220 f.

[151] *Ibid.*, 227, n. 92.

ticular. It is a presupposition of this study that the elucidation of what
the Church Fathers meant, when they tried to put into their own words
and concepts what they believed to be the content of the Christian
faith, is relevant to our present-day teaching and life in the Chris-
tian church. If we want to express our faith, in communion with those
who went before us, it is neither enough to simply repeat the ancient
phrases, nor to articulate our own understanding and experiences with-
out showing their continuity with the Christian tradition. Theology
is thus understood as a continuing conversation with our fathers and
mothers throughout the ages.[152]

The definition of Chalcedon has had tremendous influence on the
christology of later generations, both as a normative statement and—
whether accepted or rejected—as a reference point for further reflec-
tion. And since Cyril of Alexandria's posthumous input at Chalcedon
was considerable, a better understanding of his christology is likely to
enhance our insight into important ideas that were present at Chal-
cedon when the fathers drew up the definition. On the one hand, Elert
is right in stating that it is not enough to study the controversies that
preceded the Council of Chalcedon in order to understand its defini-
tion; the study of its reception in the centuries that followed it is just as
necessary.[153] But on the other hand, the reverse also holds true: with-
out adequate knowledge of the preceding controversies—including the
christologies of such key persons like Cyril of Alexandria and pope Leo
the Great—our understanding of Chalcedon's definition will be defi-
cient as well.

As for the discussions in our own times, we have already seen some
of the dogmatic questions that have arisen during the ecumenical con-
sultations between the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Ortho-
dox, to which Cyril of Alexandria's christology is said to be central.

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[152] Cf. Grillmeier (1957), 715: "Eine moderne Christologie wird sich auch nicht
einer Überprüfung ihrer notwendig historisch gewordenen Sprache widersetzen. Sie
muß sogar darauf bedacht sein, sich neu auszudrücken, wenn sie je für ihre Zeit
verstanden werden will. Doch wird dabei die methodische Forderung gestellt werden
müssen, daß der Theologe, der Altes in Neues umdeuten will, nicht eine Auswahl
im auszusagenden Gehalt trifft. Wenn ein Horror vor einer Zwei-Naturen-Lehre
besteht, so muß sich der Theologe zuerst um ihren Aussagegehalt bemühen und
dann die Begrenztheit der geschichtlichen Aussage korrigieren. Sonst verliert die
Theologie ihre Identität. Ein der Kritik geopfertes Mysterium Christi ist verraten, nicht
ausgedeutet".
[153] Elert (1957), 9.

If the Eastern Orthodox "are justified in their use of the two-natures formula, since they acknowledge that the distinction is 'in thought alone' ("τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ")",[154] the implication seems to be that the distinction between the (Chalcedonian) natures in Christ is not real, but 'in thought only'. This could point to a deficient understanding of the full humanity of Christ. And it is precisely such a deficient understanding of Christ's manhood which Roman Catholic theologians during the past fifty years have criticized in their own church, in the spirituality of many of its members, but also in its theology. And they refer to neo-Chalcedonianism, and in its background to Cyril of Alexandria (among others), as the source of such a spirituality and theology. A few examples of such criticism may suffice.

1.2.3.1. *Karl Rahner*

A first example is Karl Rahner. Over several decades, he repeatedly stressed the need for a theology which does full justice to Christ's humanity. In the opening article of the third volume of *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, "Chalkedon—Ende oder Anfang", he writes that Jesus Christ may be called the 'Mediator' between us and God,

> *provided*, of course, that the real initiative, in some true sense, of the man Jesus with regard to God is given its *genuine* (anti-monothelite) meaning, and Christ is not made into a mere 'manifestation' of God himself and ultimately of him alone, such that the 'appearance' has no independent validity at all with respect to the one who appears.[155]

For a christology in which Christ's humanness is merely the disguise, the livery which God uses to show his presence among us, instead of receiving, precisely through the incarnation, its highest degree of authenticity and self-determination [Ursprünglichkeit und Selbstverfügung], is ultimately mythology. That even the theoretical formulation of such a conception died hard in the history of theology should, according to Rahner, make us aware of the fact that it "probably still lives on in the picture which countless Christians have of the 'Incarnation',

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[154] "Joint-Commission of the Theological Dialogue", *GOTR* 36 (1991) 186.

[155] Rahner (1963), 156; German original: Rahner (1954), 9. The word 'initiative' translates 'Ursprünglichkeit', which might better be rendered as 'authenticity'. Essen (2001), 67, writes that this article of Rahner's has given the partly controversial discussion of our times "ihre programmatische Zuspitzung".

whether they give it their faith—or reject it".[156] Christ's humanity is, in this view, merely an instrument of the divine subject.[157]

In this 1954 article Rahner does not use the term 'neo-Chalcedonian' yet, nor does he mention Cyril of Alexandria. Instead, he asks whether the "average Christian" can only make sense of Chalcedonian christology, if he is "tacitly thinking in a slightly monophysite way"; and he speaks of "the existential undercurrent of monophysite tendency in Christology".[158] He gives a number of suggestions how a christology could be elaborated which would give more attention to Christ's full humanity and which might avert the danger of being rejected as mere mythology. The first suggestion is a 'transcendental deduction' of faith in Christ: a theological anthropology according to which a human being is not only a corporeal, historical being, but also a being of absolute transcendence, which looks out for and expects an epiphany. Other suggestions include incorporation into christology of the mysteries of Jesus's life on earth, and a soteriology which gives due attention to the actual content of Christ's saving act, especially his death, instead of restricting itself to its formal meritorious aspects, as is done in the usual satisfaction theory.

In his book *Grundkurs des Glaubens* (1976), Rahner uses similar language, not speaking of 'neo-Chalcedonianism' or of Cyril of Alexandria, but of 'monophysitism':

> In accordance with the fact that the natures are unmixed, basically the active influence of the Logos on the human 'nature' in Jesus in a physical sense may not be understood in any other way except the way this influence is exercised by God on free creatures elsewhere. This of course is frequently forgotten in a piety and a theology which are tinged with monophysitism. All too often they understand the humanity of Jesus as a thing and as an 'instrument' [allzu sachhaft als 'Instrument'] which is moved by the subjectivity of the Logos.[159]

And 'is'-formulas like 'Jesus is God' are in themselves not unjustified, but "we have to recognize that they are fraught with the danger of a monophysitic and hence a mythological misunderstanding".[160]

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[156] Rahner (1963), 156, n. 1; Rahner (1954), 9 f., n. 6. See also Rahner (1963), 164 f., 179 f., 187, 188 and 198; Rahner (1954), 17, 31, 37, 38 and 47.

[157] Rahner (1963), 157 and 160; Rahner (1954), 10 and 13.

[158] Rahner (1963), 179 and 188, resp.; Rahner (1954), 30 and 38.

[159] Rahner (1978), 287; German original: Rahner (1976), 281.

[160] Rahner (1978), 291; Rahner (1976), 285.

In a few later publications, Rahner does use the term 'neo-Chalcedonianism', but only within the restricted framework of theopaschism. In *Die Gabe der Weihnacht* (1980), he briefly touches on the distinction between neo-Chalcedonianism and strict [reiner] Chalcedonianism, and himself opts for the latter. He elucidates the difference by discussing two possible interpretations of the phrase 'God has suffered', which "we say with everybody else and necessarily". A neo-Chalcedonian will—explicitly or unconsciously—mean by this phrase that Christ's human suffering

> affects the Logos in such a way that for the Logos himself, this suffering is also a reality, given to him, which is silently and unreflectedly different from the suffering which takes place in the dimension of Jesus's human reality. ... The suffering has extended itself into the dimension of God himself.[161]

A strict Chalcedonian, on the other hand, "has no appreciation for the idea that God would have to be affected in himself and in his divine dimension in order to really save us". He rather regards salvation as possible because God remains the impassible One, while "the worldly expressions about God ... remain creaturely realities, without division, but just as radically without confusion, [and] are accepted by God unto [zu] himself". A strict Chalcedonian does not try to solve these dialectics, and ultimately destroy them, by amalgamating these creaturely realities with God into 'one physis'.[162] In this context Rahner does not refer to Cyril of Alexandria.

In his article "Jesus Christus—Sinn des Lebens" (1983), Rahner also uses the distinction between neo-Chalcedonianism and 'pure' [reiner] Chalcedonianism.[163] According to the former,

> God has suffered, the eternal Logos of God himself has experienced our fate and our death and it is in this way that this fate of ours and our death have been saved and redeemed. ... Though aware that this remains a mystery, it [the 'neo-Chalcedonian' interpretation] still understands this affirmation of the 'obedient death of Jesus' as applying to the divinity itself.[164]

A strict Chalcedonian, on the other hand, will emphasize that the union of divinity and humanity in Christ was *without confusion*:

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[161] Rahner (1980), 31.
[162] *Ibid.*, 31 f.
[163] Rahner (1988), 213–215; German original: Rahner (1983), 210–213.
[164] Rahner (1988), 213 f.; Rahner (1983), 211.

> Death and finiteness belong only to the created reality of Jesus; ...; the eternal Logos in its *divinity*, however, cannot as such take on a historical character and suffer an obedient death.[165]

The difference between the two is described in a way similar to that in *Die Gabe der Weihnacht*. But this time, Rahner does mention Cyril of Alexandria: neo-Chalcedonian theologians "rely on the theology of Cyril of Alexandria".[166]

During the last century Karl Rahner's position on the suffering of Christ was by no means shared by all Western theologians. As one of the many scholars who do write about God himself being affected by the incarnation and by Christ's suffering and death on the cross, Reformed theologian Karl Barth may be taken as an example. Barth writes (without any reference to neo-Chalcedonianism or Cyril of Alexandria):

> It is only the pride of man, making a god in his own image, that will not hear of a determination of the *divine* essence in Jesus Christ. The presupposition of all earlier Christology has suffered from this pride—that of the fathers, later that of the Reformed, and also of the Lutherans. Their presupposition was a philosophical conception of God, according to which God was far too exalted for His address to man, His incarnation, and therefore the reconciliation of the world with Himself, to mean anything at all for *Himself*, or in any way to affect His Godhead.[167]

It should be noted that Barth distinguishes 'determination' from 'change, alteration'. Barth adheres to the teaching that God is immutable, although he prefers the more actualistic term 'constant':

> God's constancy [Beständigkeit]—which is a better word than the suspiciously negative word 'immutability [Unveränderlichkeit]'—is the constancy of his *knowing*, *willing* and *acting* and therefore of His person. ...

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[165] Rahner (1988), 214; Rahner (1983), 211.

[166] Rahner (1988), 213; Rahner (1983), 211: "deuten also das chalkedonensische Dogma aus der Theologie Kyrills von Alexandrien heraus". The German is followed by a colon, after which the abovementioned quotation, 'God has suffered' etc., follows. The English translation replaces the colon by the words 'which says that': "the theology of Cyril of Alexandria which says that God has suffered" etc. On this interpretation, Rahner attributes the statement 'God has suffered' etc. to the Alexandrian archbishop, which is grammatically possible, but it is more likely that the statement is meant to describe the neo-Chalcedonian view.

[167] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* [*CD*], vol. IV/2, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958, 84 f. (revised translation). Words that are highlighted in the German original, have been italicized. German original: *Die kirchliche Dogmatik* [*KD*], vol. IV/2, Zollikon-Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1955, 92 f.

> The fact that He possesses selfhood and continuity itself makes Him the living One that He is.[168]

Throughout the *Church Dogmatics*, Barth emphasizes that God is free and sovereign. When God becomes man, then, he does not cease to be the sovereign God, but, according to Barth, it belongs to God's unchangeable nature that he can 'determine [bestimmen]' himself to become man: "Even in the *constancy* (or, as we may say calmly, the immutability) of His divine essence He *does* this and *can* do it".[169] God's self-revelation in the incarnation teaches us "the offensive mystery" that

> for God it is just as natural to be lowly as it is to be high, to be near as it is to be far, to be little as it is to be great, to be abroad as it is to be at home … it belongs to the inner life of God that there should take place within it obedience.[170]

And, when speaking of God's mercy, Barth writes:

> But the personal God has a heart. He can feel, and be affected. He is not impassible [unberührbar]. He cannot be moved from outside by an extraneous power. But this does not mean that He is not capable of moving Himself. No, God *is* moved and stirred, yet not like ourselves in powerlessness, but in His own free power, in His innermost being. … It can be only a question of *com*passion, *free* sympathy, with *another's* suffering. God finds no suffering in Himself. And no cause outside God can cause Him suffering if He does not will it so.[171]

If we compare Rahner's and Barth's views with that of Cyril of Alexandria, it seems that the archbishop's understanding of the suffering of Christ is closer to that of the former than to that of the latter. Since he was accused of teaching a passible divinity, Cyril repeatedly stated that the divinity, the divine nature, is impassible. However, because the incarnate Logos is one Lord and Christ, it is possible to say that the Word has suffered, but it must be understood as: "he suffered in the flesh (σαρκί)".[172] Expressions Cyril frequently uses in this context are that the assumed flesh has become 'the Word's own (ἰδία) flesh' and

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[168] Barth, *CD* II/1, 495; *KD* II/1, 557.

[169] Barth, *CD* IV/2, 85; *KD* IV/2, 93.

[170] Barth, *CD* IV/1, 192 and 201; *KD* IV/1, 210 and 219.

[171] Barth *CD* II/1, 370; *KD* II/1, 416.

[172] This teaching can be found, among others, in the 'theopaschite' twelfth anathema (ACO I.1.1, 42$^{3–5}$; *DEC* I, 61): "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh and tasted death in the flesh, and that he has become the first-born from the dead inasfar as he is life and life-giving as God, let him be anathema".

that the Word 'has appropriated the sufferings of his own flesh'.[173] A closer investigation of his writings will have to show whether it is possible to describe more accurately what Cyril means by 'appropriation of the sufferings of his own flesh'.

1.2.3.2. *Piet Schoonenberg*

A second example of a Roman Catholic theologian who criticizes a deficient understanding of Christ's humanity is Piet Schoonenberg. The basic ideas of his christology, on which he builds in later publications, can be found in his book *The Christ*.[174] His major concern is the anhypostasia of the human nature in Christ,[175] the corollary of the neo-Chalcedonian theory of enhypostasia: the human nature does not have its own hypostasis, but exists *in* the hypostasis of the Logos. Schoonenberg's starting-point is the unity of Christ's person,[176] which is concretized in three points. First, there cannot be a dialogue between God and man *within* the one person of Christ; the dialogue in the New Testament is between Christ and the Father. Secondly, Schoonenberg rejects the assumption of two *psychological* subjects in Christ, because for him this implies two ontological subjects. And thirdly, he emphasizes the *concurrence* of the divine and human operations in Christ. He then states that the image of Christ that comes to us through Scripture and tradition is that of a human person: "[H]ere we are concerned with his humanity and personhood. These must unhesitatingly be awarded to Jesus Christ".[177]

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[173] See, e.g., *ep*. 17, 6 (ACO I.1.1, 37⁹⁻¹²; *DEC* I, 53): "We confess that the Son, born out of God the Father, the only-begotten God, although remaining impassible according to his own nature, himself suffered for us in the flesh (σαρκί), according to the Scriptures, and impassibly appropriated (ἦν … ἀπαθῶς οἰκειούμενος) the sufferings of his own (ἰδίας) flesh in the crucified body".

[174] Schoonenberg (1971); Dutch original: Schoonenberg (1969).

[175] Schoonenberg (1971), 65; Schoonenberg (1969), 64: After mentioning six objections to the 'Chalcedonian model', he concludes: "First and foremost there is the question of anhypostasia".

[176] Schoonenberg (1971), 68; Schoonenberg (1969), 68: "For that reason the personal oneness [persoonseenheid] in Christ, or more accurately the oneness of the person Jesus Christ, is the point of departure for our christological examination".

[177] Schoonenberg (1971), 73; Schoonenberg (19769), 73. The Dutch original reads: "[H]ier gaat het om zijn menselijk zijn en persoon-zijn. Deze beide moeten zonder aarzeling aan Christus worden toegeschreven". From the context it is clear that the adjective 'menselijk' also applies to 'persoon-zijn', which does not come across in the English translation. It is the *human* personhood that must be unhesitatingly ascribed to

If Jesus Christ is one person, while he is a human person, can he still be called a divine person, Schoonenberg then asks. In this context he refers, not only to neo-Chalcedonianism, but also to Cyril of Alexandria. From the fourth century on, more and more the pre-existence of the Logos came to be regarded as a personal existence. "Cyril and the Alexandrian theologians speak of the Word that assumes flesh (and not merely becomes flesh)". We find this view also with pope Leo. In the definition of Chalcedon the one person of Christ is not described as pre-existent, but rather as the result of the concurrence of both natures.

> Shortly after this, however, especially in neo-Chalcedonism, the Alexandrian influence became stronger, and since then, as we have already seen, both the problems of the theologians and the unreflected expressions of faith on Christ have been controlled by the pre-existent divine person,[178]

Schoonenberg writes. Jesus Christ is regarded as a divine person, who is the same one as the eternal Son of the Father, the second person of the Trinity.

Schoonenberg's initial solution is to reverse the neo-Chalcedonian enhypostasia: the human nature is not enhypostasized in the divine person, but the divine nature is enhypostasized in the human person.[179] Later, he speaks of *mutual* enhypostasia: the human nature is passively enhypostasized in the person of the Logos, while the divine nature is actively enhypostasized in the human person of Jesus Christ.[180]

What is important for the present study is that Schoonenberg links a deficiency in the understanding of Christ's humanity directly with neo-Chalcedonian christology, and indirectly with Cyril of Alexandria and other Alexandrian Fathers. Schoonenberg's focus is on the concept of 'person'. He takes up a position in the discussion whether it is enough to say that Christ has a full human nature in the hypostasis of the

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Jesus Christ. This study cannot discuss Schoonenberg's argumentation, nor his use of the various terms 'hypostasis', 'person', 'subject'. It merely gives a brief description of his views.

[178] Schoonenberg (1971), 75; Schoonenberg (1969), 75.

[179] Schoonenberg (1971), 87; Schoonenberg (1969), 84: "The concept developed here regarding Christ's being-person is a reversal of the Chalcedonian pattern insofar as it is influenced by neo-Chalcedonism [Dutch original: voorzover het alexandrijns is beïnvloed, van het neo-chalcedonisme], which has become our current christology. . . . However, it is primarily not the human nature which is enhypostatic in the divine person, but the divine nature in the human person".

[180] Schoonenberg (1991), 187, n. 7, where more literature references are given.

Logos in order to express his full humanity, or whether a human nature that does not have its own hypostasis cannot be regarded as a full humanity. This discussion is burdened by the fact that the modern word 'person' has a different meaning than the words ὑπόστασις or *persona* in the fifth and sixth centuries, in that concepts like 'consciousness' and 'freedom' have come to determine the content of what it is to be a 'person'.[181]

The distinction between 'person' and 'nature' was explicitly made at Chalcedon and was maintained in sixth-century neo-Chalcedonianism. It is not so clear to what degree that distinction was already present in Cyril of Alexandria, and what ways he used to express it. It is often said, with Lebon, that the word φύσις in Cyril's μία φύσις formula has the same meaning as ὑπόστασις at Chalcedon and is synonymous with 'person'. Although there is no doubt that the archbishop of Alexandria used the μία φύσις formula to emphasize the oneness of Christ, the implication is not necessarily that he meant 'one ὑπόστασις' or 'one person' by this. In fact, it is a hypothesis of this study that he did not. It will be investigated what words and concepts Cyril of Alexandria used to denote the oneness and the distinction in Christ, and what are the consequences of such language for the understanding of his full humanity.

1.2.3.3. *Georg Essen*

Georg Essen (2001) assesses Rahner's and Schoonenberg's christologies and their criticism of neo-Chalcedonianism, and he himself gives an evaluation of neo-Chalcedonian christology as well. Essen is positive about the 'Alexandrian intuition', which emphasizes the unity of Christ and also Christ's identity with the pre-existent divine Logos.[182] Contra Schoonenberg, he upholds that the Logos, the eternal Son, is a 'person' in the immanent Trinity, and does not *become* one in the incarnation.[183] He cites Cyril of Alexandria who wrote that "God the Logos did not come into a man, but he 'truly' became man, while remaining God", but adds that this intuition was made unclear again by "the *henosis* model on the basis of a natural composition". And it is the

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[181] See for a recent study of these issues: Essen (2001).

[182] *Ibid.*, 121–124.

[183] *Ibid.*, 107–109.

"conceptual achievement of neo-Chalcedonianism" that with the theory of the hypostatic union it could "give conceptual expression to this 'Alexandrian intuition'".[184]

Although he sympathizes with Schoonenberg's concern for the ontological status of Christ's human nature, Essen questions his analysis. It seems to him that Schoonenberg does not take into account that neo-Chalcedonianism differentiates between hypostasis and individual: that which is united to the divine hypostasis is an individual human nature, which is idiomatically determined. And this nature includes the soul, and therefore, according to the anthropology of the Fathers, also consciousness and freedom. Thus, the neo-Chalcedonian doctrine of anhypostasia does not imply that Christ's was not a full human nature. But Essen does agree with Rahner that it degrades Jesus's humanity to a mere instrument of the divine Logos. The human nature lacks autonomy, is "ontologically passive".[185]

More explicitly than Rahner and Schoonenberg, Essen speaks of the influence of Cyril of Alexandria on neo-Chalcedonianism, especially in a section on the Logos-sarx schema. This term is used for christologies which regard Christ as a substantial unity of the divine Logos with human 'flesh', based on John 1:14, "The Word became flesh".[186] To what extent 'flesh' includes a human soul, and what soteriological significance is given to the 'flesh' varies from one theologian to another. But in general the Logos is seen as dominant. In this section Essen writes:

> It is indeed with Athanasius that, properly speaking, the triumphal march of Alexandrian christology begins. But there is no need to discuss him further. In the context of my historical investigations into the concepts of hypostasis and enhypostasia, attention has already been drawn to *Cyril* as that prominent representative of this tradition who would dominate the Nestorian controversy and whose significance for neo-Chalcedonian christology can hardly be overestimated. At the moment, it is therefore only important to point out that in the history of theology the christological statements of the early, pre-Ephesine Cyril—apparently unimpressed by the Apollinarian controversy—are fully in line with the Athanasian hegemony of the Logos. Cyril represented a Logos-sarx schema, which

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[184] *Ibid.*, 122 f.

[185] *Ibid.*, 125–129.

[186] See for the concept of 'Logos-sarx christology': Hainthaler (1997a); Grillmeier, *JdChr* I (³1990), 494–497, 605–609, 619–622, 673–679; idem, *CCT* (²1975), 341–343, 414–417, 426–428, 473–478; Grillmeier (1983).

was under the spell of Alexandrian Logos-centricity and which left no room for the anthropological and theological dignity of Christ's human soul.[187]

The present study will investigate whether in Cyril's christology of the years 429 and 430 the Logos is indeed so dominant that there is not enough room for Christ's humanity. More specifically, it will examine whether the roots of the later distinction between hypostasis and individual nature are already present in Cyril's writings of that period, and if so, what language he uses to express this.

1.2.3.4. *Aloys Grillmeier*

A final example of a Roman Catholic theologian who warns against the dangers of a neo-Chalcedonian christology is Aloys Grillmeier. When he discusses the theology of neo-Chalcedonianism in his review article of Patrick Gray's book (1984), he focusses on the ground of the union (ἕνωσις) between the Logos and the human nature in Christ. Grillmeier himself favours a view in which it is God's creative power which brings about the divine-human unity. But in neo-Chalcedonianism he detects a different ground, the θέωσις: the more Christ's humanity is deified, the stronger the union is. Grillmeier also speaks of "a Cyrillian / neo-Chalcedonian temptation", namely, that "the spiritual autonomy of Christ's humanity" is violated.

> Here a road from Cyril of Alexandria via pseudo-Dionysius to the doctrine of the one *energeia* and the one *thelema* in the seventh century is opened up, while, of course, in each case the intensification of a one-sidedness which with Cyril is still subdued, has to be taken into account,[188]

Grillmeier writes. He gives a long citation from pseudo-Dionysius, which ends with the "totally new theandric operation", and comments that the Areopagite's "dependence on Cyril cannot be denied".[189] He

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[187] Essen (2001), 113 f.

[188] Grillmeier (1984), 92 f.

[189] *Ibid.*, 93. The end of the citation is: καινήν τινα τὴν θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡμῖν πεπολιτευμένος, which Grillmeier translates as: "eine ganz neue gottmenschliche Wirksamkeit vollführt". Grillmeier sees pseudo-Dionysius's dependence on Cyril (1) in the context (the co-operation of divinity and humanity is shown in healings and the raising from the dead—in Cyril—, or in miracles in general—in pseudo-Dionysius), and (2) in that "in beiden Texten der Begriff der *Energeia* vorkommt, und dies mit einer starken Hervorhebung der Einzigartigkeit der theandrischen Wirksamkeit. Diese Singularität

then compares this with the christology of Severus of Antioch, and finally concludes:

> When, therefore, according to Gray, *neo-Chalcedonianism* should be characterized as special guardian of the *tradition*, one should be aware of the fact that one places oneself in the current of the *mia physis* theology between Cyril and Severus, and that, though striving to cling to the Chalcedonian post, one is always in danger of being swept away by the water.[190]

With this conclusion Grillmeier leaves historical neo-Chalcedonianism as a phenomenon in the history of theology, and applies his lessons to contemporary christological approaches, in a way similar to Rahner. Over against these approaches, he places a Chalcedonian christology, which upholds the autonomy of Christ's human will, and which incorporates the image of the suffering Christ.

In this study attention will be given to the ground of the hypostatic union, as the archbishop of Alexandria discusses it in his writings of the period 429–430. And it will be examined whether the road to the one *energeia* starts indeed with Cyril of Alexandria, and whether its corollary is a lack of human autonomy in Christ.

1.3. Conclusion

We have seen that up to the present day theologians interpret the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις in the christology of Cyril of Alexandria differently. And yet, Cyril's christology has had a tremendous influence on the understanding of Christ's person throughout the ages, due to its authority at the councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451), and during the Miaphysite controversy following the Chalcedonian council, and, especially for the West, due to Thomas Aquinas who incorporated thoughts from Cyril into his own theology. Its importance in contemporary theology is highlighted by the references to the archbishop's christology in the ecumenical discussions between Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox theologians, and in the debate over Christ's full humanity in the Western church. One may say that Cyril's christology lies at the roots of much theological debate, both in the century following his death and in the twentieth century. A better understanding

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ist im griechischen Text durch ein hinzugefügtes τινα betont, was eine emphatische Bedeutung hat".

[190] *Ibid.*, 95.

of his christology will, therefore, shed some light on these debates and may help them move forward.

The contribution this study wants to make is a clarification of the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις and related expressions, as they appear in Cyril's writings during the first years of the Nestorian controversy, before his rapprochement to the Antiochenes. Recent studies suggest that Cyril had a grasp of Aristotelian logic and that he used this knowledge not only in his trinitarian writings but also in those on christology. In the next two chapters we will investigate to what extent the archbishop utilized this logic in his works on the Trinity in order to facilitate the assessment of the influence of logical categories and terminology in his christological writings. In the fourth chapter some language tools will be developed with which the various interpretations of Cyril's vocabulary will be compared. And in the following chapters a number of Cyril's own writings will be investigated with the aid of these tools, which will lead to an assessment of the interpretations found in twentieth-century literature.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA'S USE
OF ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC

2.1. INTRODUCTION

While Cyril of Alexandria has often been depicted as an exegete and a theologian with little knowledge of philosophy, recent studies have made it plausible that he was quite familiar with Aristotelian logic and that he combatted Arianism with the same logical tools that his opponents used. There are also indications that he continued to employ logic during the Nestorian controversy. In this chapter, then, the archbishop's knowledge and utilization of Aristotelian logic in his trinitarian writings will be investigated, in order that in later chapters it can be assessed what bearing this logic has on the terms and phrases he uses in his christological writings. In the third century, Aristotelian logic was incorporated into neo-Platonism by Porphyry, which makes it possible that Cyril acquired his knowledge of it not directly from the Peripatetic tradition, but from Porphyry or other neo-Platonic authors. Therefore, attention will be given, not just to some writings of Aristotle himself, but also to two important works by Porphyry.[1] After that, Cyril's use of logical terminology and reasonings in the *Thesaurus* and in his *Dialogues on the Trinity* will be investigated. But we begin with a brief overview of contemporary literature about the archbishop's grasp of philosophy in general and of logic in particular.

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[1] Labelle (1978 / 1979) searched Cyril's works for references to and quotations from philosophers and could not find any philosopher later than Porphyry (pp. 149 f.). Cyril did use later sources, like Eusebius's *Praeparatio Evangelica*, and probably also doxographies—manuals giving summaries of certain views of different philosophers— (p. 156), but for the present purposes a summary treatment of the two main figures in the area of logic, Aristotle and Porphyry, will suffice.

2.2. Cyril of Alexandria and Ancient Philosophy

2.2.1. *Varying Assessments*

The assessment of Cyril of Alexandria's knowledge and use of philosophy varies. By some he is depicted as lacking philosophical depth. For example, G.M. de Durand, who has edited several of Cyril of Alexandria's texts, is not too positive on the archbishop's use of philosophical terminology. He calls the variation in meaning of the word ἰδιότης in these texts "one sign among others of the fact that, although he is not fully ignorant of the technical vocabulary, Cyril hardly cares to strictly delimit the area of use of these terms".[2] And in a note on the second dialogue on the Trinity he states:

> So, we might as well say that a development of a strongly arid technicalness, borrowed from an elementary textbook on logic, interrupts, between 424d and 431a, an investigation which takes place more on the level of religious realities, brought to bear by the alleged supremacy of the ἀγέννητος.[3]

De Durand apparently regards the philosophical passages in Cyril's works as alien to the archbishop's own thinking; he has not fully incorporated them into his theology. A similar assessment is given by Lionel R. Wickham:

> Cyril's Christology, at the level of philosophical explanation, will always seem thin. It lacks the barrage of technical jargon to be developed over the next century … Cyril's innocence of jargon, his simplicity over against the sophistications of his opponents and even of his interpreters, is his strength.[4]

Jacques Liébaert is more nuanced in his judgement. In an article on Cyril of Alexandria and ancient culture he concludes that the archbishop's "erudition is biblical, not profane".[5] He is an exegete and a theologian, but his knowledge of profane culture is limited. The only work which engages more thoroughly with pagan culture is *Contra Julianum*, the refutation of *Adversus Christianos*, which the emperor Julian had written in the year 363. But even about this work Liébaert writes: "Not being a philosopher, at least much less so than Eusebius

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[2] De Durand (1976), 51.
[3] De Durand, SC 231, 378f., n. ** to *Dial. Trin.* II, 419.
[4] Wickham (1983), xxxiv.
[5] Liébaert (1955), 16.

and especially Origen, it was more difficult for Cyril to tackle Julian's philosophy and Greek philosophy in general".[6] Even so, although Cyril has borrowed from earlier Christian works like Clement of Alexandria's *Stromateis* and Eusebius of Caesarea's *Praeparatio Evangelica*, he has used a more recent version of Plotinus's *Enneads*, and he cites works from Porphyry, to which there are no references in his predecessors' works. Therefore, Cyril must have consulted the original writings himself. Besides, the Alexandrian bishop quotes Hermetic books, while Eusebius does not mention Hermes Trismegistus. Cyril probably borrowed several Hermetic quotations from [pseudo-]Didymus's *De Trinitate*, but here again, some of his citations are not to be found in any other work. Liébaert concludes that, if Cyril had these texts at first hand, he must have had a considerable knowledge of Hermetic literature, but he regards it more likely that the archbishop used a florilegium.

Cyril does not always attack philosophy, he also looks for philosophical views that are in line with Scripture in order to support his argument against Julian—tactics not uncommon in apologetic works. According to Liébaert, Cyril can be positive about Platonism, neo-Platonism, Pythagoreanism, and even Hermetism, while he is more critical of Aristotelianism and Stoicism. On the other hand, he can cite the Aristotelian philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias, who is not found in Eusebius's *Praeparatio Evangelica*. And

> the polemics against Arianism have led Cyril to employ sometimes principles of logic and definitions borrowed from Aristotelian dialectic, but in a rather casual way, and undoubtedly under the influence of earlier polemicists (Didymus and the Cappadocians).[7]

Voices that attribute to Cyril a more thorough knowledge of contemporary philosophy, however, are increasing. Robert M. Grant examined the archbishop's use of non-Christian sources in his treatise *Contra Julianum*.[8] His findings are in line with those of Liébaert, but his assessment is more positive. It is his conviction that "following leads is characteristic of Cyril's work as a whole".[9] He means to say that when Cyril finds references to certain non-Christian authors in writings by Eusebius of Caesarea and pseudo-Didymus, he not only makes use of

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[6] *Ibid.*, 14.
[7] *Ibid.*, 19.
[8] Grant (1964).
[9] *Ibid.*, 272.

the quotations by these Christian writers, but he goes back to the original sources and through them finds other writings of the same non-Christian authors, which he also quotes. This holds particularly true for books by Porphyry.

Even more positive about Cyril's philosophical knowledge is Jean-Marie Labelle.[10] He has browsed the entire extant oeuvre of the Alexandrian archbishop for references to philosophers and comes to the conclusion that especially in the *Thesaurus* Cyril shows dexterity in handling Aristotelian logic. He discusses a few passages from this work in more detail, and comments that "the subtlety and the accuracy of Cyril's argumentation should be underlined", and that the author of such passages "possesses a real philosophical skill and a perfect mastery of Aristotelian analytics".[11]

Building on the findings of these people, in 1984 Ruth M. Siddals wrote her dissertation, *Logic and Christology in Cyril of Alexandria*.[12] She investigated how Cyril starts to apply "the tools of logic" in his anti-Arian writings; how he "learns to use" them; how, in his christological writings, he analyses John 1:14 "with great precision in accordance with the rules of logic"; and how, in the course of the Nestorian controversy, "Cyril goes on to specify, with technical skill, the precise ways in which humanity and divinity are seen to be both one and different within the person of Jesus Christ".[13] According to Siddals, Cyril is well aware that the theologian is dealing with mystery, and that there is a tension between logic and mystery, so that for him, "logic is a tool to be used with flexibility and creativity".[14] So, here we find a much more positive assessment of Cyril's knowledge and application of at least the logical tradition in philosophy.

More recently (1994), Marie-Odile Boulnois, in her thorough study of Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian doctrine, also discusses the archbishop's use of philosophical methods and concepts.[15] She traces Cyril's application of Aristotelian argumentation, especially the syllogism,[16] and investigates in some detail Cyril's utilization of Aristotle's cate-

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[10] Labelle (1978 / 1979).
[11] *Ibid.*, 27.
[12] Siddals (1984).
[13] *Ibid.*, i.
[14] *Ibid.*, 22.
[15] Boulnois (1994).
[16] *Ibid.*, 181–185.

gories.[17] In this context she speaks of "the technical mastery which Cyril shows" in several passages that have parallels in pseudo-Basil's *Adversus Eunomium*, a mastery which goes beyond that of pseudo-Basil.[18] And she writes that Cyril "not only knows the general rules of Aristotelian logic, but also its subtleties".[19] With respect to Cyril's sources, Boulnois thinks that he may have been inspired by Porphyry's lost commentary on the *Categories* or by a post-Porphyrian commentary, but she regards it equally probable that Cyril has read Aristotle's *Categories* himself.[20]

From these findings it may be concluded that there is a distinct possibility that Cyril of Alexandria was familiar with Aristotelian logic, more than has often been admitted. Therefore, an investigation of the archbishop's terminology in christology should reckon with possible influences of the logical tradition on the meaning he attached to the terms. For this reason, we will now turn to a discussion of that tradition and to the use Cyril made of it in his trinitarian writings.

2.2.2. *Ancient Logic*

In Antiquity the various philosophical schools developed their own forms of logic.[21] In the Platonic tradition it was called 'dialectic', and it consisted mainly in a method to rise from the specific to the general by classifying things under their proper genus. The Peripatetics regarded logic as a tool to assess the argumentations employed in any discipline. And for the Stoics, logic was an independent branch of philosophy, besides ethics and physics.

Aristotle (384–322 BC) gave an enormous impulse to the development of logic by a series of works which his followers later combined into the *Organon*: the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and *On Sophistical Refutations*.[22] These six treatises deal with an increasingly complex subject-matter: the *Categories* deals with terms, *On Interpretation* with propositions, the *Prior Analytics* with syllogisms, the *Posterior Analytics* with demonstrations, and the *Topics* and *On Sophistical*

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[17] *Ibid.*, 189–209.
[18] *Ibid.*, 194.
[19] *Ibid.*, 199; see also p. 202.
[20] *Ibid.*, 206.
[21] See for a brief introduction: Chadwick (1990), 108 ff.
[22] See, e.g., Aristotle (1973), ix.

Refutations with dialectical practice.[23] Already in Antiquity there was a longstanding debate about the status of the *Categories*: does it belong to logic, and so, is it concerned with words and terms only, or does it belong to metaphysics, and so, does it speak of beings in reality?[24] The title *Organon*, 'tool', refers to the first position. If, on the other hand, the *Categories* is regarded as belonging to metaphysics, it bears the anti-Platonic stamp of much of Aristotle's writings: the particular is primary, the universal is only derived from the particular.

Porphyry (ca 232–305), the neo-Platonist disciple of Plotinus (ca 205–270), did much to reconcile Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. He must even have written a treatise with the title *Concerning the [Dis]agreement between Plato and Aristotle*, which is lost in Greek, but whose main content has been preserved in an Arabic work of the tenth century.[25] This reconciliation made it possible for Porphyry to make use of Aristotle's categories within a Platonic framework.[26] He wrote two commentaries on the *Categories*, one dedicated to a certain Gedalius (probably one of his students), which is lost,[27] and the other in the form of question and answer, which is still extant.[28] Even more influential was his *Isagoge*, an introduction into the 'predicables', which denote the various ways in which a term may be predicated of many things (see section 2.3.2).[29] The reconciliation of Plato with Aristotle "became accepted wisdom after the work of Porphyry".[30]

2.2.3. *Christian Authors and Aristotelian Logic*

What was the attitude of Christian authors to Aristotelian logic? According to Stead, Christian writers of the second and third centuries who can be positive about Plato generally dismiss Aristotle. Although the *Categories* was familiar in philosophical circles it seems that

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[23] Strange, in: Porphyry (1992), 7 f.

[24] Stead (1977), 56. Stead adds that this controversy over the status of the *Categories* has been revived in the past two centuries.

[25] Chadwick (1990), 125.

[26] Modern commentators differ in the way in which they see Porphyry reconcile the *Categories* with Platonic philosophy. See, e.g., Chadwick (1990), 56, and Strange, in: Porphyry (1992), 10–12.

[27] Strange, in: Porphyry (1992), 2.

[28] Porphyry (1887). English translation by Strange in Porphyry (1992).

[29] Porphyry (1998). English translation by Warren in Porphyry (1975).

[30] Chadwick (1990), 121.

Christian theologians had little knowledge of Aristotelian logic. The distinction between substantial and accidental predication became widely accepted, and rhetoricians used a system similar to that of the categories, but otherwise Aristotle's logic had little influence on Christian writers of that period.[31]

Improving on an earlier study by A.J. Festugière,[32] David T. Runia has investigated explicit references to Aristotle in the texts of the Greek Fathers from the second century till the Council of Chalcedon.[33] An initial observation Runia makes is that the list of references is relatively small. A similar list for Plato would have been very long indeed, while Runia suggests that lists for Epicurus, the Stoa, and Pythagoras would probably be longer as well. He concludes that the Greek Fathers were not that preoccupied with Aristotle and his philosophy.[34] On the other hand, a lack of explicit references to any philosopher does not necessarily indicate that the Fathers were not interested or knowledgeable, for "it appears that there was a tacit understanding not to discuss 'outside wisdom' in an explicit way".[35]

As to the nature of the references, Festugière has written that sometimes Aristotle is commended for anticipating Christian doctrines, but mostly he is criticized by the Fathers for teaching views that contradict the Christian religion, notably in three areas: providence, the nature of the soul, and the goods that contribute to blessedness (εὐδαιμονία).[36] According to Runia, this is too narrow a view of the Fathers' treatment of Aristotle. They dealt with more doctrinal issues, also with themes "in the area of logic and dialectic", and they associated Aristotle with the origin of heresy.[37] Runia regards Aristotle's association with heretical thought as so important that he devotes a separate section to this issue. In the fourth century this aspect of Aristotelianism "tends to dominate the discussions". Orthodox theologians see the "reliance on the over-subtlety (λεπτολογία, τεχνολογία, δεινότης) of Aristotle's dialectic and syllogistic" as a major source of the errors of their heretical

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[31] Stead (1977), 110–113.
[32] Festugière (1932).
[33] Runia (1989).
[34] *Ibid.*, 13.
[35] *Ibid.*, 16.
[36] *Ibid.*, 2, 20f.
[37] *Ibid.*, 3, 20–23; quotation from p. 3.

counterparts.[38] But, with a reference to J. de Ghellinck, Runia states that "these Fathers, in order to combat the devil, had to know what he knew".[39]

In 1930, de Ghellinck wrote an article on the dialectic of Aristotle during the trinitarian conflicts of the fourth century, and he elaborated on this in a 1948 book.[40] He says that from all the passages by these Fathers on dialectic (διαλεκτική) "one gets the impression that, among the philosophical works, the ecclesiastical writers have especially, if not exclusively, in view the logic of Aristotle".[41] They reproached the Arians—Aëtius (*fl.* ca 350) and Eunomius († ca 393) in particular—for turning Christian theology into a technical skill. But at the same time, while combatting their Arian opponents, gradually the Fathers learnt to use and to appreciate Aristotelian logic (with some Stoic logic mixed in). De Ghellinck sees a progression from Athanasius (ca 293–373) and Epiphanius (ca 315–403) through the Cappadocian Fathers (ca 330–400) and Didymus the Blind (ca 313–398), which leads to "the eulogy, by St. Augustine, of dialectic and its usefulness for the defence of the Christian dogmas".[42] Athanasius and Epiphanius had little knowledge of Aristotelian logic, but the Cappadocians were well-versed in it, as was Didymus, and in the latter we already encounter a more positive tone with regard to dialectic.

De Ghellinck devotes a few lines to Cyril of Alexandria and sees a similar attitude in him: although he "had been so severe on Aristotle", "he certainly does not renounce using Aristotle against the heretics", and he "teaches explicitly that one can refute the heretics by Aristotle himself".[43] Since the period which Runia investigated runs until the Council of Chalcedon, Cyril is also mentioned in his study. Together with Eusebius of Caesarea (ca 263–340) and Theodoret of Cyrus (ca 393–466), the Alexandrian archbishop is portrayed as one of the worst examples of "the practice of raiding the collections of *placita*"; he is "merely copying out Ps.Plutarch".[44] In his list of references, Runia

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[38] *Ibid.*, 23–26; quotation from p. 23.

[39] *Ibid.*, 25.

[40] De Ghellinck (1930); de Ghellinck (1948), 245–310.

[41] De Ghellinck (1930), 25; de Ghellinck (1948), 275.

[42] De Ghellinck (1930), 32; de Ghellinck (1948), 298.

[43] De Ghellinck (1930), 39; de Ghellinck (1948), 306. For Cyril's being 'severe on Aristotle', de Ghellinck refers to *Thesaurus*, PG 75, 148. We will discuss whether Cyril is indeed 'severe on Aristotle' in this passage of the *Thesaurus* in section 2.5.4.

[44] Runia (1989), 19.

gives six passages in Cyril's writings in which Aristotle is referred to by name—one in his commentary on the Psalms, one in the *Thesaurus* (the same passage that de Ghellinck mentioned), and four in *Contra Julianum*. Three of the latter passages he identifies as coming from pseudo-Plutarch.[45]

Runia himself calls attention to the limitations of his procedure. Since there seems to have been among the Fathers "a tacit understanding not to discuss 'outside wisdom' in an explicit way", restricting the list of references to those places where Aristotle is mentioned by name may leave out many other passages that deal with philosophical issues without explicitly naming the philosopher.[46] Besides, the number of patristic texts to be examined is so vast that a complete list can only be drawn up when all the texts are digitized and, thus, can be searched by computer.[47] As a result, quite a number of places in Cyril's *Thesaurus* and *Dialogues on the Trinity* where he employs Aristotelian categories are not included in the list. And, for example, two passages in the *Thesaurus* are missing where Aristotle is mentioned by name.[48] Runia also provides an index in which the references are linked to a number of topics. The references to Cyril are linked with various doctrinal issues: with '*dissensio philosophorum*', 'exegesis', 'heretics', and 'relations with Plato'. None of the references to Cyril are linked with the topics 'dialectic/syllogistic' and 'logic'.[49]

We have already seen that according to Siddals and Boulnois, on the other hand, the archbishop of Alexandria was quite familiar with Aristotelian logic and used it in both his trinitarian writings and in his christology.[50] After a brief overview of what Aristotle and Porphyry have to say on logic we will turn to a number of passages in Cyril's *Thesaurus* and *Dialogues on the Trinity* in which the categories play an important role.

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[45] *Ibid.*, 11.
[46] *Ibid.*, 4, 15 f.
[47] *Ibid.*, 5.
[48] *Thesaurus*, PG 75, 16D and 444D.
[49] Runia (1989), 27 f.
[50] See section 2.2.1.

2.3. Aristotle and Logic

2.3.1. *The* Categories

For about half a century Werner Jaeger's theory of a development
in Aristotle's thought from Platonism to empiricism dominated most
scholars' thinking about the chronology of Aristotle's works.[51] Within
this framework, the *Categories* (Κατηγορίαι)[52] was regarded as an early
work of Aristotle.[53] Nowadays, however, the development hypothesis
is more and more abandoned, so that the dating of the *Categories*
is open to debate again.[54] The ancient discussion of whether the
treatise belongs to logic, and thus deals merely with words and terms,
or to metaphysics, and thus deals with beings in reality,[55] has been
revived over the past two centuries.[56] According to Warren, "J.L. Ackrill
represents the contemporary consensus".[57] 'Consensus' may be too big
a word, but it seems that the majority of commentators would agree
with Ackrill's assessment: "[I]t is important to recognize from the start
that the *Categories* is not primarily or explicitly about names, but about
the things that names signify".[58] At the same time, however, it is good
to keep in mind that Porphyry and the neo-Platonic tradition had to
downplay the metaphysical aspect of the *Categories* in order to establish
its agreement with Platonic philosophy. Stead sums up Porphyry's
compromise as follows:

> [T]he *Categories* is concerned primarily with words, …, it considers the
> natural divisions of our language as reflecting a corresponding division
> in the order of nature; indirectly, therefore, it contributes to our theory of
> the universe.[59]

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[51] Jaeger (1948).

[52] Greek text and French translation: Aristotle (2002). Older edition of the Greek
text: Aristotle (1949). English translation: Aristotle (1990).

[53] Ackrill, in: Aristotle (1990), 69; Stead (1977), 55, 63.

[54] Barnes (1995), 15–22; Bos (2003), 13–30.

[55] See section 2.2.2.

[56] Stead (1977), 56f.

[57] Warren, in: Porphyry (1975), 14.

[58] Ackrill, in: Aristotle (1990), 71.

[59] Stead (1977), 56. In Porphyry's own words: "So our inquiry is incidentally (ἐμπί-
πτουσα) concerned with the generic differentiae of beings, while primarily (προηγου-
μένη) it is about significant expressions", *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* (1887),
58^{27-29}. See for a more thorough discussion of Porphyry's view, Strange, in: Porphyry
(1992), 1–12.

When compared with other works in the *Organon*, the *Categories* does not contain some of the terminology and the elaborations found in the other treatises, so that it was probably written before these other treatises. Besides, there are several loose ends in the whole of Aristotle's argumentation. Stead mentions several of them.[60] The *Categories* can be divided into two parts, chapters 1 through 9, and chapters 10 through 15. The second part, the so-called *Postpraedicamenta*, though authentically Aristotelian, may originally have existed separately, and may later have been added to the first part by an editor.[61]

The brief first chapter introduces 'homonyms' (when the name is the same, but the definition differs), 'synonyms' (when the names differ, but the definitions are the same), and 'paronyms' (words that are derived from other words, like 'grammarian' from 'grammar'). In chapter 2 Aristotle creates four groups of things (τῶν ὄντων) by means of two fundamental distinctions: 'said of something as a subject (καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται)' and 'is in a subject (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν)'. In chapter 3 he speaks of 'differentiae (διαφοραί)', which make distinctions within 'genera (γένη)'.[62] For example, 'terrestrial', 'winged', and 'aquatic' are differentiae of the genus 'living being (ζῷον)'. Chapter 4, then, lists the ten categories,[63] each with two or three examples: substance (οὐσία: man, horse), quantity (ποσόν: two or three cubits), quality (ποιόν: white, grammatical), relative or relation (πρός τι: double, greater), where or place (ποῦ: in the Lyceum, in the market-place), when or time (ποτέ: yesterday, last-year), position (κεῖσθαι: is lying, is sitting), having or state (ἔχειν: has shoes on, has armour on), doing or action (ποιεῖν: is cutting, is burning), and being affected or affection (πάσχειν: being cut, being burnt).

While the first four chapters are each quite short, chapters 5 through 8 are much longer. They discuss the first four categories in detail. The short chapter 9 begins with a few words about the categories action and affection. According to Ackrill, the remainder of the chapter and the first sentence of chapter 10 form a transition from the first part to

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[60] Stead (1977), 62 f.

[61] Minio-Paluello, in: Aristotle (1949), v–vi; Ackrill, in: Aristotle (1990), 69 f.

[62] In Greek, the same word διαφορά is used for the more technical term 'differentia', by which a genus is subdivided, and the more general term 'difference'. In this study διαφορά will be translated by 'differentia' or 'difference', depending on the context.

[63] In chapter 4 itself they are not called 'categories'. In fact, the word κατηγορία is hardly used in the *Categories* (it is in 3a³²⁻³⁷). Mostly the verb κατηγορεῖσθαι is employed, and sometimes the participle derived from it, κατηγορούμενον.

the *Postpraedicamenta*, and are not written by Aristotle himself.[64] Of the second part of the work, chapter 10 is long, the other five chapters are short. They deal with various forms in which things can be opposites of one another (chapters 10 and 11); ways in which things can be prior to (chapter 12) or simultaneous with (chapter 13) each other; several kinds of change (chapter 14); and a number of meanings of 'having' (chapter 15).

Chapter 5 is devoted to the first of the categories, 'substance (οὐσία)'. It is defined on the basis of the two fundamental distinctions: a 'primary substance (πρώτη οὐσία)' is neither 'said of something as a subject', nor is it 'in a subject'. It is an individual being, which has its existence independently from other beings; for example, a particular man or a particular horse. A 'secondary substance (δεύτερα οὐσία)' is a species (εἶδος) or a genus (γένος), it is not 'in a subject', but it is 'said of something as a subject'. To a species belong the individual beings, to a genus the species. So, 'man' and 'horse' are species, for one can say that a particular man is a 'man', and a particular horse is a 'horse'. And 'living being' is a genus, for the species 'man' and 'horse' belong to the genus 'living being'. The formula (λόγος) of a secondary substance (which defines it) applies also to the primary substances of which it is the species or a genus. So, the formula of the species 'man' and of the genus 'living being' apply also to the individual man.

The formula of things that are 'in a subject', however, does not apply to the subject, although the name may be predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι) of the subject. For example, a particular man may be called 'white', but this does not mean that the formula of 'white' applies to the man: 'white' is not part of the formula of the man. Aristotle does not use the later terminology yet, but one could rephrase this as follows: 'white' is not one of the substantial (οὐσιώδης) characteristics of a man, but it is an accident (συμβεβηκός).[65] Therefore, in Aristotle's understanding, primary substances, that is, individual beings, form the basis of all existence: "So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist" (2b[6]).

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[64] Ackrill, in: Aristotle (1990), 69 and 31.

[65] Later in the *Categories*, Aristotle does use the word συμβεβηκός and various forms of the verb συμβαίνειν. Although it does not seem to be a technical term yet, it conveys the meaning of 'contingent'. For example, in 5b[8–10] κατὰ συμβεβηκός is used as the opposite of καθ' αὑτό. Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* (1887), 73[31–35], links the two fundamental distinctions from the *Categories* with 'substance', 'accident', 'universal' and 'particular'. See section 2.4.1.

A primary substance signifies "a certain 'this' (τόδε τι)", for what is indicated is "individual and numerically one (ἄτομον καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ)". A secondary substance, however, signifies "a certain qualification (ποιόν τι)", but not in the same way as 'white', for 'white' signifies nothing but a qualification, while a species and a genus "mark off the qualification of substance—they signify substance of a certain qualification (περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει—ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει)" (3b¹⁰⁻²³). Aristotle adds three characteristics of substances. The first is that there is nothing contrary (ἐναντίος) to them; for example, there is nothing contrary to an individual man, nor to 'man' or to 'living being'. This characteristic also applies to definite quantities, like 'two cubits' or 'ten'. Then also, substances do not admit of a more or a less (ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον). For example, one man is not more or less man than another, or than himself at another time, as one might say that a thing is more pale or less hot than another. But what is most distinctive of primary substances (μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας) is that they are able to receive contraries, for this does not apply to anything else but primary substances. For example, an individual man may be pale at one time and dark at another, or hot at one time and cold at another.

Chapter 6 of the *Categories* deals with quantity (ποσόν). This need not be discussed in too much detail, since in Cyril of Alexandria's writings, there is not nearly as much reference to quantity as to substance. However, a few remarks are worthwhile. Numbers, language (that is, as measured by the number of syllables), lines, surfaces, bodies, time, and place are called quantities strictly (κυρίως). Other things are called so derivatively (κατὰ συμβεβηκός): so we can speak of a large amount of white, when its surface is large, and an action may be called long, because the time it takes is long. Further, 'large', 'small', 'much', and 'little' may seem to be quantities, but they are not. Rather, they are relatives (τὰ πρός τι), for nothing is called 'large' or 'small' in itself, but only by reference to something else. A quantity, strictly speaking, does not have a contrary, nor does it admit of a more and a less. But "most distinctive of a quantity is its being called both equal and unequal (ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι)" (6a²⁶⁻²⁷), for things that are not a quantity are not called equal and unequal. For example, a condition (διάθεσις, which Aristotle reckons among the relatives) is not called equal and unequal, but similar (ὅμοιος), and likewise, white (a quality) is called similar.

Chapter 7, which discusses the relatives (τὰ πρός τι), starts with the following sentence:

> We call *relatives* all such things as are said to be just what they are, *of* or *than* other things (ἑτέρων), or in some other way *in relation to* something else (πρὸς ἕτερον) (6a³⁶⁻³⁷).

So 'greater' is a relative, since something is said to be greater *than* something else, and 'double' is a relative, since it is called double *of* something. Aristotle then mentions six sorts of relatives, but they are not relevant to this study. Some relatives have contraries, others do not. And some relatives admit of a more and a less, while others do not. A characteristic to which Cyril of Alexandria refers is that "all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate (πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται)" (6b²⁸). Thus 'slave' and 'master' are correlatives, and so are 'double' and 'half'. But it is important to state the correlatives correctly. For it is improper to correlate 'wing' and 'bird', for there are other winged beings which are not birds. Therefore, the proper correlatives are 'wing' and 'winged'. Aristotle goes so far as to suggest that sometimes new words need to be created in order to express the correlation properly. For example, 'boat' is not a correlative of 'rudder', since there are boats without a rudder; the correct correlative of rudder would be the neologism 'ruddered'. Another characteristic is that "relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature (ἅμα τῇ φύσει)" (7b¹⁵): they exist at the same time, they also perish together, for if, for example, there is no longer a double, neither is there a half. But there are exceptions to this rule: the knowable seems to be prior to knowledge of it, and similarly, the perceptible seems to be prior to the perception of it.

In discussing whether substances can be relatives Aristotle introduces a stricter definition of relatives. He remarks that under the first definition a hand and a head could be regarded as relatives, since one can say that a hand or a head is someone's hand or head. According to the new definition, relatives are things "for which being is the same as having some relationship (οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τι πως ἔχειν)" (8a³²). If this stricter definition applies, definitely (ὡρισμένως) knowing one relative implies also knowing its correlative definitely: if one knows that something is the double of another thing, one also knows the other thing of which it is the double. And since we can know substances like hand or head definitely without knowing whose hand or head it is, they are not relatives according to the stricter definition. Aristotle adds that it is perhaps hard to make firm statements on such questions.[66]

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[66] Aristotle, *Categories*, 8b²¹⁻²⁴. Ackrill, in: Aristotle (1990), 101–103, discusses some

The subject matter of chapter 8 is the category of 'quality (ποιότης)', "that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow (καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται)" (8b²⁵). Aristotle distinguishes various sorts of qualities or qualifications, but this classification is not relevant to the present study. Examples are: hotness, sickness, justice, knowledge, the capacity to run, sweetness, paleness, madness, curvedness. These are called 'qualities' (ποιότητες), "while *qualified* (ποιά) are things which are called paronymously because of these, or which in some other way [derive their name] from them" (10a²⁷⁻²⁹). In most cases, things are called paronymously from the corresponding quality; for example, 'the pale man' from 'paleness', or 'the just man' from 'justice'.

Most qualities have contraries; for example, justice and injustice, whiteness and blackness. This also applies to the things that are qualified in virtue of them: 'the just' and 'the unjust', 'the white' and 'the black'. However, not all qualities have contraries: there is nothing contrary to red or yellow or such colours. Qualifications also admit of a more and a less; for example, more pale or less pale. This, too, does not apply to all qualifications: one shape is not more of a triangle than another. What is distinctive of quality (ἴδιον ποιότητος) is that only qualities are called "similar and dissimilar (ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια)".⁶⁷ Finally, some qualities are also relatives. This applies especially to the genera (τὰ γένη), not to the particular cases (τά καθ' ἕκαστα). For the genus 'knowledge' is said *of* something, but particular cases of knowledge, such as grammar or music, are not said to be 'grammar of something' or 'music of something'.

From the remaining chapters of the *Categories* only a few thoughts need to be mentioned. Firstly, in one of his logical discussions, Cyril of Alexandria uses the word 'privation' (στέρησις), which in the *Post-praedicamenta* is a technical term. Aristotle states that there are four ways in which things are said to be opposed (ἀντικεῖσθαι) to each other (11b¹⁷⁻¹⁹): (1) as relatives (ὡς τὰ πρός τι); (2) as contraries (ὡς τὰ ἐναντία); (3) as privation and possession (ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις); (4) as affirmation and negation (ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις). Privation is defined as the absence of something which naturally should be present at the time; for example, when a living being has no teeth at a time when naturally it

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of the problems surrounding the interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of the stricter definition of relatives.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 11a¹⁵⁻¹⁶.

should have them. Toothlessness, blindness and baldness are privations. The change is always from possession to privation: becoming toothless, blind, bald. Privation and possession are not opposed to each other in the same way as relatives, for they are not correlatives that reciprocate. For instance, blindness is privation of sight, but sight cannot be expressed in a similar way in relation to blindness.

Since 'unchanged' (for which various Greek words are used) plays an important role in the christological discussion of the fifth century, it may be noteworthy what Aristotle has to say about the different kinds of change. He distinguishes six sorts of change (κίνησις): generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place (κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή). Alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) is defined as "change in qualification (μεταβολή κατὰ τὸ ποιόν)" (15b$^{11-12}$). 'Becoming white' and 'becoming black' are instances of such change; they are also an example of two changes in qualification that are opposed to each other.

Finally, Aristotle does not give a clear-cut definition of man in the *Categories*, but he states that man belongs to the genus 'living being (ζῷον)',[68] and he calls 'terrestrial (πεζόν)' and 'two-footed (δίπουν)' differentiae of man (3a$^{21-28}$).

2.3.2. *The* Topics

The *Topics*[69] is part of the *Organon*; it deals with dialectical practice. In Book I Aristotle mentions the ten categories. He uses the same names as in the *Categories*, except for the first one: instead of οὐσία he now speaks of τί ἐστι (103b$^{20-23}$). In several other places he does not give the whole list, but mentions some of them, mostly substance—now called οὐσία—, quality, and relative.[70] In the *Topics* we also encounter the distinction between 'said of something as a subject (καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται)' and 'is in a subject (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν)', in accordance with what Aristotle writes about this in the *Categories*. When discussing the relationship between a genus and a species he writes that a genus can only be said of a species as a subject, and cannot be said to be *in* a species as a subject.[71]

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[68] *Ibid.*, 1b$^{12-15}$, 2a$^{16-19}$.
[69] Aristotle (1958).
[70] Aristotle, *Topics*, 103b$^{27-39}$, 120b^{36}–121a^9, 146b$^{20-30}$.
[71] *Ibid.*, 127b$^{1-4}$. See also 144b^{31}–145a^2, where it is stated that a differentia can never signify existence *in* something.

According to the *Topics*, dialectical practice consists of propositions and problems, which can be expressed in terms of what later have been called the 'predicables' (101b⁹⁻¹⁹). Aristotle introduces them at the beginning of the *Topics*, and it is those which Porphyry considers in the *Isagoge*. A predicable is a term which may be predicated of many things. Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of predicables: genus (γένος), property (ἴδιον), definition (ὅρος), and accident (συμβεβηκός). He also mentions differentia (διαφορά), but states that it is generic in character and can, therefore, be ranged with the genus (101b¹⁸⁻²⁶). A definition is "a formula (λόγος) indicating the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of something".[72] A property is something which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but, nevertheless, belongs to this thing alone and is predicated convertibly of it (ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος). For example, 'capable of learning grammar' is a property of man, for it does not indicate the essence of man, but a man is capable of learning grammar, while, conversely, that which is capable of learning grammar is a man. When understood in this way, the term 'property' is used absolutely (ἁπλῶς); in English the word 'proprium' could be used for this. In a second sense, the word is used for something that belongs to a thing at a certain time or in a certain relation, for example, when 'sleeping' is called a property of man, for man only sleeps at certain times, while not everything that sleeps is a man (102a¹⁸⁻³⁰).

A genus is that which is predicated with respect to essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον) of many things which differ in species (102a³¹⁻³²). Here it is implied what later is made explicit: a species is defined as a genus with a specifying differentia.[73] 'Living being' is the genus of man, and if it is also the genus of an ox, then man and ox are in the same genus. An accident is something which can belong and not belong to one and the same thing. For example, 'being seated' is an accident, for sometimes it will apply to a person, and at other times it will not apply to the same person. An accident will never be a property absolutely, but it can be a property temporarily or relatively.

A definition consists of genus and differentiae (ὁ ὁρισμός ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν),[74] which implies that a definition applies to a species. And a definition is necessarily convertible with its subject, for it indicates the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of its subject. As we have seen,

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[72] *Ibid.*, 101b³⁸–102a¹. See also 101b¹⁹⁻²³ and 154a³¹⁻³².
[73] *Ibid.*, 143b⁸⁻⁹: πᾶσα γὰρ εἰδοποιὸς διαφορὰ μετὰ τοῦ γένους εἶδος ποιεῖ.
[74] *Ibid.*, 103b¹⁵⁻¹⁶. See also 139a²⁸⁻²⁹.

a property in the absolute sense, too, is convertibly predicated of its subject. If something is not convertible, it is either one of the terms of the definition, i.e., the genus or the differentia, or it is an accident. Having come this far in his treatment of the predicables, Aristotle then mentions the ten categories and states that the accident, the genus, the property, and the definition will always be in one of these categories (103b²⁰⁻²⁷). In the *Topics*, genus (and then also species) is not restricted to the first category, as it seems to be in the *Categories*,[75] but can be applied to all the categories.

One of the recurring examples is the definition of man.[76] In the *Topics*, Aristotle defines man (ἄνθρωπος) as 'two-footed terrestrial living being (ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν)', in which 'living being' is the genus and 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are differentiae. 'Mortal living being receptive of knowledge' is, then, not part of the definition, but it is a property, as is 'by nature a civilized living being'. In the formula of man, therefore, the addition of 'receptive of knowledge' would be superfluous. Of course, the example 'man' is a substance, but Aristotle also speaks of genera and species with respect to other categories. He explicitly mentions relatives and qualities.[77] The examples he gives include the genus 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) with species 'grammatical knowledge' and 'musical knowledge', and the genus 'change' (or 'motion', κίνησις) with species 'increase', 'destruction' and 'generation' (111a³³–b¹¹).

Aristotle's use of the expressions οὐσία, τὸ τί ἐστι, and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι needs some clarification. The expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι seems to be reserved to indicate the 'essence' of a species, *what* a species is essentially, its quiddity. Thus, a definition is a formula—containing the genus and the differentiae of a species—which indicates τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι,[78] and a property in the absolute sense does not show τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of a thing, but belongs to it alone and is predicated convertibly of it.[79] Sometimes τὸ εἶναι is used instead of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (135a¹⁰⁻¹²).

For the 'essence' of a genus, rather than a species, Aristotle uses a different expression: τί ἐστι. We have seen that in the *Topics* he applies the term 'genus' to all the categories, and it is defined as "that which is predicated with respect to essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον) of

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[75] Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b¹⁰⁻²³.
[76] Aristotle, *Topics*, 101b³⁰⁻³¹, 103a²⁵⁻²⁷, 128a²⁵⁻²⁶, 128b³⁴⁻³⁶, 132a¹⁻², 132b³⁵⁻133a⁵, 134a⁵⁻¹⁷, 138a¹⁰⁻¹³, 140a³⁵⁻³⁶.
[77] *Ibid.*, 120b³⁶⁻121a⁹.
[78] *Ibid.*, 101b³⁸, 103b⁹⁻¹⁰, 154a³¹⁻³². See also 143a¹⁵⁻¹⁸.
[79] *Ibid.*, 102a¹⁸⁻¹⁹, 131b³⁷⁻132a⁹.

many things which differ in species" (102a$^{31-32}$). The same expression, 'predicated with respect to essence', also occurs elsewhere in relation to 'genus'.[80] And in order to check a definition, one must see if the genus "is predicated, not with respect to essence (μὴ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται), but as an accident", for then it is not given properly (120b$^{21-22}$). For example, 'white' cannot be stated as the genus of snow, nor 'moving' as the genus of the soul.

In the enumeration of the ten categories Aristotle has replaced οὐσία by τί ἐστι. This is not as surprising as it might seem at first sight. In the *Categories* Aristotle distinguishes between 'primary substance' and 'secondary substance'. While in 'primary substance' the notion of individual and independent existence dominates, although the notion of 'essence' (the *what*, quiddity) is by no means absent, in 'secondary substance' the emphasis lies on 'essence', but it is restricted to the essence of primary substances. The *Topics* are all about the predicables and about what, making use of them, is a proper argumentation. Since a predicable is a term which may be predicated of many things, the secondary substances have a much larger role to play in the *Topics* than the primary substances. Consequently, for the first category the notion of 'essence' takes priority over the fact that it is the essence of things that can exist individually and independently. And since 'essence' at the level of genera is denoted by τί ἐστι, the name τί ἐστι for the first category may be regarded as a sign of this emphasis on essence.

In a number of places the word οὐσία is employed to denote secondary substance.[81] Several times in Book VI, however, the meaning of οὐσία is broadened to indicate the essence of a species, irrespective of category, and it is then synonymous with τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.[82] So, Aristotle speaks explicitly of the 'essence of a relative': "For the essence (οὐσία) of every relative is relative to something else, since for each of the relatives 'being' (τὸ εἶναι) is the same as 'having some relationship' (τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν)" (146b$^{3-4}$). Here, Aristotle applies the stricter definition of a relative.[83] He mentions this definition also elsewhere in the *Topics*, and then calls such relatives 'relatives in themselves (καθ' αὐτὰ πρός τι)' (142a$^{28-30}$). Similarly, he speaks of 'a property in itself (τὸ καθ' αὑτό ἴδιον)', which is assigned to something and which sets it apart

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[80] *Ibid.*, 122a^2–b^7, 128a$^{13-29}$.
[81] *Ibid.*, 103b$^{27-29}$, 120b^{36}–121a^9, 131a$^{4-6}$, 135a$^{16-19}$, 143a$^{32-33}$.
[82] *Ibid.*, 139a$^{29-31}$, 140a^{33}–b^7, 143a$^{17-19}$, 144b$^{31-32}$, 145a$^{3-12}$, 150b$^{22-26}$.
[83] See section 2.3.1.

from everything else. Examples of properties in themselves of man are 'by nature a civilized living being' and 'a mortal living being receptive of knowledge' (128b[16–18, 35–36]). A 'property in itself', then, seems to be synonymous with a 'property in the absolute sense'.

Finally, something needs to be said about genera and species. We have seen that a species is regarded as a genus combined with one or more differentiae. Thus, the genus 'living being' combined with the differentiae 'two-footed' and 'terrestrial' forms the species 'man'. But Aristotle is aware that sometimes more levels than three—genus, species, individual—can be distinguished. He speaks of "the genus of the assigned genus, and so in succession the genus next above", and "all the higher genera must be predicated of the species with respect to essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι)".[84] Also, "the genus is always said of more things than the species" (121b[3–4]). It is implied that the species is the lowest of a list of successive genera, and that it is the first level above the individual things.

2.3.3. *The* Metaphysics

In the other works of the *Organon* and in the *Metaphysics*, it seems that the definitions and distinctions laid down in the *Categories* and the *Topics* are presupposed. Sometimes they are elaborated on or modified, but the 'proprium' seems to be missing in the *Metaphysics*. We will look at some places in the *Metaphysics*[85] in particular. The work is a compilation of texts. Although the development hypothesis is being abandoned,[86] an overview based on this hypothesis gives some idea of the contents of the *Metaphysics*:[87]

> Books I, III, and IV belong together; II is probably the report of a lecture. Book V is a philosophical dictionary. Books VII, VIII, and IX form a unity and may have been meant to update the discussion of I, III, and IV, while Book VI forms a transition between the older and the newer version. The connection of Book X with the other parts of the *Metaphysics* is debated, and Book XI is regarded as a summary treatment of the content of III, IV, and VI. Book XII is an independent treatise, while XIII and XIV contain two criticisms of Plato's theory of ideas.

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[84] Aristotle, *Topics*, 122a[2–5]. See also the paragraphs that follow: 122a[6]–b[11].
[85] Aristotle (1957).
[86] See the beginning of section 2.3.1.
[87] See, e.g., Stead (1977), 63–66; and Tredennick, in: Aristotle (1980), xxxi–xxxiii.

The full list of ten categories is missing in the *Metaphysics*: a list of eight categories is given, in which 'position' and 'having' are left out.[88] In the dictionary, Book V, the first category is referred to as τί ἐστι, as in the *Topics*. In various other places there are references to the categories, but then only two or three are mentioned as examples.[89] The teaching about the predicables, too, is presupposed. Species and genera are predicated of individual things, there are higher and lower genera, species is lower than genus.[90] Essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) belongs to those things the formula of which is a definition, and therefore, it belongs only to a species of a genus.[91] The definition consists of the genus and the differentiae.[92] An accident (συμβεβηκός) is something which is neither always nor usually the case.[93] 'Property', as discussed in the *Topics*, seems to play little role in the *Metaphysics*.

Book VII is devoted to 'being' and discusses various terms and expressions related to it. Aristotle starts with the meaning of 'being (τὸ ὄν)': first, it signifies "what something is and a certain 'this' (τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι)", and then a quality or a quantity or one of the other categories. It appears that with the phrase "what something is and a certain 'this'" Aristotle wants to indicate the first category, more precisely, what in the *Categories* is called 'primary substance', of which he mentions two characteristics. 'A certain "this"' denotes the individuality. 'What something is' denotes the essence, the quiddity. Aristotle then adds that it is clear that from the various senses of 'being', "the primary one is 'what something is', which indicates the substance (οὐσία)". Examples are 'man' and 'god', as opposed to 'white', 'hot' and 'three cubits' (1028a¹⁰⁻²⁰). Substance is primary in definition and in knowledge and in time. For none of the other categories can exist separately (χωριστός), only substance (1028a³³⁻³⁴).

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[88] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book V, 1017a²⁴⁻²⁷. Cf. *Posterior Analytics*, 83a²¹⁻²³, 83b¹³⁻¹⁷, where 'position' and 'having' are also missing; the Greek text in: Aristotle (1964).

[89] *Ibid.*, Book V, 1024a¹²⁻¹⁵ (τί ἐστι and ποιόν); Book VII, 1028a¹⁰⁻¹³: 'being' (τὸ ὄν) indicates τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι or ποιόν or ποσόν or any of the other categories. See also 1026a³⁵⁻b¹, 1030a¹⁹⁻²⁰, 1032a¹⁵, 1034b⁹⁻¹⁹; and *Posterior Analytics*, 96b¹⁹⁻²⁰: ποσόν and ποιόν.

[90] *Ibid.*, Book III, 998a²⁰⁻999a²³.

[91] *Ibid.*, Book VII, 1030a⁶⁻¹³.

[92] *Ibid.*, Book VII, 1037b²⁹⁻³¹.

[93] *Ibid.*, Book VI, 1026b³¹⁻³³. See also Book V, 1025a⁴⁻³⁴; here, Aristotle adds 'another sense' of συμβεβηκός—'whatever belongs to each thing in itself (καθ' αὐτό), not being in its substance (οὐσία)'. Porphyry will later distinguish the two kinds of accidents as 'separable' and 'inseparable' accidents; see section 2.4.2.

Aristotle discusses several meanings given to the word οὐσία (starting in 1028b³³⁻³⁶), and argues that some uses are more appropriate than others. So, if οὐσία is used to indicate the substrate (τὸ ὑποκείμενον), it should refer to the form (or essence), rather than to the matter or to the combination of both. And if it is used for the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), it applies to the first category in the absolute sense (ἁπλῶς), and to the other categories in a secondary sense (πως). Further, οὐσία in the sense of 'form' or 'essence' is individual, but its defining formula is universal (τὸ καθόλου). Matter, too, is universal, but the combination of matter with essence is individual. Of a particular individual (τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά τινος), whether sensible or intelligible, there is no definition.

Aristotle devotes quite some space to the question of whether a universal (τὸ καθόλου) may be called 'substance' (οὐσία). His argument is largely a rejection of the Platonic Ideas—which are universals and at the same time regarded as substances—, and, therefore, he concludes that "none of the things called universals is a substance" (1041a³⁻⁵). This implies that he now restricts the term 'substance' to what in the *Categories* are called 'primary substances', the individual things. The main understanding of 'substance' in the *Metaphysics*, then, is also different from that in the *Topics*. Since the *Topics* is about the predicables, in that book οὐσία is mainly used for universals, but in the *Metaphysics*, where ontology is more important, its primary sense is the individual form.

We now turn to some of the entries in the dictionary, Book V. Chapter vi deals with 'one' (ἕν).[94] Since 'to unite', 'union' and 'unity' are crucial notions in Cyril of Alexandria's christology, it is interesting to look at Aristotle's treatment of 'one'. At the beginning of the chapter Aristotle expresses a major distinction by the terms 'accidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός)' and 'in virtue of itself (καθ' αὐτό)' (1015b¹⁶⁻¹⁷). As a concrete example of accidental unity he gives 'cultured Coriscus', which is one, because both 'cultured' and 'Coriscus' are accidents of the same individual, of one substance. Most things, then, are accidentally one, but some are called 'one' in a primary sense, namely, when their substance (οὐσία) is one, and the substance can be one in continuity or in form or in definition (1016b⁶⁻⁹). Something is one 'in continuity' when its parts are linked with one another, like a leg or an arm; this is a quantitative unity. The parts of a shoe could be put together in a

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[94] *Ibid.*, 1015b¹⁶–1017a⁶.

random way and thus be one in continuity, but they are more truly one when they are one in form, that is, if they are put together to be a shoe. Things are also called 'one' when the definition stating their essence is the same.[95]

Chapter vii concerns 'being (τὸ ὄν)' (1017a⁷–b⁹). Aristotle distinguishes between accidental being (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) and being in itself (καθ' αὑτό), and gives several examples of accidental being: 'cultured', 'being a builder', and 'white', when said of a human being. Another important distinction is that 'to be' and 'being' can be employed, not just when something is actually (ἐντελεχείᾳ), but also when it is potentially (δυνάμει).[96] For instance, we can use 'is seeing' for someone who is capable of seeing and for someone who is actually seeing. Chapter viii briefly sums up four ways in which 'substance (οὐσία)' is used (1017b¹⁰⁻²⁶). After discussing each of them, Aristotle concludes that οὐσία has two (main) senses. First, it is the ultimate subject (ὑποκείμενον), which is not said *of* something else. And second, it is that which is individual (τόδε τι) and separate; this is the shape and the form of each thing.

Chapter xiv of the dictionary describes 'quality' (called both ποιόν and ποιότης; 1020a³³–b²⁵). Quality in the primary sense is "the differentia of the substance (ἡ τῆς οὐσίας διαφορά)"; for example, 'two-footed' for a man, and 'four-footed' for a horse. In the secondary sense, it denotes the affections (πάθη) of substances, according to which they are said to change, such as heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, and especially, goodness and badness. It is remarkable that, once again, Aristotle does not mention the properties in the absolute sense, since they belong to neither of the two senses, and yet they are qualities; for example, 'receptive of knowledge' in a human being.

'Relative' (πρός τι) is the subject of chapter xv.[97] Three kinds of relatives are discussed. (1) Numerical relatives, such as 'half' and 'double'.

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[95] At first glance, it seems that Aristotle, when speaking of unity in definition, has secondary substances in mind: various individual men are one, because they all belong to the species 'man'. But it is clear from the context that here, too, he is thinking of primary substances, for he argues that what increases and decreases is one (*Metaphysics*, 1016a³⁵⁻³⁶), i.e., a thing remains the same ('one') in time, even when it changes by increasing or decreasing, because the definition of its essence remains the same.

[96] The difference between actuality and potentiality is one to which Aristotle refers a number of times throughout the *Metaphysics*. Actuality is mostly called ἐνέργεια instead of ἐντελέχεια, and δύναμις can also mean 'potency' besides 'potentiality'. See especially, Book V.xii and Book IX.

[97] *Ibid.*, 1020b²⁶–1021b¹¹.

(2) The active in relation to the passive; for instance, that which heats
and that which is heated. This does not only apply to actuality, but also
to potentialities: that which *can* heat is called relative to that which *can*
be heated. (3) Relatives like the measurable and the measure; the know-
able and knowledge; and the sensible and sensation. Aristotle further
distinguishes between relatives in themselves (καθ᾽ ἑαυτά)—which cor-
respond to the relatives according to the stricter definition in our discus-
sion of the *Categories*—and accidental relatives (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). He
also calls 'equal', 'like' and 'same' relatives, and adds: "For 'the same'
are those things whose substance is one, 'like' those things whose qual-
ity is one, and 'equal' those things whose quantity is one" (1021a$^{11–12}$).

The above presentation of some of Aristotle's views on logic and
metaphysics contains aporias and raises questions. It is, however, not
the intention of this study to give a detailed discussion of Aristotelian
logic, but it is only meant as a means to a better understanding of
Cyril of Alexandria's christology. Therefore, any discussion of aporias
in Aristotle's writings will be subject to its use for the elucidation of the
Alexandrian archbishop's theological views.

   Finally, a few words about the way 'man' is defined in the *Metaphysics*.
Although it is generally implied rather than clearly stated, the definition
of 'man' in this work is 'two-footed living being (ζῷον δίπουν)'.[98]

2.4. Porphyry and Logic

Since Porphyry's major commentary on the *Categories* is lost, we will
look at his smaller extant commentary, and after that at his *Isagoge*,
which can be regarded as an introduction to Aristotle's *Topics*.

2.4.1. Commentary on Aristotle's Categories[99]

Porphyry's commentary covers the first part of the *Categories*, up to
and including chapter 9, not the *Postpraedicamenta*. Although the text
breaks off at the end, it is possible that also the original text did not

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[98] See, e.g., Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1006a$^{31–32}$, 1006b$^{28–30}$, 1020a$^{33–34}$, 1022a$^{32–35}$,
1023a$^{35–36}$, 1037b$^{11–13}$, 1038a$^{30–33}$, 1039a$^{30–33}$.
[99] Text: Porphyry (1887); English translation: Porphyry (1992).

go beyond the ninth chapter.[100] Even so, there are two references in the commentary to the second part, once with the words 'hereafter (μετὰ ταῦτα)', which suggests that Porphyry regarded the *Postpraedicamenta* as belonging to the *Categories*.[101] In order to reconcile Aristotle with Plato, Porphyry argues that his enquiry into the *Categories* "is incidentally (ἐμπίπτουσα) concerned with the generic differentiae of beings, while primarily (προηγουμένη) it is about significant expressions".[102] In general, he follows the text of the *Categories* closely, but at times his treatment is much more elaborate than Aristotle's, and sometimes his views are different from those of the Stagirite. We will pay special attention to some of the places where Porphyry goes beyond Aristotle.

First of all, Porphyry brings Aristotle's phrases in line with what has become traditional language in his time. He explains that 'said of something as a subject' refers to a universal (τὸ καθόλου), and that 'being in a subject' refers to an accident (τὸ συμβεβηκός). 'Not said of something as a subject', then, belongs to a particular (τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους), and 'not being in a subject' to a substance (ἡ οὐσία). We thus get four classes: particular and universal substances, and particular and universal accidents.[103] In the introduction, before he discusses the categories one by one, Porphyry deals at greater length with the terms 'genus', 'species', and 'differentia' than does Aristotle. The ten categories are the highest genera. And since a definition consists of a genus and a differentia, the categories cannot be defined; one can only give examples and properties. Between the highest genera and the individuals there are other genera, species being the lowest of them, just above the individuals. We thus get a list of genera, from the highest genus to the species, for example: substance—living being—rational living being—man.

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[100] Chadwick (1990), 125.

[101] Porphyry, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, 118[1–2] (a reference to chapter 13, about things that are simultaneous by nature) and 118[20] (a reference with the words 'hereafter [μετὰ ταῦτα]' to chapter 12, about 'prior' and 'posterior').

[102] *Ibid.*, 58[27–29]. See also 86[35–37]. In 75[24–31], Porphyry states that the question of why universals are not said to 'be', but to 'be spoken of', is beyond the beginning student. In 90[12]–91[27], he nevertheless returns to the issue, trying to explain why Aristotle calls the individuals *primary* substances and the genera and species *secondary* substances. Here, he declares that "with respect to significant expressions sensible individuals are primary substances, but with respect to nature (πρὸς τὴν φύσιν) intelligible [substances] are primary" (91[24–27]).

[103] *Ibid.*, 72[30]–74[2].

Porphyry calls a differentia a 'substantial quality' (ποιότης οὐσιώδης; 95[19]), which is reminiscent of Aristotle's speaking of the primary sense of quality as 'the differentia of the substance' (ἡ τῆς οὐσίας διαφορά).[104] Porphyry explains that a differentia is neither a mere quality (for then it would be an accident) nor a mere substance (for then it would belong to the secondary substances), and he adds: therefore, it is not predicated "with respect to essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι)", but "with respect to quality (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν)".[105] Since he also writes that secondary substances do not indicate a certain 'this' (τόδε τι), but rather 'such' (τὸ τοιόνδε),[106] this may need further explanation. In my own words, not Porphyry's, I might say: secondary substances signify primarily a potentiality for individual existence—which is actualized in the primary substances—and secondarily the substantial qualities of the primary substances.[107] Thus, the highest genus, 'substance', indicates the potentiality for individual existence. But with the lower genera, through to the species, a growing number of differentiae, that is substantial qualities, are added to the significance of the secondary substances. The secondary substance 'living being (ζῷον)', then, which Porphyry defines as 'animate, sensible substance (οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική)' (68[24]), indicates not only the potentiality for individual existence, but also the substantial qualities 'animate' and 'sensible'. Porphyry also calls the differentiae 'complements' (συμπληρωτικά) of substances, since their loss would mean the destruction of the subject. For example, if the differentia 'rational' is taken away from 'man', it is no longer 'man' (95[22–33]).

Porphyry discusses three meanings of the word 'property' (ἴδιον): (1) that which belongs to all the members of a kind, but not to them alone (in this sense, 'two-footed' is a property of man, for it is not only men who are two-footed); (2) that which belongs only to members of a kind, but not to all of them (e.g., 'to be a rhetorician' is such a property of man); (3) that which belongs to all the members of a kind, and only to them (e.g., 'capable of laughing' is a property of man in the third

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[104] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1020b[14–15].

[105] Porphyry, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, 95[17–20]. See also 82[22]. The expression 'predicated with respect to essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι)' is used for genera by Aristotle in the *Topics*, 102a[31–32].

[106] *Ibid.*, 96[27–28]. See also 91[2–4], 96[7–8].

[107] The use of the word 'potentiality' here is not meant to say anything about the metaphysical status of universals; that question has been bracketed out. In his *Isagoge*, 11[4–5] and 14[20–21], Porphyry himself states that the genus possesses the differences under it 'potentially (δυνάμει)', not 'actually (ἐνεργείᾳ)'.

sense). The latter is a property in the strictest sense (κυριώτατον; 94²⁻³), in English also to be called 'proprium'. Of the first four categories, which, like Aristotle, he discusses in detail, Porphyry gives a property in the strictest sense. What is most of all a property of substance is to be receptive of contraries while being numerically one and the same. For example, the same man may be foolish and wise, healthy and sick (98³⁻⁶). And of quantity, the property in the strict sense of the word is: to be called equal and unequal. If equal and unequal are said of qualities, like 'white', they are used improperly, instead of 'similar';[108] and if they are said of substances—e.g., when two men are compared— they are used accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), for they then pertain to the accident of size (110³³–111⁴). The proprium of quality is similarity and dissimilarity (139¹⁷⁻²¹). With respect to the properties distinctive of substance, quantity and quality, Porphyry, then, is in agreement with Aristotle.

It is a property of relatives to be said in relation to correlatives (ἀντιστρέφοντα), Porphyry states (115¹⁷⁻¹⁸). And he takes up various discussions about relatives from the *Categories*: what proper correlation is (rudder and 'ruddered'), whether being simultaneous by nature applies to all relatives, and whether substances can be relatives. On the latter issue he is much more outspoken than Aristotle. He calls the implication of the initial quasi-definition (οἷον ὁρισμός; 'quasi', because, being the highest genera, no real definition can be given of the categories), that substances could be regarded as relatives, 'absurd (ἄτοπος)', since relatives are accidents, and substances can never be accidents (121²⁰–122¹⁰). Therefore, he adheres to the stricter definition: relatives are things for which being is the same as being somehow related to something.

Porphyry writes in general that nothing prevents the same thing considered in different ways from falling under several categories, but he applies this statement only to relatives. The concrete example given is that of virtue and vice, which are qualities as well as relatives. We have seen that he dismisses the possibility that substances are also relatives. Substances are rather the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) for relatives; for example, a substance like Socrates can be the substrate for relatives like father or child, and master or slave.[109]

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[108] *Ibid.*, 110²⁵⁻³²: οὐ κυρίως ἀλλὰ καταχρώμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅμοιον.
[109] *Ibid.*, 114¹⁻²². See also 139²²–141⁴.

As regards quantity, Porphyry accepts the same seven sorts of quantity that Aristotle mentions: numbers, language, lines, surfaces, bodies, time, and place (105^{5-10}). But he has a different attitude towards 'much', 'little', 'large' and 'small'. Whereas Aristotle explicitly states that they do not belong to the category of quantity, but to the relatives, Porphyry writes that they are not merely relatives, but that taken absolutely (ἁπλῶς) they signify an indefinite quantity.[110] In the context of quantity, Porphyry also declares that nothing prevents there being several divisions (διαιρέσεις) of the same genus from different points of view (101^{4-5}). And he applies this also to substance. For example, the substance 'living being' can be divided into mortal and immortal, into rational and irrational, into footed and footless, and also into winged, terrestrial and aquatic.

Finally, Porphyry defines 'man' in another way than does Aristotle. According to the latter, man is a 'two-footed (terrestrial) living being', but the former defines man as a 'mortal rational living being' (ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν).[111] Early on in his commentary, Porphyry even says that man is a 'rational mortal living being receptive of intelligence and knowledge',[112] while in the *Topics* Aristotle calls 'receptive of knowledge' a property of man, which is not part of the definition.[113]

2.4.2. Isagoge[114]

Porphyry wrote the *Isagoge* in response to a request from the Roman senator Chrysaorius, who had been reading Aristotle's *Categories* and did not understand it. Despite its incidental beginnings, the *Isagoge* became one of the most influential philosophical writings during Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Grant, who investigated Cyril of Alexandria's use of Greek literature in his *Contra Julianum*, does not mention the *Isagoge* among the various Porphyrian writings quoted by the archbishop.[115] But seeing that Cyril quotes passages and works that are not found in his main sources—Eusebius's *Praeparatio Evangelica*

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[110] *Ibid.*, 108^{15-16}. According to Strange, in: Porphyry (1992), 107, n. 281, the view that 'much', 'little', 'large' and 'small' are indefinite quantities derives from Andronicus (first century BC; he published many of Aristotle's works), and was also adopted by Plotinus.

[111] *Ibid.*, 63^{12}, 73^{23-25}, 82^{18}, 92^{27-30}.

[112] *Ibid.*, 60^{18}: ζῷον λογικόν θνητόν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν.

[113] Aristotle, *Topics*, $103a^{27-28}$, $128b^{34-36}$, $134a^{14-17}$, $140a^{35-36}$.

[114] Text: Porphyry (1998); English translation: Porphyry (1975).

[115] Grant (1964), 273–275.

and pseudo-Didymus's *De Trinitate*—he probably examined Porphyry's oeuvre himself, and, therefore, it is not unlikely that Cyril knew the *Isagoge* as well.

In the first paragraph of the *Isagoge*, Porphyry writes that for the teaching regarding Aristotle's categories it is necessary to know what genus (γένος), difference (διαφορά), species (εἶδος), property (ἴδιον), and accident (συμβεβηκός) are (1^{3-5}), and it is to the elucidation of these predicables that the work is devoted. First, the author declares that he will leave more profound questions, such as the reality status of genera and species, aside, and that he will try to make clear what the ancients (οἱ παλαιοί), and especially the Peripatetics, understood by these terms in a more logical sense (λογικώτερον) (1^{14-16}). He then proceeds to discuss each of the five predicables in some detail, and ends with an enumeration of the common characteristics of and the differences between the various predicables.

We have seen that in the *Topics*, Aristotle treats four kinds of predicables: genus, definition, property, and accident; and that he includes differentia in genus. Thus, Porphyry leaves out definition, makes difference into a separate predicable, and adds species; the discussion about the validity of this change does not concern us here.[116] Every class under a genus he calls a species, and every class above a species he calls a genus. Thus, the highest genus (γενικώτατον) is only a genus, not a species; the lowest species (εἰδικώτατον) is only a species, not a genus; all the classes in between may be called both genera and species. There are ten highest genera, Aristotle's ten categories, which in this case Porphyry does not mention by name.[117] The resulting system has later been called the Tree of Porphyry: from a highest genus a number of species branch out, each of which in turn branch out to a lower class of species, etc., down to the lowest species. Porphyry gives one example of the intermediary classes from a highest genus to a lowest species and its individuals: substance (οὐσία)—body—animate body—living being—rational living being—the species man—particular men (οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι), like Socrates or Plato (4^{21-25}).

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[116] See for some brief remarks about this discussion: Warren, in: Porphyry (1975), 11–12, n. 3.

[117] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 6^{5-10}. He adds that the ten categories are not species of a higher genus 'being' (τὸ ὄν), for when 'being' is applied to the various categories, it is said homonymously, not synonymously.

Porphyry distinguishes three types of difference: 'difference' may be said commonly (κοινῶς), properly (ἰδίως) and strictly (ἰδιαίτατα) (8⁸). It is said commonly when things differ from one another by otherness in any way. Things differ properly when they differ because of an inseparable (ἀχώριστον) accident. And 'difference' is said strictly when things differ because of a specific (εἰδοποιός) difference. By the specific differences—also translated as 'differentiae'—genera are divided into species; they are comprehended in the (defining) formula, and they are part of the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).¹¹⁸ Another way of putting it is that specific differences complete (συμπληροῦν) the formula or the substance, they are complements.¹¹⁹ An inseparable accident is a difference which is not part of a definition, but which nevertheless always belongs to an individual thing, for example, greyness of the eyes, 'being hooked' of the nose, or even a scar (8¹²⁻¹⁵).

As in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, Porphyry declares that genera and species, i.e. secondary substances, are predicated 'with respect to essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν)', while specific differences are predicated 'with respect to quality (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν)'. He now adds a third type of predication: πῶς ἔχον.¹²⁰ It seems that with this term Porphyry groups together all the remaining eight categories, besides substance and quality, so that it could be translated as 'with respect to the other categories'.¹²¹ Differences of the first two types, then, are predicated 'with respect to quality' or 'with respect to the other categories'.

With regard to the propria Porphyry now writes: a property strictly (κυρίως) so called belongs to an entire species, only to it, and always. And they are convertible (ἀντιστρέφει). For example, the species 'man' is capable of laughing, and when something is capable of laughing, it belongs to the species 'man'. This also applies to 'capable of neighing' and 'horse'.

In this context, Porphyry uses the term πεφυκέναι, the perfect infinitive of the verb φύειν, from which φύσις is derived. 'Capable of laughing' is a property of man, not because man is always laughing, but because it is natural (τῷ πεφυκέναι) for him to laugh. And this capacity

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¹¹⁸ The expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι occurs only twice in the *Isagoge*, both times in this context: a differentia is part of the essence of a thing (12¹⁻⁴ and 12⁹⁻¹⁰).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9¹⁸⁻²⁰, 10⁹⁻¹⁰, 12⁵⁻⁹, 14¹⁹⁻²⁰.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 3¹⁷⁻¹⁹, 8¹⁰⁻¹², 9⁵⁻⁶, 17¹⁰⁻¹³, 21⁹⁻¹⁰.

¹²¹ See also the discussions by Warren, in: Porphyry (1975), 33–34, n. 24, and by de Libera, in: Porphyry (1998), 44, n. 34, and 56, n. 72.

always belongs to him as natural (σύμφυτον).[122] The same term πεφυ-κέναι is applied to 'the natural capacity to sail', of which it is explicitly stated that it is not a difference in the strict sense, but a property of man (12[4–9]). Thus, words that are related to φύσις are not just employed for the essence of a thing, but also for 'natural' properties.

A few other terms in the *Isagoge* deserve attention. The word ἰδιότης occurs several times. It is used both for the characteristics of an individual like Socrates, and for the characteristics of a species like 'man' (7[19–27]). It is also employed for the unique characteristics of the predicables, in contrast to those characteristics that two or more predicables have in common, the κοινότητες (22[11–13]). In one passage, the term σχέ-σις is used for the relation between genera and species.[123] And finally, the word ὑπόστασις can be found once in the *Isagoge*, when Porphyry states that one difference combines (συντίθεται) with another differ-ence, like 'rational' and 'mortal' are combined "into the hypostasis of man".[124] Various forms of the related verb ὑφίστασθαι are encountered. They seem to stress the reality of existence over against something purely noetic. So, it is said that it is common to proprium and insepa-rable accident that those things in which they are observed do not exist (ὑποστῆναι) without them. Examples are 'being capable of laughing' in man and 'being black' in an Ethiopian (21[21]–22[1]). And in the passage on accidents, Porphyry writes that it *is* possible to *conceive* (ἐπινοηθῆναι) of an Ethiopian who has lost his colour apart from the destruction of the substrate (ὑποκειμένου).[125] In the same passage, in one of the defi-nitions of 'accident', he says that it "always exists in a substrate (ἀεὶ δέ ἐστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὑφιστάμενον)" (13[3–5]). Thus, Porphyry uses the verb ὑφίστασθαι not just for substances, but also for accidents.

In Table 1, an overview is given of how various terms and concepts in the logic of Aristotle and Porphyry relate to each other. The table is structured by the two main divisions: (1) (not) said of something as a subject (universal vs. particular); (2) is (not) in a subject (substance vs. accident).

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[122] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 12[17–22]. See also 19[7–9]. In the *Topics*, 134a[5–17], Aristotle makes a similar distinction between 'belonging naturally (τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον)' and 'belonging always (τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχον)'.

[123] *Ibid.*, 5[7–16]. In the *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, 112[1–23], σχέσις is used for the relation between two relatives, like father and child, or perception and the perceptible.

[124] *Ibid.*, 18[24]–19[1].

[125] *Ibid.*, 13[1–3]. Warren, in: Porphyry (1975), 27, n. 11, writes that "ὑφίστασθαι becomes a strong word in neoplatonism and frequently denotes what 'really' exists".

Table 1. A summary of logic according to Aristotle and Porphyry

	said of something as a subject (καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται) = **universal** (τὸ καθόλου) = **predicable** genus (γένος) species (εἶδος) differentia (διαφορά) definition (ὅρος) formula (λόγος) property (ἴδιον) accident (συμβεβηκός) essence of genus (τὸ τί ἐστι) essence of species (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι)	NOT said of something as a subject (καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς οὐ λέγεται) = **particular** (τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους)
is NOT in a subject (οὐ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν) = **substance** (οὐσία): man, horse = the first category	secondary substance (δεύτερα οὐσία)	primary substance (πρώτη οὐσία)
is in a subject (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν) = **accident** (συμβεβηκός) = all the other categories quantity (ποσόν): two or three cubits quality (ποιόν): white, grammatical relative or relation (πρός τι): double, greater where or place (ποῦ): in the Lyceum, in the market-place when or time (ποτέ): yesterday, last-year position (κεῖσθαι): is lying, is sitting having or state (ἔχειν): has shoes on, has armour on doing or action (ποιεῖν): is cutting, is burning being affected or affection (πάσχειν): being cut, being burnt	universal accident	particular accident

2.5. Cyril of Alexandria and Logic

In order to get an impression of Cyril of Alexandria's knowledge of logic at the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy, we will look at the use he makes of logic in two of his trinitarian writings: the *Thesaurus*[126] and the *Dialogues on the Trinity*.[127] The *Thesaurus* is the older of the two, possibly already composed round the year 412, while the *terminus ante quem* of the *Dialogues* is 425.[128] In literature about Cyril's use of logic, it is mainly these two writings which are discussed.[129] Both works are polemical, directed against Arianism in a rather broad sense. In the *Thesaurus* Arius, Eunomius and Aëtius are mentioned by name, while the references in the *Dialogues* are more general. There do not seem to have been any contemporary Arian writings, which Cyril was opposing.[130]

In section 2.5, first, the broader context is sketched in which Cyril's more logical passages are placed, then a general idea is given of the way

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[126] *CPG* 5215. Cyrillus Alexandriae Archiepiscopus, *Thesaurus de Trinitate*, PG 75, 9–656. There is no critical edition nor a translation into any Western language available.

[127] *CPG* 5216; PG 75, 657–1124. Critical edition and French translation: Cyrille d'Alexandrie, *Dialogues sur la Trinité: Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes*, vols. 1–3 (SC 231, 237, 246), ed. Georges Matthieu de Durand, Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1976, 1977, 1978.

[128] Jouassard (1945) dates the Old Testament commentaries before 423, the *Thesaurus* and the *Dialogues on the Trinity* between 423 and 425, and the *Commentary on John* after 425. Charlier (1950), 64 f. and 80 f., places the *Thesaurus* at the beginning of Cyril's episcopate (412), while he regards the *Commentary on John* as the first of Cyril's commentaries. De Durand (1976), 39, even suggests that Cyril wrote the *Thesaurus* before he succeeded his uncle as bishop of Alexandria, that is, before 412. And he expects the *Dialogues on the Trinity* to have been written before the year 420, also before the *Commentary on John* (p. 40). Liébaert (1951), 12–16, discusses the chronology and rejects Jouassard's view. In a second article, Jouassard (1977) defends his earlier position.

My investigations into the contents of the writings suggest a better understanding of Aristotelian logic in the *Dialogues on the Trinity* than in the *Thesaurus* (see section 2.5.5), and therefore, some time between the earlier *Thesaurus* and the later *Dialogues*. And they suggest a somewhat more developed christology in Cyril's *Commentary on John* than in the trinitarian writings (see section 3.5), and therefore, a later, rather than an earlier, date for the *Commentary*.

[129] De Durand (1976), 29, writes that Book I of Cyril's *Commentary on John* contains a number of syllogisms (see chapter 3, n. 212), while his *Festal Letter* 12 of 424 has many similarities with the second dialogue from the *Dialogues on the Trinity*. Siddals (1984) refers to the *Commentary on John* a number of times.

[130] Charlier (1950), 65 f.; de Durand (1976), 32–37, 52 f. Wessel (2004), 57–62, writes about Arians in Cyril's time, also in Egypt.

in which the Alexandrian archbishop deals with logic in the service of theology, and finally, a number of passages are discussed in more detail.

2.5.1. *Logic in Context*

Cyril of Alexandria is first and foremost a biblical theologian. This is clear from the many commentaries on Bible books that he has written. But also in those parts of his writings in which logic plays a role, the underlying questions are often exegetical. What does it mean when Christ is said to be 'the only-begotten Son' of God,[131] and by contrast God the Father is called 'unborn' (ἀγέννητος)?[132] Christ says that "no-one is good, except God alone", and that the Father is 'greater' than himself; he calls the Father 'my God', while in the letter to the Hebrews he himself is called 'apostle and high priest'—does all this not imply that Christ is a creature, albeit the highest of all?[133] A series of similar questions might be added.

Logic, then, is a set of tools for Cyril. On the one hand, he stresses at times that it is not himself who has introduced these tools into theology. His opponents "attack us on the basis of Aristotle's teachings", and they "make full use of the cleverness of worldly wisdom".[134] With an implicit reference to Isaiah 36:6, he writes that they "support their own souls with worldly wisdom as with a staff of reed", while they "count as nothing the duty not to go astray from dogmatic orthodoxy".[135] At times, Cyril suggests that he is not an expert in logic.[136] But on the other hand, he is quite confident that his opponents use Aristotelian logic 'unlearnedly',[137] and so, he himself applies these tools to refute them.[138]

In these anti-Arian works, then, logic is not a tool to build a dogmatic system. Especially in the *Thesaurus*, the polemical goal is dominant; in Charlier's words: "What he [Cyril] wanted above all was

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[131] John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9.

[132] Cyril employs both ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος. At times they are used synonymously, so that it has to be deduced from the context whether they should be translated as 'unborn' or as 'uncreated'. Something similar applies to other words derived from the verbs γεννᾶν and γίγνεσθαι. See also de Durand, SC 231, 369–371, n. * to *Dial. Trin.* I, 396.

[133] Mark 10:28, John 14:28, John 20:17, and Hebr. 3:1, respectively.

[134] *Thesaurus*, 145B.

[135] *Dial. Trin.* II, 418c. Cf. *Thesaurus*, 148AB.

[136] *Dial. Trin.* I, 408d; II, 427bc.

[137] *Thesaurus*, 145B, 152B.

[138] *Dial. Trin.* II, 451b–d.

not so much to expose the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, but to warn the faithful against the error of Arius and Eunomius in multiple forms".[139] In order to achieve this, he can place side by side different reasonings or different interpretations of the same Bible verse, which give varying meanings to the words of the text, but which are all in line with orthodox teaching and contradict the Arian argumentation. For example, he can say that Christ could call the Father 'greater than I', because within the Trinity the Father is the origin (ἀρχή) of the Son.[140] But within the same chapter (XI), he can also reason that the 'greater' refers to the economy: because the Son is made man, and the Father is not, the latter is called 'greater'.[141]

The *Thesaurus* consists of many short sections, each with a separate subtitle, often not more than the word 'Another' (ἄλλο), which means something like 'another argument'.[142] Many of these sections contain conditional clauses with the conjunction 'if (εἰ)', to which Cyril regularly adds an argumentation by reduction to the absurd (διὰ τῆς εἰς ἄτοπον ἀπαγωγῆς), sometimes explicitly.[143] De Durand warns that it may be dangerous to come to conclusions about Cyril's own theological views on the basis of these 'syllogisms'.[144] They do, however, give an impression of the way in which he employs logical terminology.

One of the questions Cyril returns to on various occasions is to what extent human words are capable of saying something about God. According to the Eunomians, the substance of God can be known by the human mind. Cyril describes their view in the *Thesaurus* as follows:

> 'Uncreated' (ἀγένητος), then, is indicative of the substance (οὐσία) of God. If this is so, God knows himself as uncreated. And if someone else knows this, he will certainly know God as he knows himself.[145]

The Alexandrian archbishop stands in the tradition of the Cappadocian Fathers when he rejects such a view, maintaining that the

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[139] Charlier (1950), 78.

[140] *Thesaurus*, 141D, 144D.

[141] *Thesaurus*, 144B, 149D, 156B.

[142] According to Charlier (1950), 55, these subtitles were probably assigned by Cyril himself.

[143] Charlier, *ibid.*, 73–80, regards employment of reduction to the absurd and conditional argumentation the two main characteristics of the *Thesaurus*, a "work in which Scripture, while ceding some enclaves to philosophy, occupies a pre-eminent place" (p. 80).

[144] De Durand (1976), 26.

[145] *Thesaurus*, 445D.

substance of God is unknowable, incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος).[146]
One of the arguments of the Eunomians is that there is nothing
accidental in God (οὐδὲν τῇ θείᾳ συμβέβηκεν οὐσίᾳ). In response, Cyril
distinguishes between the ontological and the noetical. It is wise of
them to say that there is nothing accidental to the substance of God,
he says. But there is plenty of reason that necessitates us to think
(νοεῖν) of 'such things' as accidents. Besides 'uncreated', other examples
of 'such things' are 'Father', 'incorruptible', 'immortal', 'invisible', but
they are only thought to be accidents in language (συμβεβηκότα, μέχρι
μόνης φωνῆς οὕτω νοούμενα). The Eunomians, however, do not regard
anything as an accident in God, not just in reality, but also in thought
(κατ' ἐπίνοιαν).[147]

With respect to the ontological, he reasons elsewhere: if it is most
proper for a substance to be a substrate (ὑποκείμενον) to accidents, and
there is no accident to which God is a substrate, then God is not prop-
erly called a substance. He is rather beyond substance (ὑπερούσιος).[148]
In our thinking and speaking, however, we, as human beings, are lim-
ited, while God surpasses the creatures, also in understanding. When
the Eunomians say that they know God like he knows himself, it seems
that they are afraid of having limited knowledge, Cyril argues. But not
knowing completely, like God does, does not imply that we do not know
truly. For example, if someone does not know how the moon's eclipses
come about, this does not render the knowledge he does have about
the moon false. Similarly, our knowledge of God is not false, even if
the knowledge he has about himself is far superior to ours. We can
only speak humanly about God, and we use human things as a model
(ὑπόδειγμα) of greater things.[149] In the *Dialogues*, Cyril calls our speaking
of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις with respect to God a sort of image (ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι
τυχόν) of the divine transcendence in its sublime heights.[150]

When names (ὀνόματα) are applied to things (πράγματα) properly
(κυρίως), they are not the same as their substances—in this Cyril
agrees with Eunomius—, but they do signify (σημαίνει) the substances.
For example, the name 'man' signifies the φύσις of man. The proper

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[146] *Ibid.*, 28A.
[147] *Ibid.*, 445D–449A. In *Dial. Trin.* II, 421bc, Cyril argues that nothing would be
thought (νοοῖτ' ἄν) to be an accident with God. He then speaks of 'naturally inhering
attributes'. This will be discussed in chapter 3.
[148] *Ibid.*, 36B. Cyril also uses the term in *Dial. Trin.* II, 434c.
[149] *Ibid.*, 449A–452B.
[150] *Dial. Trin.* I, 408de.

meaning (κυριολογία) of the names should not be thrown out. But in applying words to God, we should realize that he surpasses human things, and thus that the words refer to God in a different way than to us. So, a human word does not have a hypostasis of its own, but that does not mean that the divine Word does not have his own hypostasis either. And words like 'just' and 'good' and 'holy' are attributed truly and properly (κυρίως) to God, but improperly (καταχρηστικῶς) to human beings, when they participate in God's justice, goodness and holiness.[151]

In the *Dialogues*, Cyril accuses his opponents of regarding the names of 'sonship' and 'generation' as attributed figuratively (κατάπλαστον) to the Son.[152] Instead of being Son by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) he would then be son by adoption and son by grace, just as we are, and he would belong to the creation. The words 'sonship' and 'generation' would be applied rather improperly (καταχρηστικώτερον) to Christ. In opposition to this, Cyril bases himself on John 10:35–36 and 17:10, and concludes that Christ is more truthfully (ἀληθέστερον) 'God' and 'Son' than human beings. The Father is 'Father' because he begot the Son, and the Son is 'Son' because he is born of the Father.[153] The Father and the Son share in equal names, like 'life', 'light', 'incorruptible' and 'invisible', which prerogatives are attached substantially to the divine nature. By these words we come to a moderate knowledge (εἰς μετρίαν γνῶσιν) of the divine nature. The names 'Father' and 'Son', however, indicate the πρόσωπον of each separately.

In the last of the dialogues, Cyril argues that we know something well on the basis of what it is by nature (κατὰ φύσιν), on the basis of what it really (ἀληθῶς) is, not by its name, for names may be used homonymously.[154] The name 'man' is also applied to a statue of a human being, and 'god' is said of angels and human beings, although only as a gift. Definitions, however, like that of man—a rational, mortal living being, receptive of intelligence and knowledge—, indicate what things really are. And by his properties—like incorruptibility, indestructibility, eternity, and immutability—we have a better indication of who God is than by his names.

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[151] *Thesaurus*, 321A–325D.
[152] *Dial. Trin.* I, 413d–416d.
[153] See also *ibid.*, II, 424a, 432a–e, 436ab, 438cd.
[154] *Ibid.*, VII, 634d–635d.

2.5.2. *Cyril's Grasp of Logic*

We have already seen that Cyril works with the distinction between
substance and accidents. Besides the places mentioned in section 2.5.1,
it can be found in various other parts of the two trinitarian writings.[155]
When a substance acts as substrate (ὑποκειμένης τῆς οὐσίας) the acci-
dents are received by it and are predicated of it.[156] Properties, too, are
attached to substances.[157] The Alexandrian archbishop makes use of
the four categories that both Aristotle and Porphyry discuss in more
detail: substance, quantity, quality, and relative. The word οὐσία can
be found numerous times in the two trinitarian works, especially in the
Thesaurus. Just as in Aristotle, it has the double meaning of (1) (poten-
tiality to) independent and separate existence, and (2) essence. Some-
times the aspect of separate existence is emphasized,[158] more often the
term has the meaning of a secondary substance, for example, when
a number of beings are said to be of the same substance,[159] when
'the formula of the substance' (ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) is mentioned,[160]
or when different things are compared 'according to substance' (κατὰ
τὴν οὐσίαν).[161] For the archbishop of Alexandria, the authority of the
Nicene Creed is beyond doubt, and thus he strongly upholds that
the Son is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father. However, when
he explains this word in terms of Aristotelian logic the unity of the
Godhead is jeopardized. For when the consubstantiality of Father and
Son is compared to that of men like Paul, Peter and James, the two
divine hypostases might seem to be separate to such an extent that
they become two gods. When Cyril makes this comparison in the *The-
saurus*, he does not emphasize the unity.[162] But when he repeats it in
the *Dialogues*, he adds that there is not a total separation (τὴν εἰσά-
παν διατομήν) between the hypostases, like with us men, but that there

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[155] See nn. 147 and 148. Also, e.g., *Thesaurus*, 144BC, 232B, 256A–C, 596A–D; *Dial.
Trin.* II, 421b–d, 433e–434a, 451de.

[156] *Thesaurus*, 444AB. See also *Dial. Trin.* II, 451de.

[157] *Thesaurus*, 445B.

[158] *Thesaurus*, 36A, 101BC; *Dial. Trin.* II, 430e.

[159] *Thesaurus*, 109A, 316A.

[160] *Thesaurus*, 116B, 140C, 144A–C, 324B; cf. *Dial. Trin.* I, 407c.

[161] *Thesaurus*, 140B, 596D.

[162] *Thesaurus*, 316A–C.

is a natural and ineffable union between them (φυσικὴν καὶ ἄρρητον ἕνωσιν).[163] In the sixth dialogue he even adds: otherwise there would be two gods.[164]

Cyril's knowledge of several Aristotelian characteristics of 'substance' will be discussed in section 2.5.3. The other categories are mentioned not nearly as often as substance. 'Quantity' and 'relative' both play an important role in *Thesaurus*, 145B–152A, which is the subject of section 2.5.4. 'Quantity' is hardly used elsewhere, but 'relative' occurs also in other places in the *Thesaurus* (see section 2.5.4), while two passages in the *Dialogues on the Trinity* are devoted to it, which are examined in sections 2.5.5 and 2.5.6. 'Quality' and its derivatives can only be found a few times in the two anti-Arian writings. The terms are mentioned, but hardly discussed, while in several cases they should probably not be regarded as technical terms.[165] We will look at one of the more important occurrences of 'quality' in section 2.5.4.

According to Aristotle, to be equal or unequal (ἴσον / ἄνισον) is the proprium of quantity.[166] Scripture, however, speaks of Jesus Christ as being "equal to God".[167] For Cyril of Alexandria, this means that the Son is consubstantial with the Father: things that are naturally (φυσικῶς) in equality with one another are consubstantial;[168] "the Son, being equal to the Father according to the formula of the substance";[169] "because he is God by nature (φύσει), he is equal to God the Begetter".[170] Conversely, he is unequal to the prophets,[171] and to created things.[172] Something similar applies to 'like' and 'unlike' (ὅμοιος / ἀνόμοιος). For Aristotle, it is the proprium of 'quality' that things are called

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[163] *Dial. Trin.* I, 408bc. See also 409b–d. In his *Commentary on John*, Cyril writes that 'consubstantial' does not apply to us men in exactly the same way (ἐν ἴσῳ τύπῳ) as to the Father and the Word, *In Jo.* IX.9, 698 (972d).

[164] *Ibid.*, VI, 592b–d.

[165] *Thesaurus*, 149B, 361C, 452C, 496A, 596A; *Dial. Trin.* II, 429ab, 434c.

[166] Aristotle, *Categories*, 6a[26–27]; *Metaphysics*, 1021a[12]. Cf. Porphyry, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, 110[29]–111[4].

[167] John 5:18: "making himself equal to God (ἴσον τῷ Θεῷ)"; Philippians 2:6: "who, being in the form of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal to God (ἴσα Θεῷ)". Cyril refers quite often to the verse in Philippians. One place in which both verses can be found side by side is *Thesaurus*, 140D.

[168] *Thesaurus*, 140D.

[169] *Ibid.*, 141D.

[170] *Ibid.*, 156B; see also 157A.

[171] *Ibid.*, 320AB.

[172] *Dial. Trin.* I, 414cd.

'like' and 'unlike' only with reference to a quality.[173] Thus, two differ-
ent substances may be called 'like' each other with respect to a certain
quality, for example, tin and silver with respect to 'being white', gold
and fire to 'being yellow and flame-coloured'.[174] In the *Thesaurus*, Cyril,
however, speaks of '(un)like by nature (κατὰ φύσιν)' and similar expres-
sions,[175] or of 'natural and substantial likeness (φυσικήν καὶ οὐσιώδη τὴν
ὁμοίωσιν)',[176] which, for him, implies consubstantiality. In the *Dialogues*
he attributes the teaching that the Son is ὁμοιοούσιος to his Arian oppo-
nents.[177]

Cyril of Alexandria also makes use of the predicables. According to
Labelle, one of the passages in which the archbishop does this "almost
suffices by itself to show how much Cyril is soaked in Aristotelian-
ism".[178] Labelle gives a French translation of the section, *Thesaurus*,
444D–445B, and adds a brief exposition.[179] The Arian opponents have
said that ἀγένητος—which, as we shall see, in this context should be
translated as 'uncreated'—is the substance of God. Cyril responds that
everything that is predicated of something else, signifying the essence
(τὸ τί ἐστιν), is either a genus, or a species, or a differentia, or a defini-
tion. This is in line with both Aristotle's and Porphyry's logic. There-
fore, if 'uncreated' is the (secondary) substance of God, it should be one
of these four predicables. Genus and species, however, are predicated of
many things which differ either in species or in number, while only God
is uncreated (since God is not the only being that is unborn,[180] ἀγένητος
must mean 'uncreated' here). Therefore, 'uncreated' cannot be God's
genus or species, Cyril argues. The third possibility is that 'uncreated'
is a definition. But every definition is a formula (λόγος) which tells what
the signified is according to substance (τὸ τί ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν). 'Uncre-

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[173] Aristotle, *Categories*, 11a[15–19]; *Metaphysics*, 1021a[11–12]. Cf. Porphyry, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, 139[17–21].

[174] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1054b[11–13].

[175] *Thesaurus*, 29A, 104D, 109B (φυσικῆς ὁμοιότητος), 316C (φυσικὴν ὁμοιότητα); see also 132B, 141D, 152CD.

[176] *Ibid.*, 232C.

[177] *Dial. Trin.* I, 392d–393a, 394e–395b, 410b. Cyril now distinguishes between 'natu-ral likeness'—which corresponds to ὁμοούσιος—and 'external resemblance'—which he equates with ὁμοιοούσιος.

[178] Labelle (1979), 29.

[179] *Ibid.*, 29–32.

[180] In *Dial. Trin.* II, 427de, Cyril states explicitly that there are many things unborn (ἀγέννητος), which he then uses as an argument why ἀγέννητος cannot be the substance of God. See section 2.5.5.

ated' is not a formula, but a word (ὄνομα); therefore, it cannot be a definition either. The remaining option is that 'uncreated' is a difference, a 'substantial difference (διαφορὰ οὐσιώδης)', Cyril specifies. But a differentia only applies to something which is compounded (σύνθετος), and God is simple and uncompounded (ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀσύνθετος). 'Uncreated', then, cannot be a differentia of God. The conclusion must be that 'uncreated' fits none of the four predicables, and that, therefore, it cannot signify the substance of God.

Labelle may be overstating the case, when he infers from this passage that Cyril is soaked in Aristotelianism, but the archbishop is certainly playing with the logical concepts. And if he were asked whether it is proper to apply these rules of logic to God—whom, somewhere else, Cyril himself has called 'beyond substance'[181]—he could rightly respond that it was not himself who initiated this debate, and that he is merely refuting the position of his opponents. De Durand takes a very different stance with regard to Cyril's understanding of logic, as we have already seen.[182] He regards the *Thesaurus* as a work of the young Cyril, probably from before he became a bishop, and suggests that the whole work was copied from various older sources.[183] For this, he bases himself on Liébaert's research who found that Cyril made extensive use of the *Contra Arianos* of his predecessor Athanasius for about one third of the *Thesaurus*. Encouraged by this result, Liébaert searched for other sources for the remaining two thirds of Cyril's work, but he could find none. He did find that another third of the *Thesaurus* is directed against Eunomius and that it shows some similarities with pseudo-Basil's *Adversus Eunomium*, which has been attributed to Didymus the Blind, but these similarities were not sufficient to regard this work as a source for the *Thesaurus*. He then postulated that the parts of the *Thesaurus* that are anti-Eunomian, were borrowed by Cyril from a lost work of Didymus.[184] Since Eunomius made use of Aristotelian logic, it is not surprising that most of the more logical reasonings of the *Thesaurus* are located in the parts written against Eunomius, which—on Liébaert's postulation, followed by de Durand—could imply that Cyril copied his logical arguments from Didymus. However, since this

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[181] See n. 148.

[182] See nn. 2 and 3.

[183] De Durand (1976), 25.

[184] Liébaert (1951). The first chapter (19–43) investigates the borrowings from *Contra Arianos*, the second chapter (44–64) the parts that are directed against Eunomius. Some useful tables can be found on pp. 24 f. and 54 f.

train of thought contains several unproven hypotheses, it seems a rather thin basis for a conclusion about Cyril's knowledge of logic. More specific comments from de Durand about the Alexandrian archbishop's utilization of logic will be discussed later on in this chapter.

Labelle could have strengthened his case, if he had included the next two sections of the *Thesaurus*, 445BC, in his investigation. In the first section, Cyril argues that 'uncreated' signifies 'not having been created', and that it is to be compared to 'capable of laughing' in man and 'capable of neighing' in horse. They are propria, and if a proprium (τὸ ἑκάστου ἴδιον) is not itself a substance, but is attached (προσόν) to a substance, then 'uncreated' is not a substance either, but one of God's propria. In the second section, Cyril states that 'uncreated' is predicated of God as something inseparable (ἀχώριστον), like 'white' with a swan or with snow. And substances are not understood on the basis of their inseparable attributes, but on the basis of what they are themselves. Therefore, when someone knows that God is 'uncreated' he does not know God's substance, but he knows that 'not having been created' is attached to his substance. Here, the archbishop makes correct use of several notions that we have come across in Porphyry's writings: the proprium, with laughing and neighing as examples,[185] and the inseparable attribute.[186]

Already in chapter II of the *Thesaurus* (28B–32B), Cyril of Alexandria has referred to some predicables in his argumentation. There, he gives another reason why it is not helpful if 'uncreated' is regarded as a differentia: a differentia only makes sense if it is added to a substance, for example, the differentiae 'rational, mortal, receptive of intelligence and knowledge' are added to the substance 'living being' in the definition of man. If, then, 'uncreated' would be a differentia of God it would be more useful to search for the substance to which the differentia is added.[187] As for the suggestion that 'uncreated' could be a definition, he here states that a definition should consist of a genus and a differentia or differentiae. Thus, 'uncreated' cannot be a definition for two reasons: (1) there is no genus to which it could belong; (2) a definition cannot consist of only one word.[188] Besides, according to the philosophers, definitions should not be given on the basis of opposites

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[185] Porphyry, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, 94$^{2–3}$; idem, *Isagoge*, 12$^{16–22}$.

[186] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 8$^{12–15}$, 9$^{7–11}$, 12^{24}–13^{3}.

[187] *Thesaurus*, 28CD.

[188] *Ibid.*, 29BC.

(ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων), but on the basis of what they are. For example, one should not define 'white' as 'not black'. And since 'uncreated' means 'not created', the indication would be based on opposites, and this is not sound, Cyril writes.[189] This reasoning is reminiscent of a passage in the *Topics*, in which Aristotle—using different terminology—states that it is better not to divide a genus by means of a negation (ἀποφάσει). Thus, a line should not be defined as 'length without breadth'. But an exception should be made for privations, such as 'blind', which is 'not having sight, when it is natural to have it'.[190] Once again, then, the archbishop of Alexandria applies logic correctly.

In the last section of chapter II, however, Cyril seems to interpret his opponents' position, which is that 'uncreated' is a definition, strangely.[191] First, he says that if it is a definition it must be convertible (ἀντιστρέφει). For example, if the definition of 'man' is 'rational, mortal living being, receptive of intelligence and knowledge', then, conversely, someone who is a rational, mortal living being, receptive of intelligence and knowledge, must be a man. This is indeed in line with Aristotle's logic.[192] But then he concludes that 'uncreated' cannot be a definition, since not all substances are uncreated, only God is. This seems illogical, for it presupposes that 'uncreated' would be regarded as the definition of 'substance', while his opponents no doubt meant it to be a definition of 'God'.

In the *Dialogues*, too, Cyril speaks of the predicables. The most relevant passage will be discussed in section 2.5.5. Twice, we have seen Cyril define 'man' as a 'rational, mortal living being, receptive of intelligence and knowledge'. This is the longer of Porphyry's definitions of man, which he mentions at the beginning of his *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*.[193] Cyril repeats this definition several times in both anti-Arian writings.[194] He also uses Porphyry's shorter definition, 'rational, mortal living being',[195] sometimes after he has first given the longer definition.[196] The Alexandrian archbishop, thus, consistently employs a

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[189] *Ibid.*, 29D.

[190] Aristotle, *Topics*, 143b^{11}–144a^4.

[191] *Thesaurus*, 32AB.

[192] Aristotle, *Topics*, 103b$^{7–12}$ (ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι); 154a^{37}–b^3 (ἀντιστρέφειν).

[193] See n. 112.

[194] *Thesaurus*, 109A, 444A; *Dial. Trin.* II, 425c; VII, 634de.

[195] See n. 111.

[196] *Thesaurus*, 444AC, 596B; *Dial. Trin.* I, 408e; II, 427c.

neo-Platonic, rather than the original Aristotelian definition of man, 'two-footed (terrestrial) living being'.[197]

De Durand regards the fact that Cyril applies the word ἰδιότης both to the particularity of Father and Son and to the divine attributes they have in common, "one sign among others" that the archbishop does not care to delimit his terms properly.[198] Since we have seen that Porphyry in a similar way uses ἰδιότης for the particular characteristics of Socrates and for the attributes of man in general,[199] de Durand's argumentation is flawed.

2.5.3. Thesaurus, *Chapter III*

Chapter III of the *Thesaurus* (32B–36D) is discussed in some detail by Boulnois, as one of the texts of which she has not found an equivalent with Cyril's predecessors.[200] According to the title, the chapter's aim is to defend the position "that 'uncreated' (ἀγένητος) is not [a] substance (οὐσία), but that it only signifies that God has not been created". Boulnois selects four of the syllogisms, each of which deals with one of the characteristics of substance.

(a) "There is nothing contrary to a substance".[201] Since, then, 'created' is contrary to 'uncreated', 'uncreated' cannot be a substance, Cyril argues. Boulnois simply restates the argument, without further comment. The examples given by Aristotle are 'a particular man', the species 'man', and the genus 'living being'. In order for the argument to hold, 'uncreated' must be regarded as the name of a substance, similar to 'man'.

(b) "A substance is predicated synonymously of all things" of which it is predicated.[202] If 'uncreated' is 'substance' it must, therefore, be predicated of all substances or of all things under 'substance', says Cyril. And he asks the rhetorical question: if 'uncreated' is not predicated of all things, while 'substance' is, how can they be the same thing? This argumentation presupposes a different understanding of the sentence

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[197] See nn. 76 and 98.
[198] See n. 2.
[199] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 7[19–27].
[200] Boulnois (1994), 195–197.
[201] *Thesaurus*, 32B. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b[24–25]; Porphyry, *Commentary*, 96[30].
[202] *Thesaurus*, 32D. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, 3a[33–34].

"'uncreated' is 'substance'" than under (a)—something that Boulnois does not note. Here it refers, not to the name of a substance (similar to 'man'), but to the highest genus 'substance' itself. For only if it is understood in this way can one say that it is predicated of all substances and of all things under 'substance'. This example shows once again that in the *Thesaurus* the polemical goal is dominant, and that Cyril is not building a dogmatic system. He refutes side by side two different ways in which the sentence "'uncreated' is 'substance'" may be interpreted. That it is highly unlikely that his opponents had the highest genus 'substance' in mind when they wrote this phrase, does not seem to bother him.[203] We have seen a similar case with regard to the last section of chapter II.[204]

(c) "One substance is not more or less a substance than another".[205] If 'uncreated' were a substance, it could not be more, and something else could not be less than it. But what is uncreated transcends everything, and therefore, 'uncreated' cannot be a substance, according to Cyril. Boulnois rightly comments that Cyril lets himself be carried away in trying to refute Eunomius. For from 'more of a substance' he jumps to 'superior perfection'. Aristotle merely wants to say that God, insofar as he is regarded as a substance, is not more of a substance than man, or for that matter, any other substance. This does not imply that God would not be more than man or than other creatures in *another* sense.

It might be added that Cyril does not use Aristotle's vocabulary, which is repeated in Porphyry's *Commentary*: The two philosophers speak of "not admitting (ἐπιδέχεσθαι) a more or a less", while Cyril states that "one substance is not more or less than another substance (οὐσία δὲ οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον)". Using the words of the latter phrase, Aristotle even writes explicitly that he does not mean that one substance cannot be more or less of a substance than another substance. This refers to his view that primary substances are more properly called substances than secondary substances (genera and species), as also Porphyry explains. It appears, then, that Cyril did not have the *Categories* in front of him when he wrote this syllogism. One may even wonder whether he understood what Aristotle wanted to say.

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[203] Cyril himself even says so towards the end of chapter III: "If 'uncreated' is only with respect to God substance, as they say, ..." (*Thesaurus*, 36D).

[204] See n. 191.

[205] *Thesaurus*, 32D–33A. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b[33–34]; Porphyry, *Commentary*, 97[22–26].

(d) "It is a property of substance to receive opposites".[206] Therefore, if 'uncreated' were a substance, it would be receptive of opposites. It seems that in a brief and somewhat cryptic sentence, Cyril then reasons as follows: 'to create' and 'not to create' are opposites which are received by God,[207] but the opposite of 'uncreated' is not received by him, for 'having been created' does not apply to God. Therefore, 'uncreated' is not a substance. Boulnois hails this as an example of Cyril's knowledge of Aristotelian logic: not only does he reproduce Aristotle's argument, using his vocabulary, but also Cyril rightly calls this characteristic the proprium (ἴδιον) of substance. This may be true, but one can ask questions about Cyril's application of this characteristic. For although a substance can receive opposites, this does not imply that it can receive the opposite of all its attributes. For example, a substance cannot receive the opposites of its propria: it is a proprium of man to be capable of laughing, therefore, a man cannot be 'not capable of laughing'. Thus, from the fact that 'uncreated' cannot receive its opposite, 'having been created', one cannot conclude that it is not a substance.

Besides the four syllogisms considered in this section, chapter III of the *Thesaurus* contains another one which is worth mentioning, since it touches on the category of relative. It will be discussed in more detail towards the end of section 2.5.4.

2.5.4. Thesaurus, *Chapter XI*

In this section we investigate part of chapter XI of the *Thesaurus*: 140B–156B. Both Labelle and Boulnois devote several pages to Cyril of Alexandria's use of Aristotelian logic in this chapter. Labelle gives a French translation of 145B–148A, Boulnois of 144D–149C, in which she incorporates Labelle's text.[208] Boulnois starts with Eunomius's first objection and Cyril's response to it (140B–144D). Eunomius argues that things of the same substance and the same nature are not greater or smaller according to nature (φυσικῶς). In an example he replaces

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[206] *Thesaurus*, 33D. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, 4a[10–11]; Porphyry, *Commentary*, 98[3–5].

[207] This is in line with his argumentation in *Thesaurus*, 448A: although God is Creator according to substance, before the constitution of the universe he did not actually (τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ) create; in our thinking, then, it is an accident to God.

[208] Labelle (1979), 24–29; the translation on pp. 26–27. Boulnois (1994), 197–209; the translation on pp. 206–209.

'according to nature' by 'according to the formula / principle of the substance (κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον)': one man is not greater than another man according to the formula / principle of the substance, nor one horse greater than another horse. Since, then, the Son says that the Father is greater than himself, he cannot be of the same substance, Eunomius concludes. Cyril first uses several scriptural and metaphysical arguments against the Arian position, and ends with a logical argument (144A–D), at which we will have a closer look.

Cyril begins by turning Eunomius's reasoning upside down: it is only things that are consubstantial that are properly (κυρίως) compared, for it would be foolish to say that an ox is greater than a man, or the other way round. Therefore, if the Son compares himself with the Father, calling him greater, they must be consubstantial. The general rule that only consubstantial things are properly compared is not in accordance with Aristotle's logic: as we have seen, the philosopher himself compares things of different substance, as long as one of their qualities is similar, like fire and gold.[209] Boulnois shows, however, that the *Thesaurus* shares this reasoning with pseudo-Basil's *De Trinitate*.[210]

Then follows the logical refutation of Eunomius's argumentation. Cyril agrees with his opponent that one consubstantial thing is not greater or smaller than another consubstantial thing according to the formula of the substance. But they do differ with respect to the accidents (περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα). Thus, one man may be greater than another man in bodily size or strength, in greatness of soul, or in sharpness of mind, but the formula of the substance is the same for both. Similarly, the Father and the Son have the same substance, but the Father is called 'greater' as the origin (ἀρχή) of his co-eternal offspring.

Boulnois interprets this reasoning in terms of the major, the minor and the conclusion of the syllogism. Eunomius's major contains a restriction—'greater' does not apply to consubstantial things 'according to the formula / principle of the substance'—which does not return in his minor—the Father is greater than the Son. Therefore, his conclusion that Father and Son are not consubstantial is invalid. Cyril shows that the minor without the restriction—the Father is greater than the Son—can be interpreted in a different way: while consubstantial,

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[209] See n. 174.
[210] Boulnois (1994), 193.

the Father is the origin of the Son.[211] Cyril merely, but correctly, gives the argument, without employing the technical terminology of syllogisms.

In his second objection, Eunomius argues that if the Father is greater than the Son, the Son is unlike the Father, and the two are not consubstantial. A large part of Cyril's response consists in showing that Eunomius employs "the art of Aristotle (ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους τέχνη)" unlearnedly. Within the space of one column of Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* (145B–148A), the philosopher is mentioned by name seven times, while the initial description of a relative in the *Categories* is quoted verbatim.[212] And Cyril is by no means "severe on Aristotle", as de Ghellinck writes;[213] as "the inventor of such an art" the Stagirite is rather referred to as an authority. It is his Arian opponents on whom Cyril is severe, because they have worldly wisdom in higher esteem than divine Scripture, and because they apply Aristotle's art unlearnedly. It is on the basis of this passage that Labelle concludes that its author "possesses a real philosophical skill and a perfect mastery of Aristotelian analytics",[214] and that Boulnois writes that Cyril "not only knows the general rules of Aristotelian logic, but also its subtleties".[215] We will follow Cyril's reasoning step by step and discuss Labelle's and Boulnois's comments.

The archbishop of Alexandria is astounded that from a statement about 'greater' (μεῖζον) his opponents should conclude that Father and Son are 'unlike' (ἀνόμοιος), since 'unlike' and 'greater' are not classified in the same genus. 'Greater' and 'smaller' are said of things that have a relation (τῶν πρός τι ἐχόντων), while 'like' and 'unlike' belong to another category (κατηγορία), which Cyril does not specify at this point. Both Labelle and Boulnois accept this argumentation, which is surprising, because for Aristotle 'like' and 'unlike' do belong to the category of relative:

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[211] Boulnois, *idem*, 198, gives another interpretation of the 'greater': the economy, that is, the incarnation of the Son. Cyril does mention this as well, in the previous syllogism.

[212] The beginning of the seventh chapter of the *Categories*, 6a^{36}–b^{1}, is quoted verbatim in *Thesaurus*, 148A, with the exception of the clause 'for it is called larger than something', which is omitted. This is not to say that Cyril had a copy of the *Categories* in front of him; the text may have come to him through a third party.

[213] See n. 43.

[214] See n. 11.

[215] See n. 19.

> Relatives seem also to admit of a more and a less. For a thing is called more similar (ὅμοιον) and less similar, and more unequal (ἄνισον) and less unequal; and each of these is relative (πρός τι ὄν), since what is similar is called similar *to* something and what is unequal unequal *to* something. But not all admit of a more and a less; for what is double, or anything like that, is not called more double or less double.[216]

We will return to this misunderstanding shortly, but first, we will follow Cyril's reasoning.

The archbishop continues with an alternative, which he does not borrow from the Eunomians, but which he makes up himself: it would have been better to conclude from the 'greater' to 'not equal' or 'not so great'. This, however, would imply that 'greater' and 'smaller' belong to the category of quantity (τὸ ποσόν), Cyril argues. As part of this fabricated alternative he writes: "For Aristotle framed the law that, not relatives (τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα), but 'greater' or 'smaller' are subordinate (ὑποκεῖσθαι) to quantity".[217] He does not mention it, but the underlying argument may be that the proprium of quantity is 'being called both equal and unequal', which might suggest that 'equal' and 'unequal' and, therefore, also 'greater' and 'smaller' belong to quantity. He then sums up the seven kinds of quantities that Aristotle gives— number, language, line, surface, body, time, and place[218]—and comes to the conclusion that 'greater' is not among them, so that this alternative is not a solution either.

Labelle regards this second argumentation as clear evidence that Cyril knows Aristotle very well. In discussing it, Boulnois makes a category mistake herself. By assigning 'greater' to quantity Cyril places it in the same category as 'equal', she writes. And in a note she adds: "Not only does 'equal' belong to the category of quantity, it is even the distinctive characteristic which allows this category to be recognized and defined".[219] It is correct that 'equal' is the distinctive

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[216] Aristotle, *Categories*, 6b[19–27], in the translation of Ackrill: Aristotle (1990).

[217] Οὐ γὰρ τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ποσῷ νενομοθέτηκεν ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους τέχνη (*Thesaurus*, 145D). The translation of Labelle (1979), 26 (copied by Boulnois), seems incorrect: "La doctrine d'Aristote fixe alors le 'plus grand' et le 'plus petit', non comme des choses se rapportant de quelque façon à autre chose, mais comme sujet de la quantité". Not τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα and ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ποσῷ are placed in opposition to each other, but τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα and τὸ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον. And although the technical meaning of ὑποκεῖσθαι is 'to underlie' or 'to be subject to', it makes more sense to translate it here as 'to be subordinate to'.

[218] Aristotle, *Categories*, 4b[23–25]. See also Porphyry, *Commentary*, 105[5–10].

[219] Boulnois (1994), 199, n. 89.

characteristic of the category of quantity, but 'equal' itself belongs
to another category, that of relative, as we have just seen in the
quotation from the *Categories*. Porphyry must have realized that this
may be confusing and spends some time in his *Commentary* explaining
the difference.[220]

This same difference between a category itself and the category of
its proprium may be the reason that Cyril as well as Labelle and
Boulnois think that 'like' and 'unlike' do not belong to the relatives.
Cyril does not say so directly, but Labelle and Boulnois are probably
right in deducing that he regards 'like' and 'unlike' as qualities.[221]
This may be due to the fact that Aristotle and Porphyry both regard
being called 'like' and 'unlike' as the proprium of quality,[222] and to the
misconception that the proprium of quality is itself also a quality, and
not a relative.

We return to Cyril's text. He now starts a series of argumentations to
show that 'like' and 'unlike' do not belong to the category of relative,
and that, therefore, one cannot logically move from 'greater' to 'unlike',
as Eunomius does. He first quotes Aristotle's initial description of a
relative.[223] Then he discusses the different ways in which 'greater' and
'smaller' on the one hand, and 'like' and 'unlike' on the other hand
are opposed to each other (ἀντίκειται): 'greater' is said as greater than
the 'smaller', but 'like' is not said as greater than the 'unlike' (148AB).
Boulnois rightly comments that Cyril should have said: "but 'like' is
not said as *like* the 'unlike'". He then elaborates on this and refers
to one of the properties of relatives that Aristotle mentions: they are
'simultaneous by nature (ἅμα ... τῇ φύσει)'.[224] 'Great' cannot exist
without 'small', neither 'double' without 'half'. But 'like' can very well
exist without 'unlike'. 'Unlike', then, is a privation (στέρησις), and a
possession and its opposite privation do not exist simultaneously, but a
privation is secondary to the possession. Therefore, 'like' and 'unlike'
do not belong to the relatives, Cyril concludes.

[220] Porphyry, *Commentary*, 114²⁵–115¹². He also writes that relatives cannot be con-
ceived without some other category, and that 'equal' and 'unequal' also belong to the
category of quality (114⁸⁻¹⁴, 115⁴⁻¹²).

[221] Labelle (1979), 29; Boulnois (1994), 202–204. Boulnois makes plausible that Mig-
ne's text needs to be corrected: in *Thesaurus*, 149B, ἀνεπίδεκτα must be replaced by
ἐπίδεκτα.

[222] Aristotle, *Categories*, 11a¹⁵⁻¹⁶; idem, *Metaphysics*, 1021a¹¹⁻¹²; Porphyry, *Commentary*,
139¹⁷⁻²¹.

[223] See n. 212.

[224] Aristotle, *Categories*, 7b¹⁵.

Boulnois accepts this last reasoning insofar as she interprets the criterion 'simultaneous by nature' as belonging to the strict relatives: although 'like' and 'unlike' might be called relatives according to the initial broader description, they are not relatives in the strict sense.[225] However, she fails to recognize the mistakes the Alexandrian archbishop makes in his argumentation. It is true that, according to Aristotle, possession comes first and may be followed by privation. The philosopher writes this in the *Postpraedicamenta*—of the content of which Cyril thus shows knowledge.[226] But 'unlike' does not necessarily follow 'like', for two things may also change in the opposite direction: from being 'unlike' to being 'like' each other. 'Unlike' and 'like', then, are not a privation and a possession.

More importantly, from the fact that 'like' and 'unlike' are not simultaneous by nature, one cannot conclude that they are not relatives, as Cyril does. The proper conclusion is that they are not *correlatives* (ἀντιστρέφοντα). Just as the correlative of the relative 'knowledge' is not 'ignorance', but 'the knowable',[227] so the correlative of 'like' is not 'unlike', but something like 'like in return'. In the *Dialogues* Cyril is more aware of the importance of proper correlation,[228] to which Aristotle gave special attention with neologisms like 'ruddered', but here in the *Thesaurus* he does not seem to realize it, and neither does Boulnois.

In the course of this discussion, Cyril makes another logical mistake which is not noted by Boulnois (148D–149A). He writes regarding the names that have a relation with each other (that is, correlatives, although Cyril does not use this term): if one of them is taken away the other will be taken away with it. This is in line with Aristotle's logic: it is a consequence of their being simultaneous by nature. It is in the example he gives, however, that the archbishop errs. He suggests that there is a man and something which is unlike that man, and then says: when this something is taken away, "the being, that is, the man (τὸ ὄν, τουτέστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος)" is not taken away with it; therefore, 'like' and 'unlike' do not belong to the things that are said to have a relation to each other. Besides the error of treating 'like' and 'unlike' as correlatives, Cyril also does not distinguish between the relative and

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[225] Boulnois (1994), 201f.

[226] Aristotle, *Categories*, 12b[15–25], 13a[31–36]. Again, Cyril's knowledge of Aristotle's teaching about possession and privation does not necessarily imply that he has read the *Postpraedicamenta*; he may know it from a secondary source.

[227] *Ibid.*, 6b[33–36].

[228] *Dial. Trin.* II, 431c–433a. See section 2.5.5.

the substance to which the relative belongs as an accident.[229] When something which is unlike a man is taken away, not the substance, the man himself, is also taken away, but merely one of its accidents, namely, the relative which could be described as 'unlike that something'. That the man himself is not taken away, then, is not an indication that 'unlike' is not a relative, as Cyril suggests.

A final characteristic of relatives that Cyril employs as an argument why 'like' and 'unlike' are not relatives is that—according to him— they do not admit of a more and a less (149AB). He reasons that 'greater', 'smaller', 'double' and 'half' do not admit of a more and a less, while 'like' and 'unlike' do, just as 'virtue', and that, therefore, 'like' and 'unlike' are not relatives. Labelle and Boulnois are probably right in interpreting a difficult sentence of Cyril's in such a way that 'like', 'unlike' and 'virtue' are regarded as qualities.[230] But they fail to mention that Cyril's reasoning is not in agreement with Aristotelian logic. As we have seen, Aristotle himself declares that some relatives admit of a more and a less, while others do not. He even gives 'like' as an example of a relative that does admit of a more and a less, while 'double' is one which does not.[231] Thus, from the fact that 'like' and 'unlike' admit of a more and a less one cannot conclude that they do not belong to the relatives, as Cyril does.

This is as far as Labelle and Boulnois comment on chapter XI of the *Thesaurus*. Our analysis shows that the Alexandrian archbishop certainly did have knowledge of Aristotelian logic, but that in these passages he does not display the kind of mastery of subtleties which both modern commentators suggest.

In these passages, Cyril employs a number of expressions to indicate relatives. Five times he uses Aristotle's term [τὰ] πρός τι, but we also encounter τὰ πρός τι ἔχοντα (145C), τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα (145D),[232] τὰ πρός τι ἔχοντα τῶν ὀνομάτων (148A, B and D), [τὰ] πρὸς ἕτερόν τι λεγόμενα (148C) and τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα λεγόμενα (149A). Boulnois comments that Cyril does not use the technical term σχέσις, employed by Aristotle's commentators.[233] Although this may be an indication for

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[229] We have seen in n. 109 that Porphyry calls the substance the substrate (ὑποκεί-μενον) of the relative.

[230] See n. 221.

[231] See n. 216. Ackrill translates ὅμοιος with 'similar' instead of with 'like'.

[232] This is reminiscent of an expression Aristotle uses in his stricter definition of a relative, *Categories*, 8a[32]: οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τι πως ἔχειν.

[233] Boulnois (1994), 205.

the sources to which the archbishop turned for his knowledge of logic, it is not likely that he will have used Aristotle's *Categories* itself, for then he probably would not have made some of the mistakes that we have encountered. It should be added that, before Cyril mentions the next objection from the Arians, he does use the term σχέσις once (149C). He reasons that, when the Father is called 'greater' it brings along "that which is in relation to him (τὸ ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς αὐτόν)", that is, the Son. We find a similar argumentation in response to the next objection, which states that the Father is always (ἀεί), while the Son is not:

> For what is called greater than something would not be greater if not something else, which is smaller, will certainly accompany it, in relation to which (πρὸς ὅ) it being measured, it will appear as greater in relation to it (πρὸς αὐτό) (153B).

Without using the technical terminology, Cyril applies the rule that correlatives are simultaneous by nature.

Chapter XI is the part of the *Thesaurus* in which relatives are treated most extensively. The syllogism in chapter III, already mentioned at the end of section 2.5.3, reads:

> If 'the uncreated' has a relation (ἀναφορά) to 'uncreatedness', but the substance of God does not have a relation (σχέσις) to anything, how can that which somehow has a relation (τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχον) be the same as the substance which does not have a relation to anything (τῇ πρὸς μηδέν ἐχούσῃ οὐσίᾳ)? (33C).

It appears that the three terms for relatives are employed synonymously here. Since the above quotation is the whole content of the syllogism and the surrounding syllogisms do not touch on relatives, not too much should be read into Cyril's use of these terms here.

We encounter the term σχέσις also in several other places of the *Thesaurus*. It is used for the relation between the Father and the Son, between God and creatures, and of creatures with each other. Creatures have an external relation with God 'by participation (μετοχικῶς)',[234] while the Son has a relation with the Father 'naturally (φυσικῶς)', 'a natural relation (σχέσις φυσική)'.[235]

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[234] *Thesaurus*, 200B. See also *ibid.*, 45A, 65CD, 184A, 452B. See for the difference between 'by participation' and 'by nature', section 3.2.2.

[235] *Ibid.*, 120B. See also *ibid.*, 92D, 101C, 117A.

2.5.5. Dialogues on the Trinity *II*

According to de Durand, part of the second dialogue—namely, 424d–431a—is "a development of a strongly arid technicalness, borrowed from an elementary textbook on logic", which interrupts a discussion of a more religious nature about ἀγέννητος.[236] The end of this intermezzo is allegedly signalled by a return to the baptismal formula in 431b, which was already cited in 422c. However, when we examine the context of this passage in more detail, it appears that the flow of Cyril of Alexandria's argumentation is not interrupted, neither at the beginning, nor at the end of this section.

The title of the second dialogue is: "That the Son is both co-eternal with God the Father and born (γεννητός) from him by nature" (417a). Soon the discussion turns to the status of the terms 'born' and 'unborn' (ἀγέννητος).[237] B (or Hermias), A's (or Cyril's) partner-in-dialogue, says that being 'unborn' and being 'born' are not the same thing, and that, therefore, Father and Son must also be different (419d). A answers that, although they are different, this does not mean that they are different *as God*, which evokes B's question: is 'unborn', then, an accident of God the Father (421b)? A denies this, with a reference to naturally inherent attributes, which are neither independent substances nor accidents, but he leaves open how 'unborn' fits into this metaphysics (this will be discussed in chapter 3). He rather stresses that Christ did not call God 'unborn', but 'Father', and gives several biblical quotations, including the baptismal formula in 422c, which de Durand mentions.

In 423b, B responds that 'they'—the opponents—say that by the word 'unborn' the nature of God the Father is defined (ὁρίζεσθαι), and since the Son is born, he must be of a different nature than the Father. This question starts off a whole debate whether 'unborn' can be regarded as the definition of the Father's nature, which lasts until 429b, where B admits that indeed it cannot. A's first counter-argument is that if 'born' is the definition of the Son's nature, he must be on the same level as others who are born, and thus a creature, while he himself has said that he is from above (John 8:23). Then, in 424d—where, in de Durand's view, the technical development starts—he says

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[236] See n. 3.
[237] It is clear from the opposition to the birth of the Son that ἀγέννητος means 'unborn' here, and not 'uncreated'. This is confirmed by Cyril's statement in 427e that there are countless things ἀγέννητος, something which would not apply to 'uncreated'.

that a definition (ὅρος) is something that has the power of limitation (τὸ ὁρισμοῦ δύναμιν ἔχον), and he implies that it is impudence to suggest that we could speak of God's boundaries.

A's next argument is one that we have already encountered in the *Thesaurus*,[238] but on which he now elaborates: a definition is not given by one word, but by a formula. The definition of man is given as an example. He then states that a definition starts with a genus, to which a substantial difference or differences (οὐσιώδη διαφοράν, ἤτοι δια-φοράς) are added (425e). Besides 'substantial difference' Cyril also uses the expressions 'natural (φυσική) difference' and 'specific (εἰδοποιός) difference'. The latter term can be found both with Aristotle and with Porphyry.[239] A now starts an argumentation based on Aristotelian logic. If 'unborn' is a definition, it must be either a genus or a differentia. To speak of a genus with regard to God, who is unlike everything else, is hardly proper, but let us suppose 'unborn' is his genus, says A. A genus does not indicate in what way it differs from something else; in this case, then, 'unborn' cannot mean 'not having been born'. What is then the difference between Father and Son? On the other hand, if 'unborn' is a differentia, they should say to what genus it is added, which once more they cannot. Therefore, 'unborn', being neither a genus nor a differentia, cannot be a definition, A concludes (427b).

He continues with another argument: according to those who are well-versed in these things, to every definition the so-called conversion (τὴν καλουμένην ἀντιστροφήν) is applicable. For example, if a man is a rational, mortal living being, then, conversely, a rational, mortal living being is a man. And similarly for a horse and a living being capable of neighing. We have already come across this argument in the *Thesaurus*.[240] In a note to this passage, de Durand writes that ἀντιστροφή seems to be used more for propositions than for definitions, but that a certain Stoic author affirms its use for definitions.[241] He does not refer to Aristotle's *Topics*, which does state that a definition must be convertible.[242] Once again, de Durand's assessment of Cyril of Alexandria's knowledge of Aristotelian logic is inaccurate. A applies this rule to 'unborn': if it is the definition of God the Father, it should

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[238] *Thesaurus*, 28B–32B, 444D–445B. See section 2.5.2.

[239] Aristotle, *Topics*, 143b$^{6–9}$. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 6$^{13–15}$ (with a reference to Plato), 8$^{15–22}$, 10$^{18–19}$, 12$^{5–10}$.

[240] See n. 191.

[241] De Durand, SC 231, 380, n. * to *Dial. Trin.* II, 427.

[242] See n. 192.

be convertible, that is, if something is unborn, it must be the substance of God. This, however, is not the case, for there are countless things unborn. Thus, 'unborn' cannot be a definition of God.

Cyril still adds another reason why 'unborn' may not be regarded as a definition, one which, in different words, he has also applied to 'uncreated' in the *Thesaurus* (29D): a definition is based on what something is, not on what it is not. For example, fire is defined as a hot and dry body, and water as a wet and cold body. We do not define fire by saying that it is a body which is neither wet nor cold, nor water by saying that is a body which is neither hot nor dry. Therefore, since 'unborn' means that God the Father is not born, it cannot be regarded as a definition (428a).

Cyril's next argument is that definitions do not have an opposite (ἀντιδιαστολή) and do not belong to the relatives (τῶν πρός τι), of which mentioning one always evokes the other. So it is with left and right: when one is mentioned, the other also comes to mind. And this also applies to someone born and the person who gave birth or begot. But this does not hold for substances and their definitions. A man is 'man' and a stone is 'stone', and these indications are not the opposite (διαστολή) of anything. But the term 'unborn' calls to mind 'born'. How, then, can it be a definition, Cyril asks. Here, he combines two characteristics of substances and applies them to definitions and secondary substances: (1) they do not have opposites; (2) according to the stricter definition of relatives, substances do not belong to the relatives. Again, Cyril does not use the technical term 'correlatives' (ἀντιστρέφοντα), but his examples of left and right, and of 'someone born' and 'the person who gave birth or begot' form two sets of correlatives. 'Unborn' and 'born' are not correlatives, but they are contraries.

By now, B concedes that 'they'—Cyril's opponents—are willing to drop the term 'definition', and he replaces it by 'substance': 'unborn' is the substance of the Father, 'born' that of the Son, and "the quality of the names defines for us very well the substantial difference" (429b). A responds that this 'correction' does not help. His first argument is that if 'unborn' is the substance of God, then everything unborn is God's substance, "or has 'unborn' as formula (λόγος) of the substance", and there are countless things unborn, for example, the sun, the moon, and the stars, for these things have not come into being by birth (διὰ γεννήσεως; 430a). A's first interpretation of the phrase '"unborn" is God's substance', then, boils down to the same thing as '"unborn"

is the definition of God', since the formula is the expression of the definition. And he re-employs the argument of convertibility without using this technical term.

A second interpretation of the phrase '"unborn" is God's substance' is that 'unborn' does not refer to genus, species or differentia, but that it is merely a name indicating the substance. If similarly 'born' is a name for the substance of the Son, what is then the difference between the two, A asks, for there is no distinction between one substance and another "insofar as we say and think that substances are" (430e). This is resuming the argument of *Thesaurus*, 32D–33A, using different terminology, and now applying Aristotle's characteristic that "one substance is not more or less a substance than another" correctly.[243] A continues: on this interpretation, 'unborn' no longer means that the Father has not been born, nor 'born' that the Son has been born. It can then be asked: "What argumentation will set out the difference in person and hypostasis (τὴν ἐν προσώπῳ τε καὶ ὑποστάσει διαφοράν) of the Father in relation to (πρός) the Son, or of the Son in relation to (πρός) the Father?" Because the teaching of the faith is at stake, we do not admit that in these things the meaning of the words is destroyed, A adds. In this context, A refers to the baptismal formula again: we were really not far away from the knowledge of God, when we were baptised in the Father, the Son and the holy Spirit (431b). This reference has a clear function in the course of Cyril's reasoning, and it is not an indication of the end of an intermezzo, at which the thread of 422c is picked up again, as de Durand suggests.

Leaving the notion of substance aside, B now responds to A's latest point: the opponents do not drop the meaning of 'Father'. For them, it means that God is the Creator; as creatures, we too call him 'Our Father'. A first asks whether we call God 'Father' because we have been created by him, or because we have been adopted as sons, and then turns to a logical exposition, making use of the category of relative. This is another indication that there is no logical interruption which ends at 431a: Cyril continues to make use of Aristotelian logic after his reference to the baptismal formula. He argues that a father has a relation to (ἡ σχέσις πρός) a son, and a product to its producer. When we associate 'father' with 'product' instead of with 'son', we are "unskilfully degrading the value of the so-called relatives (τὴν τῶν

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[243] See section 2.5.3, point c.

καλουμένων πρός τι δύναμιν ἀτέχνως ἀτιμάζοντες)". Cyril does not use the technical term ἀντιστρέφειν, but it is clear that he is speaking of proper correlation.

B answers that 'they' say that we, human beings, are fathers really and by nature, while God is called 'Father' improperly (καταχρηστικῶς). A counters this with a biblical rather than a logical argument: the apostle Paul attributes the principle of fatherhood to God, not to any of the creatures (Eph. 3:15). But he immediately returns to logic. After establishing that God was always unborn, and not just since the creation of the world, he asks in relation to what he was unborn (πρός τι γὰρ ἀγέννητος; 432c). And he concludes that the Son, who is born, must have always co-existed with the Father. Cyril uses the rule that correlatives are simultaneous by nature without mentioning the technical terms. Strictly speaking, though, he employs it incorrectly by applying it to 'unborn' and 'born', for the correlative of 'born' is 'that which gave birth' or 'that which begot', not 'that which is unborn'. It would have been better if he had stuck to the terms 'Father' and 'Son', for they are indeed correlatives.[244]

B now repeats the view that 'Father' is applied improperly to God, and A's response is the same as the previous time: Paul writes that the name of fatherhood extends from God, as the first one, to every rational creature, who has it as an image and by imitation. When B asks whether being in the image of the Unborn means that creatures are robbed of the attribute of being born, A (of course) denies this. He then returns to the phrase, '"unborn" is God's substance', and starts an interesting examination of the distinction between substance on the one hand and accidents and inhering attributes on the other hand. This passage will be discussed in chapter 3.

It is clear from this investigation that de Durand's view that a debate of a religious nature is interrupted by a technical intermezzo does not hold. The boundaries that he suggests appear to be no boundaries at all: there is a continuous flow from one argument to another, both references to the baptismal formula fit well within the argument at hand, and Cyril's utilization of Aristotelian logic does not end after the second mentioning of the formula. Moreover, the reasoning cannot have been "borrowed from an elementary textbook on logic", since it not merely reproduces logical statements, but it

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[244] Porphyry, *Commentary*, 115[18–23], mentions 'father' and 'son' as an example of correlatives.

applies them to the subject under discussion, whether 'unborn' can be called God's definition or substance. Besides, Cyril appears to have improved his knowledge of logic since he wrote the *Thesaurus*. He uses the technical term 'conversion' for definitions and their substances. He applies correlation of relatives more, though not fully, correctly than in the older work. And he shows a better understanding of the rule that "one substance is not more or less a substance than another".

2.5.6. Dialogues on the Trinity *IV and VII*

In the fourth dialogue, Cyril of Alexandria briefly takes up the subject of relatives again (509c–510b). This passage is also interesting because de Durand comments on it in a note.[245] A, the teacher in the dialogue, starts with the statement that those names that have relations receive their meaning through both of the names (τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα τῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτὰ δι' ἀμφοῖν σημαίνεται). He explains this with the following example: if someone learns what 'right' means, he will through this also know what 'left' is, and the other way round. He then adds that 'father' and 'son' belong to the relatives (ὄνομα τῶν πρός τι), and he asks "with what something will make a relation (ἀναφορά) with respect to these [names], while (καί) the relation (σχέσις) [they have] to each other and the notion (λόγος) that belongs to them is by no means abandoned".[246] In other words, could 'father' have a relation with something else than with 'son'? And B responds that it is thought and said that a father is in relation with (πρός) a son, and a son with a father.

A now applies this to the view of his opponents: how can they call God 'Father' and say that the Son is a creature? Is it not unlearned to say that the Father is joined to a creature according to the notion of relative (κατά γε τὸν τοῦ πρός τι λόγον)? B agrees: it certainly is, unless we would say that the Father himself is also a creature, who has a natural relation to (σχέσιν φυσικήν τὴν πρός) one of the creatures. A then applies the rule that correlatives are simultaneous by nature, without stating the rule as such. If there is no Father, who has begotten naturally, one cannot admit that a Son exists either, he argues. And if

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[245] De Durand, SC 237, 413–416, note * to *Dial. Trin.* IV, 509. See also: *idem*, SC 231, 380–383, note * to *Dial. Trin.* II, 428.
[246] In his translation, de Durand interprets "the relation they have to each other" to belong to the first part of the sentence, but it makes more sense if it belongs to the second part.

there is no Son, who has been born, neither is there a Father. It is the truth, then, that each exists together and disappears together with the other one (καὶ συνυφεστάναι καὶ συναναιρεῖσθαι δι' ἀμφοῖν ἑκάτερον). It is typical for Cyril of Alexandria that he introduces this argument by (a free rendering of) a Bible verse which, in his view, says something similar: "He denies the Father as well as the Son; and he who denies the Son, does not have the Father either" (1 John 2:22–23).

Cyril's whole argumentation in this passage is in line with Aristotelian logic. And the terminology is similar to that in the *Thesaurus*. Relatives are called πρός τι or τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα τῶν ὀνομάτων, while the relations between them are indicated by the words ἀναφορά and σχέσις, which seem to be used as synonyms. Besides, he speaks of a 'natural relation' between beings of the same nature.

In his notes, de Durand discusses briefly the ways in which the Church Fathers have made use of the relation between a father and a son in their teaching about the divine Father and Son, and how gradually technical terminology began to play a role in it. He notes that Cyril of Alexandria employs the Aristotelian πρός τι, but also the later σχέσις, and regards a Stoic influence on his use of τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα unlikely. He sees, however, a clear difference between σχέσις and ἀναφορά in the *Dialogues*. While σχέσις supposedly has an ontological value, ἀναφορά—which he consistently translates with 'référence'—is a relation which does not need to have an ontological basis, but is a relation produced by the mind. To support this view, he refers to a passage in the seventh dialogue, where the term ἀναφορά occurs four times (636c–637a).[247]

The starting-point is the story about Peter and Ananias in Acts 5, where it first says that Ananias has lied to the holy Spirit, and later on that he has lied to God. B suggests that this may be interpreted in the same way as Jesus's words, "He who receives you, receives me": this does not mean that the disciples are gods by nature; similarly, the verses in Acts do not imply that the Spirit's nature is divine. In his response, A speaks four times of a relation (ἀναφορά). (1) When two beings are consubstantial talk about a relation to what is better is superfluous. (2) When two beings are separated by natural inequality it is not inappropriate to speak of a relation to what is excellent. (3) Let

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[247] The word ἀναφορά can be found in only three passages of the two trinitarian writings, all of which are discussed in this chapter: *Thesaurus*, 33C (once); *Dial. Trin.* IV, 509d (once); *Dial. Trin.* VII, 636c–e (four times).

them search out the relation to him who sent him. (4) When we speak of a man, it is reasonable to introduce a relation to God, who is his leader. In none of these four cases it is obvious that Cyril is merely speaking of relations in the minds of human beings. On the contrary, the third instance, which is an exhortation to examine the relation between the Spirit and the Father, seems to presuppose an ontological relation.[248]

2.6. Conclusion

Having studied several passages in which Cyril of Alexandria makes use of Aristotelian logic we may now come to an assessment of his knowledge of such logic. It seems clear that the archbishop was much more knowledgeable and skilful in this area of philosophy than de Durand—and others with him—purport him to be. Cyril deftly applies the teaching on predicables to the doctrine of God. He even refers to the rule that definitions should be convertible with their subjects—a rule that de Durand does not know to be Aristotelian. And the archbishop also shows some understanding of the four major categories—substance, quantity, relative and quality—and their characteristics. On the other hand, he does make mistakes in applying the properties of the categories to the terms in his debate with the Arians. Therefore, it appears to be an overstatement when Labelle and Boulnois write that Cyril masters the subtleties of Aristotelian logic.

A comparison of the passages in the *Dialogues on the Trinity* with those in the *Thesaurus* creates a distinct impression that the Alexandrian archbishop improved his knowledge of logic in the time between the two writings. Although not flawless, his understanding of the properties of the categories and how they can be applied in the debate with his opponents seems to be better in the later work.

As for his sources, although the initial description of a relative given by Aristotle in the *Categories* can be found verbatim in the *Thesaurus*, it

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[248] De Durand comments that Cyril's understanding of ἀναφορά in his christological writings is in continuity with that in the *Dialogues*. However, the archbishop hardly uses the word ἀναφορά in christological contexts. In his description of Nestorius's view he does speak of an (external) 'relation' between the Word of God and a separate man, but he usually employs the term σχέσις for this (see, e.g., section 6.3.7). In the *Scholia on the Incarnation*, ACO I.5.1, 225[34–37], we find the word ἀναφορά in the same meaning of a relation between the Word and a man. Here too, then, ἀναφορά does not mean 'reference', but signifies an ontological relation.

is unlikely that Cyril had the philosopher's book at hand. Otherwise he could hardly have missed the extensive passage on the importance of correlation,[249] he would probably have used the technical term 'correlation' in his discussion of relatives, and he would have realised that the Stagirite regards 'like' and 'unlike' as relatives. That the term 'correlatives' is also missing in the *Dialogues on the Trinity* seems to indicate that also when he wrote this later work, Cyril did not consult the *Categories*. For similar reasons, it is improbable that Cyril had (recently) read Porphyry's *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* when he wrote both trinitarian works.[250]

Since the Alexandrian archbishop may well have read various works of Porphyry by the time he composed his *Contra Julianum*,[251] it is possible that in the meantime he had also become acquainted with the neo-Platonist's logical works. This may have increased his knowledge of logic even further. Be that as it may, the use he makes of logic in his trinitarian works is sufficient reason to reckon with the possibility that Aristotelian (or neo-Platonic) logic may also shed some light on the terms and the argumentations he employs in his christological writings, which will be investigated in the following chapters of this study.

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[249] The passage on correlation stretches from 6b[28] till 7b[14] in Aristotle's *Categories*.

[250] Porphyry, too, devotes several pages of his *Commentary* (115[17]–117[31]) to the property of relatives that they are said in relation to correlatives. And, as was mentioned earlier (see n. 220), he also explains that the terms which indicate the proprium of a category do not necessarily belong to that same category (for example, 'equal' and 'unequal' indicate the proprium of quantity, but they themselves are relatives and qualities).

[251] Grant (1964), 273–275.

MEANINGS AND METAPHYSICS
IN THE TRINITARIAN WRITINGS

3.1. Introduction

In our investigation into Cyril of Alexandria's knowledge of Aristotelian logic we have come across the terms οὐσία and φύσις many times, while also other key terms from the christological debate can be found in his earlier works. Although in christology the words do not necessarily have the same meaning as in trinitarian theology, it is useful to get an idea of the various meanings they have in the anti-Arian works, since it is likely that at least part of those meanings will recur in Cyril's christology. Besides, it is worthwhile to investigate what metaphysical notions these terms express, since the metaphysical framework will probably be very similar in both parts of Cyril's oeuvre, even if the terminology varies at times. Thus, his utilization of certain notions in his earlier works will shed light on the meaning of words and phrases in his christological writings. This chapter will, therefore, be devoted to a discussion of the meaning of some key terms in the archbishop's trinitarian writings, in debate with several modern scholars. The main sources for this discussion are the *Thesaurus* and the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, but passages from other works from before 428 will also be used, especially the *Commentary on John*.[1] Jacques Liébaert's well-documented book on Cyril's christology before the Nestorian controversy provides many useful references.[2]

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[1] I am aware that this procedure brings along the dangers of the 'proof-text' method, which I mention in section 1.1.2, but it is not possible to include a full-scale investigation of works from before the Nestorian controversy in this study.

[2] Liébaert (1951).

3.2. Οὐσία

Before we look at a broader overview of how the Alexandrian arch-
bishop employs the word οὐσία in his trinitarian writings, it is interest-
ing to see how he introduces and develops this term in the first of the
Dialogues on the Trinity.

3.2.1. Dialogues on the Trinity *I*

In the first dialogue, after a brief introduction, A (Cyril) cites the
symbol of faith accepted at the Council of Nicaea (325), including
the anathema (380e–390a), and asks what the heterodox have against
it. B (Hermias) responds that they object to the word 'consubstantial'
(ὁμοούσιος), since it is an innovation and non-scriptural (391a). A
points out that there are other terms used to describe God's nature,
which cannot be found in Scripture either, for example, 'bodiless',
'without form', 'without quantity', and asks why, then, they denounce
the strangeness of such a clear and philosophical (ἐμφιλόσοφος) term
(391c). *Without being induced by his opponents to do so (at least explicitly), Cyril
then uses logical terminology*: although it is true that the divine transcends
genus (γένος) and specific difference (διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός), we would be
unfaithful and unlearned if we were to reject the things through which
one is called to some, albeit little, knowledge of the substance (οὐσία)
that transcends everything (391d). If we totally reject the seeing, albeit
it in a mirror and in a riddle, and the knowing in part, we are like
unperceptive stones.

   When B repeats the question where 'consubstantial' can be found in
Scripture, A adds a new argument. When God reveals himself to Moses
he says: "I am he who is (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν)" (Exodus 3:14, LXX). 'He
who is' is used strictly and properly (κυρίως τε καὶ ἰδικῶς) of God only,
but improperly (ὡς ἐν καταχρήσει) it is also employed with respect to
others (392b). Since 'substance' (οὐσία) and 'consubstantial' (ὁμοούσιος)
are derived from 'he who is (ὁ ὤν)', there is nothing innovative about
these terms, but they have their foundation in Scripture.

   B now introduces another term, 'similar in substance' (ὁμοιοούσιος).
A does not miss the opportunity to point out that, if his opponents
dismiss 'consubstantial' as non-scriptural, they should dismiss 'similar
in substance' for the same reason. But then he refutes the term on
material grounds. By using this term, they deny the natural relation
and intimacy (σχέσεώς τε καὶ οἰκειότητος φυσικῆς) of the Son with

the Father (393b). They rank him among the creatures, who do not have a substantial (οὐσιώδης), unchangeable (ἀμετάστατος) and natural resemblance (ἐμφέρεια φυσική) to God the Father. They attribute an external likeness (τὸν θύραθεν ἐξεικόνισμον) to the Word (395a). The Son himself, however, said: "I am not from this world; you are from this world", and: "You are from below, I am from above" (John 8:23 and 3:31), which indicates that he is not connatural (ὁμοφυής) with us. B answers that, according to 'them', the Son is not consubstantial with the Father, because he is below him, but neither is he connatural with created beings; he occupies a middle region. A, however, emphasizes that a being is either God by nature or a creature; there is nothing in between these two options.

B states that this is how they interpret the phrase 'mediator between God and men' (1 Timothy 2:5). After some elaboration, A concludes that the word 'mediator' does not define the substance (οὐχ ὁριστικὸν τῆς οὐσίας) of the Only-Begotten; it rather refers to his obedience (398de). B would like to receive more information on the how of the mediation, to which A responds with a very interesting exposition. In it, he employs words related to φύσις rather than to οὐσία, so that we will return to this passage in section 3.4. At the end, B is convinced that it is right to say that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, and the discussion turns to the meaning of this phrase (405e). B suggests that the unity of the Father and the Son is like that between human beings. A dismisses the idea sharply. Then, the union between Father and Son would be one of choice (προαιρετικήν) rather than natural (φυσικήν), and similar to that between God and the saints. *A turns, once again unsolicitedly, to the terminology of logic to explain the difference.* We, human beings, do not differ in substance, but we are somehow separated, each in his own hypostasis. "For we are of the same species, and the definition and formula of the substance of all is one, which is predicated of all in equality".[3] But besides this natural union, there is another unity for us, human beings: while we are separated in our own individual (τὴν καθ' ἕκαστον) hypostasis, as Peter, John, Thomas and Matthew, we have become concorporeal (σύσσωμοι) in Christ, fed by the one flesh, and sealed into unity by the one holy Spirit (407e). So we are all one (ἕν) according to body and according to spirit.

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[3] *Dial. Trin.* I, 407bc: Ἐσμὲν γὰρ ὁμοειδεῖς, καὶ τῆς ἁπάντων οὐσίας ὅρος τε καὶ λόγος εἷς, ὁ πάντων ἐν ἴσῳ κατηγορούμενος.

B restates his question: is the Son united with the Father in the same
way as we with each other, or does their union go beyond that? A
now responds: both at the same time, like us and beyond that. They
are absolutely consubstantial, and the Son is in his own hypostasis.
But we are fully separated from each other, according to the law of
bodies, and this does not apply to Father and Son. The Son has a
natural and ineffable union with the Father, although the hypostases
are not mixed: the Father is not the same as the Son, but each is and
subsists (ὑφεστηκότος), and is said to have his own existence (408c).
It is the identity of substance which determines the union. A admits
that he is not very familiar with these matters either, but continues his
exposition. It seems, he says, that 'substance' refers to some common
reality, while the word 'hypostasis' is predicated and said of each of
the things under this common [reality].[4] And he explains this by taking
man as an example. Man is defined as a 'rational, mortal living being'.
This is the definition of the substance, which extends to those who
subsist separately (τῶν κατὰ μέρος ὑφεστηκότων). Under that which
is common, that is, under man, or under the definition of man, fall
Thomas, Mark, Peter and Paul. They are both in a species and in their
own separate hypostasis. The substance applies to every man, for it
contains the common notion of the genus, while the hypostasis is said
of one. The commonality is not denied, but neither is the individuality
obscured by mixture or confusion.

Having outlined the difference between substance and hypostasis in
more general terms, A then applies this to the divine Father and Son.
By confessing that the Son exists both as consubstantial with the Father
and in his own hypostasis, we say that they are united in a way that at
the same time conjoins and divides (συναφῶς τε ἅμα καὶ διωρισμένως
ἡνῶσθαί φαμεν). When B suggests that it might be better to speak of
two substances, one of the Father and another of the Son, A rebuts this
idea. For if the nature of the Son is different from that of the Father, we
are bound to think that a reasonable ground (λόγος) separates them into
two. Also in the case of two people, who are consubstantial, we should
not speak of two substances. If we did speak in this way, the universal
(τὸ σύμπαν) would disappear into nothingness, that is, they would be
presented as different in substance, rather than as having a common
substance (410a).

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[4] *Ibid.*, 408e: τῆς οὐσίας ἡ δήλωσις, κατὰ κοινοῦ τινος ἔοικεν ἰέναι πράγματος · τὸ δὲ
τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἑκάστου τυχὸν ὄνομα τῶν ὑπὸ τουτὶ τὸ κοινὸν κατηγορεῖται καὶ λέγεται.

From this argumentation in the first dialogue we get a first impression of Cyril's use of οὐσία in his trinitarian writings. Although he roots the legitimacy of employing words like οὐσία and ὁμοούσιος in the divine name given in Exodus 3, in his explanation of these terms he has no qualms about using Aristotelian logic. *He introduces logical terms without being (explicitly) induced to do so by his opponents.* And though 'He who is' is only 'improperly' said of human beings, Cyril does not hesitate to use the definition of man and the existence of individual men as an example to shed light on the relationship between Father and Son. 'Substance' refers to some common reality (κατὰ κοινοῦ τινος … πράγματος), while 'hypostasis' indicates the individuals. *It appears, then, that here Cyril utilizes 'substance' for Aristotle's secondary substance rather than for his primary substance, while this secondary substance is said to denote a reality (πρᾶγμα).* And 'hypostasis' seems to be his word for a primary substance. But it should be added that when Father and Son are called 'hypostases', there is no full separation between them, as there is between individual men.

3.2.2. *The Trinitarian Writings*

We will now investigate whether this first impression is borne out by the way Cyril employs words related to οὐσία elsewhere in his trinitarian writings. When one reads the *Thesaurus*, it is obvious that its author uses οὐσία not just for secondary but also for primary substances. When he speaks of the differentia,[5] or the definition[6] or formula[7] of a substance, when things are said to be of 'the same substance'[8] or to have 'identity of substance',[9] the word 'substance' must be interpreted as 'secondary substance'. However, when he regards 'substance' as a substrate,[10] or when 'substance' and 'hypostasis' are placed side by side as synonyms,[11] it rather indicates a 'primary substance'.

In the *Thesaurus*, the οὐσία to which the word ὁμοούσιος refers is a secondary substance. This becomes particularly clear in 316A–C. Here, Adam is called consubstantial with Abel, who is born from him. They

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[5] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 28CD, 116D.
[6] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 32A, 109B, 596B.
[7] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 140C, 141D, 144A–C, 152A, 324B.
[8] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 109A, 140B, 144A.
[9] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 132C, 316A.
[10] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 36B, 444AB.
[11] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 101BC.

have identity of substance. And this is taken as an example for the consubstantiality of Father and Son. Also, the word 'man' indicates the human genus or 'the substance itself'. The names Paul, Peter, James or Cephas divide humanity into individuals, into many men, but they are consubstantial and fall under the same species. Similarly, although different names are used for the Father and the Son or the Word, this does not mean that they are not consubstantial.[12] As we have seen in the previous chapter, Cyril does not tackle the question of the unity of Father and Son as going beyond the unity of individual men in this passage, but he does so in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*.[13]

Thus, although Cyril of Alexandria is aware that 'substance' may mean 'primary substance' and sometimes uses it in this sense, when applied to God it generally means 'secondary substance', although the unity between the hypostases is stronger than that between individual men. This is also how he employs the word 'substance' for God in the first dialogue (see section 3.2.1). And it applies to the second dialogue, too: on the basis of the names Father, Son and holy Spirit, mentioned in the baptismal formula, that which is the same with respect to substance is distinguished in particular hypostases, and the language (λόγος) places the things that are united substantially in particular hypostases.[14] In the debate with his opponents Cyril employs phrases like 'the definition of a substance'[15] and 'substantial difference',[16] which indicate that the substance involved is a secondary substance. And when B suggests that 'unborn' is the substance of God, A responds that there are countless things unborn, which again implies that 'unborn' is regarded as the substance of many particulars and thus denotes a secondary substance.[17]

Let us take a final example from the fifth dialogue, where B quotes 1 Cor. 15:27–28, which states that "the Son will subject himself to him who subjected all things to him". From this subjection Cyril's opponents conclude that the Son cannot be consubstantial with the Father. According to the Alexandrian archbishop, however, subjection

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[12] In the eleventh chapter of the *Thesaurus*, especially in 144AB, the Alexandrian archbishop also explains the term 'consubstantial' by using examples from the created world. Here, too, 'substance' indicates 'secondary substance'.

[13] See section 2.5.2.

[14] *Dial. Trin.* II, 422de: τὸ … διαγινώσκεται ταὐτὸν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐν ὑποστάσεσιν ἰδικαῖς, …, καὶ ἐν ἰδικαῖς τιθέντος ὑποστάσει τὰ οὐσιωδῶς ἡνωμένα.

[15] Cf. *ibid.*, 425e, 426b, c and d, 428e.

[16] *Ibid.*, 425e, 429b.

[17] *Ibid.*, 429b–430a. See also section 2.5.5.

is not a characteristic of a substance, but it resides in the will (584a). He compares the Son's submission to the Father with that of Isaac to his father Abraham, and infers that just as Isaac is not of another substance than Abraham, so the divine Son is consubstantial with God the Father (582b–d). Once again, the same substance is attributed to two beings (the general word οὖσι can actually be found in 583e) and, thus, it denotes a secondary substance.

There is one series of expressions in which οὐσία, applied to the Father, does not indicate a secondary substance. These expressions are all related to a phrase in the Creed of Nicaea (325). In the creed, as quoted by Cyril of Alexandria himself, it is said of Jesus Christ that he is "Only-Begotten, born (γεννηθέντα) of the Father, that is, from his substance (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ)".[18] Cyril writes several times that the Son is born from or has come from the substance of the Father. He may vary the verb, but the preposition is always ἐκ, while he sometimes adds words like αὐτῆς or ἰδίας to οὐσίας.[19] It seems that the main reason that the archbishop speaks in this way is his loyalty to the Nicene Creed. The use of the word οὐσία in these phrases does not fit well with Cyril's general understanding of the Godhead as one secondary substance and three ineffably united hypostases. In these expressions, the meaning of οὐσία is closer to that of primary substance. This is affirmed by a passage in the fourth dialogue, where Cyril stresses that the Son is not a creature, but God's own 'fruit' (508de). More in general he then writes that that which is born is superior to a work of art, since it is "the fruit of the hypostasis of the begetter", while an invention of the will or a work of wisdom is not "offspring of a substance". Since 'hypostasis' and 'substance' are placed side by side, one may conclude that here οὐσία means 'primary substance'.[20]

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[18] *Dial. Trin.* I, 389e. The phrase 'that is, from his substance' is absent from the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381, but Cyril always refers to the original creed of 325.

[19] *Thesaurus*, 232C. *Dial. Trin.* I, 391c; I, 413d; II, 424a; II, 436ab.

[20] See also *Dial. Trin.* V, 558d: "the hypostasis [of the Father] from where he [the Son] is (τῆς ὅθεν ἐστὶν ὑποστάσεως)". That 'substance' in the expression 'from the substance of the Father' refers to the hypostasis of the Father, not to the common substance of the Godhead, is corroborated by a passage in the *Commentary on John*, where Cyril's opponents reason on the basis of Hebr. 1:3—which calls the Son the 'imprint of the hypostasis' of the Father—, that he is "not from his hypostasis (οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ὑποστάσεως)", implying that Cyril himself does teach that he is from the Father's hypostasis (*In Jo.* II.8, vol. 1, 341 [231c]). It may also be added that the Nicene Creed,

We have seen that in the first dialogue Cyril of Alexandria writes that οὐσία refers to "some common reality (κοινοῦ τινος … πράγματος)".[21] It is not just the substance of God that he is speaking about in this way,[22] for he immediately explains what he means by giving the example of several individual men who all fall under the common designation 'man' and its definition, by which the substance is indicated. *Substance, then, seems to be more to Cyril than an abstract universal; it is a common reality.* In this context he also uses the word 'containing' (περιεκτικός): "the substance contains the individuals" (408d). We find this term also with Porphyry, in a similar meaning: the species contains the individuals, while it is itself contained by the higher genera.[23]

According to Ruth M. Siddals, Cyril of Alexandria's 'basic christological model' depicts the incarnation as the divine subject of the Word acquiring the humanity as an accident, or a property, an inherent factor.[24] And John Henry Newman (1801–1890) writes in a tract on the μία φύσις formula that the Word's humanity is "recognised as a perfect nature", but that it exists "after the manner of an attribute rather than of a substantive being".[25] In order to assess these views it is important to have a better understanding of the way in which the Alexandrian archbishop regards the relationship between a substance and its properties and accidents.

To describe the relationship between a substance and its characteristics, Cyril uses various terms. Often it is a form of the verb 'to be attached (προσεῖναι)',[26] which is employed by Porphyry in similar

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as cited by Cyril in *Dial. Trin.* I, 390a, anathematizes those who say that he is "from another hypostasis or substance (ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας)".

[21] See n. 4.

[22] The following sentence from the second dialogue shows that the οὐσία and the φύσις of God are regarded as realities by Cyril: "For, to put it in this way, common to the whole Godhead may be called the things that are attached naturally (προσπεφυκότα) to the supreme substance (οὐσίᾳ), and if someone mentions the divine nature (φύσιν) he directly indicates to us, as in one signified entity (ὡς ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ σημαινομένῳ), the whole holy Trinity, regarded in one Godhead, but not yet the person (πρόσωπον) of one [of the three] separately by itself" (*Dial. Trin.* II, 422cd).

[23] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 5[15–16]; cf. *ibid.*, 13[21]. See for further uses of the verb 'to contain': *ibid.*, 13[23–26], 19[21]–20[3]; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1023b[26–28].

[24] Siddals (1984), 66, 67, 77, 78, 124, 132. See also pp. 72, 82, 122, 135, 136, 137.

[25] Newman (1924), 381.

[26] Προσεῖναι can be translated by, among others, 'to be added to', 'to belong to', and 'to be attached to'. However, as we will see shortly, Cyril distinguishes 'προσεῖναι by nature or substantially' from 'to be added to'; therefore, 'to be added to' is not

ways.[27] Mostly, Cyril applies it to God, but the logical parts of chapter 31 of the *Thesaurus* show that it is for him a more general term, also to be employed for created beings. A proprium (ἴδιον) is not itself a substance, but it is attached (προσόν) to a substance, for example, laughing to man, and neighing to horse. And the substances are not understood on the basis of the things that are inseparably attached to them (ἐκ τῶν ἀχωρίστως προσόντων), like whiteness to the swan or to snow, but on what they are themselves.[28] Elsewhere, accidents like 'greater' and 'smaller' are said to 'be attached' to individual pieces of wood or stone or to individual men.[29]

In the same way, 'uncreated' (ἀγένητος) is not itself the substance of God, as the Arians say, but it is one of the things that are inseparably attached to the substance of God, it is a proprium of him.[30] Further on, Cyril reckons other attributes of God, like 'incorruptible', 'immortal' and 'invisible', to the 'things that are said to be attached to God by nature'. They are not his substance, but in language they may be called 'accidents', though they are not accidents in reality, for God is without accidents.[31]

Elsewhere, the Alexandrian archbishop distinguishes between things that are attached by nature, naturally or substantially (κατὰ φύσιν, φυσικῶς, οὐσιωδῶς), and things that have been added.[32] The latter can be lost again. Cyril uses this distinction to rebut the views that the Son and the Spirit are not God by nature. Eunomius says, according to Cyril, that Christ is called 'sanctification' and 'righteousness', not because he is these things by nature, but because he sanctifies and justifies. Cyril argues that things that are not attached by nature (μὴ κατὰ φύσιν προσόντα), but have been added (ἐπιγεγονότα) from

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chosen as its translation. He also stresses that things that προσέστι to a substance are not themselves that substance; this comes across more clearly in 'to be attached to' than in 'to belong to'. That's why, in this context, προσεῖναι is translated by 'to be attached to'.

   [27] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 19$^{18-19}$, 21$^{2-3}$, 22$^{6-7}$.

   [28] *Thesaurus*, 445BC.

   [29] *Ibid.*, 152BC.

   [30] *Ibid.*, 445BC.

   [31] *Ibid.*, 448C–449A. See also section 2.5.1. Other places where Cyril states that characteristics are not themselves substances, but that they are attached to a substance, include: *ibid.*, 33B, 444BC.

   [32] In *Thesaurus*, 244D, 'naturally' and 'substantially' are employed side by side (προσεῖναι … φυσικῶς τε καὶ οὐσιωδῶς), mostly we find only one of the three qualifications, 'naturally', 'by nature' or 'substantially'. In the context of 'being attached', they seem to be used synonymously. The relationship between 'nature' and 'substance' will be discussed in section 3.4.

outside, are easily taken away. Eunomius's position would, therefore, imply that Christ could lose righteousness and sanctification, which is unacceptable.[33] A similar argument applies to the holy Spirit. Only things that are attached substantially (τὰ οὐσιωδῶς προσόντα) to their possessors appear to be united inseparably (ἀχωρίστως συμπεφυκότα). If sanctification belongs to the Spirit in the order of addition and accident (ἐν προσθήκης τάξει καὶ συμβεβηκότος), it can be taken away. To suggest that there was a time that the Spirit was without holiness, however, is impious. Therefore, the Spirit is naturally from God.[34]

Since the archbishop of Alexandria also writes that accidents like 'greater' and 'smaller' can be said to be attached, the emphasis in the phrase 'to be attached by nature or substantially' lies on the qualification 'by nature or substantially'. Thus, things can be attached in two ways: either by nature or substantially, or as an addition from outside. Those that are attached by nature or substantially, are attached to the secondary substance. Those that are added from outside are accidents; they are attached to individuals. Although one can speak in language of accidents in God, in reality there are no accidents in him, and, therefore, all God's characteristics are attached to him by nature or substantially. If, then, the Scriptures teach that the same characteristics are attached to the Father and the Son, "except only for the name and the reality (προσηγορίας τε καὶ πράγματος) of Father and Son", they have the same formula of the substance and are consubstantial.[35]

In the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, the verb προσεῖναι is used less often. In a way similar to that in the *Thesaurus*, Cyril writes that there are many words that interpret the goods that are attached (προσόντα) to the divine nature, words that are said of the Father and the Son alike, but 'fatherhood' and 'sonship' are not among them. Briefly afterwards, he speaks of "the prerogatives that are substantially attached (οὐσιωδῶς προσόντα) to the divine nature".[36] A little further, however, he employs the verb for what is attached, not to the divine nature or substance, but to Father and Son in their particularity (τοῦ ἑκατέρῳ προσόντος ἰδικῶς … τὴν δήλωσιν).[37]

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[33] *Thesaurus*, 325CD.
[34] *Ibid.*, 596AB.
[35] *Ibid.*, 116B–D. Cf. *ibid.*, 109B, 145B, 244D.
[36] *Dial. Trin.* I, 415ab.
[37] *Ibid.*, 416d.

The metaphysical image emerging from these texts is that of a substance that includes only the substantial differentiae, which form part of its definition. The characteristics which are not part of the definition, but which are nevertheless inseparable from the substance are said to be attached 'by nature' or 'substantially' to the substance. They include the propria—those properties which belong to only one secondary substance, such as 'capable of laughing' to man—, but also all other inseparable characteristics, such as 'being white' in the swan or in snow. In the examples given, Cyril speaks of 'man', 'swan' and 'snow' in general, and, therefore, by οὐσία he means secondary substance: *the characteristics are attached to the secondary substance, which, as we saw, Cyril regards as a reality.* And also when he says that 'uncreated', 'incorruptible', etc., are attached to the οὐσία of God, the word indicates what is common to Father, Son and holy Spirit, and thus denotes a secondary substance.

However, the properties that are attached to a secondary substance, may also be said to be attached to each of the individuals that fall under that substance. So the divine attributes are said to be attached to Father and Son alike.[38] And also the separable accidents, such as 'greater' and 'smaller', are 'attached to' the individuals they belong to. Similarly, the things that are particular to the divine hypostases (their being Father and Son, unborn and born) are attached to them. We will now turn to other terms that Cyril uses to describe the relationship between a substance and its characteristics.

In two of the passages from the *Thesaurus* just referred to, the archbishop of Alexandria uses derivatives of the verb 'to participate' (μετέχειν) to describe the more accidental possession of characteristics. In Eunomius's view, Christ participates (μέτοχος) in righteousness and sanctification, rather than being these things by nature. Over against this participation, Cyril places 'being attached by nature'.[39] And the Spirit is not holy by participation (ἐκ μετοχῆς), for that which is added by participation can be taken away, while things that are attached substantially are united inseparably.[40] Also in other places, participation in something is opposed to being that something by nature or substantially.[41] At the beginning of the *Thesaurus*, Cyril states explicitly that "that which participates is something else than that in which it participates", and he concludes from this that, since creation participates

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[38] *Thesaurus*, 116C. Cf. *ibid.*, 109B, 145B, 244D.
[39] *Thesaurus*, 325D.
[40] *Ibid.*, 596A.
[41] *Ibid.*, 232A–D, 324BC. *Dial. Trin.* V, 560bc, 562e, 564c; VI, 593b–594d.

in the Son, the Son himself is different from creation, and "by nature separated from it".[42]

Another verb which the Alexandrian archbishop applies in a way very similar to προσεῖναι, is ἐνυπάρχειν, 'to exist in'. In chapter 31 of the *Thesaurus* (448CD), Cyril says of 'uncreated', 'incorruptible', 'immortal' and 'invisible', not only that they "are attached naturally to" God, but also that they "exist in God by nature (κατὰ φύσιν ἐνυπάρχοντα)", while they are not themselves substances. And things can exist substantially in human beings.[43] This verb, too, not only indicates the relationship between secondary substances and their properties, but also between individuals and their attributes. It can denote that 'will', 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' exist in created beings like men or angels.[44] It is used for things that exist in something else through participation.[45] And we find it several times in contexts in which Cyril argues that the Word is not something that exists in God like, for example, a word in a human being, but that he has his own hypostasis. This will be discussed in section 3.3.

Both verbs, προσεῖναι and ἐνυπάρχειν, may be regarded as metaphors of place. Cyril of Alexandria also utilizes other terms of this genre to describe the relationship of a substance with its characteristics, most notably the verb 'to lie' (κεῖσθαι) and the prepositions 'round' (περί) and 'in' (ἐν). A passage in which several such other metaphors of place come together is *Thesaurus*, 156AB. The question is how it is possible that in Philippians 2 Christ is called 'equal to God', while at the same time he is regarded as smaller, since he has suffered death. It is impossible that both 'greater' and 'smaller' apply to "one and the same [subject]" naturally (φυσικῶς). Therefore, it must be investigated

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[42] *Ibid.*, 28B: ἕτερόν τί ἐστι τὸ μετέχον παρὰ τὸ μετεχόμενον, and: κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς διῃρημένος. After an investigation of the concept of participation in Cyril of Alexandria's New Testament commentaries—especially his *Commentary on John*—, Keating (2004), 162, comes to similar conclusions. He sees three basic principles of participation at work: "(1) that which participates is necessarily distinct (and distinct in kind) from that which is participated in; (2) that which participates possesses the quality it receives only in part and from without; that which is participated in necessarily possesses that quality fully and by nature; (3) that which participates can lose what it has by participation; that which has a quality by nature cannot lose it".

[43] *Dial. Trin.* II, 421bc: "For although we have our being in time, we are born together with the things that substantially exist in us and that are inseparably attached to us by nature (ὁμοῦ τοῖς οὐσιωδῶς ἐνυπάρχουσι καὶ ἀχωρίστως προσπεφυκόσιν ἀπογεννώμεθα)".

[44] *Thesaurus*, 101D, 452A.

[45] *Ibid.*, 232B: διὰ τῆς μετοχῆς ἐνυπάρξαι.

how we can maintain both with respect to God the Word, and how we can hold that "the two lie round one single [subject]".[46] The answer is: he is equal to his Begetter, insofar as (καθό) he is God by nature (φύσει), and he is said to have been made smaller, insofar as he has become man. Cyril then asks: if someone takes equality away from his natural existence, where will it further lie, or what place will that which has been taken from the Son have?[47] In other words, if the Son is said not to be equal naturally to the Father—as Cyril's opponents do—what will be the metaphysical place of the 'equal' to which the apostle Paul testifies?

Another example can be found in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*. Here, Cyril of Alexandria writes that accidents or also the things that naturally inhere the substances of certain beings[48] do not have an independent existence, but they are seen round (περί) the substances of the beings, or in (ἐν) them. And he asks what place (ποῖον ... τόπον) 'unborn' is presumed to have in God. If it is something that lies (κείμενον) by itself in its own existence, while it is, as 'they' say, a property of God, it is something else than the one whose property it is (421d). The simple nature of God would then be doubled, composed of the Father and the unborn. And the archbishop of Alexandria concludes that we had better not listen to these seemingly wise men.

As with the things 'attached to' or 'existing in' substances, Cyril distinguishes clearly between the things round the substances and the substances themselves. 'Incorruptible', 'immortal' and 'uncreated' do not signify the substance, but one of the things round (περί) the substance.[49] Natural properties are said to lie round or in a (secondary) substance,[50] but also round or in individuals, while separable accidents

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[46] *Thesaurus*, 156B: περὶ τὸν ἕνα καὶ μόνον τὰ δύο κεῖσθαι.

[47] *Ibid.*: ποῖ δὴ λοιπὸν κείσεται and ποῖον ... τὸν τόπον. A similar expression can be found in *Dial. Trin.* II, 451e.

[48] *Dial. Trin.* II, 421c: τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἢ καὶ φυσικῶς ἐνόντα ταῖς τινων οὐσίαις.

[49] *Thesaurus*, 452BC. A little further: "Therefore, the substances will not be known on the basis of the things round (περὶ) the substances, but on the basis of what they are by themselves (καθ' ἑαυτάς)".

[50] *Ibid.*, 344D: the things that lie in the same nature (τὰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φύσει κείμενα) [natural properties] are common to all the things of the same species, but the prerogatives that are added [separable accidents] are not fastened (ἅπτεται) to the [secondary] substance. See also *ibid.*, 144C, 449A, 452C. An interesting verb is applied in *Dial. Trin.* II, 433de: the things that do not have their own hypostasis, hover round (περιποτώμενα) the substances of the beings.

lie round or in individuals.[51] The verb κεῖσθαι and the preposition περί are also employed in relation to other metaphysical notions, but it is not relevant to discuss these at the moment.[52]

While προσεῖναι is found more often in the *Thesaurus* than in the *Dialogues*, the reverse holds true for ἐνεῖναι, 'to inhere'. Although this verb is also applied to separable accidents,[53] it seems that it is mostly used for natural characteristics, which are inseparable from the substances. Twice, 'accidents' (τὰ συμβεβηκότα) and 'inherent factors' (τὰ ἐνόντα) are mentioned side by side as together forming the group of things that do not have their own existence, but are regarded as round the substances, existing in them.[54] The 'inherent factors' then indicate the natural properties. This is made explicit in one of these cases, where the adverb 'naturally' is added: φυσικῶς ἐνόντα. Elsewhere, the participle 'inhering' is placed parallel to 'substantial', which once more indicates that it concerns a natural characteristic.[55]

The way in which Cyril of Alexandria employs the various terms confirms and elaborates the image of his metaphysics that was painted after the discussion of the verb προσεῖναι. *There is a core which consists in a substance, including its differentiae. The natural properties, which are inseparable from the substance, and which include the propria and the inseparable attributes, 'are attached to', 'exist in', 'lie round' or 'in' both the secondary substance and the primary substances that fall under it. The (separable) accidents 'are attached to',*

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[51] *Thesaurus*, 156B: both the equality by nature and the being smaller because of the incarnation lie round the (incarnate) Word. *Ibid.*, 449C, 452D, 596AB. *Dial. Trin.* II, 421cd.

[52] *Thesaurus*, 120A: the words that are fitting to a slave lie round (περικείμενα) the πρόσωπον of the inhumanation (τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως); see section 3.5. *Ibid.*, 320C, 324AB, 595CD; *Dial. Trin.* II, 434bc.

[53] A clear example in which ἐνεῖναι applies to a separable accident can be found in *Dial. Trin.* VI, 620a. Christ is called "the giver and ruler of the strength that inhered (ἐνούσης)" the apostles, when they healed the sick and raised the dead. It is obvious that this strength is not a natural attribute of the apostles, while it is nevertheless said to 'inhere' them.

[54] *Dial. Trin.* II, 421c (see n. 48), 433e: τὰ ἐν τάξει τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἢ καὶ ἐνόντων ἁπλῶς κατηριθμημένα. The word 'accident' is taken in a narrower sense, here, to indicate only the separable properties. Cf. chapter 2, n. 93.

[55] *Dial. Trin.* I, 414c: τῆς ἐνούσης τε καὶ οὐσιώδους ὑπεροχῆς. Cf. *ibid.*, 396a: κατά γε τοὺς ἐνόντας τῇ φύσει λόγους. In one place (*ibid.* VII, 635c) Cyril even writes that the differentia 'rational' inheres (ἔνεστι) man. A somewhat different use of the verb is its application to 'unborn' as a characteristic of the hypostasis of the Father, rather than of the substance: [τὸ ἀγέννητον] ἐνεῖναί φαμεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ περί γε τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρός (*ibid.* II, 433c).

'exist in', 'lie round' or 'in' the primary substances. The natural characteristics, even the differentiae, and sometimes the separable accidents, are also said to 'inhere' the substance.

3.3. Ὑπόστασις

Neither Plato nor Aristotle used the word ὑπόστασις as a philosophical term.[56] In Aristotle's scientific works we encounter the word in the sense of 'sediment', a meaning which it also had in medical writings.[57] Its introduction into philosophy is usually attributed to the Stoics, for whom the word indicated the actualization of the primal matter (also called οὐσία) into individual things, or the result of this actualization: the existence of individual beings.[58] The Peripatetics were less interested in the dynamics of actualization and employed the word for the existence and reality of individual things.[59] In relation to the different metaphysics of neo-Platonism, Porphyry adapted the meaning of the term. He distinguishes between perfect (τέλειαι) and divided (μεριςταί) hypostases. Only the three highest ones are called 'perfect', while the One is regarded as beyond hypostasis. All the other beings which come into existence as a result of the overflowing of the three perfect ones, belong to the divided hypostases.[60]

Hammerstaedt emphasizes that, although ὑπόστασις and οὐσία were not completely synonymous during the period from Origen to Athanasius, there was a close relationship between the two notions, in that a different hypostasis implied a different substance; it did not indicate individual realities of the same substance.[61] According to him, the trinitarian controversy in the fourth century led to a new understanding of the word ὑπόστασις: it was now applied to the individual existence of

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[56] Studer (1974), 1256.

[57] Dörrie (1955), 58f., n. 1; Köster (1977), 573f.

[58] Dörrie (1955), 48–58; Studer (1974), 1256; Köster (1977), 575f. However, Hammerstaedt (1992) argues that, until Porphyry introduced its neo-Platonic meaning, there was no specific Stoic understanding of ὑπόστασις, to be distinguished from that of other philosophical schools.

[59] Dörrie (1955), 58–61; Studer (1974), 1256; Köster (1977), 576.

[60] Dörrie (1955), 73f.; Hammerstaedt (1994), 996.

[61] Hammerstaedt (1994) 991f., 993, 996, 1005. See also Hammerstaedt (1991). In these two articles Hammerstaedt refers to other authors, who maintain that already before the fourth century there were Christian writers who spoke of more than one ὑπόστασις that share the same οὐσία.

Father, Son and holy Spirit, who do not each have their own substance, but who are consubstantial.[62] However, it took some time before this new meaning of ὑπόστασις was accepted in other areas of theology as well, most notably in christology.[63] Other authors differ from Hammerstaedt in their assessment of the meaning of ὑπόστασις in various times and contexts, but two aspects frequently recur: (1) it denotes real existence; (2) it indicates separate existence. This very brief overview goes to show that there was no fully unambiguous definition of the term, which Cyril of Alexandria could adopt. We will have to distil from his own writings what he understood by the word.

A relevant passage can be found at the beginning of the eighth chapter of the *Thesaurus*.[64] Cyril writes against those who say that the Son is not like the Father, but like his will (βούλησις). He asks whether the will is something that exists by itself (ὑπέστη αὐτὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν; 101B), or not. If it were, then it would be a third besides the Father and the Son, and the Son would not be only-begotten. But if it is not, then they would compare the Son, who exists by himself, with something which does not exist by itself, but exists *in* some of the beings (ἐνυπάρχει … τῶν ὄντων τισίν; 101D). The technical term that occurs most frequently in this passage is 'enhypostatic (ἐνυπόστατος)': that which exists by itself is enhypostatic, that which does not exist by itself is 'anhypostatic (ἀνυπόστατος)'.[65]

What is notable is that οὐσία and its derivatives are placed side by side with ὑπόστασις and its derivatives, which implies that the two terms have a close relationship. Cyril speaks of regarding the will as "substantial and hypostatic (οὐσιώδη καὶ ὑποστατικήν)" (101B), or as not existing hypostatically (καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν) nor being a living and existing substance (οὐσίαν; 101B). He asks how that which has not attained the status of a substance (εἰς οὐσίαν ἐνεχθέν) could be likened to that which is hypostasized (τῷ ὑφεστηκότι; 101C). In this passage, he even employs ἐνούσιος as a synonym of ἐνυπόστατος.[66] The word ἐνούσιος is found

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[62] Hammerstaedt (1994) 1020–1023.

[63] *Ibid.*, 1002, 1031.

[64] *Thesaurus*, 101A–105C.

[65] It is clear from the whole argumentation that here 'enhypostatic' does not have the meaning it will later receive: being hypostasized in the hypostasis of another being. It simply means: existing by itself, not *in* another being as an attribute.

[66] *Thesaurus*, 104A: Δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι τοῖς ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει πρὸς τὰ ἐνούσιά τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατα ἡ ὁμοιότης ἡ κατὰ τοῦτο σώζεται, οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἑτερογενῆ καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις ἔχοντα τὸ εἶναι. The meaning of the sentence is not immediately obvious. It seems that by "things in a substance and a hypostasis" are meant things that are hypostasized. And

in five other places in the *Thesaurus*, in all of which the Son is called the living and ἐνούσιος will (βούλησις or βουλή) of the Father.[67] The meaning of the word in this phrase could be similar to 'consubstantial', in which case it would be related to 'secondary substance', not to 'primary substance'.[68] But Cyril's commentary to John 8:28 suggests that in this phrase, too, ἐνούσιος is synonymous with ἐνυπόστατος. For here, he places both 'enhypostatic' and ἐνούσιος in parallel with 'living', while ἐνούσιος is also opposed to 'anhypostatic'.[69] Thus, it is likely that in all these instances ἐνούσιος is synonymous with ἐνυπόστατος and is related to 'primary substance'.

In chapter 8 of the Thesaurus, *then, ὑπόστασις is employed synonymously with the Aristotelian primary substance. Its use is consistent with Cyril of Alexandria's understanding of the Trinity as one substance and three hypostases.* However, his use of οὐσία as primary substance, as synonymous with 'hypostasis', is not in line with the archbishop's usual trinitarian terminology. According to Liébaert, several of the terms in this chapter are characteristic of Didymus the Blind's vocabulary, by whom Cyril may have been influenced when he wrote it.[70]

In the twentieth chapter we find a passage which speaks in a similar way about 'hypostasis'.[71] In an objection from Eunomius it is stated that the Son cannot be the wisdom and the word of the Father, for wisdom,

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the same applies to τὰ ἐνούσιά τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατα. Thus, it says that hypostasized things should only be compared with other hypostasized things, not with things from another genus, that is, from one of the other categories than primary substance, things that have their being in other things.

[67] *Thesaurus*, 105C, 257C, 260D, 261B, 360B. The word is not found in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*.

[68] In line with this, Liddell & Scott (1996) gives as the primary meaning of ἐνούσιος "= συμφυής" (and as a second meaning: "= πολυκτήμων"). The word is also found in Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, c. 2, in a similar context: "…, then it is not ambiguous that he is the living will of the Father, and the ἐνούσιος ἐνέργεια, and the true Word", *Oratio II*, 2[25], in: Athanasius (1998). Archibald Robertson translates it in *NPNF*, second series, vol. 4, 349, by 'essential', and refers in a footnote to c. 28 (p. 363), where the Son is called 'essential Wisdom (οὐσιώδης σοφία)', *Oratio II*, 28[24], in: Athanasius (1998). Lampe, however, gives as the first meaning "= ἐνυπόστατος opp. ἀνούσιος, existing as a substance, really existing", and as a second meaning "opp. ἑτερογενής, of the same substance".

[69] *In Jo.* V.5, vol. 2, 47 (527b) and 48 (527d). Pusey translates ἐνούσιος here with 'inbeing'. Athanasius writes in *De Synodis*, 41.8, something very similar: he is not anhypostatic, but "the living Word and the ἐνούσιος Wisdom", in: Athanasius (1935–1941), 267[24–26]. Stead (1978), 38, translates ἐνούσιος σοφία by 'essential Wisdom'.

[70] Liébaert (1951), 60.

[71] *Thesaurus*, 321D–324B.

knowledge and word are not enhypostatic (ἐνυπόστατος), nor are they living beings, while the Son is a living being. Cyril responds that with man a word is indeed anhypostatic (ἀνυπόστατος), and although we use the same term 'word' for the Son, this does not imply that the divine Word is also anhypostatic. He is rather "living one from living one, and hypostasized one from hypostasized one".[72] And similarly, although with us wisdom and knowledge do not lie in a hypostasis by themselves, this does not imply that the wisdom that exists in God also misses being enhypostatic by itself.[73] In this context the word οὐσία is employed twice. First, Cyril says that Eunomius forgets that he is speaking about the divine οὐσία, and that he defines the things that are attached (προσόντα) to that substance on the basis of human standards. And he concludes that the things of God surpass human things as much as he differs from man with respect to the formula of the substance. Here οὐσία should be regarded as the one divine substance, in accordance with the archbishop's usual trinitarian terminology.

There are various other places in the *Thesaurus* where ἐνυπόστατος and ἀνυπόστατος are used, always carrying the same meaning of (not) having existence by itself.[74] It is noteworthy that Cyril writes that the holy Spirit is "the natural and living and enhypostasized operation (ἐνέργεια) of the divine substance", thus making clear that the Spirit has his own existence, just as the Father and the Son.[75]

When we turn to the Dialogues on the Trinity *we see that the distinction between substance and hypostasis is much more clear-cut than in the* Thesaurus, *except for the expression that the Son is born or has come from the substance of the Father.* In the first dialogue Cyril of Alexandria is quite explicit about this. When B asks whether the Son is in his own substance besides that of the Father, A responds that the Son is not in another substance besides the substance of God, but rather in the hypostasis of the Son.[76]

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[72] *Thesaurus*, 324A: ζῶν ἐκ ζῶντος καὶ ὑφεστηκὼς ἐξ ὑφεστηκότος ἐστί.

[73] *Ibid.*, 324AB: οὐκ ἐπειδήπερ ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν σοφία καὶ ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἐν ὑποστάσει κεῖται καθ' ἑαυτὴν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἐνυπάρχουσα τῷ Θεῷ σοφία τὸ ἐνυπόστατος εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ζημιωθήσεται.

[74] In *Thesaurus*, 101A–105C, ἐνυπόστατος occurs eight times, and ἀνυπόστατος three times. In *ibid.*, 321D–324B, both adjectives are found two times. In *ibid.*, 80C, the Son is said to be "the enhypostatic Word", while in *ibid.*, 297C, it is stated that the word of men is not enhypostatic. See for two references where the Spirit is called "the enhypostatic operation" the next note.

[75] *Thesaurus*, 596C; similarly, in *ibid.*, 580A.

[76] *Dial. Trin.* I, 408cd: Οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ μᾶλλον ἑτέρᾳ παρὰ τὴν ὡς Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑποστάσει τῇ ὡς Υἱοῦ.

When B infers from this that substance and hypostasis are two different things, A confirms it: the separation and the space between them are great, since the substance contains the individuals.[77] And he illustrates it by taking man as an example: 'substance' applies to all individual men, who each are in their own separate hypostasis (409ab). It is clear that here Cyril applies the meaning of hypostasis that, according to Hammerstaedt, evolved during the trinitarian controversy in the fourth century: individual beings that are consubstantial.

In the second dialogue we encounter the same distinction between substance and hypostasis: that which is the same with respect to substance is distinguished in particular hypostases.[78] But now the archbishop of Alexandria elaborates somewhat on his metaphysics. When discussing the status of the word 'unborn' as applied to the Father, he distinguishes between two sorts of beings (τῶν ὄντων). On the one hand, there are those which are in their own stations and which are assigned to be what they are enhypostatically.[79] On the other hand, there are those without station, which are not founded in their own natures, but hover round the substances of the beings.[80] Because the latter ones can join themselves (συμβῆναι) to one or another of the beings, they almost seem to exist hypostatically together with the things that possess them, and falsely present another's nature as their own.[81] Cyril goes on to explain that it is the accidents and the inherent attributes that do not exist in themselves but in others.[82] This is in line with what we saw in section 3.2.2: natural properties inhere secondary as well as primary substances, while separable accidents lie round primary substances, that is, hypostases.

In the sixth dialogue, too, we find a passage in which οὐσία refers to what is common and ὑπόστασις to what is distinct in Father, Son and holy Spirit. According to Cyril, his opponents regard the Son as an instrument of the Father, since he is called the 'power' of God (see, e.g.,

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[77] *Ibid.* I, 408d: Ναί · πολὺ γὰρ τὸ διεῖργον καὶ διὰ μέσον χωροῦν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῶν καθέκαστα περιεκτική.

[78] See n. 14.

[79] *Dial. Trin.* II, 433d: τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ ἐν ἰδίαις ἕδραις ἐστὶ καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐνυποστάτως διεκληρώσατο.

[80] *Ibid.*, 433de: τὰ δὲ ὧδε μὲν οὐκ ἔχει ποθέν, ἔξεδρα δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις μὲν οὐκ ἐρηρεισμένα φύσεσι, τὰς δὲ γε τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας περιποτώμενα.

[81] *Ibid.*, 433e: μονονουχὶ καὶ συνυφεστάναι τοῖς ἔχουσι δοκεῖ, ἰδίαν δὲ ὥσπερ φύσιν τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ψεύδεται.

[82] *Ibid.*, 433e (see n. 54).

1Cor. 1:24). But the archbishop himself argues that this power, being
the Son, is living and enhypostatic (ἐνυπόστατος), issuing forth from
the Father as from a source, and pre-eminent by the properties of the
divinity, not adventitiously, but substantially (οὐσιωδῶς; 618b). A asks
whether the Word, being regarded as existing in its own hypostasis
(τὸ εἶναι … καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἰδικήν), is not another (ἕτερος) besides
the Father, and B responds that he certainly is another, and that he
exists separately, although he is consubstantial.[83] A then broadens the
discussion to include the holy Spirit. He says that the nature of the one
Godhead is known in the holy consubstantial Trinity, and that Father,
Son and holy Spirit are perfect with respect to their own hypostasis
(καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἰδικήν). The divine operation may be regarded as the
work of the one substance, as something common, but also as fitting to
each of the three hypostases separately.[84]

> We encounter the word ὑπόστασις also a number of times in quotations
> from or references to Hebr. 1:3: "the imprint of his hypostasis", both
> in the *Thesaurus* and in the *Dialogues*.[85] In these contexts ὑπόστασις does
> not necessarily have a technical meaning, but in the fifth dialogue Cyril
> argues, over against certain opponents (557de), that the Son is not an
> anhypostatic imprint, nor an accident, but rather hypostasized by himself
> (558de). In the fourth dialogue (537a–544a), ὑπόστασις occurs a few times
> in a discussion on the status of the Son in the work of creation. It
> seems that here ὑπόστασις is used as a synonym for ὕπαρξις, without
> emphasizing that this existence is separate, by itself (and once in a clearly
> non-technical sense; 540c).

*It may be concluded that when the archbishop of Alexandria employs the term
ὑπόστασις in a technical sense, he denotes something that exists by itself—to
be distinguished from accidents and inherent attributes.*[86] Although in the *The-*

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[83] *Dial. Trin.* VI, 618c: Ὑφέστηκε γὰρ ἰδικῶς, εἰ καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοούσιος.

[84] *Ibid.*, 618de: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἑνὸς τῶν ὠνομασμένων δημιουργικὴ θέλησις, ἐφ᾽ ὅτῳπερ ἂν
λέγοιτο γενέσθαι τυχόν, ἐνέργημα μὲν αὐτοῦ, πλὴν διὰ πάσης ἔρχεται τῆς θεότητος καὶ
τῆς ὑπὲρ κτίσιν ἐστὶν οὐσίας ἀποτέλεσμα, κοινὸν μὲν ὥσπερ τι, πλὴν καὶ ἰδικῶς ἑκάστῳ
προσώπῳ πρέπον, τὸ τοίνυν ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως ἐνεργούμενον ὥς διὰ τριῶν ὑποστάσεων
πρέποι ἂν καὶ ἰδικῶς ἑκάστῃ, παντελείως ἐχούσῃ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν. The same view is repeated
somewhat further down in the same dialogue: 620e–621a.

[85] Χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ. See, e.g., *Thesaurus*, 49D, 132D, 240D, 476A;
Dial. Trin. I, 398bc; II, 452e; III, 467a; V, 550e; VI, 629b.

[86] This is also the sense that Galtier (1952a) gives to the word, which, according to
him, was its every-day, 'primitive' (366, 375) meaning: "une consistance distincte" (358);
other expressions employed by him are "réalité en soi" (359), "réalité subsistante" (361),
"réalité propre et distincte" (365), "un être réel et distinct consistant et subsistant en
lui-même" (382).

saurus we encounter passages in which ὑπόστασις and οὐσία (understood as primary substance) are used synonymously, in the *Dialogues* Cyril emphasizes the distinction between the two terms: 'substance' indicates what the members of a genus or a species have in common, it contains the individuals, while 'hypostasis' denotes the individual beings, which may belong to the same substance. In both works 'enhypostatic' means 'existing by itself', while 'anhypostatic' refers, not to 'being non-existent', but to an existence which does not have its own hypostasis, but is attached to a hypostasis as an accident or an inherent attribute.

3.4. Φύσις

3.4.1. *Φύσις and οὐσία*

The word φύσις and other derivatives of the verb φύειν abound in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings. And they can have various meanings. Most commonly, φύσις is closely related to οὐσία. Often the two words or related terms are found side by side, not just in direct reference to Father and Son, but regularly also in more general statements, from which conclusions with respect to the divine hypostases are inferred. First, some examples from the *Thesaurus*. Things of which the formula is the same are of the same species and necessarily like each other naturally (ἀλλήλοις ἐοικότα φυσικῶς); and they are of the same substance (109A). Things that are naturally (φυσικῶς) in equality with each other are also consubstantial (140D). Things that are of the same substance (οὐσίας) and nature (φύσεως) are more properly compared to each other (144A). The Son is all the things that are said to be attached to the Father naturally and substantially (φυσικῶς τε καὶ οὐσιωδῶς), such as truth, power and wisdom (244D). In many other places where the relationship between a substance and its characteristics is discussed we see that terms related to φύσις and terms related to οὐσία are to some extent interchangeable (see 3.2.2).

The picture we get from the *Dialogues on the Trinity* is no different. The Son may be called "connatural and consubstantial (ὁμοφυᾶ τε καὶ ὁμοούσιον)" with the Father.[87] 'Consubstantial' indicates identity of

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[87] *Dial. Trin.* I, 392c.

nature.[88] The Son is consubstantial with the Father, since he is truly out of him and in him by nature and substantially.[89] And A puts the question: If 'begotten' defines the nature of the Son, and they say that he is, thus, of a different nature and foreign to the substance of the Father, what then?[90] Further, Scripture calls the Son light and life, wisdom and power, but we do not say that these names enclose his nature and that he is composed out of them, for he is simple, but on the basis of these attributes which are attached to him by nature and substantially (προσπεφυκότων οὐσιωδῶς), we arrive at a feeble contemplation of him.[91]

It is clear, then, that in many places of Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings φύσις and οὐσία are closely related notions. They are often employed in contexts in which the ontological relationship between two beings is discussed, the question whether they are consubstantial or not. Thus, the meaning of οὐσία to which φύσις is linked is that of secondary, not primary, substance. Does this imply that in these instances φύσις has a meaning close to secondary substance? The fact that sometimes Cyril even speaks about 'defining the nature' instead of 'defining the substance',[92] suggests that this is the case. Even so, Labelle comes to a different assessment. He points to the parallel between κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον and κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγον,[93] he regards πως εἶναι as referring to 'how' a substance is actualized, and concludes that φύσις denotes the real, concrete being, synonymous with 'hypostasis'.[94] He explicitly distances himself from the interpretation given by Grillmeier and Hebensperger.[95] Hebensperger summarizes Cyril's understanding as follows: "essence = ὁ τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγος = being such = *physis*",[96] while the usual expression for 'essence' is οὐσία.[97] It may be added that, in Hebensperger's view, φύσις is essence considered as the principle of operation.[98] And this principle of operation is the will (βούλησις) of God

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[88] *Ibid.*, 394e: τὸ ὁμοούσιον, καίτοι ταυτότητα φυσικὴν εὖ μάλα καταδηλοῦν.

[89] *Ibid.*, 405e: κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσιωδῶς.

[90] *Ibid.*, II, 423bc: ἑτεροφυᾶ δὲ ταύτῃ τοι καὶ ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασι τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός.

[91] *Ibid.*, V, 558cd.

[92] *Thesaurus*, 444C. *Dial. Trin.* II, 423bc; VI, 587de.

[93] *Thesaurus*, 152CD.

[94] Labelle (1979), 36–39.

[95] *Ibid.*, 37, n. 9.

[96] Hebensperger (1927), 85: "Wesenheit = ὁ τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγος = Sosein = Physis".

[97] *Ibid.*, 75.

[98] *Ibid.*, 83.

for the creature.[99] One might say that Labelle regards φύσις more as hypostasis, while Hebensperger interprets it as secondary substance.

In order to come to a conclusion, let us examine the passage in which φύσις and πως εἶναι are placed side by side, to which Labelle refers:

> The things that are deprived of natural likeness (φυσικῆς ὁμοιότητος) to one another, and that are separated κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγον, are distinguished rather by 'like' and 'unlike', and certainly not by 'greater' and 'smaller'. If, therefore, κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, the Father in relation to the Son is one, let the hostile fellow-inquirers say to us in what way 'greater' and 'smaller' apply to them. But if the Son is introduced as in every way separated and divorced from the substance (οὐσίας) of the Father and understood by you [to be] of another nature (ἑτέρας φύσεως), how do the things that are in every way separated κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγον admit of comparison with each other?[100]

The structure of this passage is as follows. First, Cyril gives the general rule that 'greater' and 'smaller' apply to things that are similar by nature. The other two sentences are opposed to each other by μέν … δέ. The middle sentence gives the position in which, according to the rule, comparison is possible: Father and Son are one with respect to φύσις. The last sentence gives the opposite view: they are of a different φύσις. The wording in each of the three sentences pleads against Labelle's interpretation. If φύσις would merely indicate a real, concrete being, and not include the notion of essence, the expression 'natural likeness' in the first sentence does not make sense. In the second sentence, the word φύσις is used to express Cyril's own opinion: Father and Son are one with respect to φύσις and can be called 'greater' and 'smaller'. Since Father and Son are one with regard to οὐσία and not regarding hypostasis, φύσις should be interpreted as οὐσία rather than as hypostasis. And finally, in the third sentence, 'separated from the οὐσία', 'of another φύσις', and 'separated κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγον' apparently indicate the same view of the ontological relationship between Father and Son. If οὐσία stands for 'essence', as Labelle himself states, it is more plausible that φύσις and πως εἶναι refer to 'essence' as well instead of to a concrete being.

In his discussion, Labelle regards πως εἶναι as synonymous with τοιῶσδε εἶναι, and he links them with 'quality'. But 'quality' is more

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[99] *Ibid.*, 21, 53, 60.
[100] *Thesaurus*, 152CD.

related to secondary substance, which includes the substantial qualities,[101] than to hypostasis, which denotes individual existence. Cyril of Alexandria even applies τοιῶσδε εἶναι to the proprium 'uncreated', which shows that there is no notion of separate existence involved in this expression, for 'uncreated' applies to the substance of God, not just to one of the hypostases. 'Uncreated' is not itself a substance, he writes, but it signifies that the substance which is ordered in opposition to the uncreated substance "is not such", that is, is not uncreated, but created.[102] Similar to the propria of man and horse, 'uncreated' does not signify what God is by nature, but that he "is such".[103] The phrase πως εἶναι, then, which Labelle rightly links with φύσις, designates an essence or a secondary substance, not a hypostasis or individual existence.

The conclusion may be that in many cases in which φύσις and its related terms are placed parallel to οὐσία and its related terms, φύσις has a meaning which is close to secondary substance. However, when it is applied to living beings, as it mostly is, the fact that φύσις is derived from the verb φύειν adds a connotation which οὐσία does not have: *a being has its nature, its secondary substance, because it has received it by birth from its parents.* Thus, Cyril writes: "For further, being the same in substance may in this way, according to the law of nature, extend from him [the Father] to the Son".[104] For this reason, it is important for Cyril that Christ is truly the Son of God the Father by nature, and not by grace or by adoption, for 'Son by nature' implies consubstantiality.[105] There are a number of expressions containing the word φύσις in Cyril's trinitarian writings which he employs to denote that the Word is consubstantial with the Father: 'Son by nature',[106] 'out of him by nature',[107] 'God by

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[101] See section 2.4.1.

[102] *Thesaurus*, 28C: τοῦ μὴ τοιῶσδε εἶναι ... τὸ σημαντικόν.

[103] *Ibid.*, 445B: οὐ τί ἐστι σημαῖνον κατὰ φύσιν Θεὸς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τοιῶσδέ ἐστι.

[104] *Dial. Trin.* II, 434de.

[105] See chapter 2, nn. 152 and 153. In *Thesaurus*, 104B, Cyril states that not even the things that have a created nature are known to have as accident the bringing forth of something inferior (τὸ χείρονα), for a man does not beget something else than what he is himself. On this, neo-Platonism has the opposite view. For example, Plotinus writes: "What is always perfect, begets always something eternal, and it begets something less (ἔλαττον) than itself" (*Enneads* V.1.6). Christianity's doctrine of the consubstantiality of the divine hypostases is, then, incompatible with neo-Platonic thought. See also Meijering (1974), 21 and 26.

[106] *Thesaurus*, 189C, 320B; *Dial. Trin.* I, 413e; cf. II, 418e (each time κατὰ φύσιν).

[107] *Thesaurus*, 116B (ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν); 241D (ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν); 316C (ἐξ αὐτοῦ φυσικῶς προελθόντος). *Dial. Trin.* I, 405e (ἀληθῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ

nature',[108] 'of the same nature' or 'natural identity',[109] 'not of another nature',[110] 'like him by nature' or 'not unlike him by nature'.[111]

'By nature' (κατὰ φύσιν or φύσει), then, has two meanings. First, it can be synonymous with 'substantially' (οὐσιωδῶς) and indicate that a being is something because that something belongs to the substance of that being, either as differentia, or as proprium, or as inseparable attribute. In this way the words 'God', 'Lord', 'incorruptible' and 'king' are applied, not just to the Father, but also to the Son; he is these things 'really and by nature'.[112] In this sense, Cyril can also speak of what the swan or the snow,[113] the human body,[114] or we as human beings[115] are by nature.

The second meaning of 'by nature' is applied, not to something that belongs to a being substantially, but to (the result of) a 'natural' process by which a being produces a second being with the same secondary substance. This is the case when the Word is called 'Son by nature'. 'Son' is not something that belongs to the divine substance as differentia, proprium or inseparable attribute, for in that case it would be a predicate of the Father and of the holy Spirit as well. It rather refers to the natural process by which the Word is born from the Father, thus receiving the same substance as the Father. Similarly, in the *Dialogues*, the Father is called 'Father by nature' to indicate a process by which the divine Son is born, who has the same substance as the Father. 'Father' does not belong to the divine substance, for it applies only to

φύσιν καὶ οὐσιωδῶς); II, 417a (ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν γεννητός); II, 422e (ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ γεγεννημένον).

[108] *Thesaurus*, 109C, 116A, 149D, 153A, 156B, 316C, 496C, 496D (φύσει or κατὰ φύσιν).

[109] *Thesaurus*, 141C (διὰ ταυτότητος φυσικῆς); 501C (ὁμοφυής); 517D (ὁμοφυής). *Dial. Trin.* I, 391d (ὁμοφυής); I, 392c (ὁμοφυᾶ); I, 405d (ὁμοφυής); II, 429b (in B's argumentation: κατὰ φύσιν ὁ αὐτός).

[110] Cf. *Thesaurus*, 517A (ἑτεροφυῆ); cf. 552B (ἑτεροφυής). *Dial. Trin.* I, 395c (οὐχ ἑτέρας εἶναι φύσεως); cf. II, 418b (ἑτεροφυᾶ); cf. II, 423bc (ἑτεροφυᾶ); cf. II, 438d (ἑτεροίως ἔχων κατὰ τὴν φύσιν).

[111] *Thesaurus*, 29A (ἀνόμοιος κατὰ φύσιν); 101A (κατὰ φύσιν ἐξομοιοῦν); 104D (κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιος); 109C (τὴν ἐμφέρειαν ἣν ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν); 232C (φυσικὴν τὴν ὁμοίωσιν); 316 (οὐκ ἔσται τὴν φύσιν ἀνόμοιος). *Dial. Trin.* III, 498a (ἀνομοιότητα φυσικήν); cf. V, 584b (ἀνόμοιος κατὰ φύσιν).

[112] *Thesaurus*, 109B: ἔστιν ὄντως οὕτω καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. See also *ibid.*, 121C, 149D, 153A, 256B (φυσικῶς), 320D; *Dial. Trin.* I, 392a; VI, 592de (the Spirit is holy by nature).

[113] *Ibid.*, 446C.

[114] *Ibid.*, 452C.

[115] *Dial. Trin.* I, 393e; II, 431d (creatures by nature and sons by grace).

one of the three hypostases. 'Father by nature' is distinguished from being called 'Father' improperly, which applies when 'Father' indicates that he is the cause of created beings.[116]

> The archbishop of Alexandria employs various forms of the verb φύειν to express this process. The Father is called ὁ φύσας, 'the Begetter', in relation to the Son,[117] who is 'born' (ἀναφύς) out of (the substance of) the Father.[118] The verb πεφυκέναι and its derivatives is found much more often in both trinitarian works. It can denote the natural process itself by which one being produces a second being with the same substance. Thus, it is said of the Word that he is born (πεφυκότα) out of God.[119] But often, it is used to indicate that a particular property is not a separable accident, but that it is a differentia, a proprium or an inseparable attribute, handed down from one generation to the next. It can be translated by 'it is natural' or by the adverb 'naturally'.[120] We have come across a similar usage in Porphyry's *Isagoge*.[121]

This understanding of φύσις is reminiscent of, though not identical to, that of Aristotle in Book II of his *Physics*.[122] Aristotle distinguishes between beings that exist by nature (φύσει), and beings that exist as the result of another cause. To the first group belong living beings (ζῷα) and their parts, plants, and the elements of bodies (such as earth, fire, air, and water). They have in themselves a principle of movement and rest.[123] Things in the other group are the result of craft-work (ἀπὸ τέχνης), like a bed or a coat. They have no inherent (ἔμφυτον) tendency to change, although the elements out of which they are composed (like stone or earth) may change, which means that things like beds and coats have the capacity to change, not inherently, but as an accident (συμβέβηκεν).

Thus, all things that have such a principle have a φύσις, and all these are a substance (οὐσία), for it is a substrate, and a φύσις is always in a substrate.[124] 'According to nature (κατὰ φύσιν)' are these things and

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[116] *Ibid*. II, 432a–e.

[117] *Thesaurus*, 157A, 472B; *Dial. Trin.* VI, 622b; VII, 654d. In *Dial. Trin.* V, 582c, Abraham is similarly called ὁ φύσας of Isaac; cf. *Dial. Trin.* I, 402b.

[118] *Dial. Trin.* I, 391c, 405c. Cf. *ibid.* III, 465c.

[119] *Thesaurus*, 521A, 553D. Cf. *Dial. Trin.* I, 411b, and II, 422e.

[120] *Ibid.*, 164B, 200D; *Dial. Trin.* II, 422c; V, 565b. See also n. 43.

[121] See section 2.4.2.

[122] Aristotle, *Physics*, Book II, c. 1, 192b⁸–193b²¹. Greek edition: Aristotle (1979).

[123] *Ibid.*, 192b¹³⁻¹⁴: τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως.

[124] *Ibid.*, 192b³²⁻³⁴: φύσιν δὲ ἔχει ὅσα τοιαύτην ἔχει ἀρχήν. καὶ ἔστιν πάντα ταῦτα οὐσία · ὑποκείμενον γάρ τι, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἀεί. Presumably, the 'it' which is a substrate, is the substance mentioned in the previous clause.

everything that belongs to them by themselves (καθ' αὐτά), that is, inherently, as rising upwards belongs to fire. For this (rising upwards) *is* not nature, nor does it *have* a nature, but it is 'by nature' (φύσει) and 'according to nature' (κατὰ φύσιν). Aristotle adds that it is not the matter of beings, nor the four basic elements, that should be regarded as their nature and substance, but their form (μορφή) or essence (εἶδος), according to their defining formula.[125] Finally, φύσις is that towards which something grows (φύεται).

We see here that for Aristotle, too, φύσις and οὐσία are closely related notions, without being fully synonymous. Φύσις is applied, not to all, but to a particular group of substances—those which have a principle of movement and rest within themselves.[126] And although both φύσις and οὐσία are identified with the essence of a thing, with the word φύσις the emphasis lies on the inherent development of the thing involved, while with οὐσία the emphasis lies on the place the thing has in the whole order of realities.

Hebensperger rightly points out that, when Cyril of Alexandria applies the term φύσις to God, its connotation cannot be the inherent growth toward a future goal, since God is regarded as immutable. Hebensperger, then, describes the φύσις as the essence regarded as the principle of operation. The examples given are God's goodness and the Spirit's sanctification.[127] He explains this by stating that God's operation, not just within himself, but also towards creation, is an image of his inner nature. He refers for this to two passages in the *Thesaurus* (188C and 189D).

One may say that in Cyril's view a φύσις indeed contains a principle of operation, but he describes the relationship between the nature and the operations in different terms than Hebensperger suggests. First of all, the nature or the substance itself is unknowable; thus, the operation is not an image of the nature itself. A few times he states this explicitly,[128] but it is also quite clear from his metaphysics, in which the propria and the inseparable attributes do not indicate the substance or what something is 'by nature', but the things 'round the substance'.[129]

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[125] *Ibid.*, 193a[30–31].

[126] Cf. Aristotle's treatment of φύσις in the dictionary of the *Metaphysics*, Book V, 1014b[16]–1015a[19].

[127] Hebensperger (1927), 83. For the examples of God's operation he refers to *Thesaurus*, 116A and 596D.

[128] *Thesaurus*, 28A; 441D.

[129] See section 3.2.2.

As he writes in *Thesaurus*, 452BC: Each of the words that we apply to God, like 'Father', 'uncreated', 'incorruptible' and 'immortal',

> is not indicative of the substance of God, as I already said above, but signifies one of the things round the substance. If then, on the basis of these words and significations, we are led to the knowledge of God, how shall we know his substance, when we learn only the things round it, and are not taught what he is by nature?[130]

But although the divine substance or nature itself is unknowable, God's properties are distinctive enough to draw conclusions regarding the consubstantiality of Father, Son and holy Spirit from the properties they have in common. Thus, from the fact that both Father and Son are called, and really are, 'God' and 'Lord' and 'incorruptible' and 'king', it may be inferred that there is 'natural likeness' between them, which in the *Thesaurus* amounts to consubstantiality.[131] In the *Dialogues* Cyril reasons similarly with regard to the divinity of the holy Spirit. In order to find out whether the Spirit is God, is in God, and naturally out of him (ἐξ αὐτοῦ φυσικῶς), he investigates whether the Spirit "is honoured substantially with the properties (ἰδιώμασιν) of the divinity".[132]

> For Porphyry, 'god' is a species whose definition is 'rational, immortal living being'.[133] It is obvious that this definition will not do for the archbishop of Alexandria, especially since, in the Tree of Porphyry, the genus 'living being' (ζῷον) falls under 'body'. There is even a passage in the *Thesaurus* (324BC) in which Cyril denounces Eunomius for calling the Son a living being (ζῷον, written as ζῶον). The Son calls himself 'life' (ζωή), which is the reality (πρᾶγμα) that makes alive, Cyril argues, while a living being participates in that which makes alive. Cyril's primary distinction is that between God and creation. In *Thesaurus*, 140C, he reasons as follows. If the whole cosmos of created beings is as it were one genus, with species under it, and the Son is a created being, then he would be a species of this genus, that is, of the cosmos. But the Son is said to exist before the cosmos, and species cannot be prior to their genus;[134] therefore, the Son is not out of the cosmos, but out of the maker of the cosmos, and consubstantial (with God). In the

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[130] Knowledge of God, then, does not imply knowing God's substance (or nature), but knowing the things round the substance. Cf. *Dialogues*, 415ab: through the words "we have come to a moderate knowledge regarding it [the divine nature]".

[131] *Thesaurus*, 109B.

[132] *Dial. Trin.* VII, 635c.

[133] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, 10$^{11-13}$, 14$^{1-3}$; cf. also 11$^{23-24}$.

[134] That species cannot be prior to their genus is mentioned by Aristotle in *Topics*, 123a$^{14-15}$.

Dialogues, Cyril expresses this by means of the word φύσις: "Among all the beings, then, we observe two natures".[135] One nature of the being that exists always in the same way, the other nature is that of the things that have their being by creation. Here again, φύσις is more or less synonymous with secondary substance, but when all created beings are said to have one nature it denotes the secondary substance, not of a particular species, but of one of the highest genera. In line with Aristotle, Cyril applies the word φύσις a few times to sorts of matter, like fire and water,[136] but also to stones or snow.[137] And occasionally, φύσις acquires the meaning of 'essence' in an even broader sense.[138]

The main meaning of φύσις in the trinitarian writings, then, is that of a common nature, the reality which a number of consubstantial individuals have in common. Sometimes, however, the Alexandrian archbishop gives an even more concrete sense to the term: it then denotes all the individuals that belong to the same secondary substance. In such instances, the word 'whole' (πᾶσα or ὅλη) is often added. For example: "The divine Scripture subjects the whole nature of created beings (πᾶσαν … τὴν φύσιν) to the rule of servitude to God, saying: 'All things are your servants' [Psalm 118 / 119:91, LXX]".[139] 'Human nature' can thus stand for all human beings together, for the human race. We find this especially in soteriological contexts. For instance: "For he has become man, not bestowing his grace to some, and not to others, but having compassion on the whole (ὅλην) fallen nature".[140] We will return to this in section 3.4.4.

When this meaning is applied to God, 'the divine nature' does not merely signify what Father, Son and holy Spirit have in common, but it refers to the whole Trinity. And since the unity of the Godhead is stronger than that between all human individuals, and God is really one, 'the divine nature' and 'God' are then virtually interchangeable. So, Cyril can write that the mediator indicates "to the people that which seems good to the undescribable and ineffable nature",[141] that

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[135] *Dial. Trin*. I, 411a: Δύο τοιγαροῦν ἐν ὅλοις τοῖς οὖσι καταθεώμεθα φύσεις. Cf. *In Jo*. I.6, vol. 1, 78 (52b).

[136] *Ibid*. II, 428a.

[137] *Thesaurus*, 344B and 445C.

[138] *Ibid*., 256A ("the nature of an accident", to which it belongs that it can be taken away); *Dial. Trin*. II, 451d ("the nature of colours", by which he means that they are accidents).

[139] *Thesaurus*, 485C. See also idem, 521D, and *In Jo*., V.4, vol. 2, 18 (507d).

[140] *In Jo*. VI.1, vol. 2, 233 (654a).

[141] *Dial. Trin*. I, 401d.

"the divine nature was roused to anger",[142] and that one "shall worship the one and consubstantial nature, the Queen of all".[143]

Some further considerations with regard to the meaning of φύσις in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings can best be discussed with reference to the publications by Ruth M. Siddals and Jacques Liébaert.

3.4.2. *Ruth M. Siddals's Dissertation*[144]

In her dissertation, Ruth M. Siddals points to the importance of the term 'nature' in the treatment of 'inherent factors' and of things that are radiated from substances, such as fragrant scent from a flower, heat from fire, or sweetness from honey.[145] By 'inherent factors' she understands all the properties of a substance, both the separable accidents and the 'naturally inherent factors', which include the propria and the inseparable attributes. In her initial discussion of 'inherent factors', a passage in the *Dialogues* which we have looked at before,[146] plays an important role.[147] The word φύσις appears three times in this passage: inherent factors "are not founded in their own natures", they "falsely present another's nature as their own", and such a factor "has the nature of its possessor as its own".[148]

In her interpretation of this passage, Siddals writes that qualities "do not possess the nature of substances, but simply the nature of qualities". And:

> This picture of 'borrowing nature' strictly depends upon the ambiguity of the term φύσις. As we have seen, the nature of an inherent feature like a quality is different, ἀλλοτρία, from the nature of a substance. Nonetheless, the inherent feature so inheres within the nature of the substance, that it is regarded as having acquired this substantial nature as its very own, albeit in a qualified way, ὡς ἰδίαν and ἰδίαν ὥσπερ.[149]

It seems, however, that a more consistent interpretation of the word φύσις in these phrases makes more sense. Cyril is not really speaking

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[142] *Ibid.*, 402d.

[143] *Ibid.* II, 423ab.

[144] Siddals (1984).

[145] *Ibid.*, 27–30 and 52–58.

[146] See nn. 54 and 79–82.

[147] *Dial. Trin.* II, 433c–434a. See Siddals (1984), 27 ff.

[148] *Ibid.*, 433d: ἐν ἰδίαις μὲν οὐκ ἐρηρεισμένα φύσεσι; 433e: ἰδίαν δὲ ὥσπερ φύσιν τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ψεύδεται; 434a: φύσιν δὲ τὴν τοῦ λαχόντος ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχει.

[149] Siddals (1984), 53 f.

of 'the nature of qualities' here, but in all three cases φύσις may be regarded as 'substantial nature'. When he writes that inherent factors "are not founded in their own natures", he adds: "but (μέν … δέ) they hover round the substances of the beings". Thus, this phrase could be interpreted as: they do not have substantial natures of their own, in which they could be founded.[150] When they "falsely present another's (ἀλλοτρίαν) nature as their own", once again, φύσις can be read as 'substantial nature': they do not have a substantial nature themselves, but because they are attached to a substantial nature, it looks as if that substantial nature is their own. And the third phrase, "has the nature of its possessor as its own", may be interpreted in the same way: an inherent factor does not have its own substantial nature, but the substantial nature to which it is attached, which 'possesses' it, is regarded as that of the inherent factor.

On this interpretation, the term φύσις remains linked with substantial beings, as it is in the vast majority of cases in the trinitarian writings. But even then, its meaning in this passage cannot be the usual one, which is close to secondary substance. For in this case, it is not the essence of the substance that is envisaged, the secondary substance, but rather its separate existence. It is not the substantial qualities of the substance that the inherent factors seem to adopt, but its stable existence. This is underlined by the fact that the whole argumentation is applied to 'unborn', which is said to exist in the λόγος of the hypostasis of God the Father, not in the substance of God. In this exceptional case in the trinitarian writings, φύσις has a meaning similar to hypostasis rather than to secondary substance.

Siddals points to the fact that the examples Cyril uses to illustrate the relationships between the divine hypostases often concern things that are radiated from substances.[151] The Father and the Son may be compared to the sun and the light that is sent out by it; to a flower and the scent that it gives off; to a fire and the heat that comes from it. A word that issues from a mind is described by Cyril in the same way. 'Radiated factor' will be used as a general term to cover all these examples. In later writings Cyril applies the analogy of a flower and its scent a few times, not to the relationships between the hypostases of

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[150] Just as the sentence "John does not live in his own house, but he rents it from a corporation" does not imply that John has a house of his own, besides the one he lives in.

[151] Siddals (1984), 57.

the Trinity, but to the relation between the divinity and the humanity of the incarnate Word. According to Siddals, this analogy provides an "analytical precision" which "marks the high point of Cyrilline christology".[152] In order to be able to evaluate Siddals's treatment of these christological passages—which will be done in section 6.4.2.1— we will now have a closer look at Cyril's understanding of radiated factors in the trinitarian writings.

First of all, it would be better to make a sharper distinction between inherent factors and radiated factors than Siddals does in her dissertation. For the way in which Cyril describes their relationship with the corresponding substance is rather different.[153] As we have seen, inherent factors are said to be attached to, to exist in, and to inhere substances, either 'by nature' or 'naturally', which implies inseparability, or by addition, in which case they are separable from the substances.[154] The passage in the *Dialogues* just discussed, which also speaks about inherent factors, is an exception in that the word φύσις is applied in a different way: by being attached to a substance, an inherent factor (whether separable or inseparable) has real existence, and it seems as if it has the nature of the substance.

What an inherent factor and a radiated factor have in common is that both are said to be attached to, to exist in or to inhere a substance,[155] although Cyril seldom uses this terminology in connection with radiated factors. More often a radiated factor is said to be (εἶναι) or to exist (ὑπάρχειν) in (ἐν) a substance, while at the same time the substance is said to be in (ἐν) the radiated factor.[156] The reason that substances are said to be in radiated factors, but not in inherent factors, is that a radiated factor goes out of (ἐκ) the substance,[157] while inherent

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[152] *Ibid.*, 137.

[153] Ellis (1990) discusses the way in which several philosophers from Porphyry to Elias (*fl.* 541) wrote about the ontological status of fragrance. According to Aristotle, *Categories*, 1a$^{24–25}$, what is "in a subject", that is, an accident, "cannot exist separately from what it is in". Fragrance, however, travels from the substance to which it belongs. Is it not an accident, then? If not, what is it? Various solutions have been proposed.

[154] See section 3.2.2.

[155] *Dial. Trin.* II, 453c; *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 (12b and 12c); II.1, vol. 1, 191 (128a).

[156] *Thesaurus*, 181B; *Dial. Trin.* II, 450e, 452b, 453b; *In Jo.* I.3, vol. 1, 44 (28e–29a); II.1, vol. 1, 191 (128a); III.5, vol. 1, 444 (302b); XI.1, vol. 2, 635 (930b).

[157] *Thesaurus*, 100D; *Dial. Trin.* II, 450d, 451a, 452ab, 453ab; III, 469d, 475c; *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 (12b and 12c); I.3, vol. 1, 44 (29a); I.5, vol. 1, 68 (45e); I.5, vol. 1, 71f. (48c); II.1, vol. 1, 191 (128a); II.4, vol. 1, 255 (170e); III.5, vol. 1, 444 (302b); VII, vol. 2, 259 (671b); XI.1, vol. 2, 635 (930ab).

factors never leave the substance. The radiated factor is regarded as offspring (γέννημα), and the substance as begetter (γεννήσας, τεκών).[158] The substance may also be called 'root' (ῥίζα)[159] or 'mother' (μήτηρ),[160] the radiated factor 'shoot' (βλάστημα),[161] 'fruit' (καρπός)[162] or 'embryo' (κύημα).[163] Stating that the substance is in the radiated factor is one way of emphasizing that, despite its going out, the radiated factor is never fully separated from the substance. This is also expressed by the word 'co-existence' (συνύπαρξις) and similar terms.[164] The substance and the factor that has gone out from it co-exist.[165] Cyril regularly writes that in thought (ἐπινοίᾳ, and similar expressions) radiated factor and substance seem to be separated and to be 'another and another', but that in fact there is no separation or emanation (ἀπορροή) or passion.[166] Therefore, the substance does not suffer a loss and does not become inferior, when the radiated factor goes out of it.[167] The substance is never without (δίχα) the radiated factor, nor the radiated factor without the substance.[168]

Through radiated factors we may have knowledge of their substances[169] or we may participate in their substances.[170] The radiated factor acts on the senses of human beings, whether the eyes (light),[171]

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[158] *Dial. Trin.* II, 450d–451a; *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 (12b and 12c); I.5, vol. 1, 72 (48c).

[159] *Dial. Trin.* II, 450e, 453a; III, 469e, 475b.

[160] *Dial. Trin.* III, 469e.

[161] *Dial. Trin.* III, 47bc.

[162] *Dial. Trin.* II, 450e; III, 475b.

[163] *Dial. Trin.* II, 450e.

[164] *Dial. Trin.* II, 451b, 452b, 453c; *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 (12b and 12c); I.5, vol. 1, 68 (45e); I.5, vol. 1, 71 (48c).

[165] Cyril is not fully consistent in his use of these terms. Mostly, 'co-existence' contains both aspects of distance and proximity, in which case it is applicable to radiated factors, not to inherent factors (e.g., *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 [12c]). In another case, however, he applies 'co-existence' to the inherent factor of 'colour' (*Dial. Trin.* II, 452c).

[166] *Dial. Trin.* II, 450d, 452b, 453ab; *In Jo.* I.3, vol. 1, 44 (29a); I.5, vol. 1, 72 (48c); II.1, vol. 1, 191 (128ab); II.4, vol. 1, 255 (170e); III.5, vol. 1, 444 (302b); XI.1, vol. 2, 635 (930ab).

[167] *Dial. Trin.* II, 451a, 453b; III, 475bc; *In Jo.* II.4, vol. 1, 255 (170e); II.7, vol. 1, 333 (225e).

[168] *Dial. Trin.* II, 450e (the mind is not ἄλογος, the word is not ἄνους), 451a; *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 (12b); I.5, vol. 1, 72 (48c).

[169] *Dial. Trin.* II, 452e–453a; *In Jo.* XI.1, vol. 2, 635 (930a). Cf. *In Jo.* II.4, vol. 1, 255 (171a).

[170] *Dial. Trin.* III, 469b: μέθεξιν, explained by way of the example of the sun's rays which impart heat to the senses.

[171] *Dial. Trin.* II, 452e–453a.

the nose (scent),[172] the tongue (sweetness),[173] or the skin (heat), and thus communicates knowledge about the substance to human beings, and lets them participate in it. Through the radiated factor we may know what the substance is by nature (κατὰ φύσιν).[174] This is possible because radiated factor and substance are connatural (συμφυής),[175] they are one in nature (though separable in thought),[176] not of a different nature (ἑτεροφυής),[177] they have a natural intimacy.[178] One may even say that, as it were, one nature has been allotted to them,[179] one may speak of 'substantial identity' with respect to substance and radiated factor,[180] and say that they are the same as regards substance.[181]

From the whole argumentation it is clear that with 'one by nature' and 'identity of substance' Cyril envisages, not the substance's separate existence, but its essence, its substantial qualities. It is those that are communicated to the senses. Occasionally, the archbishop of Alexandria makes this even more explicit. Thus he says that when the mind begets a word, the quality and form of its begetter is allotted to the word as its own nature.[182] And a ray has 'the whole quality' of the substance of the sun in itself.[183] It seems that the word ποιότης in these sentences does not merely mean 'a quality'; it appears to indicate the combined natural properties.[184] After giving the examples of a human being and its child, and of fire and heat, Cyril even writes that "the descen-

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[172] *In Jo.* XI.1, vol. 2, 635 (930a).

[173] *In Jo.* I.3, vol. 1, 44 (28e).

[174] *Dial. Trin.* II, 453a.

[175] *Dial. Trin.* II, 452b, III, 469b.

[176] *Thesaurus*, 100D: ἓν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχον; *In Jo.* I.3, vol. 1, 44 (29a): ἐπινοίᾳ μεριστὸν, ἓν δὲ τῇ φύσει; I.5, vol. 1, 72 (48c): ἓν δὲ ἐστι καὶ ταὐτὸν τῇ φύσει.

[177] *Dial. Trin.* III, 469d; *In Jo.* VII, vol. 2, 259 (671b).

[178] *Dial. Trin.* VI, 593bc: τὴν φυσικὴν οἰκειότητα. It is not a matter of participation and separation: οὔτι που τὸ ὡς ἐν μεθέξει διῃρημένως.

[179] *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 (12c): καὶ μίαν ὡς πρὸς αὐτὰ τὴν φύσιν κληρωσάμενα.

[180] *Dial. Trin.* III, 469b. In a not too lucid paragraph Cyril argues that if 'other things' participate in a substance through a radiated factor, this is possible because the radiated factor is connatural with the substance, it operates as if it were equal to the substance, and by a necessary law they (substance and radiated factor) are assigned substantial identity (οὐσιώδη ταυτότητα). See also *In Jo.* III.5, vol. 1, 444 (302b).

[181] *In Jo.* I.3, vol. 1, 44 (29b): ταὐτόν εἰσιν ὅσον εἰς οὐσίαν ἀμφότερα.

[182] *Dial. Trin.* II, 450e: ὁ δὲ τὴν τοῦ τεκόντος ποιότητα καὶ ἰδέαν φύσιν ὥσπερ ἰδίαν διεκληρώσατο.

[183] *Dial. Trin.* III, 469e: τῆς τοῦ προέντος οὐσίας ὅλην ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ποιότητα διεκφαίνοιτο. Cf. *In Jo.* XI.1, vol. 2, 635 (930a): the scent receives from the flower "the substantial and natural energy, or quality (τὴν οὐσιώδη καὶ φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἤτοι ποιότητα)".

[184] This also applies to ποιότης in *Dial. Trin.* 582b (they say that the ποιότης of the

dants may, so to speak, be regarded as a particular natural quality of the begetters".[185] The 'particular' in this phrase does not single out one quality from among several, but rather indicates a particular 'descendant', which shows the whole ποιότης, that is, all the natural properties. It is probably also in this way that we should understand it when Cyril calls the holy Spirit "a particular quality of the Godhead".[186]

When these images are applied to the holy Trinity, the Father is regarded as the substance, while the radiated factor mostly refers to the Son,[187] and sometimes to the Spirit.[188] From time to time, however, Cyril emphasizes that "the power of the example is little", and that "the nature which is above everything surpasses this too";[189] that God is "beyond substance", so that any example taken from creation is never fully accurate.[190] "And if we see through a mirror and in an enigma, and we conceive in part, how much weaker shall we be in the words through the tongue?", Cyril asks.[191] Elsewhere he states: We say that the Father and the Son co-operate,

> not conceiving them separately as two, in order that we do not conceive of two gods, nor [conceiving] both together as one, in order that neither the Son is compressed into the Father, nor the Father into the Son.[192]

3.4.3. *Jacques Liébaert's* La doctrine christologique[193]

It is worthwhile to devote some attention to Jacques Liébaert's study of Cyril of Alexandria's christology before the Nestorian controversy. First of all, because an insight into the archbishop's earlier christology

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substance of the Son can be known from the fact that he is subjected to the Father), and VI, 603d (a sunbeam is thought to be like the sun διὰ τῆς … ταὐτοειδοῦς ποιότητος).

[185] *In Jo.* II.4, vol. 1, 255 (171a): φυσική τις, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, ποιότης. Obviously, a human being and its child are not to be regarded as a substance and its radiated factor. Cyril also writes that fire gives to the heat that proceeds out of it, the property of its own nature (τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως τὸ ἰδίωμα) (170e).

[186] *Dial. Trin.* VI, 593d. Cf. *Thesaurus*, 596A.

[187] *Dial. Trin.* I, 450c, 452e; III, 475bc; *In Jo.* I.1, vol. 1, 19 (12bc); I.3, vol. 1, 43f. (28d–29a); I.5, vol. 1, 68 (45de); I.5, vol. 1, 71f. (48bc); II.1, vol. 1, 190f. (128ab); II.4, vol. 1, 254f. (170de); III.5, vol. 1, 444 (302ab); VII, vol. 2, 259 (671b).

[188] *Thesaurus*, 596A; *In Jo.* XI.1, vol. 2, 635f. (930ab).

[189] *In Jo.* I.5, vol. 1, 68 (45e).

[190] *Ibid.*, I.5, vol. 1, 72 (48c): ὑπερούσιος.

[191] *Ibid.*, II.4, vol. 1, 255 (171ab). In Cyril's view, then, our thinking and contemplation of God are less inaccurate than our speaking of him.

[192] *Ibid.*, I.5, vol. 1, 71 (48b).

[193] Liébaert (1951).

will help us in assessing his later christology and in marking both
the continuity and the changes. Secondly, because Liébaert gives a
rather debatable interpretation of 'human nature' and related terms.[194]
And thirdly, because Liébaert has received a wider audience in that
Aloys Grillmeier, in his influential series *Christ in Christian Tradition*, has
adopted several of the French theologian's conclusions.[195] And since for
Cyril christology and soteriology are closely related, we will also look
at several aspects of his soteriology, including the notion of deification,
because they shed some light on his utilization of the terms.

According to Liébaert, Cyril's anthropology is Platonic in the sense
that a human being is defined as a spirit in a body, an incarnated spirit,
not as a substantial composition of a body and a soul. Any spirit, then,
can be said to 'become man' as soon as it is united with a human
body. Thus, when the divine Word 'becomes man', it means that he
unites himself with a human body. The human soul is not absent, but
is irrelevant for the process as well as for the result. Cyril's christology
before 428, then, is of the type Word-flesh, in which 'flesh' indicates the
body rather than the composition of soul and body, in Liébaert's view.

On this understanding, 'human nature' (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) is a
condition, a state, namely, the condition of a spirit united to a human
body.[196] It is not one of the elements out of which the incarnate Word
is composed. The human element is the 'flesh' (σάρξ), understood as
the body. When the human nature is said to be assumed by the Word,
it means that the Word has assumed the human condition of being
united to a body. The term 'humanity' (ἀνθρωπότης), too, does not
indicate the assumed human element, but refers to the state of being
incarnated.[197] But while the 'flesh', the element, is not called 'humanity'
in Cyril's christology, conversely, the 'humanity', the condition, the
state, is at times indicated by the word 'flesh'. A second meaning that
'humanity' may have in Cyril's writings (at least before 428), according
to the French theologian, is 'le genre humain', humankind in the sense

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[194] *Ibid.*, 174–178; see also pp. 148, 158.

[195] Grillmeier, *CCT* I, 2nd rev. ed., 1975, 414–417. This is still the case in the third revised German edition of 1990: *JdChr* I, ³1990, 605–609.

[196] Liébaert (1951), 177 f.: 'La nature humaine est donc la condition d'un esprit uni à un corps humain'.

[197] *Ibid.*, 174. Liébaert asks whether 'humanity' does not have a more concrete sense, 'désignant l'élément assumé, la chose prise par le Verbe et pas seulement son état nouveau'? And he answers that in Cyril's conception of the incarnation 'cela ne paraît pas possible'. See also p. 175: 'En somme pour Cyrille la chair est *la chose* assumée par le Verbe; l'humanité est *l'état* du Verbe incarné'.

of all people together.[198] One of the consequences of this view is that
the divine Word is the acting subject, also in his incarnated state. The
Word himself *is* the man.[199] In this sense, one can even speak of "an
extremely vigorous realism of the incarnation".[200] But this is possible
only, because the human soul of Christ, though confessed to be present,
does not play any significant role.[201]

Liébaert can arrive at his conclusions only by downplaying a num-
ber of observations he himself, nevertheless, makes, or by giving them
a disputable interpretation. Possibly his most influential choice is that
in the vast majority of cases he interprets the word σάρξ as indicating
the body only, not the whole human being, including his soul. Sev-
eral scholars have criticized Liébaert's study for this.[202] Jean Daniélou
stresses that Cyril of Alexandria is first and foremost a biblical theolo-
gian, who prefers the biblical word σάρξ, which often does not indicate
the body, but the whole human being, body and soul, in its state of
weakness.

Liébaert's interpretation is all the more remarkable since he himself
points to a passage in the *Commentary on John* in which Cyril explains
that 'flesh' means 'man', not just the body, but also the soul; the whole
is designated by the part.[203] Cyril refers to Joel 2:28, where it says: "I
will pour out my Spirit on all flesh", and he comments that the Spirit
is not bestowed on soulless flesh alone. He adds that, while man is
a rational living being, he is composed (σύνθετον) of soul and body.
And he suggests a reason why in John 1:14 it says that "the Word
became flesh", rather than "the Word became man". Death has come
to man through the flesh only, since the soul was kept in immortality,
Cyril writes.[204] The evangelist chose the word 'flesh', "indicating the
living being especially from the part affected",[205] in order to emphasize

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[198] *Ibid.*, 175, n. 1: 'Le mot ἀνθρωπότης n'a pratiquement que deux sens chez Cyrille:
condition humaine ou genre humain'. See also pp. 226 f.

[199] *Ibid.*, 177: 'L'homme dans le Verbe, c'est donc en définitive le Verbe lui-même en
tant qu'uni à une chair'.

[200] *Ibid.*

[201] Diepen (1956) takes issue with Liébaert's view of the soul in Cyril's early christol-
ogy. See also Welch (1994a) and Welch (1994b), 40–60.

[202] See the reviews of Liébaert's book by Daniélou (1952), Galtier (1952b) and Giet
(1953). See also: de Halleux (1981), 141 f., and Welch (1994b), 45 f.

[203] Liébaert (1951), 175 f. *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 138–140 (94c–96a).

[204] This is not the place to comment on Cyril's view of the immortality of the (not
pre-existent) soul.

[205] *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 139 (95d).

that it was the body in particular that needed to be restored to life. Liébaert, however, states that Cyril does not draw the conclusion that the Word has also assumed a human soul, and that in the explanation which follows he only speaks about the assumed body, which, in his assessment, makes sense when the Word united with the assumed body realizes the definition of man. Saying that the Word has assumed flesh, then, is saying that he has assumed humanity (which means: the human condition), according to Liébaert. Against this interpretation, however, it may be argued that, given Cyril's explanation why the word 'flesh' is used, there is no need for him to explicitly state that also a human soul was assumed, while it is implicitly present in the phrase "indicating the living being especially from the part affected". Cyril's argumentation might be summarized as follows: in the expression 'the Word became flesh' the word 'flesh' refers to the whole human being, body and soul, but for theological reasons the whole is indicated by the part.

Liébaert writes that "we cannot find any somewhat developed anthropological text" of Cyril's.[206] In a note he admits that the archbishop of Alexandria at times gives the formula of man as: 'a rational, mortal living being, receptive of intelligence and knowledge'.[207] But he states that Cyril merely employs it as an example of a definition and that he does not make it his own.[208] He adds that in one place in the *Commentary on John* Cyril speaks "in passing" of man as a being composed of a body and a rational soul,[209] and then he says that besides this the texts keep absolutely silent.[210] Does he mean to say that nowhere else in Cyril's writings we can find anything about man as a being composed of soul and body? But we just saw a second place in the *Commentary on John* where this is the case, while others can be mentioned.[211]

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[206] Liébaert (1951), 174.

[207] *Ibid.*, n. 2. See for places where Cyril defines man in this way: chapter 2, nn. 194 and 196.

[208] Grillmeier, *CCT* I, ²1975, 416, and *JdChr* I, ³1990, 608, writes that Aristotelian definitions of man are indeed used, "with reference to Didymus", but that they do not imply a transference of an Aristotelian anthropology to christology. In a note (n. 10) he adds that "these definitions occur in the dispute with Eunomius, who was trained as an Aristotelian". Against this, it should be said that Cyril does not refer to Didymus, Liébaert does this, and that the definitions are not only found in the chapters of the *Thesaurus* where Cyril counters Eunomius and his followers as his opponents, but also in other places. To the ones already mentioned may be added Cyril's commentary on John 8:55 (*In Jo.* VI, vol. 2, 128 [582d–583a]).

[209] *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 219 (147c).

[210] Liébaert (1951), 174, n. 2: 'Hors de là les textes sont absolument muets'.

[211] For example, *In Jo.* V.5, vol. 2, 64 (538e). See also n. 209.

What is more, in his exegesis of John 1:9 in the *Commentary*, Cyril takes several pages to refute a christianized Platonic anthropology.[212] After a depiction of the rejected view, he deals with it in 24 syllogistic sections, not unlike the ones in the *Thesaurus*. The view that he opposes may be summarized as follows:

> The human souls were pre-existent in heaven, where they spent a long time in bodiless blessedness and enjoyed the good more purely. But they declined to strange thoughts and desires, they sinned. Therefore, God sent them into the world, to be entangled with bodies of earth, through which they are in bondage to death and corruption. He chose to instruct them by this experience.

John 1:9 is one of the biblical verses on which this view is based: "He was the true light, which enlightens every man that comes into the world". The most important theme for Cyril of Alexandria, to which he returns in most of the sections, is that the body is not a punishment for previous sins, but that it belongs to God's good creation. If the body were a punishment, death would mean salvation, he argues; we, however, believe in the resurrection of the flesh, and we rightly thank God for it. But in the course of his argumentation, Cyril gives us some further insight into his anthropology. We have no other time of being than this one, he writes, and we come into the world with the body. Before that, there was non-being, out of which we pass to a beginning of being.[213] For Cyril, then, becoming man is not the entering of a pre-existent soul into a body, but the whole man, body and soul, comes into existence at the beginning of his earthly life.

The terminology Cyril employs in this passage, compared with that in the *Thesaurus*, the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, and the remainder of the *Commentary on John*, is telling as well. The verb 'to embody' and the noun 'embodiment', which contain the word σῶμα, are not used in the first two works, and in the *Commentary* only in reference to a

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[212] *Ibid.*, I.9, vol. 1, 115–126 (77e–86b).

[213] *Ibid.*, I.9, vol. 1, 118 (79e–80a): μόνον ἔχοντες τοῦτον τοῦ εἶναι τὸν καιρὸν, καθ' ὃν μετὰ σώματος εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐρχόμεθα, τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρότερον, ὥσπερ τινὰ τόπον καταλιμπάνοντες, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρὸς ὑπάρξεως ἀρχὴν μεθιστάμενοι. Later, in the year 429, in his *Letter to the Monks* (*ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 15[13–20]), Cyril writes that a man receives his flesh, his body, from his mother, while God introduces the spirit (πνεῦμα) in a way unknown to us. From his argumentation, it is clear that he means to say that God introduces the soul, but he says 'spirit' because he quotes Zechariah 12:1, where this word is used. Although in his *Commentary on John*, Cyril does not describe man's coming into existence in this way, it may already have been his view at that time, for it fits well with the text we are analysing.

Platonic understanding of the embodiment of pre-existent souls: 13 times in total, 10 of which in the passage under investigation.[214] Thus, in the three writings mentioned, Cyril never applies these terms to the incarnation of the Word of God. Conversely, in the three writings, terms like 'inhumanation' and the corresponding verb, containing the word ἄνθρωπος, are only, and quite often, applied to the Word of God, not at all to human souls.[215] This is another indication that Cyril of Alexandria's understanding of the incarnation is different from a Platonic embodiment of pre-existent souls. The souls are not said to become man, by Cyril, while the Word of God is not said to become embodied.

Terms containing the word σάρξ, like 'incarnation' and 'to incarnate', are applied both to the embodiment of souls and to the inhumanation of the Word of God.[216] Not only is there a biblical precedence for the use of σάρξ in connection with the inhumanation of God's Word, also in the Creed of Nicaea (325) σαρκωθέντα is placed side by side with ἐνανθρωπήσαντα. Besides, Cyril adds several times that by 'incarnation' is meant that the Word of God is made man. "When we say 'having been made flesh (σεσαρκῶσθαι)' we mean that he was completely (ὁλοκλήρως) made man".[217] Liébaert comments that, in the pre-428 christology of the archbishop of Alexandria, expressions like 'fully human' or 'perfect man' denote that the Word of God has entered the human condition by uniting himself to a human flesh (understood as a

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[214] Five times σωμάτωσις, twice ἐνσωμάτωσις, and six times a form of the verb σωματοῦν. The adjective ἐνσώματος can be found twice in the *Commentary on John*, II.5, vol. 1, 284 (191b) and VI.1, vol. 2, 153 (600a); both times, it refers to embodied souls, not to the incarnate Word.

[215] The noun ἐνανθρώπησις is employed 19 times in the *Thesaurus*, 11 times in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, and 38 times in the *Commentary on John*. The participle ἐνανθρωπήσας 11 times in the *Thesaurus*, 4 times in the *Dialogues*, and 7 times in the *Commentary*, while the infinitive ἐνανθρωπῆσαι is used twice, once in the *Thesaurus* and once in the *Dialogues*.

[216] Σάρκωσις is applied to the Word of God 4 times in the *Thesaurus*, once in the *Dialogues*, and 7 times in the *Commentary*, while it is used for the embodiment of souls 8 times, all of which in the passage under investigation, *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 115–126 (77e–86b). Forms of the verb σαρκοῦν are not found in the *Thesaurus*, only once in the *Dialogues* (and that in the full quotation of the Creed of Nicaea; I, 390a), and 8 times in the *Commentary*, 7 times in reference to the Word of God, once in the passage under investigation, for the embodiment of souls, *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 119 (81a). The adjective ἔνσαρκος is only used for the Word of God, 7 times in the *Thesaurus*, not once in the *Dialogues*, and once in the *Commentary on John*.

[217] *In Jo.* IV.3, vol. 1, 537 (366c). See also V.2, vol. 1, 713 (486a).

body), without necessarily implying a human soul.[218] This is not convincing. The French theologian himself refers to several places in which Cyril indicates that by these expressions he means the combination of body and soul.[219] It is not likely that elsewhere they would mean 'the human condition of being united to a body'.[220]

If, then, Cyril of Alexandria's anthropology is not Platonic (in the way that Liébaert writes about it), and he does not describe the incarnation as a divine spirit that unites itself to a human body, *what does he mean by 'human nature' and 'humanity' in the christological passages? First of all, it is important to note*, pace *Liébaert, that Cyril does employ these terms to denote the human element, which the Word of God assumes in the incarnation.*

The French theologian acknowledges that Cyril writes that 'humanity (ἀνθρωπότης)' or 'the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις)' is 'assumed', 'put on (as clothing)', or that the Word 'has united' himself to it.[221] And although he says that Cyril speaks of "a 'union' of the Word with the assumed element",[222] he nevertheless regards 'humanity' and 'the human nature' as the human condition of a spirit united to a body (and sometimes as 'le genre humain'), not as the assumed element. For the assumed element, Cyril uses the words σῶμα and σάρξ, according to Liébaert. One may admit that to speak of 'the assumption of the human condition' is no problem; 'putting on the human condition (as clothing)' is a less plausible phrase, but it is possible; what, however, would be the meaning of 'the Word united himself to the human condition', if that condition is defined as a spirit united to a human body? And yet, as Liébaert himself indicates,[223] Cyril writes that the Word united himself to the human nature.[224] It makes more sense

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[218] Liébaert (1951), 179 f.; see also p. 171.

[219] *Ibid.*, 179, n. 3. Besides the references in nn. 203 and 209, he mentions the following two places: *In Jo.* VI.1, vol. 2, 200 (632a) (PG 73, 1012A) and *In Mal.*, Pusey II, 596[7–11].

[220] It may be added that the word τέλειος and its derivatives often refer to the perfection of man in contrast to his sinful state; it then combines the notions of 'sinless' and 'without corruption'. See, for example, *Thesaurus*, 281CD, 424CD, 584D; *Dial. Trin.* VII, 653a; *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 175 f. (117a–d). 'The whole nature'—rather than 'the whole man'—sometimes refers to the whole human race; see nn. 254–256.

[221] Liébaert (1951), 170 f., 175, 199, 201 f.

[222] *Ibid.*, 201.

[223] *Ibid.*, 201, n. 3.

[224] *In Jo.* IV.1, vol. 1, 487 (331e–332a): "You see how the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) is powerless, even in Christ himself, insofar as it is by itself, while it is brought back to God-befitting boldness through the Word which is united to it (διὰ τοῦ

to regard 'humanity' and 'the human nature' in all three expressions as the assumed element.

This is corroborated by various passages in which 'that which is human (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον)', 'temple (ναός)', 'the humanity', 'the human nature', 'our nature', and 'flesh' are used more or less as synonyms. For example, in *Thesaurus*, 428B–429D, where Cyril discusses Luke 2:52, which in his version reads: Καὶ Ἰησοῦς προέκοπτεν ἐν σοφίᾳ (a reading also found in codex Vaticanus, B), "And Jesus grew in wisdom".[225] Cyril regards 'wisdom' as a name of the Logos, and thus interprets it as: "Jesus grew in the Word".[226] And he argues that Wisdom itself is something else than that which grows in it. It is not Wisdom which grows, but "that which is human (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον)" in it. And in the next section he continues:

> That which is human (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον) grew in Wisdom in this way: The Wisdom which is clothed with the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν), that is, the Word of God, through the works and the marvellous effects gradually deifying (θεοποιοῦσα) the assumed temple (ναόν), makes it (αὐτόν) to grow accordingly. In this way the humanity (ἡ ἀνθρωπότης) grew in Wisdom, being deified through it. Therefore, according to the likeness to the Word who was made man for us, we too are called sons of God and gods. Our nature (ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν), then, grew in Wisdom, moving from corruption to incorruption, from [the dignity of] humanity to the dignity of the divinity in Christ.[227]

Thus, that which grows is called 'that which is human', 'the temple', 'the humanity', 'our nature'. It is not the human condition that grows, but the assumed element.[228]

ἑνωθέντος αὐτῇ Λόγου)". *In Jo.* XI.10, vol. 2, 724 (991a): "the Only-Begotten …, having united himself ineffably to our nature (ἀῤῥήτως ἑαυτόν ἑνώσας τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φύσει)".

[225] Sometimes, Cyril writes ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ instead of ἐν σοφίᾳ. This alternative reading is attested to by codex Sinaiticus, ℵ. It does not have any consequences for Cyril's exegesis: both readings are interpreted as 'in Wisdom'.

[226] The validity of Cyril's exegesis does not concern us here; we are merely interested in the way in which he uses the various terms. In later writings, Cyril gives a different interpretation of this verse (see chapter 5, n. 136).

[227] *Thesaurus*, 428B–D.

[228] Liébaert (1951), 142, concludes from this passage that the progress Cyril speaks about is not in the order of human development, but consists in a progressive manifestation of the divinity. This may very well apply to other syllogisms in chapter 28 of the *Thesaurus*, it does not apply to this syllogism. This passage does not speak of a gradual revelation that Christ is the Word of God, who has assumed the flesh, but it is 'our nature' that is said to grow, from corruption to incorruption.

A few sections further down, Cyril compares the 'naked (γυμνός)' Word with the Word 'clothed in the flesh (τὴν σάρκα περιβεβλημένος)'. And he writes:

> Do not apply to the Word that which is fitting to the flesh only and to the human form (τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ σχήματι), but give to the nature of the flesh (τῇ φύσει τοῦ σαρκός) the things that are in debt to it (429BC).

Therefore, he continues, when 'growing' is mentioned, it is not Wisdom itself, as Wisdom, that grows, but 'that which is human (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον)' in Wisdom. The growing element is again called 'that which is human', and Cyril's reasoning makes sense when 'flesh' stands for the whole man, and 'the nature of the flesh' indicates 'the human nature', being the element assumed by the Word of God.

As Cyril often implies, and sometimes writes explicitly,[229] when the Word of God assumed human nature it assumed everything that pertains to that nature. It assumed the possibility to grow, the passions, and also the possibility to die. When, then, Cyril speaks of the assumption of the body this is not to deny that the Word also assumed a human soul (as he sometimes states expressly), but the body is one of the parts of the human nature that has been assumed.

But what does Cyril mean by this 'human nature'? In the quoted passage from the *Thesaurus* it looks like the 'human nature' and the 'humanity' that grow, are not—or not just—the individual humanity of the incarnate Word, but the common human nature, which is shared by all people. It is 'our nature' that grows in Wisdom, moving from corruption to incorruption. It has effects for us, too, who may be called sons of God as a result. It is not likely that Cyril would mean that the Word assumed the whole of humankind, all people. In other passages, Cyril writes that the transformation, the deification, took place 'in Christ first', thus pointing to an interplay of Christ as an individual human being and the common human nature. We will investigate some of those texts further down, but let us now look at a passage in the first dialogue which Liébaert discusses in detail.[230]

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[229] *Thesaurus*, 281C: "For since it is his flesh and not somebody else's, he makes the things that accidentally belong to it his own (ἰδιοποιεῖται τὰ εἰς αὐτὴν συμβαίνοντα)". *Ibid.*, 400D: 'And since he has suffered, he is regarded as making his own (ἰδιοποιούμενος), with the assumed temple, the things in it'. See also *ibid.*, 401B; *Dial. Trin.* VI, 623e; *In Jo.* XI.10, vol. 2, 723 f. (991a).

[230] Liébaert (1951), 207 f., 224–227. *Dial. Trin.* I, 403c–405e.

It is part of a longer argumentation about the meaning of the phrase that Christ is 'mediator between God and men' (1 Tim. 2:5). First, Cyril has described Moses as a type of Christ, being mediator between God and the people of Israel. Then, he refers to the story in Numbers 16–17, in which Aaron stands with incense "in the middle of the dead and the living". Similary, Cyril writes, Jesus is called high priest, and has offered himself as incense, and has become mediator between God and men (404a). Christ has come in between (μεσολαβοῦντος), the battle has stopped, and "those who were formerly separated, that is, God and humanity (ἀνθρωπότης), were joined (συνέβη) to each other" (404b). Liébaert seems right when in this case he interprets 'humanity' as 'le genre humain' in the sense of the whole human race, all people, and that it concerns a moral bond between God and men.

Cyril, however, goes on to say that there is still another reason, ineffable and mystical, why the name and the reality (ὄνομα τε καὶ χρῆμα) of 'mediation' apply to Christ, and this will appear to concern, not a moral bond, but a union of natures. He turns to Phil. 2:5–7, the kenosis: the Word of God emptied himself, became man, while preserving the dignity of his own (the divine) nature. He

> economically assumed that which is human (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον), and is conceived as one Son out of both, in that the divine and human natures have run together and have been brought together indescribably and ineffably into one (ἕν), and have been composed into unity in an inconceivable way.[231]

The Word of God was not changed into the nature of earthly flesh, nor into the flesh of the Word himself.[232] But, while each remains, so to say, in its own definition and formula,[233] what is called 'joining' (συμβάσεως) here indicates the coming together (συνδρομήν) into an extreme and unbreakable unity.[234] For the same one is God as well as man.

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[231] *Dial. Trin.* I, 405ab: καὶ εἷς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοούμενος Υἱός, συνδεδραμηκότων καὶ συνενεχθέντων εἰς ἓν φύσεως τε θείας καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἀφράστως τε καὶ ἀπορρήτως, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι νοεῖν εἰς ἑνότητα συντεθειμένων.

[232] 'The nature of earthly flesh' refers to the human nature, common to all people, while 'the flesh of the Word himself' refers to a view in which the Word's flesh was different than that of ordinary men. Cf. *Dial. Trin.* I, 395e.

[233] *Ibid.*, 405b: ἐν ἰδίῳ μένοντος ὅρῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ. Liébaert (1951), 207, translates: "dans sa limite et son caractère propre", not aware that Cyril employs terms here that belong to Aristotelian logic.

[234] *Ibid.*, 405b: τὸ τῆς λεγομένης ἐνθάδε συμβάσεως ὄνομα δηλοῖ.

According to Liébaert, the word σύμβασις refers to συνέβη in 404b, which deals with the relationship between God and all people. Therefore, he argues, it does not indicate the union of the natures in Christ, but the moral union between men and God.[235] This seems an unlikely interpretation, since the whole context, both before and after the word σύμβασις is mentioned, discusses the person of Christ, not yet his work as mediator.[236] And for several sentences Cyril continues to speak of his person, before he returns to the issue of mediation, which he does as follows:

> Therefore, he is also in this way conceived as mediator, showing that the things that were widely separated by nature and had an immense interval between them (μεσολαβοῦν), that is, divinity and humanity, have been brought together and united in him, and connecting (συνείρων) us to God the Father. For he is connatural (ὁμοφυής) with God, since he is also out of him and in him, and [connatural] with men, as out of us and in us.[237]

Liébaert rightly states that the archbishop of Alexandria places himself alternately on the moral and on the ontological plane, but his conclusion that 'humanity' and 'human nature' mean sometimes 'le genre humain' and at other times 'the human condition' is debatable. He points to two passages in the *Thesaurus*, which we will examine as well. First, *Thesaurus*, 241D:

> If the Son is mediator between God and men, as joining (συνάπτων) the extremes into natural (φυσικήν) unity, it is necessary to say that, just as he is joined naturally (συνήφθη φυσικῶς) to men, having become man, so also is he fastened (ἤρτηται) to the divine nature, being God by nature.

And then *Thesaurus*, 504A–C:

> For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all. If Jesus Christ is mediator between God and men, without being joined naturally and substantially to God and men (οὐ φύσει καὶ οὐσιωδῶς Θεῷ τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις συναπτόμενος), but only reconciling (διαλλάττων) and bringing to friendship the things that were far away from fellowship with each

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[235] Liébaert (1951), 208, n. 1: "Σύμβασις n'est donc pas un terme désignant l'union des natures dans le Christ comme l'a compris Ed. Weigl (...); le mot désigne simplement ici l'union morale entre les hommes et Dieu".

[236] One could also point to another text (cited by Liébaert (1951), 223, n. 1), from *Festal Letter* 17 (for the year 429), $3^{123-126}$ (SC 434, p. 282). See for a discussion of this passage section 5.4.2.2.

[237] *Dial. Trin.* I, 405d.

other, that is, man and God, how can Paul call him 'one'? Since many other saints were deemed worthy of such a ministry. [Then, Cyril gives several examples: Paul himself, Moses, and Jeremiah.] How can Christ be one mediator, if there is nothing unusual about him? But he is [the only] one, as Paul rightly says. In an unusual way, and not in a way similar to the others, and it needs to be said how. Since, then, that which lies in the middle of two things (τὸ δύο τινῶν κατὰ μέσου κείμενον), touches (ἐφάπτεται) both by its own extremities, holding together (συνέχων) into unity the things that are separated, and Christ is mediator between God and men, it is clear that he naturally touches (ἅπτεται φυσικῶς) God as God, and men as man. For he is our peace, through his likeness to us binding the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν) into the unity and fellowship of the divine substance. How else could we be found to be partakers of the divine nature?

Liébaert comments that 'the human nature' towards the end of this passage should be interpreted as 'le genre humain', since it concerns the moral aspect: Christ joins the two extremes, God and men.[238] 'Le genre humain' is understood by him, not as the genus of man, but as all men together.

Cyril, however, makes a similar distinction here as in the first dialogue: Christ is not just mediator by reconciling God and men as a third party, just as Aaron, Moses, Paul and Jeremiah, but he is unique in that he is also mediator in a more profound way. He alone is "naturally and substantially joined to God and men". Jesus Christ—and he alone—is ontologically united to both God and men. The juxtaposition of φύσει and οὐσιωδῶς suggests that φύσις in this passage has a meaning close to that of οὐσία, indicating the human nature common to all people. This is confirmed by Cyril's argumentation about the deification of man. We are made partakers of the divine nature, because 'the human nature' is bound by the incarnate Word into unity and fellowship with the divine substance. By Christ our common human nature is brought into contact with the divine nature or substance, and because our common nature is deified this has an effect for each individual human being.

All these passages, then, make sense when 'human nature' is interpreted in line with our previous observations of how Cyril employs the term φύσις in the trinitarian writings: it is a notion close to 'secondary substance', indicating the essence of a species. But just as οὐσία, as that which is common to the individuals

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[238] Liébaert (1951), 223.

of a species, is not an abstraction, but a reality (πρᾶγμα),[239] *so also ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις is a reality, common to all individual men, including Christ.* The Word of God is God by nature, because he is born naturally from God the Father. He is connatural with the Father. But when he became man, he also became connatural with us men. Since the incarnation he 'touches' both natures.[240] *By assuming the common human nature, the Word of God became an individual human being.*[241] That Cyril regards Christ as an individual man is particularly clear in those instances when he says that the flesh is not somebody else's, but his own,[242] and when he calls the incarnate Word 'one of us (εἷς ἐξ ἡμῶν)'.[243]

Cyril uses a metaphor of place again. The divine and the human common natures are represented as at a distance from each other. Christ, however, stands in the middle, he belongs as it were to both natures. On one side he belongs to the divine nature and touches God the Father, on the other side he belongs to the human nature and touches us men. Thus, through him we are united to the Father. The ontological and the moral relations are closely connected, but they can and should be distinguished. Jesus Christ is the only one in whom both natures are present—ontologically. The 'natural unity' is found only in him,[244] *he only is 'one out of both'. The relationship between God the Father and individual men, however, is not 'natural' but external.*[245] In one place Cyril even writes that Christ's own flesh is united with the Father 'relationally, not naturally':

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[239] See section 3.2.2. *Dial. Trin.* I, 408e.

[240] Cf. also *In Jo.* III.3, vol. 1, 393 (266c): Christ, "naturally (φυσικῶς) touching (ἐπιθιγγάνοντος) the things mediated, reaching out (διήκοντος) to both, I mean, the mediated humanity and God the Father".

[241] Loofs (1887), 49, and Harnack (1898), 176, explicitly deny that Christ was an individual human being. See p. 30.

[242] *Thesaurus*, 281C: "For since it is his flesh, and not somebody else's, he makes his own the things that pertain to it". *Ibid.*, 333A: "For the body is not somebody else's, but his". *Ibid.*, 384D: "It [the assumed flesh] became, not somebody else's, but his". *In Jo.* IV.2, vol. 1, 530 (361d): "For the body is really his own, and not someone else's".

[243] Especially in his *Commentary on John*, but also in other Old and New Testament commentaries. For example, *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 184 (123d); V.2, vol. 1, 694 (473de).

[244] Liébaert (1951), 222, criticizes Ed. Weigl for regarding 'natural unity' in *Thesaurus*, 241D, as lying on the ontological level, and himself stresses that 'the extremes' that are joined into this natural unity are God and men. Because of the brevity of the pertinent section it *seems* that Liébaert is right, but in light of the whole of Cyril's trinitarian writings it is more likely that the 'natural unity' refers to the ontological presence of both natures in Christ, as a result of which he is mediator between God and men. Whether such a 'natural unity' would not result in confusion is not an issue at this stage. Possibly the first instance that the union of the Word with the flesh is called ἀσυγχύτως is found in *In Jo.* XI.12, vol. 3, 2 (1001d). See for a discussion of the phrase 'natural unity' section 5.4.2.2.

[245] See also section 6.3.7.

> Through a union with the Spirit, according to the ineffable manner of
> the bond, the flesh is evidently sanctified, and so it ascends to a union
> without confusion with God the Word, and through him with the Father,
> evidently relationally and not naturally.[246]

And precisely because the union between the Father and the flesh of
Christ is relational rather than natural, the Father can 'give' glory to it.
It is given by the Father, through the Son, in the holy Spirit.[247]

This picture of Christ is similar to the one depicted by Daniel
Keating:

> More precisely, in Cyril's view the Word has taken on our fallen human-
> ity from the Virgin, and has become fully a human being like us; but
> because it is the *Word* who has assumed this humanity, in his capacity as
> Second Adam his humanity is representative of the whole race.[248]

Keating writes that "Cyril draws upon these biblical resources and
restates them in the more abstract language current in his day".[249]
He contends that the way in which Cyril describes the soteriologi-
cal function of Christ's humanity is not indebted to any particular
philosophical framework. I would agree that Scripture is not only
the most important source, but also the norm for Cyril's theology,
but I would add that when the archbishop employs non- or hardly
biblical terms like 'humanity', 'nature', 'substance' and the like, it
helps to try to understand his own philosophical framework. That
framework is not pre-given, whether by Platonism, Aristotelianism or

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[246] *In Jo.* XI.12, vol. 3, 2 (1001d): σχετικῶς δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὐ φυσικῶς. This passage is
also referred to by Boulnois (2003), 109, and Keating (2003), 181f. Keating comments
that Cyril "rejects what he understands the Nestorian position to be, namely, that
a *man* is said to be joined to the Word by an external or participatory relationship
(σχετικῶς)", but that "he appears to be committed to the view that, once joined to
the Word in an ineffable union, Christ's own flesh, his assumed humanity, remains
ever in a σχετικῶς relationship with the Godhead as such". See also Keating (2004),
186f. It seems to me that one comes to a better interpretation of this passage when
'relationally, and not naturally' is applied to the union between Christ's humanity with
the person of the Father, not with 'the Godhead as such'. Just as the phrase 'by the
Father, through the Son, in the Spirit' indicates a difference in the way the three divine
persons are involved in their united operation towards creation in general, so also the
union of Christ's humanity with each of the three hypostases of the Trinity is described
differently. Chadwick (1951), 154, n. 2, also applies the phrase σχετικῶς δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
οὐ φυσικῶς to the union of Christ's flesh with the Father, and he translates: "though
obviously the union with the Father is one of moral relation and not of nature".

[247] *In Jo.* XI.12, vol. 3, 2 (1001c): δοθὲν δὲ δὴ πάντως παρὰ Πατρὸς δι' αὐτοῦ ἐν
Πνεύματι.

[248] Keating (2004), 49.

[249] *Ibid.*, 51.

Stoicism (the three options Keating mentions), but it is Cyril's own, which has been informed by the eclectic neo-Platonism of his time, and which he adapts to his theological needs, where necessary.

3.4.4. *Christology and Soteriology*

The interplay between the common human nature on the one hand and the incarnate Word regarded as an individual man on the other hand is important in Cyril's soteriology. First, the divine Word assumes the common nature and in doing this himself becomes an individual human being. During Christ's life on earth the common human nature was gradually deified.[250] But this was apparent first of all in the individual man Jesus Christ, as Cyril points out on a number of occasions, already in the *Thesaurus*, for example:

> Therefore also he says: "I am the way", through which, as it were, the divine grace has come down to us, elevating and sanctifying and glorifying and deifying the nature in Christ first.[251]

Cyril does not mention it in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, but it recurs in the *Commentary on John*, for example, concerning the reception of the holy Spirit: "Christ first received the Spirit as first-fruits of the renewed nature".[252]

Cyril works with the New Testament notions of 'recapitulation' (Eph. 1:10) and the 'last (or second) Adam' (1 Cor. 15:22, 45–49; Rom. 5:12–21).[253] And in doing so, he regularly uses the word φύσις to denote that in Christ, as well as in Adam, the whole of humanity is affected. In

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[250] *Thesaurus*, 428CD; see for a quotation n. 227.

[251] *Thesaurus*, 333C. See also *ibid.*, 264D ('for the evangelical life lit up in Christ first', as an interpretation of Prov. 8:22, LXX, 'The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways unto his works'), 273C, 281B ('for these things started in Christ first, and thereafter came to us'), 336CD, 368B, 405B.

[252] *In Jo.*, V.2, vol. 1, 692 (472a). See also *ibid.*, IV.2, vol. 1, 520 (354d): "For we reckon that the mystery will extend to the whole humanity through the resurrection of Christ, and we believe that in him, and in him first, our whole human nature (καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πρώτῳ πᾶσαν … τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν) has been liberated from corruption". Other places in the *Commentary on John*, in which Cyril speaks of a change in human nature that has first taken place in Christ, include: *In Jo.* II.4, vol. 1, 257 f. (172de); V.2, vol. 1, 694 (473b), 697 (475d); IX, vol. 2, 474 (814d), 482 f. (820e–821a); XI.10, vol. 2, 724 (991ab).

[253] Welch (1994b), 61–103, has shown that these two themes, according to which Christ is at once an individual human being and the representative of the whole human race, recur frequently in Cyril's *Commentary on John*. Meunier (1997), 23–157, also devotes much attention to both themes.

these particular contexts, 'the human nature' tends to refer to the whole human race, all the people together, Liébaert's 'le genre humain'. For instance: "Since those who believed received it, because of them the grace of the resurrection was transferred to the whole (ὅλην) nature".[254] At times, it should be taken in a Pauline mystical sense, as 'all in Christ'. So, the incarnate Word

> died for our sakes according to the flesh, in order that he would conquer death for us and would raise the whole (ὅλην) nature with himself, for we were all in him, insofar as he has become man.[255]

But also in such soteriological contexts the Alexandrian archbishop sometimes employs more philosophical terminology. For instance:

> For all will rise from the dead, because it has been given to the whole nature (πάσῃ … τῇ φύσει) as a result of the grace of the resurrection, and in the one Christ—who from the beginning as the first one destroyed the dominion of death and was brought to unending life—the common definition of humanity (ὁ κοινὸς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ὅρος) is transformed, just as in Adam—as again in one who is first—it is condemned to death and corruption.[256]

Here, Cyril apparently regards man as a substance whose definition includes the notion of mortality. It is likely that he has the formula in mind that he mentions a number of times elsewhere: 'rational, mortal living being, receptive of intelligence and knowledge'. This definition is as it were changed by the resurrection of Christ, since all will rise to an unending life, and thus 'mortal' will no longer belong to man's definition.[257]

Also in his commentary on John 1:14, "and he dwelt among us", Cyril speaks explicitly about "that which is common". The evangelist reveals to us a very deep mystery:

> We are all in Christ, and that which is common of humanity rises to his person (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀναβαίνει πρόσωπον), for which reason he is also called 'the last Adam', giving richly to the

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[254] *In Jo.* IV.7, vol. 1, 636 (434e; see also 435b and 435c), and see *ibid.*, VI.1, vol. 2, 233 (654a).

[255] *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 185 (124a). See also *ibid.*, IX, vol. 2, 378 (745cd); XI.12, vol. 3, 4 (1003a).

[256] *Ibid.* VI.1, vol. 2, 220 (645cd).

[257] Since Cyril emphasizes repeatedly (also in the passage at hand) that it is by grace that humankind receives immortality, strictly speaking, it would be better, not to say that man's definition is changed, for *in principle* man remains mortal, but that immortality is now being added as a new inseparable attribute.

community of the nature (τῇ κοινότητι τῆς φύσεως) all things that lead to joy and glory, just as the first Adam [gave] the things that lead to corruption and dejection.[258]

The phrase 'that which is common rises to his person' means that the human nature, which is shared by all, is, in Christ, united to the person of the Word, as Cyril makes clear a few lines further down: "That which is enslaved, then, is truly liberated in Christ, rising (ἀναβαῖνον) to a mystical unity with him who has borne the form of a slave" (96e). In the passage from the first dialogue that we looked at in some detail, Cyril calls the second, more profound understanding of mediation 'mystical', which he then describes as a union of natures.[259] And because of this mystical union in Christ, all people who share the human nature—"the community of the nature"—also share in the benefits that result from this union, "all things that lead to joy and glory".[260]

One could say that Cyril utilizes a variety of tools to describe the incarnation of the Word and man's salvation through him: biblical language, including biblical images; non-biblical images; and also more philosophical concepts and notions. The latter do not tell the whole story, but they are important because of the influence they have had on later theology. Therefore, it is worthwhile to try to understand what the archbishop of Alexandria meant by them.

In christological contexts, the word σάρξ is used by Cyril in three ways: (1) it may refer to the common human nature that the Word of God assumes; (2) it may denote 'Christ's own flesh', which is either his individual humanity or his individual body; (3) and it may stand for the whole human race, all people ('all flesh'). Similarly, ἀνθρωπότης can have three meanings: the common human nature, Christ's individual humanity, or all human beings. But it seems that in the trinitarian writings, Cyril speaks of the human φύσις only in two ways: it may indicate the common nature that is assumed, or the whole human race.

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[258] *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 141 (96d). Cyril is not speaking of 'the common person of humanity', as Janssens (1938) 239 and 245, translates, basing himself on the text in Migne (PG 73, 161C: τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναβιοῖ πρόσωπον), which here follows a reading from the catenae (see Pusey's critical notes, vol. 1, 141).

[259] See n. 231. Cf. *In Jo.* III.3, vol. 1, 393 (266c).

[260] Cyril adds (*In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 141 [96e]) that "in us [it is liberated] by imitation of the one, through the kinship (συγγένειαν) according to the flesh", indicating not only the importance of connaturality, but also of the moral aspect. The combination of the ontological and the moral aspects will be discussed shortly.

He does not apply the word to the individual humanity of the incarnate Word. This corresponds to the way in which he speaks of the divine φύσις: this is either the divinity which Father, Son and holy Spirit have in common, or it refers to the whole Trinity, to God himself.

With respect to the salvation of man, the union of natures in Christ does not account for the whole process of salvation. Cyril of Alexandria's soteriology is not simply a physical doctrine of salvation, as nineteenth-century German theologians have argued. On such a view, man is as it were automatically restored in his relationship with God through the incarnation (and through partaking of the Eucharist): because the Son of God assumed the human nature, the whole nature and therefore all men have become partakers of the divine nature. Over against such an exclusively physical soteriology, Lars Koen emphasizes in his dissertation *The Saving Passion*, based on Cyril's *Commentary on John*, that for the Alexandrian archbishop Christ's suffering and death are not merely consequences of the incarnation, but essential to his salvific work.[261] Gudrun Münch-Labacher, too, has dealt with this question of a physical doctrine of salvation in her thesis, and she comes to the conclusion that there is both an ontological and a historical / moral side to Cyril's soteriology.[262] Bernard Meunier also sees a moral dimension in Cyril's description of salvation, although he regards the more physical dimension as dominant.[263] Daniel Keating has even made it one of the explicit aims of his study "to bring a corrective to certain readings of Cyril which, in my view, exaggerate the 'somatic' or 'physicalistic' character of his understanding of divinization", and he points to "the importance of pneumatology" and to "the requirement for an ethical aspect of divinization".[264]

In fact, Cyril himself asks the question whether his understanding of Christ's mediation does not lead to universalism, in his commentary on John 10:15.[265] He uses language similar to that in the *Thesaurus*:

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[261] Koen (1991), 105–127. The title, 'the saving passion' (τὸ σωτήριον πάθος), is actually an expression which Cyril of Alexandria employs several times in his *Commentary on John* and other works: for example, *In Jo.* IV.5, vol. 1, 582 (397b); V.3, vol. 2, 1 (496e); IX, vol. 2, 393 (756e); *Contra Nestorium*, ACO I.1.6, 102^10.

[262] Münch-Labacher (1996).

[263] Meunier (1997), 111, 122, 125, 138, 141–144, 211, 283.

[264] Keating (2004), 19.

[265] Münch-Labacher (1996) discusses this passage on pp. 133–135. See also Janssens (1938), 243–245.

> For just as he [the Son] is intimately related (ᾠκείωται) to the Father, and the Father is intimately related to him because of the identity of nature, so [are] also we [intimately related] to him, insofar as he has become man, and he to us. And through him as through a mediator (μεσίτου), we are joined (συναπτόμεθα) to the Father. For Christ is, so to say, a border (μεθόριον) between the highest divinity and humanity, being both at the same time, and as it were holding together in himself the things that are separated so much, and as by nature God, he is joined to God, and again as truly man to men.

> But perhaps someone will ask: "Do you not see, dear friend, to what risk your argumentation, in turn, leads? For if we shall think that, insofar as he has become man, he knows those that are his, that is, that he comes to an intimate relationship (οἰκειότητα) with his sheep, who will stay outside the flock? For they will all be intimately related, insofar as they too are men, just like he".[266]

And Cyril answers that the intimate relationship applies indeed to all men, since "he had mercy on the whole fallen nature".[267] But it will be of no use to those who are disobedient, only to those who love him. It is like the resurrection: the whole human nature, that is, all men, will be raised, but some to go to Hades, while others will participate in goods that are beyond understanding.

It is clear from this passage that, in Cyril's view, the restoration of the common human nature by the incarnation is an important part of salvation, but also that a personal appropriation of God's grace in Christ by the individual is necessary. The holy Spirit plays a decisive role in this. On Cyril's interpretation, Gen. 2:7, "And he breathed into his face a breath of life", means not only that man "became a living soul", but also that he received the holy Spirit, by whose power he is perfected according to the image (κατ' εἰκόνα) of the Creator.[268] As a result, man is a partaker (μέτοχον) of God's own nature. Without that, man would fall back into non-being.[269] But man is self-choosing (αὐτοπροαίρετος) and entrusted with the reins of his own will, for that is part of the image. And man changed and fell.[270] The only way to escape death was that the ancient grace would be restored, and man

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[266] *In Jo.* VI.1, vol. 2, 232 f. (653d–654a).
[267] *Ibid.*, 233 (654a). Here, 'the whole fallen nature' indicates all men.
[268] *Ibid.* IX.1, vol. 2, 484 f. (822a–e). Cf. *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 182 f. (122bc); *ibid.* XI.10, vol. 2, 719 f. (988a).
[269] *Ibid.*, 484 (822a).
[270] *Ibid.*, 485 (822e). Cf. *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 183 (122c–e).

would partake (μετέσχε) of God again in the Spirit.[271] For this reason, the Word became man, in order that the corrupted flesh would be restored, and would once more be able to partake of God.[272] Christ prays that the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν) will be restored to the original image through the participation (μετουσίας) of the Spirit, in order that, clothed with the original grace, we will be stronger than the sin that reigns in this world, and be dedicated to strive for everything good.[273]

It is also in this context that Cyril speaks of the deification of man. In the *Thesaurus* he writes:

> If the Spirit deifies (θεοποιεῖ) those in whom he comes, and makes them partakers (μετόχους) of the divine nature, he is God, and [is], naturally out of the divine substance, being given through the Son to the creature, and transforming it as towards himself.[274]

And in the seventh dialogue: Only God can deify,

> who introduces into the souls of the saints the participation (μέθεξιν) of his own properties (ἰδιότητος) through the Spirit, through whom we are conformed to him who is Son by nature, and are called gods and sons of God after him.[275]

Thus, the Alexandrian archbishop describes deification in terms of participation in the divine nature, in God, in God's properties, which is brought about by the holy Spirit. Often, Cyril employs the word μέτοχος rather than the word κοινωνός, which is used in 2 Peter 1:4, and we have seen that μέτοχος refers to an accidental possession of attributes, over against a possession by nature.[276] Deification, participation in the divine nature, is given by grace, and never becomes man's naturally inherent property.[277] It is illustrated by the image of iron, which is heated by fire, without becoming fire itself.[278]

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[271] *Ibid.*, 485 f. (823a).

[272] *Ibid.*, 486 (823ab).

[273] *Ibid.* XI.10, vol. 2, 720 (988bc). Keating (2004) assigns a central place in Cyril's soteriology to 'the narrative of divine life' (p. 52 and *passim*) as he calls the story of man's reception of the holy Spirit at creation, the loss of the Spirit through sin, and the re-acquisition of the Spirit through Christ.

[274] *Thesaurus*, 592D.

[275] *Dial. Trin.* VII, 644cd.

[276] See section 3.2.2.

[277] Keating (2004), 191–196, also emphasizes that Cyril was concerned to keep the distinction between the human and the divine clear, and suggests that this is the reason why the archbishop used the verb 'to deify' and its derivatives sparingly.

[278] *Thesaurus*, 200B.

Finally, according to Lebon, Cyril himself does not use the word φύσις for the humanity of Christ; if he does so, it is only as a concession to the Orientals.[279] Since before 428, there was no Nestorian controversy yet, this would imply that during that early period the archbishop would never have referred to the humanity of the incarnate Word by the word φύσις. We have, however, seen several examples of the contrary. It is true, though, that Cyril does not often use φύσις to denote the humanity of Christ. Part of the reason may be that he prefers biblical terminology like σάρξ and ἡ δούλου μορφή, and language that stems from the Creed of Nicaea, like ἐνανθρωπῆσαι, but that would not explain why he does quite regularly speak of 'assuming τὸ ἀνθρώπινον' and of ἀνθρωπότης.

In Lebon's view, Cyril refrains from using φύσις in these cases, because in christological contexts the word would indicate a separate being, and the archbishop denies explicitly that the Word assumed a separate being, a human being that already existed before the incarnation. However, before 428, Cyril does at times employ the term φύσις for Christ's humanity, and its meaning is then not that of a separate being, but it is closer to secondary substance. Therefore, there must be another reason why he uses it so seldom. It seems likely that the reason is to be sought in the anti-Arianism of his writings at that time. What he wanted to stress over against the Arians was that Christ was 'God by nature'. Applying the word 'nature' also for Christ's humanity could confuse his argumentation, as if Christ was 'man by nature', and thus a created being. It is to safeguard his 'fundamental intuition' that Christ is first and foremost the divine Word of God, who has *also* become man,[280] that Cyril prefers to reserve the term φύσις for his divinity. In the course of his anti-Arian argumentation, Cyril may even say that Christ is not connatural (ὁμοφυής) with Moses,[281] although we have seen

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[279] Lebon (1909), 251: "Quand Cyrille emploie le langage propre à sa christologie, jamais, sans doute, il ne donne à l'humanité du Christ le nom d'*hypostase*, mais jamais non plus il ne l'appelle une *nature*, une *nature humaine*." He adds in n. 2: "Nous entendons excepter les cas d'emploi des formules δύο φύσεις ἐν θεωρίᾳ ou ἐκ δύο φύσεων. Elles n'appartiennent pas à la terminologie propre à la doctrine de Cyrille, mais elles constituent des concessions aux Orientaux unis." Thus, Cyril is alleged to have employed the term φύσις for Christ's humanity only as a concession to the Orientals.

[280] See for this 'fundamental intuition' n. 109 in chapter 1.

[281] *Thesaurus*, 496B. See also *Dial. Trin.* I, 395de. Similarly, he speaks of the Word's kenosis as "coming down, because of his love for mankind, to what is against his nature (παρὰ φύσιν)" (*Thesaurus*, 561C), and conversely, he may describe man's deification as

that in christological contexts, the archbishop can write that Christ is connatural with God and with men.[282]

3.4.5. *Summary*

It may be concluded that in the vast majority of cases in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings, the word φύσις has a meaning close to secondary substance. It is the reality that individual beings of the same species have in common. Applied to God, 'the divine nature' indicates that which Father, Son and holy Spirit have in common. Cyril's most basic distinction of reality is that between God and creation. He can express this by stating that there are two natures: the nature of God and the nature of created beings. Like Aristotle's notion in Book II of his *Physics*, the term is usually, though not exclusively, applied to living substances, like angels, men, animals, and plants; and also to the materials that bodies are made of, like fire, earth, water and air, but also stone, wood or snow. In the case of living substances, the verb φύειν, from which φύσις is derived, and related terms are used for the process by which the same nature or essence is handed down from one generation to the next. The verb πεφυκέναι and its derivatives are employed for this process, too, but often they denote that characteristics belong 'naturally' to a substance, that is, as a differentia, a proprium or an inseparable attribute, rather than as a separable accident. 'By nature' (κατὰ φύσιν or φύσει) basically has two meanings: (1) it may indicate that a characteristic belongs naturally to a substance, as differentia, proprium or inseparable attribute, rather than by participation (e.g., God is invisible by nature); (2) it may denote the process by which the same essence is handed down to another generation (e.g., the divine Word is Son of God by nature, while human beings may be sons of God by grace or adoption).

Φύσις is also, but less often, used to indicate all the individuals that fall under a common substance. 'Human nature' then stands for the whole human race; we find this especially in places where the relationship between Christ as the second Adam and humankind, which is recapitulated in him, is mentioned. 'The divine nature' then refers to the whole Trinity, and since the unity of the Godhead is

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rising by grace to a dignity "above our nature (ὑπὲρ φύσιν)" (*In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 133 [91c]). See for a discussion of these expressions: Liébaert (1951), 233–236.

[282] See n. 237.

stronger than that of all people, and there is really only one God, in such cases 'the divine nature' and 'God' are virtually interchangeable.

When the word φύσις is used in relation to the humanity of Christ, it also indicates the secondary substance of man. It is the reality that all people have in common. By assuming this human nature the Word of God has become man, an individual man. The incarnate Word is God by nature and has also become man. He is connatural with God the Father, and has become connatural with us men. He is one out of both, out of divinity and humanity. In him, and only in him, the two that were widely separated according to nature, divinity and humanity, are united. And as a result there can be a moral union between God the Father and individual men.

In exceptional cases, φύσις has still other meanings in Cyril's trinitarian writings. It indicates the essence of other categories besides substances, when he speaks of the 'nature of accidents' or the 'nature of colours'. It refers to the existence as such of correlatives in the expression 'simultaneous by nature'. And in one passage in the *Dialogues* its meaning is closer to that of hypostasis than to that of secondary substance.

3.5. Πρόσωπον

In the *Thesaurus*, the word πρόσωπον occurs round about fifty times. In about half of the cases it has the meaning 'face', in literal quotations from Scripture,[283] or in allusions to biblical texts.[284] Besides these references to Scripture, the meaning of 'face' is not to be found in the *Thesaurus*. Several other senses also only occur in citations from or allusions to Bible verses, such as the expressions 'respect of persons',[285] and 'in appearance'.[286]

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[283] For example, *Thesaurus*, 165D (Luke 1:76), 276B (Prov. 8:30), 329D (Hebr. 9:24), 564A (Ps. 103 / 104:30, LXX), 628D (Ps. 43 / 44:3, LXX).

[284] For example, *Thesaurus*, 229C (the angels see God's face), 577B (the Spirit is called the face of God, referring to Ps. 138 / 139:7, LXX).

[285] In *Thesaurus*, 628A and 648B, quotations from 1 Esdras 4:38 f. (λαμβάνειν πρόσωπα). And in *ibid.*, 509C and 636A, James 2:1 is cited (ἐν προσωπολη[μ]ψίαις). According to Prestige (1952), 158, and Nédoncelle (1948), 282 f., in these expressions the word πρόσωπον already has the sense of 'particular individual', which is close to the meaning it has in Cyril of Alexandria's own language. Nédoncelle (1948), 282, agrees with Michel (1922), 376, that in 2 Cor. 1:11 πρόσωπον already means 'individual'.

[286] *Thesaurus*, 468A, where 2 Cor. 5:12 is quoted.

Cyril of Alexandria himself uses the term πρόσωπον in the description of his exegetical procedure.[287] When we investigate Scripture, we should observe the time (τὸν καιρόν) about which the passage speaks, the "person (πρόσωπον) by whom or through whom or about whom it is said", and the 'subject matter' or 'the event' (τὸ πρᾶγμα) at hand. The archbishop frequently applies this to Jesus Christ: it must be established whether a statement refers to the time before or after the incarnation, to the Word 'without the flesh', or 'with the flesh'.[288] When it says that "he sat down at the right hand of the majesty on high", and that "he was made better than the angels" (Hebr. 1:3 f.), this does not refer to the φύσις of the Son, as if he had a created nature, capable of change, but it refers to the πρᾶγμα that happened at the time (ἐν καιρῷ) of his inhumanation (337D). The comparison of Christ and the angels concerns their ministry and their glory, not their nature (341B); it is made on the basis of the *rank* of the 'persons' (ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν προσώπων ἀξίας; 340A).[289]

Although in such a context, the primary meaning of πρόσωπον is that of a grammatical person, Cyril easily switches between the grammatical and reality, and it is not always easy to tell in a particular instance whether πρόσωπον denotes the grammatical or the real person, or both. The archbishop does not elaborate on his exegetical procedure, so it is from the examples that we learn more about his view. In another interpretation of Hebr. 1:1 ff., he comments that, when it is shown that the Gospel teaching is better than the covenant given through Moses and than the proclamations of the prophets, "the separation is made on the basis of the difference of the persons", after which Cyril compares the prophets with the Son.[290] Elsewhere, in describing his opponents' interpretation of Mt. 11:11, "Yet he who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he", Cyril writes that they apply 'who is least' to the person of the Lord (τὸ Κυριακὸν πρόσωπον; 157D). In similar ways, the archbishop speaks of "the person

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[287] Cyril describes this procedure, with several examples, in *Thesaurus*, 337B–D. See also Siddals (1987), 358–361.

[288] Liébaert (1951) discusses the application of the procedure to the incarnation in detail in the section "La distinction des 'temps' et la double condition du Verbe", 158–169.

[289] The same expression, 'the rank of the persons', can be found in *Thesaurus*, 353C.

[290] *Thesaurus*, 492BC: ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν προσώπων διαφορᾶς ποιεῖται τὴν διάκρισιν. The same expression, with the same meaning, but with the preposition ἐκ (ἐκ τῆς τῶν προσώπων διαφορᾶς) can be found in the following section of the *Thesaurus* (492D).

(πρόσωπον) of Moses" and of "the great person (πρόσωπον) of the Ruler of all things".[291]

From these examples it seems that we may conclude that the word πρόσωπον is employed to indicate a rational being, either in a text, or in reality. It may refer to people, to angels, to the divine Word, to God. Πρόσωπον has a related meaning in instances where one or more persons are represented by somebody else. Often, Cyril employs the expression ὡς ἐκ προσώπου for this. In the *Thesaurus* this is found once: When Isaiah says, "Lord, give us peace, for you have given us all things" (Is. 26:12, LXX), he does so "as in the name of (ὡς ἐκ προσώπου) them who have believed in him"; he represents the persons of the believers (484D). A less frequent phrase to express representation is ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὸ πρόσωπον. This is also encountered once in the *Thesaurus*.[292]

A christologically interesting occurrence of πρόσωπον can be found in *Thesaurus*, 120C. Commenting on the words, "I am going to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God" (John 20:17), Cyril writes that, after the Son has assumed the form of a slave, "the words that are fitting to a slave concern his humiliation, they do not rise to his substance, but are lying round the person of his inhumanation (τῷ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως προσώπῳ περικείμενα)". He uses the metaphysical language 'lying round' in combination with the term πρόσωπον, which in this case denotes the Word 'with the flesh', the incarnate Word.

Twice only in the *Thesaurus*, the Alexandrian archbishop employs the word πρόσωπον for one or two of the hypostases of the Trinity. When discussing Acts 2:36, "Let, therefore, the whole house of Israel know with certainty that God made this Jesus, whom you have crucified, both Lord and Christ", he draws a conclusion from the fact that his opponents let the name 'God' in this verse refer "to the person of the Father".[293] This seems to be an instance in which the more general meaning of πρόσωπον—an indication of a rational being—is applied to God the Father. The second place in which πρόσωπον is applied to divine hypostases is *Thesaurus*, 141C:

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[291] *Ibid.*, 496B, in a discussion of Hebr. 3:5f., and *ibid.*, 544C, with reference to Is. 45:21. See also *ibid.*, 224B. where Cyril speaks of Christ's 'own person (τὸ οἰκεῖον πρόσωπον)'.

[292] *Thesaurus*, 117C. See also *In Jo.* IV, vol. 1, 51[9f.] (33d).

[293] *Ibid.*, 364D: Ἐάν ... τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσηγορίαν εἰς τὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς πρόσωπον ἀναφέρῃς.

> Therefore, while the nature of the Godhead is simple and uncomposed, it would not be divided by our thoughts into the dyad of Father and Son, if not some difference were posited, I mean, not according to substance, but thought to be external [to the substance], through which the person (πρόσωπον) of each is made (εἰσφέρεται) to lie in a peculiar (ἰδιαζούσῃ) hypostasis, but is bound into unity of Godhead through natural identity.

It looks like here πρόσωπον indicates the grammatical distinction between Father and Son, which is then said to be a distinction in reality in that each has its own hypostasis.[294]

In the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, the use of πρόσωπον is comparable to that in the *Thesaurus*, except that the word is now applied to the persons of the Trinity more often. The total number of occurrences is again round about fifty, while in about half of them it concerns citations from[295] or allusions to[296] biblical verses, in which the meaning is 'face'. In the majority of the other cases, πρόσωπον indicates a rational being, in a text and/or in reality. When Cyril describes the form of the dialogues, he says that the argumentation runs by way of question and answer between two persons.[297] Elsewhere, he writes that Moses applies to the simple and uncomposed nature of God language that is fitting to a person (προσώπῳ) who is not simple.[298] In his elaboration of this, he states that 'Let us make' and 'in our image' in Gen. 1:26 are not fitting to one person, but rather to more than one or two.[299] In the fourth dialogue, he points again to the importance of distinguishing the times and the persons with respect to the Word of God,[300] who was first without flesh and later with flesh. Later on in the same dialogue, he cites Prov. 8:22, "The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways for his works", and comments that Solomon says this, "painting beforehand the person (πρόσωπον) of the Son" (533d).

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[294] Twice the name of Sabellius is mentioned in the *Thesaurus*: in 181D and in 381AB. In neither case do we encounter the word πρόσωπον in the refutation of his views, but rather the terms ὄνομα and ὑπόστασις.

[295] For example, *Dial. Trin.* I, 402e (Numbers 16:22 and 46, LXX); V, 479c (Is. 50:6); VII, 638a (1 Cor. 14:25).

[296] For example, *Dial. Trin.* IV, 521a (the face of the Lord); V, 554c (the Son is the face of the Father, referring to Ps. 138 / 139:7, LXX, and Ps. 4:7); VI, 604d (again, the Son as the face of the Father, with a reference to Ps. 16 / 17:15, LXX).

[297] *Dial. Trin.*, Prologue, 384a: ὡς πρὸς πεῦσιν δὲ καὶ ἀπόκρισιν διὰ δυοῖν προσώποιν ἔρχεται. The word πρόσωπον returns in 384b.

[298] *Ibid.* III, 471cd.

[299] *Ibid.* III, 472e: οὐχ ἑνὶ προσώπῳ, πρέποι δ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἕνα καὶ δύο.

[300] *Ibid.* IV, 515a, 516b, 516c (2).

In the *Dialogues*, the term πρόσωπον is also employed several times to indicate representation. Four times we find the expression 'as in the name of (ὡς ἐκ προσώπου)' which we also encountered in the *Thesaurus*.[301] And Paul is said to "assume the person of Christ" when he writes in 2 Cor. 5:20: "We ask you on behalf of Christ: Be reconciled to God".[302] Another related sense is found in the third dialogue, when, quoting Song of Songs 1:3, Cyril says that here "the church out of the nations speaks as in the person of the bride".[303]

Ten times πρόσωπον is used for one or more of the hypostases of the Trinity. It is placed in a position parallel to ὄνομα or ὑπόστασις or ὕπαρξις,[304] or in opposition to the unity of nature and substance,[305] or in various combinations of these possibilities.[306] And sometimes without a clear reference to any of these other terms.[307] It is probably not accidental that when 'name', 'person' and 'hypostasis' all three occur side by side, 'name' and 'person' are linked more closely with each other than with 'hypostasis'. Thus, Cyril can speak about "the distinction of the persons or the names, and the otherness of the hypostases".[308] And he can write that "the nature which is above everything is simple and uncomposed, broadened by the particularities of the hypostases as well as (μέν … δέ) the differences of the persons and the names".[309] It seems that de Durand is right when he states that πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις denote two different aspects of the same entity: πρόσωπον the external aspect, as an interlocutor, to whom one relates; ὑπόστασις the internal aspect, as a centre of existence.[310] 'Internal' may not be the best designation for hypostasis, though. *One could say that πρόσωπον refers to the (indeed) external aspect of the*

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[301] *Ibid.* II, 455ab; V, 554c; VI, 599c, 604d.

[302] *Ibid.* I, 399b: τὸ Χριστοῦ πρόσωπον ἀναλαβών.

[303] *Ibid.* III, 502b: ὡς ἐν προσώπῳ τῆς νύμφης.

[304] *Ibid.* II, 431a.

[305] *Ibid.* II, 422d.

[306] *Ibid.* I, 409c; VI, 618e; VI, 621a and b; VII, 641a.

[307] *Ibid.* I, 416c; III, 481d; VI, 598e.

[308] *Ibid.* I, 409c: τῶν προσώπων ἤτοι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν διαστολὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἑτερότητα.

[309] *Ibid.* VII, 641a: ὑποστάσεων μὲν ἰδιότησι, προσώπων δὲ καὶ ὀνομάτων διαφοραῖς ἐξευρυνομένη.

[310] De Durand (1976), 82 f.: "La résultante se situe donc, semble-t-il, à l'intersection des deux champs sémantiques de 'prosopon' et d' 'hypostase', sans qu'il y ait un troisième terme où s'amalgament les deux points de vue, l'un plutôt interne (hypostase = centre d'existence), l'autre plutôt externe (prosopon = interlocuteur à qui l'on fait face), sans qu'on doive non plus privilégier l'un par rapport à l'autre".

possibility of having a 'personal' relation with another πρόσωπον *(face to face),
while* ὑπόστασις *indicates that the entity has its own real existence, in relative
separation from other hypostases.* Marie-Odile Boulnois comes to a similar
conclusion.[311]

Apart from the passages in which Cyril speaks of the times and
the persons, πρόσωπον is not used in specific christological contexts in
the *Dialogues*. In neither of the two anti-Arian works (nor in his Old
Testament commentaries) the archbishop uses the word πρόσωπον to
emphasize that the incarnate Word is one Son, and not two. We do
find this usage in his *Commentary on John*. In his exposition of John 3:13
Cyril writes that Christ, "after the incarnation, refuses to be divided
into two persons (πρόσωπα)".[312] And he repeats it when he discusses
John 6:69: Christ is "indivisible after the union, and he is not severed
into two persons (πρόσωπα)".[313]

In the *Thesaurus* and in the *Dialogues*, the unity of the incarnate Word
is expressed by phrases like 'the Christ is one',[314] 'one Christ',[315] 'one
Son out of both',[316] 'a coming together of both as in one'.[317] Similar
expressions recur in the *Commentary on John*: 'one out of both',[318] 'one
Son'.[319] In the commentary Christ is once called 'one and the same'
(with flesh),[320] an expression not found in the two trinitarian writings,
but present in the *Festal Letter* for the year 420.[321] More often, Cyril
writes that Christ is not to be divided 'into a duality of Sons'.[322]

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[311] Boulnois (1994), 309: "Alors qu'ὑπόστασις insiste sur le fait que les person-
nes divines subsistent réellement par elles-mêmes, πρόσωπον manifeste davantage
qu'il s'agit de sujets rationnels, qui agissent et communiquent entre eux ou avec les
hommes".

[312] *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 224 (150e).

[313] *In Jo.* IV.4, vol. 1, 577 (393e). Cf. also *ibid.*, XI.10, vol. 2, 725 (992b).

[314] *Thesaurus*, 333AB: "For the Christ is one, mixed out of humanity and the Word of
God, not by having been changed into what he was not, but by assuming the temple
from the virgin". Before 429, Cyril still employed the verb 'to mix' and its derivatives
for the union of the Word with his humanity. Later he dismissed it.

[315] *Ibid.*, 388D.

[316] *Dial. Trin.* I, 405a: εἷς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοούμενος Υἱός. See also *De ador.*, PG 68, 345C.

[317] *Ibid.*, III, 501a. See also *ibid.*, I, 405d (see n. 231); VI, 605d.

[318] *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 140 (96a); *ibid.*, II.1, vol. 1, 224 (150e); *ibid.*, III.5, vol. 1, 442 (301b);
ibid., IV.2, vol. 1, 532 (363b); *ibid.*, IX, vol. 2, 381 (747e).

[319] *Ibid.*, IV.3, vol. 1, 550 f. (375e): 'one Son'; *ibid.*, V.2, vol. 1, 713 (485e): 'one and a
single (εἷς καὶ μόνος) Son'. Cf. *ibid.*, IX, vol. 2, 377 (744d); X, vol. 2, 505 (836d); XI.12,
vol. 3, 2 (1001c).

[320] *Ibid.*, XII.1, vol. 3, 152 (1110a).

[321] *Festal Letter* 8, 6[32, 60] (SC 392, 102 and 104).

[322] *In Jo.* II.4, vol. 1, 265 (178c): 'Do not divide the one Christ into a duality of Sons'.

We may come to some conclusions regarding Cyril of Alexandria's use of πρόσωπον in his trinitarian writings. Although the word has the meaning 'face' in many instances, this sense is restricted to biblical language. In Cyril's own terminology πρόσωπον rather has the meaning of a rational being which is capable of having a 'personal' relation, face to face, with other πρόσωπα: a human being, an angel, God, the Word of God. It may refer to persons in reality, but also in texts. The word 'hypostasis' indicates the real existence of the persons. Apart from metaphorical biblical expressions like 'the face of the earth', πρόσωπον is not used for any other than rational beings.

It seems that there is a development over time in Cyril's usage of the word πρόσωπον. In the *Thesaurus*, he hardly applies it to the hypostases of the Trinity, while in the *Dialogues* the divine hypostases are indicated by this term at a number of places. In the christological passages he only uses the term to indicate the difference of the times and the persons: the Word without the flesh before the incarnation, and after it the Word with the flesh. Since πρόσωπον is employed to stress that the incarnate Word is one, not two Sons, neither in the *Thesaurus* nor in the *Dialogues*, while it is so used in his *Commentary on John*, this may imply that the *Commentary* is of a later date and contains a somewhat more developed christology.

3.6. Ἴδιος, ἴδιον, ἰδιότης

In Cyril of Alexandria's christology, words related to ἴδιος play an important role. He often emphasizes that the Word has made his own (ἰδιοποιεῖσθαι) the flesh that he has assumed, that it is now his own (ἴδιον). Ruth M. Siddals discusses Cyril's use of these terms in her chapter on his 'basic christological model'.[323] We will now look at the way in which Cyril employs these words in the trinitarian writings, as a preparation for a discussion of their meaning in the christological works, which will follow in later chapters.

In section 2.5.2, it has already been mentioned that Cyril of Alexandria employs ἰδιότης both for the particularity of Father and Son and

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Cf. *ibid.*, IV.2, vol. 1, 533 (363c); V.2, vol. 1, 713 (485e); VI.1, vol. 2, 200 (631e); IX, vol. 2, 381 (747e); X, vol. 2, 505 (836d); XII.1, vol. 3, 152 (1109e). Similar expressions are found in *Glaphyra*, PG 69, 129C and 576C, and *Festal Letter* 8, 4, SC 392, 92.

[323] Siddals (1984), 68–72; see also pp. 135f.

for the characteristics they have in common; and also that we see such an ambiguous usage of the term in Porphyry's *Isagoge* as well. The same ambiguity pertains to τὸ ἴδιον and to the adjective ἴδιος. In the trinitarian writings, τὸ ἴδιον is used for the technical term 'proprium', and also for 'property' in a more general sense. Thus, Cyril can speak of the proprium (ἴδιον) of substances, which is that they can receive contraries,[324] or about the propria of laughing in man and of neighing in horse, while 'uncreated' may similarly be called a proprium of God.[325] He can also say that it is a property (ἴδιον) of creatures that they can sin,[326] or a property of the human nature that it can receive something from God,[327] or a property of bodies that they are in a certain place.[328] Quite regularly, the plural τὰ ἴδια denotes the whole set of natural properties belonging to a particular secondary substance. For example, it is uneducated to apply the properties (τὰ ἴδια) of bodies to a bodiless substance.[329] The properties (τὰ ἴδια) of horse are foreign to man, and the other way round.[330] At times, it is part of Cyril's reasoning that, since the natural properties (τὰ ἴδια) of the Father (or of the divinity) apply to the Son as well, the Son must be consubstantial with the Father.[331] And when he became man, the Word assumed the natural properties (τὰ ἴδια) of humanity.[332]

Sometimes, the singular τὸ ἴδιον stands for 'that which is (naturally) proper' and also implies the whole set of natural properties. So in the fourth dialogue: "Therefore, having become like us, he is not like us in some way in which he has discarded that which is [naturally] proper (τὸ ἴδιον)"; in other words, he has retained all the divine properties, when he became man.[333] Several times Cyril writes that the Son has

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[324] *Thesaurus*, 33D and 36A.

[325] *Ibid.*, 445B.

[326] *Ibid.*, 305A.

[327] *Ibid.*, 332D.

[328] *Dial. Trin.* IV, 511c. Perhaps 'being in a place' should be regarded as a proprium of bodies.

[329] *Thesaurus*, 44BC.

[330] *Ibid.*, 117A. In order for Cyril's statement to be correct, according to Aristotelian logic, τὰ ἴδια must mean 'the whole set of natural properties', for the statement does not apply to the properties individually, since man and horse, both being living beings (ζῷα), have several natural properties in common.

[331] *Ibid.*, 117AB; cf. 209C, 357AB. The reverse reasoning is found as well: since the Son is born of the Father, he has the same natural properties (τὰ ἴδια): *ibid.*, 233B; cf. 381C.

[332] *Ibid.*, 269D, 332D, 561C.

[333] *Dial. Trin.* IV, 517b.

(or is) τὸ ἴδιον of (the substance of) the Father, thus indicating their consubstantiality.[334] Occasionally, Cyril uses τὸ ἴδιον for that which is proper to one of the divine hypostases, not to the substance which is common to all three of them. Thus, he ends a sentence in which he discusses the oneness and the threeness of God as follows: "so that in each [of the three] the whole nature is conceived, to which is also attached that which is proper to it (τὸ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ), with respect to hypostasis, obviously".[335]

Both in the *Thesaurus* and in the *Dialogues*, the noun ἰδιότης is used with regard to the common nature of the Godhead, but also to indicate the peculiarity of each of the hypostases. When it is applied to the divine nature it is a collective noun, denoting the whole set of natural properties.[336] It would, therefore, be best to translate it by the plural 'properties',[337] but in order to retain the singular, in the following examples it will be rendered by 'property'. So, the Son is called "the imprint and likeness of his [the Father's] property (ἰδιότητος)".[338] The fullness of the properties is sometimes emphasized by the addition of the word 'whole'. It is said of the Spirit that he "has the whole property (ὅλην … τὴν ἰδιότητα) of God the Father substantially in himself",[339] and similarly of the Son that he "has the whole property (τὴν … ἰδιότητα πᾶσαν) of the Father in himself".[340]

As has been said, ἰδιότης can also indicate the peculiarity of each of the hypostases. For example, in the *Thesaurus*: "For the Father is in his peculiarity, and the Son is in his own peculiarity".[341] More often in the *Dialogues*: the peculiarity of the names,[342] or the peculiarity of the hypostases.[343]

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[334] *Thesaurus*, 96D, 181A, 181B, 185A, 185B, 204C, 225D, 396C, 421C, 461C.

[335] *Dial. Trin.* VII, 641b.

[336] While Cyril of Alexandria usually employs the singular ἰδιότης to denote the properties of a substance, there is one place in the *Thesaurus* (244A) in which we find the plural.

[337] De Durand translates it with the plural 'propriétés' in *Dial. Trin.* III, 484b; IV, 534b; VI, 592d; and VII, 644d.

[338] *Thesaurus*, 80C.

[339] *Ibid.*, 576C.

[340] *Dial. Trin.* VI, 592d.

[341] *Thesaurus*, 100D: Ἔστι γὰρ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἰδιότητι· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἰδιότητι.

[342] *Dial. Trin.* II, 421a (Father and Son); VII, 640d (Father, Son and Spirit).

[343] *Dial. Trin.* II, 423a ('the peculiarity of the three hypostases'); VII, 641a ('the peculiarities of the hypostases').

The adjective ἴδιος, mostly translated as 'proper' or '(one's) own', also has various meanings in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian works. First, it denotes the natural relationship between Father and Son: he is the Father's own Son,[344] his own offspring (ἴδιον γέννημα),[345] his own radiance (ἴδιον ἀπαύγασμα),[346] while God is his own Father.[347] This implies that they are consubstantial, that they have the same nature. In the *Dialogues*, Cyril elaborates on the meaning of ἴδιος. He distinguishes between the myriads of men who have been called to become sons of God and the one who is truly God's own Son, since he shares with the Father the nature which is above all things. The word ἴδιον applies strictly and truly (κυρίως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς) only to one.[348] Similarly, when the holy Spirit is called 'the Son's own Spirit', it indicates "the substantial and natural intimacy" which the Spirit has with the Son, which is not a matter of participation.[349]

Secondly, ἴδιος is applied to the Word's humanity after the incarnation. The suffering body was his own,[350] which is also called 'his own temple'.[351] But while he *is* God's own Son by nature, he *made* the flesh his own.[352] And since it was his flesh, and not somebody else's, the things that belong to the flesh are also made his own (ἰδιοποιεῖται),[353] the things in it and round it:[354] its weaknesses,[355] its passions.[356] The verb 'to appropriate (οἰκειοῦν)' is applied in the same sense.[357] It is not that the Alexandrian archbishop is not aware that he employs the term ἴδιος in various senses. In the first dialogue, he brings the two meanings of ἴδιος together into one sentence:

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[344] *Thesaurus*, 381C, 477C, 516B. *Dial. Trin.* III, 498d.

[345] *Thesaurus*, 48A, 125D, 184D, and *passim*. *Dial. Trin.* II, 460e.

[346] *Thesaurus*, 40A, 44A, 381A.

[347] *Thesaurus*, 408D, 485B.

[348] *Dial. Trin.* III, 498d–499a.

[349] *Ibid.* VI, 593ab; cf. VII, 640e.

[350] *Thesaurus*, 429A; cf. *ibid.*, 540C; *Dial. Trin.* V, 563d; VI, 600d.

[351] *Thesaurus*, 333A. *Dial. Trin.* VI, 600e. In *Dial. Trin.* V, 565b, and VI, 596d, οἰκεῖον is used instead of ἴδιον.

[352] *Dial. Trin.* VI, 598e: ἴδιον ἐποιήσατο.

[353] *Thesaurus*, 281C. Mostly, the verb ἰδιοποιεῖσθαι is utilized by Cyril to express that the things of the flesh have been made the Son's own. In *ibid.*, 540B, however, he argues on the basis of his opponents' view that Christ is a mere man, and asks how, then, he can "make the common Father of all his own (ἰδιοποιεῖται)", that is, how he can claim for himself alone a natural relationship with God.

[354] *Ibid.*, 384D; cf. *ibid.*, 400D.

[355] *Ibid.*, 376D.

[356] *Ibid.*, 396D.

[357] *Ibid.*, 69A, 333A, 429A; *Dial. Trin.* VI, 627b.

> And just as the name of 'Only-Begotten', being proper (ἴδιον) to the Word, is also preserved for him when united to the flesh, so 'First-born', not being strictly his, has become his own with the flesh.[358]

'Only-Begotten' and 'First-born' seem to contradict each other, but, Cyril argues, they are applied to the Word in different ways. 'Only-Begotten' is a name that is truly and strictly his own, because it refers to his divine nature. But he has become 'First-born' among many brothers, after the Word was united to the flesh. 'First-born', then, does not strictly apply to the Word, but it has become his own name.

Besides these two meanings related to the Word of God,[359] Cyril also employs ἴδιος in a more general sense: the prophets' own words;[360] to be troubled is a passion proper to the flesh;[361] those who combat the truth follow their own wills;[362] each being is subjected to some laws of its own, while the nature of each debars it from being the same as something else;[363] those who have perverted their own mind.[364]

3.7. Conclusion

We may now briefly summarize the metaphysical notions which are denoted by the key-terms in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings. Usually, οὐσία indicates a secondary substance, although there are also instances in which a primary substance is meant. Such a secondary substance is not an abstraction, but it is itself a reality (πρᾶγμα) that applies to all the individuals that fall under that substance. Οὐσία is also used for what Father, Son and holy Spirit have in common. The term φύσις is mostly applied to secondary substances of living things ('living beings', plants, angels, also God) and of the material elements (air, water, earth and fire, but also stone, bronze, etc.). While οὐσία tells something about the place a substance possesses in the whole order of things, φύσις indicates the principle of operation of a substance. The

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[358] *Dial. Trin.* I, 405cd: οὕτω τὸ Πρωτότοκος, αὐτοῦ κυρίως οὐκ ὄν, γέγονεν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῆς σαρκός.

[359] See for a brief discussion of Cyril's double use of ἴδιος within the context of Greek patristic thought: Louth (1989).

[360] *Thesaurus*, 180C.

[361] *Ibid.*, 400B.

[362] *Ibid.*, 524D.

[363] *Dial. Trin.* II, 448d.

[364] *Ibid.* VII, 634a.

human nature which is assumed by the Word of God in the incarnation is the common nature of all human beings. But by assuming this nature, the Word becomes an individual man, whose flesh is not someone else's.

The substance or nature of a thing is unknowable. We can have some knowledge of a thing by knowing the things 'round' the substance, especially the natural properties, that is, (the differentiae,) the propria and the inseparable attributes. To describe the relationship between these characteristics and the substance, Cyril employs various metaphors of place: to be attached to, to exist in, to inhere, to lie in or round. Besides these inherent factors, there can also be radiated factors, such as the scent of a flower or heat from a fire. While inherent factors are characteristics that are attached to the substance, radiated factors have the same nature as the substance, and go out from it without being separated from it. The latter serve as an illustration for the relationship between the Father and the Son, and between the Father and the Spirit.

An ὑπόστασις is a being that really exists, and that has its existence in itself, over against natural characteristics and accidents, which need for their existence a substance or a hypostasis to be attached to. A hypostasis, then, is very much like Aristotle's primary substance. Father, Son and holy Spirit are also called hypostases, to emphasize their individual existence, although their unity goes beyond the union of several individual human beings: they are one God. The word πρόσωπον indicates a rational being (man, angel, God, the Word, the incarnate Word), in a text and/or in reality. The three divine hypostases are also called πρόσωπα to indicate their distinctness, but because πρόσωπον may denote a person in a text only, their real individual existence is better expressed by the word ὑπόστασις.

Ἴδιος and related terms can have various meanings. They may be used to express that natural characteristics belong to a substance, or that Father, Son and holy Spirit have a natural relationship with each other. But they may also indicate the particularity of the divine hypostases individually. Further, the flesh that the Word assumed in the incarnation, has been made his own (ἴδιος), with all the characteristics that pertain to that flesh, and they are now his own (ἴδιος). Besides, ἴδιος can simply have the non-technical meaning '(one's) own'. Ἰδιότης, τὰ ἴδια, and even the singular τὸ ἴδιον may denote the whole set of natural properties of a substance.

Before we turn to the christological writings of the Alexandrian archbishop, one further preparation will be executed. A set of terms

will be developed for the various metaphysical notions, into which the terms used by Cyril himself and by ancient and modern commentators can be translated, so that a comparison of their respective views is made easier. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

COMPARISON OF INTERPRETATIONS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Part of the problem during the Nestorian and Miaphysite controversies in the fifth and sixth centuries was that terms like φύσις and ὑπόστασις carried different meanings for different authors, even within the writings of one and the same author. This was bound to lead to misunderstandings. But when these terms or their translations, like 'nature' and 'hypostasis', are employed in present-day literature about these controversies the ambiguities often return, which adds more misunderstandings. And the use of terms like 'person' and 'subject' in this literature compounds the problem, due to the modern connotations these words carry. In order to reduce the equivocality, a number of terms will be defined in this chapter, which can be recognized by their being written in SMALL CAPITALS. In the remainder of this study, these small-capital terms will be used to facilitate a comparison of statements of various authors, both from ancient and from contemporary times. For this purpose, more ambiguous terms like φύσις, ὑπόστασις, 'nature', 'person', 'subject' will be 'translated'—if possible—into the small-capital terms. In the second part of this chapter, such a translation of words into small-capital terms will be executed for the interpretations of Cyril's christology by modern authors, so that it will become more obvious where they are in line with each other, and where they diverge.

4.2. SMALL-CAPITAL TERMS

4.2.1. *Definition of the Small-Capital Terms*

Cyril of Alexandria's metaphysics, as described in the previous chapter, can be a starting-point for developing a set of small-capital terms. One of the most basic terms would be REALITY, which can be used to denote anything that has real existence, whether Cyril's secondary

substances, his common natures, individual substances and natures, differentiae, propria, inseparable and separable accidents, radiated factors. A REALITY is not an abstraction, it does not exist merely in thoughts, in contemplation.[1] A Greek word which may have a similar meaning is πρᾶγμα,[2] while sometimes χρῆμα is used in this sense.[3]

As we have seen, Cyril considers the secondary substances and the common natures as realities. For these, the terms COMMON SUBSTANCES and COMMON NATURES will be employed. A COMMON SUBSTANCE is a secondary substance which is not regarded as an abstraction, but as really existing, as a REALITY. It denotes only what belongs to the definition of the substance, that is, the essence, which includes the differentiae, and the potentiality for individual existence. The propria and the inseparable attributes are not part of the substance, but they are things round the substance. Virtually synonymous with COMMON SUBSTANCE is COMMON NATURE. It, too, indicates a REALITY which is common to all individuals of the same species or genus, and does not include the propria and the inseparable attributes. The difference between the two terms is that COMMON NATURE is reserved for materials, plants, 'living beings' (ζῷα), angels, and God, while COMMON SUBSTANCE is also applied to works of craftsmanship; and COMMON NATURE has the connotation that a principle of operation is at work.

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[1] Strictly speaking, this would imply that, if 'nature' denotes a REALITY, 'two natures in thought only' would be a contradiction in terms. According to common parlance, however, this expression means that in reality there are not two natures.

[2] See, for example, *Thesaurus*, 116C: the divine attributes apply equally to Father and Son, "except only for the name and the reality (προσηγορίας τε καὶ πράγματος) of 'Father' and 'Son'"; *ibid.*, 120D: "if someone wants to apply the words and the realities (ῥήματά τε καὶ πράγματα) of the humanity to the naked God the Word, before the inhumanation (ἐνανθρωπήσεως), he acts severely impiously". A very clear example can be found in *ibid.*, 321AB, where a distinction is made between the names (ὀνόματα) and the realities (πράγματα) they refer to. For instance, the heaven (in the sense of firmament) is a visible reality (πρᾶγμα ὁρατόν), while the name 'heaven' cannot be seen, but only heard (μόνον ἀκουστόν). The same applies to a man and the name 'man'. Other examples include *ibid.*, 324B, 325B, 448A; *Dial. Trin.* II, 438d; III, 485d.

Hadot (1980) writes that in ancient Greek philosophy the word πρᾶγμα, as opposed to ὄνομα or λέξις, often means 'sense', 'concept' or 'notion'. Especially from the example in *Thesaurus*, 321AB, it is obvious that with Cyril it can also have the meaning of 'reality' in opposition to 'name' or 'word'. In each case, the context will have to be taken into account in order to come to a good rendering of πρᾶγμα.

[3] *Dial. Trin.* I, 404e: "the name and the reality of mediation": τὸ τῆς μεσιτείας ὄνομά τε καὶ χρῆμα; *ibid.*, I, 413d: "the reality (χρῆμα) of birth" (of the divine Son); *ibid.*, II, 419b: "the name and the reality of 'Father'": τὸ Πατὴρ ὄνομά τε καὶ χρῆμα.

The set of all the characteristics that are substantially or naturally attached to a really existing substance will be referred to as NATURAL QUALITY. It is a collection of REALITIES which include the differentiae, the propria and the inseparable attributes. Not everybody will consider the secondary substances as realities, and therefore, two other terms are needed. ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE and ABSTRACT NATURE signify a secondary substance that is not regarded as a reality, but merely as an abstract description of a set of characteristics that individual substances have in common.

INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES are the individual REALITIES that fall under a secondary substance.[4] For them the potentiality for individual existence has become an actuality. They are to be distinguished from other INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES that fall under the same secondary substance, but they all have the same essence. Here again, the propria and the inseparable attributes should not be regarded as part of the INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE, but rather as lying round it. Also separable accidents may be attached to an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE. Similarly, an INDIVIDUAL NATURE is a REALITY that falls under a common nature, it is distinguished from other INDIVIDUAL NATURES under the same common nature, it has individual existence and possesses the essence of the common nature. The propria, the inseparable attributes, and also the separable accidents lie round the INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

Both INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE and INDIVIDUAL NATURE combine two characteristics: (1) individual existence; (2) possession of the essence of a secondary substance. For each of these two characteristics, small-capital terms may be defined. INDIVIDUAL REALITY will be used to denote an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE or an INDIVIDUAL NATURE without any reference to the essence involved; it merely indicates individual existence. And ESSENCE will be applied to what in Aristotelian logic is called the essence of a species (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) or the essence of a genus (τὸ τί ἐστιν). For all those really existing attributes that cannot exist by

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[4] The expression 'to fall under (πίπτειν ὑπό)' is employed by Cyril to describe the relationship between a secondary substance and its individuals: *Dial. Trin.* I, 409a; cf. *Thesaurus*, 36A, 316B. Other expressions are: a secondary substance 'contains (περιεκτική)' the individuals (*Dial. Trin* I, 408d); an individual 'has (ἔχοντος)' the secondary substance (*Thesaurus*, 144C; cf. *ibid.*, 140B); with respect to several individuals one can speak of 'identity of substance (ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ταυτότης)' (*Thesaurus*, 316A; *Dial. Trin.* I, 408c; cf. *ibid.*, VI, 592b), of 'sameness of substance (τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ταὐτόν)' (*Dial. Trin.* VII, 637a), and of 'being of the same substance (τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας εἶναι)' (*Thesaurus*, 109A, 132D, 144A, 152D).

themselves, but need an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE to be attached to—that is, the propria, the inseparable attributes, and the separable accidents—the term DEPENDENT REALITY will be employed.

Another notion that is needed is that of a SEPARATE REALITY, a REALITY that exists separately from other SEPARATE REALITIES. An INDIVIDUAL REALITY may be a SEPARATE REALITY, but this is not necessarily the case. If a human being is regarded as a composition of an individual soul with an individual body, then the soul and the body may be viewed as INDIVIDUAL REALITIES, but not as SEPARATE REALITIES. Only the whole human being, composed of two INDIVIDUAL REALITIES, is then a SEPARATE REALITY. And similarly, if the incarnate Word is described as a composition of the divine Son and a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, which never existed separately from the Word, then the divine hypostasis was a SEPARATE REALITY before the incarnation, but after the inhumanation there is only one SEPARATE REALITY, the composition of the Word with the human nature; his human INDIVIDUAL NATURE never was a SEPARATE REALITY.

According to Stephan Otto, Leontius of Byzantium describes the individuation of the human nature that is assumed by the Logos as a two-stage process (Zweistufenindividuation).[5] First, an individual (ἄτο-μος, indivisible) nature (Einzelnatur) is marked off from the common nature. This individual nature has the same natural characteristics as the common nature. In small-capital terms it may be called an INDIVIDUAL NATURE. The next stage (logically, not chronologically) is that this individual nature is incorporated into the hypostasis of the Word. The resulting composition exists by itself (καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἶναι, Fürsichsein), and the human individual nature is part of this SEPARATE REALITY.[6]

Otto calls the natures and the hypostases 'bearers' (Träger) of properties. An individual nature bears the natural properties and also the marking properties (ἰδιώματα ἀφοριστικά), which mark the individual nature off from the common nature. When a hypostasis incorporates two natures, as is the case with a human being or with the incarnate Logos, the properties of the natures remain their own properties, but they become *also* properties of the hypostasis. Besides these, the hypostasis has its own distinctive properties, by which it is

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[5] Otto (1968), 79 ff.; see also pp. 52 f. and 59.
[6] Otto's terminology is somewhat different in that he calls the individual nature 'Einzelnatur', while he speaks of an 'Individualnatur' only when an 'Einzelnatur' has been hypostasized (*ibid.*, 80 f.).

distinguished from other hypostases. The hypostasis bears all these properties. A nature cannot bear opposing properties, but a hypostasis can. So, the divine nature is invisible, the human nature is visible, and the hypostasis of the incarnate Logos bears both properties, 'invisible' and 'visible'.[7]

In Otto's interpretation of Leontius of Byzantium's christology and anthropology, 'nature' and 'hypostasis' are distinguished, since both have their distinctive properties, but one might say that the two concepts remain at the same level. The hypostasis is not a metaphysical container for the two natures (the divine and human natures in Christ; soul and body in a human being), it is the SEPARATE REALITY which consists of the combination of these two natures. Although Leontius of Byzantium does not employ the expression 'composite hypostasis (ὑπόστασις σύνθετος)', which we find in Leontius of Jerusalem's writings, it is Otto's understanding that the Byzantine author works with this concept without employing the term.[8] In the following chapters we will investigate to what degree such a conception of the incarnate Logos is present in the writings of Cyril of Alexandria, even if for him the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις have a different meaning than for Leontius of Byzantium.

There are other conceptions of the incarnate Word, in which 'nature' and 'hypostasis' no longer belong to the same metaphysical level. In his first contribution to the unofficial consultations between the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Orthodox, Johannes Karmiris writes that by the 'one nature' in the μία φύσις formula Cyril of Alexandria means the 'hypostasis', the 'person', who is the 'bearer of both natures'.[9] This 'bearer' is not simply the composition of the two natures, as in Otto's conception of the hypostasis, but it is another metaphysical entity, which is as it were regarded as the container of the two natures. In the first agreed statement of the official consultations between the two families of churches we find a similar conception, although the word 'bearer' is not used:

> It is not the case that our Fathers used *physis* and *hypostasis* always inter-changeably and confused the one with the other. The term hypostasis

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[7] *Ibid.*, 25, 63, 69 f., 82 f.

[8] *Ibid.*, 63 f., 85. Leontius of Byzantium rejects the miaphysite expression μία φύσις σύνθετος, but, according to Otto, could have accepted the expression μία ὑπόστασις σύνθετος.

[9] Karmiris (1964–1965), 65, 66, and 72.

> can be used to denote both the person as distinct from nature, and also
> the person with the nature, for a hypostasis never in fact exists without a
> nature.[10]

On this view, the 'person' can be regarded 'as distinct from nature', but
also 'with the nature'. It seems that the person as distinct from nature
can be interpreted as the 'bearer' of the nature. For such a notion
the small-capital term BEARER will be used, and it will be investigated
whether the archbishop of Alexandria works with such a notion, as
Karmiris suggests.

It can already be added that before 429, Cyril uses the verb φορεῖν
in conjunction with 'flesh', 'body' and 'our nature' for the incarnate
Word,[11] but in these instances it is not a metaphysical concept (the
Word 'bearing' the flesh), but a metaphor: the Word wears the flesh like
a garment. This becomes particularly clear when derivatives of φορεῖν
are placed side by side with other verbs associated with clothing. So,
in his commentary on John 17:1 Cyril includes the phrase: "wearing
(πεφορεκώς) this most ignoble body and, out of love, having put on
(ὑποδύς) the likeness of human smallness".[12] And in his exposition of
John 6:27 he writes:

> For Christ is really one for us, wearing (περικείμενος) his own clothing
> (φόρημα) as the royal purple, I mean the human body, or the temple out
> of soul and body, of course, if indeed Christ is one out of both.[13]

When, then, the Word is said to φορεῖν his flesh, the flesh is regarded
as a garment which is worn by the divine Son. In the pre-429 writings
there is no hint of the hypostasis of the Son 'bearing' the human nature,
in the sense that Karmiris writes about it.

Based on our analysis of the word πρόσωπον in the trinitarian writ-
ings, we can add some more concepts. First, a PERSON; this is a rational
being—a man, an angel, God, the Word, the Word incarnate—in a
text and/or in reality, which is capable of having a 'personal' relation-
ship with other PERSONS. A 'personal' relationship is expressed by way
of communication and by feelings such as love and hatred. Whether

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[10] "Communiqué of the Joint Commission of the Theological Dialogue" (1989), 395.
[11] Liébaert (1951), 199, gives many examples. Two references in which the Word is
said to wear the human 'nature' are: *Thesaurus*, 424B: καὶ φύσιν πεφόρηκε τὴν τούτου
δεκτικήν (that is, capable of growth); *In Jo.* IX.1, vol. 2, 486 (823d): πεφόρηκε δὲ τὴν
ἡμετέραν φύσιν.
[12] *In Jo.* XI.3, vol. 2, 660 (947c).
[13] *In Jo.* III.5, vol. 1, 442 (301ab).

this rational being exists in reality or not, is left open when the term PERSON is employed. If the real existence of the PERSON is emphasized or clearly implied, this can be made explicit by speaking of an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. If, on the other hand, the emphasis lies on the role of the PERSON in a text, the term GRAMMATICAL PERSON may be applied. An ONTOLOGICAL PERSON is always a SEPARATE REALITY. The relationship it has with other ONTOLOGICAL PERSONS is external.

It should be noted that when the term PERSON is applied to the debate about Cyril of Alexandria's theology, various distinctions that were made later in the history of thought are not taken into account. Thus, no side is taken in the monothelite and monenergistic controversies when the small-capital term PERSON is used: the one PERSON of the incarnate Word may have one or two wills, one or two energies. Neither does PERSON by itself imply anything about human consciousness and other aspects of the modern notion of 'person'. However, one further concept is helpful in the discussion of Cyril's christology, and this is based on the abovementioned distinction between 'a person with the nature' and 'a person as distinct from nature'. We have applied the term BEARER to 'the person as distinct from nature'. The word BEARER, however, merely indicates a metaphysical entity at a different level from that of natures, to which one or more natures may belong. It does not in itself imply that such a BEARER is a PERSON. The term METAPHYSICAL PERSON will be employed for a BEARER which is an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, that is, a BEARER that is a really existing rational being. A METAPHYSICAL PERSON, then, may 'bear' one or more natures, but is metaphysically distinct from those natures.

The English word 'subject' may indicate a PERSON. Thomas Weinandy applies it in this way when he employs 'subject' and 'person' as virtual synonyms, which indicate 'the who' of the incarnate Word.[14] 'Subject' may also be a grammatical term, to be distinguished from 'verb', 'object', etc. Such a subject may be referred to by GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT. In a sentence like 'Paul and Barnabas were appointed', 'Paul and Barnabas' is the GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT, but it refers to two ONTOLOGICAL PERSONS. If, then, the incarnate Word is called one GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT, this does not necessarily imply that he is only one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. If the Greek word ὑποκείμενον is applied in a merely linguistic, not a metaphysical, sense, it could be translated

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[14] Weinandy (2003). See for a discussion of Weinandy's views sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.

by GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT. If, however, its meaning is more metaphysical, 'substrate' is the better rendering, as that which 'underlies'. In this sense, it is especially used for a substance which 'underlies' its properties.

The meaning of the various small-capital terms may be summarized as follows:

ABSTRACT NATURE	an ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE—and thus not a REALITY— of substances in which a principle of operation is at work, such as materials, plants, 'living beings (ζῷα)', angels, and God
ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE	a secondary substance which is not regarded as a REALITY
BEARER	a metaphysical REALITY at a different level than INDIVIDUAL NATURES, which is regarded as a sort of container for one or more of such natures, for example, a human BEARER 'contains' a soul and a body
COMMON NATURE	a COMMON SUBSTANCE—and thus really existing—with the connotation that a principle of operation is at work; it, therefore, applies only to materials, plants, 'living beings (ζῷα)', angels, and God
COMMON SUBSTANCE	a secondary substance which is not regarded as an abstraction, but as really existing, as a REALITY; it denotes only what belongs to the definition of the substance, that is, the essence, which includes the differentiae, and the potentiality for individual existence
DEPENDENT REALITY	a really existing attribute that cannot exist by itself, but needs an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE to be attached to—that is, a proprium, an inseparable attribute, or a separable accident
ESSENCE	what in Aristotelian logic is called the essence of a species (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) or the essence of a genus (τὸ τί ἐστιν)
GRAMMATICAL PERSON	a PERSON in a text, not necessarily also an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON
GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT	a subject in the grammatical sense of the word, to be distinguished from verb and object
INDIVIDUAL NATURE	an individual REALITY that falls under a common nature; it combines the essence of the common nature with individual existence
INDIVIDUAL REALITY	an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE or an INDIVIDUAL NATURE without any reference to the essence involved; it merely indicates individual existence

Figure 1. Overview of the small-capital terms.

INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE	an individual REALITY that falls under a secondary substance; it combines the essence of the secondary substance with individual existence
METAPHYSICAL PERSON	a BEARER which is an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, that is, a PERSON regarded to be at a different metaphysical level than the nature(s) it 'contains'
NATURAL QUALITY	the set of all the characteristics that are substantially or naturally attached to a really existing substance; it is a collection of REALITIES which include the differentiae, the propria and the inseparable attributes
ONTOLOGICAL PERSON	a PERSON which really exists; it is always a SEPARATE REALITY
PERSON	a rational being—a human being, an angel, God, the Word, the Word incarnate—in a text and/or in reality, which is capable of having a 'personal' relationship (communication, love) with other PERSONS
REALITY	anything that has real existence, whether Cyril's secondary substances, his common natures, individual substances and natures, differentiae, propria, inseparable attributes, separable accidents, and radiated factors; a REALITY does not exist merely in thought
SEPARATE REALITY	a REALITY that exists separately from other SEPARATE REALITIES; for example, a human being, composed of two INDIVIDUAL REALITIES—soul and body—is one SEPARATE REALITY

The interrelationships between the small-capital terms are depicted in figure 1. We are now in a position to translate the terminology and metaphysics in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings, as described in the previous chapter, into language containing the small-capital terms.

4.2.2. *Cyril's Terminology and Metaphysics before 429*

We have seen that in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings, the usual meaning of οὐσία is COMMON SUBSTANCE. The term denotes what a number of individuals have in common. It is not an ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE, but the substance under which the individuals fall is itself regarded as a reality. It includes the differentiae, but the propria and the inseparable attributes are viewed as lying round the COMMON SUBSTANCE as DEPENDENT REALITIES. When this more general metaphysical understanding is applied to God, it is in line with the language of the Cappadocians: οὐσία indicates the reality which is common to Father, Son and holy

Spirit, while each of them is an ὑπόστασις. For Cyril, it is this meaning that οὐσία has in the credal term ὁμοούσιος. At times, Cyril emphasizes that the unity of the three divine persons is stronger than that between three individual men. Sometimes οὐσία designates an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE, most notably in Cyril's interpretation of another phrase from the Nicene Creed, 'born from the substance of the Father', and in related expressions.

When ὑπόστασις is used as a technical term, it denotes a being that exists separately from other beings, that is, a SEPARATE REALITY. Normally, it refers to the individuals that fall under a COMMON SUBSTANCE, that is, to INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES. In such cases Cyril may also employ οὐσία to denote such a primary substance, especially in the *Thesaurus*. The word ὑπόστασις is explicitly employed for individual men and for the three persons of the Trinity. And a number of times Cyril writes that human properties like 'wisdom', 'knowledge' or the 'will' are not 'in a hypostasis' by themselves, or enhypostatic, but they are anhypostatic, that is, they are DEPENDENT REALITIES. In the works from before 429, I have not come across an instance in which two substances or natures are said to form one hypostasis. Thus, the incarnate Word is not called 'one hypostasis', and although an individual man may be referred to as a hypostasis, and in other places man is said to be composed out of soul and body, it is not expressly stated that, therefore, the hypostasis of man is a composition of soul and body.

In the anti-Arian works, φύσις usually has a meaning related to οὐσία. It denotes a COMMON NATURE, the REALITY which a number of individuals have in common. It is also in this sense that the word is applied to the Godhead. The divine φύσις designates the common reality of Father, Son and holy Spirit. Once only have we come across an instance in which φύσις is employed to denote the individual existence of a substance, a SEPARATE REALITY.

When the Logos is said to assume the human nature or to unite himself to the human nature, here too, this φύσις is the COMMON NATURE that is common to all people. By assuming this nature the Word becomes (also) an individual man. The archbishop of Alexandria does not, however, use a technical term for this individual human being. Instead, he refers to the incarnate Word by expressions like 'one of us' (εἷς ἐξ ἡμῶν). In the trinitarian writings, the word ὑπόστασις is used for the Logos in relation to the Father and the Spirit, not for the incarnate Word, nor for the flesh of the Word.

The word φύσις is also employed for the totality of all the INDIVIDUAL NATURES that fall under one COMMON NATURE. We find this usage applied to the human nature in soteriological contexts, where Christ is regarded to recapitulate the whole human race, the human 'nature', as the second Adam. When this understanding of φύσις is applied to the divine nature, because of God's unity, φύσις can stand for God himself, as a GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT (which is also a REALITY). Cyril does not refer to the one trinitarian God by the term πρόσωπον, which is rather reserved for each of the three divine hypostases. Nevertheless, the one God acts toward his creation as a unity, since "all things are by (or from) the Father, through the Son, in the holy Spirit",[15] which is the archbishop's way of expressing that *opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt*.

In Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings, the term πρόσωπον denotes 'face' in many biblical quotations and allusions, but otherwise it normally indicates a GRAMMATICAL and/or an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, a rational being. It is also employed for the three persons of the Trinity, more so in the *Dialogues* than in the *Thesaurus*. It seems to indicate their possibility of having relations with each other and with other rational beings, while the term 'hypostasis', as applied to the divine persons, emphasizes their real and relatively separate existence.

When in the *Commentary on John*, Cyril starts to express the unity of the incarnate Word by writing that he is not two πρόσωπα—implying that he is one πρόσωπον—, this is not just a grammatical statement, but one with ontological implications. The incarnate Word, more often indicated by 'one Son', 'one Christ' or 'one out of both', is one πρόσωπον. He relates to other rational beings as one rational being, not two. In small-capital terms, one might say that the Word made flesh is not just one GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT, but also one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON (which—as was noted above—still leaves open the questions of one or two wills, one or two energies, and modern consciousness).

Before we turn to the twentieth-century interpretations of Cyril of Alexandria's christological terminology, it is useful to discuss some christological 'models', that have been ascribed to the archbishop during the last decades, because they can help us to get a better understanding of Cyril's christology.

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[15] Already in *Thesaurus*, 580D, also in *Dial. Trin.* VI, 596d, and a number of times in his *Commentary on John*, e.g., *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 128 (87c): πάντα γὰρ παρὰ Πατρὸς δι' Υἱοῦ ἐν Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι.

4.3. Christological 'Models' or 'Themes'

We will look at the view of three theologians who have discussed Cyril's christology in terms of two 'models', 'themes' or 'viewpoints': Richard A. Norris, Ruth M. Siddals and Thomas G. Weinandy. We should bear in mind that they base their understanding, not just on the pre-429 works, but also on the archbishop's christological writings. After a brief presentation of their respective views, they will be compared and assessed.

4.3.1. *Richard A. Norris*

Dissatisfied with the classification of Cyril of Alexandria's christology in terms of the Logos-Flesh versus Logos-Man dichotomy, R.A. Norris presented in 1975 the suggestion that the archbishop's christological writings contain two 'models' or 'themes', which in his estimation are difficult to combine.[16] The first may be called the 'subject-attribute' or 'kenotic model'. It is related to two scriptural passages that were central to Cyril—John 1:14 and Phil. 2:5–8—and to the Nicene Creed. These three texts have in common (at least in Cyril's interpretation) that it is the divine Son who is the subject, to whom the incarnation is added as a predicate: (1) it is 'the Word' who 'was made flesh'; (2) it is 'he who was in the form of God' who 'emptied himself, taking the form of a slave'; and (3) it is 'the Son of God, the Only-Begotten, born from the Father' who 'came down and was made flesh and became man'. It is this logical and grammatical structure that Cyril adopts and makes his own in what Norris also calls a 'linguistic model' or a 'model of predication'.[17] In many varying ways Cyril expresses that the divine Son remains the same when he becomes man and thus enters upon a new condition of existence.

The subject-attribute model also finds expression in Cyril's usage of ἴδιος and its derivatives: the humanity is 'appropriated' by the Word, it now 'belongs to' him.[18] And according to Norris, the μία φύσις formula and its alternative with the word ὑπόστασις belong to the first theme,

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[16] Norris (1975).
[17] *Ibid.*, 268.
[18] *Ibid.*, 264. See also his earlier article, Norris (1966), 70.

too. They assert that "there is only one concrete nature or subject in question: that of the Logos".[19] In an earlier article he writes:

> We are drawn therefore to the interesting conclusion that what, in the first instance, governs Cyril's distinctive understanding of the formula 'one substance' [= one hypostasis] (and therefore the formula 'one nature') is not a physical or metaphysical definition of either term but a perception of what he takes to be the normative grammatical (and logical) form of statements about Christ.[20]

The term 'hypostasis'—and also 'nature' when used as a synonym of 'hypostasis'—refers

> to the 'real subject' of statements about Christ. In other words, it specifies the general form of an answer to the question 'Who?' as that is asked in connection with sayings and doings of Christ.[21]

It appears that Norris interprets the words φύσις and ὑπόστασις in the μία φύσις and μία ὑπόστασις formulas, not as referring to the ontology of Christ, but as a GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT, more precisely, as a GRAMMATICAL PERSON.[22]

Besides the subject-attribute model or theme, Norris recognizes a second one, the 'composition' theme: "it pictures the Person of Christ as the result of the 'putting together' or 'composition' of two different realities".[23] Words associated with it are σύνθεσις, συνδρομή, σύμβασις, ἕνωσις, and their cognates. Cyril can describe the incarnation as the "ineffable concurrence into union of two unequal and unlike natures".[24] And a number of times he writes that Christ is 'one out of both (εἷς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν)'.[25] According to Norris, Cyril tried to express his first, and more important, theme by way of the physical terminology of the second theme, which resulted in confused and confusing language. Thus, although Christ can be said to be composed out of two things, his person is not constituted by the union. His personal unity is as it were

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[19] Norris (1975), 261.

[20] Norris (1966), 71. In this article, 'substance' is Norris's translation of ὑπόστασις.

[21] *Ibid.*, 70.

[22] Because of Cyril's influence on the definition of Chalcedon, Norris (1966), 77, applies the same principle to the council's doctrinal statement: "it insists that all language which refers to Christ (that is, to the incarnate Word) is language about a single, individual subject".

[23] Norris (1975), 261.

[24] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 688d. Cf. *Scholia* 8, ACO I.5, 221[9f.] and *First Letter to Succensus*, *ep.* 45, 6, ACO I.1.6, 153[17].

[25] For example, *Festal Letter* 8, 6, SC 392, 100; *Festal Letter* 17, 3, SC 434, 282. See further chapter 3, nn. 316 and 318.

extended to embrace the humanity. This notion is made even more explicit by the phrase ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν, Norris writes, implying that in this expression ὑπόστασις means PERSON.

To this second theme also belongs the analogy of soul and body.[26] And Norris notes that when this analogy is employed to elucidate the μία φύσις formula, the word φύσις gets "a slightly different sense" than when the formula is understood as part of the first theme: "it suggests, that is, that the one nature may be the product of the 'putting together' of Word and Humanity".[27] From this brief statement, it is not quite clear how this second meaning of φύσις might be translated into a small-capital term. It is Norris's opinion that in his usage of the composition theme, Cyril does not "actually succeed in saying quite what he wants: he cannot in practice make it work for him".[28] The main reason for this he locates in the incompatibility of the two models: Cyril's primary model is a linguistic one, while the composition theme works with physical models, which are of a different order. Finally, Norris suggests that it may be "fundamentally misleading" to understand Cyril's christology in terms of a conflict between the Logos-Flesh and the Logos-Man models, since both of them belong to the second theme.[29]

4.3.2. *Ruth M. Siddals*

In the fourth chapter of her dissertation, Ruth M. Siddals discusses what she calls 'Cyril's basic christological model'.[30] She herself writes that it is Norris's subject-attribute model, expressed with different terminology, but adds that perhaps

> Norris fails to distinguish fully between Cyril's analysis of christological predicates (a linguistic exercise) and his formation of a model illustrating the ontology of Jesus Christ (an exercise in metaphysics).[31]

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[26] Norris (1975), 267, adds that the analogy of soul and body can be and is also employed by Cyril within the subject-attribute model: just as the soul is the principle of life in a human being, so the Word is the one subject in Christ.

[27] *Ibid.*, 264. He refers to the occurrence in the *Second Letter to Succensus*, *ep.* 46, 3, ACO I.1.6, 160$^{2-5}$.

[28] *Ibid.*, 265.

[29] *Ibid.*, 268.

[30] Siddals (1984), 63–89. See n. 24 of chapter 3 for pages where the term 'basic christological model' can be found.

[31] *Ibid.*, 174 f., n. 2.

According to Siddals, Cyril does distinguish between the two, although this is not always very clear, since the ancient terminology is at times ambiguous with respect to the linguistics / ontology issue.

In his basic model, Cyril interprets the sentence 'the Word became flesh' in the same way as the sentence 'a man became a carpenter', Siddals states.[32] She acknowledges that Cyril himself does not actually place the two sentences in parallel with each other, but in his exegesis of John 1:14 she sees the same sort of argumentation which the archbishop elsewhere applies to 'a man became a carpenter'.[33] This means that, for the purposes of analysis, Cyril treats 'flesh' as an inherent factor which is acquired by the subject, which is the Word, as a new accident. He uses four verbs from the logical tradition for this acquisition: occasionally συμβῆναι and προσγενέσθαι, more often προσλαμβάνεσθαι (and πρόσληψις), most frequently ἰδιοποιεῖσθαι (as well as ἴδιος and ἴδιον). All four, the British theologian argues, are also employed to describe the relationship between a subject and its accidents or properties.

In her view, Cyril even utilizes purposefully the ambiguity of the term ἴδιον. It can merely indicate that something belongs to something else, is its property. But in a more strict sense, it denotes a natural property, one that adheres to a substance by nature. When pressed, Cyril will deny that the flesh is a natural property of the Word, but in the meantime he makes use of this connotation of the term ἴδιον to suggest that the flesh is more to the Word than a mere separable accident, according to Siddals.[34]

She also acknowledges Norris's composition theme, which she tends to refer to as the 'picture' of composition.[35] She introduces it as Cyril's way to "indicate the correct notion of oneness while yet giving sufficient weight to the difference".[36] A compound is one thing (ἕν τι), but it is made up of parts, which are different in nature and which retain their difference within the compound. The phrase 'one out of both (εἷς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν)' sums up what has taken place. Cyril gives several examples, but the most frequent by far is the analogy of man, compounded of

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[32] *Ibid.*, 65.

[33] *Ibid.*, 177, n. 17. See also p. 86, and p. 194, n. 126. The word 'carpenter' (τέκτων) occurs in two passages of the *Thesaurus*, 313C and 341B. In neither, the phrase 'someone became a carpenter' is adduced to elucidate the sentence 'the Word became flesh'.

[34] *Ibid.*, 71.

[35] *Ibid.*, 128–132. The term 'picture' for this theme can be found on p. 174, n. 2, and on pp. 131 and 132. The phrase 'compound model' is used on p. 133.

[36] *Ibid.*, 128.

soul and body. Siddals states that Cyril employs the analogy only to stress *that* the components unite, not *how* they unite. With a reference to Cyril's *Second Letter to Succensus*, she adds that the archbishop suggests that the distinction between the components, body and soul in man, is essentially a theoretical one. And she concludes: "The key value of the analogy is that it includes the necessary concept of oneness, while at the same time allowing considerable weight to the differences".[37]

Although Cyril often adduces the compound analogy to illustrate his basic christological model, the two themes are 'not of a piece', according to Siddals.[38] In the basic model, the Word is the one subject, who acquires a new property. But in the compound model, as elaborated so far, the subject Jesus Christ is the sum of both components, divinity and humanity. The British theologian, however, pieces together from various remarks in Cyril's writings an understanding of the composition which she labels ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ, 'one thing [residing] in another'.[39] Just as the soul can be said to be 'in' the body, so also the Word can be said to be 'in' the flesh. But this is not an indwelling similar to that of the Spirit in the prophets, but Christ is one out of both. Since the language of ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ is applied to an inherent feature, a property, that resides in a substance, Cyril interprets the composition theme of soul and body in a way which is in line with his basic christological model, Siddals concludes: the soul is in a body, and the Word is in the flesh, just as an inherent feature is in a subject. This leads her to the analogy of a flower and its scent. We will leave that until the discussion of the appropriate passage in *Contra Nestorium* in section 6.4.2.1.

4.3.3. *Thomas G. Weinandy*

Thomas G. Weinandy explicitly rejects Norris's understanding of Cyril's christology in terms of two different models which cause conceptual chaos.[40] He rather sees the archbishop state two different truths about his one conception of the incarnation, although he admits that Cyril not always distinguishes the two in an unambiguous manner. The first truth, expressed by the soul/body analogy, is that Christ is one

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[37] *Ibid.*, 131.

[38] *Ibid.*, 132. On p. 230, n. 66, Siddals gives some credit to Norris's assessment that the two themes are incompatible, but she adds that some of the mist may clear when one of the components is regarded as residing within the other.

[39] *Ibid.*, 133–137.

[40] Weinandy (2003), 40.

existing reality, one ontological being or entity. The second truth, related to Norris's subject-attribute 'model', is that this one existing reality is the same as the divine Son of God, now existing as incarnate; it is the person of the Word existing as incarnate.[41] According to Weinandy, Norris is right in regarding the subject-attribute model as of primary importance (although he objects to the term 'model'), but by interpreting it as merely a linguistic tool, Norris misses Cyril's metaphysical understanding of Christ's ontological constitution.[42] In small-capital terms one may say that Weinandy's first truth states that the incarnate Word is one SEPARATE REALITY, and the second truth that he is one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON.

More strongly than Siddals, Weinandy emphasizes that the comparison of soul and body only denotes *that* divinity and humanity are united in the Word, not *how* they are united.[43] In his view, also the μία φύσις formula underlines his first truth: it indicates that the incarnate Word is one entity.[44] The word φύσις in the formula is not to be understood in the sense of quiddity, but it stands for SEPARATE REALITY. Cyril's usage of φύσις is ambiguous, Weinandy adds, for he does speak of soul and body, and of divinity and humanity, as a φύσις in the sense of quiddity.

It is in the terms ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον that Weinandy sees his second truth—that the one ontological reality is the person of the Word existing as incarnate—enunciated. He usually translates them by 'subject' and 'person', and regards them as synonymous.[45] He explicitly alters Wickham's translation of 'union / united καθ' ὑπόστασιν' into 'union according to the person' and 'united personally'.[46] And he writes that Cyril distinguishes between 'the level of natures' and 'the level of the person'.[47] The person indicates the who, while the person's nature indicates the manner of the who's existence: as God or as man.[48] The union of the Word with humanity is not a composition of two natures,

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[41] See also *ibid.*, 32.

[42] *Ibid.*, 47.

[43] Another article, Weinandy (1996), is fully devoted to this issue.

[44] *Ibid.*, 63–65. Weinandy (2003), 32–39.

[45] See, e.g., Weinandy (2003), 38: with reference to Cyril's speaking of the incarnate Word as μία ὑπόστασις or ἓν πρόσωπον: "Here the customary term *physis* has been substituted by the terms *prosopon* and *hypostasis* which acquire the more Chalcedonian sense of person or subject". See also p. 39: "the one divine person / subject (*prosopon / hypostasis*)"; and p. 42: "the ὑποστάσει μία is highlighting who the one subject is".

[46] *Ibid.*, 41 f. Weinandy (1996), 66, n. 17.

[47] Weinandy (1996), 66.

[48] *Ibid.*, 61. Weinandy (2003), 42.

but it is the person of the Word taking on a new mode or manner of existence. Weinandy refers to this view as the "personal / existential understanding of the Incarnation",[49] and calls Cyril's achievement "a true christological breakthrough".[50]

From this brief summary, it is clear that Weinandy interprets both ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον in Cyril's christology as a METAPHYSICAL PERSON. It is an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON who 'bears' the divine and the human natures (although Weinandy himself does not use the verb 'to bear'). This PERSON belongs to a different metaphysical level than the natures. This PERSON of the Son lives eternally in a divine mode or manner of existence, and since the incarnation he (also) lives in a human mode or manner of existence.[51] This METAPHYSICAL PERSON is the 'who', the 'identity' of the man Jesus, and this PERSON is the eternal Son of God. Weinandy also speaks of the human 'I' of the Son, which is "the human psychological centre of the one ontological person or subject of the divine Son", but these elaborations are not pertinent to the present discussion.[52]

4.3.4. *Discussion*

When the views of the three theologians—Norris, Siddals, and Weinandy—will now be compared and assessed, this will mainly be done on the basis of our findings so far, as we have gathered them from the trinitarian writings. However, in a few cases passages from later writings will enter into the discussion, when the theologians adduce them for important parts of their argumentation.

What is striking, first of all, is that all three are in agreement about Cyril's primary christological theme, albeit that they employ different language to express it. Norris's subject-attribute model, Siddals's basic christological model, and Weinandy's notion of a personal union all give expression to what Jouassard has called the 'fundamental intuition' of Cyril of Alexandria's christology: Christ's divinity is primordial,

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[49] *Ibid.*, 61. Weinandy (2003), 43 f. He already described this view and employed this expression in an earlier book: Weinandy (1985), 53–55.

[50] Weinandy (2003), 41.

[51] In Weinandy (1996 / 1997), 264 and 265, he writes twice that "that is the manner in which the Son now exists", but presumably he means that the Son now exists in two modes, a divine *and* a human one.

[52] *Ibid.*, 264.

while his humanity is added.[53] Norris regards this as a linguistic rule, which governs our language about Jesus Christ. Although this may be a useful contribution to present-day systematic theology, it does not seem to be historically correct to attribute such a merely linguistic understanding to the fifth-century archbishop of Alexandria. Both Siddals and Weinandy rightly comment that for Cyril there were ontological truths underlying the words. These truths were more easily expressed in narrative structures, such as the biblical language of John 1:14 and Phil. 2:5–8 and the text of the Nicene Creed, than in metaphysical concepts. Yet, we see Cyril trying to put them into more conceptual language as well. 'The Word became flesh' is translated into 'the Word has assumed the human nature' or 'humanity'.

His problem, however, was that there were no metaphysical concepts available to express precisely what he learned from the Scriptures: the Son of God assumed human nature, but in doing this he remained one and the same Son, now with the flesh. What concept could be applied for that which remained the same, also after the assumption of the flesh? It is not surprising that the structure of his language is similar to that of a substance which acquires a property, since there, too, the substance remains the same, both before and after the acquisition. But Cyril was well aware that the assumed humanity was not an accident (see below). So, he looked for other ways to put his understanding into concepts. He employed the metaphysical language he was familiar with: οὐσία, φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον. But these terms had connotations which could easily lead his readers to conclusions that he did not intend. The composition theme and the soul/body analogy gave him a possibility to illustrate how two things that come together can form a single being. However, in this illustration it is not clear how the result of the composition is 'the same' as one of the two elements that constitute the compound. Thus, Cyril's attempts to state his understanding of the incarnation in metaphysical language are confusing at times, as Norris states. Nevertheless, they confirm that Cyril was concerned for the ontology of the confession that 'the Word became flesh'.

Weinandy, no doubt, is right in searching the development of Cyril's ontology in a growing insight that two metaphysical levels need to be distinguished, those that were later to be labelled 'person' and

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[53] Jouassard (1953), 179. See chapter 1, n. 109.

'nature'.[54] It is very doubtful, however, that Cyril already applied the conceptual language in the way that Weinandy describes it: ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον both signifying a METAPHYSICAL PERSON at another metaphysical level than the natures, which can exist in two different modes, a divine and a human one. We have seen that in the trinitarian writings the technical meaning of ὑπόστασις is that of a SEPARATE REALITY, which often is also an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE. This suggests that in his christological works Cyril would mean by μία ὑπόστασις 'one SEPARATE REALITY', in other words, he would confirm by it Weinandy's first truth—that the incarnate Word is one existing reality, one ontological being or entity—, not his second truth—that this entity is the divine person of the Word. And although πρόσωπον does have the meaning of PERSON in the anti-Arian works, and Cyril infers in his *Commentary on John* that the incarnate Christ is one πρόσωπον, there is no hint that Cyril would regard such a PERSON as representing a different metaphysical level than the natures. It seems that Weinandy is reading a later theological development back into the writings of Cyril of Alexandria. A more final assessment of his views, however, can only be made after we have looked at a number of Cyril's christological writings in the following chapters.

It is also too early to evaluate the conflicting interpretations of the μία φύσις formula. That, too, will have to wait until we have investigated a series of writings from after 428.

Siddals interprets Cyril's primary christological theme in terms of the Word as a subject acquiring the flesh, the humanity, as a new inherent feature, a property, an accident. When she first introduces these thoughts, she adds the qualifying phrase 'for the purposes of analysis', and although she repeats the word 'analysis' and its cognates several times,[55] nevertheless the suggestion is raised that Cyril regarded Christ's humanity ontologically as an accident. Siddals does state that in his exegesis Cyril applies the rules of logic, especially Porphyrian logic,[56] but since logic is for Cyril not just a linguistic exercise, but an expression in language of underlying ontological structures, stating that the flesh "actually has the status of an accident" has ontological

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[54] Moeller (1951), 718, already spoke of "l'intuition géniale de Cyrille sur *l'unique personne* du Verbe fait chair" (see chapter 1, n. 108).

[55] Siddals (1984), 66, 67, 73, 77, 88.

[56] *Ibid.*, 78.

implications.[57] This may unduly (and probably unintentionally) promote the idea that Cyril insufficiently values Christ's humanity.

When we have a closer look at Siddals's argumentation, it appears that there are indeed similarities between the Word's acquiring the flesh and the acquisition of an accident by a substance, but that Cyril does not actually refer to the humanity in terms of an accident. First of all, Siddals herself admits that Cyril does not use the sentence 'a man becomes a carpenter' as a paradigm for the interpretation of John 1:14.[58] It is the British theologian herself who makes the comparison. Secondly, the four verbs by which she links Cyril's christology with the relationship between a substance and its accident, do not point unambiguously in the direction she suggests. Siddals herself notes that συμβῆναι is also employed by Cyril in a less technical sense.[59] He not only writes that the humanity is joined to the Word, but also that the Word is joined to the flesh,[60] while the verb is also used to denote that the Word and humanity come together in a more symmetrical picture.[61] And Cyril does not actually call the flesh 'an accident' of the Word. Therefore, when the humanity is said to συμβῆναι to the Logos this may be understood in a more general, non-technical way.

Something similar applies to the verb προσλαμβάνεσθαι and the related noun πρόσληψις. To begin with, λαμβάνειν and its derivatives are often used by Cyril, because the apostle Paul employs this verb in Phil. 2:5–8: "taking (λαβών) the form of a slave". It seems that Cyril adds the prefix πρός to emphasize that this 'taking' does not involve any change in the nature of the Word. As he repeats many times, the Word remained what he was, God, when the flesh was added.[62] Furthermore, Siddals writes that the concept of addition, treated in terms of a new accident being added to a subject, allows us to say strictly that the subject is still numerically one. This, however, only holds when the addition is an accident not only 'for the purposes of analysis', but in reality. And Cyril is quite aware that the added flesh is not an accident in reality. It is not something that can only exist when it is attached to

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[57] *Ibid.*, 70.

[58] See n. 33.

[59] Siddals (1984), 179, n. 22.

[60] E.g., *In Jo.* IV.2, vol. 1, 520 (354b).

[61] E.g., *Contra Nestorium*, ACO I.1.6, 33$^{13-14}$.

[62] For example, in the first citation that Siddals (1984), 68, gives containing the verb προσλαμβάνειν: not having changed into flesh, by no means, rather having added (προσλαβών) it, and not having neglected being God (*Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 27$^{11-14}$).

a substance; the flesh is itself a substance, a nature, which *could* exist by itself, but which, in the case of Jesus Christ, never existed apart from the Word. It is precisely because the flesh *could* exist by itself that Cyril sees a danger in Nestorius's teaching: in Cyril's perception Nestorius taught that the flesh, the man Jesus, lived as a separate individual besides the Word.

For the same reason Siddals's interpretation of ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ, as applied to the incarnate Word, in terms of a subject and its accident is flawed. All the examples of compositions that Cyril adduces to illustrate the union of the Word with his flesh, which Siddals mentions,[63] are compounds of two substances; they do not consist of a substance and a property.[64] That the notion of ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ applies to body and soul as well as to the Word and his flesh, is not because Cyril would regard them as a subject and its accident, but because they are compositions of an incorporeal with a corporeal substance. The incorporeal substance can be said to be *in* the corporeal substance.[65] Besides, when the Word is said to be in the flesh, the Word would be regarded as the accident and the flesh as the substance, which would be altogether unacceptable to Cyril.

The composition theme is ascribed to Cyril of Alexandria by Norris and Siddals, but Weinandy rejects it because for him it implies that the divine and human natures in Christ are changed and confused.[66] For neither Norris nor Siddals, however, speaking of a composition implies confusion of the natures, on the contrary. Norris writes that one reason for Cyril to use the picture of composition is precisely his concern to maintain the completeness and reality of the human nature of Christ, in an anti-Apollinarian sense.[67] And according to Siddals, Cyril turns to the notion of compound to meet two requirements at the same time: to indicate the correct notion of oneness while yet giving sufficient weight

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[63] Siddals (1984), 226, n. 49.

[64] In *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 705c, Cyril himself even writes that the Son is not *in* "this one" (in Jesus) as ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, for that would imply that the Son and "this one" stand apart (ἀναμέρος), a duality. So, also, in *Or. ad Theod.*, ACO I.1.1, 667⁻⁹.

[65] McKinion (2000), 67–79, too, interprets the comparison in terms of the union of an incorporeal entity with a corporeal one: "these images illustrate that the Word, who is incorporeal, is intrinsically linked to his body" (p. 74).

[66] Weinandy (2003), 40 (rejection of Norris's composition model), 44 ("the incarnational act, the 'becoming', is not the compositional union of natures which would demand change and confusion"). See also Weinandy (1996), 59f., 62.

[67] Norris (1975), 262.

to the difference.[68] It may be added that for Aristotle the notion of composition (σύνθεσις) is by itself rather vague. In the *Topics* he writes: If someone says that a whole is a composition of things, for example, that a living being is a composition of soul and body, then one must first investigate whether he has indicated what kind of composition it is.[69] There is, then, no reason to avoid the term 'composition theme' as though it would infer confusion or change of the natures.

More importantly, Weinandy emphasizes repeatedly that Cyril uses the soul/body analogy to illustrate that the Word and the assumed humanity are one entity, and that it does not say anything about the type, manner, and nature of the union.[70] As we just saw, both Norris and Siddals add that Cyril also employs the analogy to stress that the divinity and the humanity in Christ remain different, that they retain their integrity. That in the application of this comparison the difference of the natures is indeed upheld by Cyril can be shown from his use of the analogy in his *Commentary on John*, that is, already before the Nestorian controversy:

> But [we say] that, according to our holy and God-inspired Scripture, Jesus, Christ and Son, then, is one, considered to be out of the divine temple, which has the whole definition of humanity, and out of the living Word. The same is also with respect to us considered to be true and to apply by nature in the same way. For we are composed into one man out of soul and body, while the body is different and the soul in the body is different, according to the formula for each, but they concur to show one living being, and they will not suffer to be divided altogether after being combined with each other.[71]

Since Cyril speaks of 'the soul *in* the body', it seems that he has a remaining difference in mind, and that not just in thought. In his *Letter to the Monks of Egypt*, at the very beginning of the Nestorian controversy, we find an even clearer expression of this:

> For, as I have said, [a mother] has given birth to a living being skilfully composed out of unlike things, and to one human being, albeit out of

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[68] Siddals (1984), 128.

[69] Aristotle, *Topics*, 151a[20–25]. McKinion (2000), 59–63, does not mention this passage in the *Topics*. According to McKinion, Aristotle's composition is a juxtaposition, certainly not a mixture. It is obvious, however, that Cyril would not want to compare the union of the Word with his flesh with a juxtaposition, the position he attributes to Nestorius.

[70] Weinandy (1996), 61, 64, 65; Weinandy (2003), 33.

[71] *In Jo.* XII.1, vol. 3, 155 (1112bc).

two things, each of which remains what it is, while they concur, as it
were, into a natural unity, and mingle, as it were, with each other that
which is attached to each as its own.[72]

"Two things, each of which remains what it is". What is said to mingle
here is not the natures of soul and body, but their properties.

Siddals quotes a passage from Cyril's *Second Letter to Succensus*, in
which "at first sight" she reads the "quite extraordinary" claim that
"the distinction between body and soul is theoretical and not real":[73]

> But they overlook that those things which are usually divided (διαιρεῖ-
> σθαι) not just in contemplation (κατὰ μόνην τὴν θεωρίαν), will split apart
> from each other fully and in every manner separately into diversity
> (ταῦτα πάντως καὶ εἰς ἑτερότητα τὴν ἀνὰ μέρος ὁλοτρόπως καὶ ἰδικὴν ἀπο-
> φοιτήσειεν ἂν ἀλλήλων). Let a man like us once again be an example to
> us. For also with respect to him do we consider two natures, one of the
> soul, another of the body. But, dividing (διελόντες) them in mere thoughts
> and taking the difference (διαφορὰν) as in subtle reflections or imagina-
> tions of the mind, we do not set the natures apart (ἀνὰ μέρος), nor do we
> grant them the power of a radical separation (διατομῆς), but we regard
> them to be of one [man] (ἑνός), so that the two are no longer two, but
> through both the one living being is completed.[74]

Although Cyril does indeed employ the word 'distinction (διαφορά)',
it is clear from the whole context that what he opposes is a total
separation into two SEPARATE REALITIES. If such a separation would
apply, not just in the mind and in contemplation, but in reality, then
body and soul would no longer constitute one man (and similarly the
incarnate Word would no longer be one). Cyril is here not denying the
remaining ontological difference between body and soul in man (and
by implication between divinity and humanity in the incarnate Logos).
It is their *separation* which should take place in the mind only.

Siddals herself elsewhere gives a quotation from *Contra Nestorium* in
which this becomes even clearer:[75]

> For the Word from God the Father, not without flesh, is not twofold,
> but [the] one and only Lord and Son. For I myself would also hold that
> the difference (διαφορὰν) or the interval (διάστασιν) between humanity
> and divinity is vast, for other with respect to their mode of being

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[72] *Ep.* 1, 12, ACO I.1.1., 15[30–33]. See for a further discussion of this passage, section
5.5.2.2.
[73] Siddals (1984), 130.
[74] *Ep.* 46, 5, ACO I.1.6, 162[2–9]. See further section 8.4.
[75] Siddals (1984), 127.

(κατά γε τὸν τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγον) and unlike each other are plainly the things that have been mentioned. But when the mystery regarding Christ is brought into our midst, the principle (λόγος) of the union does not fail to acknowledge (ἀγνοεῖ) the difference (διαφοράν), but it puts aside the separation (διαίρεσιν), not confusing the natures or mingling the natures, but because the Word of God participated in flesh and blood, he is, then, also in this way [that is, incarnate] regarded as and called one Son.[76]

The *difference* of the natures is acknowledged, but their *separation* is not accepted. And this confessed difference is not just in thought only, for confusion and mixture of the natures are explicitly rejected. We will return to the distinction between 'difference' and 'separation' in section 4.4.1.

The distinction Weinandy makes between the two ways in which Christ is one in Cyril of Alexandria's writings is helpful: (1) he is one entity; (2) this one entity is the person of the Word existing as incarnate. For it helps to show the problems that Cyril faced when he tried to put his understanding of the incarnation into metaphysical language. The usual non-metaphysical way of emphasizing the unity of Christ consists in stating that the incarnate Word is 'the same' with and without flesh, that he is 'one (εἷς)', 'one and the same', 'one Son', 'one Lord', 'one Christ', 'one out of both', 'not a duality of sons'. This unity is the result of a 'union (ἕνωσις)' or a 'coming together (συνδρομή)' of the Word or the Only-Begotten with the flesh,[77] with that which is human,[78] with the temple,[79] with our nature.[80] When the Word is the subject we are still close to the subject-attribute theme, but when the Word himself is said to be united,[81] and when the terms for the elements of the union become more technical and philosophical, we move from the subject-attribute theme towards the composition theme: a union or

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[76] *Contra Nestorium* II.6, ACO I.1.6, 42$^{30-37}$.

[77] *Dial. Trin.* VI, 605d.

[78] *Ibid.*, 601b.

[79] *Ibid.*, 608d.

[80] *In Jo.* XI.10, vol. 2, 724 (991a): ἑαυτὸν ἑνώσας τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φύσει. Cf. *ibid.*, 734 (998b): ἀναμιγνὺς ὥσπερ ἑαυτὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φύσει. In the *Commentary on John*, before the Nestorian controversy, Cyril still employed the verb 'to mingle' for the Word's union with the flesh, albeit with the addition of 'as it were'.

[81] Many times Cyril writes that the Word is 'united with the flesh'. See, e.g., *Dial. Trin.* I, 396e. In the *Commentary on John*, this is especially the case in passages that speak of the life-giving flesh in the Eucharist, for example, *In Jo.* IV.3, vol. 1, 553 (377d).

coming together of divinity and humanity,[82] of the divine and human natures.[83] There is no clear separation between the language of the subject-attribute theme and the terminology of the composition theme, but there is a whole spectrum of expressions from pure subject-attribute phrases on the one side ('the Word became man') to pure composition language on the other ('two natures have come together'). While in the trinitarian writings Cyril already starts using more metaphysical language for the elements that come together, he does not have a metaphysical term yet for the resulting entity or for that which is 'the same' before and after the incarnation.

The unity is further indicated by what later came to be called the communication of idioms:[84] both the divine and the human properties and actions are ascribed to one grammatical subject, which refers to one ontological being, Jesus Christ. We find this already in the eighth *Festal Letter* for the year 420: Christ says that the Son of Man came from heaven (John 3:13) and he speaks of the Son of Man ascending to where he was before (John 6:62)—although it was the divine Word who was in heaven, not his flesh—because he wants us to confess "one (εἷς), both before the flesh, and with the flesh".[85] This reasoning returns in the *Commentary on John*, but this time he adds that the incarnate Word "refuses to be divided into two πρόσωπα after the inhumanation (ἐνανθρώπησιν)".[86] We find a similar phrase in his exposition of John 6:69: the incarnate Word is "indivisible after the union, and he is not severed into two persons (πρόσωπα)".[87]

The introduction of the word πρόσωπον seems to be an important step towards a more metaphysical understanding of the unity of Christ. The Word made flesh is not two persons; it is implied that he is one person, that is, one PERSON—one GRAMMATICAL PERSON, but also one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. Christ is regarded as one rational being, who is capable of having personal relationships with other rational beings. One cannot say, however, that Cyril views him here as a METAPHYSICAL

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[82] *Dial. Trin.* III, 501a.

[83] *Ibid.* I, 405ab; see chapter 3, n. 231.

[84] *ODCC* (³2005), s.v. 'Communicatio idiomatum': "The term, in its Greek form [ἀντίδοσις ἰδιωμάτων], was first regularly used in the 6th cent. by theologians who defended the Chalcedonian Definition; the Latin form, which derived from it, seems to have become a technical phrase in the Middle Ages".

[85] *Festal Letter* 8, 5, SC 392, 98.

[86] *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 224 (150e).

[87] *Ibid.* IV.4, vol. 1, 577 (393e). Cf. also *ibid.*, XI.10, vol. 2, 725 (992b).

PERSON, as a bearer of natures. What the relationship is between this one person and the divine and human natures is not indicated. Nor is there any reflection on what it means that this one person is 'the same' as the 'naked' Word. That in Cyril's trinitarian theology the 'naked' Word is also called a πρόσωπον raises the question what the relation is between this divine πρόσωπον and the πρόσωπον of the incarnate Word, but the archbishop does not answer this question. He just argues that Christ is not to be divided into two πρόσωπα. It is a first step on this metaphysical road. We will have to see what other steps will follow during the Nestorian controversy.

4.4. Various Interpretations

Now that the small-capital terms have been defined, Cyril of Alexandria's metaphysical terms in the trinitarian writings have been translated into these terms, and we have discussed various christological themes, we can turn to the modern interpreters of Cyril and translate their concepts into these terms. A few times an initial assessment of their views, mainly based on the analysis of Cyril's pre-429 writings as given in the previous chapters, will also be given. First, the two scholars will be discussed who almost a century ago put to paper their opposing views and who have influenced the debate since then: Joseph Lebon and Martin Jugie. Then follow a number of other theologians who have contributed to the study of the Alexandrian archbishop's christology. Not all those who have written a monograph on Cyril's christology and/or soteriology during the last fifteen years have given much attention to the terms, formulas and concepts that are the focus of this study. Because their contribution in this area is minimal, Lars Koen,[88] Lawrence J. Welch,[89] and Daniel A. Keating[90] are not included in this overview.

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[88] Koen (1991).
[89] Welch (1994b).
[90] Keating (2004).

4.4.1. *Joseph Lebon*

In 1909 Joseph Lebon's influential dissertation was published,[91] in which he maintained that the 'Severian Monophysites' were traditional Cyrillians, who in their theology and in their terminology faithfully followed Cyril of Alexandria, whose authority was unquestioned by them. In his study he investigates the key terms and expressions in the Miaphysite works in the period from 451 till 543, and comes to the conclusion that especially Severus of Antioch ascribes the same meaning to them as did the archbishop of Alexandria. Therefore, although his book is about the Miaphysite theologians in the fifth and sixth centuries, it also contains an interpretation of Cyril of Alexandria's christology, which at least partly has been followed by others. Forty-two years after his dissertation, in his contribution to the first volume of *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Lebon reiterated his views on the Miaphysites and Cyril of Alexandria, with only slight alterations.[92]

The Louvain scholar starts his discussion of the terminology by arguing that for the Miaphysites φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον have exactly the same meaning.[93] In their christology, these words signify an individual being, really existing, separate from other beings.[94] They do not specify the essence of that being or classify it within a species, they merely denote a being as individually existing.[95] In other words, φύσις and the two other terms signify a SEPARATE REALITY. They do not include a reference to a particular substance or essence, neither divinity nor humanity.

When Lebon discusses the μία φύσις formula, it appears that Severus of Antioch has written that the term σεσαρκωμένη indicates the composition, and the Louvain scholar concludes that 'the one nature (μία φύσις) … is exclusively the divinity'.[96]

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[91] Lebon (1909).

[92] Lebon (1951).

[93] Lebon (1909), 242 ("ils sont employés comme équivalents"), 250 ("il n'y a, entre ces mots, aucune différence de sens"). Lebon (1951), 461.

[94] *Ibid.*, 255 ("un être concret et existant individuellement"), 256 ("il est l'exact synonyme de notre expression: individu, ou: être individuel"), 257, 274. Cf. Lebon (1951), 461 ("parfaitement synonymes" et "le sens de réalité concrète, individuelle, existant à part et de son existence propre"), 463 f., 483.

[95] Lebon (1909), 274 ("non pas une essence spécifique ou une forme abstraite"), 275 ("Dire d'une chose qu'elle est une *nature* (*hypostase*, *personne*), ce n'est pas encore déterminer son *essence* et la classer dans une *espèce*"). Lebon (1951), 465.

[96] *Ibid.*, 310 f. Cf. Lebon (1951), 482.

> The whole mystery of the incarnation takes place in the order of *nature* and *hypostasis*, that is, in the order of individual existence. It is a *union* (ἕνωσις), a natural and hypostatic union, which operates by reduction to the unity of subject, and by appropriation to the unique pre-existent hypostasis or nature of the Word, in other words, to the Word himself, of a humanity which only exists in and by the union. The incarnation has not at all modified the individual reality of the Word; after as well as before the mystery, he is 'one and the same' (*individual*), the Word, the Son, the second Person of the Trinity. If the *nature* of the Word is the Word himself, his hypostasis, his individual, it is not at all modified, *in this understanding of nature*, by the union with the flesh. From then on, the incarnation only places the Word in a new state, that of the hypostatic union with the flesh, by reason of which it is *incarnated*.[97]

Lebon speaks of 'a new state' (un état nouveau) in which the Word is placed by the incarnation. 'State' presumably is his own term, not Severus's. If we try to give this concept a place in the pertinent metaphysical framework it should be regarded as an accident. 'State' (or 'état') is one of the usual translations of Aristotle's category of ἔχειν, or of ἕξις, which is one of the subclasses of accident.[98] And if 'the nature of the Word' is the SEPARATE REALITY of the Word, and it denotes the *divine* nature, which is 'one and the same' before and after his becoming man, then what is added in the incarnation cannot be regarded as another substance, for the addition of a second substance would lead to a composite reality, which is no longer the *same* SEPARATE REALITY. Lebon's argumentation, then, seems to imply (though probably not intentionally) that Christ's humanity is viewed as an accident.

Yet, there is some tension in Lebon's description of Severus of Antioch's terminology. For the identification of the φύσις with the Word himself might suggest that Lebon's φύσις signifies a PERSON. Tension is also felt in what he writes about composition:

> the one *incarnate nature and hypostasis* is the term for it [for the composition], and, *as such*, truly *results* from [the fact] that the divinity and the flesh subsist in a single individual (= *nature, hypostasis*), of which they are, as it were, the parts.[99]

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[97] *Ibid.*, 314 f.

[98] In Aristotle (2002) ἔχειν is translated by 'tenue' (pp. 6, 52), and ἕξις by 'état' (pp. 39–41). In Aristotle (1990) ἔχειν is translated by 'having' (pp. 5 and 31), and ἕξις by 'state' (pp. 24–25). In Aristotle (1973) ἔχειν is translated by 'state' or 'condition' (pp. 17 and 81), and ἕξις by 'habit' (pp. 63, 65).

[99] Lebon (1909), 297, n. 2: "la divinité et la chair subsistent en un seul individu

He quotes Severus as saying that in the incarnate Word the divinity and the body both "have the rank of a part (μέρους τάξιν)". Three interpretations are possible. (1) If, indeed, the single individual is the φύσις, the SEPARATE REALITY, of the divine Word, then the humanity that subsists in it must be regarded as an accident. (2) The humanity is not regarded as an accident, but as a substance—an understanding which better fits with the term 'part'. In this case, the resulting single individual, viewed as a φύσις, a SEPARATE REALITY, cannot be the divine Word, but must be the combination of the two INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES, divinity and humanity. (3) The phrase 'subsist in a single individual' would also make sense when this individual were interpreted as a META-PHYSICAL PERSON, which acts as a sort of container for the divinity and the humanity. However, in his explicit description of the meaning of φύσις, Lebon is quite unambiguous: it denotes a SEPARATE REALITY. The notion of a METAPHYSICAL PERSON is nowhere to be found in his elucidation of the Miaphysites' christology. The tension cannot be properly solved.

So far, this is Lebon's description of the meaning of these terms in the christology of the Miaphysites, Severus of Antioch in particular.[100] He, however, is insistent that this is also how Cyril of Alexandria utilized this terminology in his christology. "Cyril employs the terms *nature and hypostasis* absolutely in the same sense", synonymously, he writes.[101] And the archbishop does not shrink from using πρόσωπον as a synonym of ὑπόστασις either. The meaning of these terms in his christology is what we nowadays call an ὑπόστασις: it is the real being, insofar it is individual, existing independently, a separate subject.[102] In other words, it is a SEPARATE REALITY. The μία φύσις formula is also interpreted by the Miaphysites in the same way as did Cyril of Alexandria, according to Lebon. For Cyril, too, the φύσις in the formula is the nature of the divine Word, regarded as existing reality,

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(= *nature, hypostase*), dont elles sont comme les parties: μέρους τάξιν ἐπέχει ἡ θεότης καὶ μέρους τὸ σῶμα, dit Sévère". On p. 325, n. 1, he adds that it is not *qua* φύσις that the 'incarnate nature' may be regarded as the *result* of the composition, but because the divine nature is incarnated. The composition does not constitute the nature.

[100] Philoxenus of Mabbug at times speaks of 'the human nature' in the sense of "le genre humain, c'est-à-dire, l'ensemble des hommes". Lebon (1909), 402–405; quotation from p. 405. Also Lebon (1951), 529.

[101] *Ibid.*, 277.

[102] *Ibid.*, 278 ("l'être réel en tant qu'individuel, existant indépendant et sujet distinct"), 280.

as individual entity. The incarnation has not altered this nature, but has placed it in a new state.[103]

Lebon goes so far as to say that "when Cyril employs the language proper to his christology, without a doubt, he never gives the name *hypostasis* to the humanity of Christ, but neither does he call it a *nature*, a *human nature*".[104] The expressions δύο φύσεις ἐν θεωρίᾳ and ἐκ δύο φύσεων, in which the humanity of Christ is referred to by the word φύσις, are not part of Cyril's 'own (propre)' christological language, but Lebon regards them as concessions to the Orientals, to dispel their accusation that Cyril confused and mixed the natures.[105] The phrases did not belong to Cyril's own terminology, but they were used by the Antiochenes with whom he reunited in 433. When he had been convinced that they did not mean to separate the incarnate Word into two sons, he 'conceded' to them the use of these formulas, but with one restriction: one can only speak of two natures 'in contemplation only (ἐν θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ)'. Since φύσις meant an independently existing reality for Cyril, Lebon argues, accepting two natures in reality would amount to two Sons. Therefore, the qualification 'in contemplation only' had to be added. And accepting 'from two natures' in reality would amount to an independent human being before the incarnation, which would then have been united to the eternal Word—an understanding which Cyril fiercely rejects, since, in his view, that could only result in a relational, external union, not in a real unity.

In Lebon's interpretation of Cyril's christological vocabulary the qualification 'in contemplation only' should always be applied to the φύσεις themselves—or, more accurately, to the human φύσις. The

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[103] Cf. Lebon (1951), 483.

[104] Lebon (1909), 251. He repeats it in Lebon (1951), 466: "car nous persistons à croire que l'illustre Père [Cyril of Alexandria], dans le langage propre à sa christologie, a toujours employé φύσις et ὑπόστασις comme synonymes et que, s'il n'a jamais donné à l'humanité du Christ le nom d'*hypostase*, il ne l'a jamais non plus appelée une *nature*, une *nature* humaine".

[105] *Ibid.*, 251, n. 2. See also pp. 279 f., 358–360, 377–379, 390 f., and Lebon (1951), 506, 516, 528, 558. Lebon (p. 280, n. 1; p. 359, n. 2) derives the term 'concession' from the word συγκεχωρήκαμεν in the *Letter to Eulogius*: "Since all the Orientals believe that we orthodox follow the opinions of Apollinarius and think that a mixture or a confusion has taken place, …, we have allowed (συγκεχωρήκαμεν) them, not to divide the one Son into two, far from it, but only to confess that neither confusion nor mixture has taken place" (*ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 35[18]–36[1]; Lebon quotes from PG 77, 225BC, which reads συνεχωρήσαμεν). See for a discussion of this passage section 8.4. The idea of a concession to the Orientals stems from Severus of Antioch, who employed the word συγκατάβασις for it: Lebon (1909), 157, 529 f.

divine φύσις existed as a SEPARATE REALITY already before the incarnation, the human φύσις did not. But also after the incarnation, there is only a divine φύσις, no human φύσις; Christ's humanity has been added to the divine φύσις. When one speaks of a human φύσις, not just before the incarnation (in the ἐκ δύο φύσεων formula), but also after the incarnation, this is to be taken 'in contemplation only'. An alternative interpretation, however, which Lebon rejects, applies 'in contemplation only' after the incarnation, not to the φύσεις, or to the human φύσις, but to the verbs 'to separate', 'to divide'. On this view, the φύσεις themselves are real—that is, they are INDIVIDUAL NATURES—but because of their union they should not be separated, for that would result in two Sons. If we separate or divide them, it should be done 'in contemplation only'. The two INDIVIDUAL NATURES form not two, but only one SEPARATE REALITY. For Lebon, a φύσις is not an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, but a SEPARATE REALITY and, therefore, two φύσεις is equivalent to two SEPARATE REALITIES.

Lebon notes that Cyril describes Nestorius's position by means of such terms as διαιρεῖν, διατέμνειν, καταδιιστάναι, ἰδίᾳ, ἀνὰ μέρος, κατὰ μόνας, ἰδικῶς, etc., all indicating division and separate existence. And he asks the rhetorical question:

> If the Nestorian affirmation of two *natures* seems to Cyril to be the division of Christ into two distinct individuals, should one not say that, in his eyes, the term φύσις has, in christology, the sense of *something that exists separately and independently*?[106]

My answer to this question, however, is: Not necessarily so. As has already been argued in section 4.3.4, Cyril objects to *separating* the natures, while he acknowledges the real distinction of the natures, also after the union. This argumentation is not new; already John the Grammarian used it against the Miaphysites of his time. But Lebon comments that the Chalcedonians alleged in vain that Cyril only forbade to *divide* the natures after the union, since for the Miaphysites 'two natures inseparably united' was a contradiction in terms: for them, speaking of two natures implied that there are two individual entities, two SEPARATE REALITIES.[107] Lebon adopts Severus's interpretation of Cyril, not John the Grammarian's.

It has already been argued (towards the end of section 3.4.4) that even before the Nestorian controversy Cyril speaks of two natures

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[106] *Ibid.*, 279.
[107] Lebon (1951), 494–496, 501.

that come together, or of the Word assuming the human nature.[108] Therefore, Lebon's reasoning that in the language proper to him, Cyril never calls the humanity of the Word a φύσις, is flawed, and in Cyril's christology the term φύσις cannot always have the meaning of an independently existing, individual being, a SEPARATE REALITY. We will see in the following chapters whether it ever has this meaning in Cyril's writings of the years 429 and 430.

If the term φύσις merely indicates a separately existing, individual reality, what term do the Miaphysites and Cyril of Alexandria use to denote the difference between divinity and humanity, according to Lebon? Severus of Antioch was induced by his correspondence with Sergius the Grammarian to elucidate the issue of the remaining difference in the incarnate Word.[109] Severus's standard expression for this difference is ἰδιότης ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ, 'the property as in natural quality', or briefly, ποιότης φυσική, 'natural quality'.[110] 'Natural quality' is a synonym for ὁ λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι, and it denotes 'l'essence spécifique', the essence of a species.[111] In his dissertation, Lebon regards this essence as abstract[112]—that is, an ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE—, and he writes that Severus denotes it also by the term οὐσία.[113] However, in his article in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, he corrects himself and points out that, for the Miaphysites, οὐσία has a concrete sense, signifying "the reality which is necessarily encountered, one and identical, in all human beings: mortal body and rational soul, gifted with intelligence and with the capacity to know"[114]—this is a COMMON SUBSTANCE. It is not "the abstraction which we call essence of a species".[115]

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[108] Lebon (1909), 251, n. 2, explicitly states that one should also guard oneself against attributing the expression ἀνθρωπεία or ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις to the christological language of Cyril. When he employs them, he is merely reproducing the language of his Antiochene adversaries.

[109] *Ibid.*, 433 ff.

[110] See also *ibid.*, 272, n. 2; 274 f., n. 2; 292, n. 1. Other, synonymous, expressions are ἰδιότης φυσική, ἰδιότης ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, διαφορὰ ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ (all mentioned in Lebon (1951), 537 f.), διαφορὰ κατ' οὐσίαν (*ibid.*, 538, n. 12), and διαφορὰ ἐν οὐσίᾳ (*ibid.*, 541, n. 22; Lebon (1909), 440).

[111] *Ibid.*, 292, n. 1; 438, 441. Lebon (1951), 539.

[112] *Ibid.*, 261 and 274.

[113] *Ibid.*, 257; 274 f., n. 2; 440.

[114] Lebon (1951), 457–460; quotation from p. 457. See also pp. 512 f. Lebon corrects himself on p. 460, n. 23.

[115] *Ibid.*, 460, n. 23.

It seems that Lebon is not consistent in working out this notion. On the one hand, he writes that Severus denotes the abstract essence by the expression ὁ λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι.[116] And, just as in *Le monophysisme sévérien*, he equates ὁ λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι with ποιότης φυσική,[117] which would imply that ποιότης φυσική, too, is an abstract concept. And while he reiterates that οὐσία is not abstract, he also states that Severus calls the difference in natural quality sometimes διαφορὰ ἐν οὐσίᾳ or κατ' οὐσίαν,[118] which would suggest that the ποιότης φυσική, like οὐσία, is not abstract but concrete. So, it is not quite clear whether in the end Lebon regards the 'natural quality' as abstract or as concrete. One may, however, wonder what is 'remaining' in a difference, if it is defined only in terms of abstract notions.[119]

For the present study, it is important that, according to the Louvain scholar, Severus derives both his understanding and the terminology concerning the remaining difference from Cyril of Alexandria. References are given to Cyril's *Second Letter to Succensus*,[120] to his *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*,[121] and to *Contra Nestorium*,[122] while also the fragments of *Contra Diodorum* are said to be a source for the expression 'as in natural quality'.[123] When we look at Cyril's writings from before the Nestorian controversy, it appears that he employs the phrase ποιότης φυσική for

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[116] *Ibid.*, 458, 18.

[117] *Ibid.*, 539.

[118] *Ibid.*, 541, n. 22. The reiteration that οὐσία is not abstract can be found on p. 539, n. 18.

[119] There are other inconsistencies in Lebon's presentation of the Miaphysites' christological terminology. For example, while he insists that φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον are absolutely synonymous, he also writes that both Severus and Cyril adhere to the principle that "a nature (*hypostasis*) that exists separately is a person", "une nature (*hypostase*) existant à part est une personne" (Lebon (1909), 375, n. 3; cf. Lebon (1951), 512, n. 162), and that Severus, therefore, rejects the formula ἐν δύο προσώπων. This suggests that the three terms are not as synonymous as Lebon would have it. It might be worthwhile to investigate whether the Louvain scholar has drawn the right conclusions regarding the Miaphysites' terminology.

[120] Lebon (1909), 435; Lebon (1951), 537, n. 10. *Second Letter to Succensus*, *ep.* 46, 3, ACO I.1.6, 159²¹–160¹; PG 77, 241B: ἐν ἰδιότητι τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκατέρου μένοντός τε καὶ νοουμένου.

[121] Lebon (1951), 541, n. 21. *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*, *ep.* 40, 14, ACO I.1.4, 26²⁶; cf. PG 77, 193BC: οὐ γάρτοι ταὐτὸν ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ θεότης τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότης.

[122] Lebon (1909), 438; Lebon (1951), 541, n. 21. *Contra Nestorium* II.6, ACO I.1.6, 42³⁰⁻³⁷. Here, the expression ὁ λόγος τοῦ πως εἶναι is found. An English translation of this passage is given in section 4.3.4; see n. 76.

[123] Lebon (1909), 434, 540. It concerns passages that are only available in Syriac. Specific references to *Contra Diodorum* are not given.

the whole set of natural properties, what we have called NATURAL
QUALITY.[124] We have come across this usage when we investigated how
Cyril treats radiated factors.[125] Radiated factors receive the 'natural
quality' from the substances to which they belong. And the offspring
may be called 'a particular natural quality (φυσική τις ποιότης)' of its
begetter, that is, a particular descendant which contains all the natural
properties of the original substance. In the writings from before 429
the phrase is not utilized to indicate the remaining difference between
divinity and humanity in the incarnate Word. Instead, the difference
finds expression in sentences like: "each remains, as it were, in its own
definition and formula",[126] or "each remains what it is by nature".[127]
The way in which it is expressed during the first two years of the
Nestorian controversy, will be a focus of our attention in the following
chapters.

Although, on the one hand, Lebon insists that the Miaphysites are
faithful to the terminology of Cyril of Alexandria, on the other hand,
he himself points to another influence, which may be of more impor-
tance: the pseudepigraphic Apollinarian writings. As has been widely
accepted, when the Apollinarian teachings had been condemned by
various synods, the followers of Apollinarius tried to preserve his works
by falsely attributing them to orthodox theologians, like Gregory Thau-
maturgus, Julius and Felix of Rome, and Athanasius.[128] Cyril of Alexan-
dria was not aware of this fraud, and neither were the Miaphysite
theologians Lebon writes about. Severus of Antioch was influenced

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[124] A computer search in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG) with 'author = 4090
(Cyrillus Alexandrinus)'—which includes virtually all of Cyril's writings from before
429, but only few of the writings from after that date—, looking for passages with
the strings ποιοτη and φυσικ within a proximity of one line, yields fourteen hits, ten
of which contain the phrase ποιότης φυσική. Of these ten, one is found in a spurious
publication, two in *De adoratione*, two in the *Thesaurus*, one in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*,
and four in the *Commentary on John*.

In TLG, those writings of Cyril's which are included in ACO are not attached to the
author 'Cyrillus Alexandrinus', but to 'Concilia Oecumenica (ACO)' = 5000. The same
search in ACO I.1.1 through I.1.7 plus I.5.1, 219–231 (the *Scholia*) yields only two results,
both in Cyril's *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*, *ep.* 40, ACO I.1.4, 26[26] (the place Lebon refers
to; see n. 121) and 27[13f.] (which is a repetition of the first place: μὴ ταὐτὸν, ὡς ἔφην, ἐν
ποιότητι φυσικῇ θεότης τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότης).

[125] See section 3.4.2, especially notes 182–186.

[126] *Dial. Trin.* I, 405b: ἑκατέρου δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν ἰδίῳ μένοντος ὅρῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ.

[127] *In Jo.* IV.2, vol. 1, 532 (363b): μένει γὰρ ἑκάτερον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει.

[128] Lietzmann, in: Apollinarius (1904), 82.

by Cyril more directly than the other Miaphysites,[129] who were more dependent on the Apollinarian writings.

According to the Louvain scholar, it is from the Apollinarian litera- ture that the Miaphysite theologians borrowed the meaning they gave to the term φύσις in their christology.[130] And when he discusses the analogy of soul and body, he says that the Miaphysite Syrians "do not seem to have had numerous and intimate relations with the whole of Cyrillian literature", so that one is led to look for the "immediate ori- gin" of their frequent use of this analogy "in the pseudepigraphic Apol- linarian writings".[131] Also with respect to other aspects of their christol- ogy, Lebon regards these forgeries as their main source: the use of the word 'embodiment (σωμάτωσις)' for 'incarnation',[132] not distinguishing between the *principium quod* (the 'who') and the *principium quo* ('by what') of the actions of the incarnate Word,[133] the unity of will in Christ,[134] and, more in general, why they employed the terms in christology in a different way than in trinitarian theology.[135] Severus points to pseudo- "Julius of Rome" as someone who also acknowledged the "difference and property in natural quality".[136] And, of course, the Miaphysites found the μία φύσις formula not just in Cyril, but also, and more so, in the Apollinarian works.[137] Lebon, however, emphasizes that, although the Miaphysites use the Apollinarian terminology, they do not share the Apollinarian understanding of the incarnation nor their christology.[138]

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[129] Lebon (1909), xxiv. Even so, in Lebon (1951), 466, n. 33, he writes about Severus: "il manifeste, lui aussi, dans ses diverses oeuvres, une grande dépendance à l'égard des écrits pseudépigraphiques apollinaristes".

[130] *Ibid.*, 264: "C'est aux écrits apollinaristes que nos auteurs ont repris, comme leurs prédécesseurs alexandrins, le sens qu'ils donnent au terme φύσις en christologie". Cf. Lebon (1951), 466.

[131] *Ibid.*, 232.

[132] *Ibid.*, 187. Cf. pp. 305 f., n. 4. Lebon (1951), 480. See for Cyril's use of the term σωμάτωσις chapter 3, n. 214.

[133] *Ibid.*, 454. Lebon (1951), 557.

[134] *Ibid.*, 459.

[135] *Ibid.*, 277, where he adds that others before them had equally undergone the influence of these writings, and then continues with an exposition of Cyril's use of the terms in christology.

[136] *Ibid.*, 542.

[137] *Ibid.*, 302 f. Lebon (1951), 479.

[138] *Ibid.*, 187; 200–202; 306, n. 4; 459 f. Lebon (1951), 578.

4.4.2. *Martin Jugie*

Three years after the publication of Lebon's dissertation, Martin Jugie wrote an article in which he argued that the words φύσις and ὑπόστασις do not have one consistent meaning in Cyril's christology, as the Louvain scholar alleged, but that their meaning differs from one context to the next.[139] And in his book on Nestorius, which appeared in the same year, he defends the same position.[140] Cyril of Alexandria was concerned about ideas, not about words, he states.[141] He was willing to adapt the terms to his interlocutor, as long as the understanding of the incarnation and of the incarnate Word remained the same. Jugie comes to conclusions that are similar to those of Dionysius Petavius, the seventeenth-century theologian (Denis Pétau; 1583–1652).[142]

First, Jugie gives several passages, from both before and after the Council of Ephesus, in which the Alexandrian bishop uses the word φύσις for the humanity of Christ, thereby denying Lebon's claim that in his own christological language Cyril did not call the Word's humanity a φύσις. From these examples Jugie concludes that φύσις at times is synonymous with οὐσία, ὁ λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι and ποιότης φυσική, in the sense of 'essence spécifique', the essence of a substance, that is ESSENCE. He does not elaborate on the contents of this concept. But he adds that already in his *Second Letter to Nestorius*, Cyril spoke of two φύσεις: "not that the difference of the natures has been annulled".[143] If the difference of the natures persists, it is clear that the natures themselves, too, persist, he argues. What is important is that they are not separated. Cyril does not forbid to *distinguish* two natures after the union and to call them 'natures', but only to *separate* them from each other in a way that makes two subjects of them.[144] In a note, Jugie also refers to the passage in *Contra Nestorium* that we have looked at before,[145] and to the *Letter to Eulogius*.[146]

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[139] Jugie (1912a).

[140] Jugie (1912b), 174–190.

[141] Jugie (1912a), 17: "Cyrille, en effet, ne tient qu'aux idées et nullement aux mots". Literally the same in Jugie (1912b), 178.

[142] *Ibid.*, 14 f. and 16. Jugie (1912b), 176 f. Petavius (1866), 505–510.

[143] *Ep.* 4, 3, ACO I.1.1, 27$^{2\,f.}$. *DEC* I, 41$^{36–38}$.

[144] Jugie (1912a), 20: "Cyrille ne défend pas de *distinguer* deux natures après l'union, et de leur donner ce nom de nature; il interdit seulement de les *séparer* l'une de l'autre, de manière à en faire deux sujets". Literally the same in Jugie (1912b), 182.

[145] See n. 76.

[146] *Ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 35$^{10–12}$: it is not a problem that Nestorius speaks of two natures

Speaking about two natures after the union, then, belongs to Cyril's natural language, Jugie maintains. The reason that Cyril used φύσις also in another sense was that he wanted to combat an error. First, Jugie stresses that the Word did not assume human nature in general, but a concrete, individualized nature. It is a hypostasis, which signifies "a *reality, something existing*, in opposition to pure abstractions or to appearances, but without determining the mode of existence".[147] It seems that Jugie defines ὑπόστασις here as a REALITY. In *Contra Theodoretum* Cyril writes about "a coming together of hypostases or natures". Cyril rejects a union of πρόσωπα; therefore, ὑπόστασις cannot be synonymous with πρόσωπον here, Jugie adds.

In the famous expression 'hypostatic union (ἕνωσις καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν)', the word ὑπόστασις has the same meaning, according to Jugie. It is synonymous with πρᾶγμα and denotes real existence. A 'hypostatic union', then, is a real union; it does not have the meaning which the expression later received: that of a personal union, a union in the person of the Word (although the two unions are related: the hypostatic, real union of divinity and humanity is realised in the person of the Word). This 'hypostatic' or real union is opposed to Nestorius's 'union of persons (ἕνωσις προσώπων)', which Cyril regards as an external, merely relational, and therefore not actually real union. When φύσις is employed side by side with ὑπόστασις, as a synonymous term, it also indicates something that is really existing, but which is not a πρόσωπον, in Jugie's view.

The French theologian goes on to say that the word φύσις gets a third meaning in Cyril of Alexandria's christology when it is not only synonymous with ὑπόστασις, but also with πρόσωπον. The three terms then denote a being with its own, independent existence, an individual, a person, in other words, a SEPARATE REALITY. This is the meaning that, according to Lebon, the three terms *always* have in Cyril's own christological language. Jugie, however, distinguishes between a φύσις or an

to indicate the difference between the flesh and the Word of God, but the problem is that he does not confess the union. Jugie (1912b), 183, n. 1, also refers to a passage in the *Scholia*, which he dates before the controversy with the Orientals. Other scholars, however, have suggested a later date for this work (see section 5.2.2), so that it cannot be adduced to get an understanding of Cyril's own christological terminology.

[147] Jugie (1912a), 21. 'Mode of existence' apparently refers to the essence (and is probably a rendering of ὁ λόγος τοῦ πως εἶναι): saying that something is a hypostasis defines it as really existing, but it does not say anything about the essence of that something.

ὑπόστασις that indicates a REALITY, and such a φύσις or ὑπόστασις when it exists separately. By its *separate* existence it becomes a πρόσωπον, that is, a SEPARATE REALITY. Because in Nestorius's theology the two natures or hypostases of Christ have their own separate existence, they are also persons, πρόσωπα, and their union is relational, external. Over against this, Cyril emphasizes that the incarnate Word is not two persons, not two SEPARATE REALITIES, but that he is one REALITY, that is, one ὑπό-στασις or one φύσις. This is the one incarnate ὑπόστασις or φύσις of the Word of God. But since it is the REALITY of the Word of God, this REALITY is necessarily separate, Jugie argues. Therefore, one can say that in this formula both terms, ὑπόστασις and φύσις, in fact indicate a person, a SEPARATE REALITY. This one nature is a nature-person, a φύσις-πρόσωπον.

Jugie continues by stating that it is quite natural that, in reality, every individual being—for example, an angel or a man—is at the same time a nature or essence, a hypostasis or reality, and a subject (suppôt) or person. Christ's humanity, however, is different, in that it is

> an essence, φύσις, a reality, ὑπόστασις, but it is not a nature-person, φύσις-πρόσωπον, because it does not exist by itself (ne s'appartient pas) and it has been, from its origin, the property of God the Word.[148]

By calling the Word's humanity both 'an essence' and 'a reality', the French theologian presumably wants to indicate what he wrote earlier: that it is not a general nature, but a concrete and individualized nature, in other words, an INDIVIDUAL NATURE or INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE. And by stating that it is not a φύσις-πρόσωπον he underlines that Christ's humanity is not a SEPARATE REALITY, but that it belongs to the SEPARATE REALITY which is the Word.

Just as in the μία φύσις formula, also in the expression 'out of two natures' the φύσις denotes a nature-person, according to Jugie. That's why Christ is regarded to be out of two natures 'in contemplation only', for two nature-persons before the incarnation in reality would amount to the Nestorian union of πρόσωπα.

Jugie's interpretation of the word φύσις in Cyril of Alexandria's christology may be summarized as follows. Explicitly, he gives the term three different meanings: (1) it may signify the essence of a substance, an ESSENCE, in which case it is synonymous with οὐσία; (2) it may indicate something that really exists, a REALITY, in which case it is synonymous

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[148] *Ibid.*, 25. Literally the same in Jugie (1912b), 188.

with ὑπόστασις; (3) it may indicate a nature-person, that is, a SEPARATE REALITY, in which case it is synonymous with πρόσωπον. Implicitly, φύσις receives a fourth meaning: that of an INDIVIDUAL NATURE or INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE.

In an earlier section of his book on Nestorius, Jugie seems to allow yet another meaning of ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον. He speaks repeatedly of 'the divine I (le moi divin)', and says that after the incarnation "the divine hypostasis has remained immutable in itself", and:

> It is the same divine I, the same hypostasis, the same *prosôpon*, before and after. There has not been a single moment at which there was a human I, since from the first instant of the conception, the divine I has appropriated the humanity.[149]

Here, the terms ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον seem to have the meaning of PERSON.

4.4.3. *Joseph van den Dries*

Joseph van den Dries's dissertation on the the μία φύσις formula was published in 1939. He starts with an overview of how various theologians through the ages have interpreted the formula. He then analyses Cyril of Alexandria's utilization of the term φύσις in his christological writings, and compares it with ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον. And he ends with a discussion of the meaning of the formula.

In a summary of his conclusions regarding the meaning of φύσις in Cyril's christological works,[150] van den Dries writes that the term is also used for the humanity of Christ, and this cannot be a concession to the Orientals, since it is already done in works that were written before the Nestorian controversy. At least in these instances the word cannot denote a 'person', since Cyril does not allow Christ's humanity to be called a 'person'. His research leads him to the more general conclusion that "both in Cyril's Trinitarian and Christological works φύσις, therefore, never signifies 'person'" (112). He leaves open the possibility that ὑπόστασις may at times signify a 'person'. But, when φύσις and ὑπόστασις are used synonymously, as they are on a number of occasions in the christological writings, the meaning of both terms is "that of an objective singular substantial reality" (111), or, as the Dutch

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[149] Jugie (1912b), 165–167.
[150] Van den Dries (1939), 111 f.

theologian calls it more often, "an impersonal substantial reality".[151]
This is van den Dries's term for an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE, which may
be, but is not necessarily, a SEPARATE REALITY.

'Person' is van den Dries's translation of πρόσωπον. The distinction
between φύσις and ὑπόστασις in the sense of INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE, on
the one hand, and πρόσωπον or 'person', on the other, is defined in
terms of separation and of 'subject of attribution':

> A ὑπόστασις is, therefore, equivalent to a πρόσωπον if it is separated from
> another ὑπόστασις, and is itself made a subject of attribution. Taken
> by itself, the term ὑπόστασις, it would seem, signifies an impersonal
> substance; the division of both constitutes them persons.[152]

A 'person', then, is a SEPARATE REALITY, but it may also denote a GRAM-
MATICAL SUBJECT in such a way that it implies an ontological unity.
When van den Dries discusses passages where the terms φύσις and
ὑπόστασις are juxtaposed to 'Son', 'Only-Begotten' and similar words,
especially when they are said to be adored (78 f.), one gets the impres-
sion that 'person' also denotes PERSON, or even an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON.
However, towards the end of his dissertation he briefly discusses the
concept of 'person' explicitly, and states that, while several theologians
in the fourth century regarded such notions as intelligence and liberty
as constitutive for a 'person', Cyril, like Athanasius, says that Christ's
humanity is not a person, because it does not exist apart, separately.[153]
In the end, then, van den Dries defines Cyril's πρόσωπον or 'person' as
a SEPARATE REALITY.

Our investigation of the trinitarian writings led to the conclusion
that for Cyril the word πρόσωπον rather indicates a rational being,
capable of having personal relations with other such beings. These
personal relations, however, are always external, and a πρόσωπον is
always separate from other πρόσωπα. Being separate, then, does not
so much constitute a πρόσωπον, but it is an important characteristic of
a 'person'. We will have to see whether this interpretation also holds
good for the writings during the first years of the Nestorian controversy.

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[151] See, e.g., *ibid.*, 50 ("the impersonal concrete substantial reality"), 65–67, 70 f.

[152] *Ibid.*, 71. See also p. 65.

[153] *Ibid.*, 163 f.: Basil the Great identified the notion of individuality with that of
personality. Gregory Nazianzen mentions totality, independence and intelligence as
constituent elements of personality, while Gregory of Nyssa added the notion of liberty.
According to Apollinarius, a person is a complete nature, intelligent and free, existing
by itself and '*sui iuris*'. Athanasius emphasized that a person has a separate existence.

The Dutch theologian spends a number of pages (93–111) argu-
ing that Cyril of Alexandria opposed Nestorius's two-nature-language,
not because he objected to two φύσεις after the union as such, but
because the archbishop of Constantinople *separated* these two natures,
and thus made the two impersonal substantial realities—or INDIVIDUAL
SUBSTANCES—into two 'persons'—or SEPARATE REALITIES. "The φύσεις
are the object of the division and not the subjects which divide" (94).
The remaining difference of the natures is acknowledged, but their divi-
sion or separation is rejected.

In the μία φύσις formula, the word φύσις has the same meaning
of impersonal substantial reality or INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE, but by the
addition of 'of the Word of God' the separate existence is indicated, so
that the whole phrase 'the one nature of the Word of God' denotes the
person of the Word, van den Dries argues (131 f.). The 'one nature' is
the divine nature, which remains the same during the incarnation.[154] In
the formula, the humanity is indicated by the participle 'incarnated'.

4.4.4. *Aloys Grillmeier*

In his important, lengthy contribution to the first volume of *Das Konzil
von Chalkedon*, Aloys Grillmeier gives an interpretation of the terms and
phrases in Cyril of Alexandria's christology,[155] to which he adhered till
the end of his life: it is still, for a large part verbatim, to be found in
the third edition of *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*.[156] He builds on
the studies by Hebensperger[157] and van den Dries, but he goes beyond
them.

Grillmeier, too, points to the fact that Cyril employs the word φύσις
for the humanity of Christ, and not just when he reproduces the views
of his opponents, but even before the Council of Ephesus. He suggests
that the word συγκεχωρήκαμεν in the *Letter to Eulogius* does not indicate
a concession by Cyril to the Orientals with regard to their terminology
(as Lebon holds), but an acknowledgement that the ideology and

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[154] *Ibid.*, 152. Van den Dries does not fully rule out the possibility that the word 'one'
indicates, at least in some instances where the formula is used, a unity of composition
(p. 144).

[155] Grillmeier (1951), 164–182.

[156] Grillmeier, *JdChr* I, ³1990, 673–686. See also: *CCT* I, ¹1965, 400–412; *CCT* I,
²1975, 473–483; *JdChr* I, ¹1979, 673–686. References will be given to each of these
publications, while the citations are taken from the second edition of *CCT* I.

[157] Hebensperger (1927).

the terminology of the moderate Antiochenes does not imply a real separation.[158] And he states that Cyril does not reject speaking of two φύσεις as such, but that it is their division which he opposes: "A *distinction* of the natures is necessary, a *division* is reprehensible".[159]

The concepts of φύσις and ὑπόστασις are "not so much synonymous as associated one with another".[160] Φύσις refers, first of all, to the essence of a thing, to ὁ τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγος; in this sense one may also speak of ποιότης φυσική, the German scholar writes. A second connotation is that of 'actuating' and 'giving life', while, thirdly, a φύσις can only operate when it is 'rounded off', that is, when it is a hypostasis. The term ὑπόστασις refers to existence and reality; the corresponding verb ὑφιστάναι "is to produce from nothing, to root in being". The relationship between the two terms may be further expressed as follows: an ὑπόστασις is a basis for the real existence of a φύσις, while it needs a φύσις for there to be real existence. A hypostasized φύσις is also called an ὑπόστασις.[161] Cyril can even identify hypostasis with πρᾶγμα, Grillmeier states. If we translate these concepts into small-capital terms, we may say—more or less—that a φύσις is an INDIVIDUAL NATURE or INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE, while an ὑπόστασις is an INDIVIDUAL REALITY.

So far, Grillmeier follows Hebensperger and van den Dries, but in his interpretation of the μία φύσις and μία ὑπόστασις formulas he goes beyond them. The words φύσις and ὑπόστασις by themselves denote the divine substance, that is, the INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE of the divine Son. But when "of the God-Logos" is added, then the "subject, the personal bearer" is mentioned, to which this nature / hypostasis belongs. Only the whole phrase "nature of God the Word" indicates

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[158] Grillmeier (1951), 178, n. 35; *CCT* I, ¹1965, 408, n. 3; *CCT* I, ²1975, 480, n. 23; *JdChr* I, ¹1979 / ³1990, 681, n. 23. Grillmeier consistently, but incorrectly, writes συνεχω-ρήκαμεν, which seems to be a conflation of συνεχωρήσαμεν (the reading in PG 77, 225B) and συγκεχωρήκαμεν (the reading in ACO I.1.4, 35²¹). See for Lebon's view n. 105, and for a discussion of the passage in the *Letter to Eulogius*, section 8.4.

[159] *Ibid.*, 178; *CCT* I, ¹1965, 408; *CCT* I, ²1975, 479; *JdChr* I, ¹1979 / ³1990, 681.

[160] *Ibid.*, 180; *CCT* I, ¹1965, 410f.; *CCT* I, ²1975, 481; *JdChr* I, ¹1979 / ³1990, 683. In volume II/2 of *Jesus der Christus*, Grillmeier nevertheless states repeatedly that the words φύσις and ὑπόστασις are synonymous in Cyril of Alexandria's christology: *CCT* II/2, 430, 448, 492 (n. 56), 505; *JdChr* II/2 (1989), 450, 469, 513 (n. 56), 526.

[161] These thoughts about the relationship between ὑπόστασις and φύσις are borrowed from Hebensperger (1927). Grillmeier quotes Hebensperger (p. 95): "Die Unterlage verlangt eine Auflage in einer Physis, φύσις ὑφεστῶσα, die als solche wieder den Titel Hypostasis führt", which sentence is preceded by: "Die nächste Bedeutung der Hypostasis ist demnach die Existenzgrundlage". This word 'Existenzgrundlage' is also employed by Grillmeier, on the next page.

a "natural prosopon" and "designates the substance with its bearer". Christ's human nature has its hypostasis, that is, its "ground of existence and being", in the Logos; it has no *separate* existence. And the German scholar concludes:

> So in the end the formula of the one *physis-hypostasis* necessarily leads to the idea of a unity of person, even if Cyril does not bring the element of person sufficiently into play, and in particular does not distinguish it either in language or concept from the concept of nature. ... From all this, then, it is clear that Cyril in fact transfers the unity in Christ into the '*personal*' realm while ascribing a duality to the *natures*. Here he has anticipated the distinction of the Council of Chalcedon and has helped to lay its theological foundations.[162]

When Grillmeier speaks of a personal unity, and especially of a bearer of the divine nature, he introduces a second metaphysical level, besides that of nature and hypostasis. One may say that it amounts to a BEARER and a METAPHYSICAL PERSON. But, although he uses Jugie's and van den Dries's term 'nature-prosopon', one cannot say that he gives this meaning of METAPHYSICAL PERSON to Cyril's term πρόσωπον. He rather emphasizes that the Alexandrian archbishop had this understanding of the incarnation, but was not able to find the right terms and phrases to express it.

4.4.5. *The Ecumenical Consultations between the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Orthodox*

When the unofficial consultations between theologians from the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches started in 1964, Cyril's μία φύσις formula was regarded as a good starting-point. For the Oriental Orthodox the formula had always been at the heart of their christology, while the Eastern Orthodox Church had given it an interpretation which made it possible to accept it besides the dyophysite definition of Chalcedon. During the consultations several participants presented papers in which they gave their view of Cyril's christology in general and about the μία φύσις formula in particular. We will have a closer look at two of these papers now.

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[162] Grillmeier (1951), 180 f.; *CCT* I, [1]1965, 411 f.; *CCT* I, [2]1975, 482; *JdChr* I, [1]1979 / [3]1990, 684.

4.4.5.1. *Johannes N. Karmiris*

The Greek Orthodox theologian Johannes N. Karmiris gives an interpretation of Cyril's terminology in a paper on the μία φύσις formula.[163] He asks the question how Cyril and the later Orthodox Fathers understand the phrase, and answers that "they interpret the term 'one nature' as *one* hypostasis, as *one* person of the God-Logos, who became incarnate". According to Karmiris, "the terms 'nature', 'hypostasis' and 'person' were equated at that time since they were regarded as synonymous and identical".[164] As for the meaning of these three terms, Cyril "understands the one person to be the bearer of both natures",[165] that is, of divinity and humanity. The phrase 'nature of the God-Logos' testifies to the divine nature, the word 'incarnate' testifies to the human nature, and the term 'one nature' testifies to the one hypostasis or person of the incarnate Word (66). We may conclude from these brief quotations that the Greek theologian interprets the terms φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον in Cyril of Alexandria's christology as denoting a BEARER of natures, at another metaphysical level than the divinity and humanity which the person of the Logos 'bears'. From this article, it is not quite clear into what small-capital terms the two elements may be translated that are borne by the one hypostasis.

4.4.5.2. *John S. Romanides*

John S. Romanides, another Greek Orthodox theologian, also presented an essay during the first unofficial consultation in 1964, in which he interprets Cyril's christological terminology.[166] Like Karmiris, he regards the terms φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον in Cyril's christology as synonymous, although he adds the qualifying phrase that Cyril does not speak of two πρόσωπα before the union, as he does with the

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[163] Karmiris (1964–1965).

[164] *Ibid.*, 64. Cf. p. 66: "Being used interchangeably, the terms 'nature', 'hypostasis' and 'person' become synonymous".

[165] *Ibid.*, 65. The word 'bearer' recurs several times: "The unity of the person, i.e., the bearer of both natures" (p. 66), "the worship cannot be related to the nature in itself, but only to the one bearer of both natures" (p. 72). Obviously, when Karmiris calls 'the one nature' "the bearer of both natures", he uses the term 'nature' in the latter phrase in a different sense than in the first phrase, but he does not elaborate on the precise meaning of this second term 'nature'.

[166] Romanides (1964–1965).

other two terms.[167] In trinitarian theology, however, Cyril uses φύσις and οὐσία as synonymous, he writes. Φύσις and οὐσία are regarded as synonyms in christology by theologians like Flavian, the later arch-bishop of Constantinople, and the archimandrite Eutyches, and in the definition of Chalcedon, according to Romanides.[168]

In Cyril's christology, then, φύσις "means a concrete individual act-ing as subject in its own right and according to its own natural proper-ties". "To speak about two natures in Christ would be somewhat equiv-alent to a Chalcedonian speaking about two Hypostases in Christ" (86). Romanides employs the word 'subject' rather more often than 'per-son'.[169] But since he writes about an *acting* subject it denotes more than a SEPARATE REALITY, it refers to a PERSON, an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. The Greek theologian does not work out the relationship between this sub-ject and Christ's divinity and humanity in the same way as Karmiris. Romanides does not speak of a 'bearer'. And he explicitly rejects the view that the μία φύσις formula can be harmonized with dyophysite language by regarding the 'one nature' as (also, besides the 'subject') indicating the divine nature, and the word 'incarnate' as indicating the human nature. Speaking of two natures in Cyril's terminology leads to two hypostases or πρόσωπα, he declares (97). In line with this interpre-tation of the word φύσις, Romanides writes that Cyril allows a distinc-tion of the two natures after the union 'in contemplation only' (84, 86).

4.4.6. *John A. McGuckin*

In his 1994 book *St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy*, John A. McGuckin concludes that by his insistence on the single subjectivity of Christ, Cyril introduced a new, Christian anthropology, besides the Semitic, Platonic and Aristotelian anthropologies.[170] The new definition of 'person' is "the one who has the potential to transcend".[171] And in the introduction to his translation of Cyril's *On the Unity of Christ*, he states that, over against the modern understanding of personhood in

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[167] *Ibid.*, 99, 100. See also: "Discussion: Concerning the Paper of Father Meyendorff", *GOTR* 10 / 2 (1964–1965), 31.

[168] *Ibid.*, 86 f., 96, 99–101.

[169] See, e.g., *ibid.*, 86 ("the Logos Who is the sole subject incarnate and acting"), 87 (in Leo's *Tome* "the natures seem to be acting as separate subjects"), 95.

[170] McGuckin (1994), 224 f.

[171] *Ibid.*, 225.

terms of consciousness, the Alexandrian archbishop does not "reduce the notion of person to those psychic experiences" or to "brain act".[172] A person, then, is not fully conditioned by his nature; he is able to transcend that nature. McGuckin describes this transcendence in terms of "divinization", "divine transfiguration" and "an ever deepening communion with God's transforming grace".[173] This implies that the notion of 'person' does not coincide with 'nature', but that both concepts belong to two different metaphysical levels. Thus, McGuckin's 'person' is a METAPHYSICAL PERSON.

That it concerns two levels becomes especially clear when he writes that "there is only one individual subject presiding over both", that is, over divinity and humanity in Christ, "the one person of the incarnate deity".[174] It is further confirmed by other ways in which McGuckin writes about Cyril's understanding of the unity of Christ:

> The human nature is, therefore, not conceived as an independently acting dynamic (a distinct human person who self-activates) but as the manner of action of an independent and omnipotent power—that of the Logos. ... There can only be one creative subject, one personal reality, in the incarnate Lord; and that subject is the divine Logos who has made a human nature his own.[175]

The 'subject', the 'personal reality', is the Logos; it is this 'subject' that has made human nature his own. The 'subject' and the 'nature' do not belong to the same metaphysical level. To indicate the unity of Christ, McGuckin often uses the phrase 'single subject' or 'single subjectivity',[176] but he also speaks of the (one) 'person' of Christ, and of the 'personal subject', while he applies other phrases containing the adjective 'personal', too.[177] When discussing the attribution of both the divine and the human expressions (φωναί) to one subject, McGuckin at times adds a word like 'referent',[178] which leans more toward a GRAMMATICAL PERSON, although the notion of an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON is implied.

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[172] McGuckin (1995), 41. Cf. McGuckin (1994), 206f.
[173] *Ibid.*, 42f.
[174] McGuckin (1994), 212.
[175] *Ibid.*, 186.
[176] *Ibid.*, 186, 191f., 208, 211, 219, 224.
[177] *Ibid.*, 186, 194, 195, 202, 205, 206f., 208f., 210, etc.
[178] *Ibid.*, 193f., 196, 205, 208.

On McGuckin's interpretation, the word ὑπόστασις has two mean-ings in Cyril's christological writings (212). Primarily, it denotes "indi-vidual reality", which refers to the "single divine subjectivity", or the "direct and single personal subject of the incarnation and every incar-nate act". The term then stands for a METAPHYSICAL PERSON, 'presiding over' divinity and humanity. But Cyril was aware, the author argues, that ὑπόστασις had a second meaning, that of "concretely realised exis-tence", or simply "real". And the archbishop "delights in running the two associations together in his use of 'hypostatic union'". This expres-sion indicates (a) that the union is effected by one personal subject, and (b) that it is a real and concrete event, "a substantive reality", not a cosmetic exercise. Thus, the first meaning of 'hypostatic union' is that it is effected by a METAPHYSICAL PERSON, while the second indicates that it is a real union, a REALITY, rather than an abstraction, and, therefore, resulting in one SEPARATE REALITY.

When McGuckin discusses the μία φύσις formula he comes to similar conclusions regarding the word φύσις. First, it signifies the reality of the union. There is only one reality to be affirmed henceforth. "This concrete reality (physis) is what stands before the christian observer" (208). The real union results in one SEPARATE REALITY. But, what is more, this concrete reality is the Word of God. By using the formula, "Cyril is attributing the person of the Word as the single subject of the incarnation event" (208). In this latter sense, φύσις is synonymous with ὑπόστασις, McGuckin states. "Both are referring to individual and real personal subjectivity" (208 f.), that is, to a METAPHYSICAL PERSON.

The British theologian adds that "Cyril was also (though less fre-quently) capable of using physis to connote 'natural quality'" (209). He did this especially in his correspondence with the Orientals, after the Council of Ephesus. The Antiochenes understood by φύσις a "physi-cally constituted nature" or "defining natural qualities". In his letters to them, Cyril could even speak of two φύσεις in Christ. This, how-ever, was a concession to them; he allowed the Antiochenes to speak in this way, but he had no intention to do so himself, McGuckin writes (228). Dyophysite language was applicable in two ways: (1) the φύ-σεις meant natural properties (ἰδιώματα), not independent subject enti-ties ("in the way he habitually preferred to regard the connotation of physis"; Cyril's habitual understanding of φύσις is said to be that of an independent subject); (2) their continuing co-existence should be radi-cally qualified, so that it would be clear that they were really made one. They are only "notionally" separable; a proper understanding does not

deny that the two natures endure within the one Christ, but it only
denies that they endure separately; notionally, or "in theory", one can
speak of two natures; it is "only possible to speak of two natures after
the union in a theoretical or deductive sense".[179]

Translated into small-capital terms, the primary meaning of φύσις in
Cyril's christological writings is, on McGuckin's view, that of SEPARATE
REALITY, which in the case of Christ amounts to a METAPHYSICAL PER-
SON. The Antiochenes, however, regarded a φύσις as "defining natural
qualities", as natural properties. According to McGuckin, Theodoret
considered a φύσις that is not hypostasized as "simply a notion, not a
reality" (214). Apparently, φύσις denotes an abstract set of natural qual-
ities when it is not hypostasized, but when it is hypostasized, a φύσις
is a set of really existing qualities, that is, NATURAL QUALITY. Cyril con-
ceded to the Antiochenes to speak of two such φύσεις, two sets of nat-
ural properties, two different NATURAL QUALITIES, in Christ. The British
theologian does not consider the possibility of an INDIVIDUAL NATURE
that is not a SEPARATE REALITY, but he does emphasize that in Cyril's
christology Christ was individual, and not "merely generic" (216). He
also mentions another way in which the Alexandrian archbishop would
admit two φύσεις after the union: when these φύσεις indicate SEPARATE
REALITIES, they are allowed 'in contemplation only'. As to Cyril's uti-
lization of 'in contemplation only', McGuckin is not quite clear. Some-
times he writes that the qualification applies to the natures themselves,
at other times that it only applies to their separation.

In his exposition of Cyril of Alexandria's christology, McGuckin
hardly mentions the word πρόσωπον.[180]

4.4.7. *Gudrun Münch-Labacher*

In her study on Cyril of Alexandria's soteriology in his *Commentary on
John*, Gudrun Münch-Labacher briefly discusses the meaning of the
word φύσις in his christology.[181] When the archbishop takes the term
seriously, he means by it something that exists by and of itself ("in
sich und für sich selber"), that is, a SEPARATE REALITY. Cyril does not
deny the really existing and full humanity in Christ, but he does deny

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[179] *Ibid.*, 228, 239, and 211, resp.
[180] In *ibid.*, 212, he writes that Cyril "clearly regarded" ὑπόστασις "a much better
term with which to replace Nestorius' preferred concept of prosopon".
[181] Münch-Labacher (1996), 18–21.

that this humanity exists by itself, separated from the person of the Logos.[182] By accepting the Formula of Reunion he admitted that it was possible to speak of two natures, but also after 433 he did not like to use the concept of φύσις for Christ's humanity. According to Münch-Labacher, Cyril accepted that one could speak of two φύσεις conceptually (begrifflich), while in reality there was only one φύσις of the incarnate Word.[183] The German theologian thus applies 'in contemplation only' to the φύσεις themselves, not to their separation, which is understandable, since in her view the φύσεις are SEPARATE REALITIES and, therefore, separated from each other by definition.

In later publications we see the same view recur. In 1998, she writes that the later Cyril has kept his reservations about using the concept of φύσις for Christ's humanity, that he only wants to speak of two φύσεις in the order of thought, because, when he takes the concept seriously, he means by it something that exists by and of itself ("in sich und für sich"), that is, a SEPARATE REALITY.[184] And in 2002, she repeats several of the phrases almost verbatim.[185] Münch-Labacher does not explicitly discuss the meaning of the terms ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον, and it seems better not to deduce too much from passages in which their meaning is given more implicitly.

4.4.8. *Bernard Meunier*

In his monograph, *Le Christ de Cyrille d'Alexandrie*, Bernard Meunier emphasizes the priority of soteriology over christology in Cyril of Alexandria's works and, therefore, takes the way in which the archbishop speaks about man's salvation as the access route to his understanding of the humanity of Christ.[186] Meunier stresses that Cyril's language lacks precision and constancy (275), and does not spend much time investigating the key concepts of Cyril's christology, with the exception of 'appropriation' and related terms, which he calls "the corner-stone of Cyril's thought, both for his soteriology and for his christology".[187] He hardly devotes any attention to the definition of the

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[182] *Ibid.*, 18.
[183] *Ibid.*, 19.
[184] Münch-Labacher (1999), 151.
[185] Münch-Labacher (2001), 124 f.
[186] Meunier (1997).
[187] *Ibid.*, 264–275; quotation from p. 268.

terms ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον, but the word φύσις is discussed on various occasions. In a footnote, Meunier takes the position that when Cyril attributes all the expressions in the Gospels to one πρόσωπον, this word retains its literary, almost theatrical sense: it concerns the 'role' to which the Gospel words refer, a human role or a divine role.[188] A few times, the meaning of ὑπόστασις is said to be the same as one of the senses of φύσις, which will be discussed below.

According to Meunier, even after 433, Cyril was repugnant of applying the term φύσις to the humanity of Christ—although he confessed it to be a true and integral humanity—because in this context the word φύσις "evoked for him the hypostasis, and thus a 'subject' besides the Word". This repugnance crystallized in the μία φύσις formula.[189] The words φύσις and ὑπόστασις are often practically equivalent for Cyril, the French theologian writes, especially during the first phase of the Nestorian controversy. This holds for the μία φύσις and μία ὑπόστασις formulas in particular. Although φύσις also keeps a kinship with οὐσία, the two formulas are virtually equivalent, especially in exegetical contexts, where they indicate the subject of attribution.[190] But the one subject in Christ is not just a logical one, it is also an ontological one (242).

What does Meunier mean when he calls the incarnate Word one 'subject'? Although it may at times indicate a GRAMMATICAL SUBJECT or a GRAMMATICAL PERSON, it usually refers to an ontological entity. At the least, it then refers to a SEPARATE REALITY, for Cyril is said to emphasize that Christ is one 'subject' and not two 'subjects'. Is it also an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON? Meunier does not use the word 'person', but always speaks of 'subject'. He stresses that the connotations of the modern word 'person' do not apply to the concept of the fifth century. A discussion on one of the last pages of his book sheds more light on this:

> This notion of nature-subject (or hypostasis) is ontological rather than moral (in the broad sense), in which it differs from our modern perception of the subject, which implies conscience and liberty; in Cyril, these latter things are placed elsewhere than in the subject: they belong to 'that which is proper' to the subject, and which the Word appropriates without denaturing it (283).

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[188] *Ibid.*, 257, n. 7.

[189] *Ibid.*, 255. Elsewhere (*ibid.*, 275), Meunier even states—incorrectly—that Cyril never designates the humanity appropriated by the Word by the term 'nature'. Cf. *ibid.*, 280.

[190] *Ibid.*, 258, n. 9.

This comparison with the modern understanding of subject suggests that Meunier's 'subject' is indeed an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON without modern connotations like conscience and liberty.[191]

There are even hints that Meunier implies a METAPHYSICAL PERSON, but he is not very explicit about this. His assertion, in the passage just quoted, that conscience and liberty reside not in the subject, but elsewhere, namely in Christ's appropriated humanity, intimates that the subject and the humanity belong to distinguishable metaphysical levels. One way of defining these two levels would be to regard the subject as a substance and the humanity as an accident. However, since he expressly rejects Siddals's subject-accident model, but emphasizes that the Word's individual humanity *could* be a subject in its own right, while it is not (276–278), the notion of a METAPHYSICAL PERSON seems to be implicitly present. This is confirmed in that he calls the one subject in Christ 'divine', a few lines further down on the same page,[192] but also elsewhere.[193] If the subject would be the SEPARATE REALITY of the incarnate Word, it could not be called 'divine', since it would include the humanity, and not just as an accident.

It may be concluded that when φύσις and ὑπόστασις are employed synonymously—for example, in the μία formulas—they denote a 'subject', that is, an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON (and sometimes imply a META-PHYSICAL PERSON). Meunier does not speak of ὑπόστασις in another sense than 'subject', but he allows for other meanings of φύσις. He speaks of the ambivalence of the term, which is "sometimes equivalent with substance (especially when he [Cyril] uses it in the plural), and sometimes equivalent with subject or hypostasis" (261). In this context he writes that Cyril "conceded" to the Orientals two natures after the union, but this is a purely intellectual distinction (κατὰ μόνην τὴν θεωρίαν), which "places φύσις on the side of an abstract concept, that is, of a substance, and not of a concrete subject". Thus, the archbishop allows 'two natures' only when 'nature' has "a different meaning than the more concrete one he usually gives to it".[194] This alternative meaning seems to be ABSTRACT NATURE or ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE. Meunier's reasoning differs from that of Lebon. The latter argues that φύσις

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[191] His remark that 'human nature' would suggest a subject, while 'earthly nature' does not (*ibid.*, 280, n. 37), also points in this direction.

[192] *Ibid.*, 283: "poser un unique sujet (divin) dans le Christ".

[193] For example, *ibid.*, 114, 130, 288 (each time "sujet divin").

[194] *Ibid.*, 263. Meunier refers to a similar distinction in meaning on p. 280, n. 37.

retains its meaning of a concretely existing reality, and that, therefore, 'in contemplation only' must be added when one speaks of two natures. According to the French theologian, however, the word φύσις itself has a different meaning when one speaks of two natures; it is not a concrete subject, but an abstract concept.

This is not to say that Meunier makes Cyril deny the real distinction of the two elements in Christ after the union. He declares that the archbishop avoids the word φύσις for Christ's humanity, while he agrees with its concrete substantiality.[195] The appropriation by the Word of the acts of his flesh manifests a distance, which is a sign that the human factor has a real consistency (284). But it is not quite clear how this concrete substantiality can be expressed. Meunier briefly discusses, but rejects, a view in which the humanity is "a substance, which is not a subject", a set of human substantial attributes that do not have their own hypostasis, but for which the Word acts as a substrate—something like a NATURAL QUALITY (279). The conceptual tools of the christology of that era (and in Cyril in particular) were too imprecise to allow for a lucid distinction between the status of the divine and that of the human in Christ, the French theologian writes (284). He does not seem to account for the possibility that Cyril may have had in mind an INDIVIDUAL NATURE which is not a SEPARATE REALITY.

What Meunier also terms ambiguous in Cyril is that, when he speaks of the Word and humanity, it is often unclear whether he means Christ's individual humanity, which the Word assumed and has made his own, or humanity in general, to whom the Word has come to bring salvation.[196] But in a footnote Meunier adds that this does not apply to Cyril's usage of the word φύσις, which he refuses to employ for Christ's own—that is, individual—humanity.[197]

4.4.9. *Steven A. McKinion*

Steven A. McKinion's study focusses on Cyril of Alexandria's use of images, which, he says, the archbishop employs, "not to analyse or to describe the Incarnation, but to clarify some particular component

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[195] *Ibid.*, 280. Cf. *ibid.*, 255 and 287.

[196] *Ibid.*, 156. Cf. p. 142, n. 22.

[197] *Ibid.*, 157, n. 5: "À ceci près qu'il utilise volontiers le mot 'nature' pour désigner l'humanité commune, alors qu'il l'évite, et même le refuse, pour désigner l'humanité propre du Christ".

of it, which he has already described in his various descriptive formulae".[198] McKinion examines both biblical images and those taken from natural phenomena, which he places in the philosophical context of such (Aristotelian and Stoic) notions as 'composition (σύνθεσις)', 'mixture (μίξις)', and 'blending (κρᾶσις)'. He gives little attention to Cyril's christological formulae and the key terms in them. He interprets the expression ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν as indicating "a real union of the Logos of God and human σάρξ, which means nothing other than that he has become a genuine and real ἄνθρωπος" (162). Elsewhere, he renders ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν by "true union" and ἡνῶσθαι καθ' ὑπόστασιν by "to unite truly" or "to unite naturally".[199] There is no discussion of the meaning of the terms ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον. When Cyril says that Nestorius divides Christ into two πρόσωπα καὶ ὑποστάσεις, McKinion translates this as "persons and individuals" (91), while in another quotation ὑποστάσεις is rendered by "natures" (111).

In a section on the complete humanity of Christ, McKinion writes that the Son is as perfect in his humanity as in his divinity, and adds:

> This does not mean that the human φύσις or ὑπόστασις is a human individual whom the Logos has joined to himself. … When Cyril uses φύσις to describe either the human or divine element in Christ he does not do so in order to explain something about its individuality. Rather, the human φύσις or ὑπόστασις is the human condition, or a human existence that the Word makes for himself.[200]

However, "the lack of a concrete christological vocabulary is readily seen", since in the μία φύσις formula the word φύσις has a different meaning, namely, "individual, living being".[201] Other translations of μία φύσις include "one individual", "one living individual", and "one living reality".[202] It seems, then, that in the formula McKinion understands φύσις to mean, not just a SEPARATE REALITY, but, in view of the addition of the word 'living', an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. It is not quite clear how the other sense of φύσις—condition or existence—could be translated into a small-capital term.

There are a few passages which suggest that the notion of 'in contemplation only' is applied to the natures themselves rather than

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[198] McKinion (2000), 188.
[199] *Ibid.*, 90 (a true union), 95 (truly united), 102 (true union), 167 (naturally united).
[200] *Ibid.*, 176. See also p. 175.
[201] *Ibid.*, 173, n. 180.
[202] *Ibid.*, 118, 124, 173, 196, 201.

to their separation, but since it is merely mentioned and not discussed, they should not be given much weight.[203]

4.4.10. *Overview*

In table 2 an overview is given of the meaning—as translated into small-capital terms—of the various key terms in the publications of the authors discussed in section 4.4, to whom Richard A. Norris and Thomas G. Weinandy from section 4.3 have been added. The theologians are ordered by the chronology of their publications. Even a brief look at this table shows that we are still far from a consensus with respect to the interpretation of the key terms in Cyril of Alexandria's christological writings. It appears that Jugie, van den Dries and Grillmeier are in a minority position, stating that Cyril did not concede to the Orientals their speaking of two φύσεις, but that it was part of his own christological vocabulary. What he consistently opposed was the separation of the φύσεις. It was not the φύσεις themselves that had to be regarded 'in contemplation only', but their separation.

The majority of the modern commentators on Cyril's christology interpret φύσις, just as Lebon did, as a SEPARATE REALITY, or even an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. This implies—and some state this explicitly—that Cyril himself would not speak of two natures in Christ, but that he allowed the Antiochenes to speak of two φύσεις, provided these natures themselves—more accurately, the human nature—were regarded to exist 'in thought only'. Several go beyond Lebon by interpreting either ὑπόστασις alone, or both ὑπόστασις and φύσις in the μία formulas as indicating a BEARER of natures or a METAPHYSICAL PERSON, at a different metaphysical level than the φύσεις.

4.5. CONCLUSION

With this chapter the first part of this study comes to an end. In earlier chapters, we have seen to what extent Cyril of Alexandria makes use of Aristotelian logic in his trinitarian, anti-Arian writings. He works with the logical concepts, which to him refer to underlying metaphysical realities, but he freely adapts them to his theological needs. So, the

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[203] *Ibid.*, 109, 113.

concept of secondary substance is applied to people and the triune God alike, but Cyril adds that, God being one, his unity is of another kind than the union of various individual people. And Cyril's secondary substance, as well as his common nature, are not abstractions, but realities which the individuals that fall under them have in common. And while in his trinitarian theology the word φύσις usually signifies a common nature, especially in his soteriology it may also denote the combined individuals that belong to a common nature. Thus, 'the human nature' may indicate the reality which all human individuals have in common, but it may also stand for humankind, the human race, all people.

In this chapter, small-capital terms have been defined into which the various terms and concepts—in writings from both ancient and modern times—may be translated, in order to facilitate a comparison of the different interpretations. After a discussion of three classifications of Cyril's christological expressions into models or themes, the key terms in a number of writings on the archbishop's christology from the last one hundred years were translated into small-capital terms. It appeared that no consensus has yet emerged regarding the interpretation of Cyril's christological key terms and phrases.

Building on the findings of the first part, we may now turn to Cyril's writings of the first two years of the Nestorian controversy in order to see whether there is a shift in meaning of the terms, when we move from trinitarian writings to christological works.

Table 2. Meanings of the key terms in the publications of various theologians.

theologian	main meaning of φύσις	other meanings of φύσις	meaning of φύσις in the μία formula	meaning(s) of ὑπόστασις	ὑπόστασις in the μία formula	meaning(s) of πρόσωπον	'in thought only' concerns	concession
J. Lebon	SEPARATE REALITY		SEPARATE REALITY	SEPARATE REALITY	SEPARATE REALITY	SEPARATE REALITY	the φύσεις	yes
M. Jugie	ESSENCE	REALITY SEPARATE REALITY INDIVIDUAL NATURE	SEPARATE REALITY	REALITY SEPARATE REALITY (PERSON)	SEPARATE REALITY	SEPARATE REALITY (PERSON)	the separation	no
J. van den Dries	INDIV. SUBSTANCE		INDIV. SUBSTANCE	INDIV. SUBSTANCE (SEPAR. REALITY)	INDIV. SUBSTANCE	SEPARATE REALITY GRAMM. SUBJECT	the separation	no
A. Grillmeier	INDIV. NATURE		INDIV. NATURE	INDIV. REALITY	INDIV. REALITY		the separation	no
J.N. Karmiris	BEARER		BEARER	BEARER	BEARER	BEARER		
J.S. Romanides	ONTOLOG. PERSON	οὐσία (ESSENCE?)	ONTOLOG. PERSON	ONTOLOG. PERSON	ONTOLOG. PERSON	ONTOLOG. PERSON	the φύσεις	
R.A. Norris			GRAMM. PERSON	GRAMM. PERSON	GRAMM. PERSON			
J.A. McGuckin	SEPARATE REALITY	METAPHYS. PERSON NATURAL QUALITY	SEPARATE REALITY METAPHYS. PERSON	METAPHYS. PERSON SEPARATE REALITY	METAPHYS. PERSON SEPARATE REALITY		(ambiguous)	yes
G. Münch-Labacher	SEPARATE REALITY		SEPARATE REALITY				the φύσεις	yes
B. Meunier	ONTOLOG. PERSON	ABSTRACT NATURE (humankind)	ONTOLOG. PERSON (METAPH. PERSON)	ONTOLOG. PERSON	ONTOLOG. PERSON (METAPH. PERSON)	(role)	the φύσεις	yes
S.A. McKinion	condition, existence		ONTOLOG. PERSON	condition, existence	ONTOLOG. PERSON		(the φύσεις?)	
T.G. Weinandy	SEPARATE REALITY	quiddity (ESSENCE?)	SEPARATE REALITY	METAPHYS. PERSON	METAPHYS. PERSON	METAPHYS. PERSON		

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE
NESTORIAN CONTROVERSY

5.1. Introduction

In the first part of this study we have investigated the meaning of key terms and expressions in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian writings from before 429, and the influence of the logical tradition on his thought, and we have compared the interpretations of the key terms in modern publications on the archbishop's christology. We are now ready to embark on the second part, the investigation of the meaning of the key terms and expressions in Cyril's christological writings during the first two years of the Nestorian controversy, 428 through 430. This is the period in which Cyril responded to Nestorius's views as he read them in the archbishop of Constantinople's sermons, letters and other writings. He did not have to defend himself yet against the attacks of Theodoret of Cyrus and Andrew of Samosata on his own christological views. His *Contra Theodoretum* and *Contra Orientales* are both from the spring of 431. It is, therefore, in Cyril's writings up till then that we may encounter his own christology, without any alleged concessions to the terminology of his Antiochene opponents. According to Joseph Lebon and other theologians after him, Cyril conceded to the Orientals certain ways of speaking about the incarnation and the incarnate Word, which he himself did not apply in his own christology.[1] We will examine whether indeed such terms and phrases are absent in these earlier works of the archbishop.

In an initial section it will be established which of Cyril's writings will be taken into account in the following chapters. In the present chapter, his publications from the very beginning of the Nestorian controversy until the spring of 430 will be studied. Chapter 6 will be devoted to *Contra Nestorium*, while chapter 7 will cover the remaining works of the

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[1] See chapter 4, n. 105.

year 430, especially the three *Orationes* Cyril sent to the imperial court
and his *Third Letter to Nestorius* with the anathemas.

5.2. Selected Writings

In order to give a context and a chronology to the various writings of
the period to be investigated a brief history of the Nestorian controversy
up to the Council of Ephesus will be given. Then a few writings will be
discussed whose date or authenticity is disputed. After that a list will
be produced of those writings which we will examine in the following
chapters.

5.2.1. *A Brief History*[2]

On 10 April 428, Nestorius, a monk that stood in the Antiochene
tradition of Diodore of Tarsus (bishop from 378–390) and Theodore
of Mopsuestia (ca 350–428), was consecrated as archbishop of Con-
stantinople, following the death of his predecessor Sisinnius. Nestorius
had a reputation as a preacher and as a rigorous ascetic. Soon after his
enthronement he started a programme that should bring more disci-
pline to the ecclesiastical life in the capital. He took measures against
a number of heresies, and induced the emperor Theodosius II (408–
450) to issue anti-heretical legislation. He alienated the monks by order-
ing them to stay in their monasteries and to refrain from the many
ministries they had accumulated in and around Constantinople. He
also clashed with Pulcheria, the emperor's elder sister, who had been
a regent when her brother was a minor, and who still had considerable
influence at the court. At Easter, she used to communicate alongside
her brother in the sanctuary of the cathedral, but Nestorius forbade her
to do this. Her longstanding alliance with the monks in the capital was
strengthened by these acts of the archbishop.

Two influential men were also allied to the monks. The first was
Proclus, who already twice had been a candidate for the see of Con-

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[2] See, for example, McGuckin (1994), Wessel (2004), and Fraisse-Coué (1995).
Unless stated otherwise, Eduard Schwartz's chronology will be followed which he
gives in Schwartz (1929), 6–9. In the text, besides the usual numbering of the letters,
Schwartz's numbering in the Collectio Vaticana (V), the Collectio Atheniensis (A) and
the Collectio Vallicellianus (U) is given, for example '*ep.* 11 = V 144'. Cf. for the
chronology also McEnerney (1987a), 6f.

stantinople. When Atticus died (425), Proclus was bypassed and Sisin-nius appointed. Sisinnius consecrated Proclus to become archbishop of Cyzicus, but the local clergy chose a bishop of their own, and Proclus remained in the capital. In 428, Proclus was a candidate in the capi-tal for the second time, but Nestorius was elected. It was not until a few years after the Council of Ephesus that Proclus finally did become arch-bishop of Constantinople (434–446/7). The other ally of the monks was Eusebius, the later bishop of Dorylaeum. In 428, he was still a lay lawyer in the capital city.

The issue of the title 'Mother of God (θεοτόκος)' for Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ, was brought before Nestorius by the monastic party under the archimandrite and deacon Basil. They had clashed with a group, possibly that of Nestorius's own chaplain Anastasius, that regarded θεοτόκος to reflect a defective christology, and that applied the title 'Mother of man (ἀνθρωποτόκος)' instead. Nestorius ruled that strictly speaking (ἀκριβῶς) both titles were inadequate, but that they allowed for an orthodox interpretation. Therefore, the two parties were not to brand each other as heretical. But he forbade the use of both titles and proposed 'Mother of Christ (χριστοτόκος)' as a better, since more accurate, title. The monastic party was not satisfied and concluded from the archbishop's refusal of the epithet θεοτόκος that he taught that Christ was a mere man, and accused him of the heresy of Paul of Samosata (who was condemned at a council in 268/269 for teaching that Jesus Christ had not come down from heaven, but that he was from below, and that the Word of God dwelt in a human being).[3]

Through his own contacts in the capital city Cyril of Alexandria will have known what was happening there, but he kept his distance. In his *Festal Letter* for the year 429, probably already written at the end of 428, which was sent throughout Egypt and Lybia, he warned against a dualistic christology, but there is no explicit reference to Nestorius. Towards the end of 428, Nestorius's chaplain Anastasius preached a sermon in which he clearly denounced the title 'Mother of God'. This troubled many, both of the clergy and the laity, since the term belonged to common piety. But Nestorius followed it up by starting his own series of sermons on Christmas day which continued through the early months of 429. These homilies, in which he attacks the *theotokos* title, were published and distributed in the neighbouring churches.

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[3] Grillmeier, *CCT* I, 165; *JdChr* I, 297.

When the monks in Egypt had become acquainted with the sermons, in the spring of 429 Cyril wrote his *Letter to the Monks of Egypt* (*ep.* 1 = V 1), in which he writes to be amazed that some people would put in doubt the validity of the title *theotokos*, and in which he emphasizes the unity of Christ. He also made sure that copies of this letter reached Constantinople, and when Nestorius had read it he was clearly annoyed. Some people from Nestorius's entourage wrote to Cyril that he should have kept silent; Cyril's response is still extant (*ep.* 8 = V 21). In this letter, Cyril recounts that Dorotheus, bishop of Marcianopolis, was allowed to say in the cathedral of Constantinople: "If anyone says that Mary is the Mother of God, let him be anathema". And Nestorius not only remained silent, but had communion with him afterwards.[4]

In the meantime, pope Celestine I in Rome (422–432) was not unaware of what was going on in Constantinople. It seems that Marius Mercator was already in a monastery not far from Constantinople at that time, and he and other agents will have informed pope Celestine and his archdeacon Leo—the later pope Leo the Great (440–461). Also, the lawyer Eusebius arranged a public display of his accusation against Nestorius (V 18), and sent four sermons, parts of which were included in the display, to Rome and (probably) Antioch.[5] And finally, Nestorius himself sent a letter to the pope containing a complaint about his adversaries and an exposition of his own teachings. The Constantinopolitan archbishop also made some moves which seem to have been motivated by a desire to assert the authority of his own see, but which only backfired on him in that they irritated both Celestine and Cyril. He wrote to the pope that he was in touch with several bishops who had been excommunicated by Western synods on charges of Pelagianism, implying that he might formally review their cases. The pope did not respond;[6] instead, he wrote to Cyril that he was deeply disturbed by Nestorius's teachings. And Nestorius started an investigation into the cases of certain clerics who complained that they had been wronged by Cyril's court in Alexandria—a move which Cyril could only interpret as a defiance of his authority. This, however, does not mean that we should adopt Nestorius's reading—as does Eduard

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[4] *Ep.* 8, ACO I.1.1, 109; quotation from line 13. See section 5.6.1.

[5] Fraisse-Coué (1995), 510, seems less convinced that Eusebius is the author of the display and of the letter sent to Rome.

[6] That Nestorius sent his letters in Greek without Latin translation may also partly explain why Celestine did not respond.

Schwartz—that Cyril only started the dogmatic controversy to divert attention from his investigation into the complaints of these clerics.[7] Such an understanding does no justice to Cyril's genuine concern for the christological issues underlying the quarrel over the title *theotokos*.

When Nestorius, through Anastasius, tried to persuade Cyril's clergy in Constantinople to dissociate themselves from the teachings in the *Letter to the Monks*, they wrote a draft of a petition to the emperor concerning Nestorius, and sent it to Cyril for his approval. But Cyril responded (*ep.* 10 = V 22) that the wording of the petition was too negative about Nestorius and that he withheld it. He also promised to send letters to the proper people. Schwartz believes that among these promised letters, sent at more or less the same time, are the one to a devotee of Nestorius (*ep.* 9 = V 20) and that to the Nestor of the Oriental bishops, Acacius of Beroea (*ep.* 14 = V 16), whose response to Cyril is also extant (*ep.* 15 = V 17).[8] And after Cyril had received the letter from Celestine, he wrote his *First Letter to Nestorius* (*ep.* 2 = V 2), stating that not only he himself, but also the pope of Rome and the bishops with him denounced the sermons that were circulating. Cyril leaves open whether these sermons are from Nestorius or not. When Nestorius did not reply, Cyril urged him to do so through the priest Lampon. Then Nestorius wrote a very brief response (*ep.* 3 = V 3), merely indicating that he was not pleased with Cyril's actions.

All these letters were written in the course of 429. At the end of that year Cyril composed his *Festal Letter* 18, in which, surprisingly,

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[7] Schwartz (1928). With a reference to the *Letter to the Apocrisiaries* (*ep.* 10; see section 5.6.2) he writes: "Wer es versteht, das politische Dokument politisch zu lesen und zu deuten, wird zugeben müssen, dass Nestorius recht hatte, wenn er es im Herakleides zum Beweis dafür anführt, dass für Cyrill die dogmatische Polemik den Zweck verfolgte, die gegen ihn in Konstantinopel vorgebrachten Anklagen beiseitezuschieben und den Streit auf das Gebiet der Lehre hinüberzuspielen" (p. 6). Schwartz suggests that it was Cyril's apocrisiaries who, therefore, renewed the battle over the epithet *theotokos*, which Nestorius had already put to rest (pp. 4 f.). This interpretation, however, overrates the influence of the Alexandrian apocrisiaries and underestimates the opposition against Nestorius in the capital by the monks, Pulcheria, Proclus and Eusebius. See also chapter 7, n. 194.

[8] Schwartz, ACO I.1.8, 8. McGuckin (1994), 41 f., places Cyril's letter to the clergy in Constantinople (*ep.* 10) and that to Acacius of Beroea (*ep.* 14) in the (late) summer of 430, rather than in 429. Jouassard (1955), 362, suggests that *ep.* 10 was sent to Constantinople several days before his *Second Letter to Nestorius*, that is, in the beginning of 430. However, in *ep.* 10, ACO I.1.1, 111[19], Cyril writes: "So far, there has been no word by me to him about these things (ἐμοὶ τοίνυν πρὸς αὐτὸν περὶ πραγμάτων τέως λόγος οὐδὲ εἷς)", which suggests that *ep.* 10 was written before Cyril's *First Letter to Nestorius*, that is, in the year 429.

there is little to be found in relation to the developing crisis. Then, in February 430, followed one of the most important documents of the whole controversy, Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* (*ep.* 4 = V 4), which was to be canonized at the Councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). Nestorius's response (*ep.* 5 = V 5) was written in June 430. *Epp.* 6 and 7, which are only extant in Arabic and Latin translations, are probably not authentic.[9] In the meantime, Cyril had sent his deacon Posidonius to Rome with a letter for the pope (*ep.* 11 = V 144) and a dossier of documents: several sermons from Nestorius, and his own *First* and *Second Letters to Nestorius*, all of which translated into Latin. A memorandum from Cyril to Posidonius (*ep.* 11a = U 4) is extant as well.

In the spring of 430, Cyril was very productive. He composed his 'five tomes against the blasphemies of Nestorius', *Contra Nestorium* (V 166), in which he refutes passages from the sermons that Nestorius had published the previous year. And he wrote three treatises which he sent to the imperial court: to the emperor (*Oratio ad Theodosium* = V 7), to the empresses, that is, Theodosius's wife Eudocia and his elder sister Pulcheria (*Oratio ad augustas* = V 149), and to the princesses, the emperor's younger sisters Arcadia and Marina (*Oratio ad dominas* = V 150). By sending three separate treatises rather than only one, Cyril showed that he was aware of the various factions within the palace. But Theodosius was not amused; in the later letter of invitation to the Council of Ephesus (V 8), he rebuked Cyril for suggesting that there was no harmony at the court.

Nestorius was acting more and more boldly against his opponents. He deposed several of the monastic leaders, who then appealed to the emperor, asking for an ecumenical council that would review their cases. Nestorius himself wanted an international synod, too, to be held in Constantinople, since he had good hopes that he would be the victor, and he felt that the emperor was on his side. For the time being, however, Theodosius II wavered.

After Posidonius had arrived in Rome with Nestorius's sermons and Cyril's letters, pope Celestine called a council, at which he and the Italian bishops, in August 430, anathematized Nestorius's teachings. Immediately, he sent letters to Cyril (*ep.* 12 = V 9), Nestorius, John, archbishop of Antioch (429–441), Juvenal, bishop of Jerusalem (ca 422–458), some bishops in Macedonia (who fell under the jurisdiction of

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[9] See section 7.6.

Rome), and to the clergy and the people of the church in Constantinople. The pope gave Cyril a mandate to execute the decisions of the Roman synod on his behalf. After receiving the pope's letter, John of Antioch cautioned Nestorius not to act too rashly. And when Celestine's letter had arrived in Constantinople, the emperor decided in November 430 to hold an ecumenical council, which should start at Pentecost 431 (7 June). Possibly due to Pulcheria's influence the location was changed from Constantinople to Ephesus. Since the bishop of Ephesus, Memnon, was an ally of Cyril, and the city had the largest shrine dedicated to the virgin Mary, Nestorius could only be displeased with this change of venue.[10]

In November 430, Cyril was still unaware of the emperor's decision to convene an ecumenical council, and he called his own Egyptian synod. Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius* (*ep.* 17 = V 6) was sent on behalf of the synod, and the archbishop attached to it the twelve anathemas, which summarized in stark language his own christological insights. The archbishop and the synod also sent letters to the clergy and the people in Constantinople (*ep.* 18 = V 24), and to the monks in the capital (*ep.* 19 = V 145), while Cyril sent copies of Celestine's letter to John of Antioch and Juvenal of Jerusalem, adding to each a letter of his own (*epp.* 13 and 16 = V 13 and 15).

Towards the end of the year 430, Cyril will have written his *Festal Letter* 19, in which there is even less reference to the christological controversy than in the previous one. After Nestorius had received the letter with the anathemas in December 430, he preached two sermons, now allowing θεοτόκος to be used, provided it would not be interpreted in an Arian or Apollinarian sense, but adding that χριστοτόκος was the better title. It seems that the archbishop tried to gain more support by loosening the reins, and not without result, for the congregation applauded him. It is possible that for the same reason he let Proclus preach in the cathedral later that month. In his monograph on Proclus, Nicholas Constas suggests that the bishop of Cyzicus held his famous sermon on the virgin Mary on 26 December 430, as part of the cycle of

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[10] McGuckin (1994), 40 f., regards the choice of Ephesus as the city where the council would be held as disadvantageous to Nestorius. Fraisse-Coué (1995), 517, suggests that Nestorius saw it as an opportunity to manifest the authority of the see of Constantinople over the diocese of Asia. According to the Syrian tradition, Nestorius himself selected Ephesus as the place for the council, but there is no corroborating evidence for this assertion; Wessel (2004), 142, n. 15.

celebrations surrounding the Nativity of the Lord.[11] Proclus defended the title *theotokos* and proclaimed views to which Nestorius, who was present in the service, felt constrained to respond, especially since Proclus's homily was received with enthusiastic applause.

Cyril's anathemas changed the atmosphere among the Oriental bishops. Nestorius sent them to John of Antioch, Theodoret of Cyrus, and Andrew of Samosata. When the archbishop of Antioch received the anathemas he immediately had copies dispatched to the bishops throughout Asia Minor and the Orient. Both Theodoret and Andrew of Samosata wrote treatises against the anathemas, to which the Alexandrian archbishop responded in the spring of 431 with *Contra Theodoretum* (V 167–169) and *Contra Orientales* (A 24).[12] After that he set off for Ephesus, to play a decisive role at the council that the emperor had convened.

5.2.2. *Disputed Writings*

We will now look at several writings of which it is disputed whether Cyril of Alexandria wrote them during the period under investigation, either because a different date has been suggested, or because they are said to be pseudepigraphic.

First, the *Scholia on the Incarnation of the Only-Begotten*.[13] According to Jugie, the *Scholia* is regarded as the first work of Cyril's after the

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[11] Constas (2003), 57 f.; the Greek text and an English translation of the sermon on pp. 136–147. Schwartz, ACO I.1.8, 7, places the sermon on 25 March, and adds that it is more likely to have been held in 430 than in 429, since Nestorius's response is not included in the sermons that Cyril of Alexandria discusses in the spring of 430. According to Constas, however, 25 March did not become a Marian feast-day until the sixth century. The 'Virginal Festival' about which Proclus speaks in his sermon was still linked to the feast of the Nativity. In choosing the year, Constas follows Richard (1945), 255–257, who argues that, because in his response Nestorius speaks of two hypostases regarding Christ, a later date is more likely than an earlier one. Richard places the sermon on 25 March 431, Constas on 26 December 430. McGuckin (1994), 30, sticks to the older tradition that the sermon was delivered on the Sunday before Christmas 428. The eighth-century chronicler Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. Carolus de Boor (Greek text in vol. 1), Leipzig: Teubner, 1883, 88, dates it in the year of Nestorius's consecration, that is, 428 (*Anno Mundi* 5923). So does the twelfth-century historian Georgius Cedrenus, *Compendium historiarum*, PG 121, 644C–645A.

[12] McGuckin (1994), 49. Fraisse-Coué (1995), 520, doubts whether Cyril was able to write the responses to the two treatises before the Council of Ephesus.

[13] Only part of the Greek text of the *Scholia on the Incarnation of the Only-Begotten* (*CPG* 5225) is extant, published in ACO I.5.1, 219–231 (cf. PG 75, 1369–1412). The whole text

Nestorian controversy had started.[14] In 1950, Haring could still write that the *Scholia* was composed in 429.[15] But Richard has argued that it was only written after Cyril had realised that the theology of the anathemas had to be attenuated, and he suggests a date of composition of 432–433.[16] De Durand follows him in this,[17] and so do Quasten[18] and McGuckin,[19] who both state with respect to the *Scholia*: "Composed after 431". G. Jouassard, however, sees similarities between the *Scholia* and Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* and his *Letter to the Apocrisiaries* (*ep.* 10), and dates them at the beginning of the year 430, although he does not categorically dismiss Richard's suggestion.[20] It seems that the majority of scholars have accepted Richard's re-dating of the *Scholia* and regard it to be a work from after the Council of Ephesus. Therefore, it will not be discussed in the following chapters.

The date of the dialogue *On the Incarnation* has also been a matter of dispute. Before developing his own understanding, de Durand briefly mentions the views of several earlier theologians.[21] Pusey,[22] Mahé[23] and Schwartz[24] regard it as an edited version of *Oratio ad Theodosium*, intended for a greater public, which implies that it should be dated (in or) after the spring of 430. But Dorner, Devreesse and Kunze propose a reverse order: the dialogue was the earlier work and Cyril re-worked it into the treatise for the emperor. De Durand analyses the differences between the dialogue and the treatise and comes to the conclusion that the language of the *Oratio* is more cautious than that in *On the Incarnation*, which suggests that the dialogue was written first and that Cyril changed those terms and expressions which could be interpreted

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is available in a Latin translation, ACO I.5.1, 184–215 (cf. PL 48, 1005–1040; Pusey VI, 498–579). An English translation is given by McGuckin (1994), 294–335.

[14] Jugie (1912b), 183, n. 1. Richard (1951 / 1952) 122, writes that since Jean Garnier (1612–1681) the majority of the historians considered the *Scholia* to be a work from the beginning of the Nestorian controversy.

[15] Haring (1950), 5.

[16] Richard (1951 / 1952), 124 f.

[17] De Durand, SC 97, 35 f., n. 1.

[18] Quasten (1960), 128.

[19] McGuckin (1994), 294, n. 1.

[20] Jouassard (1957a), 223, n. 44.

[21] De Durand, SC 97, 43. This volume contains the critical text and a French translation of *On the Incarnation* (*CPG* 5227: *De incarnatione unigeniti*).

[22] Pusey VII, viii–ix.

[23] Mahé (1938), 2490, where he explicitly refers to P.E. Pusey.

[24] Schwartz, "Praefatio", in: ACO I.1.1, xvii, n. 1.

in a Nestorian or an Apollinarian way.[25] For example, while in *On the Incarnation* the humanity of Christ is referred to as 'man', this has been replaced by 'humanity' in the treatise. Also words like 'mingling' have disappeared in the *Oratio*. Since the word ϑεοτόκος is absent from the dialogue, while it is found four times in the treatise, de Durand suggests that *On the Incarnation* was written before the *Letter to the Monks*.

But the French theologian goes one step further.[26] In his *First Letter to Nestorius*, Cyril speaks about a book on the Trinity, which, he says, was written when Atticus, archbishop of Constantinople, was still alive (who died in 425), and which included a treatise about the incarnation.[27] He has read this book to bishops, clergy and eager laity, but he has not given a copy to anyone. It is generally accepted that the archbishop refers to the *Dialogues on the Trinity*. It was traditionally thought that by the treatise on the incarnation Cyril means the sixth dialogue. De Durand, however, forwards several arguments for his hypothesis that this treatise is *On the Incarnation*, written shortly after the seven dialogues on the Trinity and added to them as an appendix. This would imply that the work was composed several years before the Nestorian controversy.

It appears that the priority of *On the Incarnation* has gained the support of other scholars. Edward R. Hardy writes in *TRE* that *Oratio ad Theodosium* is a re-working of the dialogue.[28] André de Halleux adds that the treatise, "which mainly opposes a christological dualism, naturally follows" the *Thesaurus* and the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, suggesting a date of composition before 428.[29] And Gudrun Münch-Labacher says, with an explicit reference to de Durand, that *On the Incarnation* "seems to belong to the early period", and that it was for Cyril a text which he could use after the Nestorian controversy had started.[30]

If indeed the dialogue stems from before 428 it would strictly fall outside the boundaries of the second part of this study. Since, however, it is not only a work explicitly devoted to christology, but also one which in 430 obviously has been adapted to be sent to the emperor, it will nevertheless be investigated, and well at the very start, even before *Festal*

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[25] De Durand, SC 97, 44–51.

[26] *Ibid.*, 51–57.

[27] *Ep.* 2, ACO I.1.1, 24^{29}–25^4.

[28] Hardy (1981), 257.

[29] De Halleux (1981), 139.

[30] Münch-Labacher (2001), 120f.

Letter 17. A comparison with the *Oratio* will follow in chapter 7, and on the basis of our findings de Durand's hypotheses will be assessed.

A work whose authenticity has been put to doubt is *Against Those who Refuse to Confess the Holy Virgin to be the Mother of God*.[31] In 1956, Lavaud and Diepen, who published a French translation of it, could still write that its authenticity was beyond doubt, since it is guaranteed by the manuscript tradition, its vocabulary, the style and its ideas, while Justinian cites two passages from it in his *Contra Monophysitas*, ascribing them to Cyril of Alexandria.[32] And they add that it must have been written in the first two months of the Nestorian controversy. Quasten, too, refers to Justinian's testimony that it is a genuine work of Cyril.[33] But in an excursus in SC 97, de Durand forwards a number of arguments why this writing should not be regarded as a work of Cyril. He rather suggests that the archbishop is once again the victim of pseudepigraphy, this time because a work is attributed to him which is not his.[34] De Durand's argumentation is convincing. Hardy[35] and Münch-Labacher,[36] too, accept his conclusion. The work will, therefore, not be examined in the following chapters.

5.2.3. *The Writings to be Investigated*

We will restrict ourselves to the works that are directly related to the Nestorian crisis, and therefore the fragments of Cyril's New Testament commentaries, including the homilies on the Gospel of Luke, will not be taken into account. The *Festal Letters* for the years 429, 430 and 431, however, will be included. In fact, *Festal Letter* 17 for the year 429 is regarded as Cyril's first work against Nestorius's christology, although the Constantinopolitan archbishop is not explicitly referred to. Based on the brief history of section 5.2.1, the following writings of Cyril will be discussed:

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[31] ACO I.1.7, 19–32 (*CPG* 5226; PG 76, 256–292).
[32] Lavaud & Diepen (1956), 688; this article contains a French translation of the treatise with a two-page introduction.
[33] Quasten (1960), 128.
[34] De Durand, 'Excursus III', SC 97, 522–524.
[35] Hardy (1981), 257, with an explicit reference to de Durand.
[36] Münch-Labacher (1999), 149.

title	*date*
in the present chapter:	
On the Incarnation	before 428
Festal Letter 17	end of 428
Letter to the Monks of Egypt (*ep.* 1)	beginning of 429
To the Accusers (*ep.* 8)	spring 429
To the Apocrisiaries (*ep.* 10)	429
To a Devotee of Nestorius (*ep.* 9)	429
To Acacius of Beroea (*ep.* 14)	429
First Letter to Nestorius (*ep.* 2)	429
Festal Letter 18	end of 429
Second Letter to Nestorius (*ep.* 4)	Febr. 430
in chapter 6:	
Contra Nestorium	spring 430
in chapter 7:	
Oratio ad Theodosium	spring 430
Oratio ad augustas	spring 430
Oratio ad dominas	spring 430
To Celestine (*ep.* 11)	spring 430
Memorandum to Posidonius (*ep.* 11a)	spring 430
To Nestorius (*epp.* 6–7) [probably not authentic]	summer 430?
Third Letter to Nestorius (with anathemas) (*ep.* 17)	Nov. 430
To John of Antioch (*ep.* 13)	Nov. 430
To Juvenal of Jerusalem (*ep.* 16)	Nov. 430
To the Clergy and the People of Constantinople (*ep.* 18)	Nov. 430
To the Monks of Constantinople (*ep.* 19)	Nov. 430
Festal Letter 19	end of 430

5.3. *On the Incarnation*[37]

As has been discussed in section 5.2.2, *On the Incarnation* was probably written before 428 and attached as an appendix to the *Dialogues on the Trinity*. If this is correct, it is Cyril of Alexandria's only work from before the Nestorian controversy that is dedicated to christology. Therefore, it will be studied in detail. It will be interesting to see whether the archbishop's christology and terminology in this work are in line with

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[37] The critical text and a French translation can be found in G.M. de Durand, *Cyrille d'Alexandrie: Deux dialogues christologiques*, SC 97, 188–301. References in parentheses are to the Aubert pages which de Durand gives in the margin of the text. See also PG 75, 1189–1253, and Pusey VII, 11–153 (*CPG* 5227).

what we have found in other writings from before 428, or whether it contains a further development in his thought.

5.3.1. *Summary of the Contents*

On the Incarnation (Περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως) is written in the form of a dialogue, similar to that in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*: Cyril's interlocutor is the same Hermias, and the two partners are indicated by the letters A and B. A (Cyril) starts with the question whether their discussion on the divinity of the Only-Begotten has been thorough enough, and B (Hermias) answers affirmatively (678b). This might be a reference to the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, in which an anti-Arian emphasis on the divinity of Christ is the dominating theme. A then suggests to describe the mystery of the inhumanation, insofar as that is possible for people who see in a mirror and in an enigma, and who know only in part (678c).

In response to a question from A, B gives a brief description of six heterodox views on the incarnation:[38]

1. First, there are those who say that indeed the Word appeared (πέφηνε) as man, but that he did not wear (πεφόρεκε) the flesh from the virgin. They falsely allow only the appearance (δόκησις) of the mystery (679a).
2. Others allege to be afraid that they will worship a man. They say that the Word of God was changed (παρατετράφθαι) into the nature (φύσις) of bones, nerves and flesh, and they laugh at the idea that Emmanuel was born from the virgin (679ab).
3. A third group believes that the Word came into existence when he was born according to the flesh (679b).
4. Still others say that the Word of God is anhypostatic (ἀνυπόστα-τον), that it was a word regarded as a mere utterance which has become man (697c).
5. Then there are those who do believe that the Only-Begotten has truly become man, but not that the assumed flesh was animated with a rational soul that possesses a mind (ψυχῇ λογικῇ καὶ νοῦν ἐχούσῃ). Rather, the Word of God inhabits the temple from the virgin and takes the place of the rational and intellectual soul (679cd).[39]

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[38] The word ἑτεροδόξων can be found in *On the Incarnation*, 680c.
[39] *Ibid.*, 697d: ψυχῆς δὲ αὐτὸν τῆς λογικῆς τε καὶ νοερᾶς ἀναπληροῦν τὸν τόπον.

6. A last group has views opposed to the previous one: Emmanuel is composed (συνεστάναι) of (ἐκ) the Word of God and a rational soul and a body, or an absolutely perfect (τελείας ἁπλῶς) humanity, but they divide the one Christ into two, virtually setting each of them apart (ἀναμέρος). They do not merely distinguish (ὅ τί ποτέ ἐστιν … διακρίνοντες) the nature of the Word and that of the flesh, but they place the one (τὸν μέν) apart as man, and call the other (τὸν δέ) God by nature. While the latter is truly called Son, the assumed man is called so only homonymously. And they apply one expression from Scripture to the one who is Son of the Father by nature, and another expression to the man (679d–680c).

After stating that he does not agree with these views, B asks A to teach him a better understanding. A then proceeds to discuss each of the six christologies that B has presented, giving by far the most attention to those who separate the Logos and the man Jesus, just as B has done (group 6). Throughout, he cites many Scripture passages, which form the basis for his argumentation.

A starts with the Docetists (δοκηταί) (680d–682d). He points to the shepherds who were told by the angel who announced the Saviour, Christ the Lord, that they would see an infant lying in a manger. If this were just a shadow and an appearance (σκιὰ καὶ δόκησις), he would not have become like his brothers, for we are visible and tangible. Neither could he "help those who are tempted in that he himself suffered, being tempted" (Hebr. 2:18). He would not have died, nor have been raised, and our faith would be void.

A then moves on to the second group, who teach that the Word was transformed into earthly flesh (682d–684e). He states that rather the Word of God was born of a woman (Gal. 4:4) in order that, just as the children, that is we, share in blood and flesh, he similarly would partake of them, and through his death would liberate those who were in slavery by their fear of death (cf. Hebr. 2:14). A emphasizes that God's nature is immutable, while the created nature, which comes into existence in time, suffers change.

According to the third heterodox view, the Word of God came into existence at the same time as his flesh. Over against this (684e–685e), A upholds that the Father was always Father, so that the Son is co-eternal with him. And that all things were made through the Word, so that he must pre-exist (προϋφεστάναι) them. To back this up, he adds several quotations from the Gospel of John and from John's first letter.

A calls the next view "related" (συγγενής) to the previous one: the
Only-Begotten did not exist by himself before the incarnation. He is
regarded as an utterance from God which inhabits a man, thus having
composed Jesus (συνθέντες δὲ οὕτω τὸν Ἰησοῦν), who is more holy than
the saints, but who is not God. In his refutation (686a–688a), A starts
with a reference to 1 John 2:22–23, and argues that the Father cannot
exist if there is no Son, and vice versa. Therefore, if they teach that the
Son does not subsist, the implication is that the Father does not exist
either, which is bare nonsense. And A asks: What is special about God's
love for us, if the Son whom he gives does not have his own existence?
Then he will not have destroyed the power of death, and our faith has
lost its stability.

Another argument is that the Son is called the image of God: if an
image does not subsist by itself, then the prototype of which it is an
image cannot have a separate existence either. And A elaborates on this
in an exegesis of John 14:9–10 and 10:30. A continues by arguing that
existence is better than non-existence, and that it, therefore, is absurd
to suggest that he through whom all things have come into being would
not subsist himself. B adds that "he himself"—that is, the Son—has
said to Moses: "I am he who is".

The fifth view that is rejected by A—and thus by Cyril of Alexan-
dria—is the Apollinarian one: the eternal Word of God has united
himself to human flesh which was not animated by a rational soul;
the operation (ἐνέργειαν) of mind and soul is attributed rather to the
Word. The name of Apollinarius is not mentioned anywhere in the
treatise, but the refutation of his views is almost as long as the previous
ones taken together (688a–694a). A gives two reasons why they deny
that Christ's humanity is perfect (τέλειος), that is, it does not consist
of a body and a rational soul. First, they hold that in general things
that are composed into a perfect entity are themselves imperfect parts;
therefore, the temple united to the Word cannot be a perfect man.
Secondly, they consider it inevitable that, if Emmanuel is composed of
a perfect man and the Word of God, they will end up with two Sons
and Christs.

After having stressed that one should not try to get to the bottom
of things that are beyond understanding, A points out that even on the
heterodox' own understanding one cannot speak of a coming together
of two imperfect things with respect to Emmanuel, since the Word of
God can hardly be called imperfect. And to their second argument A
merely states emphatically that even though the Word of God is said

to be united to a perfect man,[40] the result is not a duality of Sons, but "one and the same" is by nature God and has become man.

B then asks whether it would not have been enough for the Word to assume flesh without a rational soul in order to be seen and to show to humankind the evangelical way of life (690cd). A responds that if this is what they believe, they are ignorant of the goal of the inhumanation. If they were right, it would be better to think like the Docetists: the Word did not really assume flesh at all, but only appeared to have done so, making himself visible to man. But if the Logos would not have added (προσετίθει) anything else to the human nature than becoming visible, he would not have profited (ὀνίνησι) it at all. After quoting two Scripture passages, A concludes that the Only-Begotten became a perfect man in order to liberate our earthly body from corruption, and in order to make the human soul, which he made his own, stronger than sin by impregnating it as it were with the stability of his own divine nature. Christ has become the first man who did not know sin, the root and first-fruits of those who are renewed in the Spirit, and he transmits the incorruption of the body and the stability of the divinity to the whole human race by participation and by grace (ἐν μεθέξει καὶ κατὰ χάριν).

Also, with his own flesh he payed for the flesh of all, and he made his soul a ransom for the soul of all, although he came to life again, since he is God by nature. A then discusses several biblical verses about Christ's death, his descent into Hades, and his resurrection. And he ends with an exhortation that the mode of the union between the Word and his humanity is ineffable, and that it is very unwise to investigate things that are beyond understanding.

Before Cyril of Alexandria turns to the final heterodox view, he briefly summarizes the five that he has already rejected (694a–e). The refutation of the sixth view takes the remainder of the dialogue (694e–714a) and is longer than the treatment of the five previous ones taken together. It is started off by a question from B: Who, then, has the holy virgin borne—the man or the Word of God? A is very clear from the outset: Do not divide Emmanuel nor, separating him into a man by himself (ἰδικῶς) and into God the Word, represent him as denoting

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[40] *Ibid.*, 690b: ἀνθρώπῳ τελείῳ. This is one of several places where Cyril speaks of a 'man' with whom the Word of God is united. In *Oratio ad Theodosium* the word 'man' has been replaced by terms like 'humanity'. See for the present instance: ACO I.1.1, 53[24–26].

two persons (διπρόσωπον). It is true that the mind contemplates a difference of natures (τινα φύσεων διαφοράν), for divinity and humanity are not the same thing, but it also accepts the coming together of both into unity. He was born from the Father as God, and from the virgin as man. When he became man, he remained what he was, God.

A compares the unity (ἕν) of the incarnate Word with the composition (σύνθεσιν) of a human being: it is woven out of things which are dissimilar by nature, out of soul and body, but both together are regarded as one man (696c). And just as the whole living being is sometimes called 'flesh' and at other times 'soul', so Christ is in some Scripture verses designated as the Son of God and in others as a man—of which Cyril gives many examples. But Christ is neither the Word separately, nor the man born from the virgin by himself, but he is the Word united with humanity. He who is the only-begotten Son as God is the first-born among many brothers as man (700a). The archbishop of Alexandria also employs the language of composition to the incarnate Word himself, for example, when he comments on John 4:22: the Lord Jesus Christ is ineffably composed (συγκείμενος) out of the worshipping humanity and out of the worshipped divinity (702a).

Another indication of the unity is given, A argues, by those Bible verses in which the Son of God is said to be seen in Christ, while it is the humanity which is visible and the divine nature is invisible.[41] He does not mind repeating that Jesus Christ is not the Word, naked and by himself, but after he has assumed that which is human (705b). We are baptised in the name of Jesus Christ (Acts 2:38), that is, not into a mere man, but into the incarnate God (706c). And the holy Spirit is called 'the Spirit of Christ' (Rom. 8:9), that is, the Spirit of the Son of God who has become man. He not only vivifies us by participation in the holy Spirit, but also by giving us the assumed flesh as food (707c). How could Paul say that all things are through one Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 8:6), if there was a division into two Sons after the union (709cd)? And how could Jesus Christ be said to be the same not only today and for ever, but also yesterday (Hebr. 13:8), unless he is the pre-existent Word united with his own flesh (710cd)? A adds several other Scripture verses which attribute an existence to Jesus Christ before the incarnation. And he explains the title 'Christ' as meaning that

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[41] With a reference to 2 Cor. 4:6 and John 14:9 in *ibid.*, 702d, and to John 9:35–38 in *ibid.*, 703de.

the Word, who was born according to the flesh, was anointed for his mission into the world (711e).

On the other hand, there are passages in which the one who died and was raised is called "My Lord and my God" (John 20:28) or the Lord for whom we live (Rom. 14:7–8). Thus, the Word is Lord, not without the flesh, but with the flesh (712e). After stating clearly once more that we confess one and the same Son, out of two things (ἐκ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν), Cyril points to the benefit by quoting 1 John 4:15: "He who confesses that Jesus is the Son of God, God remains in him, and he in God". And he ends with a doxology to the triune God (714a).

5.3.2. *Terminology*

5.3.2.1. *Οὐσία*

The word οὐσία and its derivatives occur relatively seldom in *On the Incarnation*: six times οὐσία itself; twice οὐσιώδης; ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοουσιότης each only once. Their usage is comparable to that which we have come across in other writings from before 428. It is said that "the corruptible and changeable, that is, the created nature will not acquire the substantial immutability".[42] In his refutation of those who teach that the Word has been changed into the flesh, A suggests that then one could also say that the flesh "can rise to the nature of the divinity" and "take on the consistence of the substance which is above all [substances]",[43] or that it is "changed into the divinity and into the highest substance".[44] The Son is not less than the Father, in that he is "the same in substance".[45] He is the "consubstantial offspring" of the Father.[46]

We see that οὐσία is used more or less synonymously with φύσις, and that the divine substance and the divine nature are placed side by side with 'divinity' (θεότης). The concept is also applied when divinity and humanity are compared with each other: they are far removed from consubstantiality with each other.[47] As in the other pre-428 writings,

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[42] *Ibid.*, 683e: οὐσιώδη τὴν ἀτρεψίαν.

[43] *Ibid.*, 684b: τῆς ἀνωτάτω πασῶν οὐσίας γενέσθαι σύστασιν.

[44] *Ibid.*, 684c: εἰς οὐσίαν τὴν ἀνωτάτω.

[45] *Ibid.*, 698d: κατά γε τὸ ἐν οὐσίᾳ ταὐτόν.

[46] *Ibid.*, 707a: ὁμοουσίῳ γεννήματι.

[47] *Ibid.*, 695d: τὰ πολὺ τῆς ἀλλήλων ὁμοουσιότητος διεστηκότα …, θεότητά τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότητα.

then, οὐσία is employed to denote a secondary substance, and it may reasonably be assumed that here, too, it is a COMMON SUBSTANCE which is intended, rather than an ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE.

Also the relationship between an individual being and its characteristics is described in similar vocabulary as in the trinitarian works. The substantial transcendence is 'attached to' the Word.[48] And when A emphasizes that all the characteristics of the divine Son remain his when he becomes flesh, they are summed up as "the things that exist in him both naturally and individually".[49] The adverb ἰδικῶς here indicates the properties that distinguish the individuals with the same nature from one another, in this case the properties that are the Son's and not the Father's and the Spirit's.

Just as in the *Thesaurus* and in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, we encounter the familiar phrase that the Word is 'out of the substance' of the Father, which can be traced back to the Nicene Creed.[50] Here, οὐσία has a different meaning; it is closer to INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE and it indicates the ὑπόστασις of the Father. And Cyril quotes Hebr. 1:3 with the expression 'imprint of the hypostasis', but speaks shortly afterwards of the 'imprint of the substance'.[51]

5.3.2.2. Ὑπόστασις

The noun ὑπόστασις itself occurs only four times in *On the Incarnation*, but various forms of the related verb ὑφεστάναι recur frequently, mainly in the parts that deal with the view that the Word was anhypostatic before the incarnation. The word ἀνυπόστατος is applied with the same meaning as in the anti-Arian works:[52] it does not denote something that does not exist at all, but a REALITY that does not have its own stability, its own hypostasis, but is for its existence dependent on the hypostasis of a substance; it is a DEPENDENT REALITY. Thus, when the Word is regarded as anhypostatic, it is for its existence dependent, first on God the Father, as his utterance, and then on the man in which it has come. The same understanding of a DEPENDENT REALITY is put into various

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[48] *Ibid.*, 697e–698a: τῆς αὐτῷ προσούσης οὐσιώδους ὑπεροχῆς.

[49] *Ibid.*, 709d: τὰ φύσει τε καὶ ἰδικῶς ἐνυπάρχοντα τῷ ... Λόγῳ.

[50] *Ibid.*, 688d; 690c.

[51] *Ibid.*, 697c: the quotation from Hebr. 1:3; *ibid.*, 697e: τῆς οὐσίας ὁ χαρακτήρ.

[52] All four times that the term ἀνυπόστατος occurs are related to the fourth heterodox view. First, in B's initial description of that view (679c), twice in A's refutation of it (687 a and b), and a last time in the brief summary of the first five views (694c).

other expressions: (1) 'not enhypostatic';[53] (2) 'not subsisting by itself';[54] 'not in a hypostasis by itself';[55] (3) 'not in an existence by itself'.[56]

Having said this, it should be added that Cyril of Alexandria is not fully consistent in his reasoning. For besides the phrases which emphasize that the Logos is not a DEPENDENT REALITY, but that he existed by himself also before the incarnation, A also reasons as if his opponents deny the Word any real existence at all before he became man, and in doing so he applies, not only the verbs ὑπάρχειν and εἶναι, but also ὑφεστάναι:

> Therefore, I think it necessary and right to say that if the Son is without existence (ἀνύπαρκτος), we should not regard the Father as real (κατὰ τὸ ἀληθές) either. For where is still a Father, if he has not begotten in reality? Or if he begot something that does not subsist and that does not exist at all (τὸ μὴ ὑφεστὸς μήτε ὑπάρχον ὅλως), that which is born will be nothing. For that which does not subsist (ὑφεστώς) is equal to nothing, rather, it is absolutely nothing. Then God will be the Father of nothing.[57]

It seems, then, that the primary meaning of ὑφεστάναι in *On the Incarnation* is 'to exist in reality', while it is used especially of the real existence of substances, and that an additional phrase like 'by itself' (καθ' ἑαυτόν or ἰδικῶς) is employed to indicate that it concerns a SEPARATE REALITY.[58]

The noun ὑπόστασις is found once in a quotation from Hebr. 1:3 ("the imprint of his hypostasis", 697c), while in the three other occurrences 'by itself' or 'own' is added to emphasize the separate existence.[59] Thus, the fundamental meaning of ὑπόστασις appears to be 'a really existing being', belonging to the Aristotelian category of substance, while the notion of 'separate existence' is indicated by additional words. It should be noted that both the noun and the verb

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[53] *On the Incarnation*, 687a: μὴ ἐνυπόστατος.

[54] *Ibid.*, 686a: ἰδικῶς οὐχ ὑφεστηκότα.

[55] *Ibid.*, 686a: οὐκ εἶναι μὲν ἐν ὑποστάσει τῇ καθ' ἑαυτόν; 688a: οὐκ ἐν ὑποστάσει καθ' ἑαυτό.

[56] *Ibid.*, 687a: μήτε μὴν ἐν ὑπάρξει νοοῖτο τῇ καθ' ἑαυτόν; 687c: εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὁ Λόγος ἐν ὑπάρξει τῇ καθ' ἑαυτόν.

[57] *Ibid.*, 686cd. A few lines further down: "And if he has given the Son for us, who according to you does not subsist (οὐχ ὑφεστηκότα), he has given nothing for us" (686d). And further still: "If, then, the Son is nothing, seeing that he does not subsist (μὴ ὑφεστηκώς)" (687b).

[58] Similarly, προϋφεστάναι (*ibid.*, 685b and 694c) seems to be used synonymously with προϋπάρχειν (*ibid.*, 710d) and merely to mean 'to pre-exist'.

[59] *Ibid.*, 686a and 688a (see n. 55); 694d: ὄντος τε καὶ νοουμένου κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν.

are not applied to the incarnate Word, but in discussions regarding the existence of the Word as such, independent of the incarnation.

5.3.2.3. *Φύσις*

Other than οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, the word φύσις and its derivatives abound in *On the Incarnation*. They can be found on the majority of its pages. It is all the more remarkable that precisely in those passages where ὑπόστασις and ὑφεστάναι are frequent—those that deal with the fourth heterodox view[60]—φύσις and its cognates are virtually absent. In these passages they are found twice only. That it is better to exist than not to exist is called a matter of nature.[61] And the Word is said to be life by nature.[62] Conversely, ὑπόστασις and its cognates occur only four times outside of these passages.[63] Nowhere, throughout this christological treatise, are they placed side by side with φύσις and its derivatives as synonyms.

In section 5.3.2.1, we have already seen an instance in which φύσις is used beside οὐσία in the sense of COMMON SUBSTANCE. In that case φύσις denotes the COMMON NATURE. In the oft-recurring phrase 'by nature' (κατὰ φύσιν or [τῇ] φύσει) it either has the same meaning COMMON NATURE—so in 'God by nature',[64] 'life by nature',[65] 'not visible by nature',[66] 'corruptible by nature'[67]—or it refers to the process by which the COMMON NATURE is handed down to another generation—so in 'Son by nature',[68] 'out of God by nature'[69] and 'Father by nature'.[70] Especially in the second meaning, 'by nature' is regularly linked with 'and truly' and similar phrases containing a cognate of ἀληθής. This

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[60] *Ibid.*, 679c, 686a–688a, 694cd.

[61] *Ibid.*, 687e: Ἔχοι γὰρ ἂν ὧδε τὸ χρῆμα τῇ φύσει.

[62] *Ibid.*, 687e: κατὰ φύσιν.

[63] *Ibid.*, 685a: εἰς τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ ὑφεστάναι; 685b: προϋφεστάναι; 696a: εἰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ ὑφεστάναι; 697c: χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως (quotation from Hebr. 1:3).

[64] *Ibid.*, 688e (κατὰ φύσιν); 690c (φύσει); 698c (φύσει); 701c (φύσει); 701c (κατὰ φύσιν); 702d (φύσει καὶ ἀληθῶς); 703a (κατὰ φύσιν); 706a (κατὰ φύσιν); 709e (φύσει); 711b (κατὰ φύσιν).

[65] *Ibid.*, 687e (κατὰ φύσιν); 692d (κατὰ φύσιν); 697a (κατὰ φύσιν).

[66] *Ibid.*, 690d (κατὰ φύσιν ἰδίαν).

[67] *Ibid.*, 693b (τῇ φύσει).

[68] *Ibid.*, 680a (φύσει τε καὶ ἀληθῶς); 680a (in a quotation from his opponents: φύσει καὶ ἀληθῶς); 713e (κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀληθῶς).

[69] *Ibid.*, 680b (in a quotation from his opponents: φύσει τε καὶ ἀληθείᾳ); 688c (κατὰ φύσιν); 707b (κατὰ φύσιν).

[70] *Ibid.*, 699e (φύσει).

usage of φύσις is in line with that which we have seen in the other
pre-428 writings. It is remarkable, though, that its synonyms κατ᾽
οὐσίαν and οὐσιωδῶς are rare in comparison with their frequency in
the *Thesaurus* and in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*. In an interesting case
of κατὰ φύσιν, Cyril describes the Word as "having himself become
man by nature".[71] While he usually calls the incarnate Word 'God
by nature' and employs other terminology like 'flesh' or 'humanity'
to refer to Christ's human nature, here, he unreservedly says that the
Word became 'man by nature'. Elsewhere he says of the man who
the Word has become that "in his own nature", that is, in his human
nature, he is deprived of the properties of the divinity.[72]

Then there are those instances in which the word φύσις is used when
the relationship between the Word and his flesh is discussed. To begin
with, it is noteworthy that we find dyophysite language in *On the Incar-
nation*. In his presentation of the sixth heterodox view, B states that they
not merely distinguish the nature of the Word and that of the flesh[73]—
with which there is nothing wrong, since the nature of the flesh and that
of God are not the same[74]—, but that they set one as man and the other
as God apart.[75] In his refutation of those who deny Christ a rational
soul, A writes that he is convinced that "some coming together (σύν-
οδον) and concurrence (συνδρομήν) beyond understanding into union
(εἰς ἕνωσιν) has been brought about of unequal and dissimilar natures
(φύσεων)" (688d). And elsewhere A states that the mind contemplates a
difference of natures (τινα φύσεων διαφοράν), for divinity and humanity

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[71] *Ibid.*, 695c: ὡς αὐτὸς κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπος γεγονώς. The same phrase is still
present in *Oratio ad Theodosium*, ACO I.1.1, 58[7]. In *In Jo.* XII, vol. 3, 69[22–25], he writes
similarly: "What else could that which was born out of the virgin be but a man like
us as far as outward appearance and nature of the body is concerned (ὅσον εἰς τὴν τοῦ
σώματος ὄψιν τε καὶ φύσιν)? For together with being man he was also truly God".

[72] *Ibid.*, 707a. Although in *Oratio ad Theodosium*, ACO I.1.1, 67[16–17], the phrase before
this has been deleted and τητώμενος has been replaced by λειπόμενος, it still says that
the man who the Word has become is bereft of the properties of the divinity in his own
[the human] nature. De Durand, SC 97, 278, n. 1, reads οὐ instead of ὁ, and concludes
from this that the sense has been "profoundly modified": the text now allegedly states
that the Word is not bereft of the properties of the divinity in his own [the divine]
nature. Although there are indeed several manuscripts that read ὁ μή (so Schwartz,
ACO I.1.1, 67, n. to line 16) or οὐ (so Pusey VII, 124, n. to line 2; also in PG 76, 1189A)
instead of ὁ, both Schwartz and Pusey regard ὁ as the original reading. It is not unlikely
that later editors changed it into ὁ μή or οὐ, in order that ἐν ἰδίᾳ φύσει would no longer
apply to Christ's humanity, but to the divine Word.

[73] *Ibid.*, 679e: οὐχ ὅ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἥ τε τοῦ Λόγου φύσις καὶ τῆς σαρκός διακρίνοντες.

[74] *Ibid.*, 680a: ἐπεὶ μὴ φύσις ἡ αὐτὴ σαρκός τε καὶ Θεοῦ.

[75] *Ibid.*, 680a: ἰδίᾳ τιθέντες καὶ ἀναμέρος.

are not the same, but that it [the mind] also accepts, together with the notions about these, the concurrence of both into unity.[76] From this last sentence it cannot be concluded that Cyril of Alexandria regards the natures 'in contemplation only'. The word 'only' is not added. Besides, also the concurrence into unity is an object of the mind here, while Cyril freely speaks of concurrence or coming together without any reference to contemplation or the mind.[77] It is, therefore, also unlikely that 'only' is implied. In fact, the whole notion of 'in contemplation only' is absent from this work. Towards the end of the treatise, there is another mention of two natures: A remarks, with a reference to 1 John 1:1–2, that the biblical author all but gathers together the natures and leads the power of the properties that belong to each [nature] into a confluence (712a).

When the two natures are distinguished, this has to do with their essence, not with their existence. Cyril explains the difference of natures by adding that divinity and humanity are not the same. It is not quite clear from the passages themselves whether he has COMMON NATURES or INDIVIDUAL NATURES in mind. In light of what we have seen in the other writings from before 428, it is likely that here, too, the word φύσις indicates a COMMON NATURE. When the two natures are said to have come together, this does not imply, however, that the Word's humanity is not individual. In the concurrence of the natures, the humanity is individuated.

In *On the Incarnation*, the archbishop of Alexandria at times uses very concrete language for the assumed element. He can speak of "the concurrence into unity out of a perfect man and the Word of God",[78] of "the divine soul which has a concurrence and a union with him",[79]

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[76] *Ibid.*, 695b: εἰσδέξεται δὲ ὁμοῦ ταῖς περὶ τούτων ἐννοίαις καὶ τὴν ἀμφοῖν εἰς ἑνότητα συνδρομήν.

[77] See for the places where these notions can be found in *On the Incarnation*, nn. 118 and 119.

[78] *Ibid.*, 690a: ἐξ ἀνθρώπου τελείου καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ Λόγου τὴν εἰς ἑνότητα συνδρομήν. In *Oratio ad Theodosium*, ACO I.1.1, 53²¹, this sentence has been replaced by: "we believe that the temple that was united with the Word was animated with a rational soul". The idea of a concurrence of 'a perfect man' and the Word leads too easily to a conception of two Sons.

[79] *Ibid.*, 693b: ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ θεία, τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν λαχοῦσα συνδρομήν τε καὶ ἕνωσιν. In a similar way, Cyril calls Christ's flesh 'divine' in *Contra Nestorium*, ACO I.1.6, 46³³, explaining that by this he means that the flesh has become the Word's own: just as the flesh of a man is called 'human', so the flesh of God the Word may be called 'divine' (see also section 6.2.2). By 'the divine soul', then, Cyril means that the soul belongs to the divine Son, not that Christ's soul is different by nature than any other human soul.

or of "the body which is united to him".[80] In *Oratio ad Theodosium*, he has removed the phrase 'a perfect man', but the words 'soul' and 'body' remain (although he has dropped the adjective 'divine', which is open to misunderstanding). It is also possible, then, that the human φύσις that is mentioned as an element of the union is an INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

Also when the view is discussed that the Word of God changed into the nature of bones, nerves and flesh, it is the essence which is referred to, not the existence (679b). In his refutation, A applies the word φύσις both to the Word and to the flesh. They think that the nature of the Word has changed into earthly flesh, but the nature of God is fixed in its own goods and has an unshakeable permanence, while the created nature suffers alteration (683ab). From the more general expressions 'the nature of God' and 'the created nature' we may conclude that here φύσις denotes a COMMON NATURE rather than an INDIVIDUAL NATURE. This is corroborated by the fact that it is in the course of his argumentation against this second heterodox view that Cyril employs the cognates of οὐσία in parallel with those of φύσις.[81]

Four times Cyril speaks explicitly about 'the human nature'. The first two instances occur within the same argumentation (690d–691a). If the Only-Begotten had no other reason for the incarnation than to become visible for humankind, and he did not add anything else to the human nature (τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει), then it would be better to hold the view of the Docetists. And if the Logos was of no use to the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν) when he became flesh, would it not be better that he would be freed from the impurity of the flesh? In both cases 'the human nature' may either stand for the COMMON NATURE of humanity, or for the whole human race. In the third instance, the kenosis is described as the descent of the eternal Son "into the human nature (εἰς τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν)", which is best understood as 'into the human race' (696b). The fourth and final occurrence concerns a comment on Hebr. 13:8, "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever". Cyril asks how the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) could be immutable and have continuity of identity, although it is subject to change, especially change from non-being into being and life (710c). Here, φύσις does not refer to the whole race, but rather to the COMMON NATURE of humankind, or possibly to the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE of Jesus Christ.

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[80] *Ibid.*, 708c: τοῦ ἑνωθέντος αὐτῷ σώματος.
[81] See nn. 42–44.

A few occurrences of the word φύσις deserve special attention. First, the one in which being called 'Lord of glory' is said to be a privilege that must be ascribed to the nature (φύσει) which reigns over all (697d). This is similar to those instances in the *Dialogues on the Trinity* in which 'the divine nature' is virtually interchangeable with 'God'.[82] Here, it can be understood in the same way: it is a privilege of God, who reigns over all. A second special case concerns a comment on Acts 2:31: "his soul was not left in Hades". According to Cyril, the apostle Peter does not say here that it was the nature (φύσιν) which cannot be grasped by death, "that is, the divinity (θεότητα) of the Only-Begotten", which was brought back from the inner parts of the earth (693a), but rather the soul united to the Word, for by nature the Word fills all things, so there would be nothing astounding in the Word not remaining in Hades. There is a reference to a natural property (immortality) and also to a concreteness (being brought back); in the following sentence he even switches to "the Word", who does not remain in Hades. This suggests that here φύσις denotes the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word. One may wonder, however, whether the concept of an INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word has a place in Cyril's trinitarian theology, as he has developed it in his anti-Arian writings. For there the word φύσις is employed for what Father, Son and holy Spirit have in common, and he emphasizes that there is only one divine φύσις. There is, then, a tension in Cyril's usage of the term here, which he does not seem to have been aware of.

In a third instance in which the word φύσις is used in an unusual way, Cyril writes: "The nature (φύσις) of the Word, having assumed (προσλαβοῦσα) that which is human, …, preserves his God-befitting reputation" (701d). Here, again, we find the combination of a natural property (his God-befitting reputation) and concreteness (having assumed that which is human). Where Cyril normally says that 'the Word' assumes, he has probably replaced it by 'the nature of the Word' here, because he wants to emphasize that his divine nature is not altered by the incarnation, that it still bears the same glory, and that, therefore, the Word is worthy of adoration, also after having become man. With respect to the specific meaning of the term φύσις in this sentence, similar comments may be made as in the previous case: it seems that φύσις indicates the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word, but that raises questions regarding Cyril's trinitarian theology.

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[82] See chapter 3, nn. 141–143.

Is Lebon's interpretation (see section 4.4.1) a better one in these two instances: φύσις is synonymous with ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον and denotes individual existence, without any reference to the essence involved, it is a SEPARATE REALITY? Although in both passages 'the nature of the Word' may be replaced by 'the Word' as the subject of the concrete verb, an understanding of φύσις as a SEPARATE REALITY does not do justice to the references to natural properties, which are relevant to Cyril's argumentation in both cases. It is these divine properties that the archbishop wants to emphasize. They are the reason that it is the soul, rather than the divine Word, which is said to be brought back from Hades, and that the Word is still to be adored after the incarnation. A meaning of φύσις that includes this reference to the natural properties—such as INDIVIDUAL NATURE—better fits the context.

We find a fourth special case of the use of φύσις in a description of the communication of idioms:

> It may be seen, then, that he [the Word] grants the glory of the God-befitting operation (ἐνεργείας) to his own flesh, while, on the other hand, he appropriates the things of the flesh, and as it were somehow, according to the economic union, places them round his own nature (τῇ ἰδίᾳ περιτιθέντα φύσει) (707ab).

In Cyril's metaphysics properties are attached to, exist in or lie round a substance, a nature, or an individual being (see section 3.2.2). By stating that the Word places the properties of the flesh "round his own nature", Cyril emphasizes the union of the divine Son with his flesh; we will return to this in section 5.3.3. It is clear that in this case φύσις cannot denote the COMMON NATURE of the Godhead, since it is only the Son who became man. It is most likely that here, too, φύσις indicates the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Logos, although in this case there is no direct reference to his natural properties and, therefore, SEPARATE REALITY might be possible as well.

It may still be added that derivatives of φυσικός,[83] φύειν[84] and πεφυκέναι[85] have meanings similar to those in the trinitarian works.

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[83] *On the Incarnation*, 700a (the opposition between φυσικῶς and κατὰ χάριν, twice), 700d ('natural property'; see section 5.3.2.5), 692c (here, φυσικά does have a different meaning: it refers to 'physical', that is, bodily ailments).

[84] Words derived from φύειν are used to denote that the Word is born from the Father (679b, 682d, 702c, 707a), from the Father as God and from the virgin as man (695b), and out of the seed of David (695e).

[85] The term πεφυκός occurs three times in the sense of 'naturally, by nature': *ibid.*, 683c, 684b, 694b.

5.3.2.4. *Πρόσωπον*

Although we encounter the word πρόσωπον relatively few times in *On the Incarnation*, the term plays an interesting role in Cyril of Alexandria's developing christological terminology, so that it is worthwhile to study the occurrences in some detail.

At the very beginning of his refutation of those who divide Christ into two, he employs the word διπρόσωπον: "Do not divide Emmanuel for me, nor, separating him into a man by himself (ἰδικῶς) and into God the Word, represent him to us as denoting two persons (διπρόσωπον)" (694e). De Durand suggests that διπρόσωπον might indicate a slightly weaker division than 'two πρόσωπα'. He refers to a passage in *Oratio ad augustas*, where the same adjective is used with regard to biblical language.[86] There, Cyril writes: often, with regard to one person our way of speaking introduces two persons.[87] The archbishop opposes reality and speech. Although in reality there is only one person, we speak as if there are two: a man and his spirit, or a man's heart and his spirit. There is one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, but we speak of two GRAMMATICAL PERSONS, who seem to have an external relationship to one another. The word διπρόσωπον, then, does not seem to express a 'slightly weaker' division than 'two πρόσωπα', but the two expressions rather seem to be identical. Just as he does in his *Commentary on John*,[88] in *On the Incarnation* Cyril rejects a division of Christ into two πρόσωπα.

The only other place in the treatise where we find the term πρόσ-ωπον is in a discussion round 2 Cor. 4:6: God shone in our hearts to enlighten us with the knowledge of his glory in the face (ἐν προσώπῳ) of Jesus Christ (702c–703c). Besides the quotation of the biblical verse the phrase ἐν προσώπῳ is employed four times. Although most of the modern Bible translations render πρόσωπον in this verse by 'face', it is doubtful whether Cyril of Alexandria understood it in this way. Once, he virtually repeats the statement in the verse, but in the other three cases he links the phrase ἐν προσώπῳ with faith:

1. The faith is not directed at one of us, at a man, but at him who is God truly and by nature ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ.

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[86] De Durand, SC 97, 241, n. 2.
[87] *Oratio ad augustas*, ACO I.1.5, 37[20–21]: ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς δὲ προσώπου πολλάκις διπρόσωπον ἡμῖν εἰσφέρεται λόγου σχῆμα. See section 7.4.2.3.
[88] See chapter 3, nn. 312 and 313.

2. Christ directs the faith to the nature of the Godhead, ὡς ἐν προσώπῳ Πατρός.
3. You could learn in another way that he [Christ] does not reject the faith, but that he accepts it without separation and distinction ὡς ἐν ἰδίῳ προσώπῳ, also when he has become flesh.[89]

Since he also speaks of the πρόσωπον of the Father, it is clear that at least once he does not mean 'face' in a literal sense. Neither is it plausible that in the second case it would mean 'the representative of the Father', as de Durand has it, since representation is indicated by Cyril through the expression ὡς ἐκ προσώπου. It is more likely that Cyril understands πρόσωπον as 'person', PERSON, in this case an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. And the person of Christ is both God and man, but in this person the faith is directed, not at a man, but at him who is God. Cyril lets Christ say:

You who put your faith in myself, who is seen in the flesh, should know that you have not believed in a mere man, but in the Father himself, through me, who is equal and indistinguishable in all things (703bc).

Through himself, then, Christ directs our faith to the divine nature in the person of the Father.

Cyril speaks of seeing Christ and quotes parts of John 14:9, 12:45 and 9:37, but he does not link this directly to the word πρόσωπον. He explains that the divine imprint is not bodily, but that it exists in God-befitting power and glory. Christ wished that his hearers rose to thoughts about himself (ἐπ' αὐτῷ), while the visible body somewhat diminished him (702e). The body diminishes his divine glory, but this glory nevertheless shines through in his deeds (Cyril quotes John 10:37–38a: believe my works; 703a). Therefore, when he writes that the enlightenment shone through (διέλαμψε), he does not say that it shone through the—bodily—face (προσώπου) of Christ, but that it shone in the person (ἐν προσώπῳ) of Christ (702d).

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[89] De Durand, SC 97, 264–267, renders the expressions by: "Dieu dont par nature et en toute vérité le Christ nous présente le visage" (φύσει καὶ ἀληθῶς, however, is linked by τόν to Θεόν); "en représentant du Père qu'il est" (we have seen in section 3.5 that Cyril rather uses the expression ὡς ἐκ προσώπου to indicate representation); and "à son personnage véritable", resp.

5.3.2.5. Ἴδιος

Just as in the trinitarian writings, ἴδιος and its derivatives are used for that which is common as well as for that which is particular. The phrase 'one's own nature (ἰδία φύσις)' occurs quite regularly, usually in reference to natural properties, and, therefore, indicating something which the being in question has in common with other beings of the same nature. It is applied to the Word, whose 'own nature' is his divine nature,[90] to 'that which is divine',[91] and to created beings.[92] Also the Word's 'own glory', that is, his divine glory, which he has in common with the Father and the Spirit, is mentioned a few times.[93] And the natural relationship between the Spirit and the Word is expressed in that he is called the Son's 'own' Spirit.[94] All the natural properties together are referred to by ἰδιότης φυσική.[95]

On the other hand, the Word 'makes his own' the flesh, the body, the soul.[96] They are then called his 'own' flesh, body or soul.[97] That which has been assumed is not 'foreign to him (ἀλλότριον αὐτοῦ)', but truly his own (696c). Here, ἴδιος denotes particularity. This is also the case when Cyril speaks of Christ's 'own existence' (685d), his 'own hypostasis' (694d), or his 'own person' (703c). The adverb ἰδία occurs once and then means 'individually' or 'separately'.[98] The term ἰδικῶς indicates specificity in a broad spectrum of applications. It may indicate separate individuality.[99] When the Word "with the flesh and in the form of a slave" is said to be truly μοναδικῶς τε καὶ ἰδικῶς the Father's Son (705d), μοναδικῶς denotes that the Word with the flesh is one entity, and ἰδικῶς emphasizes that this one entity is the Father's own Son. However, when Hermias is advised to observe in Jesus Christ the antiquity that belongs ἰδικῶς to the Word, it is precisely not the separate individuality of the

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[90] *On the Incarnation*, 683c, 684e, 690a, 691d, 706d, 710b, 711b.

[91] *Ibid.*, 690d (τὸ θεῖον).

[92] *Ibid.*, 684c (the flesh), 690a (a perfect man), 707a (the man who the Word has become; see n. 72), 708c (the earthly flesh).

[93] *Ibid.*, 695c, 700b, 701d.

[94] *Ibid.*, 706a, 706cd, 707a.

[95] *Ibid.*, 700d. See also section 3.6.

[96] *Ibid.*, 691d, 703c, 707b, 712bc. In his description of the Apollinarian view, B also uses this language: 679d.

[97] *Ibid.*, 692c, 693d, 707b, 708b, 710d, 711b.

[98] *Ibid.*, 680a: ἰδία τιθέντες καὶ ἀναμέρος.

[99] *Ibid.*, 686a: ἰδικῶς οὐχ ὑφεστηκότα (see n. 54); 694e: μηδὲ διϊστὰς εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἰδικῶς καί…

Word which is meant. Rather, that which specifically belongs to the divine Word, and not to his humanity,—his pre-existence—is attributed to Christ—the Word made man—because of the economic union.[100] And when ἰδικῶς is placed side by side with φύσει it signifies what is specific for the Son, while φύσει points to the attributes which the Son has in common with the Father and the Spirit.[101]

We have already come across the communication of idioms in the sense that both the divine and the human properties are attributed to one subject, and that, therefore, the Son of Man may be said to have come down from heaven (see section 4.3.4). In *On the Incarnation*, we find the same references to John 3:13 and 6:62 (708ab), but also other examples. Insofar as he is God, he is the Lord of glory, but insofar as he has become man he asks: "Father, glorify your Son" (702a). Being consubstantial with the Father, the Son has the Spirit as his own, but he is said to receive the Spirit, when he has become man (707a). And although he is life because of his birth from the living Father, he is said to be made alive with us (707a). We find these paradoxical statements sometimes in a condensed form: "For the bodiless one has become visible, and he who cannot be touched has become tangible" (712b).

In this treatise, Cyril of Alexandria also uses the term ἴδιον to describe the exchange of properties. Just as in Christ 'being called only-begotten' has become a property (ἴδιον) of the humanity, because it has been united to the Word according to the economic coming together, so 'being said to be among many brothers' and 'being called first-born' have become a property (ἴδιον) of the Word because he has been united to the flesh.[102] Cyril does not say that 'being only-begotten (τὸ εἶναι μονογενής)' has become a property of Christ's humanity, but 'being called only-begotten (τὸ μονογενές)', and similarly for the other properties. The exchange of properties that he mentions here is not an ontological exchange, but it is a matter of linguistics. At the ontological level there is a union of the only-begotten Word with humanity, by which he has become a man who is the first-born among many brothers.

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[100] *Ibid.*, 711d: Ἄθρει δὴ οὖν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ καθ' ἕνωσιν οἰκονομικὴν τὸ ἰδικῶς τοῦ Λόγου πρεσβύτατον.

[101] *Ibid.*, 709d; see n. 49.

[102] *Ibid.*, 700b: Ὥσπερ οὖν γέγονεν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἐν Χριστῷ τὸ μονογενὲς διὰ τὸ ἡνῶσθαι τῷ Λόγῳ κατὰ σύμβασιν οἰκονομικήν, οὕτως ἴδιον τοῦ Λόγου τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς καὶ τὸ πρωτότοκος διὰ τὸ ἡνῶσθαι σαρκί.

Cyril also employs other words to describe the exchange. Antiquity must be attributed (ἀναθετέον) to the Word, "also with the flesh", as to him who is God by nature, who is united to the flesh, and who customarily communicates (κοινοποιεῖν) the things of his own (ἰδίας) nature to his own (ἰδίῳ) body (711b). In his *Commentary on John*, Cyril employs the verb κοινοποιεῖν for the sharing of earthly wisdom by teaching, of a prerogative or a dignity of the Only-Begotten, and of spiritual goods by the Samaritan woman.[103] It usually goes beyond the sharing of a name; something real is imparted. This is not to say, however, that in the particular example of 'antiquity' or pre-existence the flesh participates in such a way that it itself also becomes pre-existent. The Word, who was made man, existed before the ages, but he was born according to the flesh only in the last times (711de). And Cyril writes regularly that Christ received his flesh from the virgin.[104]

In the context of the Eucharist, the communication of idioms receives a special importance for Cyril of Alexandria. When he has written that "it may be seen that he grants the glory of the God-befitting operation (ἐνεργείας) to his own flesh" (707ab), Cyril starts an elaboration on the Eucharist with several quotations from John 6. Christ has said that they who do not eat his flesh and drink his blood do not have life in themselves, and that he himself is the bread that has come down from heaven. Yet, on the one hand, it is not his flesh that has come down, and on the other hand, one cannot eat the Word. "But through thousands of words he is seen to gather both [the Word and the flesh] into one (ἕν) and, as it were, to mingle the properties (ἰδιώματα) of the natures with each other" (708a). It should be noted that he does not say here that the natures are mingled, but rather the properties of the natures.[105] He writes that Christ calls his own flesh life-giving, but he comments that, as far as its own nature is concerned (ὅσον ἧκεν εἰς ἰδίαν φύσιν), the flesh cannot give life. It is only life-giving

[103] *In Jo.* I.9, vol. 1, 110 (74a); I.10, vol. 1, 159 (107a); II.2, vol. 1, 242 (162c); II.5, vol. 1, 288 (194b).

[104] E.g., *On the Incarnation*, 708a: 'Is it not correct to say that the flesh did not descend from the heavens, but was from (ἐκ) the virgin, according to the Scriptures?'

[105] In the earlier *Festal Letter* 8 (SC 392, 100⁷) for the year 420, Cyril writes about a mixture (ἀνάκρασις), which seems to be a mixture of the two elements. And still in *Festal Letter* 17 for the year 429, he speaks of the Word who mingles his own nature with blood and flesh, although it is clear from the context that he does not have a *tertium quid* in mind (see section 5.4.2.2).

because of the union (καθ' ἕνωσιν) with the living Word who is from heaven (708c).

On two other occasions, the archbishop speaks in a similar way of the ἰδιώματα.[106] First, the incarnate Word "is composed (συγκείμενος) by both human and super-human properties (ἰδιώμασιν) into one thing, which is in between".[107] And he immediately adds a quotation from 1 Tim. 2:5: He is "mediator of God and men", explaining that also with the flesh the Word is God by nature, and truly man, though not a mere man like us. By 'in between', then, Cyril does not mean a *tertium quid*, which would imply 'neither God nor man', but both sets of properties remain intact; Christ is God *and* man.

In the other instance where ἰδίωμα appears in a similar context, Cyril expresses a conclusion based on 1 John 1:1–2 in metaphysical language: the author all but gathers together (συναγείρων) the natures and leads the power of the properties (ἰδιωμάτων) that belong to each nature into a confluence (μισγάγκειαν).[108] Here again, it is not the natures that flow together—an expression which looks like mingling—, but the properties; the natures are gathered together, which does not imply mingling.

5.3.3. *Christology*

On the Incarnation is not a treatise which gives a positive exposition of Cyril of Alexandria's christology. It is a refutation of six 'heterodox' views. But from his argumentation against these other positions we do get a picture of his own understanding of the person of Christ. Just as we have seen in other writings, the basis for Cyril's reasoning is Scripture. He quotes many verses, which for him form the final authority. But on this basis he reasons, utilizing the metaphysical terminology we have become acquainted with in the previous chapters.

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[106] Besides these, there is only one other place in which we find the term ἰδίωμα, namely, *On the Incarnation*, 707a; see n. 72.

[107] *Ibid.*, 709e: ἀνθρωπίνοις τε αὖ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἰδιώμασιν εἰς ἕν τι τὸ μεταξὺ συγκείμενος. It does not say that the incarnate Word is composed 'out of (ἐκ)' the two sorts of properties, which is the usual way of expressing the components, but Cyril uses a dative, here translated as 'by'. When he does use ἐκ he designates the components as "not divinity and flesh only [that is, body only]", but "humanity [that is, including the soul] and divinity" (694de), or "humanity and divinity" (702a).

[108] *Ibid.*, 712a: μονονουχὶ καὶ συναγείρων τὰς φύσεις, καὶ μισγάγκειαν ἄγων τῶν ἑκατέρᾳ πρεπόντων ἰδιωμάτων τὴν δύναμιν.

We find language which belongs to the kenotic model, but just as much, if not more, language which belongs to the composition model (see section 4.3.1).

Not surprisingly, Cyril repeatedly speaks of the Word who has become flesh or man. He is also said to exist in the form of God (696e), to have emptied himself,[109] to have come down,[110] and to have assumed the form of a slave.[111] Cyril also writes that the Logos has assumed (λαβεῖν, also with the prefixes ἀνα-, ἐπι- and προσ-) the flesh,[112] the seed of Abraham (681c), that which is human,[113] 'being less' (697e), and the birth according to the flesh (710b).[114] And he emphasizes that the Word remained the same when he became man. Further, in section 5.3.2.5 we have seen that he applies the language of appropriation and that he speaks of the Word's 'own' flesh, body and soul. All this fits in the kenotic or subject-attribute model.

But the language of the composition model is richly present in the treatise as well. Especially the noun 'union (ἕνωσις)', the related participle 'united (ἑνωθείς)', and the infinitive 'to have been united (ἡνῶσθαι)'. The Word is said to be united to the flesh,[115] but also the flesh to the Word (688b, 692e). In *On the Incarnation*, Cyril writes several times that the Logos is united to a perfect or a complete man, but in *Oratio ad Theodosium* he has rephrased it each time in such a way that the word 'man' no longer appears.[116] Undoubtedly, the reason for this alteration is that a union with a 'man' is too easily interpreted as an external connection, which is what Cyril wanted to refute in his writings against Nestorius. Further, instead of flesh, we also find that the body (693b, 708c), the soul (693b and d), the humanity (700b), and the temple (698bc) are united to the Word. In virtually all the cases

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[109] *Ibid.*, 682e; cf. 695c and 696d.

[110] *Ibid.*, 691d (καταβεβηκώς), 695c (καταφοιτήσας), 696b (καταβέβηκεν). Similar terms occur in the description of the second heterodox view (684b), and in quotations from John 3:13 (708b) and 6:33, 51 (707e).

[111] *Ibid.*, 681a, 694d, 705d.

[112] The phrase τὴν ἀναληφθεῖσαν σάρκα is used by B in his description of the Apollinarian view (*ibid.*, 679c; and in 679d σῶμα τὸ ἀναληφθέν), but also by A in a reference to the Eucharist (707c).

[113] *Ibid.*, 696bc, 701d, 705b.

[114] In a quotation from those whom B accuses of teaching two Sons, we find twice the expression 'having assumed a man' (ἀναλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον); *ibid.*, 680ab.

[115] *Ibid.*, 700b, 709c, 711b.

[116] *Ibid.*, 688b, 690b, 692b. Cf. *Oratio ad Theodosium*, ACO I.1.1, 52^{15}, 53$^{24–25}$, 55^{14}. Cf. also *On the Incarnation*, 690a with *Oratio*, 53^{21}.

the English preposition 'to' is a translation of the dative. Only once the Greek preposition πρός is used.[117]

Besides 'union' and its cognates, other terms are employed to describe the relationship between the Word and the human element: 'concurrence (συνδρομή)',[118] 'coming together (σύνοδος)',[119] 'to have come together (συνενηνέχθαι)',[120] 'to be composed (συγκεῖσθαι)',[121] and 'composed (συγκείμενος)'.[122] And the divine element is not always indicated by 'the Word' or 'the Son', but Christ is also said to be composed of humanity and divinity. Once, Cyril explicitly speaks of "unequal and dissimilar natures", while a second time, in "the concurrence of both", the word 'natures' is implied by the context. As we have seen in section 5.3.2, we find dyophysite language also in other places in the treatise, while the notion of 'in contemplation only' is absent. Further, φύσις is never juxtaposed to ὑπόστασις as a synonym, but it is placed side by side with οὐσία a few times. It may be added that the Word *with* his flesh is never called a φύσις. When Cyril speaks of 'the φύσις of the Word'[123] or of the Word's 'own φύσις',[124] he means the divine nature of the Logos, either the COMMON NATURE or his INDIVIDUAL NATURE (whose mutual relationship raises questions regarding Cyril's trinitarian theology). *It may be concluded that there is no miaphysite language to be found in* On the Incarnation.

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[117] *Ibid.*, 693b: ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ θεία, τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν λαχοῦσα συνδρομήν τε καὶ ἔνωσιν (see also n. 79). The reason that πρός is added probably is the presence of the noun συνδρομή before ἔνωσις. Liébaert (1951), 201f., argues that the use of πρός and similar prepositions indicates an active union or coming together, and that such expressions are practically another way of affirming the assumption of the flesh. In other words, they are not really part of the composition model, but they, too, belong to the subject-attribute model. De Durand, SC 97, 220f., n. 1, points out that in *On the Incarnation* there are several examples in which the Word and the assumed element are placed on the same level. I would add that another argument against Liébaert's suggestion is the fact that the flesh, etc., are not only said to be united to the Word, but also that, conversely, the Word is said to be united to the flesh, etc. Logically speaking, in the last instance, the flesh would be the active agent, if Liébaert's reasoning were correct.

[118] *Ibid.*, 688d, 690a, 693b, 695b, 701d.

[119] *Ibid.*, 688d, 698a (in a remark by B).

[120] *Ibid.*, 690b (see also n. 117), 698c.

[121] *Ibid.*, 688c (composed out of the humanity and the Son).

[122] *Ibid.*, 694e, 702a, 709e (see n. 107).

[123] *Ibid.*, 679e, 683a (in a description of the second heterodox view), 684a, 701d (see section 5.3.2.3).

[124] *Ibid.*, 684e (in a remark by B), 690a, 691d, 706d, 707b, 710b (said by B, approved of by A), 711b.

It should still be added that the terms mentioned or their cognates, especially σύνθεσις, abound in the description of the Apollinarian view in 689a and b,[125] and also occur a few times in other places where this view is indicated.[126]

Cyril of Alexandria himself uses the anthropological analogy twice. In the first instance he writes that that which the Son has assumed is considered to be one (ἕν) with him, just as the composition (σύνθεσιν) of man, who is woven out of things dissimilar by nature,[127] that is, soul and body, while both together are regarded as one man. And just as the whole man is sometimes called 'flesh' or 'soul', so the incarnate Son may be designated by his human properties (696c). In the second case, Cyril gives an exposition of the conversation between Jesus and the man born blind in John 9:35–38, where Jesus says that the man has seen the one in whom he is to believe. Cyril concludes that the divine Word designates himself by the visible body, and he asks how else he could be (ἂν εἴη) the flesh, if he himself is not regarded as that which is his own (ὡς αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων τὸ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ), according to the union (καθ' ἕνωσιν), just as is the case with us. For, he adds, if someone points out a man—out of soul and body—by his flesh only, he does not regard him as divided and imperfect (704a). In both cases, then, Cyril utilizes the analogy to demonstrate that the communication of idioms in the linguistic sense is valid: it is no problem to say that the Word can be seen after his incarnation, since he is one with his visible humanity, although he is and remains invisible in his divinity.

The metaphors of a garment (περίβλημα and φόρημα)[128] and a temple (ναός; 698b, 712bc) are employed a few times in *On the Incarnation*. That the Word 'puts on' human nature as clothing returns in later works as well.[129] The word 'temple' is also found in references to the Apollinarian christological position (689b and e). In his initial presentation of this view, B says that they bind the Word together with the temple, that the Word inhabits (κατοικῆσαι) it, making the body

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[125] Ἡνῶσθαι, συνενωθέντα, σύνθεσις (3), συντίθεμεν, συνδεδραμηκότα.

[126] *On the Incarnation*, 689e (σύνοδος), 690a (συνδρομή).

[127] *Ibid.*, 696c: πέπλεκται μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνομοίων τὴν φύσιν.

[128] *Ibid.*, 693d (φόρημα), 703c (περίβλημα) and 712b (περίβλημα). In the description of the heterodox views, we find verbs related to clothing: *ibid.*, 679a (πεφόρεκε), 688b (ἀμφιεννύντες), 690d (ἠμπέσχετο), 694d (ἠμπέσχετο).

[129] We find it twice in *Oratio ad augustas*: 28³⁵ᶠ·: "if he who is rich as God would not have put on (ἠμπέσχετο) the nature which is poor"; 42¹⁹⁻²²: the Word "put on (ἠμπέσχετο) the nature that was liable to death, that is, the [nature] like ours or the human [nature]".

his own, but taking the place of the rational soul (679d). Because the terms 'temple (ναός)' and 'to inhabit (κατοικῆσαι)' are applied to Christ in Scripture (John 2:19–21 and Col. 1:19), Cyril freely uses them in works before 428,[130] even in a context where he emphasizes that the incarnate Word should not be divided into two Christs.[131] The Word is said to inhabit his own flesh or his body as a temple. But here, in *On the Incarnation*, he rejects the position that the divine Son would dwell in a *man*: "not as dwelling (κατοικήσας) in a man, but as himself having become man by nature" (695c). Such a phrase, apparently, Cyril regards as too vulnerable to an interpretation that does not sufficiently express the ineffable union. As if this man and the Word would be two separate beings with an external relationship.

Cyril's use of the word πρόσωπον is in line with what we have seen in the previous chapters. The meaning of the word is PERSON, and, just as in the *Commentary on John* he writes that Christ should not be separated into two πρόσωπα, he now warns that he should not be represented as denoting two persons (διπρόσωπον). And in relation to 2 Cor. 4:6 he speaks of the πρόσωπον of Christ, denoting by it the PERSON who is God and man at the same time.

Especially from the passages where Cyril speaks of the ἰδιώματα, a picture emerges regarding his metaphysical understanding of the union (see the end of section 5.3.2.5). In the remainder of this study we will have to see whether this picture is compatible with the way in which he describes the union in the writings of the years 429 and 430. It is important to realise that the archbishop clearly distinguishes between, on the one hand, the substance or nature of a being and, on the other hand, the properties—whether natural properties such as propria or inseparable attributes, or separable accidents—which are attached to or lie round the substance, nature or individual being (see section 3.2.2). He speaks of the mingling or the flowing together of the properties, not of the Word and the flesh, not of the natures.

Since Cyril uses metaphors of place, one might illustrate this view by the picture in figure 2. The natures have come together without being mixed, but the properties belonging to both natures now lie round the combination of the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word and the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the flesh. This may be contrasted with two positions which

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[130] *Thesaurus*, 397D, 429B, 540CD. *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 212 (142e–143a); II.3, vol. 1, 250 (167d); II.5, vol. 1, 316 (214b); IX, vol. 2, 402 (762e–763a); XI.10, vol. 2, 726 (992e).

[131] *In Jo.* IV.3, vol. 1, 550 f. (375d–376a).

the properties that belong to both natures

| the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word | the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the flesh |

i.e. the divine and human properties

Figure 2

the properties that belong to both natures

| the mixed INDIVIDUAL NATURES of both the Word and the flesh |

i.e. the divine and human properties

Figure 3

the properties that belong to the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word

| the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word | the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the flesh |

the properties that belong to the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the flesh

Figure 4

Cyril rejects. First, one in which not just the properties, but also the natures themselves are mixed. This is shown in figure 3. It results in a *tertium quid*: according to Cyril's metaphysics, Christ would then be neither fully God nor fully man, not both God and man. In the second rejected position, the natures are not mixed, but also the properties remain attached only to one of the natures. They do not lie round the combination of both natures, but each set of properties lies only round the nature they belong to, as is depicted in figure 4. This results in two Sons and Christs: each nature with its properties lying round it may be regarded as a separate person, and the two persons only have an external relationship with each other.

This image is consistent with Cyril's writing that the Word places the things of the flesh round his own nature, that is, round the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word (707b). And it also explains his use of the communication of idioms. Since the properties of the divine Word also lie round the individual human nature of Christ, it is possible to say that the property 'has come down from heaven' is attached to the man Jesus, or, as Scripture has it, that the Son of Man has come down from heaven. And conversely, since the human properties also lie round the individual divine nature of the Word, it is possible to say that the property 'has been crucified' is attached to the Logos, or, as it is written in 1 Cor. 2:8, that the Lord of glory has been crucified. Cyril even goes so far as to say that the Word grants (χαριζόμενον) the glory of the God-befitting operation (ἐνεργείας) to his own flesh (707ab). He explicitly states that the flesh is not life-giving in its own nature (708c). Thus, the source of this operation is and remains the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Son—the natures are not mixed—, but by the grace of the union this operation is now also attached to the Word's own flesh.

Once, the word πράγματα, that is, REALITIES, is applied to indicate the elements that together constitute the incarnate Word: "confessing that one and the same Son has ineffably shone forth out of (ἐκ) two realities into one thing, which is out of (ἐξ) both of them".[132] The preposition 'out of' (ἐκ or ἐξ) occurs in various other expressions that indicate the union of the Word and his humanity: the mediator is

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[132] *On the Incarnation*, 713d: ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦντες Υἱόν, ἐκ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν, εἰς ἕν τι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀπορρήτως ἐκπεφηνότα. In *Festal Letter* 8, SC 372, 6³⁻⁵ (p. 100), Cyril already writes that a coming together (σύνοδος) has taken place of two realities (πραγμάτων) that are dissimilar by nature, divinity and humanity, and that Christ is one out of both. He there attributes this view to Athanasius. See chapter 8, n. 127.

composed out of the humanity and the Son (688c); the concurrence
into unity out of a perfect man and the Word (690a); he is not just
composed out of divinity and flesh only, but bound together out of
two perfect things, humanity and divinity (694de); ineffably composed
out of the worshipping humanity and the worshipped divinity (702a).[133]
And it is also used for the soul and body out of (ἐκ) which a perfect
man is composed.[134] It is nowhere added that this 'out of' is in
contemplation only. It seems that at least at this stage, Cyril employs
the preposition without thinking it through: does the use of 'out of'
imply that the elements mentioned existed in reality before the union; if
this is implied, should it, therefore, be added that it is in contemplation
only; or do the elements indeed exist before the union (for example, the
COMMON NATURE of humanity and the Word of God); or should 'out of'
be understood in the sense of 'in', just as one can say in English: 'a man
consists of a body and a soul', and does it refer to the situation after the
union? In *On the Incarnation*, it is not quite clear what Cyril's position on
these issues is, and it is probably best to leave them unanswered until
we have investigated other christological writings.

Besides his faithfulness to Scripture, another important reason for
Cyril of Alexandria's christological position is soteriological. In response
to the Docetists, he argues that, if the incarnation was a mere appear-
ance he cannot help those who are tempted, since he did not suffer
himself when he was tempted (681cd; Hebr. 2:18). If he was not mani-
fested in real flesh, how can he have died and been raised again? Then
our faith is emptied (681e). Over against those who teach that the Word
was transformed into the nature of the flesh, A quotes Hebr. 2:14 f.:
Since

> the children have shared in blood and flesh, he too participated in them,
> in order that through his death he would destroy him who has the power
> over death, that is, the devil, and liberate those who were subject to the
> fear of death all their lives (682e–683a).

And those who regard the Word before the incarnation as anhypostatic,
he asks what is extraordinary about God's love if the Son he gave for
us does not have his own existence. If the Word has not become flesh,

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[133] In *ibid.*, 688c, 690a and 702a, ἐκ is repeated before the second element, for
example: out of the humanity and out of the Son. The four occurrences given in the
text are found in Cyril of Alexandria's own christological statements. Similar phrases
are also found in the descriptions of various heterodox positions.

[134] *Ibid.*, 688b, 689e, 690b, 696c, 704a.

he did not endure the cross, he did not destroy the power of death, nor come to life again (688de).

In his refutation of the Apollinarian view, Cyril goes into more detail about the soteriological goal (σκοπός; 690d) of the incarnation. The Word did not just give us a good example of the evangelical life; for that, it would have been sufficient if he had become visible, either by assuming a body only (and not a soul), or by merely appearing to be in a body, as the Docetists say. That, however, would not have been of any use to us. No, he became a perfect man, in order to liberate the earthly body from corruption, and to give stability and strength to the human soul, so that it would be stronger than sin (691cd). Christ was the first man in whom this was the case, and he transmits the incorruptibility of the body and the stability of the soul to the whole human race by participation and by grace (691e–692a). Though both these aspects of salvation could also be described in terms of deification, Cyril does not employ this terminology here. He does add another aspect: Christ paid (ἀνταποτιννύς) his own flesh as a gift, truly of equal value (ἀντάξιον), for the flesh of all, and he made his soul a ransom (ἀντίλυτρον) for the soul of all, although he came to life again, being life by nature as God (692cd).

When in the final lengthy part of the treatise Cyril denounces the separation of Christ into two Sons, he adds another reason for his christological position: Christ gives his flesh as food, and this can only be life-giving if it is united to the living Word (707c, 708c). And he ends with describing the benefit for those who confess one and the same Son out of two realities according to the highest union, in the words of 1 John 4:15: God remains in him, and he in God.

5.4. *Festal Letter* 17[135]

Cyril of Alexandria's seventeenth *Festal Letter*, for the year 429, probably written at the end of 428, is generally regarded as his first work in the Nestorian controversy. He does not mention Nestorius by name, nor can we find the title θεοτόκος in this work, but most of the letter

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[135] The critical text and a French translation can be found in Cyrille d'Alexandrie, *Lettres Festales XII–XVII* (SC 434), 251–299. References are to the chapters and line numbers from this edition. See also PG 77, 768–789. A Dutch translation has been published in Costanza (1946), 45–66.

is devoted to christology, and especially to the affirmation that the incarnate Word is one, not two Sons, and that, therefore, Mary may be called the mother (μήτηρ) of God.

5.4.1. *Summary of the Contents*

After a preliminary sentence, Cyril writes in the first chapter that he wants to encourage the faithful to lead a holy life, just as young wrestlers are urged on by their trainer. Chapter 2 starts with a quotation from Luke 22:7–12, in which Jesus sends two apostles to the city to prepare the Passover. They are to follow a man with a jar of water. With a reference to this water, the archbishop exhorts the faithful that they should purify themselves and cleanse their souls from sins, adding a citation from Is. 1:16–18. He who lives like this may enter the upper room and celebrate the feast with Christ.

Cyril then starts the christological part of his letter (2^{64}) by describing the incarnation in subject-attribute terms, including language from John 1:14 and Phil. 2:6–8. He who is out of God by nature has come down and subjected himself to a voluntary kenosis. This is not to say that he abandoned the glory of his pre-existence. On the contrary, by remaining what he was, God, he enriched us by his poverty, and in himself he brought the human nature to a God-befitting dignity ($2^{87–89}$).

But soon the archbishop adds terminology of the composition model to this: we bind the Word of God together with our nature into union, and weave them into one thing out of both, in order that he is not regarded simply as a God-bearing man, but as God made man ($2^{98–101}$). He is not divided into a man separately and God, but although the nature of the concurring things is regarded as different, he is accepted as one Son. He is like a precious stone and its light, which are not to be separated, but which are regarded as one subject (ὑποκείμενον) out of both. Likewise, he is regarded as a man like us and as God above us at the same time, and he is both only-begotten and first-born.

From this, Cyril draws conclusions for the way Mary is to be called. Since even as a baby Christ retained the purity of the divinity, the virgin that bore him is not just mother (μήτηρ) of flesh and blood, but rather of the Lord and God who put on our likeness ($2^{130–134}$). He underlines this with Gal. 4:4: "God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law". The Word of God, then, did not descend into a man who was born through a woman, as into the prophets. He dwelt among us, somehow as it were mixing his own nature with blood and flesh in a

God-befitting and ineffable way ($2^{146–148}$). And just as the flesh became his own, so also all the things that belong to the flesh, except sin. More than anything else, it belongs to the flesh to be born through a mother. But if we regard the divinity apart from the flesh, then it is without mother (ἀμήτωρ; $2^{163–164}$). In the course of this argument, in a few brief remarks Cyril also denounces two other christological positions: the Apollinarian view (again without mentioning the Laodicean's name), and the view that Christ's divinity was called to a beginning of being, when he became man.

In chapter 3, Cyril of Alexandria continues his argumentation. The virgin did not bear the naked divinity, but rather the Word of God made man and united to the flesh. She who according to the flesh bore God, who appeared in the flesh on behalf of us, may be called mother of God (μήτηρ Θεοῦ; 3^8). The archbishop then quotes Is. 8:1–4 and applies it to Christ ($3^{14–59}$). Isaiah must write down on a large tome words similar to the name of the son born of the prophetess. Cyril argues that just as the tome is large, so the mystery of Christ is great; and that the divinity by itself is indescribable, but that a human pen can write about the Word after he has become man.

Then follows a brief exegesis of Luke 2:52: "And Jesus grew in wisdom and stature and grace before God and men" ($3^{65–79}$). It is not the Word of God who grew in wisdom, for he is the wisdom of God, Cyril writes. But neither should one ascribe this growth to 'the man', for that would imply a division of the one Christ into two. He is said to grow in wisdom in that he assumes the properties (τὰ ἴδια) of the humanity.[136]

Another question might be how the human nature could contain the majesty of the ineffable divinity, for God said to Moses that no one shall see his face and live ($3^{80–83}$). How this is possible is a mystery, but an illustration of it is given in the burning bush in Ex. 3:1–6a, which Cyril quotes in full ($3^{94–106}$). Just as the fire did not destroy the bush, so in Christ the majesty of his divinity has become bearable for our nature. According to our understanding, divinity and humanity could not come together into a natural unity ($3^{124–125}$), and yet, they did come together in Christ, and Emmanuel is one out of both.

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[136] Here, Cyril applies the growth to the incarnate Word's humanity, that is, to his individual body and soul. He does this even more explicitly in *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 759e–760c. See for a different interpretation of this verse, *Thesaurus*, 428B–429D, section 3.4.3, n. 226.

This leads the archbishop to a discussion of Christ's kingship ($3^{133-150}$), which he continues in chapter 4 (4^{1-37}). God ruled over Israel through Moses and the prophets, but in the time of Samuel they asked for a human king. The Lord gave them Saul, although according to Hos. 13:11 it was in his anger that God gave them a king. Christ, however, is not king as a mere man, but as God who has appeared in humanity. His rule is not under God's wrath, but rather liberates us from our sins.

With a reference to Rom. 1:23, the Alexandrian archbishop warns that we should not rank Christ as merely belonging to our nature, but preserve for the human nature the inseparable union with the Word, in order that we worship him as God (4^{38-46}). We honour him because as God he has become man. And he did this in order to make the corruptible body incorruptible. For just as iron takes on the colour of the fire in which it is held, and is in labour of its power, so the nature of the flesh has become stronger than corruption, after it has received the life-giving Word of God (4^{65-74}).

Christ calls all to the light through his teaching and through his miracles. And he freely gave up his own soul, in order to preach to the imprisoned spirits in Hades (1 Peter 3:19). In the brief chapter 5 ($^{1-20}$), Cyril exhorts the faithful once more to be obedient to the one who bought them with a price, and to care for those in need, for that is fasting in purity. And after giving the dates for Lent, Easter, and Pentecost, he ends with a doxology.

5.4.2. *Terminology*

5.4.2.1. *Οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον*

It is striking that οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον, and their cognates hardly appear in *Festal Letter* 17. There are only two places where such a word is found, and neither is of relevance for Cyril of Alexandria's christological terminology. Once, the divine Son is said to be coexistent (συνυφεστηκώς) with his eternal Father (2^{67}). And elsewhere, the word πρόσωπον occurs in a scriptural quotation, where it means 'face': 'No-one shall see my [God's] face and live' (Ex. 33:20; 3^{83}). The reason for this lack of technical terms probably has to do with the audience of the *Festal Letters*: it is not just fellow-bishops and theologians, but also less educated clergy and monks.

5.4.2.2. *Φύσις*

Φύσις and related terms, on the other hand, occur frequently. First, we have the well-known phrases κατὰ φύσιν and φύσει, used to indicate that the Word, Emmanuel, Christ is 'God by nature'[137] or 'life by nature' (4⁶⁵), and that the Word is 'out of God by nature'.[138] Also, 'he who is God by nature' says that no-one shall see him and live (3⁸¹⁻⁸³). As has been argued before, a reference to the secondary substance is implied, and to the process by which this secondary substance is handed down from the Father to the Son. And when in Christ God is said to render his own nature bearable, even to the weakest (3⁸⁷⁻⁸⁹), Cyril refers to the natural properties that are attached to the divine substance, he does not refer to Christ's separate existence.

We find a similar usage of the word φύσις in relation to birds (1⁴⁰⁻⁴⁶). Some fly high according to the law of their nature (νόμῳ φύσεως), others are also aquatic. Their nature marks each in a different way,[139] and by the art of the creator their genus (τὸ γένος) is broadened into a blooming class of colours. It is clear that here, too, φύσις is related to the secondary substance, and not at all to SEPARATE REALITY. The nature of the birds determines what sort of animal they are.

The notion of secondary substance, and with it that of natural properties, is also present when Cyril writes that two properties which conflict with each other by nature (τῇ φύσει) cannot exist together in the same being (2³⁷⁻³⁸); that a baby cannot yet discern the nature of things (τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς φύσεις), that is, whether they are right or wrong (2¹²⁴⁻¹²⁶); and that Christ should be regarded as higher than the created nature (4⁴⁸⁻⁴⁹). And it is present in the adjective φυσικός when the Father is said not to ban his own Son from the [divine] natural privileges that inhere him, when he has come in the flesh.[140]

If we move to contexts in which both the divine and the human elements in the incarnation are mentioned in relation to or in comparison with each other, then we find one instance of a dyophysite consideration, although the word φύσις is employed in the singular: "the nature of the things that have concurred into unity is thought to be different" (2¹⁰⁶⁻¹⁰⁷). In such a comparison φύσις must once more indicate the

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[137] *Festal Letter* 17, 2¹³⁰, 3⁵⁴, 3⁶¹, 4⁶⁴, 4⁸¹.
[138] *Ibid.*, 2⁶⁵⁻⁶⁶, 2⁹¹⁻⁹², 3¹²⁸.
[139] *Ibid.*, 1⁴⁴: γράφει δὲ ἄλλον ἄλλως ἡ φύσις.
[140] *Ibid.*, 2⁸¹⁻⁸³: τῶν ἐνόντων αὐτῷ φυσικῶν ἀξιωμάτων.

secondary substance. It is interesting that in most of the other cases, the term φύσις is used, not for the divine, but for the human element. So Cyril writes that—presumably in our thinking—we are "binding together into unity the Word born out of God with our nature" (φύσει τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς; 2⁹⁸⁻⁹⁹). And the divinity of the Word "is woven together with the flesh or our nature, which is perfect according to its own principle".[141] Several other examples could be added.[142]

In chapter 2 Cyril says that in himself Christ "brought the human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως) to a God-befitting dignity" (2⁸⁷⁻⁸⁹). In a note, Meunier states that this "concerns the human nature in general, which receives its salvation in Christ, not the individual nature of Christ, an expression which one never finds in Cyril",[143] a view which he had already presented in his book *Le Christ de Cyrille d'Alexandrie*.[144] It seems indeed reasonable to interpret 'the human nature' in this instance as the human nature in general, which in this particular case probably refers to the human COMMON NATURE, not all human beings combined.

We have, however, seen that when it comes to salvation Cyril regularly uses the notion of 'in Christ first', and that there is an interplay of Christ's individual humanity and human nature in general (see section 3.4.4). In another instance in the same chapter, then, it is more likely that φύσει τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς denotes the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE of Christ: he was "allowing the nature like ours to move (ἔρχεσθαι) according to its own laws, while at the same time preserving the purity of the divinity" (2¹²⁶⁻¹²⁹). Here, this moving according to its own laws refers to Christ's personal knowledge of right and wrong as a human being, not to any property of human nature in general. *This is a clear and first*

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[141] *Ibid.*, 2¹⁵¹⁻¹⁵²: ἀναπλεχθεῖσα σαρκὶ ἤγουν τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φύσει, τελείως ἐχούσῃ κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον.

[142] In *ibid.*, 3⁸⁰⁻⁸¹, Cyril asks "how the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) contained the majesty of the ineffable divinity". And he comes to the conclusion that "just as the fire became bearable for the bush, so the majesty of the divinity for the nature like ours" (τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φύσει; 3¹²⁰⁻¹²²). Further down, the archbishop argues that if the Word "would not have come together into union with our nature (τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φύσει)", our situation would not have improved (3¹⁴⁴⁻¹⁴⁸). And in the fourth chapter, he warns that we should not rank Christ as simply "belonging to our nature (τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φύσει), but we should preserve for the human nature (τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει) the inseparable union" with the Word (4⁴¹⁻⁴⁵). And in a final instance he writes that having received the Word, "the nature of the flesh" was made stronger than corruption (4⁷¹⁻⁷⁴).

[143] Meunier, SC 434, 266, n. 2.

[144] See section 4.4.8, esp. n. 197.

example of Cyril's willingness to attribute particular actions (ἔρχεσθαι) to Christ's individual human nature, as long as its union with the Word is unambiguously maintained.

In most of the cases where φύσις is employed for the human element in the incarnation, it may indeed be regarded as human nature in general, as the human COMMON NATURE, with which the Word is bound or woven together, or has come together. It is not stated explicitly, but it would be in line with Cyril's christology as we have come across it in the previous chapters, to add: this union of the Word with the human COMMON NATURE results in an individual man, in whom the salvation takes place first, and from whom it is transferred to the rest of humankind.

Only once the divine element is indicated by the word φύσις in a sentence where both elements are mentioned in their relation to one another: "For he has dwelt among us, as it were somehow mingling (ἀνακιρνάς) his own nature with blood and flesh, in a God-befitting and ineffable way" ($2^{146-148}$). It is somewhat surprising to see Cyril apply the verb 'to mingle' again to the union of the Word's nature with blood and flesh, after the distinction he makes in *On the Incarnation* between a coming together of the natures and a mingling of their properties. But it is clear from what follows that he does not intend a *tertium quid*, when he emphasizes that the divinity of the Word accepts a birth like ours without disgrace and in no way being injured "with respect to being what it is" ($2^{152-155}$). In other words, the Word's divine nature and his divine natural properties are not at all changed or impaired as a result of this 'mingling'.[145]

Another interesting phrase which Cyril applies to the union of the Word with his flesh is 'natural unity':

> Therefore, as far as our understanding and our words are concerned, divinity and humanity could not come together into a natural unity (ἑνότητα φυσικήν), and yet, they did come together in Christ, and Emmanuel is one out of both ($3^{123-126}$).

When the expression 'natural unity' is employed in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, it always refers to the relationship between the hypostases of the Trinity: though they are distinct with respect to hypostasis, they are one

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[145] That Cyril does not always use the verb ἀνακιρνᾶν (and its equivalents) in the technical sense of 'to mix' (as water and wine are mixed) is quite clear from *In Jo.* XI.9, vol. 2, 697^{20-23} (972a), where he speaks of the disciples being mingled (ἀνακιρναμένους) in soul and spirit and in the bond of peace and mutual love. See also chapter 6, n. 42.

with respect to nature.[146] This same usage is found several times in the *Commentary on John*,[147] where also the spiritual unity of the believers is said to be an image of the natural unity of the three divine hypostases.[148] And once, Cyril calls the natural properties of two individual men, Paul and Peter, "bound into a natural unity".[149] In all these examples from before the Nestorian controversy the 'natural unity' is brought about by a COMMON NATURE.

In the *Thesaurus* we once find a similar expression: the Word is naturally bound into unity with the Father.[150] But in chapter 3 we have already come across a passage in this early work of Cyril's where—just as here in *Festal Letter* 17—'natural unity' is applied to the elements in Christ,[151] in which case the unity is not that of a COMMON NATURE, since the elements are different by nature. There is another passage in the *Thesaurus* which may shed some light on Cyril's understanding of this other type of 'natural unity'. When explaining that the verb 'to create' does not always imply the beginning of a new substance, Cyril refers to Eph. 2:15 ("in order to create in himself one new man out of the two") and comments that Paul does not intend to say that "through Christ two men are re-created into a natural unity, as receiving a beginning of being".[152] The archbishop opposes two ways of creating. One indicates the substance in that it points to the beginning of its being. This is certainly the case for creation out of nothing. The other indicates a change (μετάστασις) of an existing being. From the examples Cyril gives we may conclude that he has separable accidents in mind: (1) a people that changes from error to knowledge of God; (2) a heart which is cleansed; (3) the 'two men' denote that the Israelites and the Gentiles both receive a new understanding (γνώμη).

It seems, then, that in this context Cyril means by 'natural unity' the coming together of two primary substances into a unity which is so

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[146] *Dial. Trin.* I, 406a; III, 475c and 476c; VII, 634c, 641ab and 642d.

[147] *In Jo.* XI.5, vol. 2, 668¹⁵ (952e); XI.6, vol. 2, 675¹ᶠ (957b).

[148] *Ibid.*, XI.9, vol. 2, 697²⁰⁻²⁶ (972ab); XI.11, vol. 2, 731²⁵⁻²⁹ (996b), 734 (997e–998b). On p. 735 (998d–999a) Cyril speaks of a 'natural union (φυσικῆς ἑνώσεως)' between believers, because they all partake of the one body of Christ; they are σύσσωμοι.

[149] *Ibid.*, IX.1, vol. 2, 451¹⁵⁻¹⁹ (798a).

[150] *Thesaurus*, 529A. In 141C, 201B and 201C the phrase 'natural identity' is applied to Father and Son.

[151] *Ibid.*, 241D. See section 3.4.3, esp. n. 244.

[152] *Ibid.*, 264B. It is part of a demonstration that Prov. 8:22 ("The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways", LXX), as applied to Christ, does not mean that the substance of the Word has been created.

tight that it results in a new primary substance—which Cyril reckons to the first type of creation. Even if the two original substances already had their being it may be said that this new substance has a beginning of being because of the union. Such a natural unity Cyril denies for Paul's 'new man' in Eph. 2; this new man is not a new primary substance, but the phrase indicates that Jews and Gentiles share the same understanding, the same separable accident. Only a few months after *Festal Letter* 17 Cyril will apply the phrase 'natural unity' to the concurrence of body and soul in a man, in his *Letter to the Monks*,[153] which is also a coming together of two substances or natures, not a change in a substance or nature due to a separable accident.

When the phrase 'natural unity' is applied to the incarnate Word it is, therefore, likely that Cyril implies by this two things:

(1) Both elements out of which a new entity is formed belong to the (Aristotelian) category of substance. It is not the unity of one substance and an accident.

(2) The new entity really is a unity, one single being, a SEPARATE REAL-ITY. It is not merely a matter of an external relationship between the two elements. But although the resulting entity belongs to the category of substance, this does not imply that it is one exemplar of a corresponding secondary substance. The incarnate Word is unique.

This leaves several other questions unanswered regarding the status of the human element before the incarnation. Of course, there is no doubt that the divine Word pre-existed the incarnation in Cyril's theology. And from his writings from before the Nestorian controversy we get the impression that Cyril regards the human COMMON NATURE, really existing, as the element that comes together with the Word, while the result of this union is that the Word also exists as an individual man. We will have to see whether this view is consistent with his writings from 429 onwards, and also what role the notion of 'in contemplation only' plays in this.

Finally, it may be added that once again there are a few instances in which derivatives of φύειν and πεφυκέναι are employed with the same meanings as were discussed in section 3.4.1.[154]

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[153] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 15[32]. See section 5.5.2.2.
[154] *Festal Letter* 17, 2[35–36] (πεφυκότος), 2[98] (φύντα), 4[66–67] (πεφυκός).

5.4.2.3. Ἴδιος

The word ἴδιος and its cognates present a familiar picture. Sometimes ἴδιος indicates what is proper to a being by nature: the Word's own transcendence or majesty,[155] our nature's own laws,[156] the Son's own honours (4³⁵). It is also used for the natural relationship between Father and Son: his own Son (2⁸¹⁻⁸²), his own Father (2⁹¹). And τὰ ἴδια is employed for all the natural properties of humanity (3⁷⁸). Twice we find the expression 'his own nature' for the divinity of the Word, as distinct from his humanity.[157] On the other hand, ἴδιος may denote that the Word has made his own the flesh and all that pertains to it,[158] and that it is now his own flesh (2¹⁰²), his own body (3¹³²), his own soul (4⁹²). We encounter the adjective ἰδικός once in the sense of proper, fitting: a name fitting for God (3⁴⁹). And the corresponding adverb ἰδικῶς, also once, to indicate individual, separate existence (3¹²⁷). The noun ἰδίωμα is absent from this *Festal Letter*.

5.4.3. *Christology*

Although there are no explicit references to Nestorius, Constantinople, or Antioch in this letter, it is not surprising that it is generally regarded as Cyril of Alexandria's first writing pertaining to the Nestorian controversy. A large part of it is devoted to christology, especially to a refutation of a division of the one Christ into two Sons. And while the term θεοτόκος is not mentioned, Cyril takes some time to exposit the view that the Word of God has been born from the virgin according to the flesh, and that she may, therefore, be called 'mother of God (μήτηρ Θεοῦ)'. It seems that in the earliest stages of the controversy, Cyril was concerned with the underlying christological issues rather than with the title θεοτόκος as such, an epithet that he hardly used himself before 429.

He starts his discussion of christology with a brief description of the incarnation in subject-attribute terms, but apart from the recurring use of ἴδιος (terminology that belongs to it), the composition model occurs more frequently in this letter: most often the noun 'union' (ἕνωσις),

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[155] *Ibid.*, 2⁸⁶⁻⁸⁷; 3⁶³.
[156] *Ibid.*, 2¹²⁷⁻¹²⁸; also these laws' own principles (λόγων; 2¹⁵⁸). Cf. 2¹⁵².
[157] *Ibid.*, 2¹⁴⁷; 3⁸⁸.
[158] *Ibid.*, 2¹⁵⁸⁻¹⁵⁹, 3⁷⁵, 4⁶⁶.

but also 'interweaving' (συμπλοκήν; 2¹⁰⁵), 'coming together' (σύνοδος; 3⁸⁵), the participles 'having been united' (ἑνωθέντα; 3⁵ ᵃⁿᵈ ⁷), 'having concurred',¹⁵⁹ 'woven together',¹⁶⁰ and the well-known expression 'one out of both';¹⁶¹ once the confusing phrase 'having mingled' is applied.¹⁶² It seems that Cyril regards the composition model a better tool to emphasize the unity in diversity of the incarnate Christ, over against the tendency to separate him into two distinct beings.

To describe the view of his opponents, Cyril employs verbs that indicate separation or division,¹⁶³ adverbs that denote individuality and separate existence,¹⁶⁴ and the numeral 'two'.¹⁶⁵ Also the adjectives 'mere' (ψιλός) and 'only' (μόνος) may express a view in which the union of the Word with his flesh is not properly confessed. We do not lower him to a mere humanity (2⁹⁶), Cyril writes. The child was not just in a mere likeness to us (3¹⁰). Christ should not be ranked as merely and only belonging to our nature (4⁴²⁻⁴³). And if he is regarded as a mere man (ψιλός … ἄνθρωπος) like us, he cannot improve our situation (3¹⁴⁴⁻¹⁴⁵). The theme of the 'mere man' is also expressed in different ways. One should not think of Christ as simply a God-bearing man.¹⁶⁶ The Word of God has not come down in a man who has been born through a woman, just as in the prophets (2¹³⁶⁻¹³⁸). We do not serve a man, but God made man (3¹²⁹⁻¹³¹). And Christ is not a king as a man like us, like Saul, but he reigns as the Word in human form (4²²⁻²³).

The issue of the attribution of actions and properties to the divinity and the humanity of Christ, whose role would grow during the controversy, is present in this letter as well. The growth in wisdom, stature and grace from Luke 2:52 should not be ascribed to 'the man' (τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ), for that would be nothing else than dividing the one Christ into two, according to Cyril (3⁶⁹⁻⁷³). Instead, the Word has assumed the properties of the humanity because of the tight union and, therefore,

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¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 2¹⁰⁶ (συνδεδραμηκότων). Cf. 2¹¹⁵⁻¹¹⁶ (συνδεδραμήκασι, and immediately before that, but then in relation to the illustration of a precious stone and its light: συνενηνεγμένα).

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2¹⁵¹ (ἀναπλεχθεῖσα). Cf. 2⁹⁹ (ἀναπλέκοντες), 2⁹⁸ (συνδοῦντες).

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 2⁹⁹ (εἰς ἕν τι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), 2¹¹² (about a precious stone and its light: ἕν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), 3¹²⁶ (εἰς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁ Ἐμμανουήλ).

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 2¹⁴⁸. See section 5.4.2.2.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 2¹⁰⁵ (ἐπιτέμνειν), 3⁷² (διελεῖν), and in the example of a precious stone and its light, 2¹¹⁴ (διιστάναι, and on the previous line the noun τομή).

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 2¹⁰⁴ (ἀνὰ μέρος), 3¹²⁷ (ἀνὰ μέρος and ἰδικῶς).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 3⁷²: διελεῖν εἰς δύο τὸν ἕνα Χριστόν.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 2⁹⁹⁻¹⁰⁰: ἵνα μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἁπλῶς θεοφορήσας νοοῖτο.

he is said to grow in wisdom, although he is the wisdom of his Begetter
($3^{77–79}$).[167] For Cyril it is a matter of what later came to be called the
communication of idioms. He does not put it as accurately as in *On the
Incarnation*, but there is no reason to doubt that he would not mean the
same thing: the humanity is and remains the source of its own proper-
ties, but after the union these properties are also attached to the divine
Word (see figure 2 in section 5.3.3). We have seen that the archbishop
does not flinch from attributing an action to the human φύσις of Christ,
as long as its union with the Word is secured: as God in humanity he
allows the nature like ours (φύσει τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς) to move according to its
own laws ($2^{126–128}$) and, therefore, the child did not yet know right from
wrong.

There is no miaphysite terminology to be found in *Festal Letter* 17.
'Natural unity' is not a miaphysite phrase: it does not indicate the
unity into one nature, but it indicates the union of two natures—
two elements that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance—
into one entity. The word φύσις usually has a meaning related to
secondary substance, to essence and to the natural properties. Nowhere
does it signify a SEPARATE REALITY. Moreover, when it is employed in
a context where divinity and humanity are spoken of in their mutual
relationship in Christ, it is normally the humanity which is indicated by
the word φύσις, only once the divinity. This contradicts Lebon's claim
that, in his own christological language, Cyril of Alexandria never calls
Christ's humanity a nature, a human nature.[168] When 'his own nature'
is employed for the Word, it is in contradistinction to 'blood and flesh'
($2^{146–148}$), and thus it indicates his divinity, his divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE,
not the Word as a SEPARATE REALITY. And a statement like "the nature
of the things that have concurred into unity is thought to be different"
($2^{106–107}$) belongs to a dyophysite rather than to a miaphysite way of
thinking.

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[167] Wessel (2004), 133, incorrectly adduces this passage for her claim that "Cyril could
say only that Christ's advance and increase were merely apparent": "In his Festal letter
for the year 430 [it should be 429; in the accompanying note, Wessel refers to *Festal
Letter* 17, PG 77, 781A], Cyril had similarly said that Jesus' progress in stature, wisdom,
and grace did not render the Word of God wise by accession, for the Word was
merely *said* to increase in Wisdom, in order that the Word may exhibit the properties
appropriate to its human nature". Cyril, however, does not speak of merely 'exhibiting'
the properties, but of actually 'assuming (ἀναλαβών)' them. The Word can be *said* to
increase, because the human properties are ontologically—and not just apparently—
attached to the (incarnate) Word because of the tight union.

[168] See chapter 4, n. 104.

The notion of 'in contemplation only' is absent from the *Festal Letter*. The verb νοεῖν ('to regard', 'to think') is frequent, as it is in many of Cyril's writings, but the restriction 'only' is not added, while it is not just the coming together of the elements or their difference that is 'thought', but also their oneness.[169] And since Christ's oneness is certainly not 'in thought only' according to the Alexandrian archbishop, one cannot simply suggest that 'only' is implied in cases where νοεῖν occurs without an explicit restriction like 'only'.

In her dissertation, Ruth Siddals refers to Cyril's illustration of a precious stone and its light (2[108–119]) and regards it as comparable to that of the scented flower.[170] She, however, fully concentrates her analysis on the latter analogy and, therefore, a discussion of her interpretation will be postponed until section 6.4.2.1, in which Cyril's treatment of the scented flower in *Contra Nestorium* will be investigated. The passage on the precious stone in the *Festal Letter* is one of the few places in which the archbishop uses the word ὑποκείμενον: "the subject is regarded as one out of both".[171] Thought and reality are somewhat mixed up in Cyril's argumentation, since he begins with a division in the mind and ends with a destruction of the beauty, when the stone and its light are separated, presumably in reality. The sentence with the word ὑποκείμενον stands in the middle. There is, however, no reference to predication, and therefore, ὑποκείμενον probably has the ontological meaning SEPARATE REALITY, rather than the grammatical meaning 'subject of attribution'. While the stone and its light can be distinguished, they are one SEPARATE REALITY, and this illustrates the unity in diversity of the incarnate Word.

Soteriology plays only a small role in this letter. There is a brief reference to it when Cyril starts his christological exposition: in Christ the human nature is brought to a God-befitting dignity and placed at the right hand of God (2[88–90]). Elsewhere, he emphasizes that Christ is king, not as a mere man, but as the Word who has come together with our nature, and he adds that otherwise our situation would not have improved, while now we are said to be renewed to what is

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[169] *Festal Letter* 17, 2[107]: "he is admitted and regarded to be in one Son (εἰς Υἱόν ἕνα παραδεχθεὶς καὶ νοούμενος)"; 3[131–132]: the Word is "regarded (νοουμένῳ) as one (ἕν) with his own flesh". Cf. also 4[48–49]: "as God", Christ "should be regarded (νοείσθω) as higher than the created nature".

[170] Siddals (1984), 137 and 232, nn. 81 and 88.

[171] *Festal Letter* 17, 2[112f.]: πλὴν ἓν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοεῖται τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

incomparably higher ($3^{144–150}$). Somewhat further down, Cyril writes that we have been liberated from all our sins through faith, but he does not develop Christ's role in this ($4^{29–33}$). And towards the end of the letter he asks explicitly what the reason is for the incarnation (4^{65}). His first answer is that when the nature of the flesh received the life-giving Word, it became stronger than corruption, just as iron receives power when it is held in the fire. A second reason is that as the light of the world, he introduces into the minds of all the rays of true knowledge of God, thus calling them to the light, using both teachings and miracles. And he freely gave up his soul in order to preach to the imprisoned souls in Hades, so that he would be Lord over both the living and the dead. The language of deification is not applied.

5.5. *Letter to the Monks*[172]

Cyril of Alexandria's *Letter to the Monks of Egypt* shows another stage in the developing controversy, in comparison with *Festal Letter* 17. Although once again, neither Nestorius nor Constantinople are mentioned by name, the allusions to what was happening in the capital have become more obvious. While the title θεοτόκος is absent from the *Festal Letter*, it features prominently in the *Letter to the Monks*. And there are other aspects of Nestorius's christology, as they can be found in the Constantinopolitan archbishop's sermons that were circulating at the beginning of 429, which his Alexandrian colleague discusses disapprovingly.[173] The *Letter to the Monks* may have been written in the month of February of that year.

5.5.1. *Summary of the Contents*

In the first two chapters, Cyril speaks to the monks who are involved in ascesis (ἄσκησις) as their trainer. He quotes 2 Peter 1:5–8, according to which faith leads through various intermediary steps to love, and he adds that above everything else there must be an unadulterated faith

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[172] *Ep.* 1 (*CPG* 5301; PG 77, 9–40). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 10–23 (= V 1). References are to the chapters, pages and line numbers in this edition. An English translation has been published by McGuckin (1994), 245–261.

[173] Liébaert (1970), 34–48, compares Cyril's christology in his *Letter to the Monks* with that of Nestorius's sermons.

in them. In the third chapter he comes to the point: he is greatly
disturbed to hear that some people query whether the virgin Mary
should be called *theotokos* or not. He would rather let such subtle matters
rest, but now that others have brought them to the fore, he wants to
give the monks some answers with which they can oppose such foolish
ideas.

In chapter 4, Cyril starts with the rhetorical question how the virgin
would not be *theotokos*, if Jesus Christ is God, and he states that this
is also what the Fathers have taught. He gives two quotations from
Athanasius in which the epithet is found.[174] In the fifth chapter he
mentions as an argument of his opponents that the word *theotokos* is
absent from the Scriptures and from the Creed. Cyril announces that
he will show that the one who is born from the virgin is God by nature,
and that should suffice as evidence that she may be called *theotokos*.
After giving the Creed of Nicaea (325) in full (without the anathema)
in chapter 6, he bases his argumentation in the next three chapters
on several of its confessional statements. He speaks of some 'inventors
of heresies' (13⁶) who regard the Son as the mediator between God
and men in such a way that he is lower than God but higher than
creation.[175] Cyril counters this view by referring to the Creed: the Son
is born from the substance of the Father, he is light from light, God
from God by nature. And he states that according to the holy synod,
the only-begotten Son of God himself descended from heaven, became
incarnate and was made man, suffered and died, and will return as
judge. Besides, the Creed calls him "One Lord Jesus Christ".

In the chapters 10 and 11, Cyril discusses the title χριστοτόκος, which
was preferred by Nestorius (see section 5.2.1). He gives several examples
of Bible verses in which the term 'christ' is applied to men who have
been anointed with the holy Spirit. And he argues that their mothers
might equally be called *christotokos*. This title does not distinguish the
virgin as the mother of Emmanuel from those other mothers, while
Emmanuel is the only christ who is truly God. Only the virgin, then,
may be called both *christotokos* and *theotokos*.

In the twelfth chapter, Cyril compares the birth of the incarnate
Word with that of an ordinary man. A man receives his flesh from
his mother, while God introduces the spirit into this living being in

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[174] Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* III, 29.1⁴ and 33.2⁸, in: Athanasius (2000), 340 and 344.
[175] Cf. *Dial. Trin.* I, 396bc.

an unknown way.[176] But although the woman only contributes the
flesh, she nevertheless bears the whole living being out of soul and
body. Therefore, she should not just be called σαρκοτόκος, but also
ψυχοτόκος, Cyril argues ($15^{20–21,\ 29–30}$). For flesh and soul are reckoned
as one (ἕν), even though they are thought to be and are different by
nature. In the same way, the Word who is born from the substance
of God the Father, was united in the last times to flesh endowed with
a rational soul. There is, then, nothing absurd in saying that he—the
Word—was born through a woman according to the flesh.

In chapters 13 and 14 follows an exegesis of Phil. 2:6–8. Some
separate the one Lord Jesus Christ into two, Cyril writes, placing the
man born from the virgin beside the Word of God, and they say that
it is this man who emptied himself. But how could he beforehand be
in the form and the equality of the Father, Cyril asks, for no creature is
by nature in the equality of the Father. And if he already was a man,
how can he be said to have descended into being a man? Someone else
may say that it is indeed the Word of God who emptied himself, but
that he did this by dwelling (κατοικῆσαι; $16^{20,\ 22}$) in a man. Cyril then
quotes John 14:23, where it says that both Christ and the Father will
come and make their abode in those who love him, and asks whether
the Father empties himself as well, since he dwells in men. And does
the same apply to the Spirit, who also dwells in us? The Alexandrian
archbishop dismisses these interpretations as nonsense.

Having established that it is the Word of God who emptied himself,
the question to be answered in chapters 15 through 18 is how the Word
can be called Christ. For the name 'Christ' refers to the anointing by
the holy Spirit. If they say that it is the Word of God by himself (ἰδικῶς;
17^4) who was anointed, this will lead to various inconsistencies. Does it
mean that the Word was lacking in holiness before he was anointed?
Then he would be changeable by nature and susceptible to sin. Or
does it imply that, since he was equal to the Father, he is now, after
this anointing, greater than the Father? And is the Spirit who does the

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[176] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 15^{16}. Cyril speaks of 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) rather than 'soul', because
he quotes Zech. 12:1: it is God who "fashions the spirit of a man in him". Liébaert
(1970), 40, points out that Nestorius has the same anthropology: a child is formed in the
womb, but without a soul; it is animated by God. According to the Constantinopolitan
archbishop, it would, therefore, be incorrect to call the mother of a man ψυχοτόκος.
Similarly, the virgin is not to be called θεοτόκος, although she bore a man with whom
the Word of God passed along. Nestorius (1905), $352^{6–13}$. The passage is quoted by Cyril
in *Contra Nestorium* I.4, $23^{31–36}$; see section 6.2.1.

anointing greater than the Son? Cyril rejects these considerations and asserts that the consubstantial Trinity is holy by nature, and that thus the Father, the Son and the Spirit are holy.

An alternative view would be that only the man born from the virgin is anointed. But this raises the question whether such an anointing would be enough to be shown equal in glory as God and to sit with him on the throne. We, too, have been anointed with the Spirit—are we then in equality with God as well, and should we be worshipped by the angels? No, Cyril responds, for though we are called 'gods', we remain servants by nature, while he is Son by nature and Lord over all. He is not a mere man, but the Word of God who made the body from the virgin his own, so that because of the union he has also become man. He is not a man who has been made god, just as those who are gods by grace, but he is the true God who has appeared in human form for our sake. Cyril undergirds his position by quoting several Scripture verses. Since, then, he is God by nature and has come together with his own flesh, the holy virgin may be called *theotokos*.

In chapters 19 through 21 the notion of an 'instrument' is central. The Alexandrian archbishop argues that Emmanuel was not a God-bearing (θεοφόρος) man or an instrument (ὄργανον) of the Godhead, but truly God made man ($19^{10–11,\ 28–29}$). He gives quotations from Isaiah and various New Testament books to substantiate this. And he illustrates it with a man who has a son playing the lyre: the lyre does not rank as a son, together with the son. One might call the prophets 'instruments' of God, and Moses more so than all the others, but does Christ not surpass them all?

The comparison between Christ and Moses is worked out in chapters 22 and 23. Cyril quotes Hebr. 3:1–6, in which Moses is called a servant in the house, while Christ is faithful as a son over the house, who is worthy of greater honour than Moses, just as the builder has greater honour than the house. The archbishop points out that both the human limitations and the God-befitting glory are attributed to Christ. For on the one hand he is called 'high priest' and 'apostle' and 'faithful to him who appointed him', and on the other hand he is said to be so much more honoured than Moses as the builder is above the house. Moreover, the author of Hebrews writes that "God is the builder of all things", thereby indicating that as builder Christ is God.

But how to understand the difference between Moses and Christ, if both have been born through a woman? Cyril answers: the first one was a man, under the yoke of slavery, but the other one was free by

nature as God. He voluntarily underwent the kenosis for our sake, but that did not deprive him of his God-befitting glory. For just as we remain human beings by nature when we are enriched by the Spirit and say to God 'Abba, Father', so the Word remained God when he honoured our nature by assuming that which is human.

At the end of chapter 23, Cyril starts to speak about Christ's death, which means salvation to the world, and he elaborates on this in the next chapter. For he is life by nature, and how can life be said to die? Cyril takes our own death as an example: no one will doubt—he writes—that when we die our souls are not destroyed together with our bodies, and yet we call it 'the death of a man'. It is like this with Emmanuel. For he was the Word, who gave his own body, born from a woman, over to death, although he did not suffer anything in his own nature. But he appropriated the things of the flesh, in order that the sufferings could be said to be his, and he could buy those on the earth with his own blood.

This leads to a discussion of the soteriological reasons behind the incarnation in chapters 25 and 26. He laid down his life, allowing death to pull down his flesh for a short time, but then as life abolished death. If he had not suffered on behalf of us as man, he would not have brought about the things for our salvation as God. Then our faith would be in vain, and we would still be in our sins (cf. 1 Cor. 15:17). If, however, Christ were not God by nature, but a mere man and an instrument of the Godhead, then we would not have been saved by God. For if Christ had died like one of us and would have been raised by someone else's powers, how would he have abolished death? But he who did not know death, went down into death with us through his own flesh, in order that we would rise with him to life. In him first, our nature is enriched with incorruptibility. And he ascended to his Father in heaven in order to render heaven accessible to those on the earth.

In a final chapter, Cyril sums up the conclusions before he ends with a doxology. Since the crucified one is truly God and king by nature, how can anyone have doubts about calling the virgin *theotokos*? Worship him as one, not dividing him into two after the union, Cyril urges his readers. That will stop the mouths of both Jews and Greeks, when it becomes clear that Christ is not a mere man, but God himself.

5.5.2. *Terminology*

5.5.2.1. *Οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον*

The word οὐσία and two of its derivatives are found several times in the *Letter to the Monks*, but in all cases it concerns the relationships within the Trinity. The terms are not employed in discussions regarding Christ's humanity. Mostly, οὐσία occurs in phrases like 'born from the substance of the Father', which Cyril uses in his faithfulness to the Creed of Nicaea (325).[177] The only other time that οὐσία is used, the Son is said to be united with the Father 'by identity of substance' (13^{26}). Here, as mostly in the trinitarian writings, it signifies the COMMON SUBSTANCE of the divine hypostases. It has the same meaning in ὁμοούσιος, which is said of the Trinity and of the Son in his relationship to the Father.[178] And finally, the Son is called 'substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) holy' (17^{21}), which indicates that holiness is attached to the COMMON SUBSTANCE of Father, Son and holy Spirit.

Similarly, the word ὑπόστασις and its cognates are only applied— three times—to the Son in reference to the Father. The Son is to be conceived of in his own hypostasis (ἐν ἰδίᾳ μὲν ὑποστάσει; 13^{26}). The living and enhypostatic (ἐνυπόστατος) Word is born out of the substance of the Father; he does not have a beginning of existence (ὕπαρξιν) in time, always subsisting together with (συνυφεστηκώς) his Begetter ($15^{8–10}$). This usage is in line with what we have seen in previous writings. The word πρόσωπον is completely absent from the *Letter to the Monks*.

5.5.2.2. *Φύσις*

Φύσις is prominently present, also in this letter, especially in the well-known phrase 'by nature' (κατὰ φύσιν, φύσει, or τὴν φύσιν). It is discussed whether Christ is God by nature,[179] in the course of which it is questioned whether or asserted that the Word is God by nature,[180] or out of God by nature (13^{28})—also after he has become man—, that

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[177] *Ibid.*, 12^{34}, $13^{24, 34}$, $15^{8, 24}$, 20^4, 21^{27}. See also section 3.2.2.
[178] *Ibid.*, 12^2, 13^1, 13^{31}, 14^6, 17^{20}.
[179] *Ibid.*, 12^{29}, 22^{25}. 23^{19}.
[180] *Ibid.*, 15^5, 19^1, 22^{20}.

he is Son,[181] Lord,[182] free,[183] life (21^{33}), king (23^{11}) by nature. As has been argued before, in these contexts it is the notions of essence and natural properties, and not that of SEPARATE REALITY, that play a role and, therefore, φύσις indicates a secondary substance or the process by which this substance is transferred from the Father to the Son. This meaning is even clearer when Cyril writes that "the holy and consubstantial Trinity is united in one nature of divinity" (13^{30-31}), where φύσις stands for the COMMON NATURE of the Godhead, and that "the consubstantial Trinity is holy by nature" (17^{20}).

When those who hold that the Word of God by himself has been anointed are said to have wronged the nature of the Only-Begotten (17^5), φύσις again points to (one of) his divine natural properties: because they attribute the anointing to the Son they deny implicitly his holiness. And every time that Cyril speaks of the Word's 'own nature (ἰδία φύσις)', it is in a context where the divine natural properties are part of the argumentation, not his separate existence. For example, as far as his own nature is concerned, the Word of God by himself is not sanctified (17^{22}).[184]

In all these cases the word φύσις refers to the divine nature. But we find a similar usage of the term for the human or other created natures. So Cyril states that none of the created beings are in equality with the Father, if they are considered "according to their own nature" (16^{14}). And he adds: How could he have been emptied out, if he was born from a woman, just like us, while he was a man by nature (16^{15})?[185] In these instances, also with respect to human beings and other creatures the term φύσις indicates the essence and the natural properties, the secondary substance, not a SEPARATE REALITY. We find such usage not just in the phrase 'by nature', but also in the sentence: "we are not unaware of the limitations of our own nature (τῆς ἑαυτῶν φύσεως)" (18^2), where the limitations are properties of our human nature. The adverb

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[181] *Ibid.*, 16^{18}, 18^4.

[182] *Ibid.*, 14^{30}, 21^{18}.

[183] *Ibid.*, 18^{11}, 21^{21}.

[184] So also: he did not suffer in his own nature (*ibid.*, 22^6), rather he suffered in his own flesh (21^{34}). And: he who is life by nature only allowed his own flesh to undergo death for a short time, refusing to suffer [longer] what is against his own nature (ὡς ζωὴ παθεῖν οὐκ ἀνεχομένη τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἰδίαν; 22^{15-16}).

[185] Cf. *ibid.*, 16^{16-18}: someone who by nature (φύσει) belongs to the servants; 17^{9-10}: that which is deprived of sanctification is unstable by nature (κατὰ φύσιν); 20^{2-4}: that which is born by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) out of a man or out of any of the other living beings; 21^{25-26}: we are men by nature (κατὰ φύσιν).

'naturally (φυσικῶς)', too, is employed to denote the essence: "For if he is regarded as a mere man like us, how did he take hold of the seed of Abraham as naturally different from himself?" (18¹²⁻¹⁴).

A few cases deserve special attention. First, when Cyril wants to emphasize that the virgin is not the mother of the deity, he writes that "the nature of the divinity has not been born through a woman before it assumed that which is human" (18⁵⁻⁶). Although his intention seems clear, there is an ambiguity about his terminology. The way in which it is phrased suggests that the nature of the divinity *was* born through a woman *after* the Word had assumed his humanity, in which case 'the nature of the divinity' must refer to the Son only, and not to the COMMON NATURE of the Trinity. At the same time it is obvious that it is not the SEPARATE REALITY of the Son that Cyril wants to highlight, but rather his divine essence. Thus, the word φύσις seems to indicate the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word. But even then it has to be interpreted in terms of the communication of idioms: because this divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE is united with the Word's own flesh, and this flesh is born through the virgin, this divine nature may also be said to be born through a woman.

In a second special case we find dyophysite language applied, not directly to the Word and his flesh, but to the soul and the body of an ordinary man, which is used as an illustration of the unity of the incarnate Word. The soul, Cyril says, "is regarded to be and is different from it [the body] by nature according to its own principle".[186] A little further he employs the expression 'natural unity': the living being is artfully composed out of two dissimilar things, yet it is one human being, while each remains what it is, "having concurred, as it were, into a natural unity".[187] According to our discussion in section 5.4.2.2, a natural unity is a union, not of a substance and an accident, but of two substances, which together form one single being. This applies to a soul and a body which together form one human being. And since Cyril adduces this as an illustration of the incarnation, it seems that he wants

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[186] *Ibid.*, 15²⁸⁻²⁹: τὴν φύσιν ἑτέρα παρ' αὐτὸ νοουμένη τε καὶ ὑπάρχουσα κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον. A few lines earlier, Cyril has already said the same thing without the word φύσις: ἕτερος δὲ σαρκὸς καὶ ὁμοίως ἕτερος ὁ ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος: the [natural] principle of the flesh is different and likewise that of the soul, in other words, soul and body have a different natural principle. McGuckin (1994), 251, incorrectly translates: "the Word is different to the flesh, and equally different to the soul", for within the immediate context the argumentation concerns an ordinary man, not the incarnate Word.

[187] *Ibid.*, 15³⁰⁻³²: συνδεδραμηκότων δὲ ὥσπερ εἰς ἑνότητα φυσικήν.

to say that Christ, too, is one ontological being, one SEPARATE REALITY, which is the result of the coming together of two elements that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance. The questions raised towards the end of section 5.4.2.2, however, cannot be answered yet.

Then there are two instances in which the human nature occurs in a soteriological context. First, Cyril writes that the Word of God, having assumed that which is human, "has honoured the nature" (21²⁷⁻²⁸). In this case, 'the nature' can be understood as the whole human race. Further down, it says: "The nature is enriched with incorruptibility in him as the first" (23¹⁻²). Here, we have the interplay again between Christ as an individual man and the rest of humankind. Through the operation of the divine Word, who is life by nature, his own flesh is made incorruptible (22¹³⁻¹⁷), but he is the first, and this incorruptibility extends to the whole nature. 'The nature' can again be regarded as the human race, all human individuals.

Nowhere in this letter does Cyril apply the term φύσις to the incarnate Word as such. When he does use it with respect to the Word after the incarnaton, it always refers to his divinity, in contradistinction to his humanity. And 'natural unity' is not a miaphysite phrase, but it rather functions in a dyophysite context: it indicates that two elements that belong to the category of substance and that are different by nature, soul and body, come together to form one human being. In the *Letter to the Monks* too, then, there is no miaphysite terminology to be found.

5.5.2.3. Ἴδιος

Once again, the Alexandrian archbishop uses ἴδιος in two different ways: on the one hand, to indicate properties or relationships that belong to a being by nature, or the nature of that being itself, on the other hand properties or relationships that belong to a particular being, and not to other beings of the same nature. Under the first category fall: their own principle (λόγος; 15²⁹), that which is attached to each as its own,[188] his own majesty (21²⁸). And since the word φύσις in the expression 'his own nature' denotes, not a SEPARATE REALITY, but a COMMON or an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, the use of ἴδιος in this phrase also fits in this category.[189] Following a quotation of Rom. 8:32 ("he who did

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[188] *Ibid.*, 15³³: it concerns the natural properties of body and soul.
[189] See section 5.5.2.2.

not spare his own Son"; 19³⁵), the word ἴδιος appears several times. First Cyril argues that that which is born out of God's substance is God's own in the same way as that which is born out of a man by nature is his own. Then he adds that, given the union, the one born from the virgin is God's own Son, because the body born from her belongs to the Word (20¹⁻¹¹). Here, ἴδιος refers to the process by which the secondary substance is transferred through birth.

In the second category we find phrases like 'his own hypostasis' (13²⁶), 'his own flesh',¹⁹⁰ 'his own body',¹⁹¹ 'he laid down his own life (ψυχήν)',¹⁹² 'his own blood' (22⁸), in all of which 'his own' refers to the divine Son. It is also said of a man's soul that it is formed together with its own body (15²⁷). Further, Cyril speaks of the Word 'having made his own' the flesh, the body, and the things of the flesh.¹⁹³

Twice, we find the term ἰδικῶς. In the first instance, Cyril asserts that the word 'christ' does not only and specifically (μόνῳ τε καὶ ἰδικῶς) apply to Emmanuel (14¹⁵⁻¹⁶). And in the second case, he writes about those who say that it is God the Word by himself (ἰδικῶς)—apart from the incarnation, that is—who has been anointed, that they wrong the nature of the Only-Begotten (17⁴⁻⁵).

5.5.3. *Christology*

The primary aim of the *Letter to the Monks* is to defend the title θεοτόκος, and Cyril of Alexandria's main argument is that the one who was born from the virgin was not a mere man (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος),¹⁹⁴ but the Word of God who has become man. In the course of his reasoning he employs terminology from both the subject-attribute and the composition models. Thus on the one hand, the Word is said to have become flesh or man, to have assumed the flesh or the form of a servant, to have made his own the flesh or the body, to have been emptied out, or to have subjected himself to a kenosis,¹⁹⁵ while on

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¹⁹⁰ *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 19¹, 21³⁴, 22³¹. Once, 'his own flesh' belongs to the first, rather than to the second, category. When discussing Hebr. 2:14–17, Cyril argues that if Christ were an ordinary man he could not be said "to have partaken of his own flesh" (18¹⁴), since it already was his own flesh by nature (first category).

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 20¹⁰ (to which it is added that it "was not of someone else like us"), 22⁵.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 21³², 22¹⁴. Cf. 22²⁹.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 15²⁴⁻²⁵, 18¹⁷, 22⁷.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 15³, 18¹²⁻¹³, 22²⁵⁻²⁶, 23¹⁹.

¹⁹⁵ Especially in chapters 13 and 14 (*ibid.*, 16¹⁻³²), but also elsewhere: 18¹⁰⁻¹¹, 21²¹.

the other hand, terms like 'union',[196] 'united',[197] and 'to bring / come together'[198] are employed. A few times, terms belonging to both models occur side by side. So Cyril writes that, according to Scripture, "the Word out of God has become flesh, that is, has been united to flesh endowed with a rational soul".[199]

When we consider the way in which Cyril denotes the elements that have come together in Christ, we just saw that the Word is said to have been united to the flesh.[200] With these terms for the elements, the archbishop stays close to the biblical language (John 1:14). But he also writes that Emmanuel is out of two realities (πραγμάτων), divinity and humanity, though one Lord Jesus Christ (18[18–20]). And he states that we "bring together into union the Word born out of God and the man which is perfectly out of the holy virgin" (18[6–8]). As we will see in a minute, Cyril is cautious in using the word 'man' for the human element, so it is somewhat surprising that it is so designated in this sentence. One possible explanation is that, here, it is 'we' who bring them together, that is, it is an operation of the mind, not in reality. But this is not made explicit, and the notion of 'in contemplation only' is absent also from this letter.

In certain contexts, Cyril rejects explicitly the use of the word 'man' for Christ's humanity. It is no problem for him to say—with the Creed—that the Word has become man, nor that 'as a man' Christ does certain things.[201] But he argues that the kenosis is not properly expressed by stating that the Word dwelt in a man,[202] while he does say that Emmanuel was the Word in (ἐν) his own body (22[5]). Also, one should not call Christ a God-bearing (θεοφόρος) man,[203] nor a man who has been made god (θεοποιηθείς), just as those who are gods by grace (18[20–21]). Similarly, Christ is not to be called an 'instrument' of the Godhead,[204] although in later writings Cyril finds no problem in calling

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[196] *Ibid.*, 16[1], 18[7, 18], 20[8], 23[13].

[197] *Ibid.*, 13[33], 15[11].

[198] *Ibid.*, 18[6] (συνενεγκόντες), 19[1] (συνενηνεγμένος).

[199] *Ibid.*, 13[32–33]. Also in 15[11–12]: "he has become flesh, that is, he was united to flesh endowed with a rational soul". These are two out of three places where without any elaboration the Apollinarian view is contradicted. The third, less explicit, place is 18[6–7].

[200] The same elements are mentioned in *ibid.*, 19[1]: "the Word is God by nature and has come together into a unity, I mean that with his own flesh".

[201] *Ibid.*, 22[19–20]: Christ is said to have died as man (ὡς ἄνθρωπος).

[202] *Ibid.*, 16[21–22]; chapter 14 (*ibid.*, 16[18–32]) is dedicated to this issue.

[203] *Ibid.*, 19[10]. Cf. 19[28–29].

[204] *Ibid.*, 19[9–11, 28–30], the whole of chapter 21 (20[12–27]), 21[29], and 22[25–26].

the *body* an instrument of the Word.[205] The reason that the archbishop rejects these ways of speaking is because he detects in them a division of Christ:

> severing (τέμνοντες) the one Lord Jesus Christ into two, I mean, into a man and the Word out of God the Father, they say that he who is from the holy virgin underwent the kenosis, separating (ἀποδιστάντες) the Word out of God from him (16[9–11]).

Even so, verbs that indicate division are employed relatively seldom. The only other occurrence is in the conclusion at the end: "Worship him as one, not dividing (διελών) him into two after the union" (23[13]).

Once the verb 'to put on' is employed in a context where the dwelling of the Word in a man is rejected: "is it safe to say that he put on (ὑπέδυ) the form of a slave in this way?" (16[23]). Because Cyril does not mind the metaphor of clothing for the incarnation in later writings,[206] his opposition in this sentence probably concerns the qualifying phrase 'in this way' (οὕτως), not the verb as such.

When in chapter 12 the Alexandrian archbishop works out the illustration of the unity of body and soul in a human being, he employs terminology which in earlier writings he has applied to the incarnation as such (15[21–33]). A human being is one out of both (ἓν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), the soul is reckoned as one (ἕν) with the body, although it is regarded and is different from it by nature.[207] The living being to which a mother gives birth is composed (συντεθειμένον) out of unlike things, out of two, although it is one human being. Each [element] remains what it is, while they have concurred, as it were, into a natural unity and sort of mingle with one another that which is attached to each as its own.[208] This description fits very well with the picture in figure 2 of section 5.3.3. The two elements are two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, that of soul and body, which have come together, but which do not mingle— they remain what they are. That which is attached to them, however, the properties that belong to soul and body, do mingle. It seems that— contrary to what Weinandy asserts (see section 4.3.3)—the comparison

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[205] *Contra Nestorium* II.8, 46[28–31]. In *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 692bc, and still in *Oratio ad Theodosium*, ACO I.1.1, 55[17–19], he is said to use "his own flesh" as well as "his own soul" as an instrument.

[206] See n. 129.

[207] See n. 186.

[208] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 15[31–33]: μένοντος μὲν ἑκατέρου τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστίν, συνδεδραμηκότων δὲ ὥσπερ εἰς ἑνότητα φυσικὴν καὶ οἷον ἀνακιρνάντων ἀλλήλοιν ὅπερ ἂν ὡς ἴδιον ἑκατέρῳ προσῇ.

of soul and body not only emphasizes *that* the Word and his flesh are one, but also gives an idea of *how* this unity can be seen.

In the first sentence of chapter 13, Cyril states that it is easy to show that in the case of Christ the union is "utterly necessary" (ἀναγκαιοτάτη λίαν; 16¹). Especially coming briefly after the expression 'natural unity', this assertion could easily raise the suspicions of his opponents. For the Antiochenes, 'nature' implied necessity: a being cannot go against its own nature. For them, a 'natural unity', therefore, sounded as if the elements of the union were imperfect by themselves and needed each other for their completion.[209] Although in the *Letter to the Monks* such a natural unity is only attributed to the incarnate Word indirectly— through the illustration of body and soul—we have seen instances in which the Alexandrian archbishop applies it directly to Christ (see section 5.4.2.2). But Cyril did not mean to say that the incarnation was a natural necessity in this sense. That the divine Word would be imperfect and in need of completion by something else is far from his theological understanding.[210] And in this very same letter, he makes it quite clear that the Word underwent the kenosis voluntarily.[211]

What, then, may he have meant when he called the union utterly necessary? When we examine his reasoning following this sentence, we see that he first quotes Phil. 2:6–8, then refutes the views of those who separate Christ into two beings, and of those who speak of the Word of God dwelling in a man. Cyril argues that these interpretations lead to inconsistencies. It seems, then, that the necessity Cyril has in mind is a logical one.

The soteriological argumentation comes in the last chapters, from the end of chapter 23 onwards.[212] If Christ had not suffered as a man, he would not have achieved our salvation as God. Just as in Adam all die, so in Christ all are made alive. The Word allowed his own flesh to be pulled down by death for a short time, and then, as life, he abolished death, in order that the power of death would be dissolved in the bodies of all. Besides, he bought us with his own blood, and we have the forgiveness of sins through his blood. Then follow the christological

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[209] See Theodoret of Cyrus's criticism in *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 116¹⁹ff. Cf. *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 38⁵⁻¹².

[210] In his refutation of the Apollinarian view in *On the Incarnation*, 690a, he states it explicitly.

[211] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 18¹⁰⁻¹¹, 21²¹⁻²². Cyril also stresses that the Word of God is free by nature: *ibid.*, 18¹¹, 18²⁹, 21²¹. Cf. *ibid.*, 16¹⁶⁻²¹, 18³⁻⁴.

[212] *Ibid.*, 21³²⁻23¹⁰.

consequences: if Christ were a mere man, or an instrument of the Godhead, how could his death have abolished death? But he who does not know death descended into death with us through his flesh, in order that we would rise with him to life. Our nature is enriched with incorruptibility in him as the first. Especially this last notion could easily have been phrased in the terminology of deification, but once again this language is absent.

5.6. Several Letters from 429

In the course of the year 429, Cyril wrote several short letters in relation to the developing controversy: *To the Accusers* (*ep.* 8), *To the Apocrisiaries* (*ep.* 10), *To a Devotee of Nestorius* (*ep.* 9), *To Acacius of Beroea* (*ep.* 14), and his *First Letter to Nestorius* (*ep.* 2). Each of these letters will be briefly discussed.

5.6.1. To the Accusers *(*ep. *8)*[213]

The title of the letter states that Cyril wrote it "to those who accused him that he had not kept silent" after hearing that Nestorius's teaching was getting worse. From the letter itself it is clear that the accusation concerns the *Letter to the Monks*, by which "the most pious Nestorius had been grieved". Cyril responds that it is Nestorius's own fault, since he let "the good bishop Dorotheus" [of Marcianopolis] openly say "in the catholic church of the orthodox": "Anathema, if someone says that Mary is *theotokos*". And afterwards Nestorius and Dorotheus had communion together. Cyril concludes that by this act, not only he and the bishops throughout the world, but also the deceased Fathers have been anathematized, since all have confessed Mary to be *theotokos*. Therefore, he could have written the opposite: "Anathema, if someone does not say that Mary is *theotokos*", but for the time being he has not done this, he adds. Cyril ends with the remark that he would have sent many books of the Fathers, in which Mary is often called *theotokos*, if it weren't so tedious to do so. The epithet θεοτόκος occurs five times in this short letter, but there is no christological discussion and the more metaphysical key terms are absent.

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[213] *Ep.* 8 (*CPG* 5307; PG 77, 60–61). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 109 (= V 21). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 51–52.

5.6.2. To the Apocrisiaries *(ep. 10)*[214]

This is Cyril of Alexandria's response to a letter he had received from his apocrisiaries, his envoys, in Constantinople, as can be gleaned from the contents and from the title it carries in several of its manuscripts.

5.6.2.1. *Summary of the Contents*

Through the apocrisiaries' letter Cyril had learned that Nestorius's chaplain Anastasius had pretended to befriend them by stating that he agreed with what was written in the *Letter to the Monks*. But he had added that in that letter Cyril, too, had written that the holy synod (at Nicaea) did not know the word *theotokos*. The Alexandrian archbishop now responds that at the time of the council there was no need to employ that title since its usage was not an issue, while its correctness is clear from the council's thoughts.

That they speak falsely is clear from two documents that were dispatched to a certain deacon, Cyril continues. The first was put together by Photius, or by someone else, against the *Letter to the Monks*. The other is a pamphlet with the "extraordinary" title: "To those who, because of the connection (συνάφεια), either kill the divinity of the Only-Begotten, or divinize (ἀποθεοῦντας) the humanity" (110^{21-23}).[215] It stresses that it is the body that suffered, not the Word, as if someone would be so mad as to say that the impassible Word of God is passible, Cyril comments. Rather, the synod says that the Word does suffer, but he suffers in the flesh. He is said to suffer himself, when his body suffers, because also the soul of a human being is said to suffer when its body suffers, although it suffers nothing in its own nature.

Then follows an interesting sentence about his opponents' views:

> But since it is their aim to say that there are two Christs and two Sons, the one a man by himself (ἰδικῶς), the other God by himself (ἰδικῶς), they then make the union be of persons (προσώπων) only (110^{29-31}).

Cyril quotes Nestorius[216] as saying that the teachers in the capital did not have the opportunity to expound the doctrines more precisely,

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[214] *Ep.* 10 (*CPG* 5309; PG 77, 64–69). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 110–112 (= V 22). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 55–59.

[215] This is the title of Nestorius's tenth homily (*CPG* 5699). See Nestorius (1905), 265.

[216] The name of Nestorius does not appear anywhere in the main text of the letter in ACO I.1.1, but at this place it is mentioned in two manuscripts (see note to 111^8;

which Cyril takes to be arrogance, as if Nestorius regards himself better than his predecessors John and Atticus. And he adds that so far he has not approached Nestorius on the matter, in the hope that he will repent and confess the true faith.

Cyril returns to the terminology: since they accuse 'Mother of God (θεοτόκος)' of being an unaccustomed word, let them be asked where the titles 'Mother of Christ (χριστοτόκος)' and 'Receptacle of God (θεοδόχος)' can be found. And Nestorius literally writes: "Let us not speak of the virgin, who is the receptacle of God, as God (συνθεολογῶμεν) together with God",[217] to which Cyril replies: If she did not give birth to God, nor had Christ, who is God, in her womb, how can she still be the receptacle of God? Nestorius employs the title θεοτόκος—in the sense of God-begetter—to the Father. Cyril says that he does not know from where he gets these terms.

The archbishop then turns to a petition to the emperor that his apocrisiaries have drafted, but he regards it as too aggressive "against the one there or my brother or how shall I call him?" (112[8]), and withholds it. Instead, he wants them to write to Nestorius, asking him for a decision, and warning him that, if he insists, the matter will be transferred to other authorities. If Nestorius continues on the same road, they are to inform Cyril immediately, who already has elected several bishops and monks to be sent to Constantinople in that case. He will also write the necessary letters to the necessary people. And he ends with the assertion that he is willing to suffer anything for the faith in Christ, until death.

5.6.2.2. *Terminology and Christology*

It is clear from the summary that the epithet θεοτόκος and Nestorius's alternatives χριστοτόκος and θεοδόχος are the focus of the attention, but the underlying christological issues are mentioned as well. The terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις and their cognates do not occur in this letter. Πρόσωπον is employed once to describe the position of Nestorius and his friends: they regard the union to be one of πρόσωπα only (110[31]), and that implies two Christs and two Sons, one being a man, the other

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also in PG 77, 65C). McEnerney (1987a), 57, translates: "Thus speaks Nestorius". The quotations are part of Nestorius's fourteenth homily (*CPG* 5703); see Nestorius (1905), 282[19–21] and 283[2–8].

[217] This is taken from Nestorius's tenth homily. See Nestorius (1905), 276[4f.].

God. This understanding of πρόσωπον is in line with that which we encountered in the trinitarian writings: it is a (rational) being that exists by itself and that is capable of an external relationship with another such being.[218]

The word φύσις is used twice, in familiar ways. Once the Word is said to be born from the Father by nature (110[14]), at another time Cyril writes that the soul does not suffer in its own nature, when the body suffers (110[29]). In the latter case it is the soul's essence and natural properties that are referred to, and in the former case it is the process by which the secondary substance is transferred from Father to Son. The two applications of ἴδιος are found in this letter, too. In the expression 'its own nature' (110[29]), it is linked to the nature, to what is shared with other beings of that nature. And when Cyril speaks of the Word's 'own body' it is the particularity of the Son that is envisaged (110[16]). The Word also appropriates (οἰκειοῦται; 110[16]) the suffering of the body. The adverb ἰδικῶς is employed in the sense of 'by himself' to indicate Nestorius's view: the one person is a man by himself, the other is God by himself (110[30–31]).

The verb 'to unite' is used for the coming together of the two elements in Christ: the Word is united (ἑνωθείς; 110[15]) to the flesh. And Nestorius's christology is described as a union (ἕνωσις; 110[31]) of two persons. The noun σύνοδος only has the sense of 'synod' in this letter; it does not denote the coming together of the divine Son with his humanity. In the title of the Constantinopolitan pamphlet we encounter the typically Nestorian word 'connection' (συνάφεια; 110[22]), but Cyril does not comment on it yet. Another word in this title to be remembered is 'to divinize' (ἀποθεοῦν; 110[22]): the Antiochenes accused Cyril of teaching that Christ is a divinized human being. At this moment, the Alexandrian archbishop does not react to it, but already in the *Letter to the Monks* (18[20–21]) he had written that Christ is not a divinized man (ἄνθρωπος θεοποιηθείς), in the way that we are divinized by grace.

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[218] The meaning that Nestorius attached to the word is not relevant to the present discussion.

5.6.3. To a Devotee of Nestorius (ep. 9)[219]

According to the title, Cyril of Alexandria wrote this letter to a devotee
(ζηλωτής) of Nestorius, which explains the more positive words he
speaks about the archbishop of Constantinople. From the body of the
text it is clear that Cyril and the addressee knew one another. If he
could stop the distress of a brother by a loss of possessions, he would
gladly do so, Cyril writes. But the faith is at stake, and all the churches
in the Roman empire have been scandalized. On the day of judgement,
laymen will only have to give an account of their own lives, but those
in the ministry also of those whom they have introduced into the
mysteries. Cyril writes that he does not regard the pain and the insults
that some disreputable men have hurled against him; God will judge
them. But let the things of the faith be kept safe, and he will yield to
no one "in the obligation of showing greater love to the most God-
loving bishop Nestorius" (108[23–24])—whose name is mentioned explicitly
by Cyril for the first time. He wants him to be of good repute and to
show that the rumours about his faith are slander and not at all truth.
If the faith is weakened by some, we will not abandon their souls, he
adds, even if we have to face death. For if we are afraid to speak the
truth, with what countenance (προσώπῳ) can we recount the praises of
the holy martyrs before the people? Except for the word πρόσωπον at
the end—where it has the meaning of 'face'—none of the key terms
appear in this letter. Neither does it contain any christological content.

5.6.4. To Acacius of Beroea (ep. 14)[220]

By this letter, Cyril of Alexandria tried to gain the support of Acacius of
Beroea, the oldest of the bishops in the East, over a hundred years old,
renowned for his holiness, who had sided with his uncle Theophilus
in condemning John Chrysostom at the Synod of the Oak, 26 years
earlier, where Cyril himself had been present as well.[221]

   Cyril writes that he hopes to find comfort by sharing his grief with
like-minded people. He is grieved because "the most pious bishop

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[219] *Ep.* 9 (*CPG* 5308; PG 77, 61–64). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1,
108–109 (= V 20). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 53–54.
[220] *Ep.* 14 (*CPG* 5314; PG 77, 97–100). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1,
98–99 (= V 16). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 73–74.
[221] Cyril refers to their presence at the Synod of the Oak in a later letter to Acacius
of Beroea, *ep.* 33 (*CPG* 5333; PG 77, 157–162), ACO I.1.7, 148[30–39].

Nestorius"—who is thus mentioned by name—not only spoke words
that scandalized the church and weakened the faith in Christ, but also
allowed a certain bishop Dorotheus to say openly in the church: "If
someone calls Mary *theotokos*, let him be anathema" (98[12–13]). And so,
Cyril concludes, we have been anathematized together with the holy
Fathers. For Athanasius, Theophilus, Basil, Gregory, Atticus, and many
other bishops call her *theotokos*, which is possible if indeed Emmanuel is
God. Moreover, the minds of the people have been perverted, for some
no longer confess Christ to be God, while others call him God only in
the way that we are 'gods', that is, by goodwill and grace—which is
lamentable.

The archbishop then asks what the advantage is of openly discussing
such subtle doctrinal matters. Would it not be more useful to give moral
expositions? But since I have written a letter to the monks, who had
been disturbed by reading such matters, he—that is, Nestorius—has
become hostile and has gathered some hopeless cases, who have run
away, and is preparing false accusations against me, Cyril adds.

In his response,[222] Acacius emphasizes that it is better to let such
difficult doctrinal matters rest, referring to Apollinarius of Laodicea
and Paulinus.[223] And he suggests that those who grieve with Cyril
repress "the reported word" (100[1])—that is, *theotokos*—so as not to give a
pretext to those who are prepared to tear apart and divide the church.
Acacius himself sets the example by not using *theotokos* once in his letter,
but twice speaking of "the term in question".[224] According to Acacius,
many of those coming from Constantinople to Antioch, both clergy and
laity, do not have any problem with the term's orthodoxy. He advises
Cyril to strive for the peace of the universal church. He adds that
John—who had just become archbishop of Antioch in 429—also read
Cyril's letter and is in agreement with him, Acacius, on this matter.

It is once more clear from Cyril's letter that for him the issues
underlying the epithet *theotokos* are christological, but he does not go
into detail and none of the key terms are present.

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[222] *Ep.* 15 (*CPG* 5315; PG 77, 100–101). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1,
99–100 (= V 17). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 75–77.
[223] Paulinus was bishop of Antioch during the Arian controversy. He opposed Mele-
tius. McEnerney (1987a), 76, n. 4.
[224] *Ep.* 15, ACO I.1.1, 100[7, 11]: τῷ ῥηθέντι ῥητῷ.

5.6.5. First Letter to Nestorius *(ep. 2)*[225]

When Celestine, pope of Rome, had written to Cyril that he was disturbed by Nestorius's homilies, Cyril wrote to the archbishop of Constantinople himself. He starts by stating that some men have come from the capital to Alexandria with the message that Nestorius was annoyed by the *Letter to the Monks*. Cyril points out that it was not his letter that created confusion, but that it was rather an attempt to allay the confusion which had resulted from what Nestorius had said, or what he had not said. He adds that he does not trust the documents— that is, whether they were really written by his Constantinopolitan colleague, thus somewhat alleviating the tension.

But the contents of the circulating writings irritated him, Cyril writes, because the faith is damaged by them. Some have come close to denying that Christ is God, he explains, confessing rather that he is an instrument (ὄργανον) and a tool (ἐργαλεῖον) of the Godhead, a God-bearing man (ἄνθρωπος θεοφόρος; 24[8–9])—briefly repeating to Nestorius some of the christological arguments that he had worked out in his *Letter to the Monks*. How could we remain silent, since we will have to give account before the judgement seat of Christ, he asks.

Then Cyril announces that Celestine, the bishop of Rome, and the bishops with him, have written that they were scandalized by some documents they had received, and that he—Cyril—must consult with Nestorius, whether they are his or not. And further, he has to take care of those that have come from the East who are murmuring against the circulating writings. If Nestorius himself is the cause of these murmurings, how can he accuse him, Cyril asks. Would it not be better if he amended his language, after having studied the issue, and called the holy virgin *theotokos* (24[25–26]), in order that those grieved could be healed, and the peace in the church restored?

In the final paragraph, Cyril makes it clear that he is not planning to change his position: he is willing to undergo imprisonment and even death for the faith in Christ. Besides, when Atticus was still alive, thus even before Nestorius was appointed, he wrote a book on the holy and consubstantial Trinity, in which is also included a treatise on the inhumanation of the Only-Begotten, which is in harmony with what he

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[225] *Ep.* 2 (*CPG* 5302; PG 77, 39–42). The critical text can be found in ACO I.i.i, 23–25 (= V 2). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 34–36.

has written now. With the remark that when this treatise is published, he will probably be accused again, Cyril ends the letter.[226]

This letter contains much information about the history of the controversy, but only a few lines about its doctrinal content. Those lines highlight some of the christological points that Cyril had raised in his *Letter to the Monks*. None of the key terms occur. Nestorius did not react to this first letter. Only after Cyril sent the priest Lampon to urge Nestorius to do so, the latter wrote a brief response.[227] Apart from several sentences about Lampon's insistence, its message can be summed up in the following quotation:

> As far as we are concerned, even though many things have been done by your reverence not in keeping with fraternal love—for one must speak mildly—we write with long-suffering and love in salutation (25^{12-14}).

5.7. *Festal Letter* 18[228]

Towards the end of 429, Cyril will have written *Festal Letter* 18 for the year 430. About two thirds of it consists of an exhortation to fast and pray and live a virtuous life during the time before Easter. The remainder is devoted to christology, but there is no reference to Nestorius's teachings. Cyril only gives a brief exposition of what he regards to be the orthodox understanding, without elaborating on any heterodox views. The title *theotokos* does not occur, and although Cyril writes that Emmanuel is "one out of both" (813C), he does not speak of those who divide the incarnate Word into two Sons or Christs.

5.7.1. *Summary of the Contents*

After a brief introduction, in which Cyril emphasizes that it is the content of his words which is important, not fluency of speech, follow five chapters. Once again, there are many references to and quotations from Scripture, from both the Old and the New Testaments, throughout the letter.

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[226] If de Durand's hypothesis is correct, this treatise is *On the Incarnation*, and it was sent, in a slightly altered form, to the emperor in the year 430. See section 5.2.2.

[227] *Ep.* 3 (*CPG* 5303; PG 77, 44). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 25 (= V 3). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 37.

[228] PG 77, 800D–820D. No critical text has been published yet, neither a translation in one of the modern languages.

In the first chapter, the archbishop urges his audience to strive to live a virtuous life, rather than gratify the passions of body and soul. He employs several illustrations to encourage them to persevere in this spiritual struggle, pointing to the reward that lies ahead: a farmer, a seaman, a warrior, a physician, and those who stand up against enemies who ravage the land. In the second chapter, Cyril discusses several biblical examples. David put on sackcloth, fasted, and prayed (Psalm 34 / 35:13, LXX). The three young men, Ananias, Azarias, and Misael, fasted (Dan. 1), and they were able to prevail against the flames (Dan. 3). Ezra prayed and fasted to obtain a safe journey (1 Esdras 8:50–53; cf. Ezra 8:21–23).

In the third chapter, Cyril states that fasting should go hand in hand with prayer. He then gives two Old Testament examples of the importance of prayer. First, the story of Israel's battle against the Amalekites (Ex. 17:8–16). As a hermeneutical guideline, the archbishop quotes 1 Cor. 10:11: "These things have happened to them as a type (τυπικῶς); they have been written as a warning for us, over whom the end of the ages has come" (812A). The second example is 1 Samuel 7:6–10: while the Israelites are fasting, Samuel prays.

This passage in 1 Samuel leads Cyril into the christological part of the letter, which starts in chapter 4. The people pour out water on the earth, and Samuel sacrifices a lamb. Cyril asks what sort of sacrifice this is. He responds: "We will find them saved and conquered in Christ, although that which took place was still in types and enigmas, neatly showing the power of the mystery concerning Christ" (813A). Water is a symbol (σύμβολον; 813C) of life, and earth of the flesh. The pouring of water on the earth, then, indicates that the Word has become flesh, that the life-giving divinity and the humanity from the earth have ineffably concurred into union. In this way, Cyril adds, we regard Emmanuel as one out of both. For since he was going to die in the flesh in order to trample on the power of death by rising from the dead, he made a mortal body his own. And so he leads the human nature to life. He did it not for his own nature, but for us; therefore, he is also called "first-fruits (ἀπαρχή) of those who have fallen asleep" and "first-born (πρωτότοκος) from the dead" (816A). And Samuel offered a lamb as an image and a type of the true sacrifice, which is Christ, who is God.

Towards the end of the fourth chapter, the Alexandrian archbishop turns to another Old Testament story, whose interpretation he gives in chapter 5: one of the signs that Moses did before the Israelites at the beginning of his ministry is that he took water from the river, and

poured it on the dry ground, where it became blood (Ex. 4:8–9). Cyril likens the Father to the river, out of which the water is taken, which indicates the Son. That the water is poured on dry ground shows that the Word has become man. And that, having been mixed with the earth, the water became blood, points to his death. The Word appropriated the death of his own flesh, and—as if he himself died—is said to have died on behalf of us. Cyril concludes the christological part of his letter with a summary of Christ's deeds, not unlike that in the Creed.

After a final exhortation to fast, to live virtuously, and to show love and compassion, Cyril gives the dates of Lent, Easter, and Pentecost, and ends with a doxology.

5.7.2. *Terminology and Christology*

The christology of *Festal Letter* 18 is, as it were, a brief summary of what we have encountered in the previous writings. Language from both the subject-attribute and the composition models is found side by side. The Word has become flesh, he "has descended into a voluntary kenosis" (813B), divinity and humanity have concurred into union (813C), Emmanuel is one out of both (813C), the Word has made the body his own (813D), he appropriated the death of his own flesh (817D). In a type of the incarnation, water and earth are said to be mixed (μέμικται; 817C), but Cyril does not apply this verb directly to the Word and his humanity. Given the smouldering controversy, it is remarkable that a division of the one Christ into two Sons is not explicitly repudiated.

Noteworthy, also, is the emphasis on Christ's death and resurrection as the way to salvation, including the notion of sacrifice. The saving passion gets relatively more attention in this letter than in many other writings of the Alexandrian archbishop. In this context, Cyril also uses the word φύσις: the Word made a mortal body his own in order that he would lead the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν) to life, having abolished the corruption (813D); 'the human nature' refers to all human beings taken together. We also find the conception that salvation—especially the change from corruption to incorruption—took place 'in Christ first', expressed in the nouns 'first-fruits' and 'first-born' (816A). Towards the end of the letter, Cyril repeats this: he has become "a way and a door and first-fruits to incorruptibility for the human nature (τῇ ἀνθρώπου φύσει)" (820B).

In the other instances where the term φύσις occurs, it has the by now familiar meanings. Sometimes, it refers to the divine nature, which is the nature of the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit (816D and 817C), their COMMON NATURE. The true God is called "God by nature" (812A); the Word is said to be life by nature (813B), and to have been born out of God by nature (817C). In the remaining cases φύσις indicates the divine nature of the incarnate Word, in distinction from the flesh.[229] It is the properties of the nature that play a part in Cyril's argumentation, and therefore, φύσις indicates the divine COMMON NATURE or the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Son, not the Word's SEPARATE REALITY. There is, then, no miaphysite language in *Festal Letter* 18.

The terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, and their cognates, are absent from this letter. Πρόσωπον occurs twice, but not in connection with Christ. Once, it says that the three young men looked good before the πρόσωπα that saw them (808C). Here, it may denote either 'face' or 'person'. The second time it appears in a quotation of 1 Sam. 7:7, in an expression which simply means 'before' (812C). And the word ἴδιος exhibits the double meaning that we have seen before.

5.8. *Second Letter to Nestorius* (*ep.* 4)[230]

Cyril of Alexandria's *Second Letter to Nestorius* was later canonized by the Councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). It was probably written in February 430. It follows a period of several months of silence, from which no letters or other documents relating to the Nestorian controversy are extant. It seems that the Alexandrian archbishop used that time to study christology more in detail, on the basis of both the Scriptures and the Church Fathers. During the spring of 430, he wrote his *Five Books against Nestorius* and the three *Orationes* he sent to the court.

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[229] *Festal Letter* 18, 813C: the Word "does not undergo change from his own nature into flesh from the earth, for the nature of God stands firm in its own goods"; 813D: the Word leads the human nature to life, "for he has not been raised for the sake of his own nature"; 817C: as long as the Word was not yet flesh, he did not become blood, "for the living and life-giving nature is completely beyond death".

[230] *Ep.* 4 (*CPG* 5304; PG 77, 44–49; Pusey VI, 2–11; *DEC* I, 40–44). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 25–28 (= V 4). Many English translations of this canonized letter have been produced, for example: McEnerney (1987a), 38–42; McGuckin (1994), 262–265; Wickham (1983), 2–11; Stevenson (1989), 295–298; Bindley & Green (1950), 209–211.

But already in this letter we see, besides familiar terminology, the new expression 'union according to hypostasis'.

5.8.1. *Summary of the Contents*

The first chapter is devoted to the men who complained in Constantinople that they were unjustly condemned by a court in Alexandria. Cyril briefly mentions the reasons why they were condemned, then states that the matter is of no great account to him, and that they will have to answer to the Judge of all. In the second chapter, he turns to the christological issue and reminds Nestorius that he should teach the people steadfastly, and that he should let himself be guided by the holy Fathers.

In chapter 3, Cyril writes that according to the great synod—at Nicaea in 325—the only-begotten Son of God himself came down, was made man, suffered, rose again, and ascended into heaven, and that it is necessary to understand what incarnation means. The nature of the Word did not become flesh by changing, nor by being transformed into a complete human being of soul and body. Rather, in an incomprehensible way the Word became man by hypostatically uniting (ἐνώσας … καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν) to himself flesh animated with a rational soul. It was not just a matter of will or approval, nor the assumption of a person (πρόσωπον) only. For although the natures that come together in unity are different, there is one Christ and Son out of both. The difference of the natures is not cancelled, but divinity and humanity make up the one Christ through the ineffable concurrence into unity.

Chapter 4 deals with the Word's birth 'according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα)'. Although he has his existence and was born from the Father before the ages, in this way he is also said to be born according to the flesh, from a woman. His divine nature did not receive its beginning of being in the virgin, nor did he need a second birth. He is said to have been born in a fleshly manner, because he came forth from a woman, having hypostatically united to himself that which is human, for us and for our salvation. It is not so that, first, an ordinary (κοινός) man was born from the virgin, on whom subsequently the Word descended, but, having been united from her womb, he is said to have undergone a fleshly birth, since he appropriated the birth of his own flesh.

In chapter 5, Cyril applies the same hermeneutical principles to the verbs 'to suffer' and 'to rise' from the Nicene Creed. The Word did not suffer in his own nature, for that which is divine is impassible,

but because the body that had become his own suffered, he himself is said to suffer for us. Also, the Word of God is immortal by nature and incorruptible, but because his own body tasted death on behalf of all, he himself is said to have suffered death. And because his body was raised, the resurrection is said to be his.

In the sixth chapter, the division of Christ into two Sons, which may also be expressed by the term 'together with (τὸ συν)', is rejected. We do not worship a man together with (συμπροσκυνοῦντες) the Word, Cyril writes, lest by saying 'together with' the image of a separation (τομῆς φαντασία) is introduced. If we reject the union according to hypostasis as unattainable, we fall into saying 'two Sons', for then it is necessary to distinguish one who is man by himself (ἰδικῶς), who is honoured by the title of Son, and another who is the Word of God by himself (ἰδικῶς), who possesses the name and the reality of sonship by nature.

In the seventh and final chapter, Cyril refers to Nestorius's use of the word πρόσωπον and to the epithet θεοτόκος, while he repeats some of his arguments. Dividing the one Christ into two Sons does not benefit the correct exposition of the faith, he states,

> even if some speak of a union of persons (προσώπων), for the Scripture did not say that the Word united himself to the person (πρόσωπον) of a man, but that he became flesh (28[12–14]).

This expression, 'to become flesh', means that he made our body his own and came forth as a man from a woman, while remaining what he was, God. This is also what the holy Fathers thought, and therefore, they confidently called the virgin *theotokos*. The holy body, animated with a rational soul, was born from the virgin, and the Word, who is hypostatically united to it, is said to have been born according to the flesh. Cyril ends by exhorting Nestorius to think and teach these same things, and thus to preserve the peace in the churches.

5.8.2. *Terminology*

5.8.2.1. *Οὐσία and ὑπόστασις*

The word οὐσία is not found in Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*, nor any of its derivatives, not even ὁμοούσιος. In this letter, ὑπόστασις is applied in reference to the incarnate Word for the first time in Cyril's writings. Although the term and its cognates appear a number of times in *On the Incarnation*, they are there only applied to the Word apart

from the incarnation (see section 5.3.2.2). According to Richard, Cyril re-introduced the word into christology after it had been dropped, following the Apollinarian controversy. And he suggests that in doing so, Cyril was influenced by the Apollinarian forgeries.[231]

None of the cognates of ὑπόστασις is present in the letter, but the word itself occurs four times, each time in the phrase 'united / union according to hypostasis'. For example, the Word became man "by hypostatically uniting to himself (ἐνώσας ὁ Λόγος ἑαυτῷ καθ' ὑπόστασιν) flesh animated with a rational soul".[232] What does Cyril mean by a union καθ' ὑπόστασιν? In our study of his previous writings we have seen that the primary meaning of ὑπόστασις is 'a really existing being', belonging to the Aristotelian category of substance, that is, an INDIVIDUAL REALITY. It may also include the notion of existence 'by itself', in which case it is a SEPARATE REALITY. This suggests that the primary meaning of 'union according to hypostasis' is: a really existing union, a union of really existing elements. But it goes further than this, since Cyril writes that when this union is denied, we end up with two Sons. Thus, it is not an external union between two individual beings, but it is a union which results in one SEPARATE REALITY.

When later challenged by Theodoret of Cyrus that this expression is an innovation, Cyril admits this, but adds that it was necessary to oppose Nestorius's unity of honours, and that

> καθ' ὑπόστασιν does not bring to light anything else than only that the nature or the hypostasis of the Word, that is, the Word himself, having really been united (κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἑνωθείς) to [a] human nature without any change and confusion, as we have often said, is regarded as and is one Christ, the same [being] God and man.[233]

This corroborates the conclusion that a union according to hypostasis indicates two things: (1) that it is a real union; (2) that it results in one Christ, in one SEPARATE REALITY.

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[231] Richard (1945), 243f. In PG 74, 24A, the expression 'one incarnate hypostasis of the Word' is included in Cyril's commentary on John 10:30. However, Pusey has already noted that this fragment has wrongly been attributed to the *Commentary on John*, since it is a passage from Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*; see *In Jo.* VII, vol. 2, 254, n. 18.

[232] *Ep.* 4, ACO I.1.1, 26[27]. McGuckin (1994), 263, inadvertently leaves καθ' ὑπόστασιν untranslated (or renders it by 'ineffably'). The other three places are 27[10–11] (ἐνώσας ἑαυτῷ καθ' ὑπόστασιν), 28[7–8] (τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν), and 28[21–22] (καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἑνωθείς).

[233] *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 115[12–16]. This passage is further discussed in section 8.2.4 (n. 18).

Neither in this letter, nor in Cyril's previous publications, is there a hint that ὑπόστασις might have the sense of 'person', as denoting an individual, rational being capable of external relationships with other such beings. It is, therefore, better to translate it by 'hypostatic(ally)', as McGuckin does, than to fill it with more meaning than it actually has in this letter and render it by 'personal(ly)'.[234]

5.8.2.2. Πρόσωπον

The word πρόσωπον occurs three times in Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*, in each case to describe a view which he rejects. The Word became man, "not just according to will or approval, but neither by the assumption of a πρόσωπον only" (26[28f.]). And dividing the one Christ into two Sons does not benefit the correct exposition of the faith, "even if some speak of a union of πρόσωπα, for the Scripture did not say that the Word united himself to the πρόσωπον of a man, but that he became flesh" (28[12–14]). It is clear from the last quotation that, for Cyril—whatever meaning the term may have had for Nestorius—, a union of πρόσωπα is an external union, which does not annul the separation into two Sons. This is in line with the sense the term πρόσωπον has in his writings before 429: an individual rational being, a PERSON, and therefore also a SEPARATE REALITY.

In our study of earlier writings we have seen that Cyril is cautious with the word 'man (ἄνθρωπος)' in his description of the incarnate Word. He may be said to have become man, and to do certain things 'as man', but he is not to be called a God-bearing man or a man in whom the Word dwells (see sections 5.3.3 and 5.5.3). These latter expressions imply a division into two Christs. Here, we find a similar reluctance with respect to the word πρόσωπον: the incarnation should not be described as the assumption of a πρόσωπον, and the Scripture does not say that the Word united himself to the πρόσωπον of a man. Given the meaning of PERSON which Cyril attaches to πρόσωπον, such phrases would imply that a separate human being already existed

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[234] The translation 'personal(ly)' is given quite deliberately by Weinandy (2003), 41 (see sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4). Stevenson (1989), 295–298, also renders καθ' ὑπόστασιν by 'personal(ly)'; and he translates ἰδικῶς by 'in his own person'. Bindley & Green (1950), 209–211, has 'hypostatical(ly)' three times, but once 'in His Own Hypostasis', which seems to read more into the expression than Cyril intends. McEnerney (1987a), 38–42, translates 'hypostatical(ly)' three times, and 'in actual fact' once, which expresses one of the two aspects of the phrase. Wickham (1983), 2–11, has 'substantial(ly)' each time.

before the incarnation, with whom the Word was subsequently united. And according to Cyril, such a union of the Word with a human PERSON could only be external, so that there would still be two Sons. He explicitly repudiates such an understanding of the incarnation when he writes that the Word did not descend on an ordinary man who had first been born from the virgin ($27^{12–13}$).

It may be added that in this letter the term πρόσωπον is not juxtaposed to ὑπόστασις. On the contrary, while ὑπόστασις is applied to express Cyril's own understanding, πρόσωπον is employed to describe the views of his opponents. This underlines that the two terms are not synonymous, and that καθ' ὑπόστασιν should not be rendered by 'personal(ly)'.

5.8.2.3. *Φύσις*

Cyril of Alexandria's usage of the word φύσις in this letter is not different from what we have come across so far. The Word is said to be immortal, incorruptible, life and life-giving by nature (κατὰ φύσιν; 27^{19}), and he is born out of God the Father by nature (κατὰ φύσιν; 26^{20}). Similarly, Cyril speaks of the Word as naturally (φυσικῶς) having the name and the reality (ὄνομά τε καὶ χρῆμα) of sonship. We also find the expression 'the nature of the Word' and similar phrases.[235] In these instances, Cyril wants to distinguish the Word's divine nature from his humanity. In the sentences which speak of his suffering and death, it is clearly not the Word as a SEPARATE REALITY which he envisages, but his essence and natural properties. In these cases it can be understood as his divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE. But also when there is mention of a change or a beginning of its existence, φύσις is more likely to mean INDIVIDUAL NATURE than SEPARATE REALITY, for it is the qualities of immutability and eternal existence which Cyril wants to safeguard. Besides, 'his divinity' is juxtaposed to 'the nature of the Word', and in Cyril's writings the term 'divinity' either means the divine COMMON NATURE, or the Godhead (as virtually synonymous with 'God'), or a divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE, not a SEPARATE REALITY. It is likely, then,

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[235] *Ep.* 4, ACO I.1.1, 26^{25} ("we do not say that the nature of the Word has become flesh by changing"), $27^{6–7}$ ("the divine nature did not receive the beginning of being in the holy virgin"), 27^{15} ("the Word of God did not suffer in his own nature"), 27^{22} ("he did not enter upon the experience of death with respect to his [own] nature"), $28^{19–20}$ ("the nature of the Word or his divinity did not receive the beginning of being from the holy virgin").

that in the case at hand both phrases—'his divinity' and 'the nature of the Word'—indicate the Son's divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

In two related sentences we find dyophysite language:

> We say … that while the natures that have come together into a true unity are different, there is one Christ and Son out of both, not as if the difference of the natures has been annulled (ἀνῃρημένης) because of the union, but divinity and humanity rather have made up for us one Lord and Christ and Son through the indescribable and ineffable concurrence into unity (27¹⁻⁵).

The notion of 'in contemplation only' is absent in this passage. Not even the verb νοεῖν is used. It is stated that the natures are different, and that their difference is not annulled through the union.[236] In other words, also after the union the difference of the natures remains. There is no mention of 'the property as in natural quality' or simply 'the natural quality', whose difference Cyril would maintain according to Lebon (see section 4.4.1). Cyril speaks of the natures themselves. It seems likely that the natures whose difference remains should be interpreted as INDIVIDUAL NATURES, certainly not as SEPARATE REALITIES, for that would imply a division into two Sons. This description fits well with the picture of figure 2 in section 5.3.3. *We may conclude that also in this canonized letter, Cyril of Alexandria employs dyophysite, not miaphysite, terminology.*

5.8.2.4. Ἴδιος

Although we find both usages of ἴδιος in this writing—indicating what is common or what is particular—the latter is by far the most frequent. Only once, ἴδιος is applied to what is natural, and therefore, shared with other beings, namely, when the Word's 'own nature' is mentioned (27¹⁵). In all the other cases it denotes the particularity of Christ's own flesh or body,[237] while Cyril also writes that the Word appropriates (οἰκειούμενος) the birth of his own flesh (27¹⁴), and that he made our body his own (ἴδιον … ἐποιήσατο; 28¹⁵).

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[236] McGuckin (1994), 263, translates: "This did not involve the negation of the difference of natures". This could be taken as a noetic difference only, but Cyril's language implies an ontological change, which is rejected: the difference of the natures is not annulled, that is, it remains after the union. McEnerney (1987a), 39, and *DEC* I, 41, translate 'destroyed'; Stevenson (1989), 296, has 'done away'; Bindley & Green (1950), 210, and Wickham (1983), 7, have 'abolished'.

[237] *Ep.* 4, ACO I.1.1, 27¹⁴, ¹⁷, ²⁰, 28⁷.

5.8.3. *Christology*

The christology of Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* is not really different from that which we have encountered in his previous writings, but his response to Nestorius's views influences the way he expresses it. The most important change is the introduction of the expression 'union according to hypostasis'. As we have seen, by this phrase Cyril emphasizes that it concerns a real, not just a notional, union and that it results in one SEPARATE REALITY. He does not use a metaphysical term for this SEPARATE REALITY—neither ὑπόστασις, nor φύσις, nor πρόσωπον—, but it is denoted by terms like 'unity' (ἑνότης), 'one Christ', 'one Son', 'one Lord', 'one and the same' (28⁴⁻⁵).

We find some language belonging to the subject-attribute model—'the Word became flesh', 'assumption'—but that of the composition model is dominant. Over against what he sees as a division into two Sons Cyril emphasizes the union, the concurrence, the coming together of the Word and his flesh, of the natures, of divinity and humanity, into one Christ and Lord. He rejects a division (τομή; 28⁴) as well as the distinguishing (διορίσαι) of a man by himself (ἰδικῶς) and the Word by himself (ἰδικῶς; 28⁸⁻⁹). One should not divide (οὐ διαιρετέον) the one Christ into two Sons (28¹⁰⁻¹¹). But he says that the difference (διαφορά) of the natures is not annulled. In this letter too, then, it is not the difference between the natures after the union that Cyril opposes, but a separation into two Sons.

His starting-point is the Creed of Nicaea (325), and he unambiguously regards the divine Word as the grammatical subject of the whole section on Jesus Christ. It is, therefore, the Word who is said to have suffered, died, and risen. And for the sake of the controversy with Nestorius he adds: it is the Word who is said to have been born from the virgin. And he undertakes to explain how this should be interpreted. He does not understand the 'who is said (λέγεται)' in a docetic way, as if it were only said, while there was no true birth, suffering, death, and resurrection. No, they truly happened, but it was Christ's body or flesh that underwent them, and because of the hypostatic union he appropriates all things that pertain to the flesh, and therefore, the Word himself can be said to have undergone them.

In response to Nestorius's writings, Cyril denounces his understanding of the union in terms of will or approval (κατὰ θέλησιν μόνην ἢ εὐδοκίαν)—which he mentions but does not elaborate on—or in terms of the assumption of a human πρόσωπον or of the union of two πρό-

σωπα (see section 5.8.2.2). He also opposes the use of the prefix συν
to indicate that 'a man' is worshipped 'together with' the Word. In all
these expressions Cyril sees a division of the one Christ into two Sons,
one of which is a man 'honoured (τετιμημένον; 28⁹)' with the title 'Son',
while the other is the Word, who is Son by nature. Only towards the
end, the Alexandrian archbishop mentions the epithet *theotokos*, stating
that the Fathers called the virgin by this name. This shows that the title
'Mother of God' was not an end in itself for Cyril, but that he regarded
it as a symptom of important underlying christological issues.

5.8.4. *Nestorius's Response*

Nestorius replied to Cyril's *Second Letter* in June 430.[238] He begins by
briefly stating that he "will pass over the insults against us in your
extraordinary letter", and that a reply will present itself "through the
events themselves" in due time—probably indicating that he plans to
pursue the charges against Cyril of those who were condemned by an
Alexandrian court. But then he immediately turns to the christological
question.

First, Nestorius gives a different interpretation of the Nicene Creed.
Cyril had emphasized that the council had said that it was the only-
begotten Son of God himself who had suffered and risen. His Con-
stantinopolitan fellow-bishop, however, regards the names 'Lord', 'Je-
sus', 'Christ', 'Only-Begotten', and 'Son' as common to divinity and
humanity—which for the name 'Only-Begotten' seems to be a dubi-
ous procedure. The suffering and the resurrection are then said, not
of the divine Son, but of the names which include his humanity: "I
believe, they say, also in our Lord Jesus Christ, his only-begotten Son"
(29²⁷ᶠ). Nestorius gives many examples from Scripture where one of
these names is applied to the incarnate Word. He infers that it is better
to call the virgin χριστοτόκος than θεοτόκος (31²⁻³).

Secondly, he concludes from Cyril's letter that, despite the explicit
assertion of the impassibility of the divinity, his understanding implies
that the Godhead has become passible. Nestorius applauds the phrase
that the nature of the divinity appropriates (οἰκειοῦσθαι) the things of the
body (τὰ τούτου), but if in the name of this appropriation the properties

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[238] *Ep.* 5 (*CPG* 5669 / 5305; PG 77, 49–57; *DEC* I, 44–50). The critical text can be
found in ACO I.1.1, 29–32 (= V 5). English translations in McEnerney (1987a), 43–48,
and McGuckin (1994), 364–368; an abridged version in Stevenson (1989), 298–300.

(ἰδιότητας) of the conjoined flesh are attributed (προστρίβειν) [to the Godhead] this is either the error of a Greek mind or the insanity of Apollinarius and Arius, or rather, worse.

Not surprisingly, the Constantinopolitan archbishop uses dyophysite language several times in his letter, and he praises Cyril for doing the same, but he does not notice the distinction Cyril makes between 'the difference (διαφορά) of the natures'—which endures after the union— and a division, which in his view results in two Sons. Thus, Nestorius can write that "I approved of the division (διαίρεσιν) of the natures according to the principle (λόγον) of humanity and divinity, and the connection (συνάφειαν) of them into one person (προσώπου)".[239]

This quotation contains two other interesting terms. First, Nestorius's typical word for the coming together of the elements in Christ, συνάφεια, connection, which, together with the corresponding verb συνάπτειν and the related προσάπτειν occurs several times in this letter.[240] The noun ἕνωσις is absent, while the verb ἑνοῦν is used once, together with the word συνάφεια in one sentence: "a temple which is united (ἡνωμένον) [to the divinity] in a sublime and divine connection" (31[26]). The second interesting term is πρόσωπον, which is only employed twice. Both in the quotation above and in the other occurrence, it is used for the result of the connection of the two natures. In the second instance, the title 'Christ' is called "a name signifying the impassible and the passible substance (οὐσίας) in a single person" (30[12]). In this letter, Nestorius does not speak of a connection of two πρόσωπα.

The quotation from 30[12] is also the only occurrence of the word οὐσία (ὁμοούσιον in 29[22]). Just as often in Cyril's writings, οὐσία has a meaning here which is closely related to that of φύσις; in several English translations it is even rendered by 'nature'.[241]

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[239] *Ibid.*, 30[18–20]. The critical text reads: τὴν τούτων εἰς ἑνὸς προσώπου συνάφειαν. Schwartz postulates ἓν πρόσωπον, which is followed by *DEC* I, 46, McEnerney (1987a), 45, and McGuckin (1994), 366, in their translations, which have 'in one person', 'into one person', and 'in one persona', respectively.

[240] *Ibid.*, 30[19–20, 26], 31[20, 26, 28], 31[2].

[241] *Ibid.*, 30[12–13]: ὡς τῆς ἀπαθοῦς καὶ παθητῆς οὐσίας ἐν μοναδικῷ προσώπῳ προσηγορίαν σημαντικήν. *DEC* I, 46, translates: "a title that expresses in one person both the impassible and the passible natures"; McEnerney (1987a), 44, has: "a name signifying the substance capable of suffering and the nature incapable of suffering in one person"; and McGuckin (1994), 365: "a term that applies to both the impassible and the passible natures in a single persona".

5.9. Conclusion

Cyril of Alexandria's christological writings up to and including his *Second Letter to Nestorius* show continuity with his christology in earlier publications, but there is also a development in terminology. We find language from both the subject-attribute and the composition models, but it seems that the archbishop regards the composition model more suitable to counteract what he sees as a two-Sons christology. Just as in the previous writings, Cyril does not hesitate to use dyophysite language, while there is no miaphysite language in any of the works that we have looked at so far. The phrase 'natural unity', which is applied once to the incarnation and once to body and soul,[242] indicates that two elements that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance—or two INDIVIDUAL NATURES—are united to form one individual being. The implication is by no means that the resulting individual being should be called 'one nature'. Therefore, it belongs to dyophysite terminology. It is noteworthy that the word οὐσία is virtually absent, but in general the terms have the same meanings as in the trinitarian writings. New are the expressions 'hypostatically united' and 'union according to hypostasis', which show up for the first time in the *Second Letter to Nestorius*. They will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, since they appear quite often in *Contra Nestorium*.

Apart from these two expressions, ὑπόστασις is not applied to the incarnation or the incarnate Word yet. It is used in trinitarian contexts to denote the persons of the Trinity, and in *On the Incarnation* its cognates are frequent in the discussion of a view which regards the Word before the incarnation as anhypostatic, but the Word made man is never called a hypostasis. Also, there is not a single place in these writings in which ὑπόστασις and φύσις are employed as synonyms. While ὑπόστασις indicates real existence, and sometimes separate existence, the meaning of φύσις is more closely related to that of οὐσία, and it varies from COMMON NATURE and INDIVIDUAL NATURE to 'all the individuals that belong to a COMMON NATURE together', and in the case of the divine nature: the Godhead, God himself. Φύσις does not take on the sense of SEPARATE REALITY.

The expressions 'union according to hypostasis' (ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν) and 'natural unity' (ἑνότης φυσική), both applied to the coming

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[242] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 3[123–126] (divinity and humanity); *Letter to the Monks*, ACO I.1.1, 15[30–32] (soul and body).

together of the Word and his humanity, do not imply that ὑπόστα-
σις and φύσις are synonyms. While both expressions emphasize that
the result of the union is one SEPARATE REALITY, they do this each in
their own way. 'Union according to hypostasis' stresses the reality of
the union, and since ὑπόστασις may also denote separate existence, the
result of such a union might be called 'one hypostasis', but so far the
Alexandrian archbishop has not employed this phrase. 'Natural unity'
indicates a union of two natures, that is, two entities that belong to the
category of substance, the result of which necessarily also belongs to
this category. In the case of the two natures body and soul the result is
an entity which may be designated as a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE. Up
till now, however, Cyril has not used the phrase 'one nature' for this. In
these conceptions ὑπόστασις and φύσις retain their distinct meanings of
(SEPARATE) REALITY and (COMMON or) INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

Cyril's use of φύσις with respect to the Logos reveals an aporia,
which he himself may not have been aware of. In his trinitarian writ-
ings, φύσις is reserved for what Father, Son and holy Spirit have in com-
mon, while ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον indicate the three divine persons.
But when Cyril speaks of 'the φύσις of the Word' in his christological
works, it cannot always mean the divine COMMON NATURE, but must at
times be taken to mean something like the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of
the Son. It is not so easy—if at all possible—to give a place to this INDI-
VIDUAL NATURE in Cyril's trinitarian theology, but the archbishop does
not dwell on this problem.

Especially in *Festal Letter* 17, the human element which comes to-
gether with the Word in the incarnation is referred to as φύσις. In line
with Cyril's previous works, in these instances φύσις can be interpreted
as the human COMMON NATURE: the Word assumes the COMMON NATURE
of humanity, but in this assumption he becomes an individual man. It
is true that the Word's individual humanity is not explicitly called 'the
human nature of the Word', but in various expressions the existence of
such a human nature is implied. This is the case in *On the Incarnation*
(707a) where it says that the man who the Word has become "is
deprived of the properties of the divinity in his own nature". Also in
Festal Letter 17 (2[127–128]), when Cyril writes that the Word lets the nature
like ours (φύσει τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς) move according to its own laws, by which
he means that as a small child Christ had no knowledge of right and
wrong yet. And every time the archbishop speaks of two natures with
regard to the incarnate Word, he must refer to a divine and a human
nature. Especially when he insists that the difference of the natures

remains, this implies the existence of a human nature in Christ after the union.[243]

These two natures in Christ are not separate so as to allow only an external relationship. Their unity is so tight that together they are regarded as one SEPARATE REALITY, but in such a way that within this one reality the two natures retain their difference. The natures are not mixed, they do not form a *tertium quid*, in which part of their natural properties has been lost. The Word is and remains perfect in his own nature, also when he becomes a perfect man. But their remaining difference is real, not just in thought. The notion of 'in contemplation only' is completely absent from the writings investigated in this chapter. What Cyril rejects is the separation of the natures into two Sons or Christs, not their enduring difference.

The word πρόσωπον is employed by the archbishop in his refutation of a two-Sons christology. A separation of Christ into two Christs may be expressed by the phrase 'two πρόσωπα' or by διπρόσωπον. But also the assumption of a human πρόσωπον by the Word is denounced, because the union with a πρόσωπον can only be external and automatically implies a division into two Sons.

In *On the Incarnation*, Cyril does speak of a mixture, not of the natures themselves, but of their properties (and in *Festal Letter* 17 similarly with respect to body and soul in a human being). After the union, the divine and the human properties do not lie only round their respective natures, but round the SEPARATE REALITY which is the result of the concurrence of the two natures. Therefore, the human properties may be said to be attached to the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of Christ, or to the Word; and the divine properties may be said to be attached to the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE of Christ. This is the metaphysical picture underlying Cyril of Alexandria's understanding of what we call the communication of idioms (a phrase which he does not use himself). It is depicted in figure 2 in section 5.3.3. In the next chapter we will examine whether this picture is consistently present also in *Contra Nestorium*, and whether new terminological developments can be detected in the largest of Cyril of Alexandria's christological works.

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[243] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 2[106–107]; *Second Letter to Nestorius*, ACO I.i.i, 27[1–5].

CONTRA NESTORIUM

6.1. Introduction

In the course of the year 429, Cyril of Alexandria will have studied the christological issues that arose from his dispute with Nestorius in more detail. He investigated the Constantinopolitan archbishop's sermons that were circulating, as is clear from the quotations in *Contra Nestorium*. And he went through a number of writings from the Fathers, as is witnessed by the florilegium contained in *Oratio ad dominas*. His studies issued into four major christological works which Cyril wrote in the spring of 430: the two writings just mentioned, *Oratio ad Theodosium*—as we have seen, a re-working of *On the Incarnation*—and *Oratio ad augustas*. The present chapter is devoted to *Contra Nestorium*.

In the manuscripts, the full title of the work reads: "Refutation in five books of the blasphemies of Nestorius by Cyril, the most holy archbishop of Alexandria, or the fives tomes of saint Cyril".[1] The author himself writes that he "has come across a certain book, compiled by someone, containing a large collection of homilies", and that "a multitude of blasphemies has been heaped into this book, and a great accusation has been made which barks against the doctrine of the truth", so that he could no longer remain silent.[2] Throughout the five tomes, Cyril quotes passages from Nestorius's sermons, and

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[1] The critical text of *Contra Nestorium* (*CPG* 5217; PG 76, 9–248) can be found in ACO I.1.6, 13–106 (= V 166; see chapter 5, n. 2); references in the text are to this edition. See for the Greek text also Pusey VI, 54–239, and for Pusey's English translation: *CN* ET. A more recent translation of part of the text (ACO I.1.6, 16¹–21¹⁴; 32⁶–34⁹; 39⁴–48³¹; 58¹⁴–62¹⁶; 83³⁰–85²⁷; 88³⁵–91⁸) is given in Russell (2000), 131–174.

Pusey often inaccurately renders ὑπόστασις by 'person', καθ' ὑπόστασιν by 'personally', and both ἀνθρωπότης and τὸ ἀνθρώπινον by 'human nature'. Russell is more careful in the translation of these terms, although once he renders καθ' ὑπόστασιν by 'in a concrete and personal manner' (p. 153; ACO I.1.6, 44³³).

[2] *CN* I, 14²⁸ᶠ, ³³⁻³⁵.

then discusses them. Cyril mentions Nestorius by name only once,[3] but also for his contemporaries there could be no doubt that it was the archbishop of Constantinople whose views are denounced. Cyril switches constantly from the second to the third person and back again, now addressing Nestorius directly, now speaking about him to others.

He complains several times that Nestorius ascribes views to him that he does not hold. He asks him: "Who are you opposing?" (90[14]), and he writes that "he sets himself up against those who do not exist at all" (99[17f.]; cf. 90[32]). The views that Nestorius attacks and from which Cyril distances himself include the following: that the virgin gave birth to the divine nature from her own flesh (31[27f.]); that the natures of divinity and flesh are mixed into one substance (90[21–23]); that the Only-Begotten could undergo change (99[34–36]); that the divine nature would not be impassible (cf. 96[39f.] and 103[1–6]); as well as particular interpretations of specific Bible verses.[4]

In order to do justice to Nestorius, or, as the Alexandrian archbishop himself puts it, not to give "a mere condemnation, but rather a wise and true refutation",[5] he quotes passages from his opponent before he comments on them.[6] There is no hint that Cyril is aware that he may nevertheless misinterpret Nestorius's understanding of the incarnation. As in his previous writings, Scripture forms the basis for Cyril's refutation: he quotes and alludes to many biblical passages. But he also reasons in metaphysical terms, further developing the concepts and terminology he had used before the Nestorian controversy started, along the road he had already taken in his *Second Letter to Nestorius*.

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[3] *CN* II, 32[21]: "And I say this, having read Nestorius's words". Schwartz adds Τοῦ Νεστορίου before the second quotation (*CN* I.2, 18[24]), but this stems from the margin of the codex (see Pusey VI, 65[27]). When the name of Nestorius and titles like 'the archbishop of Constantinople' recur in the summary in section 6.2, they are added for clarity's sake.

[4] *CN* II.13, 51[11–14] (Gal. 4:4); III.1, 56[14f.] (Hebr. 4:14f.); IV.6, 90[1–3] (Mt. 24:30).

[5] *CN* IV.1, 78[36–38].

[6] All the quotations from Nestorius in *Contra Nestorium* are brought together in ACO I.1.6, 3–13 (= V 165).

6.2. Summary of the Contents

6.2.1. *Book I*

Cyril of Alexandria starts by stating that writings on doctrinal matters should be tested, and that the Scriptures are the touchstone. In line with this, he begins his material argumentation with a quotation from John 1:1, 3, 14. "The Word was made flesh" indicates the force of the true union, which is "thought to be according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν)", and "he made his dwelling among us" forbids us to think that the Word was changed into flesh (15^{8-11}). Immediately, then, Cyril introduces the expression 'union according to hypostasis', which he had first used in his *Second Letter to Nestorius*, and which he employs a number of times in *Contra Nestorium*.

Before he turns to Nestorius's views, he gives a brief summary of his own understanding of "the mystery", in terminology that we know from his earlier writings: The Word, who is God by nature, emptied himself voluntarily, taking the form of a servant, that is, he became like us in all things, partaking of blood and flesh. He underwent a birth like us, not to receive being, for "the Word was in the beginning, and he was God", but in order to recapitulate the human race, as a second first-fruits. Through the flesh, which is united to him, he has all in himself, and it is in this way that we have been buried with Christ in baptism, that we have been raised with him, and that we have been made to sit with him in the heavens. For a proper understanding of our faith in the mystery, then, Cyril concludes, "the reality (τὸ χρῆμα) of the true union, I mean that according to hypostasis" is necessary ($15^{36f.}$).

Book I is further devoted to the defence of the title θεοτόκος, and, more in general, of the understanding of the incarnation as a birth of the Word according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα; 15^{42}). Before citing a passage from one of Nestorius's sermons, Cyril summarizes the position he is going to denounce as a rejection of the epithet θεοτόκος and as a division of the one Christ into two Sons.

In the first quotation from Nestorius (16^{20-27}), the archbishop of the imperial city acknowledges that his opponents recoil at the idea that the divinity (θεότης) would have been born from the virgin. If that is so, he asks, why is it a problem when we advise you to flee the word [θεοτόκος] and apply a term which is indicative of the two natures, instead? Cyril strongly emphasizes that he indeed rejects the thought that the Word would have the beginning of his existence from the

virgin. But, he adds, we nevertheless call her *theotokos*, since she has borne Emmanuel, who is God by nature, for the Word has become flesh, that is, "has been united to the flesh without confusion and according to hypostasis".[7] And just as our body is our own, in the same way the body of the Only-Begotten is his own, and not someone else's. And thus he was also born according to the flesh, for a human body comes into existence through birth, according to the laws of humanity. These laws are determined by the nature (ἡ φύσις; 17[7]), or rather by the nature's Creator.

The Word could have fashioned a body for himself out of the dust of the earth, as he had done for Adam, but that might have given some a reason to regard the incarnation as mere phantasy, as the Manichaeans do, Cyril writes. However, he has partaken of blood and flesh like us, in order to free the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν; 17[25]) from the accusations, the decay, and the curse. The Word came down from heaven, not to indwell someone, as with the prophets, but he has made a body his own. And by being born from the virgin he recapitulated (ἀνεκεφαλαιοῦτο; 18[5f.]) the birth of man through himself. Christ is the one and only [Son] of God the Father, not severed into a man by himself and God, but the same one is both God and man.

Cyril now addresses Nestorius directly: that you are an advocate of two Sons and divide the one Lord Jesus Christ will be shown from your own words. Then follows the second quotation (18[24–35]), in which the archbishop of Constantinople says that he does not begrudge the word—from Cyril's response it is clear that the title θεοτόκος is meant[8]—to the virgin, who is χριστοτόκος, but he knows that she through whom God passed (παρῆλθεν διά)[9] is august (σεβασμίαν). He adds that 'passed through' should not be taken to mean 'was born'; the Scriptures do not say that 'God' was born out of the χριστοτόκος, but that Jesus, Christ, Son, Lord was born.

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[7] *CN* I.1, 16[42]: ἀσυγχύτως τε καὶ καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἑνωθῆναι σαρκί.

[8] Russell (2000), 136, translates: "I do not begrudge you the expression 'Virgin *Christotokos*'." This seems to me to be incorrect. When in his response, Cyril writes, "How, tell me then, do you not (οὐ) begrudge such an expression to the holy virgin, although (καίτοι) you deprive her of the dignity of the divine birth and say that she is not *theotokos*?" (19[1–3]), Russell leaves out the word 'not' (p. 137). Cyril's argumentation, however, is: if you yourself do not call the virgin *theotokos*, because it implies a heretical view, how can you allow others to use this title (*not* begrudge this title)?

[9] Cyril gives the word παρῆλθεν, though Nestorius (1905), 277[21], has προῆλθεν. See also ACO I.1.6, 3, n. to lines 14–16. The accompanying prepositions, διά in line 18[25] and ἐκ in line 18[28], are uncontested.

Cyril asks how Nestorius can allow others to use the epithet *theotokos*, while he accuses those who do use it of heresy. If the term were indicative of heretical views, it would be better not to employ it. Besides, if he permits the title to be applied to Mary only, and not to Elisabeth and other women, let him acknowledge that the virgin has indeed borne God and that the Only-Begotten underwent a fleshly birth.

Next, the Alexandrian archbishop turns to the expression 'passed through', and he suggests that Nestorius would explain it with the words: "The Word is God, both connected with a man and indwelling him".[10] This, however, is understood by Cyril as implying an ordinary (κοινός), God-bearing (θεοφόρος) human being, who cannot be called 'Lord of all' and 'Sun of righteousness', titles which, in the quotation, Nestorius applies to the one who passed through the virgin. If a relational (σχετικήν) indwelling is meant, then there is no difference between Mary and Elisabeth, for the Word indwelt the latter as well, through the Spirit, when John was in her womb (cf. Luke 1:15), Cyril adds. He also rejects an understanding according to which the Word 'passed through' the virgin by himself (καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν), without the flesh.

You yourself have confessed quite often that the Word has been made flesh, and you have added that the divinity has been made man, Cyril continues, giving another quotation (21[19–21]) to back this up. In it, Nestorius cites Hebr. 1:2–3 and Acts 17:30–31, and concludes that the 'Son' is both appointed heir—according to the flesh—and called the radiance of the Father's glory—according to the divinity. "For, having been incarnated (σαρκωθείς), he has not departed from the likeness to the Father", he explains. And in the text from Acts, Nestorius emphasizes that the word 'man' precedes 'having raised him from the dead', "in order that no one would suppose that the divinity, having been made man (ἐνανθρωπήσασαν), had died".

Cyril asks who it is who has been made man. He argues that it cannot have been a human being, since someone who already is man cannot be *made* man.[11] If, then, the Word has been truly made man, he is not just connected to a man by indwelling only, or by an external relation or connection, as Nestorius says. And if the Fathers have sometimes spoken of a mixture (κρᾶσις) with respect to the incarnate

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[10] *CN* I.1, 20[2]: θεὸς γὰρ ἦν ὁ λόγος ἀνθρώπῳ τε συνημμένος καὶ ἐνοικῶν αὐτῷ. Loofs, in Nestorius (1905), 278[3f], takes this, too, to be a genuine word of Nestorius.

[11] Cf. *Letter to the Monks* (*ep.* 1), ACO I.1.1, 16[14–18].

Word, there is no need to be afraid that they meant a confusion (ἀνάχυσις), in the way that liquids are mingled with one another, for they used the word improperly (κατακέχρηνται), in order to emphasize the extreme union. The Alexandrian archbishop gives an example in which Scripture itself also employs the verb 'to mix' 'improperly and simply': Hebr. 4:2 speaks of those 'who were not mixed in faith with the hearers'. This does not refer to a confusion of hypostases, as with water and wine, Cyril explains, but to a union in soul.

Cyril then turns to three short quotations (22²⁸⁻³⁶), related to Is. 9:6: "A child has been born to us, a son has been given to us", in which Nestorius writes that "this baby which is seen, ..., [is] eternal Son according to what is hidden". Even though he is said to be the eternal Son 'according to what is hidden', you called the baby, which you, as it were, pointed out with your finger, the Son of God, Cyril reasons. Maybe you think that it is enough that the natures are connected, not according to hypostasis, but in unequalled honour and in equality of rank, as you constantly say, he suggests. This argument will be refuted in due time, he adds.

In another quotation (23²⁸⁻³⁶), Nestorius takes the example of a mother who bears the body of a baby, while God creates the soul in it.[12] Therefore, a mother is not to be called ψυχοτόκος, he states, but rather ἀνθρωποτόκος. Similarly, the virgin Mary should not be called *theotokos*. Cyril counters that a mother is said to bear the whole man, although she does not contribute anything to the soul, and that in the same way, the virgin has borne the Word who is truly united to the flesh, and may, therefore, be called *theotokos*. The epithet does not imply that the Word has his existence from the flesh.

Nestorius has also asked the question whether Elisabeth should be called πνευματοτόκος, since John the Baptist was filled with the holy Spirit, while still in her womb (25³⁻⁷). Cyril responds that the Scriptures do not say that the Spirit was made flesh. John rather received the Spirit as an anointing. "Why do you put the reality (χρῆμα) of the incarnation on an equal footing as the grace of participation?", he asks (25²⁰). The virgin gave birth to Emmanuel, who is God with us, but Elisabeth to a prophet, who went before the face of the Lord. Elisabeth, then, is not *pneumatotokos*, but Mary is *theotokos*.

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[12] Cf. *Letter to the Monks* (*ep.* 1), ACO I.1.1, 15¹²⁻³³. See section 5.5.1.

The Alexandrian archbishop then recounts the story that 'a certain man'—believed to be Eusebius, the later bishop of Dorylaeum—stood up in the church in Constantinople and cried aloud that the Word from before the ages had undergone a second birth, one according to the flesh, out of a woman. Nestorius immediately interrupted him and declared that if there are two births, there are also two Sons, while the church knows but one Son, the Master Christ (26^{11-13}). Cyril admits that this argumentation holds for ordinary human beings: if there are two births, there are two human beings. But it does not apply to the mystery of Christ: the Word was born out of the Father before the ages, and in the last times, when he had emptied himself, out of the virgin, and yet he is one Son.

And Cyril continues: I am amazed that, first, he confesses that the church knows only one Son, but then he separates the things that have been united and places them apart, not just to examine what the Word is by nature, and what the flesh, but he gathers them into one in an equality of honour only, by which the mystery is cast down. To substantiate this claim, Cyril quotes another passage in which Nestorius cites parts of the Nicene Creed and points out that it says that we believe 'in one Lord Jesus Christ', not 'in God the Word' (27^{3-17}). The word 'Christ' is indicative of both natures, he argues, so that the death, the crucifixion and the burial are not said of the divinity. Cyril postpones his discussion of whether the title 'Christ' signifies the two natures, and states that the one Lord Jesus Christ is none other than the one who is Son by nature, who has been made man, by birth from a woman. As evidence he quotes John 12:44–45 ("he who has seen me, has seen the Father") and 14:1 ("believe in me and believe in God"), commenting that the faith in God and the faith in Christ is one faith, not two.

Cyril already mentions that Nestorius may regard 'Christ', 'Lord' and 'Son' as homonyms, titles that apply to the Word without the flesh as well as to the temple that came forth from the virgin, but does not investigate it yet. Instead, he turns to another passage from the Constantinopolitan archbishop, in which the latter emphasizes that, when the Gospel of John mentions 'the Word' it does not speak of a birth, but rather says that he has become flesh, while a birth is mentioned in the Gospels and by the apostles only in reference to the 'Son'.

Cyril then quotes the Creed of Nicaea (325) in full, without the anathema (29^{3-10}). One of Nestorius's arguments was that the Creed

states that Christ was "incarnate of the holy Spirit and the virgin Mary" (29¹¹ᶠ·), and that it does not say that he was 'born' from them. Cyril points out that the Nicene Creed does not contain Nestorius's phrase.[13] But it does say that the Word out of God, the Only-Begotten, was incarnate and made man, suffered and rose. What does 'incarnate' and 'made man' mean, other than that he was born according to the flesh, he asks. Although the word 'birth' itself is not used, the nature of the reality (ἥ γε τοῦ πράγματος φύσις) does not know another way to become incarnate.

Nestorius, however, writes that being made man means, "not that his own nature underwent a change into flesh, but the indwelling in a human being". Cyril praises him for upholding the Word's immutability, but he denounces the concept of 'indwelling', because it is also employed for the inhabitation of the Spirit, and even of the Father, in the believers. If incarnation and indwelling are the same thing, then God has been incarnated many times, he argues. But Bible verses that speak of indwelling with respect to the Word should be interpreted differently. If the Word is said to have made his dwelling among us (John 1:14), this stresses that he did not change into flesh, while 'the Word was made flesh' indicates that he was united hypostatically to flesh. And when Paul writes that "all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in him bodily" (Col. 2:9), this emphasizes that the indwelling is not simple or relational (ἁπλῆν ἢ γοῦν σχετικήν), but true and according to hypostasis, for the apostle was fully aware that the divine nature itself is bodiless, but by the phrase 'dwelt bodily' he tried to describe the mystery accurately in human words.

In another quotation, Nestorius reasons that what is born of a mother is consubstantial with her (31⁶⁻¹³). Therefore, one cannot speak of a mother of God—for then she would be a goddess—and if one does employ the word 'mother', that which is born from her is the humanity, not the divinity. Cyril responds that no one says that the virgin has borne out of her own flesh the nature of the divinity, so that Nestorius is fighting non-existent enemies. In a final quotation, Nestorius repeats that he does not have a grudge against the word *theotokos*, but he adds: don't let them make the virgin a goddess (μὴ ποιείτω θέαν; 31³²⁻³⁴). Cyril declares emphatically that "we who call her *theotokos* have never divinized (τεθεοποιήκαμεν) any one of those that

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[13] The enhanced creed, which has become known as the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, does contain the phrase, but Cyril always refers to the original creed of 325.

belong to the creatures" and "we know that the blessed virgin is a human being like us" (31^{36}–32^3). And he ends with the announcement that Nestorius himself will soon be shown to represent Emmanuel as a God-bearing man.

6.2.2. *Book II*

With a reference to several verses from Scripture, the archbishop of Alexandria states that our words can build people up, but also harm them. Then follows the one sentence in *Contra Nestorium* in which Nestorius is mentioned by name: "I say these things, having read Nestorius's words" (32^{21}). For, Cyril continues, he not only denies that we should call the virgin *theotokos*, but he wants to show us Emmanuel as a God-bearing (θεοφόρον) man, not as truly God, but as a man who is connected (συνημμένον) with God in equality of rank (ἀξίας)—this sums up the contents of Book II. Quoting the first lines from the Nicene Creed, Cyril emphasizes that we confess 'one Lord Jesus Christ', and that it was the Word himself who was made man by receiving a body from the virgin and making it his own.

Nestorius, however, separates (διαιρεῖ) the natures and places each apart (ἀνὰ μέρος), Cyril declares. Then he devises some mode of connection (συναφείας), that according to equality of rank, and he makes the Word dwell in a common man, by participation. And he divides the expressions from the Gospels, ascribing some to the Word by himself only (μόνῳ τε καὶ ἰδικῶς), others to the one from the virgin by himself (ἰδίᾳ). But the Word is made man, not simply according to a connection, thought to be external (θύραθεν) or relational (σχετικήν), Cyril adds, but according to a true union, ineffably and beyond understanding. In this way he is regarded as one, and all the things are said as of one person (ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς προσώπου).

At this point, we encounter the μία φύσις formula for the first time in the Alexandrian archbishop's writings:

> For now, after the union, there is thought to be one nature, the incarnate [nature] of the Word himself, just as is reasonably thought with respect to ourselves too. For a man is truly one, composed (συγκείμενος) out of unlike realities (πραγμάτων), I mean soul and body ($33^{6–9}$).

And Cyril immediately gives two additions in order to distance himself from heterodox views that were attributed to him. One, the body united to God the Word is animated with a rational soul. Two, the

flesh is different from the Word according to the principle of its own nature, and, conversely, the nature of the Word himself is different substantially (οὐσιωδῶς). But then he reiterates his point in other words: but although the things named are thought to be different and scattered into natural otherness, Christ is regarded as one out of both, divinity and humanity having come together according to a true union.

Cyril then gives three examples of the union, which he has taken from Scripture. First, the coal mentioned in Is. 6:6: wood and fire have come together into union. Second, the pearl from Mt. 13:45 f.: the pearl itself and the radiance in it. Third, the lily from Song 2:1: the flower itself and its fragrance. And he concludes that Scripture binds the Son into a true union and leads us in faith to one person (εἰς πρόσωπον ἕν). But, he continues, Nestorius severs him, because he is afraid that when the virgin is called *theotokos* a mixture of the hypostases is implied—though no one thinks this, he adds.

In the first quotation in Book II (34[20–31]), Nestorius writes that he does not oppose the title *theotokos* if someone employs it in simple faith. But he objects to it, because he detects the heresies of Arius, Eunomius, and Apollinarius in it: the two natures are not divided (διαιρουμένων), but a mixture (κράσεως) has taken place, while the lowly attributes are not attributed to the humanity, but all things are said of one [subject], not according to the rank based on a connection, but according to nature.

Cyril comments that Nestorius severs Christ into two persons and hypostases, which are completely separated from each other, while he attributes the sayings that belong to them to each separately. And in terminology reminiscent of Nestorius's own words, he writes: "And, conversely, he calls Christ Jesus, the Lord, one, in that a man is connected to God according to rank only, not according to a true union, that is, according to nature" (34[39]–35[1]). The Alexandrian archbishop argues that things that are in equality of rank do not for that reason part with their individual existence (τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἰδιοσυστάτως). For example, Peter and John were both apostles and shared the same honours, but should we, therefore, regard them as one man, and does this suffice for a true union, a union in the hypostases?

Cyril then asks what mode of connection Nestorius is talking about. Those who have equal dignity are separate from one another in individual being and in not willing to think and do the same things. But if the mode of rank were a certain forceful (ἀναγκαῖος) bond which gathers them together into unity, just like a natural coming together, they would not part from each other with respect to hypostases and

wills (γνώμαις) in being one and another by themselves. A man who is connected to the Word of God, however—is he in his own hypostasis not another besides the Word? How can there be one Lord, if each has his own person (πρόσωπον ἰδικόν) and also a hypostasis which withdraws into otherness?

In a second quotation (36²¹⁻³²), Nestorius reasons that the words 'Christ', 'Son' and 'Lord' indicate the two natures, sometimes the human nature, at other times the divine nature, and at times both natures together. But 'God' is reserved in the Scriptures for the divine nature. Therefore, when the birth from the virgin is referred to in Gal. 4:4 ("God sent forth his Son, born out of a woman, born under the law"), the word 'Son' is employed; it does not say: "God sent forth God the Word". In his response, Cyril stresses the unity of Christ by referring to 1 Cor. 8:6, which says that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things have come into being. And he repeats once more that the Word was made man, was united hypostatically to the flesh, and born according to the flesh. The word 'Christ', then, should be attributed to the one incarnate Word, not to the naked (γυμνῷ) Word outside of the flesh, for he has not been anointed according to his own nature, but with respect to that which is human.

A third brief passage from Nestorius contains a similar argument, also based on Gal. 4:4 (37⁴²⁻38²). Cyril states that it was the Word who was sent forth, and undergirds this with several other biblical passages. This does not mean that God moves from one place to another, but our speech about God is framed in a human way, while it should be understood in a way that befits him alone. And that it says that he was made under the law is consistent with his incarnation, for is not the measure of the human nature (τῆς ἀνθρώπου φύσεως) defined by having to be subject to the law?

In the fourth quotation, Old Testament verses are cited in which Moses is called 'god', Israel God's 'first-born son', and Saul and Cyrus 'christ' (39¹⁰⁻¹⁷). In this way (οὕτω) we say that also the Master is Christ and God and Son, but while they have the titles in common, the rank is not the same, Nestorius explains. Cyril retorts that Moses was by nature a man, and that he was honoured with the title 'god' only, while Christ is God by nature. Similarly, the Word is God's only-begotten Son by nature, while Israel may be called God's son by grace. How, then, can he say that Christ is Son 'in this way'? And if the Saviour is God in the way that Moses was god, Son in the way that Israel was son, and Christ in the way that Cyrus was christ, how will their rank not be equal?

In the next quotation (41²³⁻²⁵), Nestorius speaks of him who assumes (τὸν ἀναλαβόντα) and of him who has been assumed (τὸν ἀναληφθέντα), he says that the dignity (ἀξίωμα) of connection must be added, since the sovereign power (αὐθεντία) is common to both, and that the unity of rank (ἀξίας) must be confessed, since the dignity of both is the same, while the natures remain. Cyril immediately concludes that Nestorius divides Christ into two, and that he does not know what union is and what rank is, since he attributes the power of union to rank. If the dignity of the natures is the same, should we infer that the Word has the same nature as Moses, he asks. Or, if equality of rank does not imply that the natures are the same, how can two natures that substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) stand so far apart, have equal rank, honours, and dignity?

The Alexandrian archbishop writes that Nestorius presumably understands the connection to be according to proximity only and to juxtaposition, or as relational, and that he thus contradicts himself. As evidence, he quotes a passage in which Nestorius says that there is no separation (διαίρεσις) of the connection, the dignity, and the sonship, nor of being Christ, but that there is a separation of divinity and humanity, to which he adds that there are not two Christs and two Sons, but that the Son himself is twofold, not by rank, but by nature (42¹⁻⁶). Cyril points to a biblical verse in which the verb συνάπτειν is applied in terms of proximity (Ex. 26:6), and declares that such a connection does not apply to Christ, since the Word made the body, assumed from the virgin, his own.

Cyril also objects to the expression 'twofold by nature (διπλοῦς τῇ φύσει)', emphasizing that the incarnate Word is one, not twofold. For, he reasons, if someone kills a human being, he is not accused of killing two, although a human being is regarded as being from soul and body, and the nature of the things that have been brought together is not the same. Similarly, Christ is not twofold, but the one and only Lord and Son. There is indeed a vast difference between humanity and divinity, for they are different according to the mode of their being (κατά γε τὸν τοῦ πως εἶναι λόγον) and not like each other at all. In the mystery of Christ, however, the separation (διαίρεσιν) is abolished, while the difference (διαφοράν) is not denied, and the natures are neither confused nor mingled.[14]

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[14] See for an English translation of this passage chapter 4, n. 76.

But although Nestorius says that there are not two Christs and two Sons, Cyril writes, he nevertheless separates a man and a God in their own otherness, the one who is operated upon (τὸν ἐνεργούμενον), the other who operates (τὸν ἐνηργηκότα). And he gives a quotation (43³⁻⁷) in which the archbishop of Constantinople stresses that, according to Scripture, it is sometimes the Father who glorifies the Son (John 8:54), and sometimes the Spirit (John 16:14), while at other times the glory is attributed to the power of Christ (Mark 16:20). Cyril argues that, if by the term 'attributed' Nestorius means to say that Christ receives the glory, and the receiver is not the same one as the giver—the incarnate Word—, then he confesses that there are two, not one.

In the following passage (44⁸⁻¹⁶), Nestorius declares that the Word was called 'Son' before the incarnation, but that after the assumption he may not be called a separate Son (κεχωρισμένος), since that would imply two Sons. And after the connection, a separation according to dignity, which is something else than a separation according to the natures, is not allowed. And since the Word has an unbroken connection with Christ, he himself is also called Christ, and he does nothing without his humanity. It is a very close connection, not an apotheosis, as the learned teachers of new doctrines maintain, the archbishop of the capital adds.

Cyril states: "Separating the natures, you gather them into a union according to the dignity of sonship" (45⁵ᶠ·), and he asks whether identity of names or homonymy and the dignity that goes with it is enough for a true union. Would that not imply that all those others who are called 'christ' or 'son' or 'lord' are also inseparable from each other and from the Word? Therefore, cease to sever the natures after the union, he urges. That the divine and the human natures are different, is necessary knowledge, but in the case of Christ, having brought them together into a true and hypostatic union, reject the separation. And if the Word is called 'Christ' by himself (ἰδικῶς), because of his connection with Christ, there are certainly two and not just one, since they are connected by relation (σχετικῶς).

And if he says that the Word cannot do anything without his humanity, Cyril continues, he is speaking of two Sons who are of one mind. But if you speak of one Son and of one hypostasis, the incarnate [hypostasis] of the Word (46²⁸ᶠ·), he is not himself an instrument of the divinity; rather, he uses his own body as an instrument, just as the soul of a human being does that. Confess him, therefore, as

one, not separating the natures, while knowing that the principle (λόγος) of the flesh and that of the Word are different. For we do not say that the flesh has become the divinity of the Word, but rather that it has become divine in the sense that it has become his own, just as the flesh of a human being is called human. Why, then, do you virtually accuse the orthodox of divinization, the Alexandrian archbishop asks.

In a brief quotation, Nestorius writes that the magi did not see a mere baby, but a body ineffably connected with God (46³⁸⁻⁴⁰), and Cyril comments that despite this confession of an ineffable connection Nestorius severs Christ again into a human being and God, separately and by themselves. As evidence he cites another passage (47⁷⁻¹²), in which the archbishop of Constantinople says that Christ is not a mere man (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος), but both man and God, otherwise he would have said: "Why do you seek to kill me, a *God* who has told you the truth?" (cf. John 8:40), and then adds: This is he who was encircled with the thorny crown, who endured death, whom I worship together with (σύν) the divinity as partner/advocate (συνήγορον) of the divine sovereign power.

Cyril concludes that although Nestorius asserts that Christ is not a mere man, he does intend a human being by himself and separately, to whom he attributes the sufferings and who is not himself the Word of God, but his partner/advocate. And he assigns the sayings of those who speak about God and of Christ himself to two persons and two distinct hypostases. The issue of co-worship is then discussed on the basis of two other quotations. In the first one, Nestorius cites Phil. 2:9–11 and writes that he venerates (σέβω) Christ as the image of the almighty Godhead (48³³⁻³⁶). If he co-worships (συμπροσκυνεῖσθαι) Christ with the Word, Cyril comments, then he makes a human being, other than the Word, an object of worship by heaven and earth, and Nestorius himself has divinized (τεθεοποίηκεν) a human being like us.

The other quotation reads: "Because of the wearer (φοροῦντα) I venerate the worn (φορούμενον); because of the hidden one I worship the visible one" (50⁸ᶠ). Cyril counters that the worn and the wearer are the same one, in a coming together of divinity and humanity. He reverts to the anthropological analogy again, and argues that neither does one say that he reverences a king's body because of his soul, for the ruler is one human being, though composed of two [things], of soul and body. While the Word is impalpable by nature, he has been made palpable through his own body. But Nestorius separates the

natures, while uniting the worship.[15] But if you separate the natures, the properties that naturally belong to each of them will diverge along with them, and they will be two, Cyril argues.

In a quotation from the same sermon (51^{5-8}), Nestorius states that that which was formed in the womb, that which was created by the Spirit, that which was buried in the tomb, is not by itself (καθ' ἑαυτό) God, for otherwise we would be man-worshippers. But because God is in the assumed one, the assumed one is co-named God, as connected with the assumer. According to Cyril, however, it is the Word's own flesh, and he should be regarded as one with it, just as the soul of a human being is one with his own body. No one will assert that the body by itself is a human being, but neither does one sever soul and body and place them apart, and say that the body is co-named with the soul. But having brought them together according to a natural union (καθ' ἕνωσιν φυσικήν) into the constitution (σύστασιν) of one human being, he will then call him a human being. If, then, one is God by nature and another co-named with him, there are two, Cyril reasons.

Nestorius writes that the assumed one is co-named God "as connected with the assumer", and Cyril asks what the mode of that connection is. If it is a true union according to hypostasis, cease severing what has been united. But if you say that the assumption or the connection is external and relational, do you not know that God is in us, too, and that we are relationally connected with him and have become partakers of his divine nature, he adds. Should every knee bow for us, too?

After a final quotation (52^{22-29}), in which Nestorius speaks again about the connection of the natures and about a human being who is co-worshipped with God, Cyril writes:

> If you separate the natures, not just to know which is the human and which in turn the divine [nature], but rather severing them from their concurrence into unity, you are undoubtedly a man-worshipper (52^{31-33}).

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[15] According to Loofs, in Nestorius (1905), 262, "I separate the natures, but I unite the worship" is part of the same sermon by Nestorius, and comes in between the quotations in *CN*, $50^{8f.}$ and 51^{5-8}.

6.2.3. *Book III*

In Book III, Cyril of Alexandria discusses at length several passages
from Nestorius's sermon "On Hebrews 3:1".[16] But he starts by citing
1 Tim. 3:16: "Beyond question, the mystery of godliness is great", and
adds that the mystery of Christ is divine rather than human wisdom,
lying in ineffable depths and incomprehensibilities. Therefore, faith
that holds the tradition uncorrupted is needed, rather than subtle
investigations. And this is what has been taught: God the Father sent
his own Son, who is God by nature, having been made man and having
been born out of a woman according to the flesh, in order that he
would justify those who believe in him, would make those who are
under death and decay partakers of the divine nature, and would teach
who the true God and Creator of all things is.

Applying Is. 45:14 ("Because God is in you, and there is no God
but you", LXX) to the incarnate Word, Cyril argues that by "God is
in you" the prophet does not imply two Gods, since he immediately
adds: "There is no God but you", rather than: "There is no God but
the one in you". Hebr. 3:1–2a is then cited: "Therefore, holy brothers,
partakers of the heavenly calling, consider the apostle and high priest of
our confession, Jesus, who was faithful to the one who appointed him".
And Cyril comments that the Word of God himself descended to the
measures (μέτροις) of humanity, and that it belongs to these measures
to seem[17] to be sent—and thus to be an apostle—and to esteem the
ministry of high priest. He then gives a quotation (54^{39}–55^{8}), in which
Nestorius reproaches others who think that the Word was an apostle,
and the divinity a high priest, and emphasizes that it was a man who
was high priest, and that it is not the substance (οὐσίαν) of divinity
which was high priest. And the Constantinopolitan archbishop adds:
"The possessor (κτήτωρ) of divinity is taken 'from among men, ordained
for men in things pertaining to God'" (cf. Hebr. 5:1).

In his response, Cyril cites several biblical verses in which Christ or
the Son is said to have been sent, which in his interpretation means

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[16] Nestorius (1905), 230–242.

[17] *CN* III, 54^{29}: δοκεῖν. Cyril does not teach a form of Docetism here (he has
repudiated that clearly enough in *On the Incarnation*; see section 5.3.1). The verb 'to
seem' is added in order to underline that the Word is apostle and high priest, not as
God, not according to his own divine nature, but as man, according to the flesh. Cf.
CN V.5, 101^{9}.

that the Word has been sent, since he possesses, with the measures of the kenosis, also the name and the reality (ὄνομά τε καὶ χρῆμα) of being sent. And he reasons: if, as Nestorius suggests, the apostle and high priest was a human being besides the Word, born of a woman, having a mere connection with the Word and equality of rank only, then we will no longer have access to the Father through the Word. And if the Logos would have regarded the office of high priest too low for himself, it would have been better if he had refused the incarnation altogether. One may marvel that the Word endured such an abasement, but Nestorius is ashamed to acknowledge it, Cyril writes. And when he stresses that it is not the substance of divinity that has become high priest, he beats the air, for there is no one who says this.

The archbishop of Alexandria then turns to the expression 'the possessor (κτήτωρ) of divinity', and interprets the word κτήτωρ as an active form of the verb κτᾶσθαι, 'to acquire', therefore, as 'acquirer'. And he argues that it is to be spurned to say that the Word has become a possessor of divinity, as if he received it from outside. It is as laughable as when one says that a human being is an acquirer of humanity, and a horse of horseness (ἱππότητος). But, he continues, Nestorius, severing the one Christ into two, probably means that a human being has acquired divinity. That would imply that he has become God by nature, which is to be rejected. Rather conversely, the Word has become man by assuming flesh, he has taken hold of Abraham's seed (Hebr. 2:16).

Cyril then gives a quotation in which Nestorius comments on Hebr. 2:16–18 (58[18–28]): is the divinity Abraham's seed, and did God the Word have brothers who were like his divinity? And the Constantinopolitan archbishop adds: "Therefore, he who suffers is a merciful high priest, and it is the temple that is passible, not the life-giving God of him who suffers". Cyril responds that the seed of Abraham is by no means the nature of the divinity, but it has rather become the body of the Word, his own [body]. Before the incarnation, one could not speak of brotherhood with regard to the Word, but when he became man he partook of flesh and blood, and now he may be called our brother. The Word has been born according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), Cyril writes, in order that we might be enriched by the birth out of God, through the Spirit, being transelemented (μεταστοιχειούμενοι) into what is above our nature (τὰ ὑπὲρ φύσιν), and being called sons of God by grace.[18]

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[18] *CN* III.2, 59[10–13]. The verb 'to transelement' is discussed in section 6.4.3.

Cyril elaborates on the notion of 'conformation to Christ' (μόρφωσις, with reference to Gal. 4:19; 2 Cor. 3:18; Rom. 8:29) and states (60$^{1-4}$): "The reality (χρῆμα) of conformation to the Son, then, is not only conceived to be according to the nature of the flesh or of the humanity, but also in another way", as Paul says: "Just as we have borne the image of the earthly one, we will also bear the image of the heavenly one" (1 Cor. 15:49). The image of Adam includes an inclination towards sin, and being subject to death and decay. The image of Christ, on the other hand, includes not knowing transgression, not being subject to death and decay, but rather sanctification and righteousness—that is, things that are fitting to the divine nature. And the Word restores us to being partakers of the divine nature. He, then, has brothers like himself, who bear the image of his divine nature according to the mode of sanctification. And Cyril adds that the Son does not change (μεθίστησι) the whole (τὸ παράπαν) of the creatures into the nature of his own divinity, but the spiritual (νοητή) likeness with him is imprinted on those who have become partakers of his divine nature, through participation in the holy Spirit.

He then asks Nestorius: Why do you accept only the likeness to the flesh, dismissing the divine and spiritual conformation? For this is the implication if it is not the Word who has become our brother, but a mere man like ourselves. By speaking of the passible temple and the God of him who suffered, Nestorius severs Christ into distinct (ἰδικάς) hypostases and two persons (πρόσωπα), Cyril argues: the Word and a God-bearing man. And with reference to the expression 'the God of him who suffered', Cyril asks where the Word has been called the God of Christ—"I shudder at saying it" (60$^{36f.}$)—, for there is one Lord Jesus Christ. "Emmanuel, then, is both at the same time, and [he is] one, both God and man" (61^2).

Next, the archbishop of Alexandria argues that, because of the condemnation by the law, a compassionate and merciful high priest was necessary. The Word is compassionate and merciful by nature, always, but he is said to *have become* a merciful high priest because of the economy. He then quotes Nestorius again, in order to show that, although he says that Christ is one, he divides the indivisible one and sets up two Christs by the force of his thoughts. Nestorius writes (62$^{24-28}$) that he who was yesterday and today (Hebr. 13:8) is the seed of Abraham, not the one who says: "Before Abraham was, I am" (John 8:58). And like his brothers in all things is he who has assumed the brotherhood of human soul and body, not the one who says: "He

who has seen me, has seen the Father" (John 14:9). To which he adds: The one who is consubstantial with us has been sent, and he has been anointed to preach.

Cyril responds that the one who was yesterday and today and forever is the same one as he who was before Abraham in a divine way, and afterwards has become man. But, he argues, Nestorius does not understand that by 'yesterday, today and forever' the whole of time is divided into three periods, in order to show that the eternal Word is superior to change. When he applies 'yesterday' to an ordinary man, he does not realize that he existed before his own birth, since 'yesterday' indicates the past. That he who was yesterday and today and he who says, "Before Abraham was, I am", are the same one, is made clear by John the Baptist, Cyril continues. For he said: "He who comes after me has come before me, for he was before me" (John 1:15). He calls Jesus a man who comes after him (John 1:30), having been born later, but also one who pre-exists him. This pre-existence does not make sense if Christ is just a man like us, but the Son who appropriates the birth of his own flesh, is pre-existent as God.

And when he says to Nicodemus that "no one has ascended into heaven than he who came down from heaven, the Son of Man" (John 3:13), he attributes the descent to himself, who is from above, although he indicates himself by 'the Son of Man' as one with the flesh which is united to him. "The things of the humanity, then, have become the Word's own, and, conversely, the things of the Word himself have become the humanity's own" (63[42f.]).

Cyril turns to the next phrase in Nestorius's quotation, "he who has assumed the brotherhood of human soul and body", and asks who this is. For a man like us already is a brother and, therefore, does not need to assume brotherhood. It is, then, the Word, who was in the form of God, who became man and our brother, while at the same time, in his own nature, showing the one who begat him. Nestorius writes that the one who is consubstantial with us has been sent and that he has been anointed to preach. By this one he means someone other than the Word, Cyril states. It would be better to say that the Word has been made consubstantial with us, while remaining consubstantial with the Father. If another one than the Word has been sent, we have not been made partakers of the divine nature.

The Alexandrian archbishop also points to the story of the patriarch Jacob who wrestled with a man, yet said that he had seen God face to face (Gen. 32:22–32), which Cyril takes to be a type of the mystery of

Christ. And he repeats: he who is consubstantial with us, insofar as he has been made man, and [consubstantial] with the Father, insofar as he remained God, also in the humanity, has been sent to preach. He then counters another objection of Nestorius, namely, that he who fills all things cannot be sent as if there were a place where he was not. Cyril cites several biblical verses which speak of a movement of God or the Spirit, and concludes that they speak about God in a human way. And when the Only-Begotten is said to have been anointed, one should realise that he was anointed humanly, while the same one was anointing divinely.

In the next long quotation (68$^{9-25}$), Nestorius cites Hebr. 5:7–9 ("Although he was Son, he learned obedience from what he suffered, and having been made perfect, he has become the cause of indissoluble salvation for those who obey him"), and concludes that he advanced little by little towards the priesthood. He also refers to Luke 2:52: "Jesus grew in stature and wisdom and grace". And he writes: this is the one who is compared with Moses, who is called the seed of Abraham, who is like his brothers, who has been made high priest in time, who was perfected through sufferings, who can help others, in that he suffered himself, being tempted. And he finishes with the question: Why, then, do you mingle the impassible Word with the earthly body and make him a passible high priest?

Cyril counters him by using another quotation of his: "But this one, …, who is man according to what is visible, …, is by connection God Almighty". He reasons: if he is God Almighty, how can he advance to the priesthood? Can God advance to something better? And if Nestorius would ask whether it is not an insult to the Godhead to become a high priest, Cyril will answer that the Word has been made man, and the reality (χρῆμα) of the priesthood is not unfitting for the measures of the humanity. In fact, he endured lower things for our sake: he gave his back to the scourges, and his face to the shame of spittings. The Word, then, did not advance to the priesthood, rather he descended into it.

The archbishop of Alexandria then turns to Luke 2:52, and gives another interpretation than the ones discussed in sections 3.4.2 and 5.4.1. Emmanuel, being God, came forth from the womb of the virgin, full of the wisdom and grace that inhere in him naturally. The growth 'in wisdom and grace' is an increasing manifestation of the divine goods, an increase which the Word lets go hand in hand with his bodily growth, so that he would not display an extraordinary wisdom as a

baby. How, Cyril asks, can he be said to advance little by little to the priesthood, as being perfected in virtue? Would that not imply that at one time Christ was lacking in virtue, and thus that he has sinned? But Scripture says that he committed no sin (1 Peter 2:22). The Lord has indeed been made perfect through sufferings, he adds, but not in the sense that he had to be made perfect for the priesthood.

And in response to Nestorius's question why the impassible Word is mingled with the earthly body, Cyril raises a counter-question: Why do you set up as priest a man honoured with a mere connection, while we hear (in Hebr. 8:1) that the same one is both high priest and co-throned with the Father? It is clear that the Word is impassible, but he has suffered for us in the flesh. If he did not give up his own body to death, he neither died nor came to life again, and our faith is in vain. But the Word united an earthly body hypostatically to himself, tasted death for everyone by the grace of God (Hebr. 2:9), and is called the first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep, Cyril declares.

In the following quotation (71[31–34]), Nestorius writes:

> Since, then, this one alone is high priest, co-feeling and akin and steadfast, do not turn away from the faith in him. For he has been sent for us, the promised blessing, out of the seed of Abraham, as bringing the sacrifice of his body for himself and the race.

Cyril reasons that, if Nestorius sets this high priest, consubstantial with us, apart from the Word, and urges us to put our faith in him, then a problem arises. For Scripture tells us to have faith in the Only-Begotten (John 3:16–18). Therefore, it is necessary, he concludes, to bind [them] together into one Lord and Christ according to a hypostatic (καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν) union, in order that the same one is regarded as only-begotten and first-born.

Cyril gives a final quotation (72[34–38]), not taken from the sermon on Hebrews,[19] in which Nestorius states that he separates[20] the natures: Christ is twofold in nature, but single in rank; because of the connection, the sovereign power of the natures is one, while the natures remain in their own order. The Alexandrian archbishop acknowledges that divinity is one reality (χρῆμα), while the humanity like ours is another, according to the principle that inheres in the natures, but he states that the Christ is one out of both by a coming together according to a true

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[19] Nestorius (1905), 354[12–18].

[20] Schwartz, ACO I.1.6, 72[35], and Loofs, in Nestorius (1905), 354[14], read διακρίνοντι, while Pusey VI, 171[1], reads διακρούοντι, and translates (*CN* ET, 118) 'refusing'.

union. And he asks: If the hypostases are separated into two, as you say, and are conceived of as separate and by themselves, how can a coming together into one person (πρόσωπον) have taken place, unless the one thing is said to be somehow the other's own (ἴδιον ἓν ἑνός), just as a body is the human soul's own, although of a different nature (ἑτεροφυές) than it? After a brief intermezzo about the one nature and the three hypostases of the holy Trinity, he adds:

> As for Emmanuel, since divinity is something else than humanity, if we do not say that the body has become the Word's own according to a true union, how can one person (πρόσωπον) be effected by both, when each hypostasis brings along its own [person], as lying separately (ἀνὰ μέρος)?[21]

Cyril then discusses Nestorius's phrase, "bringing the sacrifice of his body for himself and the race". Citing many Scripture verses (such as John 14:30 and Hebr. 7:26–28), he argues that Christ was without sin, and that he offered himself for the sins of others, not for himself. He also turns to some Old Testament types, and asks whether the Passover lamb and the young bull (Lev. 4:13–14) were slain for the Israelites, or for themselves, too. In the course of his argumentation, he speaks again of the two Adams. The human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) was brought down to curse and death because of the transgression in Adam, but the last Adam did not suffer the sickness of the first one. Rather, he freed the human nature in himself first from the accusations based on that ancient transgression.

6.2.4. *Book IV*

In Book IV, Cyril of Alexandria mainly discusses two topics: (1) Christ is not a God-bearing man who has the Spirit from without, like the prophets and the believers, but the Word made man, who himself works through his own Spirit; (2) the status of the body of Christ in

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[21] Like Schwartz (ACO I.1.6, 73[13]), who adds a comma after ἀμφοῖν, I regard this word as belonging to the clause which starts with πῶς. Pusey VI, 171[27–29] (*CN* ET, 119) interprets it as belonging to the following clause, and translates: "when either hypostasis, apart by itself, brings before us the property of both" (which does not seem to make sense). With both Schwartz (in ACO) and Pusey (in his translation), I ignore the word τό before ἀμφοῖν. Liébaert (1977), 53, translates: "comment s'accomplirait un seul *prosôpon* des deux, chaque hypostase portant alors à nos yeux son propre (*prosôpon*?) comme si elle était à part?", thus also including ἀμφοῖν in the first clause, and suggesting that *prosôpon* is implied in the second clause.

the Eucharist. The quotations from Nestorius in this Book are drawn from various sources. Cyril begins by depicting the bronze snake, which Moses had to raise in the desert, as a type of Christ's crucifixion (cf. John 3:14). And he writes that if we look with the eyes of our heart to the snake, that is, if we search out the mystery of Christ, we will escape the damage done by the prince of evil. Then we will confess that the Word has been made flesh, while remaining God, so that he is both God and man.

Introducing the first quotation, Cyril declares that Nestorius only attributes to Christ the human measure, saying that he is glorified by the Spirit, not as using his own power, but receiving it from without. The archbishop of Constantinople first writes (76³³⁻⁴¹): God the Word was made flesh, the Father co-seated with himself the assumed humanity, and the Spirit consummated the glory of that which had been assumed. And he adds: Would you like another operation (ἐνέργειαν) of the Trinity? The Son indwelt (ἐνῴκησεν) the body, the Father commended him who was baptized, the Spirit fashioned him in the virgin. And concerning the disciples: The Son chose them, the Father sanctified them, the Spirit rendered them orators.

Cyril first states his understanding of the trinitarian operation (ἐνέργεια): all things are done by (παρά) the Father, through (διά) the Son, in (ἐν) the Spirit. Although the three subsist by themselves (ἰδικῶς), the operation and the will go through the whole Trinity. But Nestorius describes the incarnation as an operation of the Word, he adds, and the indwelling of the body as another such operation, suggesting that he dwelt in a man just as in ourselves. And rather than saying that the Father co-seated with himself the assumed humanity, one had better say that the Word sits on his throne, also after having become man, for otherwise his humanity might be conceived of as another besides the Word.

The archbishop of Alexandria stresses that the Son is not glorified by the Spirit as a God-bearing man, as if he received glory from an alien nature, but it is his own Spirit. This is shown by the fact that he supplies the Spirit to others (John 3:34), and that the demons were subject to the disciples in his name (Luke 10:17). And when Christ said that power had gone out from him (Luke 8:46), this showed that he did not receive it from without; this power is his Spirit.

Cyril gives another brief quotation (78³⁹ᶠ·)—"And the proof of synergy is evident: the Son has been made man, the Father commended him, the Spirit honoured him with signs"—and argues that, although

Nestorius uses the term 'has been made man (ἐνηνθρώπησεν)' he means a mere indwelling. Christ calls the Spirit "the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father" (John 15:26), and he himself is the truth; it is, therefore, his own Spirit, Cyril writes. If he is "a man having a divine indwelling as an operation (ἐνέργειαν)" (80³), how can he promise to send the Spirit of the Father as his own, he asks.

Cyril then elaborates on the divine operation, and repeats that everything is done by (παρά) the Father, through (διά) the Son, in (ἐν) the Spirit. In Nestorius's writings, however, he detects a distribution of the operations of the one divinity over the hypostases separately and by themselves, as if one hypostasis does something in which the other two are not involved. This is nothing else than to introduce three gods, separately and completely severed from each other, Cyril declares. Each hypostasis is then regarded as external and isolated from the others, not in respect of individual existence (κατά γε τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἰδιοσυστάτως), for that is correct, but in an utter diversity that finds no place for the principle that gathers them into natural unity.

The Alexandrian archbishop introduces another quotation by saying that Nestorius is a supporter of the Spirit at the expense of the Son. Nestorius writes about some Arians that they sever from the divine nature the Spirit who has fashioned his humanity, who has reformed it according to righteousness, who made him to be feared by demons, who made his flesh a temple, who granted him to be taken up; they make the Spirit who gave so great glory to Christ his slave. Cyril agrees that it is sinful to sever the Spirit from the divine nature, but he asks whose humanity the Spirit has fashioned. Is it not that of the only-begotten Son of God, whom you just called 'the divine nature', he suggests. "For you said that the flesh is the Word's own, while evidently a rational soul inheres in it, for in this way will it be his humanity" (81²¹ᶠ). How can you say, then, Cyril argues, that the Word, united to flesh, needs the aid of the Spirit, just like an ordinary man, rather than using him as his own Spirit?

Besides, it is unsafe, Cyril continues, to say that the Spirit made his flesh a temple, for it was the Word's own flesh, as you yourself just acknowledged, for you said that the humanity is his. But it is wiser to call the body the Word's temple, and the flesh his own. And also, being taken up was not given to him by the Spirit as to an ordinary human being, but he himself ascended, while the Spirit was in him as his own, and he presented himself to the Father as a first-fruit (πρωτόλειον) of the human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως), renewed into incorruptibility.

It is true, though, that it is impious to call the Spirit Christ's slave, Cyril adds.

Next, he discusses Nestorius's phrase that the Spirit gave Christ glory, and he argues that from this one cannot deduce that Christ was a creature. For in John 17:1, Christ says, "Father, glorify your Son, in order that your Son will glorify you", and if the same reasoning were applied to the latter part, this would mean that the Father would need glory from someone else. But he says "Glorify your Son" as man, while he is life by nature as God. When, therefore, the Son is said to be glorified by the Father, consider the measure of the humanity, Cyril insists, and do not sever the one Christ into two after the union, but confess the same one as Lord of glory as God, and as receiving glory humanly.

The following quotation (83^{41}–84^6) concerns the Eucharist, more specifically John 6:56–57: "He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood remains in me, and I in him. Just as the living Father has sent me and I live because of the Father, so he who eats me will live".[22] Nestorius writes that according to "the heretic"—that is, Cyril—the one who has been sent is the divinity, the Word of God, while he himself says that it is the humanity. And he asks: "What do we eat, the divinity or the flesh?" Cyril concludes that according to Nestorius, since the flesh alone has been sent, it suffices by itself to bring to life that which is tyrannized by death. What do we need the Word for, he demands, if the human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως) suffices, alone and by itself, to destroy death?

Commenting on John 6:53 ($84^{18–22}$), Nestorius says that Christ spoke about his own flesh, but that his hearers thought he was introducing cannibalism. And Cyril retorts: Is it not indeed cannibalism, unless we confess that the Word has been sent and that the mode of the sending is his inhumanation (ἐνανθρώπησιν)? For if perceptible fire infuses into materials the power of the natural operation (φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας) that inheres in it, and changes water, which is cold by nature, into something contrary to its nature (παρὰ φύσιν) and makes it hot, what is strange about the Word, who is life by nature, rendering the flesh united to him life-giving? But if you detach the Word from his union with the flesh, Cyril adds, how can he still make the flesh life-giving? And he concludes that, out of excessive reverence, Nestorius apparently blushes

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[22] Nestorius leaves out 'because of me' at the end of verse 57.

at the measures of the kenosis and cannot bear to see the Son, co-eternal with the Father, descend into abasement.

As for Nestorius's question whether we eat the divinity or the flesh, Cyril calls the idea that we would eat the divinity folly. We will be made alive, he says, when the Word remains in us divinely through the holy Spirit, and humanly through the holy flesh and the precious blood. He then cites a number of Scripture passages on the Eucharist—or 'the blessing (εὐλογία)', as Cyril often calls it, after 1 Cor. 10:16—and comments on them.

In another long quotation (87²⁶⁻⁴²), Nestorius discusses 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord's death, until he comes". He does not say, "As often as you eat this divinity", the archbishop of Constantinople reasons. And he speaks of "the Lord's death". Now, the word 'Lord' sometimes stands for the humanity, sometimes for the divinity, and sometimes for both. In this case, the meaning is made clear by what follows, "until he comes", for who is coming? Scripture says that they shall see the Son of Man coming (Mt. 24:30), and they shall look on him whom they pierced (John 19:37). The side that was pierced, is it the side of the body or of the divinity, Nestorius asks.

Cyril replies that it is Nestorius's aim to present two Christs, to whom the title 'Lord' applies separately (ἀνὰ μέρος). If you say that Christ is both humanity and divinity, you acknowledge the truth against your own will, he continues. Stop, therefore, saying that 'Lord' is sometimes said of the humanity, sometimes of the divinity, sometimes of both, but confess with us one Christ and Lord. The unbloody sacrifice (ἀναίμακτος θυσία) is of very little use, if it merely consists in proclaiming the death of a human being. But proclaiming the death of Christ and confessing his resurrection, we become partakers of his divine nature. And he who will come is the one who suffered death humanly and was raised divinely, who sits on the throne with the Father. If he is a God-bearing man with a pierced side, how can he sit on the divine throne, Cyril asks.

And as for Nestorius's question whether it is the body's side or the divinity's, Cyril says that, if there were those who would hold that the Word came to those on earth in the naked divinity or in appearance (ἐν δοκήσει) and as if in shadow, as some of the heretics thought, he would have a point. But according to the proclamation of the truth, the Word was made flesh and was called Son of Man and is said to have suffered in the flesh—who, then, are you opposing, Cyril asks.

In a final quotation (90²⁵⁻³¹), the archbishop of Constantinople writes: If both are mingled, why did the Lord say "This is my body" and "This is my blood", and not rather "This is my divinity"? Cyril rejoins that one is beating the air, if he is opposing something which no one thinks. If someone believed the Word to have been transformed into the nature of the body, Nestorius's question would be valid. But the Word made a body from the virgin his own, without undergoing alteration or change, and, therefore, he rightly said: "This is my body".

6.2.5. *Book V*

In Book V, the relationship between the sufferings of Christ and the Word of God is central. Cyril of Alexandria starts by citing Gal. 6:14 and Rom. 1:16, in which Paul says that he boasts in the cross of Christ, and that he is not ashamed of the gospel. But some, he continues, blush at the cross, which has become a stumbling block to them. Just as the Pharisees, who regarded the crucified one simply as a man, there are now those who seem to be Christian teachers who do not believe that he is one only (εἷς τε καὶ μόνος), God by nature. Their pretext is that he chose to suffer death in the flesh, although it is because of this that he descended economically, in order that, suffering for us in the flesh, he would destroy the power of death.

For the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) was sick with corruption in the first-fruits and the first root, that is, in Adam, Cyril explains. But the Creator wanted to transelement the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν) into what it was in the beginning, and he let a second root grow, which is not overcome by death, the one Lord Jesus Christ. For we do not say that he is simply a God-bearing man, but the Word of God, united with flesh, in order that, having laid down his own life (ψυχήν) and given his body up to death, and having been raised, he would guarantee the resurrection to all who believe in him.

In a first quotation (92³¹⁻³⁵), Nestorius states that the Scriptures use the word 'Son', not 'God', when they speak of the birth from the virgin, χριστοτόκος, and of his death, citing Rom. 5:10 ("the death of his Son"). Cyril responds that Nestorius confirms what is confessed by all when he says that the Word is beyond suffering and death in his own nature, but that he attacks the doctrines of the Church, completely neglecting the economy with the flesh, and not considering the depth of the mystery. For, while impassible as God, he suffered death in his own flesh, in order that he might transelement into incorruption that which was

tyrannized by death, that is, the body; and this power extends to the whole human race.

Through him we have been rendered partakers of the divine nature and we are united relationally (σχετικῶς) with the Father and also with each other by participation in one Spirit, Cyril continues. He is naturally (φυσικῶς) in his own Father, but he has been made mediator by becoming like us, and he is in us through his own flesh, which gives us life in the Spirit, and through participation in his holiness, which again is through the holy Spirit. In the course of his argumentation, Cyril cites John 17:20–23, and because of the phrase 'the glory that you have given me' contained therein, he reasons once more that it is not a man apart who is speaking here, but the Word having been made man.

Cyril then states that Nestorius does not want to confess that the Word of God has suffered for us in the flesh, but that he uses the homonymy of the word 'Son' to allot the things in which he is glorified to a man like us, who is another besides the Word. In an interesting but rather intricate sentence, Cyril argues as follows: if something which belongs by nature to certain beings—like 'Son of God' belongs by nature to the Word—is said homonymously of some other beings—like believers who may also be called 'sons of God'—, one should not disregard the distinction between 'by nature' and 'by adoption or imitation' (95^{5-7}). Thus, the good deeds by the Son by nature (probably the reconciliation "through the death of his Son", mentioned in an earlier reference to Rom. 5:10; 94^{42}) should not be attributed to a separate man who is homonymously named 'Son'. The Word is life by nature and beyond suffering, but by the grace of God he tasted death for every man (Hebr. 2:9), in that the flesh united to him suffered, and he became the first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep and the first-born from the dead.

In a second quotation (95^{31-41}), Nestorius comments on "a heretic with an ecclesiastical mask (προσωπείῳ)", who allegedly says that in 1 Cor. 2:8 ("for had they known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory"), not the humanity but the divinity is called 'the Lord of glory'. The archbishop of Constantinople declares that in this way the accurate connection is severed, and Christ is made a mere man. And he asks: "Is the man Lord, too, or not?" He then cites 2 Cor. 13:4, "He was crucified out of weakness", and demands: "Who was weak, heretic, the Word of God?" Cyril answers that Nestorius once more phrases it in such a way as no one would even endure another saying it. Acknowledging that the Word is inseverable and one with the flesh

united to him, having a reasonable soul, we say that it is he who offered himself through his own body, he adds.

Cyril then cites Phil. 2:6–9 and reasons again that what is high can descend, what is free can assume a servant's form, what is not already a human being, can be made man. In this way the Word, impassible as God, chose to suffer in the flesh for our sakes, he continues, for no one says that he suffered in his own nature, nor that the Lord of glory, who was crucified, is the divinity, not the humanity, for we confess one Christ and Son and Lord of glory, the Word made man. From Nestorius's question, "Is the man Lord, too, or not?", Cyril concludes that he severs Christ into two, the Word by himself, who is Lord, and a man who is also Lord. But we, he says, mean by the person (προσώπου) of Emmanuel the Word of God who has assumed the form of a servant.

As for the weakness Paul refers to, Cyril declares, though the Word has no part in weakness whatsoever, being rich he became poor, and there is nothing unreasonable to see the Lord of hosts in weakness as we, for also because of this is the mystery to be marvelled at. Cyril has found something in a passage from Nestorius which he can agree with:

> Being the form of God, I have put on the form of a servant; being God the Word, I am seen in the flesh; being Lord of all, I have put on the person (πρόσωπον) of a poor one on behalf of you; hungering visibly, I supply food to the hungry (97[42–44]).

Cyril argues: Is 'hungering' not a form of weakness? Either put such passions round a mere man, keeping the Word at a distance, or consider that, while being God, he has been made man, and confess him to be impassible according to the nature of divinity and to have endured weakness in our behalf according to what is human.

In this context, the archbishop of Alexandria introduces Christ's words in Gethsemane: "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass me by. Yet, not as I will, but as you will" (Mt. 26:39). He says that Christ made the weakness that was unusual and unwilled by him voluntary, to the good-pleasure of God the Father, in order to save all under heaven. He also cites John 6:38: "I have come down from heaven, not to do my will, but the will of him who has sent me". And he asks how Christ can speak of his own will as another one than that of the Father. Cyril does not say that this 'own will' of Christ is 'according to his humanity' or something like that, he merely emphasizes that this will is good, since to die in the flesh is ignoble, unusual and repugnant to him, but that he endured this also for our sakes.

He then gives another quotation (99²⁰⁻²⁸), in which Nestorius asks "the heretics who mix up the nature[s] of the divinity and of the humanity into one substance (οὐσίαν)", who it is who is handed over to the Jews. "For if a mixture of both has taken place, both were held by the Jews, God the Word and the nature of the humanity". And who endured the slaughter? Cyril unambiguously declares that anyone who speaks about a mixture of the natures and a confusion, or who says that the nature of the Word could change into flesh, or the other way round, is in error, for the nature of the Word is steadfast, and having partaken of flesh and blood, he remained the same one. And he answers Nestorius that it was the one Lord Jesus Christ who was held by the Jews, the Word incarnate, who was held humanly, because he was also man, while remaining God, and who divinely put to shame the weakness of them who held him, when they fell to the ground after he had said: "I am [he]" (John 18:3–6).

Cyril invokes the anthropological analogy by referring to the martyrs: when their bodies were torn by steel or wasted by fire, or when they were held prisoner, were their souls held together with their bodies, and were they affected by steel and fire, too? He reasons that the souls did not suffer in their own nature, but they were not out of reach of (οὐκ ἔξω) the suffering, since they suffered the things of their own bodies, not those of other bodies. Similarly, the Word appropriated (ᾠκειώσατο) the sufferings of his own flesh, while he remained impassible as God, but not outside (οὐκ ἔξω) the suffering body.

Nestorius maintains, he continues, that a man by himself was crucified and endured death for the life of the world, for he says: This is the one who wore the thorny crown, who said, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?", and who endured death for three days (101¹⁻²). But we say, Cyril declares, that the Word has become flesh, making his own a body that could suffer death, and he gave it for us. This is the one who wore the thorny crown, this is he who was crucified humanly (ἀνθρωπίνως), and who said, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?", but who divinely (θεικῶς) restrained the light of the sun and made it night at midday—not a man simply honoured with a mere connection with the Word of God. The sun held back its rays, the veil of the temple was torn, signs of man's darkness and of the way to God which was opened by Christ—are such achievements not God-befitting and beyond human nature (ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν), Cyril asks. And has man not been brought back into paradise by the saving passion (τὸ σωτήριον πάθος)?

Nestorius, however, Cyril continues, constantly stresses that the Word is impassible, but takes away the economy and regards it as improper to say that he suffered for us, while the Scriptures say that he suffered in the flesh (1 Pet. 4:1). Then follows a quotation ($103^{7–20}$), in which the archbishop of Constantinople cites part of Acts 2:32 ("God raised this Jesus"), speaks about the exaltation of the visible nature by the divinity, and declares that God did not die. He also refers to Thomas, and he comments that, having touched the crucified body, the disciple glorified the wonder-working God, "not calling 'God' that which he touched, for not by touching is the divinity discerned".

In his response, Cyril states explicitly: "We believe that the Word made man is Jesus himself" (103^{24}). And when the Father is said to have raised Jesus, we should realize that the Word is the life-giving right hand and power of the Father. Besides, he himself has said: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up". Therefore, the Father raises the body through the Son, and the Son raises it, not without the Father, in the Spirit. For the nature of the Godhead is one, conceived of in three hypostases by themselves, having its operation with respect to all the things done, Cyril argues, applying his understanding of the divine operation to the resurrection. The Word, who was hypostatically united to the body, allowed it to yield to the laws of its own nature and to taste death, for profit's sake, while it was raised by his divine power. For when Peter says, "God raised this Jesus", "we conceive of the whole (ὅλον) Emmanuel" (104^2), and when Thomas touches the crucified one, we have the Word incarnate in mind, and we confess one and the same Son, the Alexandrian archbishop adds.

In a final quotation ($105^{8–15}$), Nestorius reasons that the Nicene Creed does not say "We believe in God the Word", but "We believe in Christ Jesus", introducing a common term, by which the Fathers signified both the one who died and the one who did not die. And he adduces the anthropological model: although the soul is immortal, one can say that a 'human being' has died, since the term indicates both natures, soul and body; it is like that with 'Christ'. Cyril takes him up on the analogy of soul and body, and argues: just as 'human being' indicates the soul with the body, although they are of different natures, and the whole (ὅλος) human being is regarded as having died when the body dies, while he has a soul that is incapable of dying, so it is with Christ. For since the Word participated in blood and flesh, and made a body his own, the principle of the true unity fastens (ἀνάπτει) the suffering to

him, when the body dies, but it knows that he remained out of reach of (ἔξω) the suffering, because he is both God by nature and life.[23]

The archbishop of Alexandria adds several citations from Scripture, and asks the rhetorical question whether someone who tries to shut up the power of the mystery within the confines of the humanity, should not be repudiated. And he ends with a confession of the one Son, Jesus Christ the Lord, that is, the Word made man, and him crucified and raised from the dead, which issues into a doxology.

6.3. Terminology

6.3.1. *Οὐσία*

The word οὐσία and two of its derivatives, ὁμοούσιος and οὐσιωδῶς, occur more often in *Contra Nestorium* than in Cyril of Alexandria's writings of the first year of the Nestorian controversy. Their meaning is in line with that in his previous works. A number of times they are employed to describe the inner-trinitarian relationships. The Son is said to be 'out of the substance' of the Father, as the Nicene Creed (325) has it,[24] to have been born substantially (οὐσιωδῶς φύντα) from the Father (32[33]), to have 'identity of substance (τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς οὐσίας)' with him (65[28]), or, of course, to be consubstantial with him.[25] We encounter the phrase 'the (holy and) consubstantial Trinity' several times,[26] while Cyril also speaks of 'the identity with respect to substance (τὸ ταυτὸν εἰς οὐσίαν)' regarding the whole Trinity (73[10]). The word ὁμοούσιος is further employed for the Spirit, who is said to be consubstantial with the Son, or with both the Father and the Son.[27] In these trinitarian

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[23] *CN*, 105[29f]. Cyril is not fully consistent in his terminology here. Earlier he wrote that the souls do not remain out of reach of (ἔξω) the suffering of their bodies (*CN* V.4, 100[33f]). According to the analogy, this would imply that the Word does *not* remain out of reach of the suffering of his body, while here he states that it *does* remain out of reach of the suffering. In the first instance, Cyril uses οὐκ ἔξω to indicate the appropriation of the suffering, in the second case, he employs ἔξω to emphasize that the Word did not suffer in his own nature.

[24] *CN* I.8, 29[5]; I.8, 29[13f]; II.3, 38[5, 17]; II.11, 49[40, 42]; III.3, 63[26, 36f]; IV, 92[8, 25].

[25] *CN* I.7, 27[11] (in a quotation from Nestorius); I,7, 28[25] (a repetition of Nestorius's quotation in 27[11]); I.8, 29[6]; IV.2, 80[41]; I.V.3, 82[36].

[26] *CN* I.7, 28[3]; II.13, 52[20f]; III.3, 67[10]; IV.1, 77[6f]; IV.2, 80[40].

[27] *CN* IV.3, 81[29], 82[15]; 81[12f].

contexts, οὐσία has, once more, the meaning of COMMON SUBSTANCE (except for the phrase 'out of the substance of the Father').

In *Contra Nestorium*, it is, first of all, Nestorius who uses οὐσία and especially ὁμοούσιος also for creatures, human beings in particular, and who is followed in this by Cyril, although we have seen in chapter 3 that it is not uncommon for Cyril to do this. Towards the end of Book I (31[11–13]), Nestorius argues that it is a property of every mother to bear what is consubstantial with her, so that either she is not a mother—namely, when she does not bear something consubstantial with her—or, when she is indeed a mother, what is born from her must be like her according to substance (κατ' οὐσίαν ὅμοιον). In his brief response, Cyril does not employ οὐσία and its cognates.

In a quotation in Book III, Nestorius writes that "he has been sent who is consubstantial with us and who has been anointed to preach freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind".[28] This time, Cyril does apply the same terminology. He reasons that the archbishop of Constantinople intends someone else who is consubstantial with us, besides the Word of God. It would be better, he writes, to say that he has become consubstantial with us, that is, man, while he also remained consubstantial with the Father.[29] This teaching of double consubstantiality is not totally new to Cyril; he already mentions it in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*.[30] Obviously, in these comparisons of individual beings, too, the reference is to secondary, not primary substances. Such a comparison of two secondary substances also applies to two uses of οὐσιωδῶς.[31]

Οὐσιωδῶς is employed three times to denote that characteristics are natural properties, that is, that they adhere to certain substances inseparably. For instance, Cyril speaks about "its own goods, which substantially adhere to it [to the divine nature]".[32] It is clear that,

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[28] *CN* III.3, 62[27], repeated in 65[12] and in III.5, 71[40].

[29] *CN* III.3, 65[24–27]; cf. 66[4–6, 39f.] and III.5, 72[7f., 28].

[30] *Dial. Trin.* I, 405e–406a.

[31] *CN* II, 33[12] (the nature of the Word is called substantially different from the flesh), II.5, 41[34] (things that are substantially far off from communion and equality with each other).

[32] *CN* I, 15[13f.] (οὐσιωδῶς αὐτῇ προσπεφυκότων). See also II.1, 36[1–3] (what is special about being God by nature, if the creature can be rich, and substantially so, with respect to the goods that are in God, Cyril asks—in other words, if the creature can have the divine characteristics as natural properties, God is no longer unique), II.11, 49[4f.] (the risen Christ is said to come again into the heights in which he exists always and substantially).

here too, the adverb οὐσιωδῶς is associated with οὐσία in the sense of secondary substance.

There is one passage left in which Cyril himself uses the word οὐσία. It is part of his argumentation that a human being cannot have acquired the divinity and have become God by nature. He asks whether this man has been enriched with the excellence of the highest substance, which is above all things ($57^{26\,f.}$). Once more, οὐσία refers to the COMMON SUBSTANCE of the Godhead. Finally, οὐσία is found in several quotations from Nestorius and in allusions to them by Cyril.[33] Since it is the aim of this study to come to a better understanding of Cyril of Alexandria's christological vocabulary, not Nestorius's, we will not dwell on the precise meaning of οὐσία in these instances.

The conclusion may be that the meaning Cyril gives to οὐσία and its cognates in *Contra Nestorium*—the use of which is partly induced by Nestorius—is virtually the same as in his previous works. Οὐσία signifies a secondary substance, which in the light of his earlier writings may be interpreted as a COMMON SUBSTANCE, rather than as an ABSTRACT SUBSTANCE.

6.3.2. Ὑπόστασις

Having added the term ὑπόστασις to his christological vocabulary in his *Second Letter to Nestorius*, Cyril of Alexandria makes extensive use of it in *Contra Nestorium*. But first, we will look at more familiar ways in which Cyril employs the word in this volume. A few times we find it in a citation of Hebr. 1:3 ("imprint of the hypostasis") or in an allusion to it.[34] Then there are three passages in which ὑπόστασις is used in a trinitarian context and denotes (one of) the three divine persons.[35] The Father is also said to "subsist by himself (ὑφέστηκε δὲ ἰδικῶς)", as are the Son and the Spirit ($77^{2\,f.}$). And once, in a more christological context, Cyril argues that to be born according to the flesh is the only way to become man for "him who subsists (ὑφεστηκότι) outside the flesh and according to his own nature" ($29^{20\,f.}$). Then, there is a passage in which

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[33] *CN* I.4, $22^{29\,f.}$ ("the just-born according to the [secondary] substance that is seen"); III.1, 55^2 (who would regard the high priest as the substance of divinity? It is repeated literally in 56^{10}, while Cyril includes a similar phrase in his response in $56^{15\ and\ 16}$); V.4, $99^{20\,f.}$ (those "who mingle the nature[s] of the divinity and the humanity into one substance").

[34] *CN* II.1, $35^{42\,f.}$; III.3, 64^{25}; V.2, $96^{21\,f.}$.

[35] *CN* III.6, $73^{9,\ 10}$; $80^{6,\ 12,\ 32\,f.,\ 36,\ 37}$ (on the one operation of the Trinity); V.6, 103^{36}.

three forms of the verb προυφεστηκέναι occur: Christ is said to pre-exist John the Baptist, he pre-exists as God (63[17, 19, 24]). In all the other cases, the word ὑπόστασις is directly related to christology (and all the places where its cognates are found, have already been mentioned).

What is noteworthy, first of all, is the sheer number in which the expression 'according to hypostasis (καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν)' occurs: eight times with 'union (ἕνωσις)',[36] nine times with a form of the verb 'to unite (ἑνοῦν)', mostly passive,[37] once with 'unity (ἑνότης; 42[19f.])', once with 'to be connected (συνάπτεσθαι; 23[19f.])', once with 'indwelling (κατοίκησις; 30[37f.])', and once with the verb 'to partake (κοινωνεῖν; 79[14])', twenty-one times in total, spread over all five Books. What Cyril means by this expression becomes clearer when we look at the other instances in which he employs ὑπόστασις in an incarnational context.

Mostly, the word is found in the plural, often to describe the view which Cyril attributes to Nestorius: that the one Christ is severed into two Sons, into two hypostases and persons. In most of these cases, ὑποστάσεις and πρόσωπα occur side by side,[38] but sometimes Cyril uses only ὑποστάσεις (never only πρόσωπα).[39] In one case, the Greek seems to be corrupt, but the meaning probably is in line with the other passages: Nestorius cuts the one Christ asunder, the hypostases part from each other, while the persons are severed into their own diversity.[40] A few times, the division into two is expressed by a sentence in which ὑπόστασις in the singular is used to denote one or each of the separate entities.[41]

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[36] *CN* I, 15[8f., 37]; I.4, 24[32]; II.6, 42[7f.]; II.8, 45[36f.]; II.13, 51[24], 52[1]; III.5, 72[29f.].

[37] *CN* I.1, 16[42]; I.4, 24[29f.]; I.8, 30[32]; II.2, 36[38]; II.8, 44[33], 46[9]; II.10, 47[30]; III.4, 71[23f.]; V.6, 104[1].

[38] *CN* II.1, 34[37f.]: "severing [him] into two persons and hypostases which are completely separated from each other", 35[16]: "separating the one into two persons and hypostases"; II.10, 48[30f.]: "assigning the sayings of those who speak about God and of [Christ] himself to two persons and two distinct (ἰδικαῖς) hypostases"; III.2, 60[31–33]: he separates him "into distinct (ἰδικάς) hypostases and also two persons", the Word and a God-bearing man; III.5, 72[4]: "separating him completely into hypostases and persons".

[39] *CN* II.1, 35[23–25]: "they would not part from each other with respect to hypostases and wills (γνώμαις) in being one and another by themselves (ἰδικῶς)"; III.6, 73[4f.]: "the hypostases having been separated into two, as you say".

[40] *CN* II.2, 36[17f.]: τέμνοντα δίχα ⟨μετὰ⟩ τοῦ καὶ αὐτὰς ἀλλήλων τὰς ὑποστάσεις ἀποφοιτᾶν καὶ εἰς ἰδικὴν ἑτερότητα τῶν προσώπων διεσταλμένων. Schwartz has added μετὰ in order to make this passage agree with the other passages in which Cyril speaks about Nestorius's separating the hypostases and persons. I follow him in this. Pusey (*CN* ET, 48) translates: "even though the hypostases themselves part not one from another", but this would contradict Cyril's usual argumentation.

[41] *CN* II.1, 35[35]: is "he who, according to his own hypostasis (κατ᾿ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν),

Three times, Cyril speaks of a mixture or a confusion of hypostases. In the first instance, he is reasoning that the verb 'to mix' is often used in an improper way, not with the exact meaning of a philosophical mixture, as of water and wine.[42] As an example, he points to Hebr. 4:2 ("those who were not mixed (συγκεκραμένους) in faith with the hearers"). This does not refer to a confusion of hypostases (ἀνάχυσίν τινα τῶν ὑποστάσεων; 22[17]), as with water and wine, Cyril explains, but to a union in soul. Here, it is the human individuals who are denoted by the word ὑπόστασις. The other two instances relate to Nestorius's statement that according to certain heretics "a mingling (κράσεως) has taken place and the two natures are not divided" (34[25f.]). Cyril re-phrases this and speaks twice of "a confusion and a mixture of the hypostases with each other".[43] Here, he must be referring to the Word and his humanity.

In the discussion following this quotation of Nestorius, Cyril first accuses his colleague of severing Christ into two persons and hypo-stases, completely separated from each other, and attributing to each of them by themselves sayings that are fitting to them.[44] He then asks how there can be one Christ and Son and Lord, if these names apply to both of them separately (ἀνὰ μέρος), because "the hypostases by no means come together according to union (καθ' ἕνωσιν), but are united (ἑνοῦσθαι) according to rank or sovereign power or authority only" (35[2–5]). Cyril gives the example of Peter and John, who were both apostles and were adorned with equal honours, and asks whether, because of their shared rank and sovereign power, the two can be called one man, and whether this suffices "for a union, I mean, [a union] in the hypostases".[45]

And finally, there is the one passage in which the archbishop of Alexandria speaks of "one Son and one hypostasis, the incarnate

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has been truly separated from the unity with him" not another besides the Word?; II.2, 36[7–9]: "for how is there still one Lord and Christ and Son, if each has its own (ἰδικόν) person and principle (λόγος) and also hypostasis, which withdraws into diversity"; III.6, 73[13f.]: "how can one person (πρόσωπον) be effected by both, when each hypostasis brings along its own [person], as lying separately (ἀνὰ μέρος)?" (see n. 21).

[42] See McKinion (2000), 59–67, for a brief description of the philosophical concepts.

[43] In his introduction of Nestorius's quotation, Cyril speaks about a φυρμόν καὶ ἀνάκρασιν, τὴν εἰς ἀλλήλας φημί, τῶν ὑποστάσεων (CN II, 34[15f.]), and immediately after the quotation he re-states it as: τῶν ὑποστάσεων εἰς ἀλλήλας ἀνάχυσις ἢ γοῦν σύγκρασις (CN II.1, 34[34]).

[44] CN II.1, 34[37–39], mentioned in n. 38.

[45] CN II.1, 35[13f.]: πρὸς ἕνωσιν, τὴν ὡς ἕν γε ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι λέγω.

[hypostasis] of the Word".[46] In the context of this sentence he argues that, since Nestorius says that the Word does nothing without his humanity, the connection means to him that the pair of sons are likeminded and of the same will. But, he continues, if you speak of one Son and of the one incarnate hypostasis of the Word, Christ is not himself an instrument of the divinity, but he uses his own body as an instrument, just a human soul does that.

Before we turn to the meaning of the word ὑπόστασις in *Contra Nestorium*, it is worth remarking that neither the term itself nor any of its cognates is found in the quotations of the archbishop of Constantinople. This confirms Richard's conclusion that it was Cyril of Alexandria who introduced the word ὑπόστασις into the christological debate of the fifth century.[47] And it suggests that the term takes on a meaning fully inspired by Cyril himself, and not influenced by the way his opponent employed it.

In chapter 5, it was concluded that the primary meaning of ὑπόστασις is 'a really existing being' belonging to the category of substance, that is, an INDIVIDUAL REALITY, while in a more pregnant sense it may signify something that exists by itself, that is, a SEPARATE REALITY.[48] And the expression καθ' ὑπόστασιν added to the verb 'to unite' and to the noun 'union' seemed to indicate that a real union has taken place, which results in one SEPARATE REALITY. When we look at Cyril's use of the term in *Contra Nestorium*, there is no reason to infer that he now attaches a different meaning to it. When human beings are referred to as 'hypostases', as in his interpretation of Hebr. 4:2, it may be understood in its fuller meaning of SEPARATE REALITY. When Cyril describes the view he attributes to Nestorius, he sometimes makes it quite clear that he has SEPARATE REALITIES in mind by using such expressions as 'completely separated from each other', or 'in being one and another by themselves'. And when he speaks of 'two hypostases' he sometimes adds the adjective ἰδικός to emphasize their separate existence, as he does in *On the Incarnation*, once more suggesting that ὑπόστασις itself may indicate a SEPARATE REALITY, but can also be used for an INDIVIDUAL REALITY which does not exist by itself.

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[46] *CN* II.8, 46[28f.]: ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἕνα φὴς Υἱὸν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν τὴν τοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένην.

[47] Richard (1945), 244, 255.

[48] See especially sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.8.2.1.

Then, there are those instances in which Cyril speaks of two or more hypostases that come together. In a mixture in the philosophical sense of the word, as of water and wine, the two elements already exist and then come together, that is, it is separate hypostases that are mixed. In the example of human beings—Hebr. 4:2 and the apostles Peter and John—once again, it is separate (in this case, human) hypostases that come together. And in Cyril's description of Nestorius's view, it is two separate beings—the Word and a God-bearing man—who form a connection. This leaves the two times that Cyril rephrases a statement from Nestorius into "a confusion and a mixture of the hypostases with each other". Since this describes a view which is not Cyril's own, while he does not elaborate on this expression, one cannot draw any conclusions from this regarding the status of Christ's humanity before the incarnation according to Cyril's own understanding (as if the word 'hypostasis' would indicate that the Word's humanity was a hypostasis, and therefore an INDIVIDUAL REALITY before the incarnation).

When he calls the one Christ 'one hypostasis, the incarnate [hypostasis] of the Word', however, this does indicate his own view, and his intention is clearly to posit, over against Nestorius, that Christ is one, not two SEPARATE REALITIES. In christological contexts (in *Contra Nestorium*), Cyril does not call the Word a hypostasis before the incarnation, when he expounds his own view.[49] But, no doubt, he would regard the 'naked' Word as a SEPARATE REALITY, and he argues that after the incarnation the Word with the flesh is still one SEPARATE REALITY. The word ὑπόστασις, here, does *not* signify the METAPHYSICAL PERSON of the Word which remained the same, also when the humanity was added. There is no hint in *Contra Nestorium* nor in Cyril's previous writings that ὑπόστασις can take on this meaning. Nor does it signify an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. Although Cyril regards the incarnate Word as one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, which—as will be discussed in section 6.3.3—is expressed by

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[49] Grammatically speaking, it is possible that the word 'hypostasis' in the phrase 'one hypostasis, the incarnate [hypostasis] of the Word' refers to the hypostasis of the Word only, without the flesh, in which case the term 'incarnate' adds the flesh. However, in light of the fact that the meaning of ὑπόστασις in Cyril's previous writings tends from INDIVIDUAL REALITY towards SEPARATE REALITY, it is more likely that here 'hypostasis' refers to the one SEPARATE REALITY of the incarnate Word. That he uses the expression 'united / union according to hypostasis' to emphasize that the result of the union is one SEPARATE REALITY also points in this direction. And that in christological contexts the 'naked' Word is not indicated by the term ὑπόστασις confirms this interpretation.

the term πρόσωπον, this is not the meaning of 'one hypostasis'. When Cyril calls the incarnate Word 'one hypostasis', he merely wants to emphasize that he is one SEPARATE REALITY, not two, as, in his view, Nestorius teaches.

What does Cyril of Alexandria mean by 'hypostatically united' and 'union according to hypostasis'? He places this over against Nestorius's 'connection by rank or sovereign power', which in his understanding consists of two separate Sons, who have an external relationship with each other.[50] The union Cyril has in mind is a 'real' union, not just a relational (σχετική) one, and it results in one Christ and Son and Lord, in one hypostasis, that is, in one SEPARATE REALITY. The conclusion drawn in our investigation of Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* (section 5.8.2.1) still holds, although it may be somewhat elaborated. 'Union according to hypostasis' means (1) that a real union has taken place, which may be understood as: not just a relational one, in which case two separate entities remain; (2) the result of this union is one SEPARATE REALITY, not two, and for the first time Cyril has now called this one SEPARATE REALITY 'one hypostasis'.

6.3.3. *Πρόσωπον*

On the one hand, Cyril uses the term πρόσωπον in *Contra Nestorium* in ways which are familiar from the trinitarian writings, as described in section 3.5, on the other hand, the development of its use in christological contexts, which set in in his *Commentary on John*, continues. First, we encounter πρόσωπον a number of times in the sense of 'face', in citations of biblical verses or in allusions to them.[51] We also find the expression ὡς ἐκ προσώπου a few times, indicating that someone renders the words spoken by another person.[52] In *Contra Nestorium*, Cyril does not employ πρόσωπον to indicate the persons of the Trinity, only ὑπόστασις.

We have seen a first, isolated use of πρόσωπον in a christological context in the *Thesaurus* (120C), where Cyril writes that "the words that are fitting to a slave" "are lying round the πρόσωπον of the

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[50] The concept of an external relationship will be discussed in section 6.3.7.

[51] *CN* I.5, 25²⁶ (Luke 1:76); II.3, 38²⁵ (Ps. 103 / 104:30, LXX); III.2, 59²⁸ (2 Cor. 3:18); III.3, 66²², ³⁴ᶠ· (Gen. 32:30); III.3, 67¹⁷ (Ps. 103 / 104:30, LXX); III.4, 69³⁷ (Is. 50:6); V.5, 101¹¹⁻¹³ (Is. 50:6–7).

[52] *CN* III, 53³¹; IV.3, 83³⁹ᶠ·; V.2, 97⁴⁰ᶠ·.

inhumanation". Thus, here already πρόσωπον indicates the incarnate Word, although it is not quite clear what the exact meaning of the word is. In his *Commentary on John*, Cyril starts to write that Christ may not be severed into two πρόσωπα. By then, the meaning of the term has been established as a rational being, in a text and/or in reality, that is, a PERSON—a GRAMMATICAL PERSON and/or an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. When Christ is not to be severed into two πρόσωπα, this means that he is not two ONTOLOGICAL PERSONS.[53] In *On the Incarnation*, the same understanding is expressed by the term διπρόσωπον, while in the phrase ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ the word πρόσωπον denotes the ONTOLOGICAL PERSON of the incarnate Word.[54]

In the *Letter to the Apocrisiaries*, Nestorius's view of Christ is described as a union of πρόσωπα only, of a man by himself and God the Word by himself.[55] Here again, πρόσωπον may be regarded as ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. And in Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*, he employs the word πρόσωπον three times to express a view which he rejects: the Word did not assume a πρόσωπον only, he did not unite himself to the πρόσωπον of a human being, and the incarnation is not a union of πρόσωπα. These statements, too, make sense when πρόσωπον refers to an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, which implies a SEPARATE REALITY.[56]

Based on Cyril's use of the word 'only'—'a union μόνων τῶν προσ-ώπων' and 'the assumption προσώπου μόνου'—and the absence of the word 'hypostasis' in such cases, Liébaert suggests that Cyril applied two different meanings to πρόσωπον:

> Yet, one notes that Cyril does not completely align his usage of the word *prosôpon* with that of the word hypostasis. Maybe in the end, he remains sensitive to the innate ambiguity of the first term, capable of designating a figure [le personnage], an individual, in a sense a subject or a person, but also—in accordance with its etymology—a simple mask, a face, an external form or appearance.[57]

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[53] See section 3.5.

[54] See section 5.3.2.4.

[55] See section 5.6.2.2.

[56] See section 5.8.2.2.

[57] Liébaert (1977), 61: "Toutefois, on le constate, Cyrille n'aligne pas tout à fait ici son usage du mot *prosôpon* avec celui du mot hypostase. Peut-être en définitive reste-t-il sensible à l'ambiguïté congénitale du premier terme, apte à désigner le personnage, l'individu, en un sens le sujet ou la personne, mais aussi—conformément à son étymologie—le simple masque, le visage, la forme ou l'apparence extérieure".

When Cyril speaks of 'a πρόσωπον only' or 'πρόσωπα only', πρόσωπον would indicate "the external form, the totality of characteristics and properties manifesting the individual", according to Liébaert.[58]

There is, however, no reason to believe that in these instances the archbishop of Alexandria gives to πρόσωπον a meaning different from the one it normally has in his own language: person, rational being. For what counts in the course of his argumentation is that persons are entities that are capable of *external* relations with each other only. And in this respect, persons are, as it were, deficient in comparison with other entities, such as natures, and therefore, one can speak of the assumption of 'a person only'.[59] This also explains why the word 'hypostasis' is not juxtaposed in these cases. For, as we have seen, ὑπόστασις does have a certain ambiguity about it in Cyril's metaphysics: it may indicate a SEPARATE REALITY, but it seems that it may also refer to an INDIVIDUAL REALITY, which is capable of a stronger relationship with another such reality.

It may be added that in *Contra Nestorium* πρόσωπον occurs only once in the quotations from Nestorius, namely, when he lets Christ say: on behalf of you, I have put on the πρόσωπον of a poor man. Cyril does not comment on Nestorius's use of the word.[60] The absence of the term in the quotations is a clear indication that for the meaning that Cyril attaches to the word πρόσωπον in this volume, it is necessary to look to his own previous works rather than to Nestorius's writings. Also, the only occurrence of the word 'mask' (προσωπεῖον) is found in a quotation from the archbishop of Constantinople: "a heretic with an ecclesiastical mask (προσωπεῖῳ)" (95[35]).

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[58] *Ibid.*, 60. This, however, is not Cyril's but Nestorius's understanding of the term. See Grillmeier, *JdChr* I, ³1990 (¹1979), 655 f.; *CCT* I, ²1975, 460: "According to Nestorius, each nature has its own prosopon, its own characteristics, its own appearance, through which it is characterized in its individuality".

[59] If πρόσωπον had the meaning which Liébaert suggests—the external form, the characteristics and properties manifesting the individual—'the assumption of a πρόσωπον only' would imply that Christ's humanity were deficient, merely external. This is not what Cyril accuses Nestorius's christology of. Rather, he constantly insists that the archbishop of Constantinople teaches a separate human being, a separate πρόσωπον, besides the Word of God. In *Oratio ad dominas*, Cyril speaks of 'a mere union of persons' (rather than 'a union of mere persons'), which more clearly expresses that the union of persons, that is, PERSONS, is not strong enough. See chapter 7, nn. 109 and 110.

[60] *CN* V.3, 97[43]. It is surprising that, after renouncing the assumption of 'a πρόσωπον only' in his *Second Letter to Nestorius*, Cyril does not comment on Nestorius's phrase "I have put on the πρόσωπον of a poor man".

In *Contra Nestorium*, Cyril repeats a number of times what he already wrote in his *Commentary on John*: Christ is not to be divided into two persons. As we have seen, he now usually adds: or into two (distinct) hypostases,[61] and he also expresses the same view in a sentence containing the word πρόσωπον in the singular.[62] In all these cases, Cyril's argumentation is based on the same understanding of πρόσωπον: it means PERSON, more specifically ONTOLOGICAL PERSON.

More clearly than ever before, however, the archbishop of Alexandria now confesses the incarnate Word to be one πρόσωπον. Twice he writes that the sayings about Christ should be attributed to one πρόσωπον,[63] and once that Scripture leads us in faith to one πρόσωπον.[64] Although the immediate meaning of the term is here a GRAMMATICAL PERSON, Cyril implies that Christ is one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. This is more explicitly stated in another passage, where also the unambiguously ontological word ὑπόστασις occurs:

> When the hypostases are divided into two, as you say, and conceived of as existing separately and by themselves, how could a coming together into one person (πρόσωπον ἕν) have taken place, unless the one thing is somehow said to be the other's own (ἴδιον ἓν ἑνός), just as, of course, the body is regarded as the human soul's own, although it is of a different nature (ἑτεροφυές) than it? For soul and body are not the same thing. [Then follow a few sentences about the one nature and the three hypostases of the holy Trinity.] But with respect to Emmanuel, since divinity is something else than humanity, if we do not say that the body has become the Word's own according to a true union, how can one person be effected (ἓν ἀποτελοῖτο πρόσωπον) by both, when each hypostasis brings before us its own (ἴδιον) [person], as lying separately (ἀνὰ μέρος)?[65]

The oft-repeated claims that there is one Lord and Christ and Son, and that Christ is one out of both, are here translated into the more metaphysical statement that he is one person (πρόσωπον). And Cyril argues that, if the hypostases are separated—as he believes Nestorius's view to be—, this will result in two persons. But when the body is regarded as the Word's own, the result is one person—and it seems

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[61] See nn. 38 and 40 for the references.

[62] *CN* II.2, 36[7–9]. See n. 41.

[63] *CN* II, 33[6] (ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς προσώπου); II.1, 36[6 f.] (ἑνὶ προσώπῳ).

[64] *CN* II, 34[11] (εἰς πρόσωπον ἕν).

[65] *CN* III.6, 72[39]–73[14]. See also n. 21. Towards the end of the quotation, κειμένης has been translated by 'lying', because Cyril often works with metaphors of place (see section 3.2.2).

to be implied that the hypostases are then not separated. Cyril does not employ the phrase 'one person' to declare that the Word has remained 'the same' during the incarnation. The Word before the incarnation is not called a πρόσωπον, but there is a 'coming together' (σύμβασις) into one person, and one person is 'effected' (ἀποτελοῖτο).

In the only remaining place in which the word πρόσωπον is found, Cyril speaks of "the person of Emmanuel (τοῦ προσώπου τοῦ Ἐμμανου-ήλ)" as a matter of fact, and he maintains that, although someone may call him a human being, "we regard him as the Word out of God the Father who has assumed the form of a servant" (97[18–20]).

6.3.4. *Φύσις*

While for οὐσία, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον it makes sense to mention all the places where the term and its cognates occur, the word φύσις abounds in *Contra Nestorium* to such an extent that for the more common usages it suffices to give some examples. Not surprisingly, we see Cyril of Alexandria employ φύσις in ways that by now have become all too familiar. The Word, Christ, Emmanuel is said to be God,[66] Son,[67] life,[68] wisdom (35[42]), Creator (35[42]), power (35[42]), invisible,[69] good,[70] holy (101[24]), impassible[71] by nature (κατὰ φύσιν or φύσει or τὴν φύσιν). Once, we find similar language in a quotation from Nestorius.[72] Several times, Cyril says that the Word is free, etc., according to his own nature (κατὰ φύσιν ἰδίαν),[73] or according to the principles (λόγους) of his own nature.[74] The Word is also out of (ἐκ) God (the Father) by nature,[75] while the Spirit is the Father's by nature, and the Son's naturally (φυσικῶς), and consubstantial with him, from (παρά) him and in him by nature, and his own.[76] The same expressions are also, though less often, employed

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[66] *CN* I.1, 16[36, 37]; I.2, 20[7]; II.11, 49[39]; III.5, 72[31]; IV.6, 89[7]; V.6, 104[25]; and *passim*.

[67] *CN* I.6, 26[27]; I.7, 28[5, 11]; II.4, 40[37]; III.2, 59[13]; IV.3, 83[15]; V, 92[20].

[68] *CN* II.1, 35[42]; IV.3, 83[16 f.]; IV.5, 85[21].

[69] *CN* II.12, 50[32]; V.6, 104[6].

[70] *CN* IV, 76[5]; V.3, 99[3].

[71] *CN* II.2, 37[30]; V.2, 96[37]; V.5, 102[19].

[72] *CN* I.4, 24[27, 35] (φύσει Θεός).

[73] *CN* II.3, 38[35, 41]; II.4, 40[31]; II.6, 42[26 f.]; III.1, 57[2]; III.2, 58[33]; V.1, 92[39 f.].

[74] *CN* II.10, 48[12 f.]; III.3, 64[11 f.]; IV.3, 83[16 f.].

[75] *CN* I, 15[3, 10, 22]; I.6, 26[22]; III, 53[23]; V.1, 94[19]. Quite often, the Word is also said to have been born (φύς) out of the Father, for example, *CN* I, 14[8]; I.7, 28[20]; II.2, 36[37]; III.3, 64[11]; IV.6, 89[7]; V.1, 95[1].

[76] *CN* IV.3, 82[13–15, 36 f.].

in regard to human beings and other creatures.[77] In all these cases, φύσις has a meaning similar to that of οὐσία and is related to secondary substance.

In trinitarian contexts, it is undisputed that the word φύσις has this meaning of COMMON NATURE, the divine reality which Father, Son and holy Spirit have in common.[78] But how does Cyril employ the term in christological contexts? In chapter 5, it has been argued that the Alexandrian archbishop uses dyophysite, rather than miaphysite, language in the writings discussed. In *Contra Nestorium*, we do find one miaphysite phrase, but it is surrounded by many dyophysite expressions. That there is an increase in dyophysite terminology is undoubtedly influenced by the fact that Nestorius speaks regularly of 'the natures' or 'two natures' in his quotations. But the way in which Cyril speaks about the natures of Christ is not really different from the way he does it in the earlier christological works. Nowhere, throughout *Contra Nestorium*, is there even a hint that Cyril would object to Nestorius's speaking about two natures. What he is constantly repudiating is the *separation* of the natures into two distinct hypostases and persons.

Let us look at several examples to substantiate this claim. In the first quotation, Nestorius already speaks of 'the two natures': over against the title *theotokos* he suggests a term 'indicative of the two natures' (16[24 f.]), by which he means χριστοτόκος. Cyril does not attack this dyophysite language in any way. On the contrary, in his response he himself makes extensive use of the word φύσις, and by no means just for the divine nature. He states that Emmanuel is God by nature. In an argument that he phrases on behalf of his opponent, he writes: "If you say that the nature of the Word is not the offspring of the flesh, . . ." (16[39]). Then follows the argumentation that in order to become man the Word had to be born according to the flesh. Cyril reasons that (the) nature (ἡ φύσις) has determined the laws regarding us, or rather, nature's Creator. The Word necessarily proceeded through the laws of human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως; 17[19]) and, the virgin acting as a mediator to this end, he partook of blood and flesh like we do. Cyril then gives a soteriological reason for the incarnation, in which he uses three times the phrase 'the human nature' (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις; 17[25, 28, 40]), and in which we see the interplay, discussed earlier, between the whole human

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[77] *CN* II.1, 36[4 f.]; II.4, 39[25]; cf. 40[2]; II.8, 44[26 f.]; IV.5, 84[29]; IV.7, 90[34 f.].

[78] *CN* III.6, 73[8 f.] (how is the Trinity effected as one nature of divinity, while it is distinguished in three hypostases?); IV.1, 77[2 f.]; IV.2, 80[40]; V.6, 103[36 f.].

race, the human COMMON NATURE, and Christ as an individual human being.[79] "But in Christ we see the human nature have free access to God, as in a second first-fruits of the race" (17$^{39–41}$). And before Cyril goes on to a second quotation, he accuses Nestorius of maintaining that there are two Sons and of dividing the one Lord Jesus Christ.

It is true that in these pages φύσις does not refer to Christ's human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, but at the same time he does not object to Nestorius's speaking of two natures, while he does denounce his alleged separating of Christ into two Sons. For this, Cyril adduces the second quotation, which does not mention the natures. The next time the word φύσις occurs in the plural it is in a statement of Cyril himself:

> But perhaps you think that for all this that worthless argument (λόγον) suffices, according to which the natures must be connected (συνάπτεσθαι) with each other, and that not according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν), but rather in indistinguishable honour and in equality of rank, for this is what you are always unlearnedly telling us (23$^{18–21}$).

Once again, Cyril does not attack Nestorius's speaking of two natures, but rather the way in which he regards the union: it is a connection in honour and rank only, and not one according to hypostasis. In order to show that this is indeed Nestorius's understanding, Cyril gives another quotation in which the word φύσις is absent.

Elsewhere in *Contra Nestorium*, too, Cyril does not find fault with dyophysite language, but with Nestorius's connection between the natures, which, according to Cyril, is external and relational, and therefore implies two Sons. So, he writes in the introduction to Book II that Nestorius, "though pretending to say that Christ is one, divides the natures completely and sets each apart, saying that they did not truly come together" (32$^{37–39}$). And when Nestorius states that the titles 'Christ', 'Son', and 'Lord' can indicate either of the two natures, or both together, and argues that Scripture says that God sent his Son, not that he sent the Word, Cyril again does not have a problem with the two-nature language. Instead, he chides Nestorius for teaching that a man, severed from the Word and set apart, has been born from the virgin. He emphasizes that the Christ is one, the Word made man, who has been anointed, not "according to his own nature (κατ' ἰδίαν φύσιν)", but the anointing happened to him "with regard to that which is human (περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον)" (37$^{7–9}$). And although Cyril avoids the

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[79] See sections 3.4.4, 5.4.2.2 and 5.5.2.2.

word 'nature' for Christ's humanity, the phrase 'his own nature' implies that he is aware of another nature which is involved.

Cyril's response in Book II, section 5, is even clearer (41^{23-40}). Nestorius calls the one who has assumed 'God', and the one who has been assumed 'the servant's form'; he confesses the unity of rank because the dignity of the two is the same, while the natures remain. Cyril's first comment is that Nestorius divides Christ into two again, and that he does not understand what union is and what rank is. If the dignity of the two natures is one, Cyril argues, then the Word and Moses have equal status in nature, and the principle (λόγος) of their nature will not be different. Cyril is speaking about their secondary substance, their essence, not their individual existence, as Lebon understands φύσις in christological contexts.[80] He intends to say that if the Word and a human being have the same rank, they must have the same COMMON NATURE.

But, he continues, maybe Nestorius wil say that rank is not a matter of nature—in other words, that the Word and the human being are not of the same nature. In that case, how can you crown things that are substantially (οὐσιωδῶς; the use of this word is further evidence that Cyril has COMMON NATURES and COMMON SUBSTANCES in mind) so far away from each other, with equal rank, he asks. And from 'substantially' he switches back to 'nature': when a nature is inferior to another, which is superior, how can it receive equal honours and dignity? This reasoning has as its basis Cyril's understanding of Nestorius's position as a separation of Christ into two Sons, two separate beings. For him, the word φύσις does not denote these separate beings themselves, but their COMMON NATURES or their INDIVIDUAL NATURES, in either case with special reference to their essence and their NATURAL QUALITY. Since their natures are so different, these separate beings cannot receive equal honour. Cyril implies that it is only when the same being is both God and man, this 'man' can receive the honours due to God alone.

In the following section 6, Nestorius says that "the Son himself is twofold, not in rank, but in nature", and Cyril denounces it ($42^{5f., 23f.}$). This might suggest that in this instance the Alexandrian archbishop does reject dyophysite language. However, a further investigation of his argumentation shows this not to be the case. Cyril starts with the question how Nestorius understands his notion of an indivisible

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[80] See section 4.4.1.

connection: is it a union according to hypostasis, or a juxtaposition (παράθεσις) and proximity (ἐγγύτης)? If it is a union according to hypostasis, there is no division in Christ, he is one and not two. How can you say, then, he asks, that the Son is twofold, not in rank, but in nature? Cyril introduces the anthropological analogy: when someone kills a man he is not accused of harming two people, although the man is conceived of as being out of soul and body, and "the nature of the things that have come together is not the same, but different" (42²⁹ᶠ·); in this way one must conceive of Christ as well. Although the word φύσις appears in the singular, Cyril is speaking of the two natures of soul and body. In his application of the image to Christ he is even more explicit.

First, he reiterates that the Word, not without the flesh, is not twofold, but the one and only Lord and Son. But then Cyril adds that he, too, acknowledges that the difference between divinity and humanity is vast, since they are different with respect to their mode of being (κατά γε τὸν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγον).[81] In the mystery of Christ, however, while (μέν) the principle of the union does not deny the difference, it does (δέ) put aside the division, not confusing or mixing the natures, but, having partaken of flesh and blood, the Word is still regarded as one Son.[82] Unambiguously, Cyril speaks of the natures of Christ, who are not confused or mixed. And he explicitly states that their difference is not denied, but it is their division (διαίρεσιν) which is to be repudiated. This makes sense when these natures are regarded as INDIVIDUAL NATURES, which each remain the source of their own NATURAL QUALITY, their natural properties—for there is no mixture or confusion—, but which are not SEPARATE REALITIES—for that would imply two Sons—but which together form one SEPARATE REALITY. This is the conception depicted in figure 2 of section 5.3.3. Cyril does not object to Nestorius's speaking about two natures, but to his alleged separating them into two SEPARATE REALITIES.

This picture is confirmed by another passage in Book II, where Cyril argues that if you sever the natures, the properties that naturally belong to them will also part,[83] the principle of the difference will cut right through, and therefore, with certainty there will be two. In figure 2,

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[81] See for the expression κατά τὸν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγον and its near relationship to κατὰ φύσιν section 3.4.1.
[82] A translation of this passage is given in chapter 4 (n. 76).
[83] *CN* II.11, 50³⁴⁻³⁶: συναποφοιτήσειεν ἂν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἑκατέρας ἴδια φυσικῶς.

the properties that belong to each of the natures are attached to the one SEPARATE REALITY which is comprised of both INDIVIDUAL NATURES. But if these two natures are severed and only have an external relation to each other, we end up with the situation of figure 4: the natural properties of each are no longer attached to the one SEPARATE REALITY, but only to their own INDIVIDUAL NATURE. This amounts to two Sons, for Cyril.

There is no need to discuss more examples in detail, a brief reference to several of them will suffice. Nestorius writes that, since there is a connection between Christ and the eternal Son, a separation according to the dignity of sonship is not accepted—"I do not say: according to the natures", he adds (44^{11-13}). Cyril responds that his opponent gathers the natures into union and then severs them again. And further on, he urges: "Cease dividing the natures after the union",[84] and: "Confess, therefore, [that he is] one, not dividing the natures, at the same time knowing and thinking that the principle of the flesh is one thing, while that of divinity is [another,] fitting to it alone" (46^{31-33}). And when the archbishop of Constantinople speaks of those who mingle the nature of divinity and that of humanity into one substance, Cyril again does not object to the dyophysite terminology, but merely rejects a mixture or a confusion of the natures, and states that no one holds such a view.[85]

The expression 'in contemplation (only)'—ἐν θεωρίᾳ (μόνῃ)—does not occur in *Contra Nestorium*.[86] The notion, however, is present in different words, when Cyril writes:

> For if, gathering both into one according to a true union, you confess together with us one Son, you have laboured in vain by placing each by itself and apart and by completely separating them into hypostases and persons, [and that] not only to know (οὐχὶ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον) that the nature of the flesh is different from the divine [nature], when it [the nature of the flesh] has become its own [of the divine nature] (ἰδία γέγονεν αὐτῆς) according to a true union.[87]

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[84] *CN* II.8, 45^{33}: παῦσαι διαιρῶν τὰς φύσεις μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν.

[85] *CN* V.4, $99^{20f.}$ (Nestorius's statement); 99^{29-32} (Cyril's rejection of such a view); IV.6, 90^{21-23} (Cyril maintains that no one confuses or mingles the natures).

[86] The verb θεωρεῖν is found several times in other contexts than (the separation of) the natures, for example, *CN* II.7, 43^{11}, 44^{6}; II.9, 46^{40}; II.10, 48^{4}; II.11, 50^{2}; V.2, 97^{35}.

[87] *CN* III.5, 72^{2-6}. With Schwartz, I follow the Roman editor Agellius in changing τὸ εἰδέναι into τῷ εἰδέναι. This sentence seems to be structured as an inclusion: (1) if you confess one Son with us, (2) you have laboured in vain, when you separate the one Son into two, and that not only to know the difference of the two natures, (3) when the flesh has become the Word's own.

We find the same reasoning, more clearly stated, earlier on in *Contra Nestorium*:

> If, you sever the natures, not only to know (οὐχὶ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον) what the human and what the divine [nature] is, but rather separating them from their concurrence into unity, you are certainly a man-worshipper (52³¹⁻³³).

'In contemplation only' is phrased here as 'only to know'.[88] And the restriction 'only' does not concern the existence of the natures, but the separation of the one Son into two hypostases and persons (according to Lebon, Cyril applies the notion of 'in contemplation only' to the natures' existence; see section 4.4.1). Cyril argues that if this separation is not just done in the mind in order to know the difference of the natures, but in reality, then it results in two Sons, and a confession of one Son has been made in vain.

In the midst of an overwhelming majority of dyophysite passages there is only one place in *Contra Nestorium* where miaphysite language is used, where Cyril speaks of one nature after the union. In its context it reads:

> For now, after the union, there is thought to be (νοεῖται) one nature, the incarnate [nature] of the Word himself, just as is reasonably thought with respect to ourselves too. For a man is truly one, composed (συγκείμενος) out of unlike realities (πραγμάτων), I mean soul and body. But it is necessary now to note that we say that the body which is united to God the Word is ensouled with a rational soul, and it is useful that we add this, too: the flesh is different from the Word of God according to the principle of its own nature, and conversely, the nature of the Word himself is substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) different. But although the things mentioned are regarded (νοεῖται) as different and scattered (διεσχοινισμένα) into natural diversity, yet Christ is regarded (νοεῖται) as one out of both (εἷς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), divinity and humanity having come together with each other according to a true union.[89]

It is noteworthy that even within this passage we also find dyophysite terminology: Cyril speaks about the flesh's own nature and about the nature of the Word himself. It is also important to note that the one-

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[88] Cyril speaks more often of 'knowing (εἰδέναι)' or 'regarding (νοεῖν)' the difference between the two natures, but then without the addition 'only' and without the link with the separation of the one Christ into two persons: II, 33¹²⁻¹⁴ (see n. 89); II.8, 45³³ᶠ·: "For it is fitting to know (εἰδέναι) that the divine and the human nature[s] are one thing and another".

[89] *CN* II, 33²⁻¹⁴. Lines 6–8: μία γὰρ ἤδη νοεῖται φύσις μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἡ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, καθάπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν νοοῖτ' ἂν εἰκότως.

nature language is immediately linked with the anthropological anal-
ogy, which is described as a composition of two REALITIES (πραγμάτων).
The comparison with soul and body closely resembles that in the *Letter
to the Monks* (see section 5.5.3), and it may be understood in the same
way: a human being is composed out of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, body
and soul, to form one SEPARATE REALITY. The incarnate Word may sim-
ilarly be regarded as one SEPARATE REALITY in which two INDIVIDUAL
NATURES are united. But how to understand the phrase 'one nature'?

It is clear that, just as with the phrase 'one person', also with 'one
nature' Cyril wants to emphasize that the result of the union of the
Word with his flesh is one entity, one SEPARATE REALITY. But just as
the word πρόσωπον in 'one person' does not simply mean SEPARATE
REALITY, neither does the word φύσις in 'one nature'. The analogy
with the composition of soul and body in a human being, which Cyril
immediately adds, may help to interpret it. In this instance in *Contra
Nestorium*, he does not elaborate on the analogy. One cannot, of course,
be entirely certain that the way in which he explains the comparison in
later writings is applicable to the passage at hand as well. Yet, it seems
to be the most appropriate course to understand 'one nature' in light of
the explanation the archbishop gives himself later on.

In three different letters, written after the reunion with John of
Antioch in 433, we find one and the the same elucidation. In the *Letter
to Eulogius*, Cyril mentions the 'one incarnate nature of the Son' and
continues:

> just as one can say regarding an ordinary human being. For he is out of
> different natures, I mean, out of body and soul. And the mind and the
> contemplation (θεωρία) know the difference, but having united them, we
> get one human nature (τότε μίαν ποιοῦμεν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν). Therefore,
> knowing the difference is not [the same things as] dividing the one Christ
> into two.[90]

In the *Second Letter to Succensus*, after having mentioned the "one nature
of the Son, but, as I said, incarnate", he adds that 'one' is not only
said of things that are simple by nature, but also of those that are
compounded (τῶν κατὰ σύνθεσιν συνηγμένων), as is the case with a
human being out of soul and body.

> For such things are of different species (ἑτεροειδῆ) and not consubstantial
> with each other, but united they bring about the one human nature (μίαν
> ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ἀπετέλεσαν), although the difference by nature (κατὰ

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[90] *Ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 35^{13–18}.

φύσιν) of the things that have come together into unity exists in the logic of the composition (τοῖς τῆς συνθέσεως λόγοις ἐνυπάρχῃ).[91]

In the *Letter to Valerian*, 'one nature' does not apply to the Logos, but to the nature of man, which is used as an image of the incarnate Word:

> For the nature of man and his constitution are admitted to be one (μία γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται φύσις ἀνθρώπου καὶ σύστασις), even though known to be from differing realities of different species (κἂν ἐκ διαφόρων νοῆται καὶ [ἐξ] ἑτεροειδῶν πραγμάτων). For it is generally accepted that the body is of a different nature (ἑτεροφυές) with respect to the soul, but it is its [the soul's] own [body], and co-completes the hypostasis of the one man.[92]

While soul and body are different natures, they come together to form the one nature of a man—this is how the three passages may be summarized. Although Cyril speaks of 'contemplation', 'knowing' and 'logic', this is not to deny that the difference between soul and body remains in reality after the union. The human nature is not a *tertium quid* of body and soul, but each remains the source of its own properties.[93] 'Knowing the difference of the natures' does not stand in opposition to 'acknowledging that the natures remain after the union', but to 'separating the natures into two distinct entities'. In one of the three letters, Cyril explicitly opposes the division of the one Christ into two to knowing the difference. The natures of soul and body are INDIVIDUAL NATURES. What, then, is the nature of a man? It is a composition of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, but nevertheless it is itself also called a nature. Since it is customary to speak of the human nature as a COMMON NATURE as well, it is no problem to regard the nature of a man also as an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, one which is composed of two other INDIVIDUAL NATURES.

The analogy suggests that the one nature of the incarnate Word also is a composition of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, the divine nature of the Word and the nature of his flesh.[94] Since this composition is unique, and it is not one exemplar of a series of individuals that share

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[91] *Ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 160¹⁻⁷.

[92] *Ep.* 50, ACO I.1.3, 92¹⁶⁻¹⁹.

[93] This is confirmed by the passages in *Contra Nestorium* according to which the soul and the body have different roles to play when a human being suffers bodily harm.

[94] In the passage in *Contra Nestorium* and in the *Second Letter to Succensus*, the language of composition is not directly applied to the incarnate Word, but to the image. In *On the Incarnation*, however, Cyril uses it several times for Emmanuel himself; see chapter 5, nn. 121 and 122. That φύσις in the μία φύσις formula stands for the composition of both INDIVIDUAL NATURES, and does not denote just the divine nature, is also suggested by the version of the formula in which 'incarnate' is a masculine rather than a feminine

a COMMON NATURE, it cannot itself be called an INDIVIDUAL NATURE. Cyril's use of the word φύσις for it is an anomaly, which does not fit well within his metaphysics, and which, therefore, cannot be translated into one small-capital term. He will have been induced to use it by the Apollinarian forgeries, which he took to be genuine works of Athanasius and other Church Fathers.[95] The meaning of the word φύσις in the μία φύσις formula is not simply that of a SEPARATE REALITY, since as the composition of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES it includes the essences of these components. It is thus not synonymous with ὑπόστασις in the 'one hypostasis' formula. The meaning of φύσις in the formula cannot be given by a particular term, but can only be described by phrases like 'a SEPARATE REALITY which is the composition of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES'.

In section 5.4.2.2, as part of the investigation of *Festal Letter* 17, the phrase 'natural unity (ἑνότης φυσική)' was discussed. Before 429, Cyril used it several times for the unity between individuals that belong to a COMMON NATURE, especially for the unity of the three divine hypostases. In *Contra Nestorium* we find this same usage twice, when Cyril writes about the operation of the Trinity.[96] In *Festal Letter* 17 and in the *Letter to the Monks*, 'natural unity' is employed for the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ, and for that of body and soul in a human being, respectively. It has been argued that in these cases it indicates a unity (1) of elements that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance, which (2) results in one SEPARATE REALITY. We encounter, not the same, but similar expressions in *Contra Nestorium*. In his response to the first quotation in Book II, Cyril says that Nestorius calls Christ Jesus, the Lord, one, in that a man is connected to God according to rank only, and not according to a true union (ἕνωσις), that is, [a union] according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν).[97] He argues that in doing this, Nestorius separates Christ into two.

A little further, having spoken of men who share the same dignity, yet are individual beings, he writes:

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participle, in which case the formula reads 'the one nature of the incarnate Word' instead of 'the one incarnate nature of the Word'. This version of the formula is found twice in *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 735de and 736e–737a.

[95] See chapter 7, n. 76, and chapter 4, n. 128.

[96] *CN* IV.2, 80[34f., 39f.].

[97] *CN* II.1, 34[27f.] and 34[39]–35[1].

But if the mode of rank were a certain forceful (ἀναγκαῖος)[98] bond which gathers them together into unity (ἑνότητα), just like a natural coming together (σύμβασις φυσική), they would not, being in equality of honours and rank, part from each other with respect to hypostases and wills (γνώμαις) in being one and another by themselves (35²²⁻²⁵).

It seems that by a 'union according to nature' and by a 'natural coming together' Cyril means something which results in a 'natural unity': a union of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES into one SEPARATE REALITY.

A similar expression is also found when the Alexandrian archbishop works out the anthropological analogy. In response to Nestorius he writes that one should not place body and soul apart and then 'co-name' the body with the soul to designate one man, "but having brought them together according to a natural union (καθ' ἕνωσιν φυσικήν) into the constitution (σύστασιν) of one human being, he will then call him a human being" (51²¹ᶠ). This 'natural union', too, can be understood as a union of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES into one SEPARATE REALITY. When, immediately afterwards, Cyril draws the conclusion from the analogy, he speaks of 'a union according to hypostasis': one must confess that, "having come together with the Word by a union according to hypostasis (τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἑνώσει), it [the body] has completed one Christ and Son and Lord" (51²³⁻²⁵).

In none of these cases the 'natural union' or 'natural coming together' is said to result in one nature, but it is implied that two natures—two INDIVIDUAL NATURES—form a unity. These phrases, then, belong to dyophysite, rather than miaphysite, language.

In all the passages referred to, Cyril does not elaborate on the status of the Word's humanity before the incarnation. From earlier writings, it has been gathered that Cyril emphasizes that the Word did not assume an individual human being or person,[99] but rather the human COMMON NATURE, which resulted in a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, and so Christ is not just God, but also an individual man (see section 3.4.3). Therefore, when 'natural unity' indicates the result of the incarnation it may denote the unity of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, but when expressions like 'natural union' would indicate the process of the

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[98] As was argued in section 5.5.3, with respect to the incarnation the word ἀναγκαῖος cannot signify a natural necessity—although it might easily be thus understood by the Antiochenes—since Cyril emphasizes that the Word voluntarily became man. Although this quotation does not apply to the incarnate Word directly, it does so indirectly, and therefore, 'forceful' seems to be the better translation in this case.

[99] See especially section 5.8.2.2.

incarnation it would have to refer to a coming together of the Word's divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE and the human COMMON NATURE, in order to be consistent. It is, however, likely that the archbishop of Alexandria did not think through his formulas in such detail at this moment of the controversy.

What is the relationship between φύσις and ὑπόστασις in christological contexts? When, in reaction to Cyril's *Letter to the Monks*, Nestorius writes that the Word does not have his dignity (ἀξίωμα) from the holy virgin, Cyril responds that he was not speaking of rank (ἀξίαν), but about nature and about the union according to hypostasis (περὶ φύσεως ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἑνώσεως), and he asks the rhetorical question: are dignity and nature not two different things?[100] Here, φύσις and ὑπόστασις are mentioned side by side, and besides the oft-repeated 'union according to hypostasis' we have also encountered the phrase 'union according to nature'. Does this mean that the two terms are synonymous? Both phrases emphasize that the result of the union is one SEPARATE REALITY, but they do this each in their own way. The words φύσις and ὑπόστασις are not synonymous, but retain their specific meaning. In this context φύσις signifies an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, and ὑπόστασις indicates real existence, and in a pregnant sense a SEPARATE REALITY.

Although, then, Cyril speaks in *Contra Nestorium* several times about the one πρόσωπον of Christ, once about "one hypostasis, the incarnate [hypostasis] of the Word", and once about "one nature, the incarnate [nature] of the Word himself", the three terms do not have the same meaning, as Lebon suggests.

> It is worthwhile to see how Cyril speaks about the human nature. We have already come across a few instances in which 'the human nature' (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις; 17[25, 28, 40]) is mentioned in soteriological contexts, in ways similar to those in his previous works. And we find this usage also elsewhere in *Contra Nestorium*, mostly with the same expression, ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, once with ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις (82[28]). It usually has a meaning which hovers between 'the human COMMON NATURE' and 'the human race'. Sometimes, it is more clearly the COMMON NATURE which is envisaged, for example, in: "he who transforms the human nature into what it was from the beginning" (83[11f.]). Sometimes, it is more clearly the human race, for example, in: "liberating in himself first the nature

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[100] *CN* I.4, 24[26f., 31f., 36].

of man from the charges of that ancient transgression" ($74^{10\,f.}$). Often, a choice between the two is not self-evident.[101] But the human nature is referred to in other than soteriological contexts as well, in which case its meaning also hovers between the human COMMON NATURE and the whole human race. Besides ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις Cyril uses various other expressions.[102]

6.3.5. Ἴδιος

Just as in the previous writings, Cyril of Alexandria employs the word ἴδιος in two ways: to indicate that which belongs to a being by nature and is shared with other beings of the same nature, and to denote that which belongs to it individually. The first category is mainly found in two expressions: (1) someone's or something's 'own nature', mostly the Word's own nature,[103] but a few times that of the body, souls or the flesh;[104] and (2) the holy Spirit is called the Son's 'own',[105] since he is from him and in him by nature (82^{37}). Similarly, the Son is the Father's 'own',[106] and conversely, the Father is the Son's 'own'.[107] Further Cyril speaks of the Word's 'own heights' (49^5), his 'own power' (76^{26}), his 'own fulness',[108] and of the flesh's 'own laws' (98^{33}).

In *Contra Nestorium*, however, ἴδιος is found more often in expressions of the second category, indicating what belongs individually. Many times, Cyril refers to the Word's 'own flesh'[109] and his 'own body';[110] less often he calls the birth of his flesh (15^{41}), his blood,[111] and his temple the Word's own.[112] A number of times the Word is said to have made a/the body his own (ἴδιον ποιήσασθαι);[113] once this is said of the flesh

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[101] Other places where 'the human nature' is mentioned in soteriological contexts are: III.6, 74^6; IV.3, 82^{28}; V, 91^{43}, 92^6; V.3, 99^{16}.

[102] *CN* I.2, 19^{36} (τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως); II.3, 38^7 (τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς φύσεως), $38^{37\,f.}$ (τῆς ἀνθρώπου φύσεως), 38^{43} (ὁ τῆς ὑπὸ νόμον φύσεως ὤν); IV.4, $84^{10\,f.}$ (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως); V.5, 102^9 (ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν).

[103] *CN* I, 16^7; II, 33^{40}; II.4, 40^3; III.3, 64^{22}; IV.1, 77^{21}; V.1, $94^{7\,f.}$. See also nn. 73 and 74.

[104] *CN* IV.5, 84^{39} (the flesh); V.4, $100^{31\,f.}$ (souls); V.6, 103^{38} (the body).

[105] *CN* II.2, $37^{28,\,32}$; III.3, 67^{39}; IV.1, 78^{16}; IV.3, $82^{3,\,16,\,20,\,21,\,32,\,37}$.

[106] *CN* III, 53^{16}; IV.2, 79^{23}; V, 92^{20}.

[107] *CN* III.3, 63^{24}; V.1, 94^4.

[108] *CN* IV.1, 77^{43}; IV.2, 79^{36}.

[109] *CN* I.3, 22^{12}; II.8, 46^7; III.3, 63^{23}; IV.3, 83^9; V.4, 100^{37}; and *passim*.

[110] *CN* I.1, 18^{15}; II.2, 37^{30}; III.1, 57^{28}; V.1, 93^{34}; V.6, 104^7; and *passim*.

[111] *CN* III.2, 62^{14}; V.7, 106^{34}.

[112] *CN* IV.3, 83^{10}; V.6, 104^{26}.

[113] *CN* I.1, $18^{4\,f.}$; II, 32^{34}; II.6, 42^{17}; III.3, 62^{32}; IV.5, 85^{28}; IV.7, 91^3; V.5, $101^{5\,f.}$, 102^{38}; V.7, 105^{27}.

(24^{34}). And he appropriates (οἰκειοῦσθαι) the birth of his own body or flesh,[114] all that belongs to his body ($63^{39f.}$), and the sufferings that have befallen his own flesh (100^{37}).

Not just quantitatively, also qualitatively, the notion that the body has become the Word's own gains in importance. Cyril now argues that if we do not say that the body has become the Word's own according to a true union, then the result would not be one person, but two.[115] He begins this sentence with a reason: "Since divinity is something else than humanity", in other words, since it concerns a coming together of two entities which belong to the Aristotelian category of substance, which are different by nature. If one of the two were a property, it would be obvious that the combination of substance and property would result in one SEPARATE REALITY. But, Cyril reasons, since both belong to the category of substance and are different by nature, they can only become one if the one becomes the other's own. Otherwise, they will remain separate and they will be two SEPARATE REALITIES— in the case of the Word and his humanity: they will be two separate hypostases, two Christs. To make this argumentation plausible, he adduces the anthropological analogy: in the same way, body and soul are different by nature and they nevertheless form one human being, because the body is regarded as the soul's own.[116]

In *Contra Nestorium*, the word ἰδικός is employed to denote particularity and distinctiveness, for the divine hypostases in the Trinity,[117] but also for two separate Sons in christology.[118] The corresponding adverb ἰδικῶς similarly indicates that the divine hypostases exist 'by themselves' (77^3); that, in the view rejected by Cyril, Christ is divided into a man 'by himself' and the Word 'by himself';[119] and that, in another view rejected by Cyril, a divine deed is attributed to one of the hypostases

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[114] *CN* I.1, 18^{16} (the birth of his own body); III.3, $63^{22f.}$ (the birth of his own flesh).

[115] *CN* III.6, $73^{1–17}$. See n. 65.

[116] Siddals (1984), 136f., quotes this passage, translating the word ἴδιον as 'property', as evidence for her theory that Cyril describes the relationship between the Word and his humanity as that between a substance and its property, and as ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ. It is, however, better not to give ἴδιον the technical meaning of 'property' in this passage, but to translate it as 'own', for it is virtually inconceivable that Cyril would regard the body as a 'property' of the soul. See also section 4.3.4.

[117] *CN* I, 15^{23}; V.6, 103^{36}.

[118] *CN* II.1, $36^{8,\,18}$; II.6, 43^1; II.10, 48^{31}; III.2, 60^{32}.

[119] *CN* I.1, 18^{19}; II, 33^2; II.8, 46^1; III.6, 73^5; IV.5, 84^{36}; V.1, 94^{22}; and *passim*.

'by himself'.[120] That Christ is divided into two hypostases 'by themselves' is also expressed by the word ἰδίᾳ.[121]

6.3.6. Ἕνωσις *and* Συνάφεια

Throughout *Contra Nestorium*, Cyril uses the noun ἕνωσις (union) and various, mainly passive, forms of the verb ἑνοῦν (to unite) for his own christology, and the noun συνάφεια (connection) and various, mainly passive, forms of the verb συνάπτειν (to connect) for the view which he attributes to Nestorius.[122] And yet, he makes it clear that it is not the words but the underlying conceptions that he is really concerned about. There are various indications for this. First of all, his repeated explanations of these terms in other words, emphasizing that in his own view Christ is ontologically one, united 'according to hypostasis', while he regards Nestorius's 'connection' as resulting in two Sons who only have an external relation with each other. Secondly, Cyril discusses explicitly what the mode of the connection (ὁ τρόπος τῆς συναφείας) is.[123] Thirdly, he also uses cognates of ἕνωσις for Nestorius's understanding[124] and for the relational union that human beings have with God and with each other.[125] Fourthly, he suggests that the union of the Word with his flesh could be called a 'connection according to hypostasis (συνάφεια καθ' ὑπόστασιν)'.[126]

It may be added that Cyril once speaks of an indwelling (κατοίκησις) according to hypostasis, as an explanation of Col. 2:9 (30[37f.]), and once writes that the Word participated in one flesh according to hypostasis, with a reference to Hebr. 2:14. The latter passage is especially interesting because of the word 'one'. Cyril argues against the word 'indwelling' for the relationship between the Word and his flesh, since he is said to indwell the saints as well. Over against this he declares that the Word has once come into our condition and has participated in one

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[120] *CN* IV.2, 80[6, 12, 33].

[121] *CN* II, 33[2]; III.1, 56[28]; III.5, 72[3, 17].

[122] More precisely, συνάφεια and its cognates do not occur in Book IV, not even in Nestorius's quotations. In that Book, we do find the notions of indwelling and God-bearing.

[123] *CN* II.1, 35[18–28]; II.6, 42[7–23]; II.8, 45[20–25], 46[8–27]; II.9, 46[41]–47[6]; II.13, 52[1–8].

[124] *CN* II.8, 44[18], 45[6, 11].

[125] *CN* I.3, 22[18]; IV.5, 85[38]; V.1, 93[40].

[126] *CN* I.4, 23[19f.]. Cf. *Dial. Trin.* I, 406a; VI, 605d.

flesh according to hypostasis.[127] Thus he relationally indwells the saints, but he is hypostatically united to only one flesh, to a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, which implies that the incarnate Word is an individual man.

Besides the two main terms, ἕνωσις / ἑνοῦν and συνάφεια / συνάπτειν, Cyril employs several other nouns and verbs to describe the coming together of the Word and his flesh, all beginning with the prefix συν, most of which we have already encountered in previous works, but their frequency is relatively low. There are those words which indicate the coming (or having come) together of the elements in Christ, or of body and soul, or of the elements in other analogies: συμβαίνειν / σύμβασις,[128] σύνοδος,[129] συνδρομή (52[32]), συνδεῖσθαι / σύνδεσμος.[130] And there are those active verbs which indicate that the Word binds the flesh to himself, or, more often, that a human being binds the elements together in the mind: συλλέγειν,[131] συμφέρειν,[132] συνάγειν (44[18]), συνδεῖν,[133] συνεισφέρειν (45[36]). Finally, the participle συγκείμενος (composed) is used twice for body and soul in a human being.[134]

In Cyril's treatment of the unity of the incarnate Word, there is no indication that he is aware of Aristotle's various sorts of oneness.[135] None of the Stagirite's divisions or terms is used by the archbishop of Alexandria.

6.3.7. Σχέσις

For the neo-Platonist commentators on Aristotle, the word σχέσις was a technical term for 'relation'.[136] Cyril of Alexandria uses it as such in the *Thesaurus* and especially in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*.[137] In *Contra Nesto-*

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[127] *CN* IV.2, 79[14]: γεγονότος δὲ ἅπαξ ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καὶ σαρκὶ μιᾷ καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν κεκοινωνηκότος.

[128] *CN* I.3, 22[10, 11]; II, 33[14]; II.1, 35[3, 23, 26]; II.6, 42[29]; II.8, 45[14], 46[5]; II.9, 47[1]; III.6, 73[3, 5].

[129] *CN* I.6, 26[25]; II, 33[32]; II.1, 34[35]; II.12, 50[12]; III.5, 72[5]; III.6, 73[15].

[130] *CN* II, 33[33]; II.8, 44[18].

[131] *CN* II.1, 35[22]; II.8, 45[6]; III.5, 72[2].

[132] *CN* II.13, 51[21, 24]; III, 54[3]. The verb is also employed for the unity of Christians with Christ and with each other: IV.5, 85[42].

[133] *CN* II, 34[10]; III.5, 72[29]. The verb is also employed for the unity of Christians with God and with each other: III.3, 65[30]; IV.5, 85[40].

[134] *CN* II, 33[8]; II.12, 50[19].

[135] See section 2.3.3.

[136] De Durand, SC 237, 414f., note * to *Dial. Trin.* IV, 509. See also *idem*, SC 231, 382f., note * to *Dial. Trin.* II, 428.

[137] See sections 2.5.4 through 2.5.6.

rium, he employs it—and more often the corresponding adjective and adverb, σχετικός and σχετικῶς,—to denote a relation between the Word and a second Son, over against his own understanding of the Word's union with his flesh. It is usually added as an explanation of how he regards Nestorius's 'connection (συνάφεια)' or 'indwelling (ἐνοίκησις)'. A number of times it comes together with the word 'external' (θύραθεν or ἔξωθεν). So, Cyril can write:

> If he really has been made man and has become flesh, then he is believed to be conceived of as man, and not as connected with a man, merely according to an indwelling or according to some sort of external relation or a connection, as you say.[138]

Or: "... the Only-Begotten has become man, not simply according to a connection, as he says, considered as external and relational, but according to a true union".[139] Once, it is combined with juxtaposition and proximity: "a connection, perhaps conceived of as according to proximity only or according to juxtaposition or as relational".[140]

Besides other instances in which they refer to two Sons in christology,[141] Cyril also employs these terms to the relations between believers and God, and between believers with each other. In a first instance, the Alexandrian archbishop opposes our relational connection with God to the union in Christ:

> If you say that [in Christ] the assumption or the connection is external and relational (ἔξωθέν τε καὶ σχετικήν), how have you forgotten that God is also in us, and that we are relationally (σχετικῶς) connected with him and have become partakers of the divine nature? (52³⁻⁶).

In a second case, he speaks of Christ as mediator: "He has also been appointed as mediator, through himself binding together into a relational unity things that are completely separated from each other by the principles of their nature[s]" (65³⁰ᶠ). Bound together in a relational

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[138] *CN* I.3, 21⁴¹–22²: οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ τινὶ συνημμένος κατὰ μόνην τὴν ἐνοίκησιν ἢ γοῦν κατά τινα τῶν ἔξωθεν σχέσεων ἤτοι συνάφειαν, ὡς σὺ φῄς.

[139] *CN* II, 33³⁻⁵: οὐ κατὰ συνάφειαν ἁπλῶς, ..., τὴν θύραθεν ἐπινοουμένην ἤτοι σχετικήν.

[140] *CN* II.5, 41³⁸ᶠ: συνάφειαν ... τάχα που τὴν κατ' ἐγγύτητα μόνην καὶ κατὰ παράθεσιν ἢ γοῦν σχετικὴν νοουμένην. The words κατὰ παράθεσιν and ἐγγύτητα return shortly afterwards, in II.6, 42⁹.

[141] *CN* I.2, 20²⁰ (a relational indwelling); I.8, 30³⁷ᶠ (assume the indwelling to be simple or relational); II.1, 36³⁻⁵ (a relation to him); II.8, 46⁴ (connected relationally); II.11, 49¹⁸ (he connects a man with God according to an external relation), 49³³ᶠ (a relational connection).

unity are the believers and God (the Father), through Christ. In himself, there is a union according to hypostasis, and as a result of this, the believers have a relational unity with the Father.[142] This is made more explicit in the third and final passage: "Through him, we have been rendered partakers of the divine nature, …, being united relationally (σχετικῶς) through him to the Father and also to each other" (93³⁹⁻⁴¹).

6.4. Christology

An oft-recurring term in *Contra Nestorium* is 'mystery (μυστήριον)': the mystery of Christ,[143] the mystery regarding (ἐπί or κατά or περί) Christ,[144] the plan or principle (λόγος) of the mystery,[145] the power (δύναμις) of the mystery,[146] etc. This term has its origin in Scripture, especially in 1 Tim. 3:16—"Beyond question, great is the mystery of godliness"—which Cyril cites or refers to a few times.[147] At the beginning of Book III, after having quoted the verse, he gives a brief summary of the content of the mystery, which includes the incarnation, but also salvation through the incarnate Word, and being made partakers of the divine nature.[148] He adds that faith is needed, rather than subtle investigations. When he discusses the Eucharist in Book IV, he cites Eph. 3:1–6, in which the word μυστήριον occurs twice (85⁴³–86⁶). In this context, it becomes clear that for Cyril the mystery includes the life-giving power of 'the unbloody sacrifice' (86¹⁹⁻²¹).

At the heart of the mystery is the incarnation, in Cyril's eyes. At the very beginning of *Contra Nestorium*, he even speaks of "the august and great mystery of the inhumanation of the Only-Begotten" (14⁴⁰ᶠ). In the following elaboration he includes the salvation through Christ, but—no doubt induced by the controversy with Nestorius—he concludes: "Necessary, then, for the faith of the mystery and for the exact demonstration thereof, is the reality of the true union, I mean

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[142] See for a discussion of Christ's mediation also section 3.4.3.

[143] E.g., *CN* II, 33¹⁷.

[144] E.g., *CN* III.6, 75⁴.

[145] E.g., *CN* III.3, 66²⁷.

[146] E.g., *CN* V.7, 106³ᶠ.

[147] *CN* III, 53¹ (the first words of Book III, a virtually literal quotation: μέγα μὲν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον); III.6, 73²² ("the great mystery of godliness"); IV, 78³¹ ("the mystery of godliness").

[148] See section 6.2.3.

that according to hypostasis" ($15^{36\text{f.}}$). The centrality of the incarnation can also be seen in his exposition of the story of Jacob's struggle at the river Jabbok (Gen. 32:24–33). The one with whom the patriarch wrestled was a man, a "type of the mystery" ($66^{24\text{f.}}$), for Jacob said that he had seen God face to face. This man, then, is a type of Christ, who is both God and man.

An essential aspect of the mystery is the coming together in Christ of two things that are in themselves at a vast distance from each other, divinity and humanity. The emphasis on the enormous difference between the divine and the human can be found in previous writings as well.[149] And part of his reasoning over against Nestorius is that equality of rank or honours is impossible for things that are so different by nature; therefore, in order for the man Jesus Christ to be honoured as God and to be ascribed God-befitting attributes he must himself be God, that is, God the Word.[150] Instead of an external relationship between two Sons, a true union has taken place, ineffably and beyond understanding.[151]

Just as in the earlier writings, the terminology of both the subject-attribute and the composition models is present in *Contra Nestorium*, although it seems that the composition model is dominant. This is not surprising, since one of the main lines of argumentation is to place a real union over against Nestorius's connection, which is perceived to result in two Sons. A number of times we encounter the anthropological analogy. Broadly speaking, they can be classified into two groups. One could say that the first group belongs more to the subject-attribute model, while the second group is part of the composition model.

In the instances of the first group the adjective 'own (ἴδιος)' or verbs like 'to make one's own (ἰδιοποιεῖσθαι)' or 'to appropriate (οἰκειοῦσθαι)' play a role. In Christ, the Word is the subject, while his body or the

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[149] *Thesaurus*, 324B. *Dial. Trin.* I, 393e ("the difference is vast"). But also in a christological context: *In Jo.* VI.1, vol. 2, 232f. (653de); see for a quotation of this passage, chapter 3, n. 266.

[150] *CN* II.5, 41^{34}: "Why, then, do you regard it appropriate to gather, as you yourself say, into one sovereign power and to crown with equal honours things that substantially are so far off from communion with each other and also from equality?" See also II.6, $42^{30–37}$ (see for a translation chapter 4, n. 76); II.8, $45^{33–37}$ ("incomparable differences"); "but with respect to Christ, the Saviour of all of us, having brought them together into a true and hypostatic union, reject the division"); II.12, $50^{40}–51^2$ ("incomparable differences").

[151] *CN* II, $33^{2–5}$. Cf. II.9, $46^{41}–47^6$.

things pertaining to his body are the predicate, just as in a human being the soul may be regarded as the subject and the body as the predicate. So Cyril writes that the body united to the Word is his own (ἴδιον) and not someone else's, just as with each of us our body is our own.[152] Similarly, he contends that one should not call Christ an instrument of the Godhead, but rather that he uses his own body as an instrument, just as a man's soul does that.[153]

When Cyril speaks of Christ's bodily sufferings, he compares the Word in Christ with the souls of the martyrs.[154] A human soul does not undergo the sufferings of its body in its own nature, but it is not out of reach (ἔξω) of these sufferings, for it suffers the things of its own body, and not those of other bodies. Likewise, the Word appropriated (ᾠκειώσατο) the sufferings of his own body, while he remained impassible as God. Elsewhere, he writes that, just as we say that a man has died, while it is his body and not his soul that underwent death, so we attribute Christ's death to the Word, since he made the body his own (ἴδιον ἐποιήσατο; 105²⁷), although he did not suffer as God.

In instances of the second group, the comparison concerns the coming together into one entity of two things that are different by nature. The natures of body and soul are not the same, and yet they come together into one human being. So also in Christ, divinity and humanity differ in respect of their mode of being, but because of their union he is one Lord and Son (42²⁷⁻³⁷). Therefore, one should not say that one venerates the worn (the man Jesus) because of the wearer (the Word), just as we do not venerate the king's body because of his soul (50¹⁵⁻²³). In this context, Cyril writes that a human being is composed (συγκείμενος; 50¹⁹) out of two things, soul and body. When he takes up the analogy again a little further, he speaks of 'a natural union' (ἕνωσιν φυσικήν; 51²¹ᶠ·) of soul and body. As has been argued (in section 6.3.4), a 'natural union' is a union of two things that belong to the category of substance, two natures.

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[152] *CN* I.1, 16⁴²–17². See also *CN* III.6, 73⁵⁻⁸, where Cyril adds that soul and body are of a different nature (ἑτεροφυές).

[153] *CN* II.8, 46²⁸⁻³¹. For Cyril, 'Christ' is the incarnate Word. Therefore, Christ is the subject and should not be treated as a predicate of the Word.

[154] *CN* V.4, 100²⁵⁻³⁸. Although Cyril does not mention Christ's human soul in this passage, it is clear from other parts of his oeuvre that he does not mean to say that the Word has taken the place of the human soul, in an Apollinarian sense. See, e.g., section 5.3.1.

Cyril's elucidation of the μία φύσις formula belongs to this second group. When he speaks of "the one nature, the incarnate [nature] of the Word himself" (33⁶ᶠ·), this phrase is immediately followed by the comparison with soul and body. He is one nature "just as (καθάπερ)" this is thought of a human being, who is truly one, composed (συγκείμενος) out of dissimilar realities (πραγμάτων), soul and body. And also in his defence of the title θεοτόκος Cyril stresses the unity of the one Christ by comparing him with a human being out of (ἐκ) soul and body (24⁹⁻²¹). Although a woman only contributes the body, not the soul, she is nevertheless called the bearer of the whole man, he argues. Similarly, although the Word's existence did not begin in the womb of the virgin, he was united (ἑνωθέντα) to the flesh borne by her and, therefore, she may be called 'bearer of God'.¹⁵⁵

The Alexandrian archbishop apparently sees in the composition of a human being out of soul and body a useful analogy for the incarnate Word. Both consist of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, which are substantially different, but which nevertheless together form one SEPARATE REALITY. A distinction should be made between the process of coming together and the result. The result is in both cases one SEPARATE REALITY consisting of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES. But while in the case of a human being, one can also say that two INDIVIDUAL NATURES come together, we have seen that in earlier writings it seems that it is the human COMMON NATURE that comes together with the Word in the incarnation, although it results in the Word becoming an individual human being— and therefore, it results in a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE which is united to the Word. But the link between the human COMMON NATURE and the Word remains as well, which is important for soteriological reasons: what happens to Christ has effects for ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις in the sense of both the human COMMON NATURE and the whole human race.

We have also encountered other familiar ways of denoting the two opposing understandings of the incarnation. In the rejected view, Christ is considered as a God-bearing man. Pusey translates θεοφόρος now by 'God-bearing',¹⁵⁶ then by 'God-clad'.¹⁵⁷ The latter translation suggests a view in which a man is clothed with God. When Cyril uses the metaphor of clothing in earlier writings, however, the roles are reversed:

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¹⁵⁵ Cf. a similar argumentation in Cyril's *Letter to the Monks*; see section 5.5.1.

¹⁵⁶ Pusey, *CN* ET, 11, 13, 37, 39, 95, 157.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 128, 129, 140, 151, 152, 153. Russell (2000), 167, 171 (2), 173, translates θεοφόρος by 'God-bearing' in these instances, too.

the Word is clothed with humanity.[158] 'God-bearing' seems to be the better translation. Also when Nestorius writes that he venerates the worn because of the wearer, the wearer is the Word and the worn the humanity.[159] Apart from his response to this quotation, and from the expression 'the naked (γυμνός) Word' for the Word without his flesh,[160] Cyril does not employ the metaphor of clothing in *Contra Nestorium*.

The notion of 'indwelling a man' is regarded as Nestorian and indicative of a two-Sons christology. To explain that Scripture says that God's fulness dwells in Christ (Col. 1:19; 2:9) Cyril adds καθ' ὑπόστασιν: the fulness dwells in him according to hypostasis.[161] In line with his position in *On the Incarnation* (see section 5.3.3), the Alexandrian archbishop uses the word 'temple (ναός)' for the body of Christ, not for his whole humanity. And since 'flesh' may denote the humanity, "it is, therefore, better and wiser to call the body the temple of the Word, and the flesh his own" (82$^{22f.}$). And just as in his *Letter to the Monks* (see section 5.5.3), Cyril does not accept that Christ is called an instrument of the Godhead; one had rather call his own body an instrument (46$^{28-31}$).

While in earlier writings Cyril described Nestorius's understanding of Christ also as 'a mere (ψιλός) man',[162] in *Contra Nestorium* it is Nestorius who denounces the expression, in response to Cyril's *Letter to the Monks*.[163] The Alexandrian archbishop himself speaks a few times of 'a mere connection'.[164] For Nestorius's view, he now uses the phrase 'simply (ἁπλῶς) a man',[165] while the adverb 'simply' and the adjective 'simple' recur in other expressions as well.[166]

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[158] See chapter 5, nn. 128 and 129.

[159] *CN* II.12, 50^{12}. When Nestorius writes that the Word "has put on the form of a slave", and "has put on the person of a poor one" (*CN* V.3, 97$^{42f.}$: twice περιβέβλημαι), Cyril does not take up this language.

[160] See, e.g., *CN* II.2, 37^{5}.

[161] *CN* I.8, 30$^{37f.}$. See further section 6.3.6.

[162] See sections 5.4.3 and 5.5.3.

[163] *CN* II.10, 47^{7}, repeated in 47^{14} and 47^{18}, and alluded to in 47^{23}. Also in V.2, 95$^{34, 36}$. Cyril himself employs the expression in V.3, 98^{6}.

[164] *CN* III.4, 71^{10}; V.5, 101$^{32f.}$.

[165] E.g., *CN* II.2, 37^{11}; V.7, 105^{42}.

[166] *CN* I.8, 30^{37} ("a simple or relational indwelling"); II, 33$^{3f.}$ ("simply according to a connection"); III.6, 73^{15} ("a connection, simply according to a coming together in rank only and in sovereign power"); IV.6, 89^{13} ("simply a God-bearing man").

6.4.1. *Attributing the Sayings*

An aspect of the controversy which gains in importance in *Contra Nesto-rium*, and which will later find a place in Cyril's anathemas and in the Formula of Reunion, is the attribution of sayings (φωναί) from the Scriptures. Nestorius wants to make sure that human actions and prop-erties are not ascribed to the divinity, and conversely, divine actions and properties to the humanity. Cyril detects in this further proof that Nestorius divides the one Christ into two. Over against this, he wants to emphasize that both sorts of actions and properties are allotted to one and the same person, Emmanuel, the Word incar-nate.

The issue comes up in several of Nestorius's quotations. He writes that his opponents do not refer the lower things to the humanity, but, as if a mixture has taken place and the two natures are not divided, all things are said of one [subject], not according to the rank based on connection, but according to nature (34^{25-28}). The Constantinopolitan archbishop argues that titles like 'Christ', 'Lord', 'Son' signify both natures, sometimes the one nature, at other times the other nature, and sometimes both together; therefore, both the human and the divine things can be attributed to them. 'God (the Word)', however, only denotes the divine nature and, therefore, only the divine things may be ascribed to him.[167] But Cyril attributes all actions and properties to the divine Word, also the human ones, Nestorius implies.[168]

This is correct, Cyril does attribute also the human things to the Word—to the incarnate Word, that is. It does not mean, however, that the lower deeds and properties are ascribed to the divinity, but the Word has appropriated all the things of the flesh when he made the flesh his own. In a typically Cyrillian expression: the Word does not suffer in his own nature, but he appropriates the sufferings of his own flesh.[169] The distinction that Cyril makes here between 'the Word' and 'his own nature' seems to be lost on Nestorius, for whom the Word *is*

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[167] *CN* II.1, 34^{29-31}; II.2, 36^{21-32}; IV.6, $87^{26f.}$, repeated in $88^{12f.}$. Cf. I.2, $18^{30f.}$; I.7, $27^{5f.}$; I.8, 28^{32-40}.

[168] In his tenth sermon (Nestorius (1905), 274^{4-8}), quoted in *CN* II.2, 36^{24-26}, Nestorius takes the example of Gal. 4:4 ("God sent his Son") and says that it does not say: "God sent God the Word".

[169] Cf. *CN* V.4, 100^{30-38}.

his own nature; therefore, when the Word is said to suffer, the divinity is said to suffer.

This misunderstanding comes across in the many practical examples that Nestorius gives in the quotations, sometimes in stark language, like: the side that was pierced, "was it that of the body, or that of the divinity (θεότης)?" ($87^{41\,\text{f.}}$). Other examples include: "Do you say that the divinity has been born from the holy virgin?" ($16^{20\,\text{f.}}$), although in this case Nestorius adds that his opponents "recoil at the saying"; "in order that no one would suppose that the divinity, having been made man (ἐνανθρωπήσασαν), had died" ($21^{28\,\text{f.}}$); "as though the divinity suffered these things" ($27^{8\,\text{f.}}$).

Cyril, on the other hand, interprets Nestorius's division of the sayings as a separation into two Sons. He divides up the sayings in the Gospels, assigning some of them to the Word by himself, others to the one from the woman by himself, Cyril writes ($33^{1\,\text{f.}}$). He severs Christ into two persons and hypostases, which are completely separated from each other, while he attributes the sayings that belong to them (αὐτῇ; to each hypostasis) to each (ἑκατέρᾳ) separately.[170] And Nestorius allots the thorny crown and the other sufferings to a man by himself and separately ($47^{23\,\text{f.}}$).

The archbishop of Alexandria certainly distinguishes between divine and human properties, but, because he wants to safeguard the unity of Christ, he uses different language to express it. One way he does this is to write that Christ does or is certain things 'as God (ὡς Θεός)' and other things 'as man (ὡς ἄνθρωπος)'. For example,

> Observe, then, the Word born of God, magnificent as God in the highest glory and on the throne of the Godhead, and the same one executing the office of a priest as man (62^{7-9}).

Another way is to employ the adverbs 'divinely (θεικῶς)' and 'humanly (ἀνθρωπίνως)': "You see him being anointed humanly; see the same one also anointing divinely" ($67^{29\,\text{f.}}$). Cyril employs various other words and expressions to indicate whether something applies to Christ as man or as God. First of all, the biblical expression 'to suffer in the flesh (παθεῖν σαρκί)', which is taken from 1 Peter 4:1. Then the similar phrase 'according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα)', for example, "for the Word out of God the Father has been born with us according to the flesh" ($59^{10\,\text{f.}}$).

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[170] *CN* II.1, 34^{37-39}. Cf. II.10, $48^{30\,\text{f.}}$.

Further, 'economically (οἰκονομικῶς)',[171] 'according to what is human (κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον)',[172] 'as [one] like us (ὡς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς)'.[173]

Cyril makes all sorts of combinations of these phrases, such as:

> And ju $ as he is said to suffer in the flesh humanly (σαρκί ἀνθρωπίνως), although he is impassible by nature (τὴν φύσιν) as God (ὡς Θεός), so he is considered to be anointed according to what is human (κατά γε τὸ ἀνθρώπινον), although he himself anoints with his own Spirit (37[30–32]).

Especially with regard to the divine, rather than the human, deeds and properties, an important category of such expressions contains the word φύσις. First, there are the properties like 'invisible', 'good', 'holy', 'impassible', which the incarnate Word is said to be 'by nature' (κατὰ φύσιν or τὴν φύσιν).[174] This phrase can also be combined with the others, as is already seen in the example just quoted. Elsewhere, Cyril writes that the Word, "being impassible by nature, suffered voluntarily in the flesh" (102[19f.]). Secondly, there are the references to the Word's 'own nature'. So: "For the Word, being God, was not anointed according to his own nature, the anointing rather belonged to him concerning that which is human".[175] Or:

> He who is free according to his own nature as God, who is in the form and equality of his Begetter, has been called a slave, not refusing economically the measure of those who are under the yoke of bondage.[176]

Once Cyril actually speaks of attributing something to the divine nature: "And do not be surprised if he [Christ] allotted (νενέμηκε) being before Abraham to his own nature", after a citation of John 8:58 (63[28f.]). That the archbishop is cautious with the word φύσις with regard to the humanity of Christ is nothing new. We have seen that he is that already in the trinitarian writings. The most likely reason for it is that, over against the Arians, he wanted to stress that Christ is God by nature; speaking of a human nature of Christ could give the impression that he was a mere man (see section 3.4.4).

Cyril does not have a problem, then, with the attribution of Christ's deeds and properties to each of his natures, although he hardly speaks

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[171] *CN* V.3, 99[13f.]: "he voluntarily underwent death on the wood economically".

[172] *CN* V.2, 97[34]: "even if he is said to be weak according to what is human".

[173] *CN* II.4, 39[33f.]: "since in due time, Christ, too, was to be under the law as [one] like us and as man".

[174] See section 6.3.4, nn. 69–71.

[175] *CN* II.2, 37[7–9]: κατ᾽ ἰδίαν φύσιν ... περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον.

[176] *CN* III.1, 57[2–4]: κατὰ φύσιν ἰδίαν ... ὡς Θεός ... οἰκονομικῶς.

in this way. Here, we have one example in which something is ascribed to the divine nature. In section 5.4.2.2 we have seen an instance in which an accident is assigned to Christ's 'nature like ours'. Expressions like 'he suffers in the flesh, not in his own nature' have the same meaning, but they have the advantage for Cyril of showing that it concerns one subject, one GRAMMATICAL PERSON, but then also one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. In the way Nestorius allocates the sayings, however, Cyril sees the same two-Sons christology reflected which he also perceives in the refusal to call Mary *theotokos*, and in Nestorius's connection according to rank. It is the attribution of the sayings to two separate persons which the Alexandrian archbishop rejects, not the realization that some deeds and properties have the divine nature as their source, while others have the human nature as their source, natures of which he explicitly states that they have not been mixed or confused.

6.4.2. *Metaphysics*

Although there is hardly any passage in *Contra Nestorium* devoted to Cyril of Alexandria's metaphysics as such, as is the case in the *Thesaurus* and in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, the investigation of some of the terminology in section 6.3 has shown that—not surprisingly—the same metaphysical view and largely similar language underlie Cyril's Books against Nestorius as in the earlier writings. For certain details pertinent to christology, this may be made more explicit.

Insofar as Cyril uses metaphysical language for the relationship between substances and their characteristics—which is not often—it is in line with what was found in section 3.2.2. The divine properties are called "the things that are attached to him by nature".[177] More often we find forms of the verb 'to inhere (ἐνεῖναι)', for example: "the pre-eminence that inheres him [the Word]",[178] "the wisdom and grace that inhere him [the Word] naturally",[179] "the natural energy that inheres it [fire]".[180]

We also encounter verbs with the prefix περι, but this time the characteristics are not the subject of the verbs—'to lie round', 'to hover round'—, as in the trinitarian writings, but the object; it is

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[177] *CN* II.7, 43[16]: τὰ φύσει προσόντα αὐτῷ.
[178] *CN* II.11, 49[14]: τῆς ἐνούσης ὑπεροχῆς αὐτῷ.
[179] *CN* III.4, 70[10f.]: σοφίας καὶ χάριτος τῆς ἐνούσης αὐτῷ φυσικῶς.
[180] *CN* IV.5, 84[27f.]: τῆς ἐνούσης αὐτῷ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας.

human beings who, in their minds, 'place them round' substances or individuals. So Cyril asks: "Would you, if you placed the glory of a man round (περιθείς) a horse, do something praiseworthy?" (51²). And he accuses Nestorius of "putting round (περιτιθείς) a naked creature the glories of the highest nature" (97²⁵). Elsewhere he argues that we must either place the sufferings round (περιτιθέναι) a mere man, or confess that the Word suffered according to the flesh (98⁵⁻⁹). Even if this 'placing round' is a noetic activity, it nevertheless supports the metaphor of place that underlies the three figures in section 5.3.3, since for Cyril our knowledge may be reliable, even if it is limited (see section 2.5.1): properties may be regarded as lying round substances or individual beings.

Our study of the terminology has shown that, according to *Contra Nestorium*, the incarnate Word may be regarded as one SEPARATE REAL-ITY consisting of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES. Once, this SEPARATE REALITY is called 'one hypostasis'. Mostly, it is indicated simply by 'one', or by such expressions as 'one Christ and Son and Lord', 'the one and only' or 'the same'. Several times it is referred to as 'one πρόσωπον', which indicates that this SEPARATE REALITY is a PERSON, a rational being capable of personal relations with other rational beings.

The attribution of the sayings, though in itself a grammatical procedure, has ontological implications for Cyril. He hardly ever allots the sayings directly to one of the natures of Christ, because he does by no means want to give the impression that it concerns natures that are completely separate, as two persons. But the way in which he assigns the sayings—with phrases like 'in his own nature', 'in the flesh', etc.— shows that he clearly distinguishes the two natures as the source of particular actions and properties.[181] Besides, he explicitly acknowledges the difference of the natures and rejects their mixture or confusion. All this confirms the picture in figure 2, in which the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES remain after the union.

Cyril himself refers to his own party in the controversy as "those who attribute the sayings in the Gospels to one person".[182] And one of the main problems Nestorius has with Cyril's christology is that he ascribes human attributes like birth, sufferings, and death, to the Word—though Cyril himself constantly makes it clear that he means the incarnate

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[181] It seems that the recurring phrase 'the principle(s) (λόγος) of the nature' regards the nature more expressly as a source of properties.

[182] *CN* II.2, 36⁶: τοὺς ἑνὶ προσώπῳ προσνέμοντας τὰς ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις φωνάς.

Word, not the 'naked' Word. Cyril's concept of 'appropriation' is an expression of the ontological basis for the ascription of human properties to the divine Word: the Word appropriates the birth of his own body,[183] all that belongs to his own body (63[39f.]), the sufferings that have befallen his own flesh (100[34f.]).

Although the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES can be distinguished and remain the source of particular actions and properties, they are united to such a degree—'according to hypostasis'—that they should be regarded as one entity. That implies that all the actions and properties are to be attributed to this one SEPARATE REALITY. In terms of the figures in section 5.3.3: both the divine and the human properties lie round the combination of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, as in figure 2, not the divine properties round the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE and the human properties round the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, as in figure 4. This is also expressed by the communication of properties, of which there are not only examples in *Contra Nestorium*, but a more general statement as well: "The things of the humanity have become the Word's own, and conversely, those of the Word himself the humanity's own".[184]

6.4.2.1. *The Scented Flower*

According to Ruth M. Siddals, "the analytical precision" of the analogy of a flower and its scent "marks the high point of Cyrilline christology".[185] There are only two places in Cyril's christological works where this analogy is utilized, one in *Contra Nestorium*,[186] the other in the *Scholia on the Incarnation*.[187]

We have already come across the analogy in a trinitarian context.[188] There, the scent is regarded as a radiated factor, which has the same nature as the substance it belongs to, that is, the flower. The radiated factor is in the substance, and the other way round. This is regarded as an illustration of the relations within the Trinity, especially that between

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[183] *CN* I.1, 18[15f.]. Cf. III.3, 63[22f.].

[184] *CN* III.3, 63[42f.]: γέγονε τοίνυν ἴδια μὲν τοῦ λόγου τὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, ἴδια δὲ πάλιν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου.

[185] Siddals (1984), 137. See also sections 3.4.2, 4.3.2 and 4.3.4, and the article, Siddals (1985).

[186] *CN* II, 33[38]–34[2].

[187] *Scholia*, ACO I.5, 221[33]–222[11].

[188] See section 3.4.2. Boulnois (1994), 159–170, discusses various ways in which Cyril employs the analogy in his teaching about the Trinity.

the Father and the Son. The Son goes out from the Father, just as the radiated factor from the substance. They are of the same nature, and the Father is in the Son just as the Son is in the Father.[189]

In christology, however, Cyril argues in a different way:

> Again, our Lord Jesus Christ likens himself to a pearl, saying: "The kingdom of heaven is like a merchant searching for fine pearls, who, having found one pearl of great value, went and sold all that he had and bought it" [Mt. 13:45–46]. I also hear him presenting himself to us in another way, saying: "I am a flower of the plain, a lily of the valleys" [Song 2:1, LXX]. For he has in his own nature the God-befitting radiance of God the Father, and, in turn, he gives forth a fragrance—I speak of a spiritual fragrance. Just as with the pearl and also with the lily, the body is regarded as the substratum (τὸ ὑποκείμενον), and the radiance or the fragrance in it [are regarded] as different from the things in which they are, according to their own principle (λόγον), and yet as the things that inseparably inhere (τὰ ἀχωρίστως ἐμπεφυκότα) them they are their possessors' own things (ἴδια), and not foreign (ἀλλότρια) to them— in the same way, I think, we should reason and think and reflect with regard to Emmanuel, too. For divinity and flesh are different by nature, but the body was the Word's own, and the Word, united to the body, is not separated from it. For Emmanuel, that is, God with us, should be conceived of in this way, and not in another way.[190]

In the trinitarian writings, Cyril treats the fragrance as a radiated factor which is of the *same* nature as its substance, and he employs this as an image of the consubstantiality of Father and Son. Here, however, he regards the fragrance as an inherent factor, which is *different* from the lily 'according to its own principle', and he employs it as an image of the difference in nature between the Word and his flesh. Just as the fragrance is the lily's own, so the body is the Word's own.

It is noteworthy that with respect to the fragrance, Cyril does not say that it differs from the lily 'by nature'; he merely says that it differs 'according to its own principle (λόγον)', since an inherent factor is not a nature, a substance. And yet, he employs this difference as an analogy of the natural difference between the Word and his flesh. Siddals comments:

> The difference which Cyril is clearly invoking here, is much more radical than either specific or generic difference. Self-existent substances and

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[189] In *Contra Nestorium*, the image of a flower and its scent is not applied to the relation between the Father and the Son, but we do find the example of another radiated factor, the radiance of the sun (*CN* IV.5, 85$^{21-27}$).

[190] *CN* II, 33^{35}–34^{5}.

inherent qualities exist in a totally different way, each having a different
kind of nature.[191]

This is one of very few places in Cyril's works in which he indeed
likens Christ's humanity to an inherent factor, that is, not a substance
or nature in its own right. Although the unity of a substance and its
inherent factor is strong, as Siddals emphasizes,[192] the disadvantage of
this image—that the human nature is compared with a property, rather
than with a substance—is so great that I would consider this analogy a
low point rather than a high point.[193]

   Besides, when Cyril takes up the analogy of the lily and its fragrance
again in the *Scholia*, he does so in a totally different way. He now
compares the Word with the fragrance, not with the lily, since both are
bodiless. The fragrance is in the substratum (ὑποκείμενον), which is a
body, and the lily is regarded as one out of both (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἕν). Similarly,
the Word is in his own body; and in the humanity, as in a substrate, he
perfumes the whole world. Cyril does not speak of inhering properties
here. If he would have done that, it would have been the Word who
was likened to a property. In other words, the comparison in the *Scholia*
does not support the line of reasoning of the passage in *Contra Nestorium*,
let alone Siddals's argumentation based on that passage.

6.4.3. *Soteriology*

For Cyril of Alexandria, christology is always bound up with soteri-
ology, even if during the controversy he devoted much attention to
christological issues without always repeating their soteriological impor-
tance. But when he sums up the content of the mystery at the beginning
of Books I and III, salvation in and through Christ is by no means left
out. And at times, during his argumentations, he points to the soterio-
logical relevance of his position. So, he writes that if someone was sent
who is consubstantial with us, but not with the Father, then we have
not been made partakers of the divine nature (66^{4-7}). And if the earthly
body is taken away from the Word, it will all come to nothing, for if he
did not become man, he did not die for us and neither can he be called

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[191] Siddals (1984), 139 f.
[192] *Ibid.*, 140.
[193] This does not deny Siddals's positive contribution in investigating the role of logic
in Cyril's thought.

the first-born from the dead (71¹⁶⁻¹⁸). Or, if it is not the Word of God who has been sent, but only the visible flesh, then we have been made a participant of a human body (in the Eucharist)—the implication being that that has no salvific consequences (84¹²⁻¹⁶).

Throughout *Contra Nestorium*, we find larger and smaller fragments of and references to the narrative of man's fall and his restitution in Christ. As a result of the disobedience by the first Adam, the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) has become sick, and is subject to a curse, to death and decay. But in Christ, the second Adam, a second first-fruits, the human nature is given a new beginning (17²³⁻⁴¹). The Word became man, not because he himself needed a second beginning, but in order to recapitulate (ἀνακεφαλαιώσηται) the human race, as a second first-fruits after the first one. Through the flesh which was united to him he had all in himself, for it is in this way that we have been buried with Christ through holy baptism, and raised with him and made to sit with him in the heavenly places.[194] In himself first (πρώτῳ), the human nature has been liberated from the accusation based on that ancient transgression (74⁵⁻¹⁶). He transforms the human nature to what it was in the beginning and renews it to incorruption, the ancient curse annulled (83⁸⁻¹⁴). By suffering death in his own flesh he has destroyed the power of death, and his own resurrection from the dead is a guarantee for all who believe in him.[195] He is the first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep and the first-born from the dead.[196] And he ascended into heaven to present himself to the Father as first-fruits of the human nature, renewed to immortality (82²⁶⁻²⁹). He was made man, then, in order that he might bring to the Father clean and without blemish those who were under death and decay, and might make them partakers of his divine nature (53¹⁸⁻²⁰).

Just as in earlier writings,[197] we see various components make up Cyril of Alexandria's soteriology:

1. The Word assumes the human COMMON NATURE, as a result of which that what happens to him as an individual human being has consequences for the whole human race.

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[194] *CN* I, 15²⁸⁻³⁴. In I.1, 18⁴⁻⁶, Cyril writes that the Word, having made a flesh from a woman his own, and having been born out of her according to the flesh, recapitulated (ἀνεκεφαλαιοῦτο) the birth of man through himself.

[195] *CN* V, 91³⁸⁻92¹⁴. Cf. V.3, 99¹²⁻¹⁶.

[196] *CN* V.1, 95²⁰⁻²⁹. Cf. V.5, 102³⁷⁻⁴⁴.

[197] See especially section 3.4.4.

2. By assuming the human COMMON NATURE, the Word becomes an individual man.

3. As an individual man he undergoes suffering and death, but he also rises from the dead and ascends to the Father.[198] He does this as the first-fruits of the human race, which implies a promise of our own resurrection. The results of the fall are not just spoken of in terms of corruption and death, but also of accusation.

The loss of the Spirit after the fall and the re-acquisition of the Spirit in and through Christ receive little attention in *Contra Nestorium*. In Book IV, Cyril discusses the salvific importance of the Eucharist, but he seems to be induced to do so by certain passages in Nestorius's writings, while he focusses on the christological presuppositions: if Christ were not the Word incarnate, but a man connected with the Word, his flesh would not be life-giving. In this context, he does affirm that "the Word remains divinely in us through the holy Spirit, and humanly through the holy flesh and the precious blood" ($85^{30f.}$).

The Spirit is also mentioned a few times in reference to our becoming partakers of the divine nature. Since Jesus Christ is God by nature, he richly gives the holy Spirit, pouring him out as his own to the souls of the believers, and rendering them partakers of the divine nature ($106^{35–37}$). Especially in the passage in which Cyril gives an exposition of several biblical texts about our transformation into Christ's image, he presents his understanding in more metaphysical terms.[199]

First of all, Cyril writes, all human beings were conformed to him when the Word became man. But, he argues, not all were predestined, sanctified and glorified. Therefore,

the reality (χρῆμα) of conformation to the Son is not to be conceived of only in terms of the nature of the flesh or of the humanity (κατά μόνην … τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς φύσιν ἢ γοῦν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος), but also in another way ($60^{1–3}$).

To explain this, Cyril quotes 1 Cor. 15:49: "And just as we have borne the image of the earthly one, we will also bear the image of the heavenly one". And he adds: it belongs to the image of our forefather Adam to be prone to sin and to be subject to death and decay, and it belongs to the image of Christ not to be conquered by passions, not

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[198] The phrase 'the saving passion (τὸ σωτήριον πάθος)' can be found in *CN* V.5, 102^{10}.

[199] *CN* III.2, 59^{24}–60^{22}: μορφωθῇ (Gal. 4:19), μεταμορφούμεθα (2 Cor. 3:18), and συμμόρφους (Rom. 8:29).

knowing transgression, not being subject to death and decay, and also holiness, righteousness, and similar things. These latter things, however, are fitting to the divine nature. The Word, then, renders us partakers of his divine nature through the Spirit. "For in this way Christ is formed in us, the holy Spirit as it were transelementing (μεταστοιχειοῦντος) us from human things into things that are his" (60[14f.]).

This verb 'to transelement' (μεταστοιχειοῦν, and once ἀναστοιχειοῦν) is used more often in *Contra Nestorium* to denote what happens to human beings who become partakers of the divine nature.[200] Cyril emphasizes that the Son does not at all change (μεθίστησι) any of the created things into the nature of his own divinity, for that is impossible, but "a spiritual likeness to him has somehow been imprinted in those who have become partakers of his divine nature through their participation in the holy Spirit" (60[16–19]). It seems that Cyril means to say that our human nature itself is not changed into the divine nature, but that certain human properties are replaced by divine ones.[201] So, he writes that the Word has suffered death economically in his own flesh, in order that he might transelement (μεταστοιχειώσῃ) into incorruption that which is tyrannized over by death, that is, the body (93[8–11]). Here, the property 'being corrupted' is transformed into 'being uncorrupted'. Other such properties are the ones by which Cyril has indicated the difference between the earthly and the heavenly Adam.

In *Contra Nestorium*, the verb 'to divinize (θεοποιεῖν)' and the noun 'divinization (θεοποίησις)', elsewhere employed to describe the process of becoming partakers of the divine nature,[202] have become part of the polemics between Cyril and Nestorius, in which their meaning tends towards that of 'God-making', that is, making a creature into a god. For example, in response to Nestorius's call not to make the virgin into

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[200] *CN* III.2, 59[11–13] ("transelemented [μεταστοιχειούμενοι] into things above [our] nature"), 59[36f.] ("into what are we transelemented [μεταστοιχειούμεθα]?"), 92[5f.] ("to transelement [ἀναστοιχειῶσαι] the human nature into what it was from the beginning").

[201] This is also suggested by Cyril's use of the verb 'to transelement' with the burning coal from Is. 6:6, which he regards as an analogy of the union of the Word with his flesh: "For having entered the wood, the fire in a certain way transelements (μεταστοιχειοῖ) it into its own glory and power, although it maintains (τετηρηκός) what it was" (*CN* II, 33[33–35]). And in the *Commentary on John*, where he also employs this verb, he speaks explicitly of a property: "In the same way, then, are we—although we are corruptible because of the nature of the flesh, but leaving our own weakness behind by the mingling with life [in the Eucharist]—transelemented into its property (εἰς τὸ ἐκείνης ἴδιον ἀναστοιχειούμεθα), that is, life"; *In Jo.* IV.2, vol. 1, 530f. (361e–362a).

[202] See Russell (2004). Cyril of Alexandria is discussed on pp. 191–205.

a goddess, Cyril writes: "We who call her *theotokos* have never divinized (τεθεοποιήκαμεν) any one of those that belong to the creatures" and "we know that the blessed virgin is a human being like us".[203] And when the archbishop of Constantinople states that the relation between the Word and Christ "is accomplished in a very close connection, not in an apotheosis (ἀποθέωσις), as the teachers of new doctrines maintain",[204] Cyril asks:

> Why do you mock the beauty of the truth, mentioning to us an apotheosis of the holy flesh, all but reproaching with a divinization (θεοποίησιν) those who have chosen to think correctly?[205]

Further down, Cyril turns the tables and addresses Nestorius with the words: "you think that you free the church from god-making (θεοποιίας), while you yourself divinize (θεοποιῶν) a man".[206]

6.5. Conclusion

On the one hand, there is continuity in *Contra Nestorium* with the christology in Cyril of Alexandria's previous writings. On the other hand, there is a further development in his terminology. While the subject-attribute model is by no means absent, the composition model seems to dominate, probably because it lends itself better to refute Nestorius's ideas (as perceived by Cyril). The expression 'united / union according to hypostasis', first found in the *Second Letter to Nestorius*, occurs many times in the five Books against Nestorius. It stresses that the incarnate Word is one SEPARATE REALITY, over against the two Sons that the archbishop of Alexandria sees in the writings of his Constantinopolitan colleague. These two Sons are now frequently indicated as two (distinct) hypostases or two persons (πρόσωπα). Once, the result of the union is referred to as 'one hypostasis', which denotes the SEPARATE REALITY.

Five times the one Christ is explicitly called 'one person (πρόσωπον)'. All the occurrences of πρόσωπον in christological contexts make sense

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[203] *CN* I.10, 31³²–32³.

[204] *CN* II.8, 44¹⁵ᶠ·, repeated in 45⁴³ᶠ·.

[205] *CN* II.8, 46³⁵⁻³⁷. There is no reason to make the word θεοποίησιν part of the previous clause, as Russell (2000), 157, does, who translates: "call the deification of the sacred flesh an apotheosis", repeated in Russell (2004), 193.

[206] *CN* II.10, 48¹⁶ᶠ·; see also II.11, 49⁸ᶠ·, ³⁵ᶠ·.

when the term retains the meaning we have come across in the earlier writings: a rational being capable of external, personal relations with other such beings. Since a person is always a SEPARATE REALITY, that Emmanuel is called one person also indicates that the incarnate Word is one SEPARATE REALITY, just as 'union according to hypostasis' and 'one hypostasis' do. But beyond this, 'one person' is an important phrase with respect to the attribution of sayings. Both the divine and the human sayings are ascribed to one person, one GRAMMATICAL PERSON, which for Cyril implies one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON.

Once, it is phrased in such a way that the one person is regarded as the result of the coming together. The word πρόσωπον is not employed to indicate that the Word remains 'the same' in the incarnation, also with the flesh. The 'naked' Word is never referred to as a πρόσωπον in *Contra Nestorium*. That the Word before the incarnation and the Word with the flesh is '(one and) the same' is mentioned several times, but in none of these cases a more metaphysical term like 'person', 'hypostasis' or 'nature' is added.[207] More often, the expression '(one and) the same' is used to indicate that the same Christ is both God and man.

Dyophysite language abounds in *Contra Nestorium*, and not just in the quotations from Nestorius and in allusions to them. Cyril regularly makes use of it when he is describing his own understanding of the incarnation. There is no hint that he would rebuke the archbishop of Constantinople for speaking about two natures. It is always the separation of the one Christ into two Sons, two distinct hypostases, two persons, that he refutes. The phrase 'in contemplation only (ἐν θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ)' is not to be found in the Books against Nestorius.[208] A few times, however, we find its content expressed in different words: 'only to know'. In these cases, it is the separation of the natures which is allowed when it is done 'only to know'—that is, in the mind only— but which is repudiated when it goes beyond that—that is, when a real separation is intended. It is not the natures themselves to which the notion of 'only to know' is applied.

As in the earlier writings, the word φύσις has various meanings in *Contra Nestorium*. It often refers to the COMMON NATURE of the three divine hypostases or of created beings. Especially in soteriological contexts, 'the human nature' may mean the human COMMON NATURE,

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[207] For example, *CN* I.6, 26³⁰ᶠ·; III.3, 62³³⁻³⁵; V.2, 97²¹ᶠ·.

[208] Once, Cyril refers to Nestorius's suggestion that he teaches a mixture as "what no one regards appropriate to think even in bare ideas (ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐννοίαις)" (*CN* I.3, 22⁵).

or all human beings together, or it may somehow combine both these meanings. When Cyril speaks of the natures of body and soul in a human being, or of the natures in the incarnate Christ, he refers to INDIVIDUAL NATURES, which are unmixed and unconfused, but which together form one SEPARATE REALITY. In the case of a human being, Cyril writes that he is composed (συγκείμενος) out of soul and body. The resulting picture is that of figure 2 in section 5.3.3: two INDIVIDUAL NATURES form one SEPARATE REALITY, round which lie both the divine and the human properties.

Only once, the Alexandrian archbishop uses miaphysite terminology in *Contra Nestorium*, in the first instance in which we encounter the μία φύσις formula: "For now, after the union, there is thought to be (νοεῖται) one nature, the incarnate [nature] of the Word himself" (33⁶ᶠ). Since this phrase is immediately followed by the anthropological analogy, it is this comparison with soul and body—a comparison which we find a number of times in *Contra Nestorium*—which helps to understand what Cyril means by this 'one nature': it is the composition of the divine and the human INDIVIDUAL NATURES in Christ, which together form one SEPARATE REALITY. In the case of Christ, this composition is unique: there is no COMMON NATURE which corresponds to it, as with the human nature, which combines the nature of the soul and that of the body. Therefore, the 'one incarnate nature of the Word' cannot be regarded as an INDIVIDUAL NATURE like the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, comprised of body and soul. It is an anomaly in Cyril's metaphysics, and there is no small-capital term for this one nature. It can only be described as the SEPARATE REALITY which is the composition of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES.

Also in christological contexts in *Contra Nestorium*, then, the terms φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον retain their own meaning and are not synonymous, as Lebon asserts.

The use of 'own (ἴδιος)' and 'to make one's own (ἰδιοποιεῖσθαι)' has become more pronounced. Cyril now argues that if the body (with a rational soul) has not become the Word's own, there will be two Sons. And although he generally employs 'union (ἕνωσις)' and its cognates for his own position, and 'connection (συνάφεια)' and related terms for that of Nestorius, he also makes it clear that it is the content of the words he is concerned about, more than the terms as such. In Nestorius's connection, he sees an external relation (ἔξωθεν σχέσις) between two SEPARATE REALITIES, while the result of his own union is one SEPARATE REALITY and one PERSON.

A verb which gets a technical meaning for Cyril is 'to transelement (μεταστοιχειοῦν)'. While he emphasizes that the nature of the Word is not changed into that of the flesh, nor the other way round, he says that human beings are transelemented into what is beyond their nature when they become partakers of the divine nature. It seems that by this he means that some of the human properties, like 'being corrupted', are replaced by divine properties, like 'being uncorrupted', while otherwise the human nature remains what it is.

Thus, we see in *Contra Nestorium* that Cyril of Alexandria's christology has not really undergone a change in content, but that the Nestorian controversy has brought about changes in the way he expresses it, although the key terms retain the meanings they had before 430—except for the word φύσις in the μία φύσις formula. In the next chapter we will investigate the other christological writings of the year 430 to see whether more changes can be detected.

OTHER WRITINGS FROM THE YEAR 430

7.1. INTRODUCTION

While Cyril of Alexandria's *Second Letter to Nestorius* and *Contra Nestorium* have been discussed in chapters 5 and 6, respectively, this chapter is devoted to the remainder of his christological writings from the year 430. First, there are the three treatises which he sent to the imperial court: to the emperor (*Oratio ad Theodosium*), to the emperor's wife Eudocia and his elder sister Pulcheria (*Oratio ad augustas*), and to his two younger sisters (*Oratio ad dominas*). Then there is his letter to pope Celestine of Rome and several other letters. And finally, there is his *Third Letter to Nestorius* with the twelve anathemas. It is especially the anathemas which evoked widespread criticism in the Antiochene diocese, and which forced the Alexandrian archbishop into the defence. In the writings from the years up to and including 430, then, we are likely to find his own christological language—rather than terminology which he might have conceded to the Orientals.

7.2. *ORATIO AD THEODOSIUM*[1]

7.2.1. *A Comparison with* On the Incarnation

The treatise which Cyril of Alexandria sent to the emperor in the year 430, *Oratio ad Theodosium*, closely resembles his *On the Incarnation*, which was discussed in chapter 5. In the first four of 45 chapters

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[1] The Greek title starts with: Λόγος προσφωνητικὸς πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβέστατον βασιλέα Θεοδόσιον περὶ τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως. In *CPG* 5218 it is called *Oratio ad Theodosium imperatorem de recta fide*. The work is often referred to as *De recta fide ad Theodosium*. The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 42–72 (= V 7; see chapter 5, n. 2; referred to as *Or. ad Th.*). A Greek text is also given in Pusey VII, 1–153 (with the text of *On the Incarnation* on the opposite pages), and in PG 76, 1133–1200.

A German translation has been published by Bardenhewer under the title "Mem-

in the *Oratio*, the archbishop addresses the emperor, and praises him as an image of God's majesty and power.[2] Adducing Old Testament examples, kings Josiah and Hezekiah in particular, he then argues that rulers will fare well if they are obedient to God. This leads him to an exposition of the incarnation. While this introduction is missing in *On the Incarnation*, the remainder is in large part identical with the contents of the other work. That *On the Incarnation* is a dialogue, while the *Oratio* is a monologue, obviously accounts for a series of differences which are of less importance. Some of the other alterations are more substantial.

In section 5.2.2, G.M. de Durand's hypothesis was mentioned, according to which *On the Incarnation* was written as an appendix to the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, while *Oratio ad Theodosium* is a re-working of the original dialogue. We will now look at a number of arguments in favour of the priority of *On the Incarnation*, most, though not all, of which are forwarded by de Durand.

1. The title θεοτόκος occurs four times in the *Oratio*,[3] while it is not to be found in *On the Incarnation*.[4] In ACO, Schwartz puts καὶ θεοτόκου all four times in brackets, but there is no reason to doubt that the words belong to the original text. In three of the four cases, the brackets are solely based on the absence of καὶ θεοτόκου in *On the Incarnation*,[5] which Schwartz regards as a re-working of the treatise to the emperor. The addition of the two words is, however, easily explained if *On the Incarnation* is the older work, from the earlier stages of the Nestorian controversy or even from before it: after θεοτόκος

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orandum an den Kaiser" in *Or. ad Th.* GT. It seems that Bardenhewer has made his own text-critical choices, so that the Greek text on which his translation is based differs from all three above-mentioned editions. The translation does not give an accurate picture of where the key terms occur. Especially, the word 'Natur' is used a number of times where φύσις is absent in the Greek original. But we also find 'Personen' and 'Wesenheiten' where πρόσωπα and οὐσίαι are absent.

[2] In fact, in the initial four chapters Cyril addresses the "Christ-loving emperors" (*Or. ad Th.*, 42[14]) in the plural, but in the remainder of the treatise we only find "Christ-loving emperor" (*Or. ad Th.*, 63[1f.] and 69[28]) and other terminology in the singular. De Durand, SC 97, 36 f., n. 2, suggests that the adolescent Western emperor Valentinian III is included in the plural.

[3] *Or. ad Th.*, 45[6], 46[27], 53[29], 69[26]. Cf. *On the Incarnation*, 679a, 681a, 690c, 710a.

[4] Cf. de Durand, SC 97, 47–49.

[5] In the remaining instance (*Or. ad Th.*, 45[6]) καὶ θεοτόκου is also missing in the Florilegium Cyrillianum, while the word order varies in the other witnesses. In *ibid.*, 46[27], there are other minor differences between the witnesses, but in *ibid.*, 53[29] and 69[26], they all have the same reading.

had gained in importance in his dispute with Nestorius, Cyril will have wanted to include it in the essay he sent to the emperor. It is difficult to understand why θεοτόκος would have been dropped, if the *Oratio* were the original work.

2. Four times in *On the Incarnation*—in the part in which the Apollinarian view is refuted—the human element in Christ is referred to as 'man (ἄνθρωπος)', while we find the terms 'flesh', 'temple' and 'humanity' at the corresponding places in the *Oratio*.[6] Since union with a 'man' might suggest that this man already existed before the union, and that, therefore, it implies an external relation, it makes sense if, during the Nestorian controversy, 'man' has been replaced by language which is not (or less) open to such a misunderstanding, while it is unlikely that Cyril would have introduced the word 'man' in a later writing. In other words, the dialogue which contains the word 'man', *On the Incarnation*, will be the earlier work.

3. Various terms and expressions from *On the Incarnation* which could be interpreted in an Apollinarian sense, are absent in the *Oratio*.[7] Since Cyril was being accused of the Apollinarian heresy by Nestorius, it is more probable that these terms were present in an earlier work, and that they were abandoned later on, than the other way round. This implies, once again, that the dialogue was written before the treatise to the emperor.

"Gathering both into one and, as it were, mingling (ἀνακιρνάς) the properties (ἰδιώματα) of the natures with each other" in *On the Incarnation* has been replaced by "gathering both, the properties of the natures, into one according to an economic coming together" in the *Oratio*.[8] And "all but gathering together the natures, and leading the power of the properties (ἰδιωμάτων) that belong to each [nature] into a confluence (μισγάγκειαν)" has become "all but gathering together the natures, and binding together the power of the properties that are attached to each [nature] into union (ἕνωσιν)".[9] Cyril possibly regarded the

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[6] Cf. de Durand, SC 97, 44 f. *On the Incarnation*, 688bc, 690a, 690b, 692b; *Or. ad Th.*, 52[15], 53[21], 53[24f.], 55[14].

[7] Cf. de Durand, SC 97, 45–47.

[8] *On the Incarnation*, 708a; *Or. ad Th.*, 68[7f.]. By the deletion of the verb ἀνακιρνάς 'both' and 'the properties of the natures', which were objects of two different verbs, are drawn together. The intended sense is likely to be: 'both sets of properties'.

[9] *On the Incarnation*, 712a; *Or. ad Th.*, 71[11f.].

words 'mingling' and 'confluence' as too vulnerable of an Apollinarian interpretation, although in both cases he speaks of the properties of the natures, not the natures themselves. The same reason may have caused him to change 'has become flesh' into 'has become / appeared as man'.[10]

De Durand also adduces two other alterations as related to the accusation of Apollinarianism, one in which the word συγκείμενος no longer appears,[11] and one in which συμπλοκήν has been replaced by ἕνωσιν.[12] In both cases, however, it is unlikely that fear of being accused of Apollinarianism was the reason for these changes, since the same or related terms are used for the union in Christ elsewhere in *Oratio ad Theodosium*. In three other places where the participle συγκείμενος and the infinitive συγκεῖσθαι are applied to Emmanuel, they have been retained in the later work.[13] And the verb (ἀνα- / ἐμ)πλέκειν, related to συμπλοκήν and used three times in *On the Incarnation*, returns each time in the treatise to the emperor.[14]

4. De Durand also points to the replacement of διά by ἐκ, when Christ is said to have been born through the virgin or a woman.[15] More careful analysis, however, reveals that διά is consistently retained in phrases like 'through the virgin (διά παρθένου)',[16] while it gives way to ἐκ in the three places where *On the Incarnation* does not read 'out of (ἐκ) a woman'—as it usually does—but 'through (διά) a woman'.[17] The reason, then, does not seem to be that διά could be interpreted as indicating a dualist christology,[18] but rather that Cyril wants to be faithful to the biblical text, which reads: γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός (Gal. 4:4).

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[10] De Durand, SC 97, 45. *On the Incarnation*, 703c, 709d; *Or. ad Th.*, 64[25], 69[19].

[11] *On the Incarnation*, 702a; *Or. ad Th.*, 63[15–17].

[12] *On the Incarnation*, 713d; *Or. ad Th.*, 72[21].

[13] *On the Incarnation*, 688c, 694e, 709e; *Or. ad Th.*, 52[20], 57[17] ('not only' does not concern the composition, but the flesh: not only out of flesh—regarded as the body—and divinity, but out of two perfect entities, humanity and divinity), 69[23].

[14] *On the Incarnation*, 679e (ἀναπεπλέχθαι), 696c (πέπλεκται, shortly after σύνθεσις), 705b (ἐνεπλάκη); *Or. ad Th.*, 45[24], 58[32], 66[3–5]. In the *Oratio* he does add the anti-Apollinarian word 'unconfusedly (ἀσυγχύτως)' to this last sentence.

[15] De Durand, SC 97, 47, n. 2.

[16] *On the Incarnation*, 681a, 681b, 682d, 690c, 708c, 710a; *Or. ad Th.*, 46[27] 46[32f.], 48[4], 53[29], 68[17f.], 69[26f.].

[17] *On the Incarnation*, 695c, 699e, 704e; *Or. ad Th.*, 58[5], 61[25f.], 65[26].

[18] Cf. Cyril's rejection of Nestorius's 'passed through' in *Contra Nestorium*; see section 6.2.1.

There are other examples where the text of the *Oratio* is closer to the biblical text than that in *On the Incarnation*. So, in a quotation of John 1:12–13, Cyril has inserted "to those who believe in his name" in his treatise to the emperor, which is missing in the dialogue.[19] In a reference to Mt. 19:4, the *Oratio* contains the word ἐποίησεν, which is also found in the Gospel, while *On the Incarnation* reads πεποίηκεν.[20] And the *Oratio* gives a full quotation of John 1:30, whereas the dialogue gives an abridged version.[21] Since it is more likely that the archbishop will have changed the text to be more in line with the scriptural text than the other way round, these changes, too, plead for the temporal priority of *On the Incarnation*.

5. Although the differences that result from the change in genre—from dialogue to monologue—are generally non-substantial, some of them, too, give us an indication of the direction in which the text was altered.[22] For several times, a question posed or a statement made by B in the dialogue is introduced in the *Oratio* by a sentence like 'Someone might ask' or 'Someone might say',[23] while a few times to the response is added something like 'We would answer' or 'I would say'.[24] Since it is more likely that these additional phrases have been added in a re-working of a dialogue than that they belonged to an original monologue, their presence once again suggests that *On the Incarnation* is the older work.

6. All five times that a composition of the verb θρώσκειν occurs in *On the Incarnation*, we find a different verb in the *Oratio*.[25] De Durand suggests that Cyril regarded θρώσκειν as too vulgar, in which case its replacement supports the view that the dialogue was written before the treatise.[26] It may be added that similarly all six times that ἀτρεκής is

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[19] *On the Incarnation*, 704d; *Or. ad Th.*, 65²³ᶠ.
[20] *On the Incarnation*, 704e; *Or. ad Th.*, 65³⁰. Gen. 1:27 and 5:2, LXX, also have ἐποίησεν.
[21] *On the Incarnation*, 710e; *Or. ad Th.*, 70¹⁵⁻¹⁷.
[22] De Durand, SC 97, 50f.
[23] *On the Incarnation*, 687b, 687d, 691a, 694e, 701e, 706b, 710e; *Or. ad Th.*, 51²⁰ᶠ, 51³⁵, 54¹³ᶠ, 57¹⁹, 63¹¹, 66³¹, 70¹⁸.
[24] *Or. ad Th.*, 54¹⁴, 57²⁰, 63¹³, 66³².
[25] *On the Incarnation*, 678e, 691e, 694a, 702e, 704e; *Or. ad Th.*, 45¹, 54³⁴, 56²⁶, 64⁷, 65²⁸.
[26] De Durand, SC 97, 49f.

found in *On the Incarnation*, it has been replaced by ἀκριβής, ἀληθής, or ἀσφαλής, or the phrase in which it occurs has been deleted.[27]

Given all this evidence, there seems little room for doubt that the treatise which Cyril of Alexandria sent to the emperor Theodosius was a re-working of an earlier work, *On the Incarnation*. The question then is how much earlier it was written. The terms which often recur in *Contra Nestorium* to describe Nestorius's christology—συνάφεια, συνάπτειν, ἀξία, αὐθεντία—are absent from *On the Incarnation*, but they are also hardly to be found in Cyril's other christological writings before the spring of 430, so that their absence does not give us much information on the year in which the dialogue was written. For the title θεοτόκος, however, the situation is different. Though it does not occur in *Festal Letter* 17, it abounds in the *Letter to the Monks of Egypt*, while it is also found in most other letters by Cyril from 429. That the title is absent from *On the Incarnation*, therefore, makes it likely that the dialogue was written before the year 429.

There is still one difficulty to be solved, though: according to Loofs—who is followed in this by Schwartz[28] and Bardenhewer[29]—, the two quotations which Cyril gives of someone who speaks of Christ as a man different from the Word of God,[30] are from a work by Nestorius, referred to as Λογίδια.[31] It appears, however, that Loofs's sole source for the ascription of these quotations to Nestorius is the text in *Oratio ad Theodosium*. Also the title Λογίδια stems from that work.[32] Loofs adds that Garnier seems to have regarded the quotations as belonging to Nestorius's sermons, but Loofs himself has not been able to find them anywhere in the sermons. And in the *Oratio*, Cyril does not mention Nestorius, but merely speaks of 'they'. It may well be, then, that Loofs

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[27] *On the Incarnation*, 678d, 682d, 684a, 685b, 686c, 708a; *Or. ad Th.*, 44^{22}, 48^2, 49^9, 50^7, 51^1, 68^6. Two searches in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae yield interesting results. The word ἀτρεκής and its cognates occur 60 times in Cyril's writings before 429 (author = 4090; work = 0). But these words are completely absent from Cyril's writings after 428 (both those with author = 4090 and those in ACO I.1.1 through I.1.7, that is, author = 5000 and work = 1). This supports the hypothesis that *On the Incarnation* was written before 429.

[28] Schwartz adds references to Loofs's volume, Nestorius (1905), in the margin of the text of the *Oratio* in ACO I.1.1, 46.

[29] *Or. ad Th.* GT, 19, n. 1: "Aus einer Schrift des Nestorius; vgl. Fr. Loofs, Nestoriana, Halle a. S. 1905, 217".

[30] *Or. ad Th.*, 46$^{1–10}$.

[31] Loofs, in: Nestorius (1905), 217f.

[32] *Or. ad Th.*, 45^{34}.

was mistaken in regarding the archbishop of Constantinople as the author of the quotations.

De Durand gives two extra reasons why Nestorius would not be the author: (1) both quotations contain the word ὁμωνύμως, and this is not to be found in Nestorius's extant works; (2) Cyril nowhere calls works by Nestorius λογίδια.[33] It may be concluded that the presence of these quotations does not require that *On the Incarnation* was written after 428. As for de Durand's hypothesis that the dialogue is the treatise on the incarnation that Cyril mentions in his *First Letter to Nestorius*, and that it was written as an appendix to the *Dialogues on the Trinity* (see section 5.2.2)—it is quite plausible. For the purposes of this study, however, it is sufficient to ascertain that most likely it was written before the year 429, and that *Oratio ad Theodosium* is a later re-working of it. Manlio Simonetti has dismissed the priority of *On the Incarnation* as proposed by de Durand.[34] His (brief) argumentation, however, is not convincing.

7.2.2. *Terminology*

The changes from *On the Incarnation* to the *Oratio* have little impact on the christological terminology, so that in general the conclusions drawn in section 5.3 apply to the treatise to the emperor as well. Even so, we will briefly walk through those passages in which key terms have been deleted, added, or replaced. First of all, two passages from *On the Incarnation* do not return in the *Oratio*. In his description of the Apollinarian view, Cyril leaves out his argument that the Word cannot be regarded as an incomplete part, while according to the heterodox the elements that come together cannot be complete.[35] As a result of this deletion, the word σύνοδος has disappeared, as well as twice the phrase 'own nature', once applied to the Word, and once to his humanity. This has no consequences for the meaning of the terms in the *Oratio*.

In the second passage, the first half of a sentence from A is missing—possibly in order to avoid duplication—, while the remainder of that sentence is linked with a statement from B.[36] The deleted part says

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[33] De Durand, SC 97, 55 f. In *Contra Nestorium*, it is Cyril himself who describes Nestorius's view in terms of homonyms.

[34] Simonetti (1982), 500 f., n. 26.

[35] *On the Incarnation*, 689e–690a; *Or. ad Th.*, 53[20].

[36] *On the Incarnation*, 707a; *Or. ad Th.*, 67[16].

that the Spirit is the Word's own, who is "the consubstantial offspring out of the Father", also when he has become man. Although the word ὁμοούσιος is, therefore, absent from the *Oratio*, all the other occurrences of οὐσία and its cognates have remained, and the conclusions regarding their usage hold for the later work as well. It is this passage, also in the *Oratio*, in which Cyril writes that the man who the Word has become is deprived of the properties of the divinity in his own nature.[37] Here, Cyril uses the word φύσις unambiguously in relation to Christ's humanity after the incarnation. Also the other passage in which this is the case is retained in the treatise to the emperor: "having himself become man by nature".[38]

As for ὑπόστασις and ὑφεστάναι, once the phrase τὸν ὄντα τε καὶ ὑφεστηκότα is repeated in the *Oratio*, where it is absent in the dialogue,[39] but otherwise the terms are used in exactly the same way in the two works. That means that they are not employed for the incarnate Word, and that ὑπόστασις and φύσις are not used as synonyms in the treatise to the emperor. The usage of πρόσωπον and διπρόσωπον, too, is no different in the *Oratio* than in its precursor, so that the conclusions regarding their meaning remain the same as well.

Then, there are the changes that have already been mentioned in section 7.2.1—especially, those where in *On the Incarnation* the human element is referred to as 'man', and those where the accusation of Apollinarianism may have caused Cyril to choose a different wording. The most interesting passage is the one in which a sentence containing the phrase ἀνθρώπῳ τελείως ἔχοντι has been replaced by: "to confess that the Word has been naturally (κατὰ φύσιν) united to human flesh, animated with a rational soul".[40] While expressions like 'naturally united' are completely absent from the dialogue, this is the only place in *Oratio ad Theodosium* where such language has been introduced. But it is done almost in passing. No explanation of the phrase 'naturally united' is given, except for the text which already followed it in *On*

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[37] See for a discussion of the relevant text-critical question chapter 5, n. 72.
[38] *On the Incarnation*, 695c; *Or. ad Th.*, 58[7]; see chapter 5, n. 71.
[39] *Or. ad Th.*, 51[21]. Cf. *On the Incarnation*, 687b.
[40] *On the Incarnation*, 688bc, and *Or. ad Th.*, 52[15f]: ψυχωθείσῃ ψυχῇ λογικῇ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ σαρκὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἡνῶσθαι τὸν Λόγον ὁμολογεῖν. Bardenhewer, *Or. ad Th.* GT, 30, translates: "zu bekennen, daß das Wort dem der Natur nach mit einer vernünftigen Seele beseelten menschlichen Fleische geeint ist", thus applying κατὰ φύσιν to 'animated' rather than to 'united'. Given the position of κατὰ φύσιν in the sentence, however, it makes more sense to apply it to 'united'.

the Incarnation: the mediator between God and men is compounded (συγκεῖσθαι) out of a perfect humanity and out of the Son, who is out of God by nature; we maintain that an unspeakable coming together has taken place of unequal and dissimilar natures.

Although in this case Cyril does not add the anthropological analogy, seeing the dyophysite language and the notion of composition, it is quite likely that he had it in mind, and that 'naturally united' has to be understood in the same way as 'natural unity' and similar expressions in *Festal Letter* 17 and in *Contra Nestorium*: two elements that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance have come together to form one SEPARATE REALITY.[41] Since the whole argumentation is part of his refutation of the Apollinarian view, and he emphasizes that Christ's humanity is perfect, and that the one Christ "exists and is conceived of as both God and man at the same time" ($52^{24f.}$), it is clear that Cyril does not have a *tertium quid* in mind.

It is also noteworthy that in the passages where 'mingling (ἀνακιρνάς)' and 'confluence (μισγάγκειαν)' have been replaced, Cyril saw no reason to abandon the dyophysite language. "The properties of the natures" are said to be gathered into one ($68^{7f.}$), and the phrase "all but gathering together the natures" ($71^{11f.}$) is maintained. Also in the other places where we find dyophysite terminology in *On the Incarnation*, no alterations have been made in the *Oratio*.[42] This suggests once again that Cyril did not object to speaking of two natures with regard to Christ, but only to separating them into two distinct beings.

In section 5.3.2.3, four occurrences of the word φύσις are discussed that deserve special attention. All four return in the *Oratio* without any relevant alterations. This means that also in the treatise to the emperor, φύσις may denote the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word, although this creates tension with Cyril's trinitarian terminology, in which φύσις is employed for what the three divine hypostases have in common.

Other passages in which metaphysically relevant terms have been added, replaced or deleted do not alter the conclusions concerning the meaning of these terms.[43] It may still be noted that the verb 'to

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[41] See sections 5.4.2.2 and 6.3.4.

[42] *On the Incarnation*, 679e, 680a, 695b; *Or. ad Th.*, $45^{29f.}$, $45^{31f.}$, $58^{1–3}$. See section 5.3.2.3.

[43] For example, *Or. ad Th.* 54^6 (τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει has been replaced by τῇ ἀνθρώπου φύσει), 54^{28}, 56^6, 56^{23}, 57^{21}, 60^8 (προσούσης has been replaced by πρεπούσης), 62^4, 69^7, 71^{12} (πρεπόντων has been replaced by προσόντων), 72^6. Cf. *On the Incarnation*, 690e, 691d, 693b, 693e, 694e, 698a, 700b, 709b, 712a, 713a.

transelement (μεταστοιχειοῦν)' occurs once in both works. We have seen that this verb takes on a more or less technical meaning in *Contra Nestorium*: it is reserved for the change that takes place in human beings who participate in the divine nature.[44] In *On the Incarnation*, we find the word in a description of the christology of those who teach that the nature of the Word has been changed into that of the flesh: "we should rather think that the nature of the Word has been transelemented (μετεστοιχειῶσθαι) into this perishable and earthborn body". In the *Oratio* this sentence has been retained.[45] Cyril may have come across the phrase containing the verb in a writing of one of his opponents. At all events, here it does not have the technical meaning it has in *Contra Nestorium*.

7.2.3. *Christology*

Because there is such a substantial agreement between *On the Incarnation* and *Oratio ad Theodosium*, most of what has been said in section 5.3.3 applies to the treatise to the emperor as well, and there is no need to repeat it. One difference has already been discussed in the previous section: while phrases like 'naturally united' do not occur in the dialogue, we find such an expression once in the *Oratio*. Probably the most important remaining question is whether the replacement of 'mingling (ἀνακιρνάς)' and 'confluence (μισγάγκειαν)' has any consequences for Cyril's metaphysical understanding of the incarnation.[46]

It has been argued in chapter 5 that both these notions—'mingling' and 'confluence'—are applied by Cyril, not to the natures, but to the properties that are attached to the natures. Does the abandonment of these terms indicate a change in metaphysical view, and does figure 2 in section 5.3.3 no longer hold? Should we add a fourth figure, in which neither the natures nor their properties are mixed, while they nevertheless form one SEPARATE REALITY, and not two Christs? In light of various other passages in the *Oratio*, this does not seem to be the case. Cyril's christology is still adequately expressed by figure 2. Cyril has probably dropped the terms 'mingling' and 'confluence' because they

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[44] See section 6.4.3. It is used in this same sense also in the *Commentary on John*, for example, *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 183 (122e); IV.2, vol. 1, 531 (362b).

[45] *On the Incarnation*, 683ab; *Or. ad Th.*, 48[14–17].

[46] See point 3 in section 7.2.1.

evoked reminiscences of Apollinarius in his opponents, and he wanted to distance himself from the Apollinarian view.

It is especially the passages in which the communication of idioms is expressed, and which have not been substantially altered in the later work, which show that Cyril's christological metaphysics has not changed. So, the following sentence is literally repeated in the *Oratio*:

> Therefore, just as in Christ 'only-begotten' has become a property (ἴδιον) of the humanity, because it has been united to the Word according to an economic coming together, so 'among many brothers' and 'first-born' [have become] a property (ἴδιον) of the Word, because he has been united to the flesh.[47]

The communication of idioms is here a linguistic one which expresses the tight union of the Word with his humanity. Another sentence which has been retained verbatim reads:

> It may be seen, then, that he [the Word] grants the glory of the God-befitting operation (ἐνεργείας) to his own flesh, while he appropriates the things of the flesh, and as it were somehow, according to the economic union, places them round his own nature (τῇ ἰδίᾳ περιτιθέντα φύσει).[48]

We see the metaphor of place which characterizes Cyril's metaphysics: the Word places the properties of the flesh, the humanity, round his own nature. Figure 2 (section 5.3.3) adequately depicts this view: Christ's human properties not only lie round the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, but also round the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE. And that the Word "grants the glory of the God-befitting operation to his own flesh", means that the divine properties now lie round the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE of Emmanuel, too. Because of the union, one cannot have the flesh of Christ without the Word, and therefore, without the properties of the Word attached to it.

Also the passage in which ἀνακιρνάς has been deleted, can be understood in this way. It now reads, following a quotation of John 6:51, 56 ("He who eats me"): "The Word is not edible, but through a great many sayings we see that he gathers both, the properties of the natures, into one according to an economic coming together".[49] The

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[47] *On the Incarnation*, 700b; *Or. ad Th.*, 61^{33}–62^{2}. The Greek text is given in chapter 5, n. 102.

[48] *On the Incarnation*, 707ab; *Or. ad Th.*, 67$^{18–20}$.

[49] *Or. ad Th.*, 68$^{7–9}$. Cf. *On the Incarnation*, 708a. Bardenhewer, *Or. ad Th.* GT, 58, leaves out the word ἰδιώματα, and corrupts the meaning of the sentence.

properties of both natures are gathered 'into one (εἰς ἕν)'—this may be interpreted as: they are placed round one SEPARATE REALITY.

Cyril phrases it in a somewhat similar way in another sentence which has not been altered in the *Oratio*: "He, then, is Creator divinely as well as life-giving as life, and he is composed by both human and super-human properties into one thing, which is in between".[50] In chapter 5, it has already been argued that Cyril does not have a *tertium quid* in mind, a being which is partly God and partly human. Both sets of properties remain intact, but they belong to one SEPARATE REALITY.

The archbishop of Alexandria even uses the verb 'to communicate' or 'to make common property' (κοινοποιεῖν) for the process which later became known as the 'communication of the properties (ἀντίδοσις τῶν ἰδιωμάτων)': "Antiquity, then, must be attributed (ἀναθετέον) to him, also with the flesh, … who customarily communicates (κοινοποιεῖν) the goods of his own nature to his own body".[51] Once again, it is the union which makes it possible to say that Jesus Christ not only is and will be, but also was (Hebr. 13:8). The property 'was', or his 'antiquity', is made a property of Christ's body, too. Not in the sense that his body was pre-existent ontologically, but because the body now forms one SEPARATE REALITY with him who was in the beginning. Figure 2 (section 5.3.3) depicts this, as long as it is remembered that the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE is and remains the source of this property, even if it is now also attached to the body.

And finally, the passage in which the word 'confluence' has been replaced, and which now reads: "… all but gathering together the natures, and binding the power of the properties that are attached to each [nature] into union".[52] It is interesting to see that to the gathering of the natures Cyril adds—already in *On the Incarnation*—the relativizing term 'all but (μόνον οὐχί)', as if he wants to make clear that the natures are not confused. But the phrase about the properties speaks of the union, and it fits with the understanding that the properties now lie round one SEPARATE REALITY. It is noteworthy also that Cyril has replaced the more general term 'belonging (πρεπόντων)' by the more metaphysical term 'attached (προσόντων)'.

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[50] *On the Incarnation*, 709e; *Or. ad Th.*, 69²¹⁻²³. See chapter 5, n. 107.

[51] *Or. ad Th.*, 70²⁷ᶠ. Literally the same in *On the Incarnation*, 711b.

[52] *Or. ad Th.*, 71¹¹ᶠ: μόνον οὐχὶ καὶ συναγείρων τὰς φύσεις καὶ συνδέων εἰς ἕνωσιν τῶν ἑκατέρᾳ προσόντων ἰδιωμάτων τὴν δύναμιν. Cf. *On the Incarnation*, 712a; see chapter 5, n. 108.

The communication of idioms is directly linked with the attribution of sayings. The exchange of properties, as it finds expression in figure 2 (section 5.3.3), may be regarded as the metaphysical process that under-lies the attribution of sayings. Because the property 'antiquity' is now also attached to the Word's humanity, it may be said of Jesus Christ that he 'was'—that is, that he was in the beginning. And because the property 'has been crucified' lies, not only round the body, but also round the Word, the Word himself may be said to have been crucified.

That the natures are not mixed or confused, but that each remains the source of its own properties, is expressed by additions like 'as God', 'as man', 'divinely', 'in the flesh', which we encountered in *Contra Nestorium*.[53] These additions are also found in the *Oratio*, and already in *On the Incarnation*. We even find a general statement about the sayings in Scripture:

> He is preached also through the holy Scriptures one time as a complete man (ὡς ὅλος ὢν ἄνθρωπος), while his divinity is economically kept silent, another time, conversely, as God (ὡς Θεός), while his humanity is passed over in silence. But he is not wronged in any way, because of the coming together of both into unity.[54]

In a more concrete example Cyril writes: "For he is only-begotten as God, and first-born among us according to the economic union and among many brothers as man".[55] Or, Christ "is higher than humanity as God and Son by nature (ὡς φύσει Θεὸς καὶ Υἱός), but does not disdain to seem to have come in abasement because of that which is human".[56] And after the union has been pointed out he says elsewhere: "For otherwise he could not be Creator divinely (θεικῶς), also when he is not conceived of as without flesh".[57]

In one of the examples we see that Cyril uses the word φύσις in assigning a property to Christ as God: "as God and Son by nature".

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[53] See section 6.4.1.

[54] *On the Incarnation*, 698d; *Or. ad Th.*, 60²⁶⁻²⁸.

[55] *On the Incarnation*, 700a; *Or. ad Th.*, 61²⁹ᶠ.

[56] *Or. ad Th.*, 60²⁰⁻²². The verb 'to seem' does not imply any Docetic tendencies in Cyril—he refutes Docetism in this very work—, but it underlines the attribution of the properties to the INDIVIDUAL NATURE which is their source: although the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE may *seem to be* in abasement, it rather *is* the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE. But because of the union, the Word himself may—and must—be *said* to be in abasement. The second part of this sentence is phrased differently in *On the Incarnation*, 698c: Christ "is higher than humanity as God and Son by nature, but as man he lowered himself for a short time below what is God-befitting in glory".

[57] *On the Incarnation*, 708d; *Or. ad Th.*, 60²²ᶠ.

This occurs more often: he is "life by nature as God";[58] compelling arguments force us "to worship the Word, born out of God the Father, as God by nature (ὡς Θεῷ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν), also when he has appeared in a form like ours";[59] and "Jesus Christ, who is out of David according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα; cf. Rom. 1:3), is Son of God by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and truly".[60] But the archbishop of Alexandria does not reserve the use of φύσις for Christ's divinity, he also employs the term a few times when he speaks of his human properties. After asking whether Christ was a mere man, or whether Emmanuel should be deprived of being life by nature, Cyril goes on:

> Or shall we do something praiseworthy by attributing that which is petty among the sayings to the humanity and to the measure of the nature (φύσεως) like ours, and shall we observe his superworldly glory on the basis of the things in which he is God, realising that the same one is God and likewise man, or God made man?[61]

Cyril calls it praiseworthy to attribute some of the sayings about Christ to his humanity (ἀνθρωπότης) or to "the measure of the nature like ours". Emmanuel's human INDIVIDUAL NATURE is the source of the properties and actions which these sayings speak about. Cyril does not object assigning certain sayings to Christ's human nature, as long as it is clear that this human nature is not separated from the Word but that Christ is the one incarnate Word.

Towards the end of the treatise we find another sentence in which the Alexandrian bishop writes about Christ's human nature:

> He who according to the law of the flesh and according to the nature like ours has died and who was raised, attached the glory of lordship to himself, then, not without the flesh, but rather in it and with it, showing dying as a human passion, and coming to life again as a divine work.[62]

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[58] *On the Incarnation*, 692d; *Or. ad Th.*, 55²⁴: ζωὴ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχων ὡς Θεός.

[59] *Or. ad Th.*, 63³ᶠ. In *On the Incarnation*, 701cd, "as God by nature" also occurs, but instead of "the Word, born out of God the Father" it reads "the Son".

[60] *On the Incarnation*, 713e; *Or. ad Th.*, 72²⁶ᶠ.

[61] *Or. ad Th.*, 59¹⁷⁻²⁰: ἢ περιτρέποντες εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα καὶ εἰς μέτρον φύσεως τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ ὡς ἐν λόγοις σμικροπρεπές, δράσομέν τι τῶν ἐπαινουμένων. In *On the Incarnation*, 697ab, ὡς is missing before ἐν λόγοις.

[62] *Or. ad Th.*, 72¹⁻⁶: οὐκοῦν οὐ δίχα σαρκός, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς τὴν τῆς κυριότητος ἀνεδήσατο δόξαν ὁ νόμῳ σαρκὸς καὶ φύσει τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς τεθνεὼς καὶ ἐγηγερμένος, ἀνθρώπινον μὲν τὸ τεθνάναι πάθος, ἐνέργημα δὲ θεϊκὸν τὸ ἀναβιῶναι δεικνύς. In *On the Incarnation*, 712e–713a, we find σὺν αὐτῇ instead of ἐν αὐτῇ.

Christ died "according to the nature like ours". Dying is a human passion, which should not be attributed to the divine nature of the Word, in Cyril's view. Rather, 'the nature like ours' is the source of this property. Although Cyril is cautious in using the term φύσις for Christ's human nature—for anti-Arian reasons, as has been argued before—,[63] he does not altogether shun it.

7.3. Oratio ad dominas[64]

It is likely that the three treatises that Cyril of Alexandria sent to the imperial court were taken to the capital by the same person, so that they arrived there at the same time. But in *Oratio ad augustas* the Alexandrian archbishop mentions "the book that has come from us to the holy virgins",[65] by which he probably means the treatise to the younger sisters. This suggests that Cyril wrote his *Oratio ad dominas* before the treatise to the emperor's wife and elder sister. Therefore, the address to Arcadia and Marina will be discussed first.

7.3.1. *Summary of the Contents*

The work consists of three main parts: (1) an introduction in which the christological issues are mentioned; (2) a florilegium of patristic texts; (3) a great number of biblical verses with Cyril's comments on them. The third part is by far the largest: of a total of 224 chapters, 203 comment on Bible verses, nine contain quotations from theologians from the fourth and fifth centuries, and the remaining twelve cover the introduction and some connecting passages. The treatise ends

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[63] See the end of section 3.4.4.

[64] The Greek title reads: Κυρίλλου ἐπισκόπου Ἀλεξανδρείας προσφωνητικὸς ταῖς εὐσεβεστάταις δεσποίναις. In *CPG* 5219 it is called *Oratio ad Arcadiam et Marinam de fide*. The work is also referred to as *De recta fide ad dominas*. The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.5, 62–118 (= V 150; referred to as *Or. ad dom.*). A Greek text is further given in Pusey VII, 154–262, and in PG 76, 1201–1336.

No translation in one of the modern languages is available yet. An Ethiopic translation was produced as early as the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century. The first twenty chapters of this Ethiopic version have been translated into German and published in Weischer (1993). This text, however, deviates considerably from the original Greek.

[65] *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 28[1f.].

somewhat abruptly with a comment on Luke 18:8, not with a doxology
as do both other works sent to the imperial court.

After having praised the princesses in the first chapter, Cyril intro-
duces his 'booklet (βιβλίδιον)' (62³⁴) in the second chapter as teaching
"that Emmanuel is God by nature and in truth, and that because of
him the virgin that bore him is θεοτόκος" (63³ᶠ). They who fear to say
and think this have not grasped the deep 'mystery of godliness' (63⁵).
In chapter 3 follows a short (otherwise unknown) creed, which issues
into christological considerations, which continue up to and including
chapter 8. We find here a summary of Cyril of Alexandria's views.
The divine Word has emptied himself and has assumed flesh, mak-
ing it his own, while remaining what he was, God. If the virgin Mary
is not called θεοτόκος, this implies the confession of two Sons, one
of which is 'an ordinary man'.[66] It is impious to sever the one Lord
Jesus Christ into two Sons. Cyril also argues on the basis of soteriol-
ogy: If Emmanuel were an ordinary man, how would his death help
the human nature?

In chapter 9, Cyril introduces his florilegium by stating that he wants
to show that the title θεοτόκος was customary to the holy Fathers,
and that it is used to the present day. That, in fact, the title occurs
in only three of the nine quotations indicates that Cyril was not so
much concerned with the epithet as such as with its christological
implications. In all nine of them it is expressed in one way or another
that the one who is out of the Father has also been born out of the
virgin Mary, and in some, it is explicitly asserted that Christ should
not be divided. The first quotation is attributed by Cyril to Athanasius,
as from a work *About the Incarnation*. It has long been established that
the attribution to Athanasius is an 'Apollinarian fraud'—an attempt
by the followers of Apollinarius to get the theology of their teacher
accepted by larger circles in the church—but that the work is in fact
a letter from the bishop of Laodicea to the emperor Jovian (ca 332–
364).[67]

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[66] The expression κοινὸς ἄνθρωπος appears quite regularly in *Or. ad dom.*, also in the
introductory chapters: 63³⁷ᶠ, ⁴¹, 64¹⁰, 65¹⁵.

[67] The quotation is found in *Or. ad dom.*, c. 10, 65²⁵–66¹⁹. With some minor
differences the text is given as from Apollinarius by Lietzmann in: Apollinarius (1904),
250⁶–252¹¹ and 253³–¹⁴.

Other quotations are from Atticus, archbishop of Constantinople
(405–425),[68] Antiochus, bishop of Ptolemais († before 409),[69] Amphilo-
chius (ca 340–395), bishop of Iconium,[70] Ammon, bishop of Adri-
anople,[71] and John [Chrysostom] (ca 347–407), archbishop of Con-
stantinople.[72] Then follow three lines attributed by Cyril to Severian
(† after 408), bishop of Gabala, but in fact taken from *De incarnatione
et contra Arianos*, written by Marcellus of Ancyra († ca 374).[73] The two
remaining quotations are from bishop Vitalius (*fl.* ca 363–382), a disci-
ple of Apollinarius,[74] and of Cyril's uncle Theophilus, his predecessor
as archbishop of Alexandria (385–412).[75]

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[68] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 11, 66[23–30]. It consists of a short (66[23f.]) and a longer (66[25–30])
quotation, linked by the phrase "then he adds again to this". Lebon, in: Atticus (1933),
172, has found the longer quotation in a Syriac manuscript; he indeed attributes it
to Atticus (pp. 172–174). In the Latin translation of the Syriac, the passage which
corresponds to the quotation given by Cyril is found on p. 191[19–26]. Brière, in: Atticus
(1933 / 34), publishes the same Syriac text with a French translation; the lines quoted by
Cyril are found on p. 182.

[69] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 12, 66[32f.]. Martin, in: Antiochus (1941), has published a florilegium
with parts of a Christmas sermon by Antiochus, but the brief quotation given by Cyril
is not included in it.

[70] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 13, 67[2–6]. Holl, in: Amphilochius (1904), 51, accepts the quotation as
genuinely from Amphilochius.

[71] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 14, 67[8–13]. Weischer (1993), 71, refers for this 'Ammon, bishop of
Adrianople' to Bardenhewer's comments on the abbot Ammonas, Anthony the Great's
successor as leader of the monks at Pispir. The Ammon Cyril quotes, however, was
bishop of Adrianople in Thrace in the second half of the fourth century. The two
quotations have not been found elsewhere.

[72] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 15, 67[16–24]. The quotation consists of two parts (67[16–21] and 67[22–24]),
which are both found (with minor differences) in a sermon *On the Birth of our Saviour Jesus
Christ* (*CPG* 4560; PG 56, 385–394; the quotations on pp. 385–386 and 389). Martin, in:
John Chrysostom (1941), 39, argues that any doubt concerning the authorship of John
Chrysostom has been removed.

It is interesting to see Cyril give a quotation from John Chrysostom, whose deposi-
tion at the synod of the Oak in 403 he still upheld in about 415, as is shown by his letter
to Atticus, bishop of Constantinople, *ep. 76* (*CPG* 5376; PG 77, 352–360), in: Schwartz
(1927), 25–28. An English translation of the letter in: McEnerney (1987b), 86–91.

[73] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 16, 67[26–28]. The quotation in *De incarnatione et contra Arianos* (*CPG*
2806) is found in PG 26, 996A. While Cyril has ἐκ παρθένου Μαρίας, the text in PG 26
reads ἐκ παρθένου θεοτόκου Μαρίας (and Cyril's quotation ends with τουτέστι Θεοῦ,
whereas PG 26 has τουτέστιν ἐκ Θεοῦ). See for the ascription of the work to Marcellus
of Ancyra: Tetz (1964).

[74] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 17, 67[30]–68[11]. Lietzmann, in: Apollinarius (1904), 273[6–25], gives the
same text and indeed attributes it to Vitalius.

[75] *Or. ad dom.*, c. 18, 68[14–27]. The quotation is taken from Theophilus's *Festal Letter* for
the year 401, as is attested by its preserved Latin translation, made by Jerome (*ep.* 96 in:
Epp. 71–120, CSEL, vol. 55, 161[2–20]). See also Quasten (1960), 103.

Cyril gives these quotations without further commenting on them. Instead, in chapters 19 and 20, he gives a summary of how he and his opponents regard Christ. Without mentioning Nestorius by name anywhere in the whole treatise, he writes that 'some' maintain that the name 'Christ' is fitting to the Word by himself and separately, also to the one born out of the holy virgin, regarded as individually and by himself, and, thirdly, to both regarded as one, in that "the principle of connection, as they call it, binds them together into one πρόσωπον".[76] Over against this, Cyril states that the title 'Christ' indicates the Word of God after he has become man, with his flesh. The title is not fitting to the Word before he has become like us. And it is unholy to say or think that 'Christ' may refer to this one and that one separately, for the Lord Jesus Christ is one and not severed.

The remainder of the treatise is dedicated to the biblical citations and Cyril's christological comments to them. They have been subdivided into groups, each with a separate title, which gives an indication of the assertion which the Bible verses are meant to support. Within each group the citations are ordered by Bible book, the name of which is given as a subheading. Chapter 21 gives a number of such titles like a table of contents, but they do not exactly correspond to the titles as they appear later on in the treatise. It seems, then, that Schwartz is right when he writes that chapter 21 has probably been added later.[77] The chapters have been grouped in the following way:

chapters	titles	Bible books[78]
22–132		That Christ is God by a union with God the Word, rising to his glory
22–39		Romans
40–55		1 Corinthians
56–65		2 Corinthians
66–70		Galatians
71–73		Ephesians
74		Philippians
75–77		Colossians
78–84		Hebrews
85		1 Timothy
86		Titus

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[76] *Or. ad dom.*, 69$^{18–23}$. This is Cyril's rendering of Nestorius's view, which is quoted by Cyril in *CN* 36$^{21–32}$ (see section 6.2.2).

[77] Schwartz, *Or. ad dom.*, 70, note to lines 19–29.

[78] Cyril often adds 'from (ἐκ)' and 'the epistle of' or 'the Gospel according to', and sometimes—but not always—'first' or 'second' and/or 'catholic' to the appropriate letters.

chapters	titles	Bible books

87–94 The Catholic Epistles
  87–88   James [with the addition: "that Christ is God"]
  89–91   1 Peter
  92   2 Peter
  93   1 John [the title is missing in most manuscripts]
  94   Jude
  95–111   Matthew [with the addition: "that Christ is God"]
  112–120   John
  121–132   Luke

133–136 That Christ is life and life-giving
  133–134   1 Corinthians
  135   2 Corinthians
  136   Hebrews

137 That there is one Son and Lord Jesus Christ
  137   1 John

138–144 That the faith in Christ is as in God
  138   1 Peter
  139–144   1 John

145–147 That he is life
  145   Matthew
  146   John
  147   Luke[79]

148 That he is atonement through faith
  148   Romans

149 That we have been redeemed and have the reconciliaton with God through his blood
  149   1 Corinthians

150 That we have been redeemed through the blood of Christ
  150   1 Peter

151–161 That the death of Christ is salvation to the world
[the title is repeated before cc. 159 and 161]
  151–153   Romans
  154   Galatians
  155   Ephesians
  156–157   Hebrews
  158   Titus
159–161 The Catholic Epistles
  159–160   1 Peter
  161   John

162–179 That there is one Son of God and Lord Jesus Christ
  162–166   Romans
  167   1 Corinthians

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[79] This is the only chapter (of cc. 22 through 224) in which Cyril does not actually give a biblical citation, but merely alludes to some passages.

chapters	*titles*	*Bible books*
168–169		2 Corinthians
170–171		Galatians
172		Ephesians
173		Philippians
174		Colossians
175–179		Hebrews
180–193	That there is one Son and Lord	
180		Matthew [the title is missing]
181–189		John[80]
190–193		Luke
194–215	That the faith in Christ is as in God	
194–201		Romans
202		1 Corinthians
203		2 Corinthians
204–206		Galatians
207–210		Ephesians[81]
211–212		Philippians
213–214		1 Timothy
215		Titus
216–224	That the faith is in Christ	
216–223		John[82]
224		Luke

It appears that in more than half of these chapters Cyril's explicit aim is to show that Christ is God. This aim also underlies the chapters under the headings "That Christ is life and life-giving", "That he is life", "That the faith in Christ is as in God", and "That the faith is in Christ". Sometimes, he states it as a conclusion: "Therefore, Christ is God" (Θεὸς οὖν ἄρα Χριστός and similar phrases).[83] At other times he asks the rhetorical question: "Then, how is Christ not God?" (εἶτα πῶς οὐ Θεὸς ὁ Χριστός; and similar phrases).[84] Often, instead of the title 'Christ' he uses a description which issues from the Bible verse, such as: "Then, how is he not God who with his own Spirit writes for us

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[80] Most manuscripts add "From the (Gospel) according to John" as a title before c. 180, but Schwartz has not added it in ACO I.1.5, 108.

[81] In chapter 209, Cyril refers back to chapter 208 for a comment on the given biblical quotation.

[82] In chapter 218, Cyril refers back to chapter 217 for a comment on the given biblical quotation.

[83] See, for example, *Or. ad dom.*, 73^{36}, 74^{10}, 78^{31}, 84^{4}, 92^{22}, 113^{1}, 122^{22}, 139^{30}.

[84] See, for example, *Or. ad dom.*, 71^{3}, 75^{38}, 77^{17}, 84^{26}, $92^{14f.}$, $113^{7f.}$, 126^{14}, 138^{25}, 202^{13}, 216^{22}.

the way of the knowledge of God?".[85] The question of Christ's deity
could also be raised in an anti-Arian context, so it is not unlikely that
Cyril has used the results of earlier studies when he wrote this treatise.
Yet it is clear from other arguments that it is the unity of Christ, over
against a division into two Christs, that Cyril has in view. He repeats
several times that by 'Christ' or 'Jesus Christ' he means the Word
of God who has become man.[86] He is not an ordinary man (κοινὸς
ἄνθρωπος), who has been honoured with the title of sonship only ($77^{40f.}$).
The term 'ordinary man' returns frequently to express the view of
Cyril's opponents,[87] as do—though less often—the phrases 'simply a
man (ἄνθρωπος ἁπλῶς)'[88] and 'a mere man (ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος)'.[89] Cyril
stresses that Christ is both God and man.[90]

The unity of Christ is, of course, more explicitly asserted in the
chapters under the headings "That there is one Son of God and Lord
Jesus Christ" and "That there is one Son and Lord". We encounter
the by now familiar terms and expressions. He is one Son and God
and Lord, even though the Word has become flesh ($96^{18f.}$). A true
union (ἕνωσις) of the Word with the flesh has taken place (104^9). This
is a union according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν), and not one in
persons only (ἐν προσώποις—a new expression) and according to will
or a simple connection (συνάφειαν ἁπλῆν), "as some say" ($103^{8f.}$). The
Word has come together with that which is human according to an
economic union, for there is one true Son out of both.[91] The same
one (ὁ αὐτός) is both God and man,[92] the same one sanctifies and is
sanctified (107^{38}).

The Word has made the body, which is capable of suffering, his
own (ἴδιον ποιησάμενος; $108^{25f.}$). The suffering body, then, is the Word's
own.[93] The truly rich Word out of the Father has become poor, having
appropriated (οἰκειωσάμενος) the petty things of the humanity ($104^{36f.}$).

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[85] *Or. ad dom.*, 77^{31}, in the chapter on 2 Cor. 3:2–3, to which Jer. 38:33 has been added.

[86] *Ibid.*, $73^{23f.}$ ("If I say 'Christ', I indicate the Word out of God made man"), $76^{25f.}$, $80^{41f.}$.

[87] See, for example, *Or. ad dom.*, 71^7, 78^7, 81^3, $87^{36f.}$, 99^{22}, 108^{22}, $115^{23f.}$.

[88] See, for example, *Or. ad dom.*, 79^{22}, 96^{30}, 105^8, 113^{33}.

[89] *Or. ad dom.*, $87^{1, 5}$, 88^{30}, 100^{17}.

[90] *Ibid.*, $80^{28f.}$, 82^{29}, 87^6, $107^{11, 21}$, 109^{28}.

[91] *Ibid.*, $106^{1f.}$: εἷς γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν Υἱὸς ἀληθής. The expression 'one … out of both' also occurs in *ibid.*, 105^4, $111^{9, 35}$, $112^{4f.}$.

[92] *Ibid.*, 107^{21}, 109^{29}; cf. *ibid.*, $115^{4f.}$.

[93] *Ibid.*, 103^{14}. Cf. *ibid.*, $103^{22f.}$, $107^{10f.}$ (he died in his own body, and not rather in that of someone else), $110^{8f.}$.

If there is a man separately (διῃρημένως), and not rather the Word out of God who has assumed the flesh, then the Father has not given his own Son for us (103[16f.]; cf. Rom. 8:32). Separating the one into two is impious (103[15f.]). The view that Christ is a man by himself (ἰδικῶς; 110[27]) or separately (κατὰ μόνας; 111[26]) is not in line with Scripture.

Under the headings with more soteriological terminology we find further argumentations. If Christ died as a mere (ψιλός) man, we remain dead; but he died as God in the flesh, suffering humanly in the flesh, in order that we would be raised together with him (100[17–19]). How could Christ's blood be given in exchange for the life of all, if he were an ordinary (κοινός) man (99[22f.])? We had better think that he is the Word who, having become flesh, suffered in the flesh, and that his suffering is sufficient for the redemption of everything (100[32f.]). For our salvation, then, it is necessary that the incarnation took place.[94] Now that the Word has become flesh, he justifies us with his own (ἰδίῳ) blood;[95] we have been redeemed in that Christ has given his own body on our behalf;[96] he is God, who, with the death of his own flesh, puts away the death of the world (101[27f.]).

7.3.2. *Terminology*

In comparison with *Contra Nestorium*, *Oratio ad dominas* contains relatively little technical terminology. Even so, it is interesting to see what language Cyril of Alexandria does employ in the treatise. Especially his use of πρόσωπον is enlightening in that it occurs in new phrases.

7.3.2.1. *Οὐσία*

The word οὐσία itself occurs only three times in *Oratio ad dominas*. Twice we find it in a familiar phrase: the Word is said to have been born out of the substance of God the Father (63[17f.]), and his own Son is "out of his substance" (103[12f.]). The third time it is part of a more complicated argumentation. In an exposition of John 17:21–23—"I have also given them the glory which you have given me, in order that they will be one (ἕν), just as we are one (ἕν)"—Cyril writes:

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[94] *Ibid.*, 99[5f.], 99[34f.], 100[8], 101[1].
[95] *Ibid.*, 99[6f.]. Cf. *ibid.*, 99[23f.], 101[20f.].
[96] *Ibid.*, 99[21f.]. Cf. *ibid.*, 99[36], 102[5].

> For the Word out of God is one (ἕν) with his own Father by natural identity (τῇ ... φυσικῇ ταυτότητι), even though each is conceived of according to his distinct hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν ... ἰδικήν). But how has he also come among us in an equal manner, I mean substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) and naturally (φυσικῶς), while the nature of God is totally incompatible with creation, as in identity according to substance (ταυτότητι ... τῇ κατ' οὐσίαν)? How has he who is above creation come among us naturally (φυσικῶς)? For he has become man, in order that, just as he is one (ἕν) with the Father by the nature (φύσει) of the divinity, so he would also become one (ἕν) with us by a relation according to the humanity (σχέσει τῇ κατὰ ἀνθρωπότητα), for in this way are we, too, perfected into one (ἕν).[97]

In reference to the divine nature, we find the synonymy of οὐσία and φύσις twice: τῇ ... φυσικῇ ταυτότητι is comparable to ταυτότητι ... τῇ κατ' οὐσίαν, and οὐσιωδῶς is juxtaposed to φυσικῶς. Here, οὐσία has the meaning of COMMON SUBSTANCE, as usual, and φύσις that of COMMON NATURE. In this passage Cyril uses φύσις and οὐσία with respect to Christ's human nature only in the interrogative sentences, although in *Contra Nestorium* he has no problem affirming that the Word has also become consubstantial with us, while remaining consubstantial with the Father.[98] Here, however, he employs the phrase 'relation according to the humanity'. Cyril may well mean a 'natural relation (σχέσις φυσική)', which he applies to the relationship between Father and Son in the anti-Arian writings,[99] and which amounts to the same thing as consubstantiality. Because the Word has become consubstantial with us, we are perfected into one. In the chapter at hand, Cyril does not work out how this perfection takes place.

The adverb οὐσιωδῶς is found one more time in *Oratio ad dominas* (98[25]). That the Father has sealed the Son (John 6:27) indicates, according to Cyril, the accurate likeness between them: the characteristics of the Father's own nature are visible substantially in the Son. The word οὐσιωδῶς refers to the divine COMMON SUBSTANCE. 'Consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος)' and 'consubstantiality (ὁμοουσιότης)' also indicate a COMMON SUBSTANCE, either that of the Trinity, or that of human beings. They are found four times in the quotation from bishop Vitalius (68[1–5]), and three times elsewhere in the *Oratio*.[100]

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[97] *Ibid.*, c. 118, 91[14–21].
[98] *CN* III.3, 65[24–27]; cf. 66[4–6, 39f.] and III.5, 72[7f., 28]. See section 6.3.1.
[99] See section 2.5.4, esp. n. 235.
[100] *Or. ad dom.*, 63[15f.], 76[7f.], 80[27].

7.3.2.2. Ὑπόστασις

The word ὑπόστασις is found ten times in the treatise to the princesses, of which three times in a quotation of Hebr. 1:3 or a reference to this verse,[101] and once in a trinitarian context.[102] Four times we encounter the expression 'union according to hypostasis (ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν)',[103] and once 'united according to hypostasis (ἑνωθέντος … καθ' ὑπόστασιν; 110²⁸). It is a union with (πρός) the Word out of God; of the Word with (πρός) the flesh; of the Word of God with the human things (πρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα). And it is placed over against a man like us, an ordinary man; a union in persons only, according to will, a simple connection. It affirms one Christ. In christological contexts we only find the phrase καθ' ὑπόστασιν; the incarnate Word is not referred to as an ὑπόστασις. Neither are ὑπόστασις and φύσις juxtaposed, as if they were synonyms. The expressions are used, but not elaborated on. There is no reason to believe that they have another meaning than the one in the *Second Letter to Nestorius* and *Contra Nestorium*:[104] a real union has taken place which has resulted in one SEPARATE REALITY.

The corresponding verb ὑφεστάναι is absent from *Oratio ad dominas*, but there is one interesting occurrence of ὑπόστασις left, where it says of the one born out of the virgin:

> Therefore, let him be conceived of as the Word who has become flesh according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν), that is, as having made the flesh which is through the Spirit out of the holy virgin, his own (92²⁸ᶠ·).

Here, too, the expression καθ' ὑπόστασιν emphasizes that the incarnation is real (not Docetic in any sense) and that it results in one SEPARATE REALITY, which is underlined by the phrase 'having made the flesh his own (ἰδίαν ποιησάμενος σάρκα)'.

7.3.2.3. Πρόσωπον

Πρόσωπον occurs fifteen times in the address to the emperor's younger sisters, of which four times in a biblical quotation, all taken from the Gospel according to Luke.[105] Once we find the expression ἐκ

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[101] *Ibid.*, 63¹³, 107²², ²⁶ᶠ·.
[102] *Ibid.*, 91¹⁵. See n. 97.
[103] *Ibid.*, 81¹⁶, 89⁵, 103⁸, 103³⁶.
[104] See sections 5.8.2.1 and 6.3.2.
[105] *Or. ad dom.*, 92¹⁰, 92⁴¹, 111³¹, 112³⁵.

προσώπου Χριστοῦ (93³¹), indicating that the prophet Isaiah utters words as if Christ speaks them. In most other cases, though not all, Cyril of Alexandria employs the term to describe the view of his opponents. They can be divided into two groups. One in which the word πρόσωπον is used in the singular, and the other in which it is used in the plural.

We first encounter it in the summary of the views of both Cyril himself and his opponents, which follows the quotations from the Fathers. When describing their—he means, Nestorius's—interpretation of the word 'Christ', he writes:

> But some maintain, I know not how, that the name of 'Christ' is fitting to the Word, born out of God, being and being conceived of as by himself and separately and outside of the flesh, and is likewise fitting to the one born out of the holy virgin, even though regarded as existing separately and individually, and is, thirdly, fitting to both as to one, when the principle of connection (τοῦ τῆς συναφείας λόγου), as they say, binds them into one πρόσωπον.[106]

Cyril is aware that Nestorius affirms that Christ is one πρόσωπον, since the archbishop of Constantinople has used this language in his response to Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*.[107] And although Cyril himself also confesses the incarnate Word to be one πρόσωπον (see section 6.3.3), he interprets Nestorius's statement as having another content. While for Cyril the one πρόσωπον is the result of a hypostatic union and is, therefore, one SEPARATE REALITY, he sees in Nestorius's πρόσωπον the result of an external connection of two individual beings, a man by himself and the Word of God by himself, which in Cyril's own vocabulary amounts to two πρόσωπα.

Several lines further down, the Alexandrian archbishop writes that 'they' present an ordinary man who is honoured with a συνάφεια προσώπου with the Word out of God (69²⁸⁻³⁰). It seems that here, too, πρόσωπον does not have the meaning of PERSON that it normally has in Cyril's own language, but that it is the one πρόσωπον which issues from the connection of two individual beings. Elsewhere, he writes that some think "that Christ is an ordinary man, who has a connection

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[106] *Ibid.*, 69¹⁸⁻²³.

[107] *Ep.* 5, ACO I.1.1, 30¹²ᶠ· (= Nestorius (1905), 176⁵⁻⁸), and in a sentence in which Nestorius approves of Cyril's speaking of one πρόσωπον, 30¹⁸⁻²⁰ (= Nestorius (1905), 176¹⁵⁻¹⁷). See also Nestorius (1905), 196¹⁵⁻¹⁷, 196²¹⁻²³ (Latin), 224¹³⁻¹⁵, 280⁸·¹¹ (Syriac), 331⁷ᶠ· (Syriac).

with the Word out of God only by a union according to πρόσωπον".[108] This expression—which he attributes to his opponents: "for they speak in this way"—was probably interpreted by Cyril along the same lines: an external connection resulting in one πρόσωπον, which is not one PERSON, but two PERSONS who have an intimate relation with each other.

Then there are those instances in which we find the word πρόσωπον in the plural, when the understanding of Cyril's opponents is expressed. Once he says that "the measure of his humanity is honoured only with a mere union of προσώπων".[109] And somewhat further down we encounter the same expression: what revelation is necessary to know the mystery of Christ "if he is a man by himself and completely separated from the Word of God, honoured with a mere union of προσώπων?"[110] This looks more like the terminology we encountered in *Contra Nestorium*: not the result of the connection is called a πρόσωπον, but the two elements that come together are indicated as two πρόσωπα. Here, Cyril will have taken the term in its usual meaning: a PERSON, in this case an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. This is further affirmed by the fact that now—other than μόνος in the two instances discussed in section 6.3.3—ψιλός follows the case and the gender of 'union' (ψιλῇ ἑνώσει), not that of 'persons' (προσώπων). It is a 'mere union of persons', not a 'union of mere persons', which would make more sense if πρόσωπον had the meaning of 'external form', which Liébaert suggests (see section 6.3.3).

In the other three places where πρόσωπον occurs in the plural, we find the phrase ἐν προσώποις. Cyril suggests that he has found this phrase in the writings of his opponents:

> The union of the Word with the flesh, then, is rather natural and true, and it is not, as some say out of unlearnedness, accomplished in the persons only, or according to a mere word of praise and [according to] will, or according to a connection simply.[111]

In the extant works of Nestorius from the early 430s he does not speak of two πρόσωπα with respect to Christ; this language is only found in the *Liber Heraclidis*, which he wrote when he was in exile.[112] It is

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[108] *Or. ad dom.*, 78⁶⁻⁸: ἑνώσει μόνῃ τῇ κατὰ πρόσωπον τὴν συνάφειαν ἔχων.

[109] *Ibid.*, 114²²: μόνον καὶ ψιλῇ προσώπων ἑνώσει.

[110] *Ibid.*, 115³⁰⁻³³: ψιλῇ προσώπων ἑνώσει.

[111] *Ibid.*, 98¹²⁻¹⁴: ὡς ἐν μόνοις πέπρακται προσώποις.

[112] Neither the index in Nestorius (1905), nor a search for the string προσωπ in the works of Nestorius in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae yields any results with πρόσωπον in the plural. See also Loofs (1914), 74–86, and Abramowski (1963), 217–224.

unclear, then, where Cyril found this phrase. But it seems obvious that he interpreted it within the framework of his own metaphysics, as the coming together into a union of two PERSONS, which can only result in an external relation, not in one SEPARATE REALITY. A number of chapters later we find a similar sentence:

> We say, then, that the union according to hypostasis of the Word with the flesh is necessary, and not just that in persons and according to will or simple connection, as some say.[113]

And a little further again: "If, as some think, Christ is conceived of as a God-bearing man, and as having only a union in persons with the Word out of God, ...".[114] Here, too, πρόσωπον has the meaning of PERSON, ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. In two of the last three cases μόνος agrees with ἕνωσις as for its number and gender, once again confirming that it is not 'a union of persons only' that Cyril envisages, but 'only a union of persons'. It is not the content of the word πρόσωπον that falls short, but the strength of the union, which is not 'according to hypostasis'.

There are two more places where πρόσωπον occurs. In his comment on Rom. 10:6–11, Cyril uses it, as in *Contra Nestorium*, to refer to the incarnate Word in a sentence which gives his own view: "If the whole definition of the faith and the power of the confession is placed round the πρόσωπον of Christ, ..." (113[17–19]). In the immediate context, Cyril speaks of Christ's death and resurrection and declares his deity. In other words, both the human and the divine characteristics apply to the πρόσωπον of Christ. Here, πρόσωπον has its usual meaning of PERSON, first of all GRAMMATICAL PERSON, but the unity of Christ as one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON is implied, in line with Cyril's language in *Contra Nestorium*.

The last instance reads: "If he is conceived of as a man separately, honoured only with the title of Christ, and having [his] πρόσωπον stripped of Son, how could his body be life-giving?"[115] It seems that Cyril wants to say that the person of such a Christ is a man separately, without also being Son of God by nature. He is 'stripped of (γυμνόν)' being Son of God. Πρόσωπον still has the sense of PERSON, but now

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[113] *Or. ad dom.*, 103[7–9]: καὶ οὐχὶ δὴ μόνην τὴν ἐν προσώποις καὶ κατὰ θέλησιν ἤτοι συνάφειαν ἁπλῆν.

[114] *Ibid.*, 103[32–34]: καὶ μόνην ἔχων τὴν ἐν προσώποις ἕνωσιν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ Λόγον.

[115] *Ibid.*, 95[10–12]: καὶ γυμνὸν Υἱοῦ πρόσωπον ἔχων.

an ordinary human PERSON is meant, not the PERSON of the incarnate Word, who is God and man at the same time.

It may still be added that the word προσωπεῖον is used once: "They mould a pious mask (προσωπεῖον) with their own argumentations" (64³³), in other words: They make a pious face.

7.3.2.4. Φύσις

Just as in the other writings of Cyril of Alexandria that we have examined, also in *Oratio ad dominas* the word φύσις is found much more often than οὐσία, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον—more than a hundred times in total. In about two thirds of this total it is part of the phrase 'by nature': κατὰ φύσιν, (τῇ) φύσει, and a few times τὴν φύσιν. Many times Cyril speaks about the Father or about Christ as God by nature.[116] The Word or Christ is also called Son by nature,[117] or (born) out of the Father by nature.[118] He is Lord,[119] Creator (76²²), life,[120] immutable[121] by nature. He is above the whole world by nature (101¹⁵), he is superior to all things by nature (107²⁹ᶠ), and he has freedom by nature (89⁷). That which is holy by nature is not sanctified, because it does not need sanctification (107³⁶ᶠ). And there is nothing great or difficult in saying about a man that he is man by nature (82⁶ᶠ). In all these cases the word φύσις refers to a COMMON NATURE—the divine nature which is common to Father, Son and holy Spirit, or the human nature which is common to all individual men—to which the natural properties are attached, and which is transferred from one generation to the other, also from the Father to the Son.

Then there are a number of instances in which Cyril speaks of the divine nature, the nature of the divinity, the nature above all things, and similar expressions. Sometimes they are more or less interchangeable with 'God'.[122] At other times they are used to declare the unity of God or the deity of the Spirit, in which cases φύσις refers to the

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[116] For example, *ibid.*, 63³, 75¹⁹ᶠ, 82²⁹ᶠ, 93⁶, 106²⁷, 114³³.

[117] *Ibid.*, 65⁸, 73⁸, 79⁵ᶠ (denied by some), 80³, 81⁴, 92²⁷ᶠ, 103²³ᶠ.

[118] *Ibid.*, 63¹⁰ᶠ, 76²³ᶠ, 83⁶ᶠ, 93³ᶠ, 97¹⁰, 107²⁷, 111²⁸.

[119] *Ibid.*, 69¹⁶ᶠ, 76³⁶, 103³⁷, 105²⁴, 107¹⁵ᶠ, 110³¹, 112¹, ⁴.

[120] *Ibid.*, 95³⁹, 96⁶, ⁸, 98²⁹, ³¹, 110¹⁷.

[121] *Ibid.*, 63²⁷; cf. 83³⁴.

[122] *Ibid.*, 80²⁵ᶠ: "Does, then, one who is conceived of as a man like us and nothing else sit on the throne together with the nature above all things?" See also *ibid.*, 94²⁰ᶠ, 108²⁴ᶠ.

divine COMMON NATURE.[123] Once it is linked with existence: "his divine nature did not receive its beginning of being when he is said to have been born according to the flesh" ($63^{30f.}$). If we look at this sentence in isolation, φύσις could mean SEPARATE REALITY here—the meaning that Lebon attaches to φύσις in christological contexts—, but it could equally refer to the Word's INDIVIDUAL NATURE. In a number of cases, however, there is an implicit reference to the divine essence or to the natural properties, in that certain properties are said to be fitting, or not fitting, to the divine nature,[124] or the divine nature is compared to creation.[125] In these last cases φύσις may be regarded as referring to the divine COMMON NATURE.

There is one instance in which it must mean the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word: "the nature which gives life to all things (for he appeared as life out of the life of the Father) . . . took hold of Abraham's seed".[126] It was not the whole Trinity who became man, but the Son only, and, therefore, 'the nature which gives life to all things' must refer to the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Son. The questions raised earlier (see section 5.3.2.3) about the relationship between this INDIVIDUAL NATURE and the divine COMMON NATURE apply here as well.

Five times Cyril speaks explicitly about 'the nature of the Word' or the Word's 'own nature'. Each time it is in connection with a property, which is regarded as fitting or not fitting to the Word's nature.[127] Therefore, this φύσις of the Logos is not a SEPARATE REALITY, without any reference to essence or natural properties—as Lebon argues—but it is either the divine COMMON NATURE or the Word's divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

It is remarkable that, seeing the explicit dyophysite language in the previous christological works, Cyril seems much more reluctant in *Oratio ad dominas*. We have already seen (in section 7.3.2.1) that he uses the adjective φυσικῶς only in the interrogative sentences, when he asks how the Word has come among us naturally. When he comments on Mt. 1:21 ("for he will save his people from their sins"), he states that in this verse two things are mentioned "which are God-befitting and not

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[123] *Ibid.*, $63^{14f.}$, 76^{5-7}, 91^{19} (see n. 97).
[124] *Ibid.*, $77^{18f.}$, $82^{28f.}$, 86^{36}–87^{1}, $95^{24f.}$, $102^{7f.}$, $103^{13f.}$.
[125] *Ibid.*, 91^{17}; see n. 97.
[126] *Ibid.*, 63^{17-24}.
[127] *Ibid.*, $96^{16f.}$, $104^{16f.}$, $106^{28f.}$, 108^{1}, $109^{14f.}$.

fitting to the human nature":[128] that they are his people, and that he saves them from their sins. And with respect to "the fragrance of the knowledge of Christ" (2 Cor. 2:14) he writes: "For one will not ascertain the aroma of the divine nature in the human nature".[129] In both these cases 'the human nature' may be taken as the human COMMON NATURE, not necessarily as Christ's human INDIVIDUAL NATURE. Since Cyril does not speak of natures in the plural with regard to Christ, the question of 'in contemplation only' is irrelevant to *Oratio ad dominas*.

Why would Cyril suddenly be so reluctant to speak of a human nature with respect to the incarnate Word, while in *Oratio ad Theodosium*, which was probably sent to Constantinople at the same time as the treatise to the princesses, he has retained the dyophysite language that was present in *On the Incarnation*? We can only guess, but it may have to do with the quotation from Apollinarius, which Cyril thought to be from Athanasius, whom he regarded as a high authority. He introduces the quotations by stating that he wants to show that the Fathers used the title θεοτόκος habitually. And the quotation from pseudo-Athanasius indeed contains the epithet θεοτόκος, (65[31f.]) while it emphasizes that the one born out of Mary is the same one as the Son of God, and it declares anathema someone who speaks of the one out of Mary as another besides the Son of God, as if there are two Sons. But the quotation also contains the μία φύσις formula—in what is usually regarded as its standard form—while it denies that the Son is two natures:

> For we confess, he says, that he is Son of God and God according to the Spirit, Son of Man according to the flesh, not that the one Son is two natures, one to be worshipped and one not to be worshipped, but one nature of the Word of God, incarnate and worshipped with his flesh with one worship, not two Sons.[130]

The tension with the language in *Oratio ad Theosodium* is obvious, where Cyril freely speaks of 'the natures' with respect to Christ, and where he writes that "to himself it applies in truth to be and to be called

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[128] *Ibid.*, 86[10f.]: Δύο κατὰ ταυτὸ τίθησι τὰ θεοπρεπῆ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπείᾳ πρέποντα φύσει.

[129] *Ibid.*, 77[18f.]: οὐ γὰρ ἔν γε τῇ ἀνθρώπου φύσει τὴν τῆς θείας φύσεως εὐωδίαν ἀναμάθοι τις ἄν.

[130] *Ibid.*, 65[25–28]: οὐ δύο φύσεις τὸν ἕνα Υἱόν, μίαν προσκυνητὴν καὶ μίαν ἀπροσκύνητον, ἀλλὰ μίαν φύσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένην καὶ προσκυνουμένην μετὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ μιᾷ προσκυνήσει, οὐδὲ δύο Υἱούς.

both God and man out of the worshipping humanity and the worshipped divinity".[131]

It may be, then, that the text thought to be from the authoritative Athanasius has made Cyril more cautious with dyophysite terminology. Even so, Cyril merely quotes the text, and not because it contains the μία φύσις formula, but because it calls Mary θεοτόκος and ascribes the birth out of Mary to the Son of God. And he does not comment on the formula in any way.

In Cyril's own language we do not find the μία φύσις formula in any form. He does speak of 'a natural union', 'a union according to nature', and 'united according to nature' four times.[132] In none of these cases does he elaborate on this expression, but it is clear from the context that he intends a union which results in one SEPARATE REALITY. It may reasonably be assumed that the Alexandrian archbishop uses the phrase in the same way as in his previous writings: it regards the incarnation as the coming together of two elements that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance into one SEPARATE REALITY, just as body and soul together form one individual human being.[133] If this is the case, 'natural union' and similar expressions fit well within a dyophysite framework: two INDIVIDUAL NATURES are united into one SEPARATE REALITY.

> A few places where φύσις or one of its cognates is used in a non-christological context are still worth mentioning. The adjective φυσικός and its corresponding adverb φυσικῶς are applied with regard to the hypostases of the Trinity to indicate their natural unity.[134] We find 'the human nature' once in a soteriological passage, where it indicates, as in other works, either the whole human race, or the human COMMON NATURE, or both.[135] And the phrase 'own nature' is once employed with respect to human flesh.[136]

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[131] *Or. ad Th.*, 63¹⁵⁻¹⁷: ἐκ τῆς προσκυνούσης ἀνθρωπότητος καὶ ἐκ τῆς προσκυνουμένης θεότητος.

[132] *Or. ad dom.*, 65¹¹: "the Word out of God the Father united according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν ἑνωθέντα) to the flesh"; 68³²ᶠ: "the Word out of God has been united according to nature (ἡνῶσθαι δὲ κατὰ φύσιν) to the flesh"; 69²³ᶠ: "for there is no word of the true union according to nature (ἑνώσεως γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀληθοῦς) with them"; 98¹²: "the union of the Word with the flesh, then, is natural and true (φυσικὴ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀληθὴς ἡ ἕνωσις)".

[133] See sections 5.4.2.2 and 6.3.4.

[134] *Or. ad dom.*, 63¹⁵, 63³¹. See also n. 97.

[135] *Ibid.*, 64¹⁰ᶠ: "if Emmanuel were an ordinary man, how could the death of a man help the human nature (τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν)?"

[136] *Ibid.*, 95⁷: "Human flesh could not be life-giving, as far as its own nature is concerned (ὅσον ἧκεν εἰς ἰδίαν φύσιν)".

7.3.2.5. Ἴδιος

The use of ἴδιος shows a familiar picture: on the one hand, it is employed to indicate a relation by nature, on the other hand, it may denote what is proper to an individual. Especially, the natural relation between the Spirit and the Son is expressed by ἴδιος: the Spirit is the Son's 'own', which is often part of an argumentation to show that Christ is God.[137] But also, the Son is the Father's 'own',[138] as is the Word (108³⁵), while the Father is the Son's 'own'.[139] Further, we find the expressions 'own nature'[140] and 'own divinity' (108¹⁵), and what belongs to Father, Son and holy Spirit as to the one Trinity is the divine nature's 'own' or the divinity's 'own',[141] but it may also be called the Word's or Christ's 'own'.[142]

Conversely, his flesh,[143] his body,[144] his blood,[145] his temple (100¹⁹), his death (102¹), his resurrection (85⁸) are the Word's or Christ's 'own' in the sense that they are his as an individual being, and not someone else's. He has made the flesh[146] or the body (108²⁶) his own (ἰδίαν / ἴδιον ποιησάμενος). He is said to appropriate (οἰκειοῦσθαι) the birth of his own flesh (63³⁴), or to have appropriated the petty things of the humanity (104³⁶ᶠ·). That these human things are the Word's own is an expression of the unity of the Word with his flesh, but in *Oratio ad dominas* it is stated rather than argued, as it is in *Contra Nestorium*.

Separate existence is expressed by various terms related to ἴδιος: ἰδίᾳ,[147] κατ' ἰδίαν,[148] and ἰδικῶς,[149] but also by expressions like ἀνὰ

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[137] *Ibid.*, 69³⁸, 72⁴¹, 74⁷, 77³⁰, ³¹, 85², ¹²ᶠ·, 110³⁴, ³⁶.

[138] *Ibid.*, 108³³, 118¹⁰, and several times in c. 163 (103¹⁰⁻¹⁷), where Rom. 8:32 ("who did not spare his own Son") is cited and commented on.

[139] *Ibid.*, 63¹² ("his own Begetter"), 81³⁸, 111²⁵, ²⁸, ²⁹.

[140] *Ibid.*, 95⁷ (human flesh), 96¹⁶ (the Word). See also *ibid.*, 104¹⁶ ("the antiquity of his own [οἰκείας] nature").

[141] *Ibid.*, 95²⁵, 95³⁰.

[142] *Ibid.*, 74¹⁴, 94¹³.

[143] *Ibid.*, 63³⁴, 72²¹, 98²⁰, 101²⁷, 102⁸, 107¹⁰ (explicitly, "as having died in his own flesh, and not rather in that of someone else").

[144] *Ibid.*, 63³³, 96⁶, ⁸, 99²¹, ³⁶, 102⁵, 103¹⁴, ²², 110⁸ᶠ·, 111³⁶.

[145] *Ibid.*, 78²⁷, 78⁷, 98⁶, 101¹⁸, ²¹ (Hebr. 13:12 and comment), 107³².

[146] *Ibid.*, 63²³, 92²⁹.

[147] *Ibid.*, 69³¹ (the Word by himself), 90³¹, ³² (the Father by himself, without the Son, and the Son by himself, without the Father).

[148] *Ibid.*, 86¹ (the one out of a woman by himself).

[149] *Ibid.*, 69¹⁹ (the Word), 72³⁹ (a man), 115³² (a man).

μέρος,[150] καθ’ ἑαυτό(ν),[151] and κατὰ μόνας.[152] Often, two of these terms appear together. Ἰδικῶς is also employed to denote that the Word is the only and proper Son of the Father—a natural relation—,[153] and that the flesh has become the Word’s own—as belonging to a specific individual.[154] The adjective ἰδικός is used to indicate the distinctiveness of the divine hypostases (91[15f.]). And finally, ἰδίωμα appears once in the sense of ‘property’.[155]

7.3.2.6. *Other Terms*

The noun ἕνωσις and the verb ἑνοῦσθαι occur a number of times in *Oratio ad dominas*, mostly to describe a christological view which Cyril supports. Four times, however, it is found in a rendering of his opponents’ views. In these cases a qualifying phrase is added, like ‘a union in persons only’.[156] The noun συνάφεια occurs five times, each time to indicate an understanding which is rejected by Cyril.[157] The corresponding verb συνάπτειν is employed once for our relationship with God the Father.[158] This confirms that Cyril tends to use συνάφεια for an external relationship. The terms ‘rank (ἀξία)’, ‘dignity (ἀξίωμα)’ and ‘sovereign power (αὐθεντία)’, which recur frequently in *Contra Nestorium* in the rendering of Nestorius’s views, also several times in quotations, are not employed in this way in the treatise to the princesses. Instead, Cyril speaks of ‘a union in persons’, of other expressions containing the word πρόσωπον, and of a union ‘according to mere honour’ or ‘according to will’.[159] The term σχέσις is found once, but not for an external relation between the Word and his flesh, as it is in *Contra Nestorium*.[160]

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[150] *Ibid.*, 70[7f.], 72[39], 90[32], 95[10f.].

[151] *Ibid.*, 69[21, 32], 85[26], 95[8].

[152] *Ibid.*, 69[19, 21], 111[26].

[153] *Ibid.*, 69[17]: μόνος καὶ ἰδικῶς Υἱός.

[154] *Ibid.*, 91[40f.]: “Because his flesh has not become foreign (ἀλλοτρία) to the Word, but properly (ἰδικῶς) his”.

[155] *Ibid.*, 108[1]: “he possesses the ability to sanctify as a property of his own nature”.

[156] *Ibid.*, 78[7] (see n. 108); 103[33f.] (see n. 114); 114[22] (see n. 109); 115[32f.] (see n. 110).

[157] *Ibid.*, 69[22] (see n. 106), 69[30] (“a connection of πρόσωπον”); 78[7] (see n. 108), 98[14] (see n. 111); 103[9] (see n. 113).

[158] *Ibid.*, 112[28f.] (“for we have been connected with God the Father”).

[159] *Ibid.*, 98[12–14] (ἕνωσις … κατὰ ψιλὴν εὐφημίαν καὶ θέλησιν), 103[8f.] (ἕνωσιν … κατὰ θέλησιν).

[160] See n. 97.

Besides the various terms for 'by himself' and 'separately', which we looked at in the previous section, Cyril also uses a wide variety of verbs which mean 'to separate' or 'to divide' for the christology of his opponents.[161]

The verb 'to transelement (μεταστοιχειοῦν)' seemed to adopt an almost technical status in *Contra Nestorium*, indicating the replacement of certain human properties by divine properties when a human being partakes of the divine nature (see section 6.4.3). This verb is absent in *Oratio ad dominas*, as is the notion of becoming partakers of the divine nature as well as the terminology of deification.[162] But in an exposition of various verses from 1 Cor. 15, Cyril writes: "The Only-Begotten has become like us and he changes (μεθιστάντος) what is mortal into immortality, and he transforms (μετασκευάζοντος) in himself first what is corruptible into incorruption". The same verb μεθιστάναι is used to affirm here the change from mortality to immortality, and in *Contra Nestorium* to deny a change of a creature into the nature of the divinity.[163] This shows that for Cyril, deification means that some human properties (like mortality and corruption) are changed into divine ones (immortality and incorruption), but that otherwise the human nature remains what it is. It may also be noted that, here too, the change is said to take place 'in [Christ] himself first'.

7.3.3. *Christology*

Despite the fact that there is hardly any dyophysite language in *Oratio ad dominas*, figure 2 in section 5.3.3 is still an adequate picture for the christology in this treatise. Cyril's emphasis that the incarnation involves a union according to hypostasis of the Word with the flesh implies that Christ is regarded as a SEPARATE REALITY which is formed out of two elements that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance. These elements may, therefore, be called INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES or INDIVIDUAL NATURES. Cyril himself does not use the word οὐσία for them, but neither does he do this in earlier christological writings. And the word

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[161] *Or. ad dom.*, 64[18] (τέμνειν), 64[20] (τέμνουσιν), 64[25] (ἀποδιιστάντες), 70[9] (μεμέρισται), 74[23] (μεμέρισται), 77[12] (τέμνειν), 88[34] (διορίζειν), 97[5] (διαιρῶν), 98[1] (ἀποδιαιροῦντες), 103[15] (ἀπομερίζειν), 103[17] (διῃρημένως), 111[7] (διορίζοντες), 115[32] (κεχωρισμένος). The verbs occurring in the quotations from the Fathers are not included.

[162] Twice Cyril speaks of "partakers of the [holy] Spirit (μέτοχοι τοῦ [ἁγίου] Πνεύματος)": *Or ad dom.*, 91[42], 100[31].

[163] *CN* III.2, 60[17].

φύσις is only applied for the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word, not for the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE: "the nature which gives life to all things … took hold of Abraham's seed".[164]

In the attribution of sayings, a number of times we come across expressions containing the word φύσις. Mostly it refers to the divine element, but sometimes to the human element. So Cyril writes: "Since he is immutable by nature as God, having remained what he always was and is and will be, he is also called Son of Man" (63[26–28]). But also, with respect to the aroma of Christ (2 Cor. 2:14–15): "For one will not ascertain the fragrance of the divine nature in the human nature".[165] And: "He attributes at the same time two God-befitting things, which are not befitting the human nature": the people are called his own, and he saves them from their sins.[166] Also: "The flesh of man, as far as its own nature is concerned, is not life-giving" (95[7]). And: "He, then, sanctifies as God, possessing the ability to sanctify as a property of his own nature, but he is sanctified with us according to what is human".[167]

While one cannot say that the word φύσις in these instances has the meaning of INDIVIDUAL NATURE, it does show that after the incarnation certain properties of Christ are attributed to the divine (common) nature, and others to the human (common) nature. That is, the elements have not been mixed to form a *tertium quid*, but each element remains the source of particular properties. And yet, as Cyril does not get tired of repeating, there is one Christ, one SEPARATE REALITY. The two sets of properties are both attached to this one reality. We also find a clear expression of the communication of idioms in *Oratio ad dominas*, in Cyril's comment to John 3:12–13 ("And no one has ascended into heaven except the one who descended out of heaven, the Son of Man"):

> In this way the properties (ἴδια) of the flesh have become those of the Word, and the properties (ἴδια) of the Word [have become] those of the flesh, sin only excepted (110[10f.]).

'In this way' refers back to the previous sentence in which Cyril argues that the body was the Word's own (ἴδιον), who had come down out of heaven and who had also become Son of Man.

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[164] *Or. ad dom.*, 63[19]. See n. 126.
[165] *Ibid.*, 77[18f.]. See n. 129.
[166] *Ibid.*, 86[10f.]. See n. 128.
[167] *Ibid.*, 107[38]–108[2]. See also 82[28f.], 83[34], 86[36]–87[1], 96[16f.], 102[7f.], 103[13f.], 104[15–17], 106[28f.], 109[14f.].

Just as in *Contra Nestorium*, the attribution of sayings is often indicated by terms and expressions which do not contain the word φύσις. We encounter 'as God (ὡς Θεός)' and 'as man (ὡς ἄνθρωπος)',[168] 'divinely (θεικῶς)' and 'humanly (ἀνθρωπίνως)',[169] 'in the flesh (σαρκί)',[170] 'according to the flesh (κατὰ [τὴν] σάρκα)',[171] 'economically (οἰκονομικῶς)',[172] and 'according to / because of / regarding that which is human (κατὰ / διὰ / περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον)'.[173] Cyril thus clearly distinguishes between the divine and the human properties and actions. And although these expressions by themselves do not show that they issue from different sources, the assertions containing the word φύσις make it clear that this is what the Alexandrian archbishop intends. Figure 2 in section 5.3.3, then, is an adequate picture of Cyril's metaphysical understanding of the person of Christ as it is described in *Oratio ad dominas*.

7.4. *Oratio ad augustas*[174]

7.4.1. *Summary of the Contents*

This treatise to the emperor Theodosius's wife Eudocia and to his elder sister Pulcheria shows some resemblances with that to the younger princesses. The larger part of both works consists of biblical citations and Cyril's christological comments on them. The number of citations is considerably less in *Oratio ad augustas*, but the comments are longer, and it does not contain quotations from the Fathers. Its total size is about two thirds of *Oratio ad dominas*. In this work, too, there is no direct reference to Nestorius.

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[168] For example, *ibid.*, 76³⁵, 82²⁷ᶠ·, 87¹⁷, 94²⁹, 107³¹, 110³³, 118²⁵. Cf. *ibid.*, 87¹ᶠ·.

[169] For example, *ibid.*, 64⁵, 76⁸, 90²², 100¹⁸, 110³⁶.

[170] *Ibid.*, 80¹⁷, 100³²ᶠ·, 102⁷, 102²³, 104²².

[171] For example, *ibid.*, 63³⁰, 82³⁰ᶠ·, 86³², 90¹⁵, 102¹⁰.

[172] For example, *ibid.*, 79⁴, 97¹¹ᶠ·, 103¹⁵.

[173] *Ibid.*, 69³⁶, 70⁴, 94²⁶ᶠ·, 107¹⁹, 108¹ᶠ·, 108¹⁵ᶠ·.

[174] The Greek title states that it is "from our holy Father among the saints Cyril, archbishop of Alexandria, προσφωνητικὸς ταῖς εὐσεβεστάταις βασιλίσιν περὶ τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως". In *CPG* 5220 it is called *Oratio ad Pulcheriam et Eudociam augustas de fide*. The work is also referred to as *De recta fide ad augustas*. The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.5, 26–61 (= V 149; referred to as *Or. ad aug.*). A Greek text is further given in Pusey VII, 263–333, and in PG 76, 1336–1420. No translation in one of the modern languages is available yet.

In the first chapter, Cyril of Alexandria gives a biblical motivation for his writings to the empresses. In the second, he introduces his treatise and states that he does not endure those who sever the one Christ into two Sons. Instead, he teaches that the one born out of the substance of the Father before the ages is not another besides the one born out of a woman in the last times, but that he is one and the same both before the union with the flesh and after it. The Son who is out of the Father by nature has assumed a body with soul and mind and was born fleshly through the holy θεοτόκος Mary,[175] not changed into flesh, but it—the flesh—was added, while he remained God. His mentioning of Christ's soul and mind foreshadows more attention for the Apollinarian heresy in this *Oratio*. This is the only time that the title θεοτόκος occurs in this work, which once more suggests that christology, not this title as such, was Cyril's real interest. If his main motive for the christological controversy were a power struggle between the sees of Alexandria and Constantinople—as has been suggested[176]—he would have played the trump of the epithet θεοτόκος, especially in a treatise to the emperor's elder sister Pulcheria.

Having thus given a summary of the issues at hand, Cyril elaborates somewhat on them in chapter 3, in which he also cites Phil. 2:6–8. In chapter 4, he writes that in "the book that has come from us to the holy virgins" (28[1f]; this refers to *Oratio ad dominas*) he has dealt with things

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[175] This is one of a few places in *Oratio ad augustas* (27[12]) where Cyril writes that Christ was born 'through (διά)' rather than 'out of (ἐκ)' Mary or the virgin. He never uses 'through (διά)' with 'a woman', but always writes 'out of (ἐκ) a woman'. Cf. section 7.2.1, point 4.

[176] One of the most blatant statements can be found in Schwartz (1928). Schwartz starts his essay with the assertion: "Das Motiv, das Cyrill dazu trieb, den Streit mit Nestorius zu beginnen, war nicht der dogmatische Gegensatz; Nestorius trug in seinen Predigten keine Neuerungen vor, … Wie der Oheim Theophilos sich an Johannes 'Goldmund' dafür rächte, dass …, so begann der Neffe Cyrill den Krieg mit dem konstantinopler Kollegen, als er merkte, dass dieser ebenso wie Johannes sein Amt selbständig zu führen gedachte" (p. 3). See also chapter 5, n. 7.

Von Campenhausen (1955), is somewhat more positive about Cyril: "Es wäre indessen nicht richtig, Kyrill nur als Kirchenpolitiker und geistlichen Regenten zu verstehen. Viel mehr als sein Oheim wollte er auch Theologe sein und die wahre Glaubenstradition nicht nur hierarchisch repräsentieren, sondern auch lehrend ver- treten und verkörpern" (p. 154). But he, too, ascribes to Cyril a church-political, tactical motive to get involved in the christological controversy: "Nach einer schon von Athanasios erfolgreich angewandten Taktik, erschien es vielmehr das Beste, den rechtlichen Streit sofort auf das Gebiet des Glaubens hinüberzuspielen" (p. 157).

that are easy to understand, while in the present work he discusses more difficult matters. His aim is to give a brief interpretation—of a number of Scripture verses—, especially regarding the kenosis. This, then, must be investigated: when Christ Jesus is mentioned, one should think that the Word out of God the Father has been made man and has been incarnated. And immediately following this statement, the citation of Bible verses and Cyril's accompanying comments start. They comprise 44 chapters, so that the total number of chapters is 48. The last one ends in a doxology. On some of the verses Cyril has already commented in the treatise to the princesses, but he does not simply repeat what he has written previously. His exposition in *Oratio ad augustas* is generally longer and covers other aspects.

Most of the chapters are grouped together under headings, but the first fifteen lack a heading. And the names of the Bible books are not given as subheadings, as they are in *Oratio ad dominas*.

chapters	titles	Bible books
5–19	[no heading]	
5		1 Corinthians
6		2 Corinthians
7		Galatians
8–10		Hebrews
11–14		John
15		Luke
16–17		Matthew
18		Philippians
19		Colossians
20–24	About Christ's obedience	
20–21		Romans
22		2 Corinthians
23		Hebrews
24		John
25–35	About the sanctification of Christ and the priesthood thought with respect to him	
25		Hebrews
26		1 Timothy
27		John
28		Luke
29–35		Hebrews
36–39	That our Lord Jesus Christ is said to receive glory	
36		Galatians
37–38		John
39		Acts

chapters	*titles*	*Bible books*

40–46	That Christ is said to have risen from the dead in the power of the Father	
40–42		Romans
43		2 Corinthians
44		John / Matthew / Luke
45–46		John
47–48	That, while Christ is called the Son of Man, he is nonetheless true God	
47		Luke
48		John

The main theme of the first group of fifteen chapters is the unity of Christ. Several of the chapters contain a conclusion like "Christ, then, is one".[177] The union between the Word and his flesh is mentioned in various ways,[178] and it is explicitly stated that the one Christ should not be divided into two,[179] and that he should not be regarded as simply a man, by himself and separately, besides the Word.[180] One of the verses discussed is Luke 2:52 again (c. 15). Cyril seems to be saying that Christ gives a manifestation (ἔκφανσιν) of a growth in wisdom which is fitting to the growth of his body. This interpretation looks like the one in *Contra Nestorium*, rather than that in *Festal Letter* 17: since he also speaks of "seeming (δοκεῖν) to be filled with wisdom", this has more of a Docetic ring to it than the assumption of the human properties in the *Festal Letter*.[181]

Another interesting verse that the Alexandrian archbishop comments on is Mt. 27:46 ("Jesus cried out in a loud voice: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"). Cyril argues that because of Adam's disobedience "the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις)", the whole human race, was somehow forsaken by God. And when the only-begotten Word of God transelemented that which suffered into incorruption,

> he had to stop, together with that ancient curse and the introduced corruption, the forsakenness which the human nature endured in ancient times. Being one of the forsaken ones, then (ὡς οὖν εἷς ὑπάρχων τῶν ἐγκαταλελειμμένων), insofar as he himself participated in blood and flesh like we, he says: "Why have you forsaken me?", which means that he

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[177] *Or. ad aug.*, 28²¹, 29³, 30²⁴, 31²⁸, 32¹ᶠ. That there is one Christ is also mentioned, not as a conclusion, but as part of the argumentation in *ibid.*, 32³³, ³⁵, 33¹⁴, 34⁴.

[178] *Ibid.*, 28²⁷ᶠ, 30²³, ²⁴, ³², 36⁶, 37⁹ᶠ, ¹⁵ᶠ, ¹⁷.

[179] *Ibid.*, 33², 35²⁰ᶠ.

[180] *Ibid.*, 29¹⁰, 30²ᶠ, 32²⁵, 33⁶, ⁹, 35²⁴, ²⁵, ²⁸ᶠ, 36³⁹ᶠ, 37¹²ᶠ.

[181] *Ibid.*, 33¹⁷⁻¹⁹. See also section 5.4.1, n. 136, and section 6.2.3.

clearly dissolved the forsakenness which had befallen us and that he as
it were put to shame the Father in himself and called him to kindness
towards us as towards himself first.[182]

Thus, Cyril does not simply take these words in a Docetic way. Christ
was "one of the forsaken ones", and the forsakenness had to be
dissolved in "himself first". Elsewhere, Cyril uses expressions like: "the
Word allowed the flesh to move according to its own laws", before he
turned the suffering into victory. He does not explicitly say that here,
nor does he dwell on the length of Christ's forsakenness, but he does
teach here that the incarnate Word was genuinely forsaken *as man*.
Cyril adds: "And if he is said to have received humanly from the Father,
he gave this to our nature, he himself being full and not at all lacking in
anything as God" (35^{6-8}).

The second group, consisting of five chapters, deals with the obedi-
ence of Christ. Man had become disobedient, but God recapitulated all
things in Christ (c. 20): the Father sent his Son, who made a body his
own, and was thus found as a man, who knew no sin. In this way
having become obedient to God the Father, he justified the human
nature in himself and took away the bonds of death. And when he
is called a servant of Jews and Gentiles alike, he is this humanly, while
he is preached to them as God (c. 21). The Word became man, while
remaining God; he added what is human and has become obedient
unto death according to the flesh (κατὰ τὴν σάρκα; 39^{25}).

The Word of God has appeared as man, and then he was called
Jesus. He himself said that he came to serve and to give his life as
a ransom for many. Serving is human, but it is not unreasonable for
him who lowered himself into human things. At the same time, he
is compared with Moses, who is called a servant, while he himself is
master over the house. The difference between him who is Master by
nature and him who is truly slave is incomparable (c. 23). When he
says that he has come, not to do his own will, but that of the Father
(John 6:38), he speaks economically. By testifying to his own obedience
he accuses the disobedience of others. And the will of him who sent
him was that all who had been given him would be saved through his
obedience (c. 24).

The third group comprises eleven relatively long chapters, which dis-
cuss Christ's sanctification and priesthood. Christ himself is perfected

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[182] *Ibid.*, 34^{36}–35^{5}.

humanly in the flesh on behalf of us, and he perfects us divinely through the destruction of the power of death (c. 25). If the Word of God is said to have become man, while remaining God, the mystery of godliness is great (1 Tim. 3:16). But if Christ is regarded as an ordinary man connected with God only according to rank or sovereign power, then he has not appeared in the flesh (c. 26). When the Spirit descended on Christ like a dove, he received the Spirit humanly. But when the same one is said to baptise with the holy Spirit, he gives divinely (c. 27). Christ was tempted by Satan like one of us. He arranged himself in battle as a man on behalf of us, and he conquered divinely (c. 28).

Before the incarnation, the Word of God had knowledge of the human weakness as Creator, but he was not yet called to the same temptation. When he had put on our flesh, he was tempted in all things as our great high priest (c. 29). He who emptied himself awaited the calling by the Father unto the priesthood, which is fitting, not to his own nature, but to ours, that is, to the human nature (c. 30). During his days in the flesh he offered up prayers and supplications (Hebr. 5:7) as having become like us, and he was heard as Son by nature. He did this as a second first-fruits of the human race: he started it, and the Father's hearing of prayers was broadened to the human nature. Thus, he prepared the reception of our prayers (c. 31). If they say that the prayers were offered by a mere man, who has equality of rank and sovereign power with the Word, as connected with him, then, conversely, the Word would have the same rank as this man, and it would be fitting for the Word himself to fear death and to lament in temptations. But this is certainly dishonouring to the Word (c. 31).

Christ was weak according to the flesh, but he was beyond weakness as God (c. 32). He is seated on the throne of the divinity as God, and he ministers humanly (c. 33). It is written that as high priest he entered the holy place through his own (ἰδίου) blood (Hebr. 9:12). The Son who is out of the Father by nature, then, is also Son of Man, and as such he has given his blood for the life of all. If it were the blood of a man by himself, who is connected with the Word, it would not be the Son's 'own' blood, who is seated on the throne with the Father (c. 34). Christ appears before God (Hebr. 9:24), not as naked Word, for as such he is always with the Father, but in the form and the nature like ours. In this way he brings the human nature in the sight of the Father (c. 35).

The fourth group, containing four chapters, discusses how Christ has received glory from the Father. He receives glory humanly, while as the incarnate Word he is also the Lord of glory divinely (c. 36; cf.

1 Cor. 2:8). The Father has given all things in the Son's hand (John 3:35). The Son, then, having become man, has become our mediator and has reconciled us with God (c. 37). He receives authority over all things as being like us and humanly, while he is king over all things divinely (c. 38). The Word, being in equality with the Father, has been emptied, and is said to be exalted to the right hand of the Father (Acts 2:33). He, then, is exalted humanly, while he is always exalted by nature. And similarly, Christ receives the Spirit humanly, while he implants the Spirit into the believers as his own (c. 39).

The next six chapters are grouped together under a heading which speaks of Christ's resurrection from the dead. Although the Father is said to have raised Jesus Christ from the dead (Rom. 4:24), he himself said that he would raise his temple (John 2:19). Because of the one nature of divinity, the work is that of the whole Godhead: all things are done by God the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit. Raising his temple, then, is not to be attributed to the nature of the body, even if it has become the Word's own, but rather to the divine nature (c. 40). We have been baptised into Christ's death (Rom. 6:3). If Christ is separated into two Sons, in whose death have we been baptised? The divine Word cannot die. And if it is the death of a man by himself, and baptism is in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the holy Spirit, is this man ranked with the Father and the Spirit (c. 41)? Paul writes about "the Spirit of him who raised Jesus Christ" (Rom. 8:11). But it is also the Spirit of Christ (Rom. 8:9). The resurrection, then, pertains to that which is human, and it is the work of the Word together with his own Father, the life-giving Spirit being the Word's own (c. 42). Christ was crucified out of weakness (2 Cor. 13:4), that is, he was weak in the flesh (σαρϰί), while he was God by nature. He allowed his own flesh to taste death on behalf of us (c. 43).

Chapter 44 is particularly interesting, because it deals explicitly with Apollinarianism. The bishop of Laodicea is mentioned by name, and his view is described as positing that "the temple united to the Word is without soul and without mind" (58[20.f.]). Cyril bases himself on John 12:27 ("Now my soul is troubled"), Mt. 26:37 ("He started to be sorrowful and troubled"), and Luke 23:46 ("Father, into your hands I commit my spirit"). He argues that a body without a soul and mind cannot have sorrow, nor fear for things to come. And the spirit which Christ is said to commit into the hands of the Father, is his human soul. Just as he appropriated all the things of the body, so he appropriated also those of the soul. For it was necessary that he

was seen as having become like us through every real aspect of flesh and soul (διὰ παντὸς ὁρᾶσθαι πράγματος σαρκικοῦ τε καὶ ψυχικοῦ; 58[36]). Just as he economically allowed his own flesh to suffer its own things, so he also allowed his soul to suffer its own things. And when Christ committed his own spirit to the Father, he opened up the way for us, so that also our souls would not have to go down to Hades, but could go up to the Father as well.

According to John (6:57), Christ says: "Just as the living Father sent me and I live because of the Father, so he who eats me will live because of me". The naked Word by himself cannot be eaten, and the body of a man by himself cannot be life-giving. The Son out of the living Father, then, made a body his own and rendered it life-giving. He is one Son and Christ and Lord, who should not be divided into two Sons (c. 45). The Son has life substantially in himself as being out of the Father by nature, but he receives life and also the authority to judge (John 5:26–27), because he is also the Son of Man. When the body united to him became the living Word's own, it is said to receive life, and the Word appropriates the receiving (c. 46).

The last two chapters of *Oratio ad augustas* look at some texts which speak of 'the Son of Man'. "But when the Son of Man has come, will he find faith on earth?" (Luke 18:8). Faith in whom, Cyril asks. Certainly not in a human being like us, but in the one who has become man for our sake, who is God by nature (c. 47). And if the Father has given the authority to give judgement to the Son, because he is the Son of Man (John 5:27), has he given the judgement to one like us? No, God is judge, and the Word is judge because of the identity of substance, and the same one is the Son of Man, because he is united to the flesh. Every time, then, that the Scriptures call him 'Son of Man' or 'man', he is not a man by himself and separately, but he is both true God and Son of Man. The Lord Jesus Christ is one (c. 48).

7.4.2. *Terminology*

7.4.2.1. *Οὐσία*

Also in *Oratio ad augustas*, οὐσία and its cognates do not occur often. The noun οὐσία itself is found only twice. In the second chapter the Word is said to have been born out of the substance of God the Father (27[8f.]), and in the last chapter Cyril speaks about the 'identity of substance' between the Father and the Son (61[9]). The adjective

ὁμοούσιος is used three times to indicate the relationships within the Godhead.[183] We encounter the adverb οὐσιωδῶς three times, and the corresponding οὐσιώδης twice.[184] In all these cases the reference is to a COMMON SUBSTANCE, mostly that of the three divine hypostases, once to that of a created nature. Several times a cognate of φύσις is juxtaposed, which then refers to a COMMON NATURE.

In the last instance where οὐσιωδῶς is found, its meaning is less clear. In an exposition of Col. 2:9 ("in him all the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily"), Cyril writes that Paul means an indwelling of the Word in the flesh, "not by participation or relationally (σχετικῶς) or as a gift of grace, but bodily (σωματικῶς), that is, substantially (οὐσιωδῶς)" (37[16–20]). In *Contra Nestorium*, Cyril called it an indwelling 'according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν)', which is more in line with his christological vocabulary.[185] By using οὐσιωδῶς Cyril wants to emphasize that this indwelling is not by participation or relationally, as it is in an ordinary human being. He probably wants to say that in Christ God is not merely working (ἐνεργεῖν), but he himself is substantially present. But since in Cyril's trinitarian theology οὐσία stands for the COMMON SUBSTANCE of the three hypostases, and it is only the Son who is incarnate in Christ, the use of this word creates confusion, more than it clarifies.

7.4.2.2. Ὑπόστασις

The noun ὑπόστασις occurs only four times in *Oratio ad augustas*, while the verb ὑφεστάναι is fully absent. Once we find ὑπόστασις in a quotation of Hebr. 1:3–5 ("the imprint of his hypostasis"; 29[19]), and once in a trinitarian context ("three hypostases"; 55[24f.]). The two other occurrences are found in chapter 34 (52[9–18]), in a comment on Hebr. 9:11–12 ("When Christ came as high priest … through his own blood, he entered once for all into the holy places"). Cyril writes: if Christ was a man by himself, connected to God, "but believed to be separated according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν) and individually", his blood

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[183] *Or. ad aug.*, 51[28], 54[13], 55[30].

[184] *Ibid.*, 29[30f.]: "the Son signifies the substantial and natural (οὐσιώδη τε καὶ φυσικήν) existence out of the Father"; 51[1f.]: the Son "is not of a created nature, which does not have immutability substantially"; 60[5–7]: God the Father "has life in himself, not added or imported, but rather naturally existing in him and as substantial fruit (φυσικῶς δὲ μᾶλλον ἐνυπάρχουσάν τε αὐτῷ καὶ οὐσιώδη καρπόν)"; 60[7f.]: "how can the Son, while receiving, have life substantially in himself?"

[185] *CN* I.8, 30[36–38]. See also section 6.3.6.

would not be the "own blood of him who is co-seated with the Father". And he argues: just as two leaders who do not differ in terms of dignities (ἀξιωμάτων), "are not at all regarded as one", so it is when there is a connection according to rank, "while the natures or the hypostases are separated": then there are two, not one, and the blood of the one is not that of the other.

From the context it is clear that the expression 'separated according to hypostasis' indicates a separation into two SEPARATE REALITIES. And the sentence 'while the natures or the hypostases are separated' also points to a division into two SEPARATE REALITIES. This is not to say that the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις as such have the meaning of SEPARATE REALITY. They retain their familiar meanings of INDIVIDUAL NATURE and INDIVIDUAL REALITY, respectively. But when two INDIVIDUAL NATURES or two INDIVIDUAL REALITIES are separated, this indubitably results in two SEPARATE REALITIES. And although φύσις and ὑπόστασις are juxtaposed, this does not imply that they are completely synonymous, the difference being that φύσις includes the notion of essence and infers natural quality, while ὑπόστασις does not; ὑπόστασις merely denotes individual existence.

The phrase 'union according to hypostasis' is missing in *Oratio ad augustas*, but 'separated according to hypostasis' may be regarded as its counterpart. While the first expression indicates a union which results in one SEPARATE REALITY, the second one denotes a separation which results in two SEPARATE REALITIES. Instead of 'union according to hypostasis', we find 'true union', in this passage, but also elsewhere.[186]

7.4.2.3. *Πρόσωπον*

Πρόσωπον itself is found thirteen times in *Oratio ad augustas*, διπρόσωπον once. A number of times the noun occurs in a quotation from or an allusion to a biblical verse, in which case it means 'face', or it is part of an expression indicating 'before', 'in the presence of'.[187] Once the phrase ἐκ προσώπου Θεοῦ indicates that a psalmist speaks in the first person singular as if he were God (Ps. 81 / 82:6): "I have said" (30[15]).

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[186] *Ibid.*, 27[10f.], 37[17]. Cf. *ibid.*, 37[15f.].
[187] Five times πρόσωπον occurs in relation to Hebr. 9:24 (τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ): *Or. ad aug.*, 32[10], 47[11], 52[20f., 25, 32]; and twice in relation to Prov. 8:30 (ἐν προσώπῳ αὐτοῦ): *ibid.*, 52[28f., 31].

Then, there is the passage where also διπρόσωπον is used, which was already mentioned in section 5.3.2.4: "often, with regard to one person the appearance of our speech introduces two persons".[188] From the examples Cyril gives, it is clear that he makes a distinction between reality and speech here: in our language we often speak as if there are two persons, while in reality there is only one. Although we speak of two GRAMMATICAL PERSONS there is only one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. So it says in Zech. 12:1 that God "forms the spirit of man within him". The man and his spirit in him are represented as two GRAMMATICAL PERSONS, but in fact there is only one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. Something similar applies to Psalm 76 / 77:6 (LXX): "At night I talked with my heart and it stirred up my spirit".[189] We should not overly distinguish the appearances of the words (τὰ μὲν τῶν λόγων σχήματα), Cyril writes, but rather look "at the natures themselves of the realities (εἰς αὐτὰς τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς φύσεις)" (37²⁷⁻²⁹).

The notion of GRAMMATICAL PERSON is also found in chapter 25, where Hebr. 2:10–12 is commented on: "For it was fitting that he for whom (δι᾽ ὅν) are all things and δι᾽ οὗ are all things, . . . , would make perfect the leader of our salvation through sufferings". Those who divide the one Lord into two Sons, Cyril writes, interpret the one for whom and δι᾽ οὗ are all things as the Word of God, and the leader of our salvation who is made perfect, as another, a man out of a woman by himself. They argue that διά + genitive is used in John 1:3 of the Word. Cyril counters that διά + genitive is also applied to the Father in Scripture, and he adduces 1 Cor. 1:9 ("God is faithful, δι᾽ οὗ you have been called . . .") and Gal. 4:7 ("So you are no longer a slave, but a son; and if [you are] a son, [you are] also an heir διὰ Θεοῦ").[190] Therefore, we are not forced to apply δι᾽ οὗ to the πρόσωπον of the Son, that is, to the GRAMMATICAL PERSON of the Son, Cyril reasons. And he continues: "leaving his πρόσωπον aside for the moment, and then following the aim of the holy Scriptures"—

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[188] *Or. ad aug.*, 37²⁰⁻²¹: ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς δὲ προσώπου πολλάκις διπρόσωπον ἡμῖν εἰσφέρεται λόγου σχῆμα.

[189] Cyril's version reads ἔσκαλε instead of ἔσκαλλον.

[190] *Ibid.*, 41¹⁵ᶠᶠ. That διά + genitive as applied to God (the Father) was regarded as problematic can also be seen from the various readings the two texts have in the manuscripts. In English διά + genitive is usually translated by 'through'; when applied to God (the Father) it is better rendered by 'by'. The notion of 'by' is usually expressed by ὑπό, παρά or πρός + genitive.

after which he gives his own interpretation of the passage. Here, 'his πρόσωπον' again refers to a person in the text, and is, therefore, a GRAMMATICAL PERSON. According to Cyril, the leader of our salvation is the Son made man, and the one who has made him perfect is the Father.

In another passage Cyril writes that the Son, having been made man, "does not give the subjection of those in the world to another, but as in his own person (ἐν ἰδίῳ προσώπῳ) to God the Father" (53³¹ᶠ·). This is an implicit reference to 1 Cor. 15:27–28, where it says that after God has subjected all things to Christ, Christ himself will subject himself to the Father. When he subjects himself to the Father, 'in his own person' all the things that are subjected to him are also given in subjection to the Father. Here it is the ONTOLOGICAL PERSON of the incarnate Word who—as man—subjects himself to the Father, and 'in his person' the whole created world is subjected with him to the Father.

And finally, in chapter 40, in his comment on Rom. 4:23–25 ("us . . ., who believe in him who raised our Lord Jesus from the dead"), Cyril discusses the one operation of the Trinity: "For all things are done by (παρά) God the Father, through (διά) the Son, in (ἐν) the Spirit" (55²⁷). Giving life is not to be attributed to the nature of the body, but "to the highest power and to the nature which is above creation, as in the person (ὡς ἐν προσώπῳ) of God the Father" (56⁵⁻⁹). Here, πρόσωπον is employed in a clearly trinitarian context for the person of the Father, 'by (παρά)' whom all things are done, also giving life. It is the ONTOLOGICAL PERSON of the Father Cyril is speaking about.

It is remarkable that, although the term πρόσωπον occurs regularly in this *Oratio*—more often than οὐσία and its cognates, and much more often than ὑπόστασις—it is not found in strictly christological phrases, neither affirming Cyril's own view (like 'the incarnate Word is one πρόσωπον'), nor denying that of his opponents (like 'Christ should not be separated into two πρόσωπα' or 'it is not a union ἐν προσώποις'). No clear reason can be given for this absence.

7.4.2.4. Φύσις

Just as in other writings from Cyril of Alexandria, in *Oratio ad augustas*, too, the term φύσις is frequent. We find the association with a COMMON NATURE in the well-known phrase 'by nature': κατὰ φύσιν, (τῇ) φύσει, τὴν

φύσιν: God by nature,[191] Son by nature,[192] out of God by nature,[193] life by nature,[194] immortal by nature,[195] immutable by nature (32^{27}), bodiless by nature (59^{15}), holy by nature (43^{7}), merciful by nature (47^{7}), exalted by nature (54^{36}), Lord by nature (47^{24}), Master by nature (40^{18}), slave by nature (35^{35}). Mostly, when a phrase like 'the divine nature', 'the nature of divinity', or 'the highest nature' is used, there is a reference to one or more divine properties, so that, then too, it is the divine COMMON NATURE which is envisaged.[196] It also refers to the COMMON NATURE when the one nature of the divinity is mentioned side by side with the three hypostases ($55^{24f.}$). Once, 'the highest nature' is more or less interchangeable with 'God'.[197]

The expression 'the human nature'—mostly, ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις— occurs in *Oratio ad augustas* relatively often. As in previous writings, we find it especially in soteriological contexts, where it generally stands for the whole human race. When Adam was disobedient to God, the human nature was somehow forsaken by God (34^{33}), it was condemned to a curse and to the sentence of death ($37^{35f.}$).[198] Once it is called 'our nature': "although he [Christ] is said to receive something from the Father humanly, he gave it to our nature (τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φύσει)". And several times, it is simply referred to as 'the nature': Christ "frees the nature from the ancient accusations" (56^{15}).[199]

In other places, the interplay between the human COMMON NATURE, the human race as a whole, and Christ as an individual man—which we have come across in earlier works of Cyril's—is visible in *Oratio ad augustas* as well. It is expressed by the notion of 'first-fruits': as a second first-fruits of the human race he offered up prayers and supplications, which were heard by the Father, and when he had started it, the Father's hearing of prayers was broadened to the human nature (49^{1-8}). It is also indicated by phrases like 'in him first': he gives the Spirit to the nature of men (τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει) through himself

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[191] *Ibid.*, 28^{18}, 40^{26}, 54^{1}, 60^{30}, and *passim*.

[192] *Ibid.*, 49^{1}, 57^{29}.

[193] E.g., *ibid.*, 27^{11}, 36^{25}, $52^{4f.}$, 60^{9}.

[194] *Ibid.*, $55^{32f.}$, 56^{31}, 57^{7}, 59^{25}.

[195] *Ibid.*, 32^{33}, 36^{35}, 37^{9}, 38^{37}.

[196] E.g., *ibid.*, $28^{26f.}$ ("both the majesty of the divine and undefiled nature and the lowliness of the measures of the humanity"), 32^{5}, $32^{12f.}$, $54^{22f.}$.

[197] *Ibid.*, $45^{8f.}$: "being able to render partakers of the Spirit those who draw near to it [to the highest nature], is fitting to the highest nature alone".

[198] See also *ibid.*, 38^{8-14}, 41^{2}, $42^{25f.}$, 45^{26-28}, $52^{34f.}$.

[199] See also *ibid.*, $49^{7f.}$, 58^{13}.

and in himself first (45¹¹ᶠ).²⁰⁰ Twice, also, 'the human nature' is itself the subject of an active sentence, but in the context 'in Christ' is added. "The human nature, having come in the heights of the divine majesty in Christ, sends away the shame of poverty" (28³²ᶠ). And Satan "withdraws ashamed, when the human nature attacks him anew in Christ" (45³⁴ᶠ). Christ is as it were the spearhead in which the human race has confronted Satan anew, and this time triumphantly.

Twice Cyril writes that the Word has put on (ἀμπέχεσθαι) the human nature. We would not have been raised with Christ and seated with him in the heavenly places, "if he who is rich as God would not have put on the nature which is poor" (28³⁵ᶠ). And since it was unattainable to the human nature to destroy death, the Word "put on the nature that was liable to death, that is, the [nature] like ours or the human [nature]" (42¹⁹⁻²²). Especially the elaborate phrase in the last sentence suggests that the nature Cyril is speaking about is not so much the whole human race as the human COMMON NATURE. This is in line with references to the Word's assumption of the human COMMON NATURE in earlier works (see section 3.4.3). His assumption of the COMMON NATURE, however, does not deny that he has become an individual man.

When Cyril mentions 'the nature of the Word' or the Word's 'own nature', he always means—because of his anti-Arian stance—the Word's divine nature. A number of times, there is a clear reference to natural properties, so that in these cases φύσις cannot indicate the SEPARATE REALITY of the Word (Lebon's view), but must refer to the divine COMMON NATURE or to the Word's divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE. So, Cyril says that the nature of the Word is not conceived of in the human things, but that he rather appropriated them with his own flesh (33²⁶ᶠ). And he has 'being sinless' as the fruit of his own nature (51⁴).²⁰¹

In one place, however, there is no reference to properties at all: to think that the indwelling Paul speaks of in Col. 1:19 "happened to the nature of the Word by itself and individually, is absolutely silly, for it is the same as saying that the Only-Begotten dwelt in himself" (37¹²⁻¹⁴). In this instance, φύσις could mean SEPARATE REALITY, but the assertion also makes sense when here, too, it indicates the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Word, even though there is no further reference to natural properties. The meaning of INDIVIDUAL NATURE is the more likely one,

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²⁰⁰ We find the notion of 'in himself first' also in *ibid.*, 35³⁻⁵, 52³⁶ᶠ.
²⁰¹ See also *ibid.*, 29²⁶ᶠ, 39²²ᶠ, 39³⁵ᶠ.

since, as we have seen so far, φύσις hardly ever means SEPARATE REALITY in Cyril's works.

In an important aspect, *Oratio ad augustas* differs remarkably from *Oratio ad dominas*. Whereas the treatise to the princesses, contains miaphysite language and hardly any dyophysite terminology, the reverse holds for the treatise to the empresses. Nowhere, the incarnate Word is called a—let alone, one—nature. We do not even encounter expressions like 'natural union' or 'united according to nature', which to his opponents might have a miaphysite ring, although in Cyril's writings they refer to a union of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES and thus belong to dyophysite language. On the other hand, there are unambiguously dyophysite phrases in *Oratio ad augustas*. First of all, we find twice an absolute genitive clause in a description of the christology of Cyril's opponents: "while the natures or the hypostases are separated" and "while the natures are separated".[202] One might think that the Alexandrian archbishop repeats the language of his opponents here, but these clauses are absent from Nestorius's extant works from this period, while they are in line with Cyril's language in *Contra Nestorium*.

And there are other places where Cyril speaks of a non-divine nature with respect to Christ, of which it is clear that it is his own language. Once it is part of a refutation of the idea that the one born out of a woman is a man by himself, apart from the Word. Cyril then asks: "Is indeed being able to execute the works of the divinity fitting to [the] human nature (ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει)?" (33[7f.]). Since Cyril is not describing his own christology, this 'human nature' does not refer to Christ's humanity, but either to the human COMMON NATURE, or to a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE of an ordinary man. In another instance, however, he does speak of the incarnate Word. He says that the priesthood, mentioned in Hebr. 5:4–5,

> was very much akin and most fitting, not to his own (αὐτοῦ) nature, but rather to that like ours, that is, to the human (τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ) [nature], and when he came into (εἴσω) it, he underwent the things belonging to it (τὰ αὐτῆς), not at all damaged by this, but rather skilfully using the economy with the flesh (47[21–24]).

Here, the meaning of 'the human nature' hovers again between 'the whole human race' and 'the human COMMON NATURE'. When the Word

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[202] *Ibid.*, 52[15] (διῃρημένων τῶν φύσεων ἢ γοῦν ὑποστάσεων), 56[29] (διῃρημένων τῶν φύσεων). See for the context of the first quotation, section 7.4.2.2.

is said to have come into it, one is inclined to think of the human race. But when the priesthood is said to be fitting, not to his own, but to the human nature, the human nature is more likely to refer to the human COMMON NATURE, or possibly even to the human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, just as 'his own' nature refers to the divine COMMON NATURE, or possibly to his divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

In a third instance, Cyril comments on the resurrection (in Rom. 4:23–25) and states that giving life must certainly not be attributed "to the nature of the body itself, even though it has become the Word's own", but rather "to the nature which is above creation, as in the person of God the Father" (56⁵⁻⁸). In the context, Cyril discusses the one divine operation, by the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit. That's why he refers to the person of the Father. The 'nature which is above creation', then, is the divine COMMON NATURE. The body is the individual body of the Word. The 'nature of the body itself' may be its INDIVIDUAL NATURE, but it may also refer to the COMMON NATURE of human bodies. What is clear is that, here, Cyril uses the word φύσις in relation to both the divine and the human elements in Christ, and that it certainly does not mean SEPARATE REALITY.

In a fourth passage in which Cyril mentions a non-divine nature with respect to Christ, he discusses the exaltation of the incarnate Word. He argues that as God, the Word is always exalted, but he has emptied himself and become man. And "since to the human nature and to the measures like ours all things are from above and from God", Christ is said to be exalted by the right hand of the Father, although he himself is the right hand, the Creator of all things (55⁶⁻⁹). The quotation probably should be read as a general statement, in which 'the human nature' is the human COMMON NATURE or the human race. But even so, this general statement about the human nature is applied to the incarnate Word. In other words, certain properties in Christ are attributed to the human nature. Cyril is not against such an attribution, he is against attributing such properties of Christ to an individual human being who has only an external relation with the Word of God.

In a fifth instance, the archbishop writes that the Word who was in the majesty of the Father, first descended and humbled himself, taking the form of a slave, and then ascended again into his own richness, "escaping the poverty of the nature united to him (τῆς ἑνωθείσης αὐτῷ φύσεως), obviously the human (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης) [nature]" (36⁵⁻⁷). What is this human nature united to him? It could be Christ's human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, but—seeing that Cyril often speaks of

the human nature in more general terms—he probably intended the human COMMON NATURE, or even the human race, all human beings combined.

And finally, Cyril says that Christ appears in the presence of the Father, "no longer as naked and bodiless Word, as he, of course, was in the beginning, but in the form and the nature like ours (ἐν μορφῇ τε καὶ φύσει τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς)" (52³²⁻³⁴). The juxtaposition of μορφῇ and φύσει makes it unlikely that Cyril would have meant the human race by φύσις. The word μορφή comes from Phil. 2:6–7; Cyril seldom uses it without an explicit or implicit reference to this biblical passage. In *Contra Theodoretum* he asks "whether the forms came together without the hypostases, alone and by themselves", and states that a coming together of hypostases must have taken place for the incarnation to be real.[203] It seems that by μορφή he understands the essence, the secondary substance. The word φύσις, juxtaposed to it, is likely to have a similar meaning, and thus, it will indicate the human COMMON NATURE.

Nowhere in this treatise is the notion of 'in contemplation only' mentioned.

7.4.2.5. Ἴδιος

Also in *Oratio ad augustas*, ἴδιος and its cognates are used in two ways: to denote a natural relation and to indicate what is particular for an individual entity. To the first category belong 'his own Spirit',[204] 'his own Father',[205] 'his own Son',[206] 'his own Begetter' (33¹⁰), 'his own offspring' (42³³), but also 'his own dignities' (35²², ³⁰), 'his own majesty' (36¹), 'his own riches' (36⁶) and 'his own fulness',[207] because they belong to the natural properties of Father, Son and holy Spirit. To the second

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[203] *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 112¹²⁻¹⁷: δίχα τῶν ὑποστάσεων μόναι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς αἱ μορφαί. That Cyril writes that hypostases have come together, does not mean that Christ's human hypostasis existed separately before the incarnation, for that would imply that a human person existed before the incarnation—which is the view that Cyril attributes to Nestorius and which he rejects. The individuation of this human hypostasis and its assumption by the Word of God must take place at the same instant for Cyril's teaching about the incarnation to be consistent.

[204] E.g., *Or. ad aug.*, 34²¹, 44¹⁹, 51¹⁶, 57³⁵.

[205] *Ibid.*, 33⁵·ᶠ·, 47¹⁵, 57²².

[206] *Ibid.*, 36⁹, 48¹.

[207] *Ibid.*, 45²⁵, 55¹⁷.

category belong 'his own flesh',[208] 'his own body',[209] 'his own spirit' (in the sense of soul; 59[4, 7]), 'his own person' (53[32]), 'his own blood',[210] 'his own resurrection' (40[40]), and various expressions used instead of 'his own body'.[211] We also encounter again the notions that he has made the body his own (ἴδιον ποιήσασθαι),[212] and that he appropriates (οἰκειοῦσθαι) the human things (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα).[213]

Both ἰδικῶς[214] and ἰδίᾳ[215] occur only in the sense of 'by himself' in passages where the archbishop of Alexandria describes the christology of his opponents as separating Christ into two separate beings. The separated existence is also indicated by ἀνὰ μέρος,[216] κατὰ μόνας[217] and καθ' ἑαυτόν (59[14, 16]). Often, two or even three of these terms are juxtaposed.[218]

7.4.2.6. *Other Terms*

Both the noun ἕνωσις and the verb ἑνοῦν are used frequently (and only) for the union of the Word with his flesh, his body, his human soul, while the noun συνάφεια and the verb συνάπτειν occur in the description of the christology of Cyril's opponents. It is remarkable that the expression 'equality of rank or sovereign power' (ἰσότης τῆς ἀξίας ἢ γοῦν αὐθεντίας, with slight variations in articles and conjunction) recurs a number of times. Mostly, a man is said to be connected (συνημμένος) to God, or to the Word of God, 'according to' (κατά) or 'by' (ἐν or a dative) equality of rank or sovereign power.[219] Sometimes a man is said to 'have' such

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[208] E.g., *ibid.*, 29[11, 12], 41[1], 50[9], 59[2].

[209] E.g., *ibid.*, 32[32], 40[27], 50[15], 60[12, 14].

[210] *Ibid.*, 29[9], and in the quotation of Hebr. 9:11–12 and Cyril's comments on it: 51[32], 52[2, 4, 5, 11].

[211] *Ibid.*, 30[26f.] ("that which suffered death"), 36[34f.] ("that which is his own suffered"), 41[3f.] ("that through which he became the first-born from the dead").

[212] *Ibid.*, 29[34], 37[15f.] (he made the body his own temple), 38[11], 39[1f.], 59[26].

[213] *Ibid.*, 33[27], 33[35f.], 58[35], 60[14]. Once (47[37ff.]), Cyril writes that "the Father, then, appropriates his [the Son's] fleshly birth". Cyril normally says that the Word appropriates the birth of his own flesh. By applying the verb οἰκειοῦσθαι to the Father, he creates confusion between the persons of the Father and the Son. The way he puts it in *ibid.*, 33[35f.], seems more in line with his usual language: the Father accepts that the Son appropriates the things of the flesh.

[214] E.g., *ibid.*, 35[24, 25, 29], 41[24], 51[25].

[215] E.g., *ibid.*, 41[22], 61[19].

[216] E.g., *ibid.*, 30[2f.], 33[6], 52[10].

[217] E.g., *ibid.*, 31[37], 37[12].

[218] E.g., *ibid.*, 45[4, 6], 56[32].

[219] *Ibid.*, 43[24] (κατά), 52[9f.] (dative), 52[17f.] (ἐν, συνῆφθαι), 56[28f.] (κατά, συναφθῆναι).

an equality,[220] and a few times another variation is used.[221] Although we have come across the terms 'rank', 'sovereign power' and 'dignity' in quotations from Nestorius, and in Cyril's discussion of them, in *Contra Nestorium*,[222] the phrase 'equality of rank or sovereign power' is absent, as it is in all Nestorius's texts from that period, as given by Loofs, *Nestoriana*.[223] And yet, Cyril adds to the phrase such remarks as "for some of the most unlearned ones think such things" (43^{25}), or "as some think" (52^9), which—together with its frequency—might suggest that the archbishop found it in one of the writings of his opponents. Just as with the expression 'union in persons' in *Oratio ad dominas*, it is unclear whether, and if so, where Cyril encountered the phrase.

The adjective σχετικός and the corresponding adverb σχετικῶς are each employed once in a rendering of a christology that Cyril rejects. When Paul writes that all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Christ, this means "a true indwelling and union", "not by participation or relationally (σχετικῶς) or by a gift of grace" ($37^{17–19}$). And if a man by himself, separated from the Word, died, his blood would not be the Word's 'own blood', but "rather that of another, who has a relational connection (σχετικὴν … συνάφειαν) with him" ($52^{11f.}$).

The word 'composition' is applied to a human being, whose union is regarded as an image of the incarnation:

> For the human soul, having another nature besides the flesh, has completed the one living being, that is, a man, by its composition with it [the flesh] according to a union (συνθέσει καθ' ἕνωσιν) ($30^{20f.}$).

A cognate occurs once, in a non-christological context.[224] In *Oratio ad augustas*, we encounter the verb 'to transelement' again in relation to man's becoming a partaker of the divine nature. "When the

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[220] *Ibid.*, $49^{31f.}$ (Schwartz understandably suggests to replace τῆς before πρός by τήν), $50^{1f.}$.

[221] *Ibid.*, $35^{26–28}$, 49^{35} (as in $49^{31f.}$, Schwartz suggests to replace τῆς before πρός by τήν). A few times, only one of the terms 'rank' and 'sovereign power' is mentioned: 35^{23}, 51^{26}, 52^{15}. Twice, Cyril speaks of 'equality of dignities (ἀξιωμάτων)': $35^{22f.}$, $52^{12f.}$.

[222] *CN* II.5, $41^{23–25}$ (= Nestorius (1905), $354^{7–11}$); III.6, $72^{34–38}$ (= Nestorius (1905), $354^{12–18}$). See sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3.

[223] A search with the string αξιας η γουν (της) αυθεντιας in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae yields only—eleven—results in works written by Cyril of Alexandria. A search with the string αξιας και (της) αυθεντιας yields three results in works from Cyril, and two in the legal manuals *Basilica* and *Prochiron*.

[224] *Or. ad aug.*, $62^{1f.}$ ("the God of all would no longer be simple by nature, but rather composed (σύνθετος), if the life in him would be something else besides him").

only-begotten Word of God sojourned [among men], transelementing (ἀναστοιχειώσων) that which suffered into incorruption", he had to stop the forsakenness which the human nature underwent in the beginning (34^{34}–35^1). And the incarnate Word will lead us to the Father, "having freed us from the ancient accusations and having transelemented (μεταστοιχειώσας) us into newness of life in the Spirit" (52^{36}–53^2).

7.4.3. *Christology*

What is striking, first of all, is the total lack of miaphysite terminology in *Oratio ad augustas*, while dyophysite language is used in a number of instances. This is in line with almost all the previous writings, making *Oratio ad dominas* with its miaphysite slant the exception. Since, according to Cyril of Alexandria's own testimony (28^{1-4}), the treatise to the princesses discusses the easier issues, while that to the empresses deals with more difficult matters, one cannot say that a more thorough study has led him in the direction of miaphysite language. On the contrary, in the deeper study he returns to the dyophysite terminology of his other works.

Another interesting feature of *Oratio ad augustas*—which may be related to the first point—is its more elaborate anti-Apollinarian stance (in c. 44). While in previous works it is stated with some regularity that the flesh which the Word assumed had a rational soul, Cyril often merely mentions it, without giving more attention to this soul. This is different in the treatise to the empresses (as it is in *On the Incarnation*). Apollinarius is the only theologian mentioned by name (58^{20}). And Cyril now explicitly speaks of sorrow and fear as passions of the soul. Just as the Word appropriated the things of his own body, so he also appropriated those of the soul. And just as he allowed his own flesh to suffer sometimes its own things (τὰ ἴδια), so he also allowed the soul to suffer its own things (τὰ οἰκεῖα). The soteriological importance comes through in his remarks about the 'spirit'—that is in Cyril's interpretation, his human soul—which Christ committed to the Father (Luke 23:46). While in ancient times the souls of men went down to Hades, Christ renewed the way for us, so that our souls may go up to the Father, like his, instead of going down. With his own soul, then, Christ opened up the way for our souls.

The metaphysical picture of the incarnation that emerges from *Oratio ad augustas* is once more that of figure 2 in section 5.3.3. It is emphasized that Christ is one SEPARATE REALITY which is the result of the coming

together of the Word with his flesh. Christ is an individual man with
his own body and his own soul. The divine nature of the Word and
the human nature of the flesh have not formed a *tertium quid*, but some
of Christ's properties are fitting to the divine nature, while others are
fitting to the flesh. With reference to Emmanuel's properties, Cyril
several times uses the term φύσις, not just for the divine nature, but also
for the human nature. The implication is that within the one SEPARATE
REALITY of Christ there is a divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE and a human
INDIVIDUAL NATURE, which are not mixed, but which are the sources of
their own properties.

As we saw in other writings, in the treatise to the empresses, too,
the distinction between the divine and the human properties is more
often expressed with terms which do not contain the word φύσις.
The summary in section 7.4.1 shows a number of them: 'as God',
'as man', 'humanly', 'divinely', 'in the flesh', 'according to the flesh',
'economically'. The absence of the word φύσις does not imply a
denial of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES in Christ, but is an indication
of Cyril's anti-Arian reluctance to employ the term φύσις for Christ's
humanity.

One way in which the communication of idioms finds expression is
by the well-known notion of 'appropriation': the Word appropriates the
things of the flesh. This implies that the Word may be said to have
been born, to have suffered, to have died. And conversely, the body
of Christ is life-giving ($59^{20,\ 27}$), it has the Word's life-giving operation
($60^{13f.}$), although it is not a property of man to be able to have life from
within (οἴκοθεν; $60^{11f.}$), and giving life must certainly not be attributed
"to the nature of the body itself, even though it has become the Word's
own" (56^{5-7}). It is Cyril's understanding of the communication of idioms
that leads him to such paradoxical statements as that the Word "could
suffer impassibly".[225] In a more elaborate form it reads: "He is one Son,
impassible according to the nature of the divinity, passible according to
the flesh" ($56^{38f.}$).

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[225] *Ibid.*, 50^{7-9}: "Christ, then, is neither a mere man, nor the Word without flesh, but
rather united to the humanity like ours he could suffer impassibly the human things in
his own flesh".

7.5. Cyril and Rome

Also in the spring of 430, Cyril of Alexandria sent his deacon Posidonius to pope Celestine of Rome with a dossier of sermons by Nestorius, a patristic florilegium, and his own *First* and *Second Letters to Nestorius* as well as his *Letter to the Monks*, all translated into Latin.[226] Both the accompanying letter to Celestine and a memorandum to Posidonius have survived.

7.5.1. Letter to Celestine *(ep. 11)*[227]

Cyril's letter to pope Celestine does not discuss the christological issues, but gives a brief overview of what has happened between him and Nestorius, who is mentioned by name once. For the theological content he refers to the sermons, the letters and the florilegium. The title θεοτόκος occurs three times in this letter, but none of the technical terms are present. Cyril writes that "the one who is now in Constantinople, leading the church" (10[24f]) started to teach things foreign to the faith of the apostles and the Gospels, as soon as he was consecrated. A number of sermons are sent as evidence. Cyril wanted to send a synodical letter to Nestorius, but refrained from this, writing personal letters instead, but to no avail.

Cyril recounts again the story he also wrote in his *Letter to the Accusers*:[228] Nestorius allowed bishop Dorotheus [of Marcianopolis] to preach in the episcopal church in Constantinople, stating that "if anyone says that Mary is θεοτόκος, let him be anathema", and afterwards had communion with him. According to Cyril, the majority of the people and the monks in the capital, as well as most of the bishops in Macedonia (belonging to the jurisdiction of Rome) and of all the East, do not accept this, confessing rather that Christ is God and that the virgin is θεοτόκος.

Cyril also mentions his *Letter to the Monks*, which he wrote after sermons from Nestorius had been spread in Egypt. When copies of

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[226] According to Haring (1950), 5, parts of the *Scholia* were also included, but Richard has argued in favour of a later date of this work, in which he is followed by other scholars (see section 5.2.2).

[227] *Ep.* 11 (*CPG* 5310; PG 77, 80–85). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.5, 10–12 (= V 144; see chapter 5, n. 2). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 60–64, and in McGuckin (1994), 276–279.

[228] *Ep.* 8, ACO I.1.1, 109[11–16]. See section 5.6.1.

this letter reached Constantinople Nestorius was annoyed. Cyril sent another letter to him, "containing an exposition of the true faith in digest form", exhorting him to teach the same things (11²⁷; the *Second Letter to Nestorius*), but so far this has had little effect.

The archbishop of Alexandria does not want to break communion with his fellow-bishop in Constantinople without consulting with the pope of Rome. He explicitly asks Celestine to specify (τυπῶσαι; 12⁸) whether one should remain in communion with him, and to let this be known by letter to the bishops in Macedonia and in the East. He ends his letter by mentioning the documents that he sends through Posidonius: excerpts from Nestorius and the Fathers, and Cyril's own letters, all translated.

7.5.2. Memorandum to Posidonius *(*ep. *11a.)*[229]

Whereas Cyril's letter to Celestine mainly sketches the development of the controversy, without paying much attention to its content, his memorandum to Posidonius gives a brief summary of both Nestorius's and his own understanding of the incarnation.

According to Nestorius, Cyril writes, the Word of God knew beforehand that the one out of the holy virgin would be holy and great, and therefore, he chose him and provided for him to be born out of the virgin without a man. He also granted him to be called by his own names—Son, Lord and Christ—, and he prepared him to die for us and he raised him again. And the Word of God is said to have become man because he was always with (συνῆν; 171¹³) the holy man out of the virgin.[230] Just as he was with (συνῆν) the holy prophets, so he is also with this one according to a closer connection (κατὰ μείζονα συνάφειαν; 171¹⁵), and he was with him from the womb. Nestorius avoids the word 'union (ἕνωσις)', but he calls it a 'connection (συνάφεια)', that is, from without (ὡς ἔξωθεν; 171¹⁶), Cyril adds. This man is not true God, but he may be called God and Lord by the good pleasure of God. And

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[229] *Ep.* 11a (*CPG* 5311; PG 77, 85–89). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.7, 171–172 (= U 4; see chapter 5, n. 2). An English translation in McEnerney (1987a), 65–66. McEnerney's translation of the title—"A Memorandum of the most holy bishop Cyril to Posidonius in Rome, sent by him on account of matters pertaining to Nestorius"—might suggest that the memorandum was sent, but it says that Posidonius was sent (ἀποσταλέντα).

[230] The verb συνεῖναι is found in Nestorius (1905), *Sermo* 14, 286⁴ᶠ·: ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι τὸ συνεῖναι τῷ γεγεννημένῳ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ γεννᾶσθαι.

the death and the resurrection belong to this man, and nothing of this pertains to the Word of God.

We, Cyril continues, also confess that the Word is immortal and life, but we believe that he has become flesh, that is, having united to himself the flesh with a rational soul, he suffered in the flesh (σαρκί). And since his body has suffered, he is said to have suffered himself, although he is impassible by nature (τὴν φύσιν). And since his body rose, we say that he himself rose on behalf of us. Nestorius, however, says that the suffering, the resurrection, and the body in the mysteries—in the Eucharist—are that of a man, but we believe "that the flesh is that of the Word, which for that reason is capable of giving life, because it is the flesh and blood of the Word who gives life to all things" (171²⁹ᶠ·).

Apart from the terms 'union' and 'connection' and the one phrase 'by nature', there is no technical terminology in the memorandum. Also the title θεοτόκος is absent. For Cyril, the issue is the unity of the incarnate Word. He regards Nestorius's connection as an external relation of the Word with a human being. He only hints at the soteriological consequences—by the phrase 'on behalf of us (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν)' and by the verb 'to give life (ζωοποιεῖν)'—but it is implied that such a connection is insufficient because the death of an ordinary man, like that of a prophet, cannot be salvific. The union with the Word has to be so tight that the body is his (αὐτοῦ) body, and that the Word himself may be said to have suffered and to have risen.

Cyril ends by mentioning Nestorius's council against the presbyter Philip, who opposed "his heresy" (171³³). First, Nestorius induced Celestius to accuse Philip of Manichaeism, and when this failed, Philip was condemned for holding divine services at home, although virtually all the clergy do this in times of need, Cyril writes. The Alexandrian archbishop may have added this, because Celestius was probably a disciple of Pelagius,[231] and therefore, pope Celestine will not have looked favourably on Nestorius's co-operation with this man.

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[231] See Schwartz (1929), 8 (in the paragraph on "V 2. 143. Coll. Palat. 35"), and McEnerney (1987a), 66, n. 7. Nestorius himself refers to the condemnation of Philip, without mentioning his name, in *ep.* 5, ACO I.1.1, 32⁹⁻¹¹; McEnerney (1987a), 47; McGuckin (1994), 368.

7.6. Two Brief Letters to Nestorius (*epp.* 6 and 7)

Under number 5306 the *Clavis Patrum Graecorum* includes two letters, allegedly from Cyril to Nestorius, known as *epp.* 6 and 7, which are only extant in Arabic. The Arabic text and an English translation were published by B. Evetts in 1907.[232] Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* gives the Latin translation from the Arabic which was produced by Eusebius Renaudot in 1713.[233] Their authenticity, however, is doubtful. Not only are they absent from the Greek and Latin corpus of Cyril's writings, Cyril himself calls the letter which he sent to Nestorius in November 430 "this third letter".[234] And when describing to Juvenal of Jerusalem what happened before November 430, he writes that he "exhorted him [Nestorius] as a brother through a first and a second letter".[235] Besides, the Arabic *History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria* does not come across as a trustworthy record of the period.[236]

But even if the letters were genuine, they are of little importance for the study of the development of Cyril's christology and terminology, since they are short and contain more quotations of and allusions to Bible verses than interpretations of them. We do encounter some typically Cyrillian phrases, though. In letter 6, the author speaks of "God, who was truly crucified for us and died in the body (*in corpore*)" (57C), an example of the communication of idioms, with the addition of 'in the body' to denote that it was not the divine nature that was

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[232] Evetts (1907); chapter 12 on "Cyril I, the Twenty-Fourth Patriarch" on pp. 430–443; the two letters on pp. 433–436.

[233] PG 77, 57B–60A. Eusebius Renaudotius (ed.), *Historia Patriarcharum Alexandrinorum Jacobitarum ad Marco usque ad finem saeculi xiii*, Paris, 1713. After *ep.* 6, Renaudot adds: "Talis est Epistola quae extat in Codicibus Arabicis earum loco quae Graece & Latine leguntur in antiquis Codicibus Actorum Ephesinorum", a remark which Migne places (somewhat altered) as a note before the letters. The text which links the two letters in the Arabic original reads: "When this second letter reached Nestorius, he wrote another answer like his first, full of blasphemies, and, when the Father Cyril received it, he again addressed an epistle to Nestorius, saying", after which the text of *ep.* 7 follows; Evetts (1907), 434. The Latin text gives only the first third of *ep.* 7, and adds: "Several other scriptural testimonies are added to prove Christ's divinity". McEnerney (1987a), 49f., gives an English translation of the Latin text in PG 77. The text in McEnerney's note 7 is a translation of the Latin version of the clause which connects the two letters.

[234] *Ep.* 17, 33[24]: τρίτῳ … τούτῳ… γράμματι. Also in the *Letter to the Monks of Constantinople* (*ep.* 19; *CPG* 5319), ACO I.1.5, 13[8].

[235] *Letter to Juvenal of Jerusalem* (*ep.* 16; *CPG* 5316), ACO I.1.1, 97[11]: δι' ἑνὸς καὶ δευτέρου γράμματος.

[236] For example, it states that "Nestorius had been a friend of the prince Theodosius [the emperor] since the time when they were together in the school"; Evetts (1907), 437.

crucified and died. And similarly in letter 7, without such an addition: "God, your Creator, who redeemed you with his blood" (59A). It further says that in Scripture Christ is not called "a mere man (*purum hominem*)" (59A), an expression also found in Cyril's writings.

7.7. *Third Letter to Nestorius* with the Anathemas[237]

When pope Celestine had received Cyril of Alexandria's letter and dossier, he called a council in Rome in August 430. The council condemned Nestorius's teachings, and Celestine informed Cyril and other leading bishops of this decision. He gave Cyril a mandate to execute the sentence. After receiving the pope's letter, Cyril called his own council in Alexandria in November 430. Archbishop and council together sent the *Third Letter to Nestorius*, to which were added the twelve anathemas as a summary of the christological positions which were to be rejected and accepted by Nestorius. Because of the special role which the anathemas have played, it is worthwhile to examine the letter and the anathemas separately.

7.7.1. Third Letter to Nestorius

7.7.1.1. *Summary of the Contents*

In the first chapter, Cyril cites Mt. 10:37 ("He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me") and applies it to the situation: one must love Christ more than a fellow-bishop, when that bishop errs. In chapter 2, he lays down the decisions: together with the Roman synod, the Alexandrian council condemns Nestorius's teachings. The archbishop of Constantinople is to anathematize his own views and to adhere to the correct doctrine, within the period stipulated in the pope's letter to him. If he does not comply, he will no longer be counted among the bishops and the clergy. It is not enough for him to accept the Nicene Creed, for his interpretation is wrong. To the letter is added

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[237] *Ep.* 17 (*CPG* 5317; PG 77, 105–121; Pusey VI, 12–39; the first two chapters are left out in *DEC* I, 50–61). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 33–42 (= V 6; see chapter 5, n. 2). Because of its importance for the history of doctrine, many English translations have been produced, for example: McEnerney (1987a), 80–92; McGuckin (1994), 266–275; Wickham (1983), 12–33; Bindley & Green (1950), 212–219; an abridged version in Stevenson (1989), 301–309 (¹1966, 280–288).

"that which you must think and teach, and that from which one must withdraw".[238]

The third chapter begins with a full quotation of the Nicene Creed (325), including its anathema. And Cyril comments that it is the only-begotten Word of God himself who came down for the sake of our salvation and was incarnate and made man. That is, he continues, assuming flesh from the holy virgin and making it his own, he underwent a birth like ours from the womb, while he remained God by nature. The flesh was not changed into the nature of the divinity, neither was the nature of the Word converted into the nature of flesh. When he was seen as a baby, on the lap of the virgin who bore (τεκούσης) him, he filled all creation as God. Cyril does not use the epithet θεοτόκος, but he discusses the underlying christological issues.

In chapter 4, the Word is said to have been united according to hypostasis (καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν) with the flesh. Man and God are not held apart and separated, connected with each other by a unity of rank and sovereign power. And when Scripture writes that all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Christ, this is not an indwelling in an ordinary man, as with the saints, but he is united according to nature (ἑνωθεὶς κατὰ φύσιν). The indwelling is like that of a human soul with respect to its own body. There is, then, one Christ, Cyril continues in chapter 5, not as a man who simply has a connection with God in a unity of rank or sovereign power, for equality of honour does not unite the natures. The mode of connection is not one of juxtaposition (κατὰ παράθεσιν), for that is not enough for a natural union, nor one of relational participation (κατὰ μέθεξιν σχετικήν), in the way that we are joined to the Lord and are one spirit with him. Rather, we reject the term 'connection (συνάφεια)' as being insufficient to signify the union, Cyril writes. We do not call the Word of God Christ's 'God' or 'Master' in order not to separate the one Christ into two, for he is united to flesh according to hypostasis (καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν). When he calls the Father his own God (John 20:17), we do not overlook that he also has become a man, who is subject to God according to the law that is fitting to the nature of the humanity.

In chapter 6, Cyril rejects several of Nestorius's phrases, of which he gives a somewhat free rendering: "Because of the wearer I venerate the

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[238] *Ibid.*, 34[23f]. By this, chapters 3 through 12 of the letter will be meant, not (just) the twelve anathemas.

worn, because of the invisible one I worship the visible one",[239] and: "The assumed one is co-named God with the assumer".[240] For Cyril, this implies a division into two Christs: a man separately by himself and God likewise. Instead, the one Christ is honoured with one worship together with his own flesh. The only-begotten God suffered in the flesh (σαρκί) on behalf of us, although he is impassible according to his own nature. He impassibly appropriated the things of his own flesh. Trampling death in his own flesh first (πρώτῃ), he became the first-born from the dead and the first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep, and he led the way for the human nature (τῇ ἀνθρώπου φύσει) to return to incorruptibility.

Chapter 7 deals with the "unbloody service", when we approach "the mystical blessings (ταῖς μυστικαῖς εὐλογίαις)" (37[24f.])—that is, the Eucharist. We become partakers of the holy flesh of Christ, and we do not receive it as ordinary flesh or as that of a sanctified man who is connected to the Word according to the unity of rank or by a divine indwelling, Cyril states. No, the Word is life by nature, and since he has become one (ἕν) with his own flesh, he has rendered it life-giving. It is not that of a man like us—for how could human flesh be life-giving according to its own nature—but it has truly become the own flesh of him who for our sakes also has become Son of Man.[241]

The attribution of the sayings is the subject of chapter 8. Cyril starts with a clear statement: "We do not divide out the sayings of our Saviour in the Gospels to two hypostases and persons (οὔτε ὑποστάσεσι δυσὶν οὔτε μὴν προσώποις)" (38[4f.]). And he ends with the conclusion:

> Therefore, one must attribute all the sayings in the Gospels to one person (ἑνὶ … προσώπῳ), to one hypostasis, the incarnate [hypostasis] of the Word (ὑποστάσει μιᾷ τῇ τοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένῃ) (38[21f.]).

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[239] Nestorius (1905), 262[3]. The first part is quoted verbatim, the second part Cyril renders in his own words: "because of the invisible one (ἀόρατον) I worship the visible one (ὁρώμενον)". Nestorius's text reads: "because of the hidden one (κεκρυμμένον) I worship the visible one (φαινόμενον)". See also *CN* II.12, 50[8f.].

[240] Nestorius (1905), 262[10–12], reads: "But since God is in the assumed one, from (ἐκ) the assumer the assumed one is co-named God, as connected with the assumer". See also *CN* II.13, 51[7f.].

[241] McGuckin (1994), 271, translates "it has truly become the personal flesh"; the Greek text has ὡς ἰδίαν ἀληθῶς γενομένην, *ep.* 17, 38[2f.]. McGuckin translates ἰδίαν in *ibid.*, 37[29] with 'very-flesh' (p. 270), and in the eleventh anathema (41[28]) with 'very-own flesh' (p. 275).

In between these two sentences, Cyril gives his argumentation. The one Christ is not twofold, although he is regarded as having come together out of two differing realities (πραγμάτων) into unity, just as a human being is regarded as out of soul and body, and not as twofold, but as one out of both. Both the human and the divine sayings were said by one [subject] (παρ' ἑνός). When in a God-befitting way (θεοπρεπῶς) he says that he is one with the Father (John 10:30), we think of his divine nature; and when he calls himself "a man who has told you the truth" (John 8:40), we nonetheless recognise him as God the Word, also in (ἐκ) the measures of his humanity. For he who is God by nature has become flesh or a man ensouled with a rational soul.

Chapter 9 speaks of Christ as high priest and as offering. If he is called "apostle and high priest of our confession" (Hebr. 3:1) because he ministers the confession of faith which is offered up by us to him (πρὸς ἡμῶν αὐτῷ), and through him to the Father, in the holy Spirit, we say again that he is the only-begotten Son who is out of God by nature, and we do not attribute the title and the reality (χρῆμα) of the priesthood to another man besides him. He offered himself up on our behalf, not for his own sake, for he is without sin, but the nature of man was infected with sin. In chapter 10, the relation between the Son and the Spirit is central. When Christ says of the Spirit, "He shall glorify me" (John 16:14), this does not imply that he needed glory from another, but it is his own Spirit, even though the Spirit exists in his distinct hypostasis and is regarded as by himself. Christ is believed to be God by nature, while he himself (αὐτός)[242] operates through his own Spirit.

Chapter 11 gives an explanation of the title θεοτόκος, which appears only once in the whole letter: the holy virgin is called this because she fleshly gave birth (ἐκτέτοκε σαρκικῶς) to God who is united to flesh according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν). The Word's nature did not have the beginning of its existence from the flesh, for he was in the beginning, and the Word was God. He did not need the birth in time by necessity or on account of (διά) his own nature, but he did this in order to bless the beginning of our existence, and in order that the curse against the whole race, which sends our bodies to death, would cease. Chapter 12 stipulates that Nestorius must give his assent

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[242] McGuckin (1994), 272, translates αὐτός by 'personally'.

to all these teachings, and it ends with an introduction of the twelve anathemas: "That which your Reverence (τὴν σὴν εὐλάβειαν) must anathematize is appended to this letter of ours".

7.7.1.2. *Terminology*

In the quotation of the Nicene Creed with its anathema we find οὐσία twice and ὁμοούσιος once (35[3, 4, 10]). The expression that the Son is (born) out of the substance of the Father, taken from the Creed, occurs two more times in Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*.[243] And once the Word is said to have 'identity of substance' with the Father (38[12]). These are all the instances where οὐσία and its derivatives are found. Their use is similar to that in Cyril's previous writings.

Twice we encounter ὑπόστασις in a trinitarian context. First, in the anathema of the Nicene Creed (35[10]). And secondly, when Cyril writes that "the Spirit exists in his distinct hypostasis and is regarded as by himself" (39[20f.]). The remaining six occurrences of ὑπόστασις are all found in christological contexts. The verb ὑφεστάναι is absent from this letter of Cyril's. Four times the expression 'united according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν)' is used.[244] Once Cyril declares that he does not divide out the sayings in the Gospels to two hypostases and persons (38[4f.]). And in the last instance, he states, conversely, that the sayings should be attributed to one person, to one hypostasis, the incarnate [hypostasis] of the Word (38[21f.]).

This christological usage of ὑπόστασις in the *Third Letter to Nestorius* is completely in line with that in *Contra Nestorium* (see section 6.3.2). There, too, the phrase 'united according to hypostasis' is frequent, while the incarnate Word is regarded, not as two hypostases and persons, but as one hypostasis and person. The meaning of the term and the phrase will, therefore, be the same as that in *Contra Nestorium*. That Christ is one, not two hypostases, signifies that he is one, not two SEPARATE REALITIES. The word ὑπόστασις does not mean PERSON. And 'united according to hypostasis' indicates a union which results in one SEPARATE REALITY. It should not be translated by 'personally united', and the

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[243] *Ep.* 17, 35[15] and 36[27].
[244] *Ibid.*, 35[26] (ἡνῶσθαι), 36[23f.] (ἑνωθείς), 40[3] (ἑνωθέντα), 40[7f.] ("having united [ἑνώσας] according to hypostasis that which is human [τὸ ἀνθρώπινον] with himself"). Here— and often elsewhere—McGuckin (1994), 273, translates τὸ ἀνθρώπινον by 'the human condition'.

notion of another metaphysical level, of a 'bearer' of natures, is totally absent from the term ὑπόστασις.

The word πρόσωπον is found three times in Cyril of Alexandria's *Third Letter to Nestorius*. Once in a biblical citation, where it means 'face' (40[14]). The other two times together with 'hypostasis', when Cyril states that he does not attribute the sayings to two hypostases and persons (προσώποις), but to one person (προσώπῳ), one hypostasis (38[4f., 21f.]). This usage of πρόσωπον, too, corresponds to that in *Contra Nestorium*, and the word will, therefore, have the same meaning: PERSON. Since πρόσωπον can stand for a GRAMMATICAL PERSON as well as an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, and the context of 'sayings' suggests a GRAMMATICAL PERSON, the addition of the word 'hypostasis' indicates that for Cyril the attribution of sayings has ontological implications. The one πρόσωπον of Christ, then, is also an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON.

Besides, Cyril knows that Nestorius also writes that Christ is one πρόσωπον, while in Cyril's view his fellow-bishop separates the one Christ into two persons and hypostases (see section 7.3.2.3). Apparently, because for the archbishop of Constantinople the term πρόσωπον has another meaning, it is not enough to state that the incarnate Word is one πρόσωπον. And Cyril adds 'one hypostasis'—a word which he re-introduced into christology—,[245] to make it clear that by 'one πρόσωπον' he means an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, which is also one SEPARATE REALITY.

We encounter the word φύσις in the *Third Letter to Nestorius* in most of the various meanings that we know from his earlier writings. It is related to COMMON NATURE when the phrase 'by nature' (κατὰ φύσιν or φύσει) is used in 'God by nature',[246] 'life by nature' (37[13, 29]), the Son who is 'out of God by nature' (38[26]), and also when the Son is said to be "impassible according to his own nature" (37[10]), and when the rhetorical question is asked "how human flesh will be life-giving according to its own nature".[247] Twice we find 'the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις)', denoting the whole human race, in soteriological contexts.[248]

With respect to Christ, the term φύσις is employed in relation to his divinity as well as his humanity:

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[245] See section 6.3.2, n. 47.

[246] *Ep.* 17, 35[20], 36[26f.], 38[17], 39[25f.].

[247] *Ibid.*, 38[2]: πῶς γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρώπου σὰρξ ζωοποιὸς ἔσται κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ἑαυτῆς; This refers, not to the flesh of Christ, but to the flesh of a man like us.

[248] *Ibid.*, 37[15f.], 39[9].

> We do not say that the flesh was changed into the nature of the divinity, nor that the ineffable nature of the Word of God was converted into the nature of flesh (35$^{21\,f.}$).

When Christ calls his Father 'his God', although he himself is God by nature, we do not overlook that he also has become a man, who is subject to God (ὑπὸ Θεῷ) "according to the law that is fitting to the nature of the humanity".[249] In all these cases, φύσις does not denote separate existence, but it refers to the essence and natural properties of divinity and humanity. Therefore, it does not mean SEPARATE REALITY, but COMMON NATURE or INDIVIDUAL NATURE. Once, the reference is not to essence and natural properties, but to existence: "the nature of the Word does not have the beginning of its existence from the flesh" (40$^{4\,f.}$). Although the immediate context does not preclude the meaning of SEPARATE REALITY for φύσις, it is more likely that here, too, its meaning is INDIVIDUAL NATURE.[250]

When Cyril writes that the Word, who is God by nature, also has become a man, who is subject to God according to the law that is fitting to the nature of the humanity (36$^{26–28}$), he applies the word φύσις to Christ's humanity. This is dyophysite language. It is even more explicit when he says that "equality of honour does not unite the natures".[251]

In the same chapter 5 where we encounter these dyophysite phrases, we also find the expression 'natural union': we do not conceive of the mode of connection as one of juxtaposition, for that is not sufficient for a natural union (πρὸς ἕνωσιν φυσικήν; 36$^{17\,f.}$). And shortly before that, at the end of chapter 4, the notion of 'indwelling' in Col. 2:9 is explained as "united according to nature (ἑνωθεὶς κατὰ φύσιν; 36$^{11\,f.}$), and not changed into flesh", but in this case the anthropological analogy is immediately invoked: "he made for himself (ἐποιήσατο) such an indwelling as the soul of a human being is said to have with its own body" (36$^{12\,f.}$). This confirms that the phrases 'natural union' and 'united according to nature' should be interpreted in the same way as Cyril applies them to the soul and the body in a human being: two INDIVIDUAL NATURES are united to form one SEPARATE REALITY.[252] This fits well within a dyophysite context. And in between both phrases Cyril

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[249] *Ibid.*, 36$^{27\,f.}$: κατά γε τὸν πρέποντα νόμον τῇ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος φύσει. See also *ibid.*, 38$^{10\,f.}$ and 40$^{8\,f.}$.

[250] Cf. *Or. ad dom.*, 63^{30}. See section 7.3.2.4.

[251] *Ep.* 17, 36^{15}: οὐ γὰρ ἑνοῖ τὰς φύσεις [ἡ] ἰσοτιμία.

[252] See for a more elaborate argumentation section 6.3.4.

writes that "equality of honour does not unite the natures". A 'natural union', then, is not (necessarily) a union that results in one nature, but one in which two natures are united.

In the *Third Letter to Nestorius* Cyril does not call the result of the union 'one nature'. Even when, over against Nestorius's phrase "because of the invisible one I worship the visible one", Cyril argues that the one Christ "is honoured with one worship (μιᾷ προσκυνήσει) together with his flesh" (37[8f.]), he does not speak of 'one nature'. And that while pseudo-Athanasius (= Apollinarius) writes in the quotation in *Oratio ad dominas* that

> we confess … that the one Son is not two natures, one worshipped and one not worshipped, but one nature of God the Word, incarnate and worshipped together with his flesh with one worship (μιᾷ προσκυνήσει), not two Sons, one true Son of God, worshipped, and another a man out of Mary, not worshipped.[253]

If the μία φύσις formula were so important for Cyril as has often been maintained he would certainly have used it in this context.[254] We have now looked at all the occurrences of φύσις and its cognates in this letter.

The word ἴδιος retains its double function also in Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*. On the one hand, it is used in connection with nature and with natural relations; on the other hand, it denotes what is proper to a specific individual. It belongs to the first category when the Spirit is called Christ's 'own Spirit' (39[18, 26]), and when the Son's 'own nature' is mentioned.[255] And in the second category we encounter the Word's 'own flesh'[256] and his 'own body',[257] while the Word is also said to have made the flesh his own (ἰδίαν … ποιησάμενος; 35[18]). Further, the Son is again said to appropriate (οἰκειούμενος; 37[11f.]) the sufferings of his own flesh.

The adjective ἰδικός is employed to express that the Spirit exists 'in his distinct hypostasis', to which καθ' ἑαυτό is juxtaposed. And the corresponding adverb ἰδικῶς has its well-known meaning of 'by himself', applied to the rejected view of a man by himself and the Word

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[253] *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 65[25–29].
[254] Also in *Contra Nestorium* II.10, 47[29], Cyril writes that Emmanuel is worshipped "with one worship (μιᾷ προσκυνήσει)", without referring to the μία φύσις formula.
[255] *Ep.* 17, 37[10], 40[9].
[256] *Ibid.*, 36[4], 37[9, 11, 14, 29], 38[2].
[257] *Ibid.*, 37[13], 39[5f.]. Also: the soul's own body, *ibid.*, 36[13].

of God by himself.[258] The phrase ἀνὰ μέρος also returns to indicate such a separate existence.[259]

The noun ἕνωσις and the verb ἑνοῦν—mostly in a passive form—are used for Cyril's own understanding of the incarnation, συνάφεια and συνάπτειν for that of Nestorius. This time, he goes so far as to state that he rejects the term συνάφεια as insufficiently signifying the union (ἕνωσις; 36[19f.]). Instead of 'equality of rank and / or sovereign power (ἰσότης τῆς ἀξίας καὶ / ἢ γοῦν αὐθεντίας)'—which we encountered in *Oratio ad augustas*—, we now find 'unity (ἑνότης) of rank and / or sovereign power'.[260] Also the words 'juxtaposition' (παράθεσις; 36[17]), 'relational' (σχετικός; 36[18]), and 'indwelling' (ἐνοίκησις; 37[28]) are used for Nestorius's position, as in *Contra Nestorium*.[261] And, of course, various verbs that indicate a division, as well as adverbs that mean 'by himself' and 'separately'.

7.7.1.3. *Christology*

The christology in Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius* is no different from that in the other writings of the year 430, and it is expressed in similar terms. Over against Nestorius, whom he regards as dividing the one Son into two, he emphasizes the unity of Christ. As in *Contra Nestorium*, he speaks of 'one person (πρόσωπον)' and 'one hypostasis (ὑπόστασις)' of Christ. In this letter he does not employ the phrase 'one nature (φύσις)'. We do encounter the phrases 'united according to nature' and 'natural union', but in the sentence in which the first phrase occurs we also find the analogy of soul and body, which confirms that Cyril will have understood them in the same way as in his earlier works: as a union of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES within one SEPARATE REALITY.

Because of the alleged synonymity of ὑπόστασις and φύσις, the 'one hypostasis' formula is often regarded as belonging to miaphysite language.[262] The conclusion of this study so far, however, is that the

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[258] *Ibid.*, 36[2, 3], 37[6].

[259] *Ibid.*, 35[27], 37[6].

[260] *Ibid.*, 36[1], 36[14]. Cf. also *ibid.*, 37[27f.]. The phrase 'unity of rank and sovereign power' is not found in Nestorius's extant writings from the period before the Council of Ephesus (see n. 223), but they do contain the phrase 'unity of rank' once: Nestorius (1905), 354[11] (= *CN* II.5, 41[25]). 'Equality of rank' is only found once in a fragment of dubious authenticity: Nestorius (1905), 224[7].

[261] See sections 6.3.6 and 6.3.7.

[262] See, for example, Meunier (1997), 256–258, esp. n. 9: "Les deux termes φύσις et ὑπόστασις sont souvent pratiquement équivalents pour Cyrille, on le sait, surtout dans

meaning of the two terms differs to such an extent that the 'one hypostasis' formula fits also within a dyophysite framework, since it indicates that the incarnate Word is one SEPARATE REALITY, while the word φύσις in the 'one nature' formula has an exceptional meaning, which does not fit well within Cyril's metaphysics (see section 6.4.3).

Figure 2 in section 5.3.3 paints an adequate picture of Cyril's understanding of the incarnate Word, also in his *Third Letter to Nestorius*. The two INDIVIDUAL NATURES that are united in the one Christ are not mixed. They remain the sources of the divine and human properties respectively. Christ can call the Father 'his God' because he is the divine Word who has also become a man who is subject to God "according to the law which fits the nature of the humanity". The property 'subject to God' belongs, not to the divine, but to the human nature. But when he says that he and the Father are one, we think of the divine nature. The property 'one with the Father' belongs, not to the human, but to the divine nature. Also, when Christ is called God or life 'by nature', or impassible 'according to his own nature', this refers to the divine, not to the human nature.

As in Cyril's previous writings, the attribution of sayings and acts is often expressed by other words: 'as God' and 'as man',[263] 'humanly' (36[4]), 'in the flesh' (σαρκί; 37[10]), 'befitting God' (θεοπρεπῶς; 38[9f.]) and 'befitting a man' (ἀνθρωποπρεπῶς; 38[18]), 'economically' (οἰκονομικῶς; 40[15f.]).

The expression 'in contemplation (only)'—ἐν θεωρίᾳ (μόνῃ)—is absent from the *Third Letter to Nestorius*, but one might think that the notion is present in the following sentence: the one Christ "is regarded (νοῆται) as having come together into an inseparable unity out of two differing realities (πραγμάτων)" (38[6]). The verb νοεῖν, however, is such a common word in Cyril's writings that without an addition like 'only' (or, conversely, an addition like καὶ ὑπάρχειν or καὶ εἶναι), one cannot draw too many conclusions from its use.[264] It seems that here, just as

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cette première phase de la controverse, et plus particulièrement dans cette formule μία φύσις ou μία ὑπόστασις, où l'on ne peut vraiment pas déceler une différence", although he adds: "Mais il faut se souvenir que φύσις garde aussi chez Cyrille une parenté réelle avec οὐσία". See also the quotations from the agreed statements of the dialogue between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches in section 1.2.2.

[263] *Ep.* 17, 35[24f.], 36[29f.], 37[2f., 29], 39[7].

[264] So, Cyril can write that "Christ Jesus, the only-begotten Son, is conceived of as

in *On the Incarnation*, Cyril employs the phrase 'out of two REALITIES' without thinking through what the status of these realities was before the incarnation.[265] And, therefore, it is more likely that the notion of 'in contemplation only' does not apply.

A few times soteriological issues come up in Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*. After the Nicene Creed has been quoted it is briefly repeated that the Word "came down for the sake of our salvation" ($35^{16f.}$). The notion of 'in Christ first' is expressed in the following sentence: He tasted death and came back to life in order that,

> trampling death in his own flesh first, he would become the first-born from the dead and the first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep, and would lead the way for the human nature to return to incorruption (37^{13-16}).

Further, in the 'unbloody service' we partake of flesh which is life-giving because it is the flesh of the Word himself, who is life by nature (c. 7). Christ offered his own body on behalf of us as a sweet-smelling fragrance ($39^{5f.}$). And finally, he was born in the flesh in order to bless the beginning of our existence, to stop the curse that sends our bodies to death, while this sentence is annulled through him: "In sorrow you will bring forth children" (c. 11).

7.7.2. *The Anathemas*

7.7.2.1. *Paraphrase of the Contents*

Since the twelve anathemas are 'main points' (κεφάλαια) by themselves,[266] it is no use to summarize them. Instead, each of them will be paraphrased. Negative and affirmative sentences will be reversed: instead of 'if someone says A rather than B, let him be anathema', they will be rendered as 'one should say B, not A' or 'it is B rather than A'.

1. Emmanuel is truly God, and for that reason the holy virgin is θεοτόκος, because, having become man, the Word was born fleshly (σαρκικῶς).

(νοεῖται) one" (37^8), and this certainly does not imply that he is one in contemplation only.

[265] See section 5.3.3, n. 132.

[266] In this case, 'chapters' is a less fortunate rendering of κεφάλαια, but since the expression 'the twelve chapters' has been widely adopted, it is used in this study as well.

2. In the second anathema, the unity of Christ is expressed by the phrases 'united with flesh according to hypostasis', 'one with his own flesh', and 'the same one both God and man'.

3. It is emphasized that with respect to the one Christ 'the hypostases (τὰς ὑποστάσεις)' should not be divided after the union, which happens when one only connects them with a connection (συνάπτων αὐτὰς συναφείᾳ) according to rank, sovereign power or might, rather than with a coming together according to a natural union (καθ' ἕνωσιν φυσικήν).

4. The sayings about Christ should not be attributed to two persons (προσώποις) or hypostases, some to a man, regarded as by himself, besides the Word of God, and some, which are God-befitting, only to the Word.

5. Christ is not a God-bearing (θεοφόρον) man, but truly God as the one Son by nature, insofar as he has become man and participated in blood and flesh.

6. The Word is not Christ's God or Master, but the same one is both God and man, since the Word has become flesh.

7. Jesus is not a man activated by the Word of God and invested with the glory of the Only-Begotten, as another one besides the Word.

8. One should not say that the assumed man is worshipped and glorified along with (συν-) the Word and that he is co-named (συγχρηματίζειν) God, as one along with another, but one should honour him with one worship (μιᾷ προσκυνήσει).

9. The one Lord Jesus Christ was not glorified by the Spirit, as if he used a power foreign to him and as if he received the ability to operate against unclean spirits and to accomplish divine signs, but it is his own Spirit, through whom he worked signs.

10. Christ is called the high priest and apostle of our confession, who offered himself up on behalf of us as a sweet-smelling odour. This high priest and apostle is the Word of God himself, when he had become flesh and man like us, and not another man out of a woman by himself besides the Word. And he did not offer himself also on behalf of himself, for, not knowing any sin, he was not in need of offerings.

11. The flesh of the Lord is life-giving and the Word's own, not that of another one besides him, who is connected (συνημμένου) with him according to rank or who has a divine indwelling (ἐνοίκησιν) only.

12. The Word of God suffered in the flesh (σαρκί), was crucified in the flesh, and tasted death in the flesh, and he has become the first-born from the dead insofar as he is life and life-giving as God.

7.7.2.2. *Terminology*

The way in which Cyril of Alexandria uses the terms in the twelve anathemas does not really differ from what we have seen so far in his christological writings. It is in the light of these other writings, then, that they should be interpreted. The word οὐσία and its derivatives do not occur in the anathemas. The expression 'united according to hypostasis', found in the second anathema, has its usual meaning: it denotes a union which has resulted in one SEPARATE REALITY. Christ is one with his own flesh. And in the two following anathemas Cyril speaks of 'hypostases' in the plural to describe a view which he rejects. The hypostases should not be divided after the union. If this is done, the result is two separate beings, two Christs. And the sayings should not be attributed to two persons and hypostases, some to a man besides the Word, others to the Word. Here again, the issue is that one should not conceive of Christ as two separate beings with an external relation only.

Cyril does not use the word φύσις in the fourth anathema, and ὑπόστασις is not synonymous with φύσις to the extent that the anathema would imply that the sayings should not be attributed to the INDIVIDUAL NATURES of the incarnate Word. On the contrary, this study has shown that Cyril continually distinguishes the sayings and the acts of Christ: some things he does as God, divinely, according to his own nature, others as man, humanly, economically. It is true that he does not often use the word φύσις when he refers something to Christ's humanity, but this has probably to do with his anti-Arian propensity. However, as long as it is clear that the φύσεις are INDIVIDUAL NATURES which together form one SEPARATE REALITY—not two persons or separate hypostases—, it is no problem for Cyril to distribute the sayings over the two φύσεις. Therefore, when Cyril later accepts the Formula of Reunion—which says that the theologians "divide some of the sayings over two natures, and attribute (παραδιδόντας) the God-befitting ones in accordance with (κατά) Christ's divinity and the humble ones in accordance with (κατά) his humanity"[267]—his christological position has

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[267] Formula of Reunion, ACO I.1.4, 17[19f.]; *DEC* I, 70[24–28].

not changed. The unity of Christ having been established, he allows the sayings to be attributed to his divine and human natures.

The word φύσις and its adjective φυσικός occur each only once in the anathemas. Christ is said to be "one Son and [Son] by nature",[268] a common phrase. And in the third anathema Cyril speaks of a "coming together according to a natural union".[269] He opposes this to a separation of the hypostases after the union and to a connection according to rank and sovereign power. He does not refer to the anthropological analogy but seeing how he uses the expression 'natural union' in the earlier writings, Cyril will understand it in a way similar to the coming together of soul and body in a human being: the result is two INDIVIDUAL NATURES which together form one SEPARATE REALITY. There is, then, no miaphysite terminology in the anathemas.

Πρόσωπον is found only once, namely, when it is stated that the sayings should not be attributed to two persons (προσώποις δυσίν; 41[1]) or hypostases, a man by himself and the Word of God. This, again, is familiar language, and πρόσωπον means PERSON here, first of all GRAMMATICAL PERSON, but with ὑπόστασις juxtaposed, an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON is implied.

In the anathemas, too, ἴδιος is used both for a natural relationship and for what is particular to the Word. So, the Spirit is called 'his own' Spirit (41[20]), but also his flesh is said to be 'his own' flesh.[270] And ἰδικῶς indicates twice the separate existence of a man besides the Word of God (41[3, 24]). 'To unite (ἑνοῦν)' and 'union (ἕνωσις)' are employed for a proper understanding of the incarnation,[271] 'to connect (συνάπτειν)' and 'connection (συνάφεια)' for a rejected view, once with the addition "according to rank or sovereign power or might", another time with "according to rank".[272] A few other special terms return, each only once: the title θεοτόκος (40[23]) and the word 'coming together (σύνοδος; 40[30])' for an accepted view; the adjective 'God-bearing (θεοφόρος; 41[5])' and the noun 'indwelling (ἐνοίκησις; 42[1])' for Nestorius's view.

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[268] *Ep.* 17, 41[6]: Υἱὸν ἕνα καὶ φύσει.
[269] *Ibid.*, 40[30]: συνόδῳ τῇ καθ' ἕνωσιν φυσικήν.
[270] *Ibid.*, 40[26], 41[28], 42[2].
[271] Only in the second and the third anathemas: *ibid.*, 40[25] (καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἡνῶσθαι); 40[28] (μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν); 40[30] (καθ' ἕνωσιν φυσικήν).
[272] Only in the third and the eleventh anathemas: *ibid.*, 40[28f.], 41[29f.].

7.7.2.3. *Interpretation*

Each of the twelve anathemas emphasizes in its own way that the Christ is one and should not be divided into two separate beings. It is for this reason that Mary is called θεοτόκος; that Cyril writes that the Word was 'united according to hypostasis' with flesh; that 'a connection according to rank' is rejected; that the sayings should not be attributed to a man by himself and to the Word of God; etc. This aim should be kept in mind when they are interpreted.[273] When the anathemas are read within the context of Cyril of Alexandria's other christological writings of the years 429 and 430, they do not stand out as saying something else or even as saying it in another way. It is the same terminology that we also encounter elsewhere, especially in *Contra Nestorium*. But by their condensed form they are forceful. As Cyril himself later was to write to Acacius of Beroea: "The force of the main points (ἡ τῶν κεφαλαίων δύναμις) was only directed [literally: written] against the teachings of Nestorius".[274]

However, when the archbishop of Constantinople received Cyril's *Third Letter* with the anathemas he sent a copy of them to John of Antioch, who distributed them throughout the East. Taken out of the context of Cyril's oeuvre they could—and were—easily misunderstood, the following points in particular:

1. The adjective 'natural' in the expression 'natural union' could be interpreted as 'necessary': that which is dictated by the natures. As if the Word were forced to be united with the flesh and to undergo the things of the flesh.[275] Even in the preceding *Third Letter to Nestorius*, however, Cyril speaks of a "voluntary kenosis" (38^{20}), and he states explicitly that the Word did not need a human birth "by necessity or on account of (διά) his own nature" (40^{8-10}).

2. It was Cyril himself who re-introduced the word 'hypostasis' into christology. Especially his expression 'united according to hypostasis' was attacked as an innovation, and as implying a mixture of the natures.[276] Again, what Cyril meant by it becomes

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[273] In a similar way, de Halleux (1992), 445, emphasizes that Cyril's intention with the twelve chapters was "exclusively anti-Nestorian", and that they should be interpreted accordingly (cf. pp. 436, 454).

[274] *Ep.* 33, ACO I.1.7, $149^{32f.}$.

[275] See Theodoret of Cyrus's criticism in *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, $116^{19ff.}$. Cf. *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 38^{5-12}.

[276] Theodoret attacks the expression; see *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 114^{11-17}.

clear only when it is read within the framework of his larger
writings.

3. The anathema on the distribution of the sayings is meant to safe-
   guard the unity of Emmanuel, that he is one SEPARATE REALITY.
   However, without further elucidation one could read into it that
   Cyril does not distinguish between the divine and the human say-
   ings at all.[277] We have seen, however, that with a whole series of
   expressions like 'as God' and 'humanly' he does make the distinc-
   tion, and that he regards the divine and the human natures as the
   sources of the properties.

4. Although Cyril adds σαρκί three times—"the Word suffered in
   the flesh, and was crucified in the flesh, and tasted death in the
   flesh"—, without the explanation that by this he means that the
   divine nature remained impassible, and that the Word appropri-
   ated the sufferings of his own flesh, the twelfth anathema could
   be misinterpreted as teaching that the Word suffered in his divine
   nature.[278]

The anathemas raised a storm of protest, and Theodoret of Cyrus and
Andrew of Samosata each composed a refutation of them. Both these
works have been lost, but part of them is retained in *Contra Theodoretum*
and *Contra Orientales*,[279] since with respect to each of the anathemas Cyril
gives a quotation from Theodoret or Andrew respectively, before he
defends his own christology. But the indignation with the anathemas
was so great that Cyril gave a third interpretation of them in his
Explanation of the Twelve Chapters, written during his forced stay in
Ephesus, after the council in 431.[280]

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[277] See *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 41[15 ff.].

[278] See *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 61[22–25], where 'he suffered in the flesh' is inter-
preted as 'he suffered with (μετά) the flesh'. Cf. *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 144[22 f.],
where Theodoret stresses that it was not God who suffered, but "the man who was
assumed by God out of us".

[279] Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. 3 (see n. 84), 546, suggests that the whole of Theodoret's
refutation has been preserved in Cyril's *Contra Theodoretum*.

[280] *Explanation of the Twelve Chapters* (*CPG* 5223; PG 76, 293–312; Pusey VI, 240–258).
The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.5, 15–25 (= V 148; see chapter 5, n. 2).

7.8. Other Letters from November 430

After the Alexandrian synod had met in November 430, Cyril also sent letters to John of Antioch, Juvenal of Jerusalem, the clergy and the people in Constantinople, and to the monks in Constantinople. Each of these letters will be briefly discussed.

7.8.1. Letter to John of Antioch *(*ep. *13)*[281]

In his letter to John, the archbishop of Antioch, Cyril mainly gives a brief history of the controversy. He writes that the church in Constantinople is in turmoil because of the teachings of its bishop, that he himself wrote several letters to Nestorius, but that his fellow-bishop in the capital did not respond well to them. Instead, Nestorius wrote to pope Celestine of Rome and sent him several of his writings. In his letter to Celestine, Nestorius says that his opponents "do not shrink from calling the holy virgin θεοτόκος" (92[13f.]). The bishops in Rome came to the conclusion that he teaches a dangerous heresy.

Cyril then tells that he sent Posidonius to Rome with copies of his own letters to Nestorius, and that, following this, the Roman synod put in writing what those who are in communion with Rome should believe. This they have sent not only to him, John of Antioch, but also to Rufus, bishop of Thessaloniki, to several other bishops in Macedonia, and to Juvenal, bishop of Jerusalem. Cyril adds that he will follow the judgements of Rome, and he urges John to consider what needs to be done.

7.8.2. Letter to Juvenal of Jerusalem *(*ep. *16)*[282]

Cyril's letter to Juvenal of Jerusalem, too, focusses more on the communication between the bishops involved than on the content of Nestorius's christology. Cyril first argues that it may be necessary to go against a brother, when we contend for the glory of Christ. He then mentions that he wrote two letters to Nestorius, which did not have the desired outcome. The archbishop of Constantinople wrote back that

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[281] *Ep.* 13 (*CPG* 5313; PG 77, 93C–96D). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 92–93 (= V 13). An English translation is given by McEnerney (1987a), 71–72.

[282] *Ep.* 16 (*CPG* 5316; PG 77, 104A–105B). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 96–98 (= V 15). An English translation is given by McEnerney (1987a), 78–79.

according to him the holy virgin is not θεοτόκος (97$^{16f.}$), which implies, Cyril adds, that Emmanuel is not God. Nestorius also sent letters and commentaries to Celestine, the bishop of Rome, and he has now been judged as a heretic. Cyril forwards Celestine's letter to Juvenal and urges him to be of one mind with him, so that Nestorius will have to choose: either leave his aberrant teachings, or face the consequences. And he suggests that they also send a letter to the emperor, advising him not to honour a man above the reverence for Christ.

7.8.3. To the Clergy and the People of Constantinople (ep. 18)[283]

Together with the Egyptian synod, the archbishop of Alexandria also wrote a letter to the clergy and the people of Constantinople to inform them of the decision regarding their bishop. It says that a synodical letter has been sent to Nestorius, stipulating that he should anathematize the teachings found in his writings within the time appointed by Celestine, bishop of Rome, or else he will no longer have a place among the priests. Cyril asks for their understanding in that it has taken so long, while the churches were in turmoil. But he has acted as a doctor, he explains: rather than immediately applying surgery, he has first used soothing drugs. He had hoped that Nestorius would amend his ways after all the counsels and admonitions he received, but he does not cease distributing the same teachings.

Cyril briefly sets out his christology, referring to the Fathers. They called the holy virgin θεοτόκος, because she bore Emmanuel, who is truly God. They did not preach two Christs, but one and the same as God the Word and as a man out of a woman according to the flesh— not a man who is connected to God with a mere connection (συναφείᾳ ψιλῇ) and as in equality of dignities (ἀξιωμάτων) only, but they said that the same one suffered death fleshly (σαρκικῶς) on our behalf and rose divinely (θεικῶς), trampling down the power of death (114$^{5–8}$). This is the sort of language that we know from Cyril's other writings.

In the last paragraph, the people in Constantinople are warned not to remain in communion with Nestorius, if he does not alter his teachings, while the church in Egypt receives in communion all the clergy and laity who have been excommunicated because of their correct faith.

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[283] *Ep.* 18 (*CPG* 5318; PG 77, 124A–125C). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.1, 113–114 (= V 24). An English translation is given by McEnerney (1987a), 93–95.

7.8.4. To the Monks of Constantinople *(ep. 19)*[284]

The main aim of this letter, written by Cyril and the Egyptian synod, is to let the monks at Constantinople know what has been decided with respect to Nestorius. First, the monks are praised for their zeal during the controversy. Christ is said to have been patient with Nestorius, giving him time to repent, but the bishop continued in his errors. Therefore, he is now reminded "by this third letter, which is sent by us and by … Celestine, the bishop of great Rome" (13[8–10]). If he anathematizes his distorted teachings, he may remain, but if he persists, he will be a stranger to the assembly of bishops and to the dignity of teaching. The letter ends with an exhortation to remain faithful. It does not contain a christological passage.

7.9. *Festal Letter* 19[285]

Cyril of Alexandria's *Festal Letter* for the year 431 will have been written at the end of 430. There is no explicit reference to the controversy with Nestorius. And although there are some small passages on christology, it is by no means the main subject of the letter. It is more pastorally devoted to soteriology and to living a holy life. As usual, the letter is full of biblical quotations and allusions. When the person of Christ and his incarnation are discussed, Cyril hardly uses technical terminology, but the language is more biblical than philosophical. Once the title θεοτόκος is mentioned, almost in passing.

7.9.1. *Summary of the Contents*

After a brief preface, Cyril starts the first of four chapters with a call to praise Christ for the salvation he has accomplished. He already cites several Bible verses in which the law of Moses is mentioned,[286] a topic which gets more attention later on in the letter. The call to live holy lives is based on the salvation in Christ.[287] The time is ripe,

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[284] *Ep.* 19 (*CPG* 5319; PG 77, 125C–128C). The critical text can be found in ACO I.1.5, 12–13 (= V 145). An English translation is given by McEnerney (1987a), 96–97.

[285] PG 77, 820D–837B. No critical text has been published yet, neither a translation into one of the modern languages.

[286] *Festal Letter* 19, 821B: 1 Cor. 15:56, Rom. 6:14, John 1:17.

[287] *Ibid.*, 821BC (2 Cor. 5:15), 821D–824A (a combination of 1 Cor. 5:7 and 2 Cor. 7:1).

for the harvest is at hand. In the second chapter, Cyril first gives an exposition of the story about the Passover lamb in Ex. 12. He argues that Christ did not abolish the law (Mt. 5:17), and that Paul calls the law 'spiritual (πνευματικός)' (Rom. 7:14). He, therefore, gives a 'spiritual' interpretation of the passage. The true lamb, which takes away the sin of the world, has been sacrificed for us, who have been called to sanctification through faith.[288] Yeast stands in the Scriptures for meanness and sin, so, the command to eat unleavened bread means to us that we should strive to get rid of ours sins, Cyril writes.[289] And that the Israelites were to eat bitter herbs indicates that we should persevere in bitter labours. The narrow road leads to life, but on the broad road pleasure (ἡδονή) leads to disgrace.

Cyril then returns to the subject of the law. He quotes Is. 8:20 (LXX): "For he has given the law as a help", and turns to Paul's discussion of the law in Rom. 7 and 8, to begin with, 7:15–17: "For I do not do what I want, but I do what I hate. If I do what I do not want to do, I agree with the law that it is good". Cyril asks whether we do not have our own will to choose what to do, and responds that sometimes pleasure enchants the mind, and we give in to the passions and do things, not voluntarily but out of weakness, which are damaging. But the Creator did not leave the human nature without help, for the law reproaches such inclinations and leads it to better things. And God gave his only-begotten Son in order to put sin to death in the flesh, having become man like us and having assumed a body out of the holy θεοτόκος Mary (829A). The Word's own body was as it were transelemented to God-befitting and ineffable purity, sin being put to death in it. As a result, we, too, are sanctified and enriched with the divine Spirit.

The third chapter is devoted to brotherly love, especially love for the poor.[290] Cyril reminds his readers that we brought nothing into this world, and that we cannot take any earthly goods with us when we die (cf. 1 Tim. 6:7). But the workers of virtue will have spiritual riches, to which the light of love for the poor belongs, and Christ promises his kingdom as inheritance. We should be like sailors who travel the wide sea, and take more than enough food and other goods with them for the journey. So, we should make sure that we have spiritual goods

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[288] *Ibid.*, 824C. Cf. John 1:29 and 1 Cor. 5:7.
[289] Cyril refers to Mt. 16:6 and 1 Cor. 5:7.
[290] Verses to which Cyril refers include Luke 6:36, Deut. 15:11, Prov. 21:13, Mt. 25: 34–36, 40, Tobit 12:9.

to take with us. Cyril also declares the objection that one would do injustice to one's own children if one gave to the poor, invalid.

In the fourth chapter, Cyril once again discusses the law of Moses. Before the Son of God became man we lived in a spiritual mist, not knowing him who is God by nature. Then he ordained the law, but the law was not able to free us from the snares of sin, nor to wash off the pollution of the transgressions. With reference to several verses from Romans, Cyril explains what the function of the law is.[291] It shows up sin, and Paul says that the law was added in order that sin would increase. The law itself is not sin, nor does it teach sin, but it shows where sin is because of our weakness, just as sunlight points out where holes are in the road. Thus, we are all made accountable to God, and we are made righteous, not by our own works, but by God's mercy. In order to render us free from punishment, the Word has become man, the free one among the slaves, the Law-Maker has come under the law, the Maker of the ages has undergone a fleshly birth in time. He renders us partakers of his own glory and sanctifies us with his own Spirit. He voluntarily sent his own body into the snares of death in order to break them, and on the third day he came to life again.

As people, then, who will be defended before his judgement seat, Cyril adds, let us cleanse our lives and hold on to the faith, having mercy on the poor, looking after widows, and in general practising love towards each other, while we renounce the passions of the flesh. After giving the date of Easter and the related periods, Cyril ends with a doxology.

7.9.2. *Terminology and Christology*

The words οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον, and their cognates are absent from this letter, as well as terms specifically related to the Nestorian controversy, like ἕνωσις, ἑνοῦν, συνάφεια, συνάπτειν, ἀξία, and αὐθεν-τία.[292] As has been mentioned, the title θεοτόκος is used once, but it does not get special attention. Φύσις occurs several times, in familiar meanings. We find the phrase 'God by nature' twice,[293] and the Word

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[291] Cyril quotes or alludes to Rom. 3:19–24; 5:20; 7:7; also Titus 3:5.
[292] The words συνάπτειν and ἀξία do occur in *Festal Letter* 19, but not in their 'technical' sense in a christological context (828B, 832A, 837A).
[293] *Festal Letter* 19, 833A, 836C.

is called "bodiless according to his own nature",[294] and "life by nature" (829A). Further, the word φύσις refers a few times to God, or to the incarnate Word, himself.[295] Once 'the human nature' stands for the human race, in a soteriological context.[296] There are two places where Cyril speaks about 'the nature of the flesh' (825C) or 'the nature of the body' (828D) in the same general sense as in 'the human nature'— meaning 'all human flesh' or 'all human bodies'—, while once φύσις in 'the nature of the flesh' refers to the COMMON NATURE of human flesh (829B).

Besides everyday usage—like 'our own heads' (824A) or 'his own yoke' (833B)—, we find the term ἴδιος in both categories: (1) in relation to what is natural, and therefore, common to more than one individual; (2) indicating what is particular for one individual. To the first category belong the expressions 'according to his own nature' (836B), 'his own Spirit' (836B), and 'his own divinity' (836D). And to the second category: 'his own blood' (821B) and 'his own body'.[297] It is interesting to see the verb 'to transelement' return in this letter: the body of the Word "was as it were transelemented (μετεστοιχειοῦτο) into God-befitting and ineffable purity, sin being put to death in it" (829A). Its meaning is the same as that in *Contra Nestorium* (see section 6.4.3), but here it is applied, not to human beings who become partakers of the divine nature, but to Christ's own body: the property 'sinful' of Christ's body is changed into 'sinless'.[298]

What little christology is found in this *Festal Letter* is fully in line with Cyril's teachings in his previous writings. And it is not a subject by itself, but it is mentioned in the service of soteriology: the Word became flesh in order to save humankind.

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[294] *Ibid.*, 836B; the Greek text in PG 77 reads σώματος, but the context suggests ἀσώματος; the Latin translation in PG 77 has *incorporeus*.

[295] *Ibid.*, 832A, 832BC; the Greek text in PG 77 contains the word φύσις twice, but the second time it reads φύσιν, where it probably should be φησίν.

[296] *Ibid.*, 828C (ἅπαν ... τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν).

[297] *Ibid.*, 836C; cf. *ibid.*, 829A (twice).

[298] In the previous sentence Cyril adds the word 'immediately (εὐθύς)': at the moment of the assumption of the flesh by the Word, this flesh was made sinless, for the incarnate Word knew no sin. As to the passions which in themselves are not sinful— such as hunger, thirst, being troubled—Cyril writes several times that the Word allowed his own flesh to yield to the laws of its own nature.

7.10. Conclusion

Although there are some differences in terminology between the writings discussed in this chapter, the general conclusion may be that their christology and language hardly deviate from those in Cyril's previous writings. Figure 2 in section 5.3.3 gives an adequate picture of Cyril's metaphysical understanding of the incarnate Word, also in these works. It is the three treatises sent to the imperial court and the *Third Letter to Nestorius* with the anathemas, which deserve more attention, since the other writings contain no or few christological statements, while these statements confirm the conclusions based on the four works mentioned.

The dyophysite language of *On the Incarnation*, written in or before 428, is retained in *Oratio ad Theodosium*, which is a later re-working of the dialogue. Also retained is the language of composition, applied, not just to the union of soul and body, but to that of the Word and his flesh as well. And although the phrase 'naturally united' is added, this is not a miaphysite expression in Cyril's writings, but it indicates that two INDIVIDUAL NATURES together form one SEPARATE REALITY, and thus it fits very well within a dyophysite framework.

In *Oratio ad augustas*, Cyril writes that in his book to 'the holy virgins'—this will be *Oratio ad dominas*—he has dealt with the easier issues regarding the incarnation in the Scriptures, while he will now discuss more complicated matters. His treatise to the princesses is the least dyophysite of all the works we have looked at. Cyril seems reluctant to use the word φύσις with respect to Christ's humanity, while it contains the μία φύσις formula in the quotation from pseudo-Athanasius (= Apollinarius). On the other hand, Cyril's explicit reason for this quotation has nothing to do with the formula, but with the fact that it contains the title θεοτόκος. Neither does he comment on the formula in any way or refer to it in the discussion following the quotations from the Fathers. The statement that we confess, "not two natures", "but one nature, the incarnate [nature] of the Word", believed to be from the authoritative Athanasius, may have induced Cyril to be cautious with dyophysite language in *Oratio ad dominas*.

In the later, deeper study, however, *Oratio ad augustas*, there is little left of this reluctance. Not only does he speak of 'natures' in the plural, he also uses the term φύσις a number of times in relation to the humanity of the incarnate Word. This applies to Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius* as well. And expressions like 'natural union' are found in these writings

in dyophysite contexts, which confirms that they should be interpreted as denoting the union of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES into one SEPARATE REALITY (and this SEPARATE REALITY is not indicated by the word φύσις).

As for ὑπόστασις, its use in *On the Incarnation* has not been altered in *Oratio ad Theodosium*, which implies that the expression 'union / united according to hypostasis' does not occur. But it is found several times in *Oratio ad dominas* and in the *Third Letter to Nestorius*, also once in the anathemas, while we encounter its counterpart 'separated according to hypostasis' in *Oratio ad augustas*. Further, Cyril writes that the hypostases should not be separated, that the sayings should not be distributed over two hypostases, regarded as existing by themselves, but rather to the one incarnate hypostasis of the Word. It is ὑπόστασις, then, which is the main technical term by which Cyril expresses the unity of Christ.

While Cyril had started to employ πρόσωπον to emphasize that Christ should not be divided into 'two persons' as early as his *Commentary on John*, and this is repeated several times in *Contra Nestorium*, where the incarnate Word is also referred to as 'one πρόσωπον', this term appeared to be ambiguous, since Nestorius also confessed that Christ was one πρόσωπον. And in Cyril's understanding, Nestorius's one πρόσωπον was two separate beings connected according to rank or sovereign power, that is, two persons. Although Cyril continues to use the word, even in his *Third Letter to Nestorius* and in the anathemas, to reject a division of Christ into two πρόσωπα, and to confess him to be one πρόσωπον, it is not surprising that he employed another term besides it to emphasize that the Christ is one, and that term is ὑπόστασις, not φύσις.

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS

Now that we have investigated Cyril of Alexandria's writings during the first two years of the Nestorian controversy, we can draw conclusions regarding the meaning of the various terms and expressions in his christology of that period. Based on this, we will also look at Cyril's christology and soteriology. Strictly speaking, the conclusions will apply to the period under investigation only, although this restriction will not be repeated too often. At times, though, extrapolations for the period after 430 will be made as well. A few passages from later works, which recur frequently in the literature on Cyril's understanding, will be discussed, while for the μία φύσις formula all its occurrences in later writings will be taken into account.

8.1. Theology and Philosophy

For Cyril of Alexandria, there are two normative sources for his theology: Scripture and the Nicene Creed (325). In his christological works he can and does draw on his tremendous knowledge of both the Old and the New Testaments, which in part he will have developed by writing commentaries on many biblical books. His paradigm for the interpretation of the Old Testament is Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 10:11: "These things have happened to them as a type (τυπικῶς); they have been written as a warning for us, over whom the end of the ages has come".[1] And just as Paul speaks with regard to the Israelites in the desert of a "spiritual rock", "which rock was the Christ" (1 Cor. 10:4), so Cyril sees many types of Christ in Old Testament passages. In his christological works, however, he bases himself mainly on the New Testament. So, the verses he comments on in *Oratio ad dominas* and in *Oratio ad augustas* all stem from the Gospels, Acts and the Epistles.

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[1] E.g., *Festal Letter* 18, PG 77, 812A. See section 5.7.1.

In the Nicene Creed, Cyril takes very seriously that it is "for us men and for our salvation" that the only-begotten Son of God came down, was incarnate, made man, suffered and rose on the third day. Therefore, the soteriological implications of a particular christological view are important to him and are mentioned many a time as an argument to accept or reject such a view. And besides biblical passages, Cyril also adduces the Creed to stress that it is the only-begotten Son of God, that is, the Word, who is the subject of the verbs 'to suffer' and 'to rise' from the dead—an important argument of his for the unity of Christ.

Philosophy, then, was for Cyril an *ancilla theologiae*. While Scripture and the Creed were the sources for theology, philosophy could be useful in the exposition and elucidation of the truth.[2] At times he accused his (Arian) opponents of placing philosophy above Scripture. But he had no qualms about using philosophical terms and concepts, if he felt that they were useful in expressing biblical truths. So, he defended the use of ὁμοούσιος against those who rejected it as a non-biblical term. Cyril frequently emphasized the incomprehensibility of God—God is even beyond substance—but in Cyril's view that does not mean that we should remain silent. Even if we see "through a mirror in enigmas" and know only "in part" (1 Cor. 13:12), we should value this knowledge in part and try to find verbal expressions of the truths we encounter in Scripture.

This also applies to 'the mystery of godliness' (1 Tim. 3:16): the mystery of the incarnation and of our salvation in and through Christ. The union of the Word and humanity is ineffable and altogether beyond understanding, but this does not imply that there are no correct and incorrect ways to speak about it. In order for our salvation to be safeguarded, the same one must be both God and man. If he were not fully God, how could he trample on death and make us partakers of the divine nature? But he also had to be fully man, for the deification of our human nature, for the change from corruption to incorruption, the resurrection from the dead, the soul's becoming stable, so that it could conquer sin—all this took place in Christ first, and from him extended to the whole nature.

As for philosophy, it is especially Aristotelian and neo-Platonic logic which plays a part in Cyril of Alexandria's theology. Induced by his

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[2] Whether Cyril could always maintain the confessed priority of Scripture is another matter. For example, Elert (1957), 33–132, argues that, although less than some

Arian opponents, he made the 'Aristotelian art' his own, and applied it to his trinitarian understanding of God. When we compare the *Thesaurus* with the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, it becomes clear that Cyril's knowledge of the intricacies of logic has improved in the later work. More important for his christology, however, is that the meanings he attaches to the terms οὐσία and φύσις are for a large part determined by the logical tradition.

Thus, both in Cyril's trinitarian and in his christological writings, οὐσία has retained meanings which are linked with Aristotle's 'primary' and 'secondary substance'. And just as in Aristotle's *Physics*, the word φύσις is mostly used for substances of living things ('living beings', plants, angels, also God) and their parts, and of the material elements (air, water, earth and fire, but also stone, bronze, etc.). While οὐσία gives a substance a place in the whole order of things, the word φύσις indicates a substance which is the source of certain operations.

8.2. The Meaning of the Terms

8.2.1. *Οὐσία*

In line with Aristotelian logic, in Cyril of Alexandria's writings οὐσία may indicate a primary or a secondary substance. Especially in the *Thesaurus*, which is probably one of Cyril's earliest works, we find instances of both meanings. In the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, however, the archbishop more clearly applies the Cappadocian distinction to the Trinity: God's unity is expressed by the terms οὐσία and φύσις, while ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον (and ὄνομα) indicate Father, Son and holy Spirit in their distinctness. Several times, Cyril adduces the one οὐσία and the various hypostases of individual men as an example of the three divine persons. From this (and other observations), it is clear that he regards the divine οὐσία more as a secondary than as a primary substance. In the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, he has become aware that this comparison makes him vulnerable to the accusation of tritheism, and therefore, he adds that the unity of the three divine hypostases is

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of his contemporaries, Cyril, too, was influenced by Greek philosophy's doctrine of God's impassibility.

stronger than that of separate human beings.[3] This is repeated in the *Commentary on John*.

In Cyril's developed trinitarian theology, then, οὐσία stands for the divine secondary substance. He regards all secondary οὐσίαι, both the divine and the created substances, not as abstract notions, but as realities. They are not ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES, but COMMON SUBSTANCES. They indicate the reality which the individuals belonging to the secondary substance have in common, that is, the differentiae, the distinctive properties by which a particular substance is distinguished from other secondary substances (for example, the properties 'rational', 'mortal' and 'receptive of intelligence and knowledge' for human beings). In this sense, every secondary substance is a unity; all individuals falling under a secondary substance are one. The unity of the Trinity, however, goes beyond this; there is not a total separation between the three divine hypostases, as there is between individual human beings, Cyril writes.

The credal word 'consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος)'—applied, not just to the Father and the Son, but to all three hypostases, also the Spirit—is understood by Cyril in this way: they share the same divine secondary substance. In his faithfulness to the Nicene Creed (325), Cyril retains and often repeats another expression from it, in which, however, the word οὐσία has a different meaning: the Son is 'out of the substance of the Father'. In this phrase, οὐσία does not refer to the secondary substance which Father, Son and Spirit have in common, but it denotes the hypostasis of the Father and, therefore, in this exceptional case the meaning of οὐσία is closer to primary substance.

In christology, the Alexandrian archbishop hardly employs the term οὐσία. When we encounter the word and its cognates in his christological works, they are usually used in ways similar to those in his anti-Arian writings. That is, they refer to οὐσία in the sense of COMMON SUBSTANCE—the phrase 'out of the substance of the Father' again being the exception. There is, however, one noteworthy usage of ὁμοούσιος in Cyril's christology. To stress that Christ is not a man, consubstantial to us, besides the Word of God, he writes that it is better to say that the Word, who is consubstantial to the Father, has also become

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[3] In fact, his reasoning in *Dial. Trin.* VI, 592b–d, does not include the holy Spirit yet. Cyril speaks of the Father and the Son, and argues that if they were separated from each other like two human beings, there would be two gods.

consubstantial with us. Within the framework of Cyril's metaphysics, this implies that the incarnate Word shares in both the divine COMMON SUBSTANCE and the human COMMON SUBSTANCE.

In order to understand the way in which Cyril of Alexandria speaks about Christ's properties, it is important to know how he describes the metaphysical relationship between a substance and its properties. He often applies metaphors of place for this: properties are 'attached to (προσεῖναι)', they 'exist in (ἐνυπάρχειν)', they 'lie (κεῖσθαι)' 'round (περί)' or 'in (ἐν)', or they 'inhere (ἐνεῖναι)' substances. He clearly distinguishes between the substances themselves and the properties that are attached to them. Only the differentiae are part of the substance itself, all the other properties are attached to the substance, but are not regarded as part of the substance.

Another important notion is 'natural properties', or properties that are attached to a substance 'substantially (οὐσιωδῶς)', 'naturally (φυσικῶς)' or 'by nature (κατὰ φύσιν)'. These include all the characteristics which are not separable accidents: the propria and the inseparable attributes. The natural properties are attached to the COMMON SUBSTANCE, but also to the individuals that fall under the COMMON SUBSTANCE. The separable accidents are attached to individuals only, not to secondary substances.

According to Cyril, God is really beyond substance, but we may know him 'in part' and we may speak about him as if he is a substance. Then, God's substance is incomprehensible, and our knowledge pertains to some of his natural properties, such as: God is holy, he is just, immortal, invisible, uncreated. These characteristics apply equally to the Father, the Son and the holy Spirit.

When Christ is said to be consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us, this implies that both sets of natural properties, the divine and the human ones, are attached to the incarnate Word. Emmanuel is both invisible as God and visible as man. He is impassible divinely, while he may suffer in the flesh.

8.2.2. Ὑπόστασις

The word ὑπόστασις was not a technical term in Aristotelian or neo-Platonic logic, nor was there another well-defined framework in which it functioned and from which Cyril of Alexandria borrowed it, although its usage by the Fathers will undoubtedly have influenced the archbishop. As a result, the meaning of ὑπόστασις has to be gleaned from

Cyril's own writings. Foundational to the sense of ὑπόστασις appears to be real existence. If something is a hypostasis, it exists in reality.

Another notion which is virtually always present is that this real existence pertains to something which belongs to the Aristotelian category of substance, and that a hypostasis can, therefore, exist by itself. This is emphasized in the *Thesaurus*, where the divine Word is called a hypostasis, which exists by itself, over against human words and the human will, which can only exist in dependence on a human being. This is also expressed by the terms ἐνυπόστατος and ἀνυπόστατος: the divine Word is ἐνυπόστατος, while human words are ἀνυπόστατος, that is, not non-existent, but existing in dependence on a substance. The word ὑπόστασις denotes the real and independent existence of a substance, without referring to its essence.

In the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, we also find the difference between hypostatic existence and the dependent existence of properties. But here, the distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in trinitarian theology is more clearly delineated. While οὐσία (as well as φύσις) indicates that which is common, ὑπόστασις (as well as πρόσωπον) indicates the relatively separate existence of Father, Son and holy Spirit.

In Cyril's oldest christological work, *On the Incarnation*, ὑπόστασις and its cognates are not employed for the incarnate Word, but only with reference to the Word before the incarnation. We find the same usage of ἐνυπόστατος and ἀνυπόστατος that we encountered in the *Thesaurus*: something which exists by itself is ἐνυπόστατος, a property which exists in dependence on a substance is ἀνυπόστατος. Now, the corresponding verb ὑφεστάναι is used almost synonymously with ὑπάρχειν, thus meaning 'to exist in reality'. When separate, independent existence is indicated, a qualifying term is added: 'in a hypostasis by itself (καθ' ἑαυτόν)'. And he who has come forth from the Father is said to be 'according to his own hypostasis (κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν)'.

In the christological writings of the first year of the Nestorian controversy, ὑπόστασις and its cognates hardly appear. When they do, it is in trinitarian contexts in which ὑπόστασις indicates the relatively individual existence of the divine persons. With Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*, the archbishop introduces the term into christology.[4] Four times the expression 'union / united according to hypostasis (ἕνωσιν

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[4] Properly speaking, Cyril *re*-introduces the term ὑπόστασις into christology, since it had been dropped after the Apollinarian controversy. See section 5.8.2.1, and Richard (1945), 243f.

/ ἑνώσας / ἑνωθεὶς καθ' ὑπόστασιν)' is used. Similar phrases occur as many as twenty-one times in *Contra Nestorium*, five times in *Oratio ad dominas*, four times in Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*, and once in the anathemas, while its counterpart 'separated according to hypostasis' is found in *Oratio ad augustas*. One may conclude that 'union / united according to hypostasis' is Cyril of Alexandria's favourite christological expression during the second year of the Nestorian controversy.

It has been argued in the previous chapters that by this phrase Cyril wants to emphasize two things: (1) the Word and his flesh come together in a *real* union; (2) this union results in one SEPARATE REALITY. Twice, Cyril actually calls this one SEPARATE REALITY 'one hypostasis, the incarnate [hypostasis] of the Word', once in *Contra Nestorium*, and once in his *Third Letter to Nestorius*. The meaning of the term ὑπόστασις in this expression is itself SEPARATE REALITY. It is the meaning that Lebon also attaches to the word in a christological context: an individual being, without any reference to its essence. Although several times ὑπόστασις is juxtaposed to πρόσωπον, this does not make the two terms synonyms. Each retains its own meaning; they complement one another, as will be argued in the next section. Thus, ὑπόστασις does not take on the meaning of 'person', a rational being, capable of communication with other rational beings, let alone that of a METAPHYSICAL PERSON, who is a bearer of two individual natures, at another metaphysical level than these natures.

More often than stating that the incarnate Word is one hypostasis, Cyril writes that Christ should not be separated into two (distinct) hypostases. We find this seven times in *Contra Nestorium*, once in *Oratio ad augustas*, and twice in the anathemas. By these statements Cyril rejects the division of the one Christ into two SEPARATE REALITIES. The word ὑπόστασις has its usual meaning of INDIVIDUAL REALITY, and in a pregnant sense: SEPARATE REALITY.

8.2.3. *Πρόσωπον*

Throughout his writings, Cyril of Alexandria quotes and alludes to biblical verses containing the word πρόσωπον in the meaning of 'face', but in his own language the term denotes a 'person', a rational being, capable of communication with other such beings, capable of a personal relation. A 'person' may exist in reality, or occur in a text, or both. For Cyril, it is important that a person acts as a unity towards the world outside. He is hardly interested in the inner make-up of a

person. Therefore, when Christ is called 'one person', this means that all the sayings, acts and passions, whether divine or human, are to be attributed, not only to one GRAMMATICAL PERSON, but also to one ONTO-LOGICAL PERSON, who is one hypostasis, one SEPARATE REALITY. Some of the sayings and acts apply to Christ as God, others, and the passions, apply to him as man. But Cyril does not ask the question what the role of Christ's human will is.

In the *Thesaurus*, we encounter an isolated case where the incarnate Word is already indicated by the word πρόσωπον. Cyril speaks of 'the πρόσωπον of his inhumanation', round which lie the words fitting to a slave. That is, the words that indicate Christ's human sayings, acts and passions, do not apply to the Word before the incarnation, to his divine nature, but only after he had become man. In the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, more often than in the *Thesaurus*, πρόσωπον is employed to denote the three persons of the Trinity, besides the words ὑπόστασις and ὄνομα. While ὑπόστασις denotes the relatively separate existence of Father, Son and holy Spirit, πρόσωπον indicates that they have external, personal relations with each other.

In the *Commentary on John*, πρόσωπον starts to function in a christo-logical context, in opposition to a dualist christology, at a time when Nestorius had not become archbishop of Constantinople yet. Twice, Cyril writes that Christ is not to be severed into two πρόσωπα. It is clear from the context that he does not just have GRAMMATICAL PERSONS in mind. For Cyril, the incarnate Word is ontologically one Son, not two persons. In *On the Incarnation*, he says the same thing, now using the term διπρόσωπον.

During the first year of the controversy, up to and including his *Second Letter to Nestorius*, Cyril uses πρόσωπον several times to describe a view which he rejects. In the *Letter to the Apocrisiaries*, he states that his opponents allow 'a union of πρόσωπα only'. And in the *Second Letter to Nestorius*, he repudiates three ways of speaking: 'the assumption προσώπου only', 'a union προσώπων', and 'the Word united himself to the πρόσωπον of a human being'. In each of these cases, Cyril understands this as an external union between two separate persons, which he regards as insufficient for the unity of the incarnate Word.

In *Contra Nestorium*, Cyril repeats a number of times that Christ should not be divided into two persons, but this time he juxtaposes the word 'hypostasis'. This may have to do with the ambiguity of the word πρόσωπον, which may denote a GRAMMATICAL PERSON as well as an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. And as he argues in *Oratio ad augustas*, we

sometimes speak of two GRAMMATICAL PERSONS (such as a man and his spirit), while there is only one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON. By adding that the incarnate Word is not to be severed into two hypostases, often with the addition of 'by themselves' or 'separately', Cyril makes it quite clear that he has two SEPARATE REALITIES in mind. Christ is not a man who has an external relation with the Word of God.

What is new in the five Books against Nestorius, is the use of πρόσωπον to affirm Cyril's own understanding of the incarnation. While he writes that Christ is 'one nature' and 'one hypostasis', each only once, he speaks five times of the 'one person' of the incarnate Word, while in a sixth instance he mentions 'the person of Emmanuel' as a matter of course. Several times this has to do with the attribution of sayings: both the divine and the human sayings should be attributed to one person. The primary meaning of πρόσωπον in those cases is GRAMMATICAL PERSON, but in the whole context of Cyril's dispute with Nestorius, it is obvious that one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON is implied. Although Christ speaks and acts one time as God, another time as man, he nevertheless is one person, one individual, rational being, who communicates with other persons as one. Twice, it is clear that Cyril regards the *result* of the union as 'one person'. He does not employ πρόσωπον for the Word before the incarnation, and thus, the term does not indicate that the Word has remained the same when he assumed the flesh. It does *not* denote a METAPHYSICAL PERSON who already bore a divine nature, and now also has become the bearer of a human nature.

The affirmative usage of 'one πρόσωπον' might have gained momentum in Cyril's christology, were it not that Nestorius also spoke of Christ as 'one πρόσωπον', and the Alexandrian archbishop interpreted his counterpart's 'one πρόσωπον' as indicating two persons. Therefore, at the height of the controversy the term was too equivocal to become a cornerstone in Cyril of Alexandria's christological vocabulary. Even so, we find the language of *Contra Nestorium* also in Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius* and in the anathemas: the sayings should not be divided over two hypostases or persons, but they should be attributed to one person, to the one incarnate hypostasis of the Word. And even in one of his last writings, *On the Unity of Christ*, this language returns.[5]

The three *Orationes* differ remarkably from one another with respect to the use of πρόσωπον. The expressions in which the term occurs

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[5] Cyril of Alexandria, *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 740c, 758a, 759e, 778ab.

in *On the Incarnation* have not been altered in *Oratio ad Theodosium*. In *Oratio ad dominas*, we find new phrases attributed to Cyril's opponents, like 'a union ἐν προσώποις only', and once he speaks of 'the person of Christ'. And although the word is relatively frequent in *Oratio ad augustas*, Cyril does not employ it to describe the christology of himself or of his opponents.

8.2.4. *Φύσις*

Like οὐσία, the meaning of φύσις in Cyril of Alexandria's writings has for an important part been informed by the logical tradition. Both terms and their cognates often occur side by side as to some extent synonymous. As was mentioned in section 8.1, φύσις usually refers to a substance with its own principle of operation. It is, therefore, especially used for living things, for the four elements, and for other materials. And just as οὐσία may refer either to a COMMON SUBSTANCE or to an INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE, so φύσις may refer to a COMMON NATURE or to an INDIVIDUAL NATURE. But beyond this, φύσις may also stand for all the individuals that belong to a particular COMMON NATURE together. So, especially in soteriological contexts, 'the human nature (ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις)' often signifies all human beings combined. And 'the divine nature' may denote the whole Trinity of Father, Son and holy Spirit, and is at times interchangeable with 'God'.

Natural properties—the propria and the inseparable attributes— are said to be attached to a substance 'substantially (οὐσιωδῶς)' and 'according to substance (κατ᾽ οὐσίαν)', but also 'naturally (φυσικῶς)' or 'by nature (κατὰ φύσιν or φύσει)'. The whole set of natural properties is sometimes called 'natural quality (ποιότης φυσική)'. 'By nature (κατὰ φύσιν)' may also indicate the natural process by which the secondary substance of a living being is transmitted from one generation to the next. Cyril uses this for the divine persons as well. Thus, the expressions 'Father by nature' and 'Son by nature' indicate that God the Father 'begot' the divine Son in such a way that the Son's secondary substance is the same as that of the Father; they are consubstantial. By contrast, when human beings are called 'sons of God' they are not sons by nature, but sons by grace and sons by participation.

This study has shown that the previous two paragraphs sum up Cyril of Alexandria's basic usage of the term φύσις, not just in the trinitarian writings, but also in his christological works, at least until the end of the year 430. Also in christological contexts, in the vast

majority of cases where φύσις occurs in the singular, there is a reference to the essence or to the natural properties of the nature. For example, the divinity of the Word "is woven together with the flesh or our nature, which perfectly possesses its own principle".[6] Or, the incarnate Word has been anointed, not "according to his own nature (κατ᾽ ἰδίαν φύσιν)", but the anointing happened to him "with regard to that which is human".[7] In these cases, the sense of φύσις cannot be a SEPARATE REALITY, an individual being, existing by itself, without any reference to its essence—the meaning which Lebon attaches to φύσις in Cyril's christology—,[8] but it is either a COMMON NATURE or an INDIVIDUAL NATURE. And also in the few instances where there is no reference to the essence or the natural properties, the statement makes sense when φύσις is understood as INDIVIDUAL NATURE (or COMMON NATURE).

When φύσις occurs in the plural in affirmative christological statements, it cannot designate a SEPARATE REALITY either, for otherwise the human element in Christ would be regarded as separately existing, before or after the coming together of the elements (or both), and this is an understanding which Cyril constantly repudiates.[9] So, for example, "some coming together and concurrence beyond understanding into union has been brought about of unequal and dissimilar natures (φύσεων)".[10] Or,

> confess, therefore, [that he is] one, not dividing the natures, at the same time knowing and thinking that the principle of the flesh is one thing, while that of divinity is [another,] fitting to it alone.[11]

If these natures (or at least the human nature) cannot be SEPARATE REALITIES, what are they? They are either COMMON NATURES or INDIVID-

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[6] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 2$^{151–152}$ (p. 272); see chapter 5, n. 141. The addition "which perfectly possesses its own principle" refers to the human nature's secondary substance. This is also one of a number of instances where the human element in Christ is called a φύσις.

[7] *Contra Nestorium* II.2, ACO I.1.6, 37$^{7–9}$. The Word's divine ('his own') nature is mentioned here, not as an individual being, but the divine and the human secondary substances are compared: the anointing does not apply to the divinity, but to the humanity.

[8] Lebon (1909). See section 4.4.1, esp. n. 102.

[9] An alternative explanation is that of Lebon: the word φύσις does mean a SEPARATE REALITY, but the two natures are regarded 'in contemplation only'; in reality, there is only one nature. The notion of 'in contemplation only' is discussed in section 8.4.

[10] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 688d. Literally the same in *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 52$^{22f.}$.

[11] *Contra Nestorium* II.8, ACO I.1.6, 46$^{31–33}$. See also *Second Letter to Nestorius* (*ep.* 4), ACO I.1.1, 27$^{1–3}$ (see section 5.8.2.3).

UAL NATURES. In Cyril's metaphysics, there is always an ontological link between a COMMON NATURE and the INDIVIDUAL NATURES that fall under it. The COMMON NATURE is not abstract, but by itself a reality, which is manifested in the INDIVIDUAL NATURES. In each of the individual human beings the natural properties of the COMMON NATURE 'man' can be perceived: differentiae like 'rational', 'mortal', 'receptive of intelligence and knowledge', but also a proprium like 'being capable of laughing', and inseparable attributes like 'two-footed'.[12] It is only by their separable accidents that individuals differ from each other. Because of their interrelationship, it is not always possible (or also necessary) to choose whether φύσις in a particular sentence means COMMON NATURE or INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

But there are cases where such a choice is possible and should be made. So, in trinitarian contexts Cyril usually places the one divine φύσις over against the three hypostases, and therefore it must denote the COMMON NATURE of the Trinity. When the Word is said to have assumed the same nature like ours,[13] it also seems to imply that the assumed nature is the human COMMON NATURE. Also when the coming together of the Word with human nature is regarded as a process, rather than as the result, this human φύσις may be understood as the human COMMON NATURE. At the same time it is quite clear from expressions like 'his own flesh, and not that of another',[14] that Christ is regarded as a human individual. And thus, when the unity with human nature is regarded as the result rather than the process, the human φύσις is a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE. The interplay between Christ's human INDIVIDUAL NATURE and the COMMON NATURE of humankind will be further discussed in section 8.6 on soteriology.

There are several places where φύσις must denote the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of Christ. For example, in *On the Incarnation*, he writes: "The nature (φύσις) of the Word, having assumed that which is human, ..., preserves his God-befitting reputation".[15] Since concreteness ('having assumed') and a reference to a natural property ('his God-befitting

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[12] For Aristotle, 'two-footed' is a differentia of man, but Cyril follows Porphyry's definition of man, 'rational, mortal living being, receptive of intelligence and knowledge', and then 'two-footed' is an inseparable attribute. See sections 2.3 and 2.4.

[13] *In Jo.* VI.1, vol. 2, 232 (653c): τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῖν φύσιν ἀναλαβών.

[14] See chapter 3, n. 242.

[15] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 701d. In *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 63[6–8], the word 'reputation' (εὐκλείας)' has been replaced by 'transcendence (ὑπεροχῆς)', otherwise the sentence has remained the same.

reputation') are combined, this φύσις is not a SEPARATE REALITY, but rather an INDIVIDUAL NATURE. Since it is only the Son who has assumed humanity, it cannot be the COMMON NATURE of the three divine hypostases. A similar argumentation applies to a passage in *Oratio ad dominas*: "The nature which gives life to all things (for he appeared as life out of the life of the Father) ... took hold of Abraham's seed".[16] This nature is clearly the Son's only, and therefore, cannot denote the divine COMMON NATURE. And since there is a reference to a natural property ('which gives life') it is an INDIVIDUAL NATURE rather than a SEPARATE REALITY.

There is a passage in *Contra Theodoretum* which again and again is adduced as evidence that Cyril would use φύσις in christological contexts in the sense of 'individual', that is, SEPARATE REALITY, or as person, PERSON.[17] When defending his introduction of the phrase 'union according to hypostasis' Cyril writes:

> 'According to hypostasis' indicates nothing else than only that the nature or the hypostasis of the Word, that is (ὅ ἐστιν), the Word himself, having really been united to the [or: a] human nature without any change and confusion, as we have said many times, is conceived of as and is one Christ, the same one God and man.[18]

From the juxtaposition of 'nature', 'hypostasis' and 'the Word himself', it is concluded that the three are more or less synonymous, so that both φύσις and ὑπόστασις would indicate the individual which the Word is. First of all, it should be noted that the phrase which connects 'the nature or the hypostasis of the Word' with 'the Word himself' is ὅ ἐστιν, 'that is', not ἥ ἐστιν, 'which is'. The expression ὅ ἐστιν, which is akin to the much more frequent τουτέστιν, means 'that is', *id est*, and denotes a much looser connection than the phrase with the relative pronoun ἥ. It does not indicate that the terms it joins are synonymous, but it rather means something like 'in other words'.[19] Moreover, in this sentence the word φύσις is not just employed for the nature of the Word, but also for the human nature, which can certainly not refer to a human individual, for that would imply the sort of external relation with the Word of which Cyril accuses Nestorius. It makes more

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[16] *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 63[17–24].

[17] For example, Lebon (1909), 312; Jugie (1912), 25; Karmiris (1964–1965), 64; Norris (1975), 263; McGuckin (1994), 209.

[18] *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 115[12–16].

[19] Other examples of this usage of ὅ ἐστιν include: *Thesaurus*, PG 75, 153A: "him who is God by nature, that is (ὅπερ ἐστιν), the Son"; *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 37[18f.]: the fulness dwells in him "bodily, that is (ὅ ἐστιν), substantially".

sense, therefore, to interpret φύσις in 'the nature of the Word' as the Word's divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE, and in 'human nature' as the human COMMON NATURE (or possibly as Christ's human INDIVIDUAL NATURE).

The difference between Cyril of Alexandria's usage of the term φύσις in trinitarian and christological contexts, then, is not that in the first case it refers to a COMMON NATURE, while in the second case it refers to a SEPARATE REALITY. The difference is much more subtle than that. Because of its association with οὐσία and its background in the logical tradition, φύσις may indicate a COMMON NATURE and an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, which are closely linked. From the Fathers in the fourth century, however, Cyril inherited the trinitarian vocabulary, which he most expressly states in the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, but which recurs in trinitarian passages in his christological works. That is, φύσις and οὐσία denote what Father, Son and holy Spirit have in common, while ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον and ὄνομα are used for each of them individually.

A tension occurs when in christological passages,—in line with his more general usage of the term—Cyril continues to employ φύσις also for the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Son. Then, φύσις does not refer to the divine COMMON NATURE, but to one of the three hypostases. Because of the close relationship between a COMMON NATURE and the INDIVIDUAL NATURES that fall under it in Cyril's metaphysics, one could say that the divine COMMON NATURE becomes manifest in the INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Son.[20] But even so, his use of φύσις for the divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE of the Son does not fit well with the distinction he makes between 'nature' and 'hypostasis' in his trinitarian writings.[21]

When the natures in Christ are spoken of in relation to the unity which is the result, rather than the process, of the coming together of the Word with his flesh, they must indicate INDIVIDUAL NATURES. This implies not only a divine INDIVIDUAL NATURE in Christ, but also a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE. In various places, the existence of such a human INDIVIDUAL NATURE in the incarnate Word is made more

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[20] One way in which Cyril expresses this is by stating that things that are different by nature have a different 'operation (ἐνέργεια)', while things that are consubstantial—like the Father and the Son—have the same 'operation'. See *Thesaurus*, 241B, 453BC; *Dial. Trin.* III, 468bc, 483c.

[21] A clear example of the distinction of the terms can be found in *Dial. Trin.* VI, 620e–621a: "I said that, since there exist three hypostases, by themselves and at the same time attached to each other as in one nature of divinity, the operation of one person may be said to be of the whole substance as well as of each hypostasis separately".

explicit. Especially in *Festal Letter* 17, from the beginning of the Nestorian controversy, Cyril employs the word φύσις several times in relation to Christ's humanity. Mostly, it can be interpreted as the human COM-MON NATURE, which is assumed by the Word. But in one instance it clearly indicates his human INDIVIDUAL NATURE, when he writes: "But, as I said, he was also in the humanity God, allowing the nature like ours to move (ἔρχεσθαι) according to its own laws".[22] The Word allowed his human INDIVIDUAL NATURE to grow in knowledge.

Similarly, Cyril asks in *Oratio ad Theodosium*: "Or shall we do something praiseworthy by attributing that which is petty among the sayings to the humanity and to the measure of the nature (φύσεως) like ours?"[23] Here, the 'petty' sayings are ascribed to Christ's humanity, in the description of which the word φύσις is used.

In all the christological writings studied in the previous chapters, with the possible exception of *Oratio ad dominas*, dyophysite language dominates. There is hardly any miaphysite terminology to be found before the end of the year 430. This will be discussed in section 8.3.

8.2.5. Ἴδιος

Both in Cyril of Alexandria's trinitarian works and in his christological works up to and including the year 430, the word ἴδιος is used for natural as well as for particular relations. It is applied to three main sorts of natural relations:

(1) In the expression 'own nature (ἰδία φύσις)', which is usually employed in relation to certain qualities, so that it is not the individual existence which is indicated by it, but the nature with its natural properties, which are shared by more than one individual. For example, 'the Word did not suffer in his own nature', or 'as far as its own nature is concerned, the flesh is corruptible'.

(2) For natural properties, which an individual has in common with other individuals of the same nature. Especially, for the divine properties of the Word, which also pertain to the Father and the Spirit: 'his own glory', 'his own majesty', 'his own riches'.

(3) For the relationship between a parent and his/her offspring, who have the same nature. When Cyril applies ἴδιος for the inner-

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[22] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 2[126–129] (p. 270). See further section 5.4.2.2.

[23] *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 59[17–20]. Cf. *On the Incarnation*, 697ab. See chapter 7, n. 61.

trinitarian relations he wants to express by this that the divine hypostases are connatural, consubstantial: 'his own Son', 'his own Father', 'his own Spirit'.

Particularity is denoted by ἴδιος when, for example, the body of a human being is called 'his soul's own'. But in his christology, Cyril uses it especially to emphasize the unity of the incarnate Word. When he speaks of the Word's 'own flesh', 'own body', 'own soul', 'own blood', his intention is to stress that it is not the flesh, body, soul, blood, of another besides the Word of God. The union between the Logos and his flesh is so strong—according to hypostasis—that it is his 'own' flesh. While his divine properties are the Word's own by nature, he 'has made his own' (ἴδιον ποιήσασθαι) the flesh. And with the flesh he has 'appropriated' (οἰκειοῦσθαι) the things of the flesh, like his human birth, the sufferings, his death on the cross.

8.2.6. Ἕνωσις and Συνάφεια

During the first two years of the Nestorian controversy, Cyril of Alexandria's own understanding of the relationship between the Word and his flesh is usually expressed by the noun ἕνωσις (union) and the verb ἑνοῦν (to unite), while Nestorius's view is rendered by the terms συνάφεια (connection) and συνάπτειν (to connect). In *Contra Nestorium*, Cyril makes it clear that it is not the words as such which are important, but the underlying conceptions (see section 6.3.6). Even so, in his *Third Letter to Nestorius* he goes so far as to write that he rejects the noun συνάφεια, because it insufficiently signifies the union (ἕνωσις).[24]

8.3. Miaphysite Terminology

The amount of miaphysite language in Cyril of Alexandria's christology is often rather overrated.[25] A first reason for this is that ὑπόστασις (and to a lesser extent also πρόσωπον) are often regarded as synonymous

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[24] *Ep.* 17, ACO I.1.1, 36[19f.].

[25] For example, de Halleux (1993a), 426: "En définitive, le dyophysisme cyrillien n'intervient donc qu'à titre de réflexe, second et défensif, sur l'horizon d'un mono-physisme foncier et spontané". Wessel (2004) refers consistently throughout her book to the 'dual-nature' christology of Nestorius and the Antiochenes, and to the 'single-nature' christology of Cyril. Just one example: the emperor was "seeming to favour at

with φύσις in Cyril's christology, so that expressions like 'the one incarnate hypostasis of the Word' and even 'union according to hypostasis' are then considered to belong to miaphysite language.[26] This study has shown, however, that the meaning of ὑπόστασις (and πρόσωπον) and φύσις differs so much that they cannot be regarded as synonyms. When the incarnate Word is called 'one hypostasis', this indicates that he is one SEPARATE REALITY, not two, without any reference to substantial properties. Also the expressions 'union / united according to hypostasis' have no other intention than to stress that the result of the incarnation is one SEPARATE REALITY. This can very well go—and actually does go—together with two-nature language.[27]

A second set of expressions which are at times incorrectly considered to be miaphysite are 'natural union', 'natural unity', and the like.[28] Rather than indicating that such a union or unity concerns 'one nature', they mean to say that there is a union or unity of two natures, of two entities in the Aristotelian category of substance.[29] By themselves, these expressions belong to dyophysite language, and the result of a 'natural union' is not called 'one nature'. The expressions are not found in the letters Cyril wrote to give account of his reunion with the Orientals to the partisans of his own party, in which the μία φύσις formula occurs a number of times.[30] Neither does Theodoret of Cyrus

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one time the single-nature doctrine that Cyril and his followers proposed at the majority council, and at another, the dual-nature christological views held by the Eastern bishops" (p. 259).

[26] Joseph Lebon is, of course, the one who has strongly promoted this way of thinking. Meunier (1997), 258, n. 9, also regards the terms as synonymous. See chapter 7, n. 262. And he calls various expressions 'embryonic forms' of the μία φύσις formula (p. 256).

[27] Immediately following the sentence in which Cyril speaks of 'one incarnate hypostasis of the Word' in *Contra Nestorium* II.8, ACO I.1.6, 46[29], he writes: "Therefore confess one [subject], not dividing the natures". See also *CN* I.4, 23[19–21]: "the argumentation that the natures must be connected with each other, not according to hypostasis"; II.8, 45[33–37]: "cease to divide the natures after the union, for it is fitting to know that the divine and the human nature[s] are one and another, for …, but with respect to Christ, the Saviour of us all, having brought [them] together into a true union, according to hypostasis, reject division".

[28] For example, Grillmeier, *CCT* II/2, 107, 276, 460 (*JdChr* II/2, 112, 291, 481), links the 'unio in natura et secundum naturam' with μία φύσις. And Meunier (1997), 258, considers 'united according to nature' to be an 'embryonic form' of the μία φύσις formula.

[29] See sections 5.4.2.2, 6.4.3 and 7.7.1.2.

[30] *Epp.* 40 (*Letter to Acacius of Melitene*), 44 (*Letter to Eulogius*), 45 (*First Letter to Succensus*), and 46 (*Second Letter to Succensus*). Grillmeier, *CCT* II/2, 460 (*JdChr* II/2, 481), incorrectly

relate 'natural union' in the third anathema to μία φύσις. His point is that 'natural' would imply necessity.[31] The same argument is forwarded by Andrew of Samosata, who does ask: "Why, then, forgetting his own [words: about two hypostases] does he [Cyril] gather together the natures into one hypostasis, mixing them".[32] In the third anathema, before he mentions the 'natural union', Cyril writes: "If anyone divides the hypostases with respect to the one Christ after the union, ..." Andrew refers to this and speaks about 'one hypostasis', not 'one nature'.

In his response to Andrew's criticism, Cyril himself explains that by 'natural union' he means 'true union'.[33] In other words, a union which results in one SEPARATE REALITY. And he adds:

> Therefore, not confusing the natures, nor mixing them with each other, as the opponents say, we say that the union is natural, but we maintain everywhere that out of two unlike realities (πραγμάτων), divinity and humanity, the one Christ and Son and Lord has come about.[34]

The logic of a 'natural union', then, is that out of two unlike realities one entity, one Christ, results. The logic of a 'natural union' is not that it results in 'one nature'.

A third, and probably the most important, reason why Cyril is often depicted as a miaphysite theologian is the self-perpetuating myth that the μία φύσις formula would be his favourite formula, which he employed many times. We find this over and over again in the literature on the archbishop.[35] There are, however, counter-voices. Jouassard,

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translates *ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 160^5–7: "although in the concept of composition the difference of the things, which are brought together *according to nature*, is expressed at the same time". The Greek reads: κἂν τοῖς τῆς συνθέσεως λόγοις ἐνυπάρχῃ τὸ διάφορον κατὰ φύσιν τῶν εἰς ἑνότητα συγκεκομισμένων. Κατὰ φύσιν belongs to τὸ διάφορον, not to συγκεκομισμένων. Therefore, the translation should read: "although the difference by nature of the things that have come together into unity exists in the logic of the composition". Cf. McGuckin (1994), 361, and Wickham (1983), 89.

[31] *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 117^3–6.
[32] *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 38^5–7.
[33] *Ibid.*, 40^21f.
[34] *Ibid.*, 40^25–28.
[35] Just a few examples, over a span of more than a century. According to Loofs (1887), 42, the formula can be found "sehr häufig" in Cyril's writings. Moeller (1944–1945), 75, says: "Cyrille parle sans cesse de 'l'*unique* nature incarnée de Dieu le Verbe', tandis que Théodoret ne connaît que '*deux* natures en une seule personne'". Kelly (1985), 329, calls 'one nature' and 'hypostatic union' Cyril's "favourite expressions". Gray (1979), 14, states that the formula is "the most characteristically Cyrillian way of expressing the traditional faith in such a union". Weinandy (2003) speaks of Cyril's

already in his article on Cyril's 'fundamental intuition' in 1953, writes that the archbishop "rallied behind" the μία φύσις formula, "probably because of the origin which he attributed to it" (Athanasius), but he adds:

> [he rallied behind it] rather late, it cannot be repeated often enough, also that this formula is by no means what inspired his christology, as so many people have thought who have voiced an opinion about it.[36]

Unfortunately, Jouassard wrote this in a footnote, and he did not repeat it often, as he himself suggested.[37] McGuckin writes about the formula: "In situ, in the context of all his work, the phrase merges unremarkably with a number of other idioms, analogies, and suggested similes",[38] although elsewhere he calls it a "favorite phrase" of Cyril's.[39]

And although Meunier regards ὑπόστασις and φύσις as (in a number of cases) synonymous, and he sees in 'united according to hypostasis' one of the embryonic forms of the μία φύσις formula, he nevertheless writes, with a reference to Jouassard:

> We know that this formula appeared rather late in the texts of the controversy. … Even if the formula quite obviously has a prehistory in our author's own thinking [the 'embryonic forms'] (would he have adopted it so quickly without this?), in the end it is present in a rather restricted corpus.[40]

How often does Cyril of Alexandria actually employ the μία φύσις formula? In the writings of the first two years of the Nestorian controversy we encounter it two times only, once in *Contra Nestorium*, and once in a quotation in *Oratio ad dominas*. In comparison, 'union / unite(d) according to hypostasis' is found seventeen times in *Contra Nestorium* alone

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"championing the *mia physis* formula", and adds that he "clung to it with such tenacity" (p. 32), and that "he loved it" (p. 40).

[36] Jouassard (1953). On p. 184 he writes: "Vienne un jour qu'il rencontre sous la plume, comme il croit, de saint Athanase, la fameuse formule: μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, il s'y ralliera", to which he adds in n. 4: "Tardivement, on ne saurait assez le répéter, et que cette formule n'est aucunement celle qui a inspiré sa christologie, quoi qu'aient pensé tant de gens qui se sont prononcé sur elle".

[37] Jouassard (1956) does refer to this note in two other footnotes: p. 240, n. 20, and p. 242, n. 25.

[38] McGuckin (1994), 194.

[39] McGuckin (1995), 45.

[40] Meunier (1997), 256 (for 'united according to hypostasis' as one of the 'embryonic forms' see p. 257). Cyril's adoption of the formula is due, not to 'embryonic forms', but to the fact that he regarded it sanctioned by Athanasius. This adoption was not quick, as Meunier himself writes, but slow.

(plus four times 'according to hypostasis' with other nouns or verbs), four times in the *Second Letter to Nestorius*, five times in *Oratio ad dominas* (plus once 'according to hypostasis' with another phrase), four times in the *Third Letter to Nestorius*, once in the anathemas (and once 'separated according to hypostasis' in *Oratio ad augustas*). Therefore, at this stage of the controversy, Cyril's 'favourite phrase' is 'union / unite(d) according to hypostasis', certainly not the μία φύσις formula. However, after Theodoret attacked the expression 'union / unite(d) according to hypostasis' as an innovation, Cyril dropped it altogether.[41]

It may be added that in *Oratio ad dominas*, the μία φύσις formula is found in a quotation from Apollinarius's *Letter to Jovian*, which Cyril thought to be written by Athanasius. His explicit reason for this quotation is the occurrence of the epithet *theotokos*, not that it contains the formula. He does not in any way refer to or discuss the formula. In the one time that he speaks of 'one nature, the incarnate [nature] of the Word himself' in *Contra Nestorium*, it is immediately followed by the analogy of soul and body. Therefore, it should be interpreted in light of this comparison.

Before the reunion with the Orientals in 433, there is only one other work of Cyril's in which he speaks of 'one nature' in a christological context,[42] *Contra Orientales*.[43] We find the same quotation of pseudo-Athanasius which we also encountered in *Oratio ad dominas*, now in Cyril's defence of the eighth anathema, which states that Emmanuel should be honoured with one worship.[44] Obviously, the reason for

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[41] In *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 114–115, it is found in the quotation of the second anathema (1), in Theodoret's objection to this anathema and to the expression 'union according to hypostasis' (3), and in Cyril's defence of the anathema (3). It also occurs three times in his *Commentary on Hebrews*, which may have been written during the first years of the Nestorian controversy. Beyond that, we only encounter it in the quotation of the second anathema in Cyril's *Explanation of the Twelve Chapters*. It is absent from *Contra Orientales* (which does not contain an objection to the second anathema), from the letters Cyril wrote after the reunion with the Orientals, and from *On the Unity of Christ*.

The 'one hypostasis' formula occurs only three times in Cyril's whole oeuvre, extant in Greek: once in *Contra Nestorium* (II.8, ACO I.1.6, 46[29]), once in his *Third Letter to Nestorius* (ACO I.1.1, 38[22]), and once in a quotation of this passage from the *Third Letter* in *Contra Orientales* (ACO I.1.7, 44[12]).

[42] Throughout Cyril's writings, the phrase 'one nature' occurs many times with reference to the nature of the three divine hypostases: the one nature of the Godhead.

[43] Besides the two places discussed below, there are two instances in the objection to the fourth anathema, in which Andrew of Samosata speaks of 'one nature': *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 41[18 f.] and 42[1 f.].

[44] *Ibid.*, 48[28–33]. See also chapter 7, n. 130.

this quotation is not that it contains the μία φύσις formula, but that it also speaks of one worship. After citing pseudo-Athanasius, Cyril gives a brief quotation from Nestorius, "Let us confess God in man; let us revere the man who is co-worshipped because of the divine connection with God the Word", which he discusses.[45] Cyril then refers to an argument which Andrew of Samosata has used against him: he himself has said that the Son is co-seated on the throne with the Father, together with (μετά) his own flesh; since σύν and μετά are the same thing, why does he attack someone who says that the man must be co-worshipped (συν-) with God the Word and co-named (συν-) God?[46]

In his response, Cyril makes a distinction between things that are one by composition (κατὰ σύνθεσιν), and things that are two because they are separate and by themselves (ἀνὰ μέρος . . . καὶ ἰδικῶς).[47] When someone attributes σύν or μετά "to one person and one nature or hypostasis (ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς προσώπου καὶ φύσεως ἢ γοῦν ὑποστάσεως μιᾶς)"[48]— as he himself did when he wrote that the Son is seated on the throne "with his own flesh"—the unity by composition is maintained. But when σύν or μετά are applied to two separate beings—like Peter and John—, this does not indicate one entity. As usual, Cyril's point is Christ's unity over against a division into a man and the Word by themselves. His remark on one person, nature or hypostasis is a general statement. It cannot be concluded from this that the three terms have exactly the same meaning.

Our investigation into Cyril's use of the μία φύσις formula so far leads to the following conclusion. In his writings until the reunion with the Orientals in 433 there are only four occurrences in which the archbishop speaks of 'one nature' in a christological context. In one of them, it concerns a general statement about the application of σύν and μετά to a unity which is compounded. Two times we encounter the μία φύσις formula in a quotation from Apollinarius's *Letter to Jovian*, which Cyril thought to be a work from Athanasius;

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[45] *Ibid.*, 49[12f.]. With a slight difference this sentence can also be found in Nestorius (1905), 249[2–4].

[46] *Ibid.*, 50[1f.]. Andrew of Samosata quotes (in *ibid.*, 48[7–10]) Cyril's *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 2[90–94] (p. 266).

[47] Twice, Cyril speaks of "the things out of which it is or is composed naturally (σύγκειται φυσικῶς)" (*ibid.*, 50[7, 15]), which will have a similar meaning as 'natural union': a composition out of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES.

[48] *Ibid.*, 50[6]. As far as I have been able to ascertain, this is the only place in Cyril's works which are extant in Greek in which all three nouns φύσις, ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον are juxtaposed.

he does not comment on the formula in any way. The only instance
in which Cyril of Alexandria himself actually employs the μία φύσις
formula is found in *Contra Nestorium*, where it is mentioned without
any emphasis. One can only conclude that, in contrast with the many
examples of dyophysite language, miaphysite terminology hardly plays
a role in Cyril's christology before the reunion of 433, and therefore, is
certainly not typical of his own christological vocabulary.

It is the partisans of his own party, dissatisfied with the reunion, which
occasion him to give more attention to the μία φύσις formula in several
letters. In his *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*, he writes:

> In this way, when we regard in thoughts (ἐν ἐννοίαις) the things out
> of which the one and only Son and Lord Jesus Christ is, we say that
> two natures have been united, but after the union, when the separation
> (διατομῆς) has been abolished, we believe the nature of the Son to be
> one, as of one [Son], but having been made man and flesh.[49]

This passage seems to be teaching: two natures before the union, one
nature after the union. But rather than a positive statement that the
nature of the incarnate Word is one, it is an explanation of what
is meant by the expression 'one incarnate nature of the Word' over
against criticism. For the theme of chapter 12 of the letter is that
the body of the Word is not taken from his own nature,[50] in other
words, that 'one nature' should not be interpreted as implying that
the nature of the body is the same as the nature of the Word. Rather,
the body is taken from the virgin, and in this way we can speak of
a separation in thought of two natures before the union. The 'one
nature' after the union is that of the Son made man and made flesh.
The participles follow the word 'Son' in gender and case, not 'nature',
this time. Therefore, the 'one nature' is not the divine nature, but the
composition of the two natures of the Word and the body. Even though
the anthropological analogy is not invoked this time, the logic of the
passage is the same: two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, which may be regarded
in thought as separate before the union, have become one SEPARATE
REALITY by their union. We will return to the precise meaning of the
word φύσις when discussing the occurrences in the other letters.

   In the following chapter of the *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*, which
deals with the distribution of the sayings, Cyril mentions the 'one

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[49] *Ep.* 40, ACO I.1.4, 26[6–9].
[50] *Ibid.*, 26[3–4]: ἐξ ἰδίας λαβόντα φύσεως.

nature' once more. After stating that he by no means has abolished the difference between the sayings (although he has rejected their distribution over two separate beings), he adds: "For the nature of the Word is admittedly (ὁμολογουμένως) one, but we know that he has been made flesh and man, as I already said above".[51] With a reference to the previous occurrence of 'one nature', Cyril employs it again without the addition of 'incarnate', and thus for the composition of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES. He reasons: although one can say that the nature of Christ is one, there nevertheless is a difference between the sayings, for Christ is the Word with the flesh. Once again, it is not positive teaching about the one incarnate nature of the Word, but a warning against incorrect conclusions from the phrase 'one nature'.

In the *Letter to Eulogius*, Cyril explicitly defends the use of 'two natures'. He argues that not everything that heretics say is wrong. So also, when Nestorius speaks of 'two natures' to indicate the difference between the flesh and the Word, that is alright. The problem is that he does not confess the union, Cyril writes, and he adds:

> For we, having united these things, confess one Christ, one Son, the self-same one Lord, and further, one incarnate nature of the Son, just as one can say with respect to an ordinary man. For he is out of different natures, I mean, from body and soul, and our reasoning (λόγος) and our contemplation (θεωρία) know the difference, but having united them, then we get one human nature. Therefore, knowing the difference of the natures is not [the same as] separating the one Christ into two.[52]

Here, the anthropological analogy is spelled out. Just as a human being is out of two different natures and nevertheless results in one human nature, so the incarnate Word is out of the natures of the Word and the flesh and results in the one incarnate nature. The one incarnate nature is, therefore, to be compared with the one human nature, which is a composition of the natures of body and soul.

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[51] *Ibid.*, 26[21f.]. Cyril uses the term ὁμολογουμένως in various meanings, like 'undoubtedly', 'by common consent', 'admittedly'. In the present context, 'admittedly' seems to be the better rendering: although one can say that the nature of the incarnate Word is one, and all the sayings may be attributed to the one person of Christ, this does not imply that there is no difference between the sayings, for the Word has been made man and flesh. Moreover, Cyril will have been all too aware that the nature of the incarnate Word was not one 'by general consent', as Wickham (1983), 51, translates the term, since the Orientals had attacked the phrase. Other places where ὁμολογουμένως means 'admittedly' include: *Contra Nestorium*, ACO I.1.6, 30[27], 55[28], 102[6].

[52] *Ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 35[13–15]. The *Letter to Eulogius* is of a later date than the *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*, since in the former (37[3f.]) Cyril refers to the latter.

As has been argued in section 6.3.4, the one human nature is, just as the natures of soul and body, an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, since we also speak of the human COMMON NATURE. The one incarnate nature of the Word, however, is a composition of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES of the Word and the flesh, but there is no COMMON NATURE which corresponds to it. Therefore, the one incarnate nature cannot be called an INDIVIDUAL NATURE. *Rather than being the epitome of Cyril's christology, the word φύσις in the formula is an anomaly within the framework of his metaphysics.* Undoubtedly, he remained faithful to it because he was convinced that his great predecessor Athanasius had sanctioned it, and therefore, he was even willing to defend it against the Antiochenes. But the term φύσις in the formula has none of the meanings which it otherwise takes on in the archbishop's metaphysics. It is the SEPARATE REALITY which results from the union of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES. It is not itself an INDIVIDUAL NATURE, but it does include the natural properties of the united natures, and therefore, it is not a mere SEPARATE REALITY either. These comments on the meaning of the word φύσις in the formula will also apply to the two passages in the *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*.

In the only other instance in the *Letter to Eulogius* where Cyril speaks about 'one nature' of the Word, he has first emphasized that union implies the coming together of two or more things. When the Orientals speak of two natures, they mean that it is a union of the Word and flesh. And he continues: "Yet, when the union has been confessed, … there is further one Son, one nature of him, since the Word has been made flesh".[53] Again, the participle 'incarnate' is not added to 'nature', so that the μία φύσις will refer to the composition of both INDIVIDUAL NATURES.

In the *First Letter to Succensus*, the μία φύσις formula occurs only once:

> But after the union we do not divide the natures from each other, nor do we separate the one and indivisible into two Sons, but we say 'one Son' and, as the Fathers have said, 'one incarnate nature of the Word'.[54]

There is no strong defence of the μία φύσις formula. It is upheld as a phrase which the Fathers have used. And after Cyril has somewhat elaborated on the anthropological analogy, he warns against one-sided miaphysite terminology: if we deny that the one Christ is "out of two different natures", the enemies of the truth will say: "If the whole is one

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[53] *Ibid.*, 36[10–12].
[54] *Ep.* 45, ACO I.1.6, 153[21–23]. See for the context of this sentence n. 88.

nature (μία φύσις), how was he made man or what sort of flesh did he make his own?"[55]

In the *Second Letter to Succensus*, the μία φύσις formula occurs a number of times. Cyril quotes four objections which Succensus has forwarded to him, two of which contain the formula, and comments on them. The first quotation states that if there is only one nature after the union, then the Word must have suffered in his own—the divine—nature.[56] In Cyril's response, the formula recurs in a paraphrase of the objection (158[25f.]), and he argues that the word 'incarnate' implies that the Word has become flesh. Christ, then, did not suffer in the divine nature, but in the flesh.

According to the second quotation, the μία φύσις formula necessitates a merger and a mixture (159[9f.]). Cyril's response contains what is probably his most positive statement about the formula: "Again, they who twist what is right do not know that there is in truth one incarnate nature of the Word" (159[11f.]). After stating that there is one Son, who is not to be separated into two persons, but who has the body as his own, without merger or change, Cyril writes:

> While each [the Word and the body] remains and is thought to be in its natural specificity (ἐν ἰδιότητι τῇ κατὰ φύσιν), for the reason just given, he showed us, ineffably and inexpressibly united, the one nature of the Son, but, as I said, incarnated.[57]

Cyril then goes on to explain that 'one' is not just said of simple things, but also of things composed, and turns to the example of soul and body: "the united things bring about the one human nature (μίαν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν)", although their difference by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) "exists in the logic of the composition" (160[5–7]). This suggests once more that the one incarnate nature of the Word is a composed reality. The term

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[55] *Ibid.*, 154[8–11]. According to Richard (1966), 275, a variation on this sentence, also containing the phrase 'if the whole is one nature', is part of Cyril's letter to the emperor Theodosius, to inform him of his reunion with John of Antioch. And de Durand (1987) has published a text which he believes to be most if not all of this letter to Theodosius.

[56] *Ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 158[8–10].

[57] *Ibid.*, 159[21]–160[2]. 'Remains and is thought to be (μένοντός τε καὶ νοουμένου)' indicates—just as similar expressions like 'is and is thought to be (ὄντος τε καὶ νοουμένου)' (e.g., *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 694d; *ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 161[5])—that something applies both in reality and in thought. Cyril does not say that just the natural properties remain, but the body and the Word each remain 'in their natural specificity', that is, they remain the sources of their own natural properties. This implies that two INDIVIDUAL NATURES remain within the one Christ.

φύσις in the formula does not just denote the divine nature, but the composition of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES, just as 'the one human nature' is the composition of body and soul.[58] After this exposition Cyril concludes that they who maintain that, if there is one incarnate nature of the Word, a merger or a mixture must have taken place, are talking nonsense (160[7f.]).

The third objection claims that Christ cannot be consubstantial with us if his humanity does not subsist (ὑφέστηκεν; 160[14–17]). Cyril responds that if in saying 'one nature of the Word' he would not have added 'incarnate', they might have a point.[59] But the word 'incarnate' indicates a perfect humanity. There is no emphasis on the 'one nature', but in what follows Cyril employs dyophysite language: Succensus's teaching on the salvific passion is correct, when he insists that the Son of God did not suffer the things of the body himself, "in his own nature, but rather that he suffered in his earthly nature" (161[5f.]). The opponents, however, attribute the suffering to Jesus as a man by himself.

According to the fourth and final objection, saying that the Lord suffered 'in naked (γυμνῇ) flesh' makes the suffering irrational and involuntary. If, on the other hand, the suffering was voluntary, then one might as well say that he suffered 'in the nature of humanity', which would imply that two natures subsist (ὑφεστάναι) indivisibly after the union (161[19–22]). Cyril begins by stating that this is another attack on those who say that there is one incarnate nature of the Son, and that they want to show that the formula is idle, arguing continually that two natures subsist (ὑφεστώσας; 161[26]–162[2]). Then follows the passage about the difference between separation in thought alone and separation in reality,[60] in which Cyril employs the anthropological analogy and speaks of the two natures of a human being, and then of 'the nature of humanity and of divinity'. He maintains that it is better to stick to the

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[58] Cyril's addition of 'incarnate' to 'one nature' does not necessarily imply that 'incarnate' indicates the human nature, while the 'one nature' is the divine nature. 'Incarnate' may be added even if the 'one nature' is regarded as the composition of the divine and the human natures. In the same way, Cyril does not just speak of 'flesh animated with a rational soul' or 'a body animated with a rational soul', but also of 'a man animated with a rational soul' (*Third Letter to Nestorius*, ACO I.1.1, 38[17]). Although the word 'man' already denotes the composition of soul and body, nevertheless the soul is made more explicit by means of a participle.

[59] *Ep.* 46, 160[19–22]. By this statement Cyril does not interpret the 'one nature' as the divine nature, he merely admits that if 'incarnate' is not added explicitly, 'one nature' is ambiguous and could be interpreted in another way than he intends.

[60] See section 4.3.4, n. 74.

biblical phrase 'he suffered in the flesh', but that in itself—if it is not used with harmful intent—there is nothing wrong with 'he suffered in the nature of humanity'. But, according to him, his opponents use it to separate the humanity from the Word. Although Cyril upholds the μία φύσις formula, once again he does not deny the enduring existence of the two natures, but repudiates their separation.

In the *Letter to Valerian*, the μία φύσις formula is absent, but when Cyril applies the anthropological analogy he writes that "one nature and constitution of man is confessed".[61]

It may be concluded that, although the μία φύσις formula occurs relatively often in these letters following the reunion with the Orientals, the main reason that Cyril defends it is probably that he believed it to be taught by Athanasius and other Church Fathers. It is for him a tool—but by no means an essential tool—to stress the ontological unity of the incarnate Word. He repeatedly explains it by referring to the anthropological analogy: just as the one human nature is a composition of the two natures of soul and body, so Christ is the one incarnate nature of the Word, out of the natures of the Word and the flesh.

There is only one work of Cyril's left in which we find the formula, *On the Unity of Christ*, one of his latest writings, containing an overview of his christology. There is one section in which the archbishop discusses the formula. It starts with a remark by his interlocutor B: "Both natures, then, have been confused and have become one".[62] Cyril first declares that it would be folly to think that the nature of the Word has been changed into that of flesh, or the other way round, and continues: "We do say that the Son is one and his nature one, even if he is conceived of as having assumed flesh with a rational soul" (735e). When B asks whether there could be two natures, that of God and that of man, Cyril responds that divinity and humanity are different with respect to the principles inhering them, but that in Christ they have concurred into a unity beyond understanding.

When B presses him for an example of the union, Cyril mentions a human being: a human being is conceived of as one, "and his nature also as one, although there is not just one species (μονοειδές), but he is rather composed out of two things, I mean, soul and body" (736b). And if one separates the soul from the body, will there not be two men instead of one, he asks. When B refers to the 'inner' and the 'outer

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[61] *Ep.* 50, ACO I.1.3, 92[16f.].
[62] *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 735d.

man', spoken of by Paul, understood as soul and body, Cyril answers
that the apostle makes a distinction grasped by contemplation only.[63]

B then argues that "if we say that the nature of the Son is one, even
if he is regarded as incarnate (σεσαρκωμένος)", a merger or a mixture
must have taken place, "in that the human nature is as it were absorbed
in him" (736e). Cyril responds that it would be idle talk if someone
alleged that a merger or mixture has taken place, "if it is confessed by
us that the nature of the Son, incarnate and made man (σεσαρκωμένου
τε καὶ ἐνηνθρωπηκότος), is one" (737a). And he adds: reasonings will not
be able to convince someone. He points to the burning bush as a type
of the incarnation.

We see that Cyril's use of 'one nature' corresponds to that in his
previous writings. The one nature of the incarnate Word, the result of
a concurrence of divinity and humanity, is compared to the one human
nature, which is out of soul and body. The participle 'incarnate' belongs
to 'Word', not to 'nature'. Therefore, the μία φύσις is the composition
of the two INDIVIDUAL NATURES of the Word and his humanity.

Having investigated all the passages in which Cyril speaks of 'one
nature' in a christological context, it is clear that the μία φύσις formula
is by no means his favourite formula, and that, although miaphysite
terminology increased after the reunion with the Orientals, this was
especially due to the questions raised by the partisans in his own party,
to which he responded in letters. He defends the formula, as coming
from the Fathers, but he explains it by the anthropological analogy, in
which dyophysite and miaphysite language come together.

If the μία φύσις formula is found in Cyril's own writings before the
reunion of 433 only three times, while two of the occurrences are quo-
tations from pseudo-Athanasius, how is it possible that people in his
own party place so much emphasis on the 'one nature'? It seems that
what Lebon writes about the leaders of the Miaphysites in the fifth and
sixth centuries, also applies to Cyril's contemporaries: they were more
influenced by the pseudepigraphic Apollinarian writings than by those
of Cyril.[64] It is the Apollinarian forgeries which led them to question
Cyril's reunion with the Orientals, and therefore, indirectly, it is these
forgeries which led Cyril to give more attention to the μία φύσις formu-
la in his letters from 433 till 435. It is likely that the same reason induced
him to devote a section in *On the Unity of Christ* to the 'one nature'.

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[63] See n. 79.
[64] See the end of section 4.4.1.

8.4. 'In Contemplation Only'[65]

If indeed dyophysite language is the norm rather than the exception in Cyril of Alexandria's christological writings of the first two years of the Nestorian controversy, its usage by Cyril cannot be due to the Orientals, as Lebon argues. Until the end of 430, Cyril was on the offensive. It was only after the anathemas had been disseminated that he was pushed into the defensive. Therefore, any concession would have to come after November 430.[66] Thus, Cyril's two-nature language is his own, and he has not borrowed it from his Antiochene opponents.

Might it be true, then, that also in these early christological writings Cyril speaks, or at least means to speak, of two natures in contemplation only? That there are two natures only in thought, while in reality there is only one nature? The notion[67] of 'in contemplation only' is certainly present in Cyril's writings, from the very beginning. In his earlier works we encounter it especially when he uses radiated factors—like radiation from the sun, or fragrance from a flower—as an analogy of the divine Son's relationship with the Father.[68] The radiating substance and the radiated factor are separated in thought only, not in nature.[69] Here, in Cyril's trinitarian theology—just as in the previous chapters has been argued for his christology—, 'in thought' does not pertain to the elements as such, but to their separation. If the elements themselves would only be different in thought, that would imply that there is no real difference between the Father and the Son, and that is certainly not what the archbishop wants to convey. No, despite their real

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[65] The conclusions regarding the writings which have not been discussed in the previous chapters, are based on searches in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, with author = 4090 (Cyrillus Alexandrinus) and work = 0 (all), and with author = 5000 (Concilia Oecumenica, ACO) and work = 1 (ACO I.1.1 through I.1.7). The works were searched for strings including θεωρ, εννοια, επινοια and ειδεναι, sometimes combined with μον or ψιλ. These searches will not have yielded all places in Cyril's writings where the notion 'in contemplation only' can be found.

[66] Lebon (1909), 358 f., himself speaks of a concession to the "united Orientals". So, he places the concession several years later still, around the year 433, suggesting that the archbishop of Alexandria did not employ dyophysite terminology until then. Cf. *ibid.*, 251, n. 2; 280, n. 1; 368; 379; 457; 467.

[67] Lebon (*ibid.*, 280, n. 2, and 346, n. 1), too, does not only consider the expression ἐν θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ, but he regards other phrases as expressive of the same notion.

[68] See section 3.4.2 for a discussion of radiated factors.

[69] *Thesaurus*, 44C, 184A; *Dial. Trin.* II, 453bc; *In Jo.* I.3, vol. 1, 44 (29a); I.4, vol. 1, 72 (48c); II.1, vol. 1, 191 (128a); XI.1, vol. 2, 635 (930a).

difference, they are nevertheless one God, they are not *separated* in reality, but only in thought.

In the *Dialogues on the Trinity*, we find the notion also in another context. When Cyril argues that the Father and the Son have always been co-existent, his interlocutor B suggests that at first God was Father only potentially, and that before his birth the Son was receptive of being "in mere contemplation and only in appearance", while he was born after this.[70] Here, 'in contemplation only' is juxtaposed to 'potentially (δυνάμει)', that is, over against 'actually'.

As early as in *Festal Letter* 8 for the year 420, we find an instance of the notion in a christological context:[71]

> And we do not annul the things that are dissimilar (τὰ ἀνόμοια) by nature because of the union: the radiance of the Father existing according to its own principle (λόγον), and, on the other hand, the flesh from the earth or a perfect man [according to] another [principle].[72] But having distinguished (διεγνωκότες) these things in this way, and having separated the principle (λόγον) of each only in thought (μόναις διελόντες ταῖς ἐννοίαις), we bind them together again into indivisible unity.[73]

In this passage, Cyril does not call the elements 'natures', but he does speak of the principle of operation which belongs to each of the natures, in other words, the sources of the divine and the human properties. These different principles remain, they are not annulled because of the union, but, on the other hand, we *separate* them only in thought. Although Cyril's language becomes more accurate in later works, his use of 'in thought only' is already similar to what we encounter in *Contra Nestorium*: it is the *separation* of the two principles that takes place in the mind only. Their abiding existence is by no means denied.

The wording in *Contra Nestorium* is different, but the idea is the same:

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[70] *Dial. Trin.* II, 457e: ψιλῇ ... θεωρίᾳ ληπτὸς καὶ ἐν μόνῃ τοῦ εἶναι δοκήσει.

[71] De Halleux (1993a), 417, sees the notion in an even earlier christological text of Cyril's, *Glaph. in Lev.*, PG 69, 560C. It seems to me, however, that here it should be interpreted in another way. It has more to do with Cyril's distinction between the historical sense (ἱστορία) and the spiritual interpretation (θεωρία). The 'contemplation' mentioned here is not opposed to 'reality', on the contrary, it points to a deeper reality than the literal sense of the text.

[72] By "a perfect man (τελείως τὸν ἄνθρωπον)" Cyril means a man who is not just a body, but a body with a rational soul. See section 5.3.1. We see that in this early work Cyril still employs the word 'man' to indicate Christ's humanity.

[73] *Festal Letter* 8, SC 392, 5[48–54] (p. 98).

> If, you sever the natures, not only to know (οὐχὶ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον) what the human and what the divine [nature] is, but rather separating them from their concurrence into unity, you are certainly a man-worshipper.[74]

Separating the natures in the mind, in order to know their difference, is alright, but a separation that goes beyond that results in two Sons, and is to be rejected.

We once come across the notion in *Contra Theodoretum*. First, Cyril states that it is certainly irreproachable not to want to separate, after the union, the things that have been united. Then he adds that Theodoret himself, taking a human being as an example,

> does not allow him to be severed asunder, although the contemplation (θεωρίας) on him [on the human being] does not regard severance and separation as unacceptable, as regards knowing (εἰδέναι), I mean, that the soul is different by nature, and the flesh is different according to its own nature.[75]

Here, it is even clearer that the contemplation concerns the 'severance', not the elements as such. Severing in contemplation, in order to know the natural difference of the elements, is no problem, but severing in reality dissolves the one human being. Neither Theodoret, nor Cyril will have meant to say that soul and body no longer exist as distinguishable elements within the one man.

Cyril then applies this to the union within Christ. "We say (μέν) that to the contemplation (τῇ θεωρίᾳ) a true coming together according to union of divinity and humanity has taken place", not denying their difference by nature, "but (δέ) it is unsound to separate the things that have once been united".[76] Here it is the 'coming together' which is regarded in contemplation, rather than a separation, but the reasoning is the same. Both a separation and a coming together show that the unity consists of two elements. With the μέν … δέ construction the coming together in contemplation is placed over against the real separation of the elements. The elements are regarded as separate in contemplation before they came together, but in reality they are not

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[74] *CN* II.14, ACO I.1.6, 52³¹⁻³³. The same phrase οὐχὶ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον also in *CN* III.5, 72²⁻⁶. See chapter 6, n. 87. Already in *In Jo.* IV.2, vol. 1, 529f. (361b), we find a similar expression: "after the inhumanation he is indivisible, except as regards knowing (πλὴν ὅσον εἰς τὸ εἰδέναι) …"

[75] *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 120⁸⁻¹¹.

[76] *Ibid.*, 120¹³⁻¹⁶.

divided. Once again, the contemplation does not concern the existence of the elements as such, but their *separate* existence.

In *Contra Orientales*, the archbishop writes that there is nothing blameworthy in "knowing (εἰδέναι) that the flesh is different according to its own nature from the Word", "but knowing (εἰδέναι) this is not [the same as] separating (μερίζειν) the natures after the union".[77] Here, too, knowledge of the difference is opposed to a separation of the natures, not to the reality of the united natures.

Immediately after the Council of Ephesus, in his *Explanation of the Twelve Chapters*, Cyril speaks of "not dividing our contemplation on him (τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ θεωρίαν) into a man by himself and separately, and into God the Word by himself".[78] In this case, the difference by nature is not mentioned, but Cyril states that not even in our thinking should we conceive of the incarnate Word as two separate Sons.

Further, apart from the letters to the members of Cyril's own party, following the reunion with the Orientals, we encounter the notion only once in *On the Unity of Christ*, where the archbishop speaks about the apostle Paul who writes about the 'inner man' and the 'outer man', interpreted by Cyril as soul and body: Paul knows very well "the things out of which the one [human being] is, and he makes a distinction (διαφοράν) grasped by contemplation only (θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ)".[79] Although the distinction can only be grasped (ληπτήν) by the mind, this does not imply that soul and body do not have their own existence, albeit not separate from each other.

We do find the notion of 'in contemplation (only)' more often in Cyril's letters to members of his own party, to assuage the worries that arose after he had made peace with the Anitochenes: Acacius of Melitene,[80] the priest Eulogius,[81] Succensus of Diocaesarea,[82] and Valerian of Iconium.[83] One cannot say, however, as Lebon does, that Cyril borrowed the notion from the united Orientals,[84] for we have

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[77] *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 40$^{8-10}$.

[78] *Explanation of the Twelve Chapters*, ACO I.1.5, 18$^{6-9}$.

[79] *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 736c.

[80] *Ep.* 40, ACO I.1.4, 26^7, 27$^{12f.}$, 28^{21}, 29$^{24-26}$. The first passage has been discussed in section 8.3, the last two will be treated in section 8.5.2.

[81] *Ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 35$^{15-18}$, 37$^{1f.}$.

[82] *Ep.* 45, ACO I.1.6, 153^{23}–154^3. *Ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 162$^{2-9}$.

[83] *Ep.* 50, ACO I.1.3, 92$^{19-25}$, 100$^{6f.}$.

[84] Lebon (1909), 360, speaks of "a very curious phenomenon: Cyril borrows his

seen that the archbishop already applied 'only in thought' to his christology in *Festal Letter* 8 and other earlier writings. But it seems that he regarded the notion a useful tool in his defence of the Orientals: while Nestorius separates the natures in reality, which results in two Christs, the Antiochenes only separate them in the mind, in order to elucidate the difference between the natures, but they confess one Christ, he argues. This comes across most clearly in his *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*:

> For he [Nestorius] spoke in this way: "God is indivisible from what is manifested. Therefore, I do not divide the honour of him who is undivided. I divide the natures, but I unite the worship". But the Antiochene brothers, taking in mere thoughts only (ἐν ψιλαῖς καὶ μόναις ἐννοίαις) the things out of which Christ is conceived of [to be], have spoken of a difference of natures, because, as I said, divinity and humanity are not the same in natural quality, but they say that there is one Son and Christ and Lord and—there being truly one—one person of him, and not in any way do they sever the things united, nor accept a natural separation.[85]

It is clear from the context that what Cyril is once again concerned about is the separation of the natures, which to him leads to two Christs. Although he does not speak explicitly of a *separation* in mere thoughts only, in the light of his other works, this is what he will have meant. Here, too, Cyril is not denying the abiding existence of the divine and human natures in the incarnate Word. It may be added that the 'natural separation' he speaks about is the counterpart of the 'natural union' we have come across in earlier works. While a natural union is the coming together of two Aristotelian substances, a natural separation is the parting of two such substances, in this case, the Word and a man by himself.

Several of the other passages have already been discussed in previous chapters,[86] and the conclusion was that 'in thought' applies, not to the elements themselves, but to their separation. In the first passage in the *Letter to Valerian*, Cyril employs the anthropological analogy and writes that "to the mind and to contemplation the difference of the things mentioned [body and soul] is not obscure". His reference

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restriction (θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ) from the united Orientals!" For this, he refers to *ep.* 40, ACO I.1.4, 27⁸⁻¹⁶; see the following note.

[85] *Ep.* 40, ACO I.1.4, 27⁸⁻¹⁶.

[86] *Ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 162²⁻⁹, is discussed in section 4.3.4 (n. 74), and *ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 35¹³⁻¹⁸ in section 6.3.4 (n. 90).

to contemplation does not imply a denial that body and soul are distinctive entities within the one human being in reality.

In the *First Letter to Succensus*, Cyril responds to the question whether or not one should ever speak of two natures with respect to Christ.[87] However, before he comes to the issue of two natures he first gives an exposition of his christology without using the word φύσις in the plural. When he finally addresses the question he does so in the context of examining the mode (τρόπος) of the incarnation. After an introduction he writes:

> When, then, as I said, we consider (ἐννοοῦντες) the mode (τρόπον) of the inhumanation, we see (ὁρῶμεν) that two natures have come together according to an indivisible union without confusion and without change. ... When, then, we consider (ἐννοῶμεν) this, we do no harm to the concurrence into unity, when we say that it took place out of (ἐκ) two natures. But after the union we do not divide (διαιροῦμεν) the natures from each other, nor do we separate the one and indivisible into two Sons, but we say 'one Son' and, as the Fathers have said, 'one incarnate nature of the Word'.

> Therefore, as far as our thinking (ἔννοιαν) is concerned, and only our seeing (μόνον τὸ ὁρᾶν) with the eyes of the soul of the way (τρόπον) in which the Only-Begotten has become man, we say that there are two united natures, but one Christ. ... And if you like, we will take as an example the composition according to which we ourselves are human beings. For we are composed out of soul and body, and we see (ὁρῶμεν) two natures, one that of the body, the other that of the soul, but there is one man out of both according to union, and the composition out of (ἐκ) two natures does not turn the one [man] into two men, but, as I said, [it produces] one man according to composition, out of soul and body.[88]

In this passage, 'in contemplation (only)' is not applied to a separation of the natures, but to their coming together. When Cyril writes: "as far as our thinking is concerned, and only our seeing ..., we say that there are two united natures, but one Christ", this is the closest he gets to saying that two natures exist only in thought, especially since it comes immediately after the μία φύσις formula. But does he indeed deny here the abiding existence of the natures within the one Christ?

It is clear that here, too, Cyril's concern is that "we do not divide the natures from each other". The anthropological analogy, which immediately follows, helps to understand his intention. "We see two

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natures", but "the composition out of two natures does not turn the one [man] into two men". The 'out of two natures' does not deny the continuing existence of soul and body; Cyril merely wants to stress that they are not separated after the union. The same applies to Christ: that we see two united natures with the mind only does not deny that the natures remain within the unity, it denies their *separate* existence.

In the *Letter to Eulogius*, Cyril applies the notion to body and soul, and briefly afterwards uses the word συγκεχωρήκαμεν, which Lebon interprets as a concession from Cyril to the Orientals:[89]

> For he [a human being] is out of different natures, I mean, from body and soul, and our reasoning (λόγος) and our contemplation (θεωρία) know the difference, but having united them, then we get one human nature. Therefore, knowing the difference of the natures is not [the same as] separating the one Christ into two. But since all those from the East think that we orthodox follow the opinions of Apollinarius and that we think that a mixture or a confusion has taken place …, we have allowed (συγκεχωρήκαμεν) them, not to separate the one Son into two, by no means, but only to confess that neither confusion nor mixture has taken place, but that the flesh was flesh, assumed out of a woman, and the Word was the Word, born out of the Father. Only, there is one Christ and Son and Lord, according to the saying of John that the Word has become flesh.[90]

Since Cyril does not deny that body and soul have their own existence within the one human being, the reference to 'reasoning' and 'contemplation' does not imply that the natures of the incarnate Word are to be taken in thought only either. He makes this even more explicit when he writes that knowing the difference of the—really existing—natures does not mean that they are separated.

What does he mean by the word συγκεχωρήκαμεν? It is not uncommon for Cyril to employ the verb συγχωρεῖν (in various tenses) in the sense of 'to allow', with a dative and an infinitive.[91] It is this same grammatical construction that he employs here. He has allowed 'them', that is, the Antiochenes, not 'to separate', but only 'to confess' that neither a mixture nor a confusion has taken place. And a further explanation of this confession is given in the words that follow: the flesh is flesh, assumed out of a woman, and the Word is the Word, as born out of

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[89] See section 4.4.1, n. 105.
[90] *Ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 35¹⁵–36³.
[91] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 22¹⁴ (συνεχώρει: "for a short time, he allowed death to pull down his flesh"). *Contra Nestorium* I.2, ACO I.1.6, 19²⁵; V.3, 98³³ (συγκεχώρηκε: "he allowed his flesh to move according to its own laws"). *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 58³ᶠ, 59¹⁻³.

the Father; only, there is one Christ and Son and Lord. In other words, Cyril's defence is that he has not allowed the Orientals to separate the one Christ into two, but to distinguish the elements that have come together. This is also Grillmeier's interpretation of this passage.[92]

Thus, if the word συγκεχωρήκαμεν is to be interpreted as a 'concession', as Lebon does, this concession does not pertain to two-nature language. Cyril rather concedes to the Orientals their emphasis that there is no mixture or confusion in Christ. And this may be expressed by dyophysite terminology, as long as it does not lead to a separation of the two natures. This 'concession' does not imply a change in Cyril's own christology or terminology. Lebon incorrectly insists that two-nature language did not belong to the archbishop's own vocabulary, and that he allowed the Antiochenes to use it only with the addition of the restriction 'in contemplation only'. Here, as throughout the Nestorian controversy, Cyril's main concern is that the two natures are not to be *separated*. When the unity of Christ is clearly established, Cyril has no qualms about speaking of two natures, neither before nor after the Council of Ephesus.

In the above quotation from the *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*, Cyril uses the phrase 'natural quality (ποιότης φυσική)' to indicate the natural difference between divinity and humanity. According to Lebon, this phrase and the formula ὁ λόγος τοῦ πως εἶναι are the ways by which Cyril normally indicates this difference.[93] However, in fact, ποιότης φυσική occurs only twice in the extant Greek works of Cyril's from after the year 428, both times in the *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*.[94] Here, as in other instances, Lebon projects what applies to Severus of Antioch onto Cyril of Alexandria. Cyril indicates the difference between the two natures by means of a series of expressions: the mind contemplates a certain difference of natures (τινα φύσεων διαφοράν);[95] the nature of

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[92] See section 4.4.4, n. 158.

[93] Lebon (1909), 441: "La notion spécifique d'humanité et de divinité, ce que nous appelons *nature* divine et humaine, ne se rend pas chez Cyrille par le terme φύσις. Quand il en parle (et c'est lorsqu'il s'agit d'éviter la confusion et la transformation), le saint archevêque l'indique par les formules que Sévère nous a révélées: ὁ λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι, ποιότης φυσική; c'est en cette manière qu'il admet et soutient une différence (διαφορά) permanente entre la divinité et l'humanité du Christ".

[94] See section 4.4.1, n. 124.

[95] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 695b = *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 58[1], to which Cyril adds: "for divinity and humanity are not the same thing". Cf. *ep.* 4, ACO I.1.1, 27[2f.]: "not as if the difference of the natures was annulled because of the union".

the things that have concurred into unity is regarded as different;[96] the flesh is different from the Word "according to the principle (λόγον) of its own nature", and "the nature of the Word himself is substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) different";[97] they are "scattered into natural otherness";[98] "the divine [nature] and the human nature is one thing and another".[99] Thus, the archbishop does use the word φύσις to indicate the difference between divinity and humanity in Christ, as well as λόγος, the principle of operation of a nature.

André de Halleux gives an interpretation of Cyril of Alexandria's notion of 'in contemplation only' which is similar to that of Lebon. He does explain the notion as it occurs in the seventh anathema of the Council of Constantinople (553) in the same way as Cyril's usage of the notion is interpreted in this study: it does not deny the real existence of the divine and human natures in Christ, but it wants to exclude their *separation* into two separate persons or hypostases.[100] But according to de Halleux, Cyril used it in a different way. He regards Justinian's reference to Cyril's letters to Succensus as anachronistic, since the emperor operated in a dyophysite context, while the archbishop used the distinction 'in thought only' "conversely, to assure a partisan of the miaphysite formula who was worried about his concessions to the dyophysitism of the Orientals".[101]

It is true that especially Cyril's *Second Letter to Succensus* has a high density of miaphysite language, but the present study has shown that this is by no means Cyril's normal terminology. Just the other way round. Cyril normally works in a dyophysite context, even if he usually refers to Christ's humanity in other ways than with the word φύσις.

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[96] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 2[106 f.] (p. 268). Cf. *ep.* 4, ACO I.1.1, 27[1 f.].

[97] *Contra Nestorium* II, ACO I.1.6, 33[11 f.]. Cf. *ibid.* II.8, 46[32 f.]; III.6, 73[2 f.].

[98] *Ibid.*, 33[13]: εἰς ἑτερότητα φυσικήν.

[99] *Ibid.* II.8, 45[34]: ἕτερόν τι καὶ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἥ τε θεία καὶ ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις.

[100] De Halleux (1993b), 1993, 316: "C'est en parfaite cohérence avec tout ceci qu'en divisant 'les choses unies par la seule pensée', Justinien ne vise pas les natures du Christ au sens chalcédonien du terme nature, mais exclut simplement la division du Christ en deux personnes ou hypostases", and the same applies to the seventh canon of the fifth ecumenical council (p. 317).

[101] *Ibid.*, 317: "Cyrille faisait valoir la distinction de raison non point dans un contexte diphysite, mais au contraire pour rassurer un partisan de la formule miaphysite qui s'inquiétait de ses concessions au diphysisme des Orientaux". On p. 318, de Halleux speaks of "une interprétation subtilement anachronique des deux mémoires à Succensus".

And he employs the anthropological analogy to combine his dyophysite thinking with the μία φύσις formula which he found in some of the writings which he attributed to orthodox Fathers: just as body and soul are two different natures which together make up the one human nature, so the natures of the Word and his flesh together form the one incarnate nature of the Logos. Therefore, one cannot say that Cyril employs the notion in a miaphysite context.[102]

The passage to which de Halleux refers explicitly is that from the *Second Letter to Succensus* which has already been discussed in chapter 4:

> But they overlook that those things which are usually divided not just in contemplation (μὴ κατὰ μόνην τὴν θεωρίαν διαιρεῖσθαι φιλεῖ), will split apart from each other fully and in every manner separately into diversity.[103]

In another article, published in the same year, de Halleux concludes from this passage: "Thus, Cyril does not conceive of an ontological middle ground between distinction by the mind and concrete separation".[104] However, the archbishop does know of a middle ground. What Cyril is comparing here is a *separation* in thought and a *separation* in reality: if a separation goes beyond contemplation, then it results in a real separation. By this statement he does not deny the middle ground of the real remaining existence of the two elements within their unity. This is affirmed in that he first applies it to a human being, composed of the natures of soul and body. Soul and body each have their real existence within the one human being, and in thought they may be separated in order to conceive of their distinctive principles, but if the division is not just in thought only, then we get two separate entities. This applies to Emmanuel as well. Cyril is speaking of two INDIVIDUAL NATURES which together form one SEPARATE REALITY, both with regard to a human being out of soul and body, and with regard to Emmanuel out of the natures of divinity and humanity. Cyril's dyophysitism is not just notional, but real.[105]

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[102] Wickham (1983), 89, n. 3, even writes with respect to one passage in the *Second Letter to Succensus*: "This is the closest Cyril comes to the ἐν δύο φύσεσι of the Chalcedonian definition. ... There can be no doubt that Cyril affirmed here the permanent co-existence of the pair of mentally distinguishable elements in Christ".

[103] *Ep.* 46, 5, ACO I.1.6, 162²⁻⁹. See section 4.3.4, n. 74.

[104] De Halleux (1993a), 422f.: "Cyrille ne conçoit donc pas de milieu ontologique entre distinction de raison et séparation concrète".

[105] De Halleux (1993b), 318, on the other hand, writes: "Si le seul diphysisme admis par Cyrille était notionnel, celui du V-e concile est bien réel".

It is not the case, then, that Cyril "did not have any technical onto-logical terminology at his disposal yet for the christological duality", so that the distinction of the natures 'in thought only' "represented the sole manner in which he could recognise a dyophysitism compat-ible with the real unity of the incarnate Word".[106] As has been argued throughout this study, Cyril applied the restriction 'in contemplation only', not to the natures themselves, but to their separation. Cyril recognised all along that there are two INDIVIDUAL NATURES in Christ, each with their own principle (λόγος) of operation. The reason that he was hesitant to use the word φύσις for Christ's humanity was his contin-uous anti-Arianism: the Word *is* God 'by nature', not man, and he has *become* man. But at times he did refer to Christ's humanity as a φύσις, from the *Glaphyra* on.[107]

When de Halleux writes that another passage from the *Second Letter to Succensus* shows the "inner repugnance which Cyril felt to attributing to the humanity of Christ, which he nevertheless regarded as complete, the qualification of a 'proper nature'," he misinterprets Cyril's use of 'proper nature (ἰδίαν φύσιν)'.[108] The pertinent paragraph in Cyril's letter starts with an objection to the μία φύσις formula: if after the union one incarnate nature of the Word is conceived of, then it follows that one must say that he suffered in his own nature (εἰς ἰδίαν φύσιν)—that is, in his divine nature. Cyril starts by implicitly denying the charges of Apollinarianism.

He continues that after the incarnation the Word is no longer without flesh (ἄσαρκος), "but as it were also clothed with our nature (ἀμφιεσάμενος δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν)". Here, Cyril already speaks of a human nature after the union, without any sense of 'inner repugnance'. This human φύσις probably refers to Christ's INDIVIDUAL NATURE, although it may also denote the human COMMON NATURE. Cyril adds that, although the body is not consubstantial with the Word, while a rational soul inheres it, and the mind pictures the difference in nature

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[106] *Ibid.*, 318.

[107] *Glaph. in Lev.*, PG 69, 576B: the two birds in Lev. 14:4–7 represent "the heavenly man as well as the Word, in two natures (φύσεις), separated (διαιρούμενον) as regards the principle (λόγον) that pertains to each, for the Word who shone forth out of God the Father was in the flesh out of a woman, but not severed (μεριζόμενος), for the Christ is one out of both".

[108] De Halleux (1993a), 423. After quoting *ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 158[21–26], he writes: "Cette dernière réflexion montre bien la répugnance intime que Cyrille éprouvait à reconnaître à l'humanité du Christ, qu'il concevait pourtant comme complète, la qualification d'une 'nature propre'."

(ὁ μὲν νοῦς φαντάζεται τὸ ἑτεροφυές) of the things united, we yet confess one Son and Christ and Lord. Then follows the sentence to which de Halleux refers: "What necessity is there, then, for him to suffer in his own nature (εἰς ἰδίαν φύσιν), if after the union one incarnate nature of the Son is spoken of?"

First of all, the phrase 'his own nature' refers to Christ's divine nature, not his human nature. Cyril takes up the objection from the beginning of the paragraph, and denies it: if one confesses one incarnate nature of the Word, this does not imply that he suffered in his divine nature. That this is what he means is quite clear from what follows: if in the logic of the economy there was nothing that by nature undergoes suffering, they would have been right. Then the suffering would necessarily have to be attributed to the nature of the Word (τῇ τοῦ Λόγου φύσει)—that is, his divine nature. De Halleux, however, translates the sentence which contains ἰδίαν φύσιν differently: "What necessity is there, then, for him to suffer in a proper nature, if one speaks of one (single) incarnate nature of the Son after the union!", and concludes that Cyril does not want to call Christ's humanity a 'proper nature'.[109] De Halleux interprets the phrase 'to suffer in a proper nature' as 'to suffer in his own human nature', and implies that Cyril would not want to say that the incarnate Word suffered in his human nature. Cyril, however, does not refer to the human nature in this sentence. Moreover, he does not regard the statement that Christ suffered in his human nature as heretical. Towards the end of this same *Second Letter to Succensus*, the archbishop writes that Scripture says that he suffered in the flesh, and that it is better to stick to this formulation, rather than saying that he suffered 'in the nature of the humanity (τῇ φύσει τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος)', although that statement does no damage to the mystery (unless it is said with harmful intent).[110] It is true, then, that Cyril prefers the biblical expression 'he suffered in the flesh' (1 Peter 4:1), but he explicitly states that in itself there is nothing wrong with the phrase 'he suffered in the nature of the humanity'.

De Halleux seems to have been inspired by Lebon's views. Just as this other Belgian scholar, he attributes to Cyril the usage of 'the difference

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[109] *Ibid.*: "Quel besoin donc qu'il ait souffert dans une nature propre (ἰδίαν) si on dit, après l'union, une (seule) nature du Fils incarnée!" This is immediately followed by the sentence quoted in the previous note.

[110] *Ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 162[11–14].

as in natural quality',[111] a phrase which is absent in all Cyril's works that are extant in Greek.[112] And he also speaks of the 'concessions' Cyril made to the Orientals, although he works this out differently: he sees this especially in the way in which Cyril dealt with the attribution of sayings. We will look at this in section 8.5.2. Moreover, he interprets the word φύσις in Cyril's christology in the same way as Lebon: "If he [Cyril] could not regard it [Christ's humanity] as a 'nature', that is, as a person or an autonomous hypostasis, . . .".[113]

According to de Halleux, Cyril recognised in the incarnate Word "a real otherness", but he calls this "not substantial, but qualifying", and adds that this is what the archbishop will have meant by the expression "as in natural quality", which "he applies to the Aristotelian category of 'differentia'".[114] For Cyril, however, 'natural quality' refers to the whole set of natural properties—propria and inseparable attributes—, not merely to the differentiae.[115] And the distinction between 'substantial' and 'qualifying' does not stem from Cyril of Alexandria. When Cyril repeatedly compares the incarnate Word with a human being consisting of soul and body, he means a composition of two different natures, two substances. The real otherness that Cyril sees in Emmanuel is not just 'qualifying', it is substantial or natural (a 'natural otherness'),[116] but without separation.

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[111] De Halleux (1993b), 315: "Cyrille lui non plus n'avait jamais songé à contester la permanence dans le Verbe incarné de ce qu'il appelait 'la différence comme en qualité naturelle', et il parlait indifféremment de 'diviser par la seule pensée' les natures, ou la différence des natures".

[112] The full expression 'the difference as in natural quality' does not occur in any of Cyril's writings which are extant in Greek. The shorter phrase 'natural quality' is found only twice in Cyril's works from after 428. See above, nn. 93 and 94, and section 4.4.1, nn. 110, 111, 120–125.

[113] De Halleux (1993a), 423. In one of his last articles, de Halleux (1994), 469, still interprets φύσις in Cyril's christology in this way: "Cyrille range la nature du côté de l'hypostase et de la personne"; see also p. 471, n. 82.

[114] *Ibid.*, 423 f.

[115] See section 3.4.2, especially notes 182–186, and section 4.4.1.

[116] See n. 98.

8.5. CHRISTOLOGY

8.5.1. *Two Christological Models*

Norris's distinction between a subject-attribute and a composition mod-el in Cyril of Alexandria's christology is helpful (see section 4.3.1). The subject-attribute theme, in which the Word is the subject while the incarnation is the predicate, is dear to Cyril for several reasons:

(1) It follows the structure of some of the biblical verses which are fundamental to his christology: John 1:14: "the Word has become flesh"; Phil. 2:6–8: "being in the form of God he emptied himself, assuming the form of a servant".

(2) Cyril sees the same structure in the Creed of Nicaea (325): "one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, …, who … came down and was incarnated and has become man".

(3) It expresses his 'fundamental intuition' that Jesus Christ is first and foremost the divine Word, while his humanity has been added. This was of special importance in his battle against Arianism: while human weaknesses may be predicated of Christ, he is nevertheless God the Word. His use of the term φύσις reflects this intuition: by nature Christ is God, while economically he has become man. Stating that Christ has become man by nature is not wrong,[117] but it could be misinterpreted in an Arian sense, and therefore, Cyril prefers to refer to Christ's humanity with other terms than φύσις. This hesitance is already found in the trinitarian writings, and when the archbishop does use φύσις for the Word's humanity in these works, it has a meaning close to secondary substance. *Therefore, that φύσις would mean* SEPARATE REALITY *in Cyril's christology cannot be the reason for this reluctance.* That in an anti-Arian context in the *Thesaurus* he can even write that Christ is not connatural (ὁμοφυής) with Moses, while in a christological context in the *Dialogues on the Trinity* he calls him connatural with God and men, suggests that Cyril's anti-Arianism is the real reason that he often employs other terms than φύσις for the humanity of Christ.[118]

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[117] Cyril explicitly uses this expression in *On the Incarnation*, 695c, while it has been retained in *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 58⁷. See section 5.3.2.3, n. 71.

[118] See the end of section 3.4.4, esp. nn. 281 and 282.

While the subject-attribute model is asymmetric, the composition theme is more symmetric: here, the incarnation is regarded as a coming together of two realities—the Word and the flesh, two natures. Cyril's favourite analogy for this is a human being who is a composite of soul and body. He regards this model as a useful tool to uphold the unity of Christ, and so it gains in importance during the Nestorian controversy.

Weinandy, too, makes an important distinction when he writes that the archbishop of Alexandria wanted to uphold two different 'truths' (see section 4.3.3): (1) that the incarnate Word is one entity—in small-capital terms, one SEPARATE REALITY; (2) that the Word before and after the incarnation is the same (person). The second 'truth' is more easily expressed in terms of the subject-attribute model: the Word without the flesh is the same one as the Word with the flesh. And the first 'truth' is akin to the composition model: two things have come together to form one reality. Weinandy himself regards the anthropological analogy as only expressing *that* the incarnate Word is one entity, not *how* this is the case. But Cyril does not hesitate to use the language of composition also for the Word and his humanity, which suggests that the comparison applies to the 'how' as well. Neither in the case of body and soul, nor in the case of the Word and his humanity does the composition imply a *tertium quid*.

However, when Norris and Weinandy enter into more detail and interpret Cyril's terms and phrases, they read other things into them than he intended. The μία φύσις formula does not belong to the subject-attribute model, as Norris states. The 'one nature' is not the GRAMMATICAL PERSON who may be said to remain the same during the incarnation, but it is the composite of the divine and human natures in Christ. Neither does the formula stress that Emmanuel is one entity without any reference to quiddity, as Weinandy argues, but the quiddity of both natures is retained in the 'one nature' of their composition.

Cyril's use of ἴδιος has a place in both models. By stating that the Word has made the flesh his own, the Logos remains the subject, while the flesh belongs to the predicate. But in his dispute with Nestorius, Cyril argues that 'his own' is also expressive of the true unity of Christ; once he even makes it a condition of true unity.[119] And thus, it also plays a role in the composition model.

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[119] *Contra Nestorium* III.6, ACO I.1.6, 73^{5f}, see chapter 6, nn. 65 and 115.

The terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις never take on the meaning of 'person', PERSON, nor that of a bearer of natures. In the μία φύσις formula, the word φύσις denotes the composition of the divine and human φύσεις, just as the one human nature is the composition of soul and body. The 'one nature' belongs to the same metaphysical level as the individual natures of the Word and his flesh. And when Cyril calls Christ 'one incarnate hypostasis', the term ὑπόστασις indicates that he is one entity, one SEPARATE REALITY. With this phrase, Cyril does not leave the metaphysical level of the two natures either. The difference between 'one hypostasis' and 'one nature' is that the first expression merely indicates the one (separate) entity, without any reference to quiddity, while in the second phrase the quiddity of both natures that have come together comes along. 'Union according to hypostasis', too, has no other sense than that the union results in one SEPARATE REALITY. A translation of ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν like 'personal union' could give the wrong impression that what is meant would be a union of two natures within the one person of the Word. Both the 'one nature' and the 'one hypostasis' formulas, however, function within the composition model, and there is but one metaphysical level involved.

What about πρόσωπον? We see an interesting development of Cyril's usage of this word in christological contexts. Leaving an isolated case in the *Thesaurus* aside, this development starts in the *Commentary on John*, where it is stated twice that the incarnate Word is not to be severed into two πρόσωπα, that is, persons—PERSONS. This language is repeated a number of times in *Contra Nestorium*, but now it is added that Christ is one πρόσωπον, one person. Cyril does not call the divine hypostasis of the Word a πρόσωπον. Rather, it is clear that he reserves the term for the result of the coming together of the two natures. Therefore, 'one πρόσωπον', too, remains at the same metaphysical level as the two natures, the 'one nature' and the 'one hypostasis'.

In theory, Cyril's use of πρόσωπον could have developed in such a way that he would have used the term within the context of the subject-attribute model as well. Then he could have expressed Weinandy's second 'truth' with it: the πρόσωπον of the divine Word remained the same during the incarnation. In that case, the term would have functioned at another metaphysical level. But this development has not taken place. Although Cyril continued to employ the term, it became problematical in that Nestorius also used it, but—at least in Cyril's perception—with another meaning. While Nestorius spoke of the 'one πρόσωπον' of Christ, to Cyril this was not the same thing as when he

called Emmanuel 'one πρόσωπον'. In his estimation, Nestorius's 'one πρόσωπον' consisted of two separate persons who had an external connection with each other. And although we only know of such language from Nestorius's later *Book of Heraclides*, Cyril accused his opponents of speaking of a union of two πρόσωπα, which to him could only imply an external relation.

How, then, did the archbishop of Alexandria put into words that the Word remained the same when he became man? Mainly by the phrase 'the same one (ὁ αὐτός)'. For example, "Therefore, the same one was born out of the Father as God, and, on the other hand, created according to the flesh".[120] Or, "For he remained the same, even though he has become man".[121] It is obvious that what remains must be divine, since before the incarnation the Word was only divine. Sometimes, it is clear that by the phrase 'the same one' Cyril wants to express that the Word has not undergone any change during the incarnation: when the Word assumed flesh and blood, "he remained the same, that is, the Son of the Father by nature and truly, being one only, and not as one with another".[122]

And yet, Cyril distinguishes between 'the Word' and 'his (divine) nature'. When he says—as he does several times—that the Word suffered, not in his own nature, but in the flesh, 'the Word' is a subject who does not coincide with his divine nature. This also applies to similar expressions, like "insofar as his own nature is concerned, the Word out of God the Father was not sanctified separately",[123] or "the Word was not anointed in his own nature".[124] On the other hand, when Cyril writes that the Word "allows the nature like ours to move according to its own laws",[125] this divine subject also presides over his human nature, with which he is one SEPARATE REALITY. Although the archbishop does not use the noun 'bearer' or the verb 'to bear', his view comes close to a divine bearer of two natures, a divine and a human nature.

This notion of 'bearer' shines through in the use of 'in the same one (ἐν ταὐτῷ)' in *Festal Letter* 8 for the year 420 as well: "In the same one a coming together of two realities (πραγμάτων), dissimilar in

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[120] *Dial. Trin.* IV, 534e. See also *On the Creed*, ACO I.1.4, 56[36–38].

[121] *In Jo.* II.5, vol. 1, 276[22f.] (185d).

[122] *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 740c.

[123] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 17[22].

[124] *Contra Nestorium* II.2, ACO I.1.6, 37[7f.].

[125] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 2[127f.] (p. 270). See section 5.4.2.2.

nature, namely divinity and humanity, has taken place".[126] The 'same one' might be regarded as the container of the two realities. However, Cyril is paraphrasing someone else here—whom he himself believes to be Athanasius—, and the phrase ἐν ταὐτῷ stems from this other theologian.[127] In Cyril's own language, ἐν ταὐτῷ usually means 'at the same time'.[128] Therefore, not too much should be concluded from this passage.

Cyril does not have a specific term for the notion of 'bearer'. As has been said, in his own christology he employs the word πρόσωπον for the result of the union, for the one person who exists after the coming together of the Word with his flesh. The πρόσωπον is not the bearer who already existed before the incarnation. Neither is the μία ὑπόστασις the bearer; rather, it is the one SEPARATE REALITY which is the composition of both natures. I agree with Grillmeier that "Cyril in fact transfers the unity in Christ into the '*personal*' realm while ascribing a duality to the *natures*", and that he has thus "anticipated the distinction of the Council of Chalcedon", although he "does not bring the element of person sufficiently into play".[129]

Essen, too, is right when he maintains that Cyril's emphasis on the composition model (he speaks of "the ἕνωσις model on the basis of a natural composition") made his fundamental intuition unclear.[130] Due to his battle against a two-Sons christology, Cyril started to stress that the Word with the flesh is one, instead of insisting that the Word is 'the

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[126] *Festal Letter* 8, SC 392, 6³⁻⁵ (p. 100).

[127] In *Sermo maior de fide* (*CPG* 2803; see also *CPG* 2225), fragment 79¹⁰⁻¹², in Marcellus (1962), 62, it says: "In the same one (ἐν ταὐτῷ) a coming together of two realities (πραγμάτων) has taken place, of realities which are not equal, I mean, but which certainly have not undergone a mixture either". According to Scheidweiler (1954), the *sermo* was not written by Athanasius, but by Marcellus of Ancyra, and should better be called *Epistula ad Antiochenos*.

[128] For example, *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 80²⁸ᶠ·: "in order that the same one (ὁ αὐτός) is conceived of as both (ὁμοῦ) God and man at the same time (ἐν ταὐτῷ)". Many times, Cyril writes that Christ is 'God and man ἐν ταὐτῷ'. Although this might be translated as 'God and man in the same one', it is more likely that Cyril meant 'God and man at the same time'.

[129] Grillmeier, *CCT* I, ²1975, 482; *JdChr* I, ³1990, 684. By 'person' Grillmeier means "the subject, the personal bearer". He adds: "and in particular [Cyril] does not distinguish it [the concept of a personal bearer] either in language or concept from the concept of nature". Cyril's concept of a personal bearer, however, is certainly distinct from the concept of nature, as is especially clear from such phrases as 'the Word did not suffer in his own nature'. But he does not have a specific term for it. See also section 4.4.4, n. 162.

[130] Essen (2001), 122. See section 1.2.3.3, n. 184.

same' before and after the incarnation. And Essen rightly adds that it is the merit of neo-Chalcedonianism to have given conceptual expression to the Alexandrian intuition, although its solution has created new conceptual problems, as he points out.[131]

8.5.2. *Attributing the Sayings*

Cyril's 'one πρόσωπον' plays a special role in the attribution of sayings: the sayings from or about the Lord Jesus Christ should not be ascribed to two πρόσωπα, separate and by themselves, but to one πρόσωπον. Since πρόσωπον may denote, not just an ONTOLOGICAL PERSON, but also a GRAMMATICAL PERSON (who in theory may consist of two ONTOLOGICAL PERSONS), the frequent juxtaposition of the unequivocally ontological word ὑπόστασις makes sure that this ambiguity is resolved: Christ is one ONTOLOGICAL PERSON.

Although Cyril wants to safeguard the unity of Christ and, therefore, emphasizes that all the sayings apply to one subject, this is not to say that he does not distinguish between the sayings. More often than not, however, he does not use the word φύσις to express this distinction. He rather writes that Christ does some things 'as God', 'divinely', other things 'as man', 'humanly', 'economically', 'in the flesh', or 'according to the flesh'.[132] But at times, he does employ φύσις in relation to the sayings. Then, φύσις stands most often for the divine nature: Christ is said to be or do certain things 'according to his (own) nature'. As has been mentioned before, Cyril is hesitant to use the word φύσις for Christ's human nature because that could be interpreted in an Arian way. But even so, we do find several places where some of the sayings are related to the human φύσις. As early as in *On the Incarnation*, we encounter: "He who according to the law of the flesh and according to the nature like ours has died and who was raised".[133] But we also find it in *Festal Letter* 17,[134] several times in *Oratio ad augustas*,[135] and even in Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*.[136]

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[131] *Ibid.*, 122–136.

[132] See especially sections 6.4.1, 7.2.3, and 7.3.3.

[133] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 712e. Exactly the same in *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 72[2f.]. See section 7.2.3, n. 62.

[134] See n. 125 and section 5.4.2.2.

[135] See section 7.4.2.4.

[136] See section 7.7.1.2, n. 249.

Although within the one Christ the natures remain as sources of the various properties and deeds, the communication of idioms makes that these properties and deeds may grammatically be attributed both to 'the Son of God' and to 'the Son of Man'. The underlying ontology is depicted in figure 2 in section 5.3.3. The divine and human natures have come together to form a single SEPARATE REALITY, without being mixed or confused, but the properties of the natures lie, not just round the nature which is their respective source, but round the composition of both natures. Therefore, the Son of Man may be said to have come down from heaven, while the divine Word may be said to have died on the cross. But, as in the twelfth anathema, Cyril usually adds that the Word has suffered and died 'in the flesh', to indicate that it is not the divine nature which is passible, but the flesh, the human nature; in other words, that the source of the property 'has suffered and died' is the human nature, although, because of the intimate union, this property also hovers round the divine nature.

It has often been stated by modern commentators that Cyril made a clear concession to the Orientals with regard to the attribution of sayings, when he accepted the Formula of Reunion in 433. He is alleged to have forbidden the distribution of sayings over the natures in his fourth anathema, while he accepted it in the Formula of Reunion. It has already been argued in section 7.7.2.2 that what Cyril opposes in the fourth anathema is the ascription of the sayings to two separate beings, a man by himself and the divine Word separately, not to two INDIVIDUAL NATURES which together form one SEPARATE REALITY. We will now look more closely at de Halleux's argumentation, who devotes more attention to this issue.[137]

De Halleux sees a first concession in *Contra Theodoretum*: here Cyril already allows the 'difference of the sayings', while he is still less open to their division.[138] Cyril in fact writes: "But neither have we denied (ἀνῃρήκαμεν) the difference of the words, for we know that some of them have been fitting to God, others fitting to man", and "But we say that they must not be attributed to two persons (προσώποις) which are fully separated from each other".[139] There is nothing new in this

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[137] De Halleux (1993a). He phrases Cyril's alleged concession like this: "En incluant cette profession [the Formula of Reunion] dans sa lettre de réconciliation du printemps de la même année 433, Cyrille d'Alexandrie concédait apparemment aux Orientaux une 'rélecture' significative de son quatrième chapitre" (p. 412).

[138] *Ibid.*, 413.

[139] *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 123[11–14]. De Halleux refers to this passage.

position. This is indeed what Cyril has been teaching all along: the sayings differ from each other, but they should not be ascribed to two separate persons, for then there are two Christs. Therefore, this is not a first concession.

Further concessions de Halleux perceives in Cyril's letters to the members of his own party, after the reunion of 433. He refers to the *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*, where Cyril writes about the united Orientals: "Not in any way do they sever the things united, nor accept a natural separation", and "it is, then, one thing to divide the natures, and that after the union, …, and likewise something else to know the difference of the sayings".[140] This, again, has been the Alexandrian archbishop's teaching from the beginning of the controversy on: the natures should not be divided, for that results in two separate beings, but there is a difference in the sayings: some Christ says 'as God', others 'as man'.

The Belgian scholar also quotes the *Letter to Eulogius*, incorrectly asserting that Cyril turns the Antiochenes into miaphysites.[141] And he points to Cyril's statement that the Orientals "only divide the sayings" (whereas Nestorius is alleged to divide Christ into a man and the Word as two separate beings).[142] De Halleux concludes that

> if Cyril spontaneously and without hesitance had opposed the 'difference of the natures', with all the suspicion of a 'change' or a 'mixture' in the incarnation of the Word, he seems, on the other hand, to have only accepted with repugnance the 'division of the sayings', affirmed in the Antiochene profession of 433, to which he subscribed.[143]

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[140] De Halleux (1993a), 415. *Ep.* 40, ACO I.1.4, 27[15f.], 28[19–21].

[141] *Ibid.*, 415: "Ainsi donc, tandis que Théodoret faisait de Cyrille un dyophysite, celui-ci transformait les Antiochiens en monophysites!" Cyril writes in *ep.* 44, ACO I.1.4, 36[9–13]: "If we say 'union', we confess that it is [a union] of flesh, animated with a rational soul, and the Word, and those who say 'two natures' understand it in this way. Yet, when the union has been confessed, the things united no longer are separate (διίστανται) from each other, but there is further one Son, one nature of him, since the Word has been made flesh. This is what the Orientals confessed, even if they are somewhat obscure in their terminology". De Halleux translates διίστανται as an active verb, interpolating 'the Orientals' as the subject, and he adds 'they confess' before 'one Son, one nature': "Cependant, l'union étant confessée, (les Orientaux) n'écartent plus l'un de l'autre les (éléments) unis, mais ils (confessent) un (seul) Fils, une (seule) nature du Verbe lui-même, en tant qu'incarné". However, when Cyril states that 'this is what the Orientals confessed', it is clear from the addition that "they are somewhat obscure in their terminology", that he does not intend to say that they confessed it with these exact same words.

[142] *Ibid.*, 416. *Ep.* 44, 36[23].

[143] *Ibid.*, 416.

This conclusion, however, can be questioned on both counts. First, Cyril has never opposed the difference of the natures; what he opposed was their separation into two separate persons and hypostases. Although de Halleux realises that for Cyril 'difference' and 'division' are not the same thing,[144] he does not recognise that the Alexandrian archbishop has always accepted the (remaining ontological) difference of the natures within the one Christ, while he strongly opposes a division which goes beyond a separation in the mind only.

The second conclusion, concerning the division of the sayings, is not born out by Cyril's writings either. Although he may not have used the term 'division' in relation to the sayings, he has not only constantly taught their difference—by expressions like 'as God', 'as man', 'divinely', 'humanly', etc.—, but it is also clear that this difference meant to him that the properties and deeds have two different sources. Already in *On the Incarnation*, he could write that he died "according to the nature like ours", and that he "attached the glory of lordship to himself", "showing dying as a human passion, and coming to life again as a divine work".[145] And in *Oratio ad dominas* we encounter: "he is anointed as man, the anointing not reaching to the nature of the divinity, but to the art of the economy".[146] With right and reason, then, the archbishop of Alexandria could write to his representatives in Constantinople that "we are not so foolish as to anathematize our own [teachings], but we stand by what we have written and think".[147]

Finally, de Halleux also discusses the way in which John of Antioch described Cyril's response to the Formula of Reunion, and how Cyril, in turn, assessed that description. John writes: the most holy bishop Cyril

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[144] *Ibid.*, 417: "Sans doute le term 'différence' ne connotait-il pas pour l'Alexandrin la même dualité ontologique que le terme 'division' … Du moins Cyrille ne ressent-il jamais le besoin de qualifier aucunement l'expression de la 'différence des natures', alors qu'il n'accepte celle de leur 'division' que dans une acception purement conceptuelle". See for a discussion of de Halleux's understanding of 'in contemplation only' section 8.4.

[145] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 712e–713a. Retained in *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 72$^{2-4}$. See for a fuller quotation section 7.2.3, n. 62. Earlier still, in *Thesaurus*, 428C, Cyril already wrote: "Our nature, then, grew in Wisdom", that is, in the Word. See section 3.4.3, n. 227.

[146] *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 82$^{27-29}$. See for other examples in this work of Cyril's, section 7.3.3.

[147] *Ep.* 37 (*CPG* 5337), ACO I.1.7, 154^{38f}, quoted by de Halleux (1993a), 414.

has instructed those who are still opposing the truth to confess with a clear voice the difference of the natures, and to divide the two [sorts of] sayings appropriately (καταλλήλως) over the natures, the identity of the one person (προσώπου) of the only-begotten Son of God being confessed by all.[148]

Cyril comments on this passage in his *Letter to Acacius of Melitene*. He first mentions the accusations that were levelled against him: Apollinarianism, that Christ's body did not have a soul, that a mixture or a confusion had taken place, or a change from the Word into flesh, or the other way round. He continues:

And they think besides that I agree with the blasphemies of Arius by not willing (διά τοι τὸ μὴ θέλειν) to recognise (εἰδέναι) a difference of sayings, and to say that some are God-befitting and others human and rather fitting to the economy with the flesh. That I am free of such things your perfection can testify to others.[149]

Cyril then tells that he has written to John of Antioch that he has never entertained such views, and he adds: "I have never denied differences of sayings, but I know that the Lord speaks both in a God-befitting way and humanly".[150] In order to point this out, Cyril writes, John has written the abovementioned sentence, "but such phrases are not mine, they were voiced by him".[151]

It is this last declaration of Cyril's—that these are not his words—which de Halleux makes much of. He even says that Cyril "acknowledged to Acacius of Melitene that John of Antioch had betrayed him".[152] In fact, Cyril merely writes that with these words John wanted to convey that the Alexandrian archbishop recognises the differences in sayings, that some are God-befitting and others spoken humanly, but that he (Cyril) himself would phrase it differently. If he did not use the expression 'to divide the two [sorts of] sayings appropriately (καταλλήλως) over the natures', this is not because Cyril denied that the natures

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[148] *John of Antioch to the Bishops of the East* (A 119; see chapter 5, n. 2), ACO I.1.7, 156$^{34–37}$, quoted by de Halleux (1993a), 413.

[149] *Ep.* 40, ACO I.1.4, 29$^{24–26}$. The translation by Wickham (1983), 57—"They believed besides that a refusal to recognize … would mean my sympathy with Arius' blasphemies"—, might suggest that Cyril acknowledges this refusal to be his. In the Greek original this is not the case; the refusal is part of what Cyril's critics think of him.

[150] *Ibid.*, 30$^{4–6}$.

[151] *Ibid.*, 30$^{7f.}$.

[152] De Halleux (1993a), 416: "De même avait-il avoué à Acace de Mélitène que Jean d'Antioche le trahissait lorsqu'il interprétait sa reconnaissance de la 'différence des natures' en termes d'une 'division des appellations corrélativement aux natures'."

remain, undivided, within the one Christ, but because he wanted to steer away from expressions which might be interpreted (when said 'with harmful intent', as he calls it in his *Second Letter to Succensus*)[153] as implying two separate beings.

8.5.3. *Of / Out of / In Two Natures*

Another issue on which de Halleux touches in his article is Cyril's understanding of the phrase 'union of two natures (δύο ... φύσεων ἕνωσις)' in the Formula of Reunion.[154] He quotes Cyril's *Letter to John of Antioch*, which also contains the Formula, as saying: "For the Lord Jesus Christ is one, although the difference of the natures, out of (ἐξ) which we say that the ineffable union has taken place, is not denied".[155] And he comments: "The concrete designation of the two natures and the ambiguous formula characterising their union are thus 'reinterpreted [relues]' in an Alexandrian sense".[156] The Belgian scholar reads into Cyril's addition of the preposition ἐξ to the genitive of the Formula of Reunion a deliberate act to shift the attention from the natures after the union to the natures before the union. Implicitly he sees the remaining presence of the two natures in Christ denied.

McGuckin shows a similar response to 'out of (ἐκ) two natures' in the *First Letter to Succensus*. He comments:

> The point here marks a crucial difference with the line that Chalcedon subsequently takes, for Cyril is happy to accept the notion 'two natures' but feels that this needs qualification if it is to avoid a tendency towards the kind of separatism that has been advocated by Nestorius. He wishes to speak of a concurrence to unity 'from two natures' but does not posit a union that abides 'in two natures'. For Cyril, to abide in two natures means to abide in an 'un-united' condition that can only be theoretically applied before the incarnation takes place; the incarnation itself is the resolution to union of the two natures. He is genuinely puzzled why anyone should continue to insist on the phrase 'in two natures'.[157]

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[153] *Ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 162[13].

[154] Formula of Reunion, ACO I.1.4, 17[14]; *DEC* I, 70[11].

[155] *Ep.* 39, ACO I.1.4, 18[26f.].

[156] De Halleux (1993a), 414. He adds that, in the way it speaks of the sufferings of Christ, the letter does not "create any echo of the Antiochene division of the sayings". Cyril, however, writes that "Christ suffered for us in the flesh, and not in the nature of the ineffable divinity" (*ep.* 39, 19[9–11]), hereby—in his own language—attributing the sufferings to the human nature.

[157] McGuckin (1994), 355, n. 6.

Wickham, on the other hand, commenting on a passage in the *Second Letter to Succensus*, states: "This is the closest Cyril comes to the ἐν δύο φύσεσι of the Chalcedonian definition", and adds that "there can be no doubt that Cyril affirmed here the permanent co-existence of the pair of mentally distinguishable elements in Christ".[158]

Should Cyril's use of ἐκ be interpreted as a denial that two natures abide after the union? It is true that the Alexandrian archbishop hardly speaks of a union 'of' (genitive) two natures, or 'of' the Word and his flesh.[159] He normally adds one of the prepositions ἐκ or πρός: it is a union out of two natures, or out of the Word and the flesh, or of the Word with (πρός) his flesh, or of the flesh with the Word. There may be other reasons, however, for the use of these prepositions than the suggestion that Cyril would deny that the natures remain undividedly after the union. A plausible reason would be that in this way something of the dynamics of the subject-attribute model, of Cyril's fundamental intuition, is retained. Implicitly it shows that the pre-existent Word assumed the flesh. It does not merely describe a *status quo*, but it indicates that with the incarnation God took the initiative to bring the two together.

Would Cyril have been puzzled by the expression 'in (ἐν) two natures', as McGuckin asserts? In his own time, 'in two natures' was not an issue; no one suggested the phrase, so Cyril did not have to pronounce an opinion about it. In an early work, the *Glaphyra*, we do find 'in (εἰς) two natures' once.[160] It has been argued in the present study that Cyril's metaphysical conception of the incarnate Christ implies (more than that it states it explicitly) that two INDIVIDUAL NATURES remain within the one SEPARATE REALITY which is Christ. This suggests that in itself Cyril would have no problems with the phrase 'in two natures', but the hesitance he shows at the end of his *Second Letter to Succensus* would probably apply here as well: when said 'with harmful intent' it could be interpreted as two *separate* natures. Within the context of the Chalcedonian definition, however, 'acknowledged in two natures' is so embedded within an unambiguous confession of the unity of

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[158] Wickham (1983), 89, n. 3.

[159] In the *Letter to Eulogius*, ACO I.1.4, 36⁹ᶠ·, Cyril employs a genitive with 'union': "If we say 'union', we confess that it is [a union] of flesh, animated with a rational soul, and the Word (σαρκὸς ἐψυχωμένης νοερῶς καὶ Λόγου)".

[160] *Glaph. in Lev.*, PG 69, 576B: the two birds in Lev. 14:4–7 represent "the heavenly man as well as the Word, in two natures (εἰς δύο μὲν φύσεις)"; see also n. 107.

Christ, that it seems likely that the Alexandrian archbishop would have accepted it.

Although most dyophysite language in Cyril's writings speaks of two natures *before* the union—two natures 'coming together', or the one Christ 'out of two natures', and similar phrases—, there are also instances where a human nature is mentioned after the union. A few examples. In *On the Incarnation*, the archbishop writes that the Word "has become man by nature",[161] and that the man who the Word has become "is deprived of the properties of the divinity in his own [the human] nature".[162] In *Festal Letter* 17, he takes the burning bush as a type of the incarnation and says that "just as the fire became bearable for the bush, so the majesty of the divinity for the nature like ours (τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς φύσει)".[163] And in *Contra Nestorium*, he maintains with respect to the mystery of Christ: "the principle (λόγος) of the union does not fail to acknowledge the difference (διαφοράν), but it puts aside the separation (διαίρεσιν), not confusing the natures or mingling the natures".[164] This is further evidence that Cyril would not have objected to 'in two natures', when the unity of Christ is safeguarded.

8.5.4. *The Passions of Christ*

In chapter 1 we have seen how in the modern debate on the (im)passibility of God Karl Rahner strongly defends God's impassibility. Speaking of neo-Chalcedonianism mainly in a theological, rather than a historical, sense, he writes that it applies Jesus Christ's death to the divinity, and adds that it relies on the theology of Cyril of Alexandria (see section 1.2.3.1). What does Cyril in fact teach on Christ's suffering?

His opponents accuse Cyril of 'theopaschism (θεοπάθεια)',[165] by which they mean that he would maintain that the divinity (θεότης)

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[161] *On the Incarnation*, 695c: ὡς αὐτὸς κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπος γεγονώς; also in *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 58[7]. See section 5.3.2.3, n. 71.

[162] *Ibid.*, 707a. See for the parallel passage in *Or. ad Th.*, 67[16–17], including the text-critical question involved, section 5.3.2.3, n. 72.

[163] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 3[120–122] (p. 282). See for other examples in this letter section 5.4.2.2.

[164] *Contra Nestorium* II.6, ACO I.1.6, 42[35f.]. See section 4.3.4, n. 76, for a fuller quotation of this passage.

[165] Cyril himself writes in his *Second Letter to Succensus*, ACO I.1.6, 161[8f.]: "For it is necessary to uphold both with respect to the one true Son: that he did not suffer divinely and that he is said to suffer humanly, for his (αὐτοῦ) flesh suffered. But those ones, on the other hand, think that by this we introduce what is called by them

itself suffered.[166] But already before the Nestorian controversy Cyril had explicitly stated that Christ suffered 'according to the flesh': "He underwent this common suffering of our nature, obviously according to the flesh (κατὰ τὴν σάρκα), although he was life by nature as God".[167] And after the year 428 he repeats many times that 'he did not suffer in his own nature', from the *Letter to the Monks* on.[168] He did insist, though, that the divine Word appropriated the sufferings of his own body and that, therefore, the Word himself could—and should—be said to have suffered. The Antiochenes equated 'the Word' with his divine nature, Cyril did not, and therefore, they misinterpreted him.

Modern commentators can—and do—fall into another misunderstanding. That the incarnate Word suffers, not in his own nature, but in the flesh, Cyril at times expresses with words and expressions which could be misinterpreted in a Docetic sense. So, he often writes that the Word 'is said (λέγεται)' to have been born, to have suffered, to have died, etc. This is not to deny the reality of Christ's human passions,[169] but to state implicitly that the Word did not undergo them as God, but as man. Sometimes, he even says that the Word 'seems' (δοκεῖν) to have suffered, which once again is not a negation of Christ's human sufferings, but a way of safeguarding that the human properties are not regarded as stemming from the divine nature.[170] In this sense, the expression is akin to that of the twelfth anathema: the Word of God suffered 'in the flesh (σαρκί)', was crucified 'in the flesh', and tasted death 'in the flesh'.

Werner Elert, who, within the patristic context, is positive about Cyril of Alexandria's understanding of Christ's passions in general, points to the archbishop's interpretation of Christ's cry, "My God, my

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theopaschism (θεοπάθειαν)". See for a discussion of terms like 'theopaschism', Sarot (1990).

[166] Nestorius writes in his *Second Letter to Cyril*, ACO I.1.1, 30³³–31²: "Throughout the divine Scripture, whenever it mentions the Lord's economy, the birth and the suffering are handed down to us as belonging, not to the divinity, but to the humanity of Christ", implying that Cyril refers them to the divinity. For similar reasons, Theodoret of Cyrus, *Contra Theodoretum*, ACO I.1.6, 144²²ᶠ, and Andrew of Samosata, *Contra Orientales*, ACO I.1.7, 61²¹ᶠ, oppose the twelfth anathema.

[167] *In Jo.* XII, vol. 3, 96²⁻⁵ (1068e).

[168] For example, *ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 22⁶ᶠ; *ep.* 4, ACO I.1.1, 27¹⁴⁻¹⁶; *ep.* 17, ACO I.1.1, 37⁹⁻¹¹.

[169] Wessel (2004), 133, concludes from this λέγεται to a Docetic understanding of Christ's growth in Luke 2:52. See chapter 5, n. 167.

[170] For example, *Contra Nestorium* V.5, ACO I.1.6, 101⁷⁻¹⁰.

God, why have you forsaken me?" (Mt. 27:46), as an unhappy exception. Unlike Rahner, Elert regards the doctrine of God's impassibility as alien to the biblical God: it is a Platonic teaching which has entered Christianity and which from Clement of Alexandria on has dominated the Church's conception of God.[171] For the Antiochene School especially, this doctrine was a starting-point on the basis of which other teachings were assessed.[172] Cyril, on the other hand, though respecting God's ἀπάθεια, let it be determined by Scripture's teaching on Christ's suffering and death, according to Elert.

It may be added that Cyril was aware that one of Nestorius's reasons to find fault with his own christology was that the Constantinopolitan archbishop wanted to safeguard the Word's divinity and impassibility. But on Cyril's view, the way in which Nestorius did this meant that he did not value the reality of the incarnation. Therefore, he could write: "Out of excessive reverence, he blushes, it seems, at the measures of the kenosis and cannot bear to see the Son, ..., descend into abasement".[173] Especially in *Contra Nestorium*, Cyril uses the verb 'to blush' a number of times, declaring both that Nestorius blushes at the inhumanation and that the Word himself did not blush at it.

We return to Elert's view now. He states that there is no Docetism in Cyril's christology. The incarnation is real, the suffering pertains to Christ's human nature, but the unity of Christ is such that the Logos may be regarded as the subject also of the human sayings. Cyril circumscribed the Platonic axiom at least to such an extent that he dared to attribute the suffering, even if only σαρκί, to the incarnate God. But although Cyril's christology is of one piece, there is one defect, and that concerns his interpretation of the *derelictio*.[174] In *On the Unity of Christ*, Cyril writes that "if someone thinks that Christ had come down to this point of faint-heartedness, ..., regarding the suffering unbearable, ..., he evidently accuses him of not being God".[175] Elert adds, referring to a nearby paragraph in Cyril's treatise: "Christ does

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[171] Elert (1950), 196: "Die Platonische Apathie Gottes bildet von jetzt ab [from Clement of Alexandria on] das Apriori der gesamten orthodox-kirchlichen Gottesvorstellung. In dem allgemeinen Strom gibt es nur einen einzigen Wellenbrecher, die theopaschitische Formel: Gott hat *doch* gelitten".

[172] Elert (1957), 87.

[173] *Contra Nestorium* IV.5, 85⁵⁻⁸.

[174] Elert (1957), 95: "Seine Christologie ist aus einem Guss, aber sie hat eine Fehlstelle, welche die gesamte altkirchliche Christologie nicht auszufüllen vermochte". Cf. Elert (1950), 201.

[175] *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 755e–756a.

not say this [My God, …] in his own name, but in the name of the whole nature".[176]

It is true that in this passage Cyril all too easily lets the human anguish of Christ at the cross be conquered by his divine majesty. The cry 'why have you forsaken me?' is, according to Cyril, not an expression of Christ's human weakness, but a prayer of the incarnate Word on behalf of the whole of humankind: "In me you see the human nature purified, … Give from now on the good things out of your gentleness, undo the forsakenness, rebuke corruption".[177]

When Cyril comments on the same verse in *Oratio ad augustas*, he gives a similar interpretation with one important difference. When Adam sinned, the human nature was somehow forsaken by God. Therefore, when the Word of God took hold of Abraham's seed, he had to stop, together with the ancient curse and the corruption, also this forsakenness. Cyril continues: "As one of the forsaken ones, then, insofar as he himself participated in blood and flesh like ourselves, he says 'Why have you forsaken me?'," to which he immediately adds: "he clearly dissolved the forsakenness which had befallen us" and he "called him [the Father] to kindness towards us as towards himself first".[178] Although the cry is still interpreted as a prayer on behalf of the whole human race, Cyril here explicitly states that the incarnate Word was himself forsaken as well, as man. He does, however, not dwell on Christ's forsakenness and on the feelings of anguish, but immediately speaks of its dissolution.

Within Cyril's own understanding of the incarnation and the passion, however, he could have given this anguish a place. For a notion which recurs in various of his writings is that the Word allowed his own flesh to act according to the laws of its own human nature. That is, the incarnate Word underwent human experiences like birth,[179] the growth in stature, wisdom and grace,[180] the growth in knowledge of right and wrong,[181] being subject to God,[182] but also weakness in the

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[176] Elert (1957), 95. Cf. *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 757c: "For he invited the good favour from the Father not on himself, but rather on ourselves".

[177] *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 757b.

[178] *Or. ad aug.*, c. 17, ACO I.1.5, 35$^{1–5}$. See section 7.4.1, n. 182.

[179] *Contra Nestorium*, I.1, 17^{19}: "he proceeded necessarily through the laws of the human nature"; I.2, 19^{36}: "not dishonouring the laws of our nature".

[180] *On the Unity of Christ*, 760a: "economically allowing his own flesh to move according to the laws of its own nature".

[181] *Festal Letter* 17, SC 434, 2$^{127\,f.}$ (p. 270); see section 5.4.2.2.

[182] *Ep.* 17, ACO I.1.1, 36$^{27\,f.}$; see section 7.7.1.2, n. 249.

face of death,[183] and death itself.[184] In the last two examples, it is especially clear that there is no immediate dissolution of human weaknesses by the divine power, but the deliverance is delayed. In the *Letter to the Monks*, Cyril writes that Christ "allowed death for a short time to pull down his flesh, but then he abolished it, as life refusing to suffer what is against his own nature".[185] In a similar way, he could have said that the Word allowed his flesh to suffer anguish at the cross for a short time, but he does not do that.

It may still be added that the passions which the Word allowed are the irreproachable (ἀδιάβλητος) ones, like fatigue, sleep, anxiety, and pain.[186] When Cyril states that the Word has been made like us, his brothers, in all things, he repeatedly adds: 'without sin (δίχα or χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας)' (cf. Hebr. 2:17; 4:15).[187] That's why he objects to Nestorius's writing that Christ as high priest "offers the sacrifice of his body for himself and the race",[188] demanding: "Convict him, then, of sin. If he has offered a sacrifice together with us, show him to have sinned with us".[189] Cyril does not deny the reality of Christ's human passions, but confesses him to be sinless.

And in one chapter in *Oratio ad augustas*, the Alexandrian archbishop distances himself unambiguously from Apollinarius, not just asserting that Christ had a human soul, but adding that the Word allowed the soul to suffer its own things just as he sometimes allowed the body to suffer its own things.[190] As examples of passions of Christ's soul Cyril mentions fear, grief and timidity. He does not mention the adage

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[183] *Contra Nestorium* V.3, ACO I.1.6, 98[33]: "he allowed the flesh to move according to its own laws".

[184] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 712e = *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 72[2 f.]; see section 7.2.3, n. 62. *Contra Nestorium* V.6, ACO I.1.6, 103[38]–104[1]: "Therefore, the body yielded to the laws of its own nature and received the taste of death, and the united Word allowed it to suffer this for profit's sake".

[185] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 22[13–17].

[186] *Ep. 45*, ACO I.1.6, 155[20–22]: "In this way he is said to be hungry and to be wearied from a journey, also to allow sleep and anxiety and pain, and the other human, irreproachable passions". Already in *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 692bc, Cyril writes that "he also used his own flesh as an instrument with respect to the works of the flesh and the physical weaknesses that are without blame (μώμου μακράν), and his own soul with respect to the human and blameless (ἀνυπαίτια) passions".

[187] For example, *Contra Nestorium* III.2, ACO I.1.6, 59[22–24]; cf. *ep.* 46, ACO I.1.6, 159[5–8].

[188] *Contra Nestorium* III.5, ACO I.1.6, 71[31–34], partly repeated in 73[24 f.]. Also in Nestorius (1905), 240[4–9].

[189] *Ibid.*, III.6, ACO I.1.6, 73[41 f.].

[190] *Or. ad aug.*, c. 44, ACO I.1.5, 59[1–3].

'what has not been assumed has not been healed', but this notion seems implied when he writes: "For it was necessary (ἔδει) that he was seen to have become like us through every fleshly and psychic reality (πράγματος)".[191]

When in certain contexts Cyril writes that the soul did not suffer in its own nature,[192] he is not thereby denying the passibility of the soul. He is rather distinguishing between the passions of the soul and those of the body. The passions of the body—like receiving blows, burning, and being cut—do not affect the soul in its own nature, but indirectly, via the body. Cyril at times uses this as an example for the relation between the Word and the passions of his own body: the passions of his body do not affect the Word in his own nature, just as they do not affect the soul in its own nature, but the Word appropriates the passions of his body, just as the soul does. There is, however, an important difference between the Word and a soul, on Cyril's understanding: the Word is completely impassible, he does not have any passions in his own nature, while a soul does have its own passions.[193] In the *Scholia* this is expressed in the following way: the soul co-suffers (συναλγεῖ) with the body, while the Word did not co-feel (συναισθάνεσθαι) the tortures, but did have knowledge (ἦν ἐν εἰδήσει) of what happened to the flesh, and appropriated (ᾠκειοῦτο) the weaknesses of the flesh.[194]

When, in the course of such argumentations, Cyril writes that the Word is impassible "because he is bodiless (ὅτι καὶ ἀσώματον)",[195] one should not conclude that the archbishop regards souls, which by themselves are bodiless as well, also as completely impassible.[196]

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[191] *Ibid.*, 58[35f.]. The expression 'what has not been assumed has not been saved' is found in the fragments of chapter VIII of the *Commentary on John*, vol. 2, 318[9f.] (705a). But Liébaert (1951), 133–136, may be right when he argues that this passage is not authentic.

[192] *Ep.* 10, ACO I.1.1, 110[27–29]; *Contra Nestorium* V.4, ACO I.1.6, 100[31f.]; *Scholia on the Incarnation*, ACO I.5.1, 209[15–18] (Latin); *ibid.*, 220[27–29].

[193] Besides the chapter on Apollinarianism in *Oratio ad augustas* (c. 44, ACO I.1.5, 58[15]–59[10]), a passage in the *Letter to the Monks* is also unambiguous about the passions of the soul: Cyril calls on the monks to "fight manfully against the passions of both body and soul (τῶν παθῶν ψυχικῶν τε ἅμα καὶ σωματικῶν)" (ACO I.1.1, 11[4]).

[194] *Scholia on the Incarnation*, ACO I.5.1, 220[25]–221[6].

[195] *Ep.* 4, ACO I.1.1, 27[16]. Cf. *ep.* 50, ACO I.1.3, 94[11f.]; *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 769b.

[196] A discussion on these issues includes the following contributions: Jouassard (1955); Diepen (1956); Jouassard (1957a); Meunier (1997), 243–253.

8.5.5. *Christ's Full Humanity*

Already in *On the Incarnation*, Cyril of Alexandria emphasized that the Word assumed 'a perfect humanity', consisting of a body and a rational soul.[197] And we have just seen that in *Oratio ad augustas* he not only speaks about the passions of Christ's body, but also about those of his soul. Although these are fundamental aspects of the incarnate Word's full humanity, more can be said about it. To begin with, we have seen Elert's example of the *derelictio*, where Cyril does not take Christ's human anguish at the cross seriously enough. While there is room in his christology for a view in which the Word allows his humanity to suffer for some time, he chooses a different interpretation of the forsakenness at the cross. In this case, all too easily the human weaknesses are overcome by the divine power.

Another such example may be mentioned. When speaking about Christ's fasting in the desert before he was tempted by Satan, Cyril writes: "Having fasted sufficiently and holding the flesh without drink and food incorrupt by the God-befitting power, he hardly (μόλις) allowed it [the flesh] to suffer its own things".[198] Although he adds that Christ is said to be hungry in order that through both he would be known to be both God and man, one may ask whether Christ's human experiences are not shortcut by divine intervention.

What about Christ's human will? It is hardly mentioned in Cyril's writings. In his treatment of Mt. 26:39 and John 6:38 in *Contra Nestorium*, he explicitly asks what the own will of Christ is, which is distinguished from that of the Father. But he does not answer that it is his human will, he rather responds that to die in the flesh is to him ignoble, unusual and repugnant, meaning to say that not willing this death is good, not evil.[199] In his *Commentary on John*, however, in his comment on John 6:38–39, he does go beyond this.[200]

First, he says similarly:

> Do you see how the death was unwilled (ἀβούλητος) by Christ because of the flesh and the dishonour [that results] from suffering, and nevertheless willed (θελητός) until he had brought to a happy conclusion for the

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[197] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 688b–e.
[198] *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 45³⁶–46².
[199] *Contra Nestorium* V.3, ACO I.1.6, 98²⁶–99¹¹, esp. 99⁴⁻⁸.
[200] *In Jo.* IV.1, vol. 1, 485–499. Russell (2000), 111–114, gives a translation of the first three and a half pages under the title "The Divine and Human Wills of Christ".

whole world the good pleasure of the Father, that is, the salvation and the life of all?[201]

When he later on repeats this, however, he adds: "the suffering on the cross is somehow also seen as unwilled (ἀνεθέλητον) by the Saviour Christ, insofar as he was man (καθόπερ ἦν ἄνθρωπος)".[202] 'Insofar as he was man' is a typical phrase for Cyril to express that it belongs to the human rather than to the divine nature. In other words, it was the human will of Christ which did not will suffering and death.

Thus, Cyril does allow for a human will in Christ, which may be opposed to the divine will in that God wants to save the world through his death, while Christ himself, as man, does not want to die. But Cyril makes clear that this human will is good, not evil, and that it submitted to the divine will.[203] Even so, instances in which the Alexandrian archbishop speaks of Christ's human will are rare. We find another example in *Contra Nestorium*, when Cyril comments on John 17:1, "Father, ..., glorify your Son": "he devises the prayer as man and wills the Father to consent with him who transforms the human nature to what it was at the beginning".[204] Here, Christ as man utters his will in a prayer to the Father, but now the human will is in accordance with the divine will.

Another issue touching on the full humanity of the incarnate Word is the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan and his reception of the holy Spirit. Grillmeier comments on Cyril's understanding of this when discussing the Ethiopian church, which in the *Qērellos* has had a number of Cyril's writings in an early Ethiopic translation. Although he qualifies his findings, writing that for an overall judgement more research would be needed,[205] the German scholar makes a bold statement. Based on an investigation of *On the Unity of Christ*, he concludes:

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[201] *Ibid.*, 488 (332c).

[202] *Ibid.*, 496⁵⁻⁷ (338a). Cyril argues that it is natural for a human being not to want to die.

[203] *Ibid.*, 496¹⁴⁻¹⁸ (338b): "But since there was no other way to raise again to life what had fallen into death, unless the only-begotten Word of God became man, and having become [man] he had (ἔδει) to suffer, he made what was unwilled willed (τὸ ἀνεθέλητον ἐποιήσατο θελητόν), the divine nature having permitted this because of his love for us".

[204] *Contra Nestorium* IV.3, ACO I.1.6, 83¹⁰⁻¹³.

[205] Aloys Grillmeier, *CCT* II/4, 343, n. 19; *JdChr* II/4, 350, n. 19.

> For Cyril joins Logos and humanity so closely together in the incarnate
> One that there is no longer any place for a lasting impartation of grace
> by the Spirit to inhere in the humanity as such.[206]

From Cyril's comment on John 1:32–34, in his *Commentary on John*, he
infers more accurately that "Christ receives the grace of the Spirit
not for himself but for us out of the salvation-economic intention of
God".[207]

In *On the Unity of Christ*, Cyril writes that "the name of 'Christ', and
also the reality (χρῆμα), that is, the anointment, has been added to the
Only-Begotten together with the ways (τρόπων) of the kenosis", and: "it
can very well signify that he has been anointed, insofar as he appeared
as man".[208] Thus, for Cyril the anointment is a reality which has been
added to the Word as part of his becoming man. Cyril's concern in the
context is that the anointment does not pertain to a man by himself,
separate from the Word of God. Therefore, there is no need for him to
dwell on the issues Grillmeier raises: whether the anointment leads to a
lasting impartation of grace by the Spirit. From the fact that Cyril does
not mention it in this passage, one cannot conclude that he denies it.
And in his comment on John 1:32–33, Cyril does speak about it.

In his *Commentary on John*, Cyril starts with an anti-Arian argumenta-
tion: from Christ's reception of the Spirit one cannot conclude that the
Son is not consubstantial with the Father. The archbishop rather gives
it a place within God's plan of salvation. When God created man he
gave him his Spirit, but by his disobedience man lost the Spirit, grace,
and the divine image. Then God sent his Son to become man, a second
Adam.

> And since the Word of God has become man, he receives the Spirit from
> the Father as one of us, not receiving something for himself individually
> (ἰδικῶς), for he himself was the giver of the Spirit, but in order that he
> who knew no sin would, by receiving [him] as man, preserve [him] for
> the nature and again root in us the grace which had left us. … For he
> had flown out of us because of sin, but he who knew no sin has become
> as one of us, in order that the Spirit will get accustomed to remain in
> us, having no reason for withdrawal or departure in him. Therefore, he
> receives the Spirit for us through himself. … Just as, being life by nature,

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[206] *Ibid.*, 343; *JdChr* II/4, 350. On p. 342, Grillmeier cites a passage from the *Qērellos*, the Greek equivalent of which is found in *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 726c.

[207] *Ibid.*, 356; *JdChr* II/4, 363.

[208] *On the Unity of Christ*, SC 97, 727cd. Cf. *Contra Nestorium* III.3, ACO I.1.6, 67[29f.]: "You see him anointed humanly; see the same one also anointing divinely".

he died for our sake according to the flesh, in order to conquer death for us, . . ., so he also receives the Spirit for our sake, in order to sanctify the whole nature.[209]

One cannot say then that, according to Cyril, "there is no longer any place for a lasting impartation of grace by the Spirit to inhere in the humanity as such". Just as Christ's death is a real death, so his reception of the Spirit is real.[210] But both, his death and his reception of the Spirit as man, are part of the plan of salvation, and are, therefore, 'not for himself, but for us'.

In this passage, Cyril does not use his oft-repeated phrase 'in him first', but it is clear that this is his intention. Christ received the Spirit as the new Adam, and because he knows no sin, the Spirit is there to stay, in himself first, but through him also in the rest of humankind. As he writes elsewhere in the *Commentary on John*: "Christ first received the Spirit as first-fruits of the renewed nature".[211] Daniel Keating gives a helpful account of how Cyril interprets Christ's baptism and his reception of the Spirit in his commentaries on John and Luke.[212] Keating's criticism is more to the point than Grillmeier's general remark: "Cyril apparently allows no opening for Jesus to receive the Spirit with a view to his unique career as earthly Messiah"; he only gives a representative or exemplary interpretation of the baptism.[213]

Christ's humanity is as dependent on the Spirit and on divine grace as the rest of humankind. Without that grace a man falls into sin. But Christ was sinless, from his birth on. As Cyril says in *Festal Letter* 19:

> For the body, having become the Word's own, was immediately (εὐθύς) freed from passions like ours, and the sting of the movements unto meanness was removed. It was as it were transelemented unto God-befitting and ineffable purity, sin being put to death in it.[214]

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[209] *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 184 f. (123d–124a).

[210] Cf. *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, c. 39, 55$^{9–11, 16f.}$: "Observe again that our Lord Jesus Christ receives the Spirit humanly, but that he fulfils the promise of the Father through implanting the Spirit in the believers ... The reception, then, is human, but to pour out the gift of the Spirit out of his own fulness into others is God-befitting and beyond man".

[211] *Ibid.*, V.2, vol. 1, 692 (472a). Cf. *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, c. 27, 44^{10}–45^{19}, esp. 44$^{24, 26, 28f., 30f.}$, 45$^{9, 11f.}$: "For he does not receive for himself, but rather for us ... having descended on him as in a second first-fruits of the race ... But although he receives humanly on behalf of us, see him giving divinely ... in himself first, he gives divinely out of his own nature".

[212] Keating (2004), 20–39.

[213] *Ibid.*, 36.

[214] *Festal Letter* 19, PG 77, 829A. See section 7.9.2, n. 298.

By the grace of the Spirit, Jesus Christ was immediately liberated from the sinful passions, but at times the Logos allowed the irreproachable passions to run their human course, on Cyril's understanding.

Then there is the question of the anhypostasia of Christ's humanity, raised by Schoonenberg (see section 1.2.3.2): whether this humanity has its own hypostasis or is 'enhypostasized' in the divine hypostasis of the Word. This question presupposes a two-level metaphysics which in Cyril is only present in embryonic form. For Cyril, the expression 'in a hypostasis' and the adjective 'enhypostatic (ἐνυπόστατος)' denote that a reality belongs to the Aristotelian category of substance. A hypostasis is a really existing individual substance or nature, without reference to its quiddity. It is not a property, neither a natural property nor a separable accident, it is not a DEPENDENT REALITY. When the individual nature or substance exists by itself, its hypostasis is a SEPARATE REALITY, but Cyril at times uses 'hypostasis' also for natures and substances which are part of a composition, in which case it indicates an INDIVIDUAL REALITY. On the other hand, he may use the term for the composition itself, and it is in this sense that he calls the incarnate Word 'one hypostasis'. This one hypostasis is the SEPARATE REALITY which is the composition of the divine and human natures of the Logos.

While in trinitarian contexts Cyril also calls the three divine persons hypostases, in his christology he does not link the divine hypostasis of the Word with the one hypostasis which is the result of the incarnation. This link was made by the later neo-Chalcedonian theologians. For Cyril, a hypostasis is the reality of a nature or substance, compounded or not. When a nature exists in reality, its hypostasis exists; when it does not exist, there is no hypostasis either. The idea of a pre-existent hypostasis in which a nature may become hypostasized is absent from Cyril's writings, at least until the end of the year 430.

If Cyril does not describe the later concept of enhypostasia with terms related to the word 'hypostasis', does he express this notion in other ways? As we have seen, the concept of 'person' as a bearer of natures, at another metaphysical level than the natures themselves, is only present in Cyril's writings as an implication. It is suggested when he writes that the Word before the incarnation and the Word with the flesh are 'the same one'. Also when the Word and his divine nature do not coincide in expressions like 'he did not suffer in his own nature'. And finally, when the Word is presented as presiding over the human nature, when he allows that nature to move according to its own laws.

But Cyril does not have a technical term for this 'person'. It is so little developed that it goes too far to draw any conclusions from this regarding the fulness of Christ's humanity (or lack thereof).

Neither can one say, therefore, that for Cyril the divine hypostasis is the ground of the union of the two natures in Christ. Grillmeier distinguishes two other grounds: (1) God's creative power; (2) deification (θέωσις).[215] He states that deification is a ground for Christ's union for neo-Chalcedonians like Leontius of Jerusalem and pseudo-Dionysius: the more Christ's humanity is deified, the stronger the union is. For this ground Grillmeier refers back to Gregory of Nyssa, not to Cyril of Alexandria, and rightly so. For in Cyril deification is not a ground for the union of the Word with his flesh, but it is its corollary. The ground is the ineffable will and power of the divine Word. He voluntarily empties himself. He assumes the flesh, he makes it his own (ἴδιον ποιεῖσθαι). And when he wills, his humanity is not deified completely, but he allows his human nature to be hungry, tired, troubled, and even to die.

Just as Grillmeier cites a text from Justinian in which the Word is said to have created for himself flesh animated by a rational and intellectual soul, so we find a similar expression in Cyril. In his *Letter to Valerian* he writes that the Word, "having created (δημιουργήσας) a temple for himself through the holy and consubstantial Spirit, has become man".[216] Grillmeier also emphasizes the difference between divinity and humanity. So does Cyril: for example, "I myself, too, would admit that the difference or the interval between humanity and divinity is vast (πλείστην)".[217] It is precisely for that reason that he often calls the union 'ineffable'. It is only by the will and the power of the divine Word that two things so different by nature can be united.

What about Grillmeier's 'Cyrillian / neo-Chalcedonian temptation': that there is not enough autonomy for Christ's humanity?[218] He refers to a text in which Cyril speaks of "one operation (μίαν … ἐνέργειαν)",[219] when the Word's divine power co-operates with Jesus's hand to raise Jairus's daughter, and compares it with a text from pseudo-Dionysius, in which "a new divine-human operation (καινήν τινα τὴν θεανδρικὴν

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[215] Grillmeier (1984), 91 f. See section 1.2.3.4.
[216] *Ep.* 50, ACO I.1.3, 92[23f.].
[217] *Contra Nestorium* II.6, ACO I.1.6, 42[32f.].
[218] Grillmeier (1984), 92.
[219] *In Jo.* IV.2, vol. 1, 530 (361d).

ἐνέργειαν)” is mentioned.[220] He then moves on to Severus of Antioch
and comments: “The idea of the 'one theandric operation' is brought
in full accordance with the *mia physis* formula, and so Cyril's basic idea
is integratively effectuated”.[221]

However, this study has shown that Cyril's basic idea is dyophysite
in content. He did not introduce the μία φύσις formula because it
was an adequate expression of his own christology, but only because
it appeared in a quotation which he thought to be from Athanasius.
And the text about the 'one operation' to which Grillmeier refers is
the only one in the whole of Cyril's oeuvre in which he uses this
phrase for the co-operation of the Word with his humanity. His stan-
dard teaching is that 'operation (ἐνέργεια)' and 'nature (φύσις)' go
hand in hand: if individuals have the same nature, they also have
the same natural operation; if they have different natures, their nat-
ural operation will be different as well.[222] Although Miaphysites and
neo-Chalcedonians could refer to Cyril for some of their formulas and
ideas, then, they could only develop these ideas more fully by neglect-
ing Cyril's more dyophysite christological teaching. I suggest that in this
sense the term 'neo-Chalcedonian' is useful both historically and theo-
logically: it denotes a christology based on the definition of Chalcedon
which incorporates formulas and ideas which can be found in Cyril of
Alexandria's writings, but which do not belong to the main thrust of his
christology (and this includes the μία φύσις formula and the phrase μία
ἐνέργεια).

With expressions like 'Cyril's basic idea', then, Grillmeier does not
do justice to Cyril's fundamental dyophysitism. This is not to deny that
there is a tendency in the archbishop's christology to let the Word be
the dominant factor in Christ to such an extent that his humanity

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[220] Grillmeier (1984), 93. See also section 1.2.3.4, n. 189.

[221] *Ibid.*, 94: “Die Vorstellung von der 'einen theandrischen Wirksamkeit' wird ganz
mit der Mia physis-Formel zur Deckung gebracht und damit die Grundvorstellung
Cyrills einheitlich durchgeführt”.

[222] See n. 20 for several places where Cyril applies this principle to the Father and
the Son: because they have the same operation they are consubstantial. Another place
where Cyril employs the word ἐνέργεια in a christological context is *On the Incarnation*,
SC 97, 707ab = *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 67[18–20]: the Word “grants the glory of the
God-befitting operation (ἐνεργείας) to his own flesh”. Here the divine operation is
related to the divine nature, while it becomes as it were the flesh's operation through
the communication of idioms. This way of speaking about it fits better in Cyril's
dyophysite christology than referring to the co-operation of divinity and humanity as
'one operation'.

has less autonomy than the Gospel accounts warrant. According to Cyril, a human being needs the holy Spirit in order to live a sinful and incorruptible life. And since the Word is always together with his own Spirit, the condition for a sinful and incorruptible life was fulfilled in Jesus Christ from his conception on. For the irreproachable passions the Word allowed his flesh to move according to the laws of its own nature. But several questions may be asked regarding the way in which Cyril elaborates on this.

First, we have seen instances in which the human passions are all too quickly conquered by the divine power: the hunger in the desert, before the temptation by the devil, and the anguish at the cross.[223] Here, Grillmeier's comment on a "premature introduction of the *theôsis*" applies.[224] This is not consistently done by Cyril, nor does his christology demand it, but we do find examples of it in his writings. Secondly, Grillmeier rightly states that the maxim 'what has not been assumed has not been healed' should also and precisely apply to human freedom, to the autonomy of human willing.[225] It is true that man cannot live a sinful and incorruptible life without the Spirit, but it is his own choice to let the Spirit be active in his life. Keating has shown that Cyril does give the human will a place in the appropriation of God's salvation in Christians.[226] The human will of Christ, however, gets little attention in Cyril's writings. It is not fully absent, and his christology allows for it, but it is certainly an underdeveloped area.

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[223] See sections 8.5.4 and 8.5.5. A more general statement is found in *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 59[1–3]: "just as he economically allowed his own flesh sometimes (ἔσθ' ὅτε) to suffer its own things, so, again, he allowed his soul to suffer its own things". The word 'sometimes' makes deification the norm and passion the exception during Christ's earthly life, rather than the other way round.

[224] Grillmeier (1984), 95: "vorschnelles Einschalten der Theiosis".

[225] *Ibid.*, 95. Also for Cyril, the will, the freedom to choose, is an essential part of human nature. For example, in *Festal Letter* 6, SC 372, 4[48–152] (pp. 352–360), he accuses the Greeks that "they deprive man of his noblest [properties] (καλλίστων) and they foolishly obliterate the great privilege of the nature, for they neither say nor wish that he possesses his own power to choose (προαιρέσεως) nor that he makes a free choice (ἐλευθέραν … τὴν αἵρεσιν) in his deeds" (4[56–59], p. 352).

[226] Keating (2004), 111–118.

8.6. Soteriology[227]

For Cyril of Alexandria, christology is bound up closely with soteriology. He sees this in the Nicene Creed: "who for us men and for our salvation came down and became incarnate …", but also in the ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, so often repeated in the epistles of the apostle Paul. In his argumentation for a particular christological view he frequently gives soteriological reasons. The mystery of godliness (1 Tim. 3:16) embraces, for Cyril, both the uniqueness of Christ's person—the Word of God who has become man—and man's salvation in and through Christ. The framework in which all the various aspects of christology and soteriology find their place is the overarching narrative of man's disobedience and God's plan of salvation.[228]

According to this narrative, grace and the holy Spirit play a vital role in the life of man. Although he has been created as a living being apart from God, man cannot exist as God planned for him without the holy Spirit and his grace. Human nature needs grace and the Spirit both physically and morally. Since without them man falls into corruption and sin, God gave him the Spirit at the very beginning. On Cyril's interpretation, Gen. 2:7—God "breathed into his face the breath of life"—means that man, consisting of soul and body, received the holy Spirit, and thus he could partake of the divine nature. It is when Adam became disobedient and his descendants continued sinning, that God took his Spirit from man. As a result, man is given over to sin and corruption, and the image of God in him disappeared.

In his love for humankind, however, God did not leave man in this predicament, but prepared for him a way of salvation. The Word of God emptied himself and became man, a second Adam, a new root for humanity, in which humankind is recapitulated (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι). Because he is sinless, he could receive the holy Spirit, and the Spirit could remain on him. How the incarnation and Christ's life, death, resurrection and ascension are beneficial to human beings may be discussed in three parts: the restoration of human nature in Christ; the saving passion; personal appropriation.

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[227] Since Cyril of Alexandria's soteriology is not the main focus of this study, it will be dealt with very briefly. Recent studies in this area are: Keating (2004), Meunier (1997), Münch-Labacher (1996), Welch (1994b), Koen (1991).

[228] See section 3.4.4. Keating (2004) in particular gives a useful account of this narrative. A summary can be found in *In Jo.* II.1, vol. 1, 182–185.

In Cyril's metaphysics, there is a remaining link between an individual nature and the common nature to which it belongs. The natural properties of the common nature are manifested in the individual natures. When the Word of God became flesh, he assumed the human common nature and became an individual man. In the case of Christ, however, the natural properties of the human common nature did not determine his individual humanity, but being also God, he could 'transelement' them, that is, he could change certain human properties; for example, he could transform corruptibility into incorruptibility.[229] This applied first of all to sinfulness, which had become an inseparable accident for man ever since Adam had become disobedient. From the very moment of conception, the Word overcame this sinfulness in his individual humanity. But the Word allowed his humanity to suffer weaknesses of body and soul, like hunger, thirst, fatigue, anguish, fear, and finally death, as long as he lived on this earth. After the resurrection, however, these weaknesses were fully overcome in his own humanity.

This 'transelementing' took place 'in Christ first', as Cyril often repeats. He is the first-fruits, the first-born from the dead. "Christ has appeared as it were as first-fruits of those who have been recreated into newness of life, and himself as the first heavenly man".[230] We find this already in the *Thesaurus*.[231] He was the first to receive the Spirit.[232] The corruptible was changed into incorruption in himself first.[233] And when he ascended into heaven, he was the first human being who was placed before the Father.[234] Now, just as the first Adam transmitted sin and corruption to his offspring, so Christ, the new Adam, can transmit this new life to 'the whole nature', to the rest of humankind. In this way, the resurrection from the dead is imparted to all individual human beings. But the life in eternal bliss is only for those who love him and do not remain disobedient.

Christ's human soul plays a role in this. When in *On the Incarnation*—thus, already before the Nestorian controversy—Cyril argues against Apollinarianism (without mentioning the name of the Laodicean

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[229] See for the verb 'to transelement' sections 6.4.3 and 7.2.2.

[230] *In Jo.* XI.11, vol. 2, 729^{11-13} (994d).

[231] *Thesaurus*, 273B: "we have the beginnings of the state which is pleasing to God in him first".

[232] See n. 211.

[233] *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 95^{31-33}.

[234] *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, $52^{36f.}$.

bishop), he writes that by the assumption of the body the Word delivered humankind from corruption and death, while by making a human soul his own he gave his own stability to our souls, so that they could become stronger than sin and live a new life in the Spirit. Besides, he used his own flesh as an instrument with respect to the blameless bodily weaknesses, and his own soul with respect to the blameless passions.[235] Just as Christ's body, his soul is called an 'instrument' here. His soul is necessary to liberate our souls from sin and passions, but its role is passive: it undergoes blameless passions and it is liberated by the divine Word. Christ's human will is hardly mentioned in Cyril's writings.[236]

Cyril seldom uses the terminology of 'deification' for man's salvation. Nestorius's accusation that he made a man into a god will have been one of the reasons for this. Cyril does use the biblical language of 'partaking of the divine nature' (2 Peter 1:4). He explains this in terms of 'transelementing': human nature remains what it is and does not change into the divine nature, but certain of its natural properties are transformed into 'divine' ones.

Cyril's soteriology is not merely 'physical', as if the fact of the incarnation, the assumption of the human nature, were enough for salvation. There are clear indications that Christ had to live a human life, not just as an example for us, but also for salvific reasons. We have already seen that, on Cyril's view, as man the incarnate Word has received the Spirit for the whole human nature. The archbishop can also write that he underwent a human birth "in order that he would bless the beginning itself of our existence" and the sentence "in pain shall you bring forth children" is "annulled through him".[237] This holds especially true for Christ's death. "For if he had not died humanly on behalf of us, neither would he have achieved divinely the things unto our salvation".[238] "And he committed his own spirit to God the Father, that is, the soul united to him", in order that also our souls would not have to go down to Hades, but could go up to the Father as well.[239]

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[235] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 691a–692c.

[236] Young (1971), 113 f., also points to the passive role of Christ's soul. Fraigneau-Julien (1955), 625–628, sees the role of Christ's human will expressed implicitly in Cyril's writings when he speaks of Christ's obedience, over against Adam's disobedience.

[237] *Ep.* 17, ACO I.1.1, 40$^{10-13}$.

[238] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 22$^{18-20}$.

[239] *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 59$^{4-10}$.

All this may be understood in terms of a participation soteriology: Christ participated in all our humanity in order that we may participate in his victory over sin, death and corruption, and in the divine nature. At the same time Cyril speaks of the salvific value of Christ's suffering and death in other terms as well, as the 'saving passion'.[240] He uses the biblical language of sacrifice, especially with reference to the epistle to the Hebrews.[241] The notion of exchange, present in the scriptural term 'ransom (ἀντίλυτρον)',[242] is also expressed in words like 'of equal value (ἀντάξιος)',[243] 'exchange (ἀντάλλαγμα)',[244] sometimes combined with verbs denoting a purchase.[245] The human race is said to be freed from that ancient curse (τῆς ἀρχαίας ἐκείνης ἀρᾶς).[246] And there are passages in which the archbishop speaks of forgiveness,[247] justification,[248] of liberation from the accusations[249] and from the sentence.[250] In Cyril's writings, just as in the New Testament, these various soteriological interpretations are juxtaposed without being integrated into a systematic whole.

Finally, Cyril writes about the personal appropriation of the salvation which is offered human beings in Jesus Christ. Although certain goods resulting from Christ's work, like the resurrection, are given to the whole of humankind, participation in the divine nature and a return to the image of God is only for those who commit themselves to God. The conclusions to which Keating comes in his book *The Appropriation of Divine Life*, based on a study of Cyril's New Testament commentaries,[251] are vindicated by the christological works from the years 429 and 430.

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[240] See for Cyril's use of this phrase section 3.4.4, n. 261.

[241] E.g., *ep.* 17, c. 9, ACO I.1.1, 38²³–39¹⁴.

[242] Used by Cyril in, e.g., *In Jo.* V.3, vol. 2, 1 (497a); *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 101²⁶.

[243] *Dial. Trin.* IV, 509c; *In Jo.* IX, vol. 2, 378 (745c); *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 692d = *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 55²³.

[244] *Dial. Trin.* IV, 508d.

[245] *Dial. Trin.* IV, 509a (ἐκπρίασθαι); *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 692d = *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 55²³ (ἀνταποτιννύς); *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 29⁷⁻¹⁰ (ἀντάξιος twice, ἀγοράσῃ).

[246] *In Jo.* IX, vol. 2, 372¹¹ᶠ (740e); cf. *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 34³⁶ᶠ.

[247] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 22²⁴ (ἄφεσιν); *Contra Nestorium* III.6, ACO I.1.6, 74²⁴ᶠ (ἄφεσις).

[248] Mostly in quotations from Scripture, in comments on them, and in expressions like 'justified through faith'. E.g., *Contra Nestorium* III.2, ACO I.1.6, 61²⁴ᶠ; *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 38¹², ¹⁷.

[249] *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 706c = *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 66³⁴ᶠ (ποινῆς καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων αἰτιαμάτων); *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 56¹²⁻¹⁵ (ἐγκλήματα, αἰτιαμάτων).

[250] *Contra Nestorium* III.2, ACO I.1.6, 61²¹⁻²³ (δίκην); IV.3, 83¹³ᶠ (δίκης).

[251] Keating (2004), esp. chapter 2, "The Gift of Divine Life", 54–104, and chapter 3, "The Reception of Divine Life", 105–143.

First of all, faith in Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word is central
to salvation. In the last words in *Oratio ad dominas*, Cyril comments on
Luke 18:8 ("but will the Son of Man, when he comes, find faith on
earth?"), and states: "John says that the Word has become flesh, and
he has become flesh together with remaining God. This faith, then,
will be searched by him in us in due time".[252] At the beginning of his
Letter to the Monks, Cyril quotes 2 Peter 1:5–8 and comments: those who
have chosen the path of the life in Christ, "must first be adorned with a
simple and unblemished faith, and thus add to it virtue", and somewhat
further down: "Before anything else, let there be in you a right faith,
which is absolutely blameless".[253] Cyril also maintains that "we have
been justified by (ἐν) faith and not on the basis (ἐξ) of works of the law,
as it is written",[254] several times quoting Gal. 2:16 and Eph. 2:8–9. But
virtue has to be added,

> for where right and unblemished faith is combined with confidence
> based on good works and they concur in their impact, there will certainly
> be perfection in all goodness and it will fittingly lead to holiness.[255]

The idea that Christ has set us an example is not found very often
in the christological writings of the first two years of the controversy,
but it is not absent. When expositing Hebr. 5:7–10 ("during the days
of his flesh he offered up prayers and petitions to him who could
save him from death, with loud cries and tears"), Cyril comments
that Emmanuel's prayers with tears are "a type and an example for
us, not before the inhumanation, but in the days of his flesh, when
it was possible to do this without accusation".[256] It was his aim "to
suffer humanly and to teach that those known to him somehow need to
approach through the attacks of the temptations", and also that we are
"found to be imitators of the things done by him economically and that,
hastening to follow in his steps, we will live a truly esteemed life".[257]

That Jesus was baptised first and then was led by the Spirit into the
desert and was tempted, is a type (τύπος) for us. "For it is impossible

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[252] *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 118$^{36-38}$; cf. 75$^{16-20}$.

[253] *Ep.* 1, ACO I.1.1, 10$^{24-27}$ and 11$^{5f.}$.

[254] *Contra Nestorium* III.2, ACO I.1.6, 61$^{24f.}$.

[255] *Or. ad dom.*, ACO I.1.5, 62$^{11-13}$.

[256] *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 49$^{15-17}$.

[257] *Ibid.*, 48$^{14-20}$. The words 'example (ὑπογραμμός)', 'imitators (μιμηταί)' and 'follow
in his steps (τοῖς ἴχνεσιν αὐτοῦ κατακολουθεῖν)' are taken from 1 Cor. 11:1 and 1 Peter
2:20–21, which are also quoted by Cyril.

that those who have not yet been baptised" are able to undergo temptations with strength or "that they are led spiritually". Only after baptism are we not conquered by Satan, "strengthened by the participation in the holy Spirit and sealed by the grace from on high".[258] Through the Spirit he makes us partakers of his divine nature, bearers of the divine image as a result of sanctification, in that the holy Spirit transelements us from things human to things divine.[259] Those who have been baptised, then, have received the holy Spirit, and it is the Spirit who makes a life of virtue possible.

Christ, however, "makes us alive as God, not only by the participation in the holy Spirit, but also by giving the assumed body to be eaten" in the Eucharist.[260] "He is in us both through his own flesh, which makes us alive in the Spirit, and through participation in his holiness, obviously once again through the holy Spirit".[261] Also in the Eucharist, the Spirit is active; as Cyril repeatedly emphasizes, the divine operation is from the Father through the Son in the holy Spirit. "The Word remains in us divinely through the holy Spirit, and, on the other hand, humanly through the holy flesh and the precious blood".[262]

Man's predicament is not only spiritual and moral, but also physical: the human body is subject to corruption. But what Keating found in Cyril's commentaries applies to his christological writings as well: one cannot say that the spiritual and moral issues are addressed by the Spirit, while the physical corruption is done away with by the bodily participation in the Eucharist.[263] On Cyril's view, the Spirit and the Eucharist both have an impact on the spiritual, moral and physical sides of human life. So he can speak of "those who through him have been transformed unto him into incorruption through sanctification in the Spirit",[264] thus linking bodily incorruption also with sanctification in the Spirit, not just with eating Christ's body. And the Word has made his own body life-giving (ζωοποιόν),

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[258] *Ibid.*, 46[11–17].

[259] *Contra Nestorium* III.2, ACO I.1.6, 60[11–15, 18–20].

[260] *Or. ad Th.*, ACO I.1.1, 67[24f.]; cf. *On the Incarnation*, SC 97, 707c.

[261] *Contra Nestorium* V.1, ACO I.1.6, 94[5–7].

[262] *Ibid.* IV.5, 85[30f.].

[263] Keating (2004), 94 f., 100–104.

[264] *Or. ad aug.*, ACO I.1.5, 28[16f.].

in order that he would make us partakers of himself both spiritually and bodily (πνευματικῶς τε ἅμα καὶ σωματικῶς), and would render us stronger than corruption and would destroy through himself the law of sin in the members of our flesh,[265]

thus linking the Eucharist, not just with incorruption, but also with victory over sin.

This study also concurs with another conclusion of Keating's: although the Eucharist plays an important role in Cyril's soteriology, we are not just united with the Word by this sacrament, nor was it "Cyril's sole concern"—I would add: or even his main concern—in the Nestorian controversy "to make the world safe for his particular view of the Eucharist".[266] In *Contra Nestorium*, the Eucharist is the subject of the second half of Book IV. If this sacrament were so central for Cyril, he would have devoted more attention to it.[267] Besides, just as with all the other issues in this work, its discussion is occasioned by certain quotations from Nestorius. Something similar applies to Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius* and the anathemas: it is only the seventh chapter of the letter and the eleventh anathema that deal with the Eucharist, and the argumentation of *Contra Nestorium* is briefly summarized.

In two influential letters from the beginning of the controversy, the *Letter to the Monks* and the *Second Letter to Nestorius*, there is no reference to the Eucharist at all. This suggests that Cyril only started to include a discussion of the sacrament in his writings after he had become familiar with Nestorius's interpretation of passages in John 6, which he wanted to redress. A proper understanding of the Eucharist, then, plays a minor role in the Nestorian controversy and is by no means one of the main reasons for Cyril's objection to his colleague's christology.

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[265] *Contra Nestorium* IV.5, ACO I.1.6, 87[19–22]. Cf. *ibid.*, IV.6, 88[27–31] (πνευματικῶς τε ἅμα καὶ σωματικῶς).

[266] Keating (2004), 96; see also pp. 19 and 103.

[267] Someone who more recently has emphasized the importance of the Eucharist for Cyril's christology is Welch (1994b), 74–106. For example, "My contention is that for Cyril salvation is mediated through the eucharist and that in the eucharist we have access to Christ's salvific worship" (p. 106). Welch, however, bases himself exclusively on certain parts of Cyril's *Commentary on John*.

8.7. ECUMENICAL RELEVANCE

In section 1.2.2 it was briefly discussed how both the unofficial and the official agreements between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches are said to be based on Cyril of Alexandria's christology and on 'his' μία φύσις formula. And it was hypothesized that this study would lead to another understanding of Cyril's christology than that underlying the agreed statements, which in turn could have repercussions for the ecumenical consultations between various churches. It may now be concluded that, if Cyril's christology is indeed taken as the basis of an ecumenical agreement, it would look very differently.

First of all, the μία φύσις formula is not at all central to Cyril's understanding of the person of Christ. The archbishop's basic outlook is dyophysite, while the miaphysite formula can be found in his writings from before the reunion with the Antiochenes only three times, two of which in quotations of pseudo-Athanasius (Apollinarius). An agreement that is rooted in Cyril's christology would, therefore, not take the μία φύσις formula as its starting-point.

Secondly, the joint declaration of the third official consultation employs the phrase 'in contemplation only': the Eastern Orthodox "are justified in their use of the two-natures formula, since they acknowledge that the distinction is 'in thought alone' ("τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ")", with a reference to various works of Cyril.[268] To apply 'in contemplation only' to the Chalcedonian dyophysite formula is incorrect, because for Chalcedonians a φύσις is not a 'person', as it is for the Oriental Orthodox, but the one person is 'recognised in two natures', two real natures, that is. But besides that, also for Cyril of Alexandria there are two real natures in Christ, understood as two INDIVIDUAL NATURES. The archbishop applies 'in contemplation only' to the *separation* of the natures, not to the natures themselves. Once again, if the agreements want to follow Cyril they should not apply the restriction 'in thought only' to the natures.

Some of the less known conclusions in Joseph Lebon's study *Le monophysisme sévérien* show that the Miaphysite Fathers of the Oriental Orthodox were inspired, not so much by the writings of Cyril of Alexandria, but by the Apollinarian frauds, which they believed to have

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[268] "Joint-Commission of the Theological Dialogue" (1991), 186.

been written by orthodox Church Fathers.[269] This is not to say that they shared the views of the bishop of Laodicea, but it does explain why the μία φύσις formula was so important to them, while it played only a minor role in Cyril's christology.

As has been pointed out by several theologians,[270] an emphasis on the miaphysite formula and on the notion of 'in contemplation only' in ecumenical agreements may be perceived by Western churches as running the danger of not giving full weight to Christ's perfect humanity, and may alienate these churches. Thus, such a rapprochement of two families of churches might in the end be counter-productive to ecumenical relations at large. If the agreements would take Cyril of Alexandria's christology as their starting-point, they would be more dyophysite, they would not apply 'in contemplation only' to the natures, and the full humanity of Christ could more easily be expressed. But, as we have seen, although Cyril is more dyophysite than miaphysite, there is at times a tendency in his writings to see Christ's human weaknesses overcome by his divine power too quickly, while there is little attention for Christ's human will. A reception of his christology in present-day ecumenical contexts would need to redress these aspects.

8.8. Conclusion

The final conclusion of this study is that Cyril of Alexandria is not the miaphysite theologian he is often made out to be. Before the reunion with the Antiochenes, he hardly spoke of 'one nature' of the incarnate Word. His language is much more dyophysite. In the writings investigated, the word φύσις hardly ever—probably never—means 'separate existence'; it rather has three main senses: (1) it may refer to a common nature, to the reality which is shared by individuals which are consubstantial; or (2) to an individual nature, which combines individual existence—not necessarily separate existence—with essence; or (3) to all the individuals belonging to a common nature combined. In his trinitarian theology Cyril has adopted the usage of the Cappadocians, and φύσις normally indicates the divine common nature, and

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[269] Section 4.4.1, nn. 128–137.
[270] De Halleux (1990a); Wendebourg (1995); Hainthaler (2004b), 299–304. See also section 1.2.2.

sometimes the Godhead as such. In christological contexts, the term can take on each of the three senses.

Other language in Cyril's christological texts is at times incorrectly regarded as miaphysite. Expressions like 'natural union' and 'natural unity' are dyophysite in that they denote the coming together of two natures, two entities that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance. They do not imply that the result is one nature, but rather that the two natures are combined into one separate reality. Further, the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις are not synonymous. While 'nature' combines the notions of existence and essence, 'hypostasis' only signifies real existence. In a pregnant sense 'hypostasis' may indicate separate existence, but Cyril usually adds qualifications like 'apart' and 'by itself' to denote the separateness of something which exists in reality.

When the Word is said to have been united with his flesh according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν), and when he is called 'one hypostasis', this indicates that the Logos together with his humanity is one separate reality, one entity. When Christ is called 'one incarnate nature' this is done in analogy to the 'one human nature': just as the two natures of soul and body are united into the one individual nature of a human being, so the divine nature of the Logos and that of his flesh are united into the 'one incarnate nature of the Word'. But whereas with a human being there corresponds a human common nature to the individual nature which is the composition of body and soul, there is no such common nature to which the 'one incarnate nature of the Word' corresponds. In this sense, Cyril's use of the word φύσις in the μία φύσις formula is an anomaly.

The notion 'in contemplation only' is applied by the Alexandrian archbishop, not to the natures of Christ themselves, but to their division. The natures themselves are really existing individual natures, which are not separate realities, but which are rather united into one separate reality. In order to contemplate each of the natures by itself, the mind may sever them from each other. But if division takes place, not just in the mind, but in reality, then the result is two Christs.

Πρόσωπον is neither synonymous with φύσις nor with ὑπόστασις. While in biblical quotations and allusions thereto it retains the meaning of 'face', in Cyril's own language the term denotes a 'person', a rational being which is capable of communication with other such beings. Because πρόσωπον is ambiguous in that it may refer, not only to a really existing person, but also to a person in a text, a number of times Cyril juxtaposes πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις. The addition of ὑπόστασις

makes sure that it is not merely a person in a text Cyril has in mind, but a person in reality. When Emmanuel is called 'one πρόσωπον' it expresses that the incarnate Word acts as one person in his relation to human beings. This one person sometimes acts 'as God', at other times 'as man'.

The main reason for Cyril's emphasis on the unity of Christ's person is soteriological. The archbishop forwards various arguments. Christ is the boundary between the divine and the human natures; it is through him that we come into contact with the divine nature, that we may become partakers of the divine nature. In Christ himself first, human nature receives the holy Spirit, incorruption, righteousness, holiness. Because he is also God, humanity—the soul in particular—receives a stability in him which makes that it does not sin, and the Spirit does not leave it again; this stability is transferred to those who believe in him. And if the same one were not both God and man, a mere man would have died, and that would not have profited anything for our salvation. It is because he is also God that his death can be a ransom for our lives.

By focussing on the μία φύσις formula, the consultations between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches have not really based their agreed statements on the christology of their 'common Father' Cyril of Alexandria, as they state, and they run the danger of alienating Western churches. If they did base their agreement on the archbishop's christology, it would be more dyophysite in outlook, but it would still have to be corrected to give more space to the reality of Christ's humanity.

The thorough investigation of Cyril's christological works from the first two years of the Nestorian controversy has made it possible to draw firm conclusions about his own christological vocabulary, before any alleged concessions were made to the Antiochenes. In fact, no such concessions have been detected. The archbishop's own terminology was already dyophysite, so that any later two-nature language is not a concession to the Orientals. Neither is his acceptance of the Formula of Reunion (433) a concession with respect to the attribution of sayings. All along, Cyril distributed Christ's sayings, properties and actions over his divinity and his humanity. The fourth anathema does not reject their distribution over two natural sources within the one and undivided Christ, but their attribution to two separate beings.

For the μία φύσις formula and the notion of 'in contemplation only' the period under investigation was broadened until the end of

Cyril's life, and most, if not all, the relevant passages were studied. A detailed examination of Cyril's writings from 431 till his death could establish whether the conclusions of the present study also hold for the remainder of the archbishop's life, or whether new developments in his christology and vocabulary would be discovered.

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Russell (2000) [contains *Explanation of the Twelve Chapters* and selections from the commentaries on Isaiah and John and from *Contra Nestorium* and *Contra Julianum*].

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Bindley & Green (1950), 209–211, 212–219, 220–223.
Stevenson (1989), 295–298, 301–309, 313–317 [*epp.* 17 and 39 have been abridged].
DEC I, 40–44, 50–61, 69–74 [the beginning of *epp.* 17 and 39 is left out].

Some texts of which there is no English translation are available in another modern language:

All texts in the series *Sources Chrétiennes* (see "Texts of Cyril of Alexandria") are accompanied by a French translation.

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