Peter (Panayiotis) Karavites

Evil, Freedom, & the Road to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria

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BY

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For
Christine, Kalliope, and Themistocles

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ABBREVIATIONS

BEP	*Bibliothêkê Hellênôn Paterôn*, Constantine Bonis (ed.) (Athens, no date).
BKV	*Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, O. Bardenhwer, T. Schermann, C. Weyman, Kempten, (eds.) (München 1911--)
CSEL	*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (Vienna, 1866-)
CAF	*Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, Theodore Koch, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1883).
Diels	*Die Fragmente der vorsokratiker*, Diels H. and W. Kranz (Weidmann, 1974).
FHG	*Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, Müller, Karl (ed.) 4 vols. (Paris, 1851).
FPhGr	*Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, Mullach, F.G.A. (ed.), (Paris, 1881).
GCS	Die *greichischen Christlichen Schrifsteller der estern Jahrhunderte* (Berlin, 1897--). *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker*, Husler, Karlheinz, 4 vols. (Stuttgart,1987).
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*.
Long and Sedley	A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987) 2 vols.
SC	*Sources Chrétiennes* (Paris, 1942 --). Stählin, O., *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der esten drei Jahrhunderte*, vols, 12, 52 (15), 17, 39 (Leipzig, 1905-60), referred to also in abbreviated form as GCS. Stählin, O., *Des Clements von Alexandreia ausgewehlte Schriften aus den griechischen übersetzt* (Münich, 1934).
SVF	*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, repr. of the Teubner ed. In Dubuque, Iowa, no year.
TGF	*Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, Nauck, Augustus (ed.) (Hildesheim,1964).
TGF	*Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, Richard Kannich, Stefan Radt, Bruno, Snell (eds.) (Göttingen, 1981).
ThHE	Θρησκευτικὴ καὶ Ἠθικὴ Ἐγκυκλοπαιδεία.
TWNT	*Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*
ZNTW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche.*

PREFACE

The subject treated in this book is extremely old and yet "super" modern, to use a colloquialism. It is as old as man himself, and yet its timeliness is as fresh today as it was at the beginning of human history. From the outset humankind has been deeply perturbed by the problem of evil and has persistently asked the question "why evil?" The question has remained the same throughout history, while the answers have differed from civilization to civilization and, frequently, from generation to generation. The Ancient Near Eastern civilizations were among the first to have tackled this question, coming up with a host of responses which often varied from one culture to the other.

Among the ancient peoples who dealt with the question of evil were the Israelites who came up with a rejoinder directly related to their conception of the universe and history in the light of their distinct ideas about God. The early Christians, who followed closely the Israelite conception of the universe, articulated their answers in the belief that they were supplementing and improving on the Old Testament conception of evil. The rejection of Christ and His teaching by the Jews deprived them of the salvific light that Christ had bestowed on mankind, so, at least, the early Christians believed. The early Christians' answer to "Whence evil?" has constituted the foundation of the Church's theory of evil, notwithstanding the fact that new refinements might have been worked out in the course of Christian history.

One of the early Fathers of the Church who sought to unravel the question of evil was Clement of Alexandria. He fully realized that he had to articulate a fresh explanation to the old question if he were to make his defense of the superiority of the Christian ideals palatable to those to whom he addressed his arguments. Clement knew that all human beings face the existential problem of whether a life mired in evil and suffering had any positive meaning. In his anxiety ridden age, as in ours, the quantity and variety of evil found in the world made urgent the question about the posture Christians ought to adopt. Should they see evil in life as a challenge the facing of which added fervor to life in a basically good world created by a benevolent creator? Should they endure it with Christian fortitude doing what true Christians should do to understand its origins and benefit from it? Or should they permit it to drive them to fiercely futile opposition? Since Clement's audience consisted not only of Christians but also of pagans and Gnostics, who possessed a high degree of sophistication, his explanation of evil had to be convincing. In defense of his argument he utilized the Old and New Testament as well as the whole panoply of Greek education in which he seems to have been extremely well versed.

The present book treats Clement's reply to the problem of evil. It is an attempt at a new synthesis of familiar evidence. As a result of this study I hope to show that Clement's ideas on evil are acutely important and relative for our times as well, especially since many of us, dominated by a feeling of alienation, are looking for soothing answers to our many anxieties.

There are many friends whom I would like to thank for their help in carrying this work to completion. Some encouraged me in the pursuit of my research. Others, through their own publications on related topics, provided me with the inspiration to continue my investigation. More specifically I owe special thanks to the Rev. deacon John Chryssavgis, Professor at the Greek Orthodox Theological School of Holy Cross in Brookline, Massachusetts, who read an earlier version of the ms. and urged me to try to bring it to fruition. The Greek scholar Christos Yannaras has been a source of inspiration with his own work on Greek patristic thought. In addition to his many stimulating ideas, which have caused us to look afresh and with a more critical eye on the ideas of the Eastern Fathers of the Church, his delightful linguistic idiom makes reading his books a sheer pleasure. Ms. Shirley Zeiba, in charge of the Interlibrary Loan of the Bridgewater State College library, made my task not only easier, but possible. Without her help this book would not have been written. My former colleague, Mary Noel, went through the ms. line by line and saved me from many errors which otherwise might have slipped into the final text. My debt to her is immense. Prof Annewiess van den Hoek of Harvard promptly agreed to read and comment on the ms. My Academic Vice-President, Dr. Anne Lydecker, volunteered to help defray part of the expense for the preparation of the ms. for publication. My gratitude to her and Bridgewater State College for their economic assistance is understandably great.

A debt of gratitude is also due to the anonymous reader of the ms on behalf of the publisher. He called to my attention several errors which I might not have noticed otherwise. While all of the above contributed to the improvement of the ms. none is responsible for the infelicitous errors that still remain in it.

Finally, thanks are also due to my silent partner, my wife, who has put up with my frequent seclusions during the long period of the composition of this ms. It is to her and to my two children that I dedicate this book. Before I end this brief preface I would like to explain that the occasional reference to "man" instead of the more fashionable "humankind" and so on is not intended to offend any body's sensibilities, let alone half of humanity's. It is a matter of custom which was not intended to be offensive before, and it is not designed to be so now.

Peter (Panayiotis) Karavites
Bridgewater
November 16, 1997

INTRODUCTION

Konrad Lorenz has reminded us that evil is genetic. Simply stated this argument claims that the violence of mankind springs from our animal nature. Skinner and other behaviorists have attempted to analyze evil from the behaviorist/sociological point of view. A third approach to the problem of evil is that of humanistic psychology represented by scholars like Freud, Jung and Fromm, who have asserted that destructiveness is "character-rooted." Genetic traits and environment may promote but they are not the main spring of destructiveness and evil.

The problem of evil is as old as man himself. In his short history man has often posited such questions: why is evil done to us or why do we do evil to others? Is there a source of evil and if there is what and where is this source? Humankind has grappled with these and similar questions almost from the very beginning of its existence, but it has found no easy answer. In human affairs the truth is often difficult to establish and at times inversely proportional to the certainty with which questions of this nature are customarily stated.

Ancient Near Easter man sought to answer questions like the above that have constantly plagued him by attributing evil to a super force which worked counter to a force of goodness and enlightenment. The best example of this effort is Zoroastrianism, whose ramifications reached the Middle Ages and beyond. Though the question of evil has often been intertwined with religion, in essence the problem of evil transcends religion. Even the acknowledged agnostics and atheists today do confront evil, as Kazantzakis did in many of his works and as Camus did very prominently in his *Plague*. The monists, who believe that God encompasses both good and evil, must beware of repressing evil rather than resolving it, for a divine force which encompasses such extreme opposites frequently strains the comprehension of even the most enlightened and patient person.

The problem of evil is particularly acute in the monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Its acuteness is due to the picture these religions present of God as a being of total love. Yet, if God is love why is there so much evil in this world? To answer this question satisfactorily has been a difficult task, assuming the omnipotence and the benevolence of God. No simple solution is entirely satisfactory but an answer has to be provided nonetheless by the champions of these religions.

The early Fathers of the Church struggled with the problem of evil from the beginning of Christianity. Generally, their answer was that the perceived evil is necessary since it serves a greater good. Evil is a necessary by-product of the fall of man. God created a good universe and endowed man with free will. Man, on the other hand, using his freedom disobeyed the commands of God and fell from grace. His fall implied the entry of evil into the world. Consequently, God uses evil to awaken and draw man towards repentance and perfection. Thus evil becomes a tool in the form of suffering that tests and instructs man, enabling him to awaken from his moral slumber and leading him to maturity. God permits evil for the purpose of achieving a greater good. This argument has been the most prominent effort to explain Christian theodicy, although it has not satisfied the skeptics throughout history, especially those who, like Voltaire, saw innocent victims suffer from cataclysmic natural events.

While these are some of the arguments associated with the problem of evil, my narrower purpose in this paper is to investigate Clement's conception of evil. Of the early Fathers of the Church Clement presents a tantalizing case-in-point. A convert to Christianity steeped in Greek philosophy, Clement exhibits an admirable openness to pagan thought when many of his contemporaries, apparently equally versed in Greek education, opted to renounce it. He never ceased to seek philosophical truth, claiming that philosophy, when properly understood, could further help its students understand Christ. He seems to have acutely felt the contradiction of evil in God's creation and sought to explain it in a somewhat unsystematic fashion throughout his extant works. He himself admits that his purpose was not to present a systematic and methodical analysis of the ideas he discusses but rather to give his readers ideas for thought.

Collateral to the problem of evil is the question of the freedom of the human will, which Clement also explains. The present investigation will deal with it also and will draw from the very lively modern discussions of the topic by historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, whose voluminous writings may not have provided a definitive answer to the problem of evil but have definitely contributed to the better understandings of its complexities. Finally, the essay will conclude with a brief discussion of Clement's view of the "gnostic" (the good Christian), since the topic relates closely to the question of evil and free will and illuminates the mysticism and the loftiness of his thought. However, before such a discussion, a quick description of Clement's background might be of some usefulness to the reader.

Clement of Alexandria is one of the most important scholars of early Christianity since more than any other writer of his time he contributed to the formation of orthodox Christianity in Egypt and left behind him several highly intellectual writings belonging to the Egyptian Christian literature. Unfortunately, except for one autobiographical reference and some occasionally veiled comments about his teachers, nothing is known of his life. He described himself as a Christian in search for understanding God,

who studied under several teachers before he settled with an unnamed master in Egypt (Str. 1.1.11). His teachers, so he says, gained their interpretations of the Scriptures from Jesus' apostles; their instruction included secret and public doctrines. In the title of the *Stromateis*, a section of which has been lost for us, his full name was Titus Flavius Clement, a priest in Alexandria.[1] The Latin form of his name points to three possibilities about his origins: that he was (1) a Roman, (2) a slave of a Roman family like the Flavians, later freed by them, or (3) a descendant of a family associated with Rome and enjoying the rights of Roman citizenship. His education leads us to exclude the first two possibilities and to accept the last, i.e., that he was a Greek whose family possessed Roman rights.

According to Epiphanius, some called Clement an Alexandrian while others called him an Athenian. [2] Clement himself maintained that he received his first teaching in Greece, while the last part of his education was in Alexandria. He probably started out his teaching career in Athens. Searching for the best teachers, Clement traveled to Italy, Syria and Palestine, and ended up in Alexandria. [3] It is a course that Justin traced a generation before Clement and, no doubt, many others followed before and after Clement. The age in which Justin, Clement and their contemporaneous intellectuals lived was an age of intellectual anxiety and discontent. In his *Dialogue with Trypho* Justin, unlike Clement, explicitly explains how and why he became a Christian. The object of philosophy, he says, was to lead man to God and to unite man to God. Justin first met a Stoic who was interested mainly in ethics and did not view the knowledge of God necessary. Justin left him and joined an interesting peripatetic. But Justin's new acquaintance was eager to settle first the question of tuition, an attitude not very philosophical for Justin. He left him and went to a Pythagorean who demanded the knowledge of prerequisites, music, astronomy, and geometry, as indispensable for the understanding of philosophy. Thus Justin ended with a Platonic philosopher. His liaison with the Platonic philosopher was happier than those with the other three, but even this situation failed to satisfy Justin's thirst for the object he was searching. He finally met an old man who explained to him that before the philosophers there lived people who were happy, just, and loved by God. They had received the illumination of the Holy Spirit and were called prophets. The reading of their works provided answers about the beginning and the end

[1] Eus. EH, 6.13.1; Photius, *Myriobiblos* III; P. Chrestou, *Hellênikê Patrologia*, hereafter simply *Patrol.*, vol. 2, (Thessalonike, 1978) 765.

[2] *Panarion* 32.6.

[3] Str. 1.11.2. Nothing permits us to identify with a good chance of probability the teacher of Clement in Christianity. Some have suggested Melito of Sardes, others the Syrian Bardesanes or Tatian, others Theophilos of Caesarea or Theodotus the Gnostic. With some greater probability perhaps, some have suggested Pantaenus, see G. Bardy, Recherches de *Science Religieuse* 27 (1937) 71 ff.

of the world and about everything a philosopher should know. These prophets did not demand proofs because their beliefs relied on faith. The story of the old man set Justin's mind to thinking. He at last concluded that what the old man had told him was the only certain and true philosophy. So, Justin became a Christian. Something analogous must have happened to those like Justin and Clement who were not satisfied with the philosophic explanations of their time and looked for answers to their questions, ending up with the apocalyptic truth. It is interesting, however, that what Justin found after he became a Christian he still described it as philosophy.

Clement was called Alexandrian because he did his work there and also in order to distinguish him from the other Clement of the Early Church, the bishop of Rome.[4] From his longest surviving work he has also been known by some later writers by the name of Stromateus. His date of birth is not known. On the evidence we have about his life, most scholars place his birth around 150-60 AD.

About his education which, as it appears from his works, must have been rich, he himself says very little. He says that he was at first a pagan. As such he seems to have been familiar with ancient religion and the mystery cults to such an extent that some modern scholars have suspected his initiation into one of them, the Eleusinian Mysteries.[5] His work is a bridge where all the intellectual currents of his time seem to meet: the Greek, the Hellenistic, the oriental and mystery religions, the Old and New Testament. Irrespective of the variety of opinion regarding him one thing is certain; Clement is the first Christian writer who dared to decide to connect Christianity and Greek culture. He is the person who realized that if Christianity were to spread and succeed it ought to use Greek education as its medium.[6] He had probably finished his basic study when he accepted Christianity, something that we surmise from his statement that the new religion made him feel young once more (Paed.1.1.2).

Who exactly his teachers were is not certain. The last of them might have been Pantaenus whom Clement succeeded in the direction of the Alexandrine school, if indeed there was a catechetical school before Origen.[7] It has also been said that he was the teacher of Origen; but Origen

[4] Eus. EH, 3.23.3; 3.29.1; 4.26.4; Chrestou, *Patrol.* 2, 765.

[5] George Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton, 1961) 290 does not agree with this view.

[6] O. Stählin, *Des Clemens von Alexandreia ausgewehlte Schriften aus dem griechischen überstzt*, vol. 7,1 (Munich, 1934) 47; E. de Faye, *Clément d' Alexadrie. Etude sur les rapports du Christianisme et de la philosophie Grecque an IIe Siecle*, 2nd ed., (Paris, 1906) 31; Walter Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1952) 21; Salvatore Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria. A Study* in *Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1971) 227; A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Bern, 1963) 17; Konstantine Bones, "Humanism and Christianity. The Humanitarian Ideal in the Protrepticus of Clement of Alexandria," in *Ecclesia* (Athens, 1970) 202.

[7] Eus. EH, 6. 6., not very reliable evidence. M. Mees, *Encyclopedia of the Early Church*, D. Berardino ed., p. 180 inclines to the theory of Pantaneus as the teacher of Clement; others are more skeptical, see W. H. Wagner, *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity*, Everett Ferguson, ed. (New York, 1990) 214-16.

while mentioning Pantaenus as his teacher does not do so for Clement.[8] Yet, if Clement had been his teacher Origen would have surely mentioned it.[9] Writing to Origen, Alexander of Cappadocia referred to Clement as his master and teacher through whom he came to know Origen, but he avoids the natural expression "our" teacher which would have been natural had Clement been the teacher of both.[10] It is possible that Origen might have heard some of Clement's lectures but did not necessarily consider Clement his teacher. From Clement's writings and precedents such as Justin, it appears that Clement headed a school that described Christianity as the true philosophy. In this letter of Alexander written in 211, Clement is referred to as "presbyteros." That he was really a presbyteros is strongly doubted by many modern scholars who consider the reference (Paed. 1.1.11) suspect, though Photius describes him as "πρεσβύτερος 'Αλεξανδρείας".[11]

In the persecution by Septimius Severus c. 200, Clement was forced to leave Alexandria but it is not known whither he escaped or whether he returned to Alexandria. Since the circumstances of his flight are not known, some scholars have speculated that Clement might have left Alexandria earlier than the persecution for some reason unknown to us.[12] Alexander of Cappadocia and then bishop of Caesarea in Palestine sent a letter from prison to the Antiochenes to congratulate them for their new bishop. He sent the letter with Clement whom he described as being in Caesarea through the providence of God, adding that Clement had helped the community of Caesarea to grow.[13] The reference to Clement shows that Clement had gone to Caesarea in Palestine where he was probably teaching at the local theological school and that he also traveled to Antioch. We last hear of him in a letter of Alexander to Origen, written in c. 215, in which he is described as "μακάριος" and "προοδεύσας" i.e., as having died. Consequently, we gather that he must have died around 215 AD.[14]

Clement's Writings

Of the many works written by Clement several have survived.[15] Among those that have survived are the *Protrepticus*, *Paedagogus*, and *Miscellanies* or *Stromateis*, two sermonic essays, *Quis Dives Salvetur* (*Who Is the Rich Man to Be Saved*), comments on a work by a heretical Gnostic, *Excerpts from Theodotus*, *On Patience*, and several other extracts. His *Protrepticus* is similar in form and contents to the other apologetic works of

[8] Eus. EH, 6. 6.

[9] Eus. EH, 6. 19. 3.

[10] Eus. EH, 6. 14. 9.

[11] Paed. 1.37. 3; Chrestou, *Patrol.*, 2. 767; Wagner, *Encycl. of Early Christianity*, 214-216.

[12] Chrestou, *Patrol.*, 2. 767.

[13] Eus. EH, 6. 11 . 6.

[14] Eus. EH, 6. 14. 9. Makarios and hagios are also titles which indicate the high esteem in which Clement was held. Mees, *Encycl. of Early Church*, 180

[15] Migne, PG, vols. 8-9.

the second century AD. It is in essence an apology for Christianity. In Part One, chapters 2-7, Clement describes what he considered the foolishness, immorality, and futility of the pagan authors, while in Part II, chapters 8-12, he praises the truth preached by the prophets and Christ. It is a sort of exhortation to educated persons with an interest in Christianity to follow it since it is, in his view, the true way of life. In the *Paedagogus*, section one, Clement deals with the pedagogic work of Paedagogos, the people and method used, where he points out the goodness and strictness of the Christians. The second and third sections discuss the proper life of the Christian, while special subsections deal with food, drink, laughter, obscenity, child-bearing, bathing, dressing, and so on. Finally in the last section Clement gives a synopsis of the proper Christian life and an encomium of Christ. In a way, the *Paedagogus* reinforces the theme treated in the *Protrepticus*.

In the *Stromateis*, Clement wanted to develop more systematically the Christian ideas and the life-giving Christian truths in order to combat paganism and heresies.[16] However, the contents of *Stromateis* do not quite correspond to the proposed design. Instead, Clement returns mostly to the pedagogic problems of *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*. On account of these apparent inconsistencies some scholars have proposed that the books of the *Stromateis* do not represent the work announced by Clement in the *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus* but constitute simply a collection of ideas and memories without order.[17] Consequently, these scholars maintain that the work is characterized by repetitions, idle talk, and superficiality, as Clement himself admits in several places.[18] The theory of the lack of organization in Clement's thought in the *Stromateis* has been justifiably attacked by Alain le Boulluec, who finds Clement's ideas in the Seventh book of the Stromateis systematically belabored. The main ideas of the Stromateis concern the usefulness of philosophy, the relation between faith and knowledge, the sacredness of marriage, martyrdom and Christian perfection, symbolism and allegory, Christian knowledge, and the life of the true Christian. The thrust of the work aims at demonstrating that the true gnostic is the true Christian and that the true philosophy is the revealed truth of Christ, which is far superior to that arrived at by human knowledge. Clement believed that Greek philosophy had borrowed from the Old Testament, but he also believed that this philosophy had prepared the Greeks, as the Mosaic Law had prepared the Hebrews, for the coming of Christ. Finally, Clement argued that through knowledge faith could be strengthened.[19]

[16] Str 1. 182. 4; 3. 110. 3; 5.141. 4; 6. 1. 1; Eus. EH, 6.13.1; Photius, *Myriob.* 111.

[17] E. de Faye, *Clément de Alexandrie*, (Paris, 1898) 130, n. 8; C. Bardy, *Clement of Alexandria* (Paris, 1927); their views have been criticized by C. Heussi in *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie* 45 (1902) 465-512; Adolph Harnack, *Gesch. der Altchrist. Literatur*, 2, 2, 9-16.

[18] Str. 4. 4.1, and in several other places in Str. 4. ch. 16.

[19] Str. 4. 54. 1; 4. 139.1; Alain Le Boulluec, *Clément D' Alexandrie, Les Stromates, Stomate VII*, SC No. 428 Paris, 1997) 9-10. Chrestou, *Patrol.*, 2.p.770 has expressed similar criticism.

Quis Dives Salvetur is addressed to the fear of those Christians, or prospective Christians, that wealth might become a hindrace to their salvation. In this work Clement argues that God does not exclude all rich men from his kingdom nor does God mean that wealthy men should completely divest themselves of their riches. Wealth is not in itself good or bad; only its use could be good or bad.[20]

As Eusebius indicates, Clement wrote other important works now lost.[21] Among these lost works the most significant seems to have been the *Hypotyposes*, a book consisting of eight parts (books) which dealt with the hermeneutics of the canonical books of the New Testament, *The Epistle of Barnabas*, *On Passover*, *Fasting*, Judaizers and the apocryphal revelation of Peter. Eusebius and others have saved a few fragments of these books.[22] There has recently been published a letter of Clement to a certain Theodore in which passages from a secret version of the Gospel of Mark are quoted. Photius chastised Clement for the many heretical ideas in the *Hypotyposes*.[23] In view of the fact that such heretical ideas cannot be located in the extant works, we must either accept this work as Clement's first and his errors attributable to his as yet unclear Christian attitude toward Platonic ideas, or that the work Photius had in front of him was not Clement's genuine work but a forgery or a mistaken work by somebody else under Clement's name. The latter seems probable, particularly since neither Eusebius nor Jerome mention anything about Clement's heretical errors.[24] But then what was considered heretical in Photius' time was not necessarily so in the time of Eusebius and Jerome. The Florentinian manuscript of the works of Clement includes the *Extracts of Theodote* and the *Eclogae Propheticae*, both of which deal deftly with problems of the Gnostics with the aim of providing a safer way to the orthodox faith. The wealth of references provided by Clement reveal a vast knowledge of earlier Christian literature that circulated in the second century AD. Obviously, his rich citations represent a wider spectrum of canonicity at his time. With the settlement of the question of canonicity, much of the literature considered non-canonical has

[20] QSD 13.1-7; 14. 1-6.

[21] Eus. EH, 6. 13 and 9.

[22] Eus. EH, 6.13. 2; 6.14. 1; Stählin GCS (1905-1980) vols. 12, 15, 17, 52.

[23] *Myriob.* 109.

[24] A chunk of Clement's work exists in Latin translation with the title *Adumbrationes Clementis Alexandrini in Epistolas Adumbrationes Clementis Alexandrini in Epistolas*, brief Scriptural interpretations in the form of Scholia, done at the behest of Cassiodorus (*Institutiones* 1.18) by an unknown translator; Th. Zahn, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Neutestamentl. Kanons*, 3, 133 ff. has argued that Cassiodorus' translation was from the *Hypotyposes*. For the lost works see Eus. EH, 6. 13. 3; 6. 13. 9; 6. 14. 1; 5; 8. Pope Benedictine XIV excised Clement's name from the list of saints in 1748 because he considered him a Platonizing heretic. Photius' criticism of Clement hurt also his reputation and his work in the East as well.

been lost.

Despite the criticism that has been leveled against Clement for the lack of systematic approach in his works, we have to concede that Clement had read a great deal; that his works are a virtual mine of philosophical, historical, archaeological, and poetic material; and that some of his references to ancient works are known to us only through him. In his citations of the ancient sources Clement has been criticized for using anthologies and other synoptic works rather than the original works directly. Whether this criticism can stand is difficult to say. The wealth of information contained in his extant works should make us skeptical as to whether anthologies actually contained in antiquity such a variety of material. But even if the theory about his use of anthologies and synopses is correct, there is no doubt that he had a wide and deep knowledge of the Greek philosophical systems and of the Greek poetic compositions, especially those of the tragic poets.

Theological Views

Clement holds that it is the Creator and the human-loving God who acts through Logos to educate men as well as women to that fulfillment which leads them to the proper heavenly mansions. Logos is the image and likeness of the Father. Christ is the Logos of God, the central figure in Clement's thought, the great teacher and savior of humanity. Man is in the image of God-Logos and can approach God through faith and proper training, the latter also a Platonic idea. Those who through training have reached the perfection of human improvement are the true gnostics. Clement's affirmation of the Biblical creation and incarnation distinguishes him from his Gnostic contemporaries. Indeed, many of the topics he so arduously defends or expounds become comprehensible in the context of his attitude toward Gnosticism. Philosophy is Logos' Law with the Gentiles, while Israel's Scriptures are Logos' covenant with the Jews before the coming of Christ. After Christ, philosophy becomes the means to understand truth in light of the incarnate Logos, a syncretistic effort between pagan and Jewish thought.

Clement has been described as the first Christian theologian and ethicist as well as mystic. His stand toward Greek philosophy and culture has been praised as enlightened, while some have seen it as diluting the gospel. "On balance," as the contributor to the *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity* says, "he attempted to present a comprehensive and coherent Logos-centered anthropology and theology." There is little doubt that his theological ideas, together with his educational and ethical emphases, have had lasting influence upon the Church, especially in the East. Fifteenth century Florentines recovered his works for Western Christianity. Severus knew his writings, and the eighteenth century churchman John Wesley drew on Clement's description of the true gnostic. Even those theologians in the nineteenth century, who accused him of corrupting the gospel with the interjection of Greek philosophy, indirectly acknowledge his historical importance. As a source for the understanding of the intellectual trends in the

second century AD, especially the varieties of Gnosticism, Biblical texts, and Church life, Clement's writings are extremely valuable, almost indispensable. In the East, Clement's depiction of the true gnostic, an idea heavily influenced by Plato's writings, culminates in the thirteenth century with the theology of Gregory Palamas. And all of this though Clement never tried to establish a theological system.

Nonetheless, he orchestrated a system of thought with a program containing what he considered the leading principles of spiritual life. In very broad strokes he assigned a wide scope to religious history and to the purpose of divine revelation. Uniting into one system the religious and humanistic ideals of the past, he sought to lay down the lines which the entire course of human history ought to follow. Directly or indirectly, his ideas influenced deeply the thought of those who came after him and the nature of Christian conduct.

Those modern scholars who have criticized him for becoming the most significant pioneer of the transformation and Hellenization of Christianity do not always understand that, steeped as he was in Greek philosophy, he could neither avoid its influence nor refrain from developing Christian thought through the aid of Greek philosophy and terminology; from this standpoint it can be said that he Christianized Hellenism. Otherwise, he did not view any effort of man as useless, no matter how great or small its consequences. On the contrary, he saw the guiding hand of God in the evolution of history which evolution led to the formation chiefly of three nations: Hellenes, Jews, and Christians (Str.6.5.42).

For Clement, Greek philosophy served as agoge for the Greeks, as the Mosaic Law served for the Jews. Through both, philosophy and the Law, God leads man to perfection (τελείωσις), provided men first accept faith. [25] Clement considers many of the intellectual leaders of the pagans as the equals of the Jewish prophets, since both were distinguished men endowed by God to transmit God's will for the sake of man's salvation. For this reason, Clement placed Greek philosophy next to the Bible in importance. By philosophy Clement means the universally accepted moral ideas anthologized into one entity conducive to moral conduct. This system of ideas is dominated by the thought of the great philosophers: Pythagoras, Aristotle, the early Stoics, followed by lesser philosophical figures, but most singularly by Plato. These universally recognized philosophers owed their ideas and moral principles to the fact that they stole them from the God-given ideas of the Jews, thereby adorning the beautiful Greek thought with these stolen ideas. However, Clement did not contest that some of them might even have been inspired directly by God but simply maintained that these divinely inspired ideas were not fully developed, compared to the

[25] Str. 1. 176. 1; 1.28. 1-2; 7. 11. 1-3.

ideas of the prophets. Still some other Greek writers formulated acceptable principles through human thinking unaided by inspiration.

While philosophers believed that they had come upon the absolute truth, Clement argued that they had discovered only partial truths (Str.6.55.1-56.1) Furthermore, the philosophical truth differs from the Christian truth, though both use the same term, in respect of extent of knowledge, power of demonstration, divine power, and the like. The Christian truth is the knowledge of the true wisdom.[26] Like Philo, Clement cultivates a philosophical interpretation of the Judaic tradition which he divides into four parts. Two of these parts, the historical and legislative, Clement ascribes to the area of morals. The third part he names the "liturgical," since it relates to sacrifice and belongs to physical science. The fourth, which is above all the department of theology or "vision," is that which Plato places in the area of the truly great mysteries of being while Aristotle puts it in the metaphysics.[27]

Tradition

The Christian tradition for Clement consists generally of two principal elements. One of them, the Christian teachings, belongs to the clear and open side of Christian religion. The other, the so-called unwritten tradition, belongs to the mystical part of religion. Elements of the dogmatic teaching of religion that remain secret are associated with the mystical part of this tradition and are intended for those who have the ability to elevate themselves from Faith to Knowledge. Clement thus becomes the first of the early Christian Fathers to invoke a secret oral tradition that has its origins in the apostolic times but is not identified with the Scriptures. Both of the above traditions have no clearly delineated borders and at times get fused. In essence, there is one tradition which has been passed down from Peter, Jacob, John, and Paul and is transmitted from father to son. Clement claims to be the carrier of this tradition, which he learned from many teachers in various places (Str.1.11.1-3).

According to Clement, the process of the division of this tradition began early in the history of Christianity. Because the lofty truths of Christianity cannot be passed on as they are to the common people, owing to the inability of many people to grasp these truths, they are presented in the Bible as mysteries, couched in parables and symbols, in order to be intelligible to the faithful after some meditation upon them (Str. 6.126.1). Consequently, the holy texts should not be taken at face value, but ought to be analyzed in depth, if their hidden meaning is to be discovered (Str. 6.126.4).

[26] ἱερὰ ὄντως γράμματα παρὰ τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ παιδευόμενοι, Str. 1.98.4. The text used here is that of the series BEP which contains corrections on Stählin.

[27] Str. 1.176.1-2; *epopteia* is a term borrowed from the Eleusinian mysteries used also by Plato, according to Clement ad loc.; see also SC. ad loc.

In his effort to discover this hidden meaning Clement followed the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures, a method practiced by Philo before Clement and carried to further heights by Origen. Clement tackled the texts in three ways: the literal or superficial way that the common reader uses to glean his knowledge of the Bible, the meaning that the author intended for his readers, and the meaning that Clement himself seeks to extract through the interpretive analysis. Clement argues that for the best results the reader should take into consideration the hermeneutical tradition of the Church and the Church's rules, by which Clement means the prevailing interpretation of the Bible given by the Church at his time. As part of this interpretation the reader is to bear in mind passages of the Bible parallel to the ones he intends to analyze. In other words, the Bible should always be interpreted with the aid of the Bible itself.[28]

Clement differs from later ecclesiastical writers in one basic sense: he uses indiscriminately the canonical and non-canonical books as his sources. Since the distinction between the canonical and non-canonical books of the Bible had not yet been established in Clement's time, he does not reject the apocrypha as a valid source, citing it at least once.[29] Clement's theological ideas must have been contained in his lost essay *On Theology*. From what we can infer about his theological ideas from his extant works, Clement presents God's two sides which he describes as the philosophical and the religious. The first paints Him as the unknown and inapproachable Being; the second as the creator and holder of the universe. Some scholars see in this description of God a contradiction which Clement tries to harmonize by the introduction of Logos, a concept that objectifies the abstraction of God. The contradiction exists in Clement's view of God Who, in the eyes of common men, possesses simultaneously the dual capacity of inapproachability and imminence. Only the gnostics (those who have reached the knowledge of God, not the followers of Gnosticism) perceive Him in these two capacities: the supernatural and creator God.[30]

Clement views God as the One and Simple, yet beyond the Monad. He is above physical changes and relations; therefore, incomprehensible by man. God combines the qualities of invisibility (John 1.18), of depth

[28] Str. 7. 96. 1-2; QDS 5.1-4; Matt. 19.16-30; Luk.18.30.

[29] QDS 42.1; see also note in Stählin ad. loc.; Str.3. 29.1.

[30] Str. 3. 29. 1; Paed. 1.71 1: ἓν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα. This expression about the transcendence of God recalls the difficult and obscure formulas of Neoplatonism and Plotin, although we should not make Clement a precursor of Plotin. See also III Hymn, v. 34-36; Str. 5.81.3-6; P. Camelot's commentary p. 25 ff. The editors of SC do not attribute to this passage any profound intent. Taking their cue from Clement's reference to the burning bush, they infer that God here is identified with being. What we have here is reminiscent of Philo, *De praem. et poen.*, 20; W.Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 91; P. Camelot, *Foi et Gnose, Introduction à l' Etude de la Connaissance Mystique chez Cléiment d' Alexandrie* (Paris, 1945) 108, n.2 in connection with a passage analogous to Philo, *Leg. alleg.* II, 3.31. Str. 5.81.1-4; Solon, fr. 16 in Diehl; Theodoret, *Therapeutique*, I, 73; SC, *Les Stromates*, 5, Part 2, *Commentary* (Paris,1 981) ad. loc.

(βυθός), mentioned by the Valentinians, and the inscrutability (δυσεύρετον) of Plato. Clement thus considers him invisible, inaccessible, and ineffable. He argues that it is impossible for language to express that which has no genos (γένος) species (εἶδος), individuality (ἄτομον), number (ἀριθμός), capability of becoming (συμβεβηκός), whole (ὅλον), or part (μέρος).[31] To understand God we must follow the apophatic path: to analyze and to abstract all the material, to penetrate into the unlimited, to know him not as what He is but what He is not. This, according to Clement, is the contemplative (εποπτιψον) method.[32] In his emphasis on apophatism Clement preceded Dionysius the Areopagite as well as the Neoplatonists and might have been the teacher of Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neoplatonism and teacher of Origen.

Needless to stress that God is kind. It is this kindness of God, Clement asserts, that triggered His creativity and brought Him closer to the world. God loves and benefits others according to His will and preference; consequently, God's kindness is not a necessary quality but a free power. As a ruler God is kind; He made the entire creation out of love (Str. 6.152.3). God is not subject to demonstration and cannot be an object of scientific proof (ἀναπόδεικτος, therefore, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός). He reveals Himself only through Logos, who is wisdom and knowledge and truth and, as truth, is thus susceptible to demonstration and description (Str. 4 156. 1).

The place of Logos in Clement's thought is dominant, and perhaps a shortcoming of his theological thought is that it is Logos-centered not God-centered. The Logos is the creator of everything, the revealing agent of God in the Old Testament, in the Greek philosophy, the incarnation, the law-giver and savior, the founder of new life which begins with faith, proceeds to knowledge, and through contemplation, winds up in adoration. Though he is constantly in the world, He is also simultaneously with the Father; therefore, He is God.[33] While He is God, He is, on the other, hand the instrument of God; He is all harmony, musical and sacred, creating in accordance with God's will (Protr. 1.5.4). With His incarnation, by becoming God and man, He turned everything into an ocean of blessings (Protr.110.3).

The Church

According to Clement, the Church is the assembly of those who are saved. As the world is the manifestation of the creative power of God, so the Church is the expression of His saving grace.[34] The Church has been

[31] Str. 8. 81. 1-4 and Comm. ad loc. part 2; Solon fr. 16 in Diehl.

[32] Str. 5.71.2-3; see also the *Commentary* ad loc.

[33] Paed. 1.24.3; John 10.13.

[34] Paed. 1.27.2: For as his will is his work and this work is called the world, so also His counsel is the salvation of men, and this has been called the Church.

founded by Him, the Logos, Who has brought salvation on earth when the divine power shone upon it, and filled everything with life-saving sperm. The true Church is old and universal and to her belong the pure at heart and righteous. Heresies and later falsifications are new inventions and aberrations from the truth (Str. 7.107.2). This view of the one ancient and universal Church illustrates what the Nicene Fathers understood by the "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church." According to Clement the Logos is one and universal; the Holy Spirit is one and the same everywhere; the Church, virgin mother, is also one (Paed. 1.42.1). The heavenly or divine Church is also one and the earthly Church is its image.[35] These two realities are coterminous inasmuch as the Church comprises only the just who have been elected to be part of it from the beginning of time. The earthly Church is ruled by the Logos, is unbesiegeable and free, the realization of the divine will, and so is also the heavenly Church (Str. 6.108.1). The philosophers of God, the true Israelites, those pure of heart, in whom there is no guile, will rest in the holy hill of God, (Ps. 15.1) in the Church on high (Str.3.49.3-4). The Church is further described as the Bride of Christ (Paed.1.42.1; 49.3) that was born from the Lord in pain and swathed in his sacred blood. She produces no milk because she is a virgin mother. Instead, she uses the Logos as milk; for if we have been regenerated unto Christ, He who has regenerated us nourishes us with His own milk, the Word. It is proper that what has procreated should forthwith supply nourishment to feed the procreated, His people.[36]

For Clement the spiritual and mystic existence of the Church is prized much more highly than its hierarchical organization. The achievements of the deacons, presbyters, and episcopoi within the Church are imitations of the angelic glory, but at the same time they are greatly dependent on their personal conduct. The apostles are not important simply because they have been chosen by Christ, and the case of Judas proves this view. The respect they enjoy is due to their own laboring toward the fulfillment of a holy goal. The same is true of the Church's functionaries (QDS 23.1). Finally, as is natural for an early Father of the Church, who is acquainted through the Scripture with the mystical saving grace of baptism, Clement places much more emphasis on the baptism than on of the other sacraments (Paed. 1.26.1; 31.1-2).

The Gnostic

For Clement the roads to wisdom and truth are many, among them a prominent one is through faith (Str. 4.143.2-3). While the Gnostics minimized faith because they considered it the opposite of knowledge, Clement tried to reconcile these two concepts. Faith is the attitude of the

[35] Str. 4.66.1-2. Clement here refers also to the heavenly city of Plato, Stählin, ad loc.; Chrestou, *Patrol.* 2, 795; Plat. Rep.esp. book 9.

[36] Str. 1. 42. 1-3; Clement's view stands in opposition to the opinion that those who are saved have an innate excellence, on account of which they are saved.

soul towards God, man's correct position vis-à-vis God (Str. 2.14.3). The rule of faith is defined by the agreement of the Mosaic Law, the prophets, and the New Testament that the Logos fulfilled with his appearance. Faith is connected with knowledge in respect that faith provides for knowledge elements on which to work. Faith is the grace that elevates the soul from what is undemonstrable to what is universal and simple; what is not with matter, not matter, and not under matter.[17] The use of the undemonstrable by faith does not place it at a disadvantage compared to knowledge (*epistêmê*) because knowledge also relies on principles that are incapable of demonstration (Str.7.57.3). Faith accepts certain undemonstrable principles just as knowledge accepts certain axioms as in the case of Thales. What Clement fails to see in this example, however, is that Thales arrived at his theory of the original substance of which the universe is made only after observing the importance of the element of water in the existence of life. Thales' conclusion, therefore, though faulty, was not as arbitrary as it appeared to Clement but the result of observation which nowadays is part of the scientific method. In line with his reasoning Clement then comes to the remarkable conclusion that "faith is a comprehensible knowledge of the essentials, while knowledge is the strong and sure demonstration of what is received by faith based upon belief in the Lord's teachings" (Str. 7.57.3). Sensing the complexities of such a statement Clement proceeds to explain that it is not possible for the two to be clearly delineated because each of them partakes of the other (Str.6.151.2-3). Knowledge is distinguished by faith while faith is characterized by knowledge; thus both are allied by a sort of mutual and reciprocal correspondence, although faith, for Clement, is higher than knowledge since knowledge is predicated on faith.

Clement goes on to say that the initial truth was one but had been dismembered by the various philosophical schools as Pentheus had been dismembered by the Bacchae. Now truth stands in two forms; the many-sided human knowledge and the single divine knowledge. The first preoccupies herself with names, the outer dressing; the second with the essences. The Greeks busy themselves with the beauty of names; we, the barbarians, Clement asserts, preoccupy ourselves with meaning and essence (Str.1.30.1). Knowledge consists of a chain in which the encyclical courses (ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα) service the attainment of philosophy as their master whereas philosophy helps the attainment of divine wisdom as her master. Philosophy is the study of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes.[18] To explain further his rather intricate

[17] Str. 2. 4. 2; 2.14. 3. Clement uses the examples of Thales and the other Greek natural philosophers who established their first principle on substances such as water and so on but whose validity as first principle cannot be absolutely proved.

[18] Str. 6.54. 1; 2. 27. 2; 1. 34. 2. For some references regarding faith and knowledge in Clement see Str. 2. 4. 2; 4.143. 3; 2. 14. 3; 7.57.3-4; 2.16.2; 6.152.1; 6.155.3; 5.1.3; 1.130. 1-2; QDS 26.6; Str. 4.136.2-3; 69.1; 6.108.1; 4.149.4; 2.14.1-3.

statement, Clement uses a passage from Philo, namely the story of Agar and her mistress Sarah, both of whom gave Abraham children of unequal value (Str.6.152.1). From the discussion in Philo *On Abraham* and Clement's comments it becomes evident that human wisdom is important especially for the intellectually simpler men, though by itself wisdom is not of absolute value, or rather it is a sort of dessert (Str. 6.91.1-2).

On the other hand, it is useless for anybody to limit himself only to human wisdom (Str. 7.55.1). It is the Christian knowledge that brings about the perfection of man (Str. 7.55. 2-4). This perfection is accomplished in stages which, according to Clement, are respect for the moral commandments and self-cleansing, spiritual struggle, which belongs to the stage of knowledge which we call theoptian (Protr. 68.4) the seeing of God, which constitutes the final stage of perfection. Here perhaps for the first time we see in the Christian world the classification of the three stages in the way toward perfection.

With the aid of faith and Baptism the Christian enters into perfection, but at that point perfection is not yet consummated. Perfection becomes consummated through knowledge. At first, Clement says, knowledge is a consequence of quest. One must search after God, to breathe God and walk with God. The attainment of this goal is accomplished through knowledge (Paed. 2.60.5). The gnostics are few but they set the tone of the entire Christian life. They live in peace (Paed.3.101.1); they pray day and night to God the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit (Str.4.136. 5), with the result that they become the equals of angels. The knowledge of God is so important that if it were to be separated from salvation and one had to chose between the two, he should definitely decide in favor of knowledge (Protr.68.4). Knowledge leads to the vision of God, while the divine light that comes from Logos illuminates the soul's eye (Protr.113.4). If we accept it, we accept God (Protr. 117.2). By receiving God we are led to the highest point of perfection inasmuch as by receiving God we receive divine love (Protr.121.1).

Creation

Clement concedes an important point in the activity of divine Logos during the creation of the world. This should not lead us to think that the world is the product of the intermediary and not of God Himself. It is the work of God Who created it voluntarily. Man lives in the world, and the world was created for man. Man is an image and likeness of God (Protr. 59.2) carrying within him the very image of God which dwells within us, takes counsel with us, associates with us, is a guest with us, feels with us, feels for us. If God is goodness, as Clement asserts, this perception of God leads inevitably to a whole chain of questions about him. Why, for instance is there so much evil in this world? What is evil? Why is it done to us, and why do we do evil to ourselves and others? Is this evil coterminous with the existence of man? Does it arise from some dark impulses that lurk in the

remote recesses within us, over which we have no control or is it someoutside force that impels us to incline more and other times less towards evil deeds? If God created this world to what extent might He be responsible for the evil in it and why? Could not He as an almighty God have created another world in which evil has no place?

Questions of this nature were constantly asked before the advent of Christianity and have continued to be asked in the Christian world and are presently discussed by scientists who may or may not take account of a benevolent God in the universe. The answers are almost as many as those who engage in the analysis or effort to understand the phenomenon of evil. Modern scientists have answered the question with such conclusions as genetic inheritance, mental disturbance, environmental influences and many others. Yet we are left with the irreducible fact that none of the answers so far provides a completely satisfactory answer to the question.

Closely tied to the question of evil and its origins are the questions of justice and free will. If evil is either coterminal or innate in man, is it so strong a force that man is unable to react to it or dominate it? If God allows evil to happen or even ordains it for some discernible or inscrutable purpose, it would appear that man is at the mercy of this overwhelming and sinister force, weak or powerless to free himself from its shackles. But if this force is not esoteric or if man can avoid it or even dominate it, then it follows that man bears responsibility for it.

The problem of evil is patently acute in all the revealed religions, which have a clearly monotheistic tendency and posit God as a force of goodness, and the ultimate predominant force in the universe. Judaism and Christianity along with Zoroastrianism, Islam and other religions accept the predicate that God is all-goodness and all powerful; otherwise for God to be all-good but not all-powerful, would be for them an absurdity. The theory of the all-good and all-powerful God, however, has led to complications, and requires some reconciliation of the existence of such qualities in God and the existence of evil in the world. For if God is all-powerful and all-good how can one justify the existence of so much evil in the world? This is a question that all Early Fathers of the Church had to grapple with and so did Clement. What follows then is an effort to investigate the source of evil and the explanation of it in the context of Clement's perception of evil, the arguments he employs to spare God of any responsibility for evil, and some of the terminology he uses in his description of evil. Along with the discussion of the various facets connected with evil, a parallel effort will be made to explore Clement's concept of man's free will, and the role it plays in the commission or avoidance of evil. Although frequent psychoanalytic, structuralist, and anthropological references are made the scholarship displayed in this essay is more firmly grounded on close and critical examination of traditional sources rather than on the wholesale application of the currently popular theories of analysis of anthropology, psychoanalysis, structuralism and so on.

CHAPTER ONE

EVIL: ITS ANTECEDENTS AND CLEMENT'S VIEWS

What is evil and how did it come to be? These are some of the most ancient and intricate human questions. Evil is something adverse that happens to some individual or object, whether animate or not. Evil is not an abstraction even when it is done to others because we all have experienced it at some time or another. As a rule it is imposed by us upon others or it occurs in the natural course of things to all of us. It touches all of us in all places and at all times and makes us understand our limitations and the limitations of the world we live in. It leads us often to revolt against a world full of evil itself and to conceptualize an ideal world in which evil produced by human insufficiencies is banished. It forces us to ask why our world is flawed and whether there could have been a world free of evil. When we raise such questions we are raising the problem of evil in its full form. But evil is a metaphor, while questions of ontology and etiology are metaphysical speculations. As we know evil has been personified in many cultures. It has been presented as a supernatural force antithetical to God. This essay is not about the objective existence of this personified force. Rather, it seeks to explain the activities of God in the universe as perceived by Clement in the beginning of the Christian era along with the role of man, especially of the Christian man, in facing God and evil. For Clement evil is bad because of the suffering it produces upon the sentient being directly or indirectly, and because of its moral consequence: that is, the alienation of man from God. But frequently evil has a silver lining since as a punishment inflicted by God it may constitute the tool for bringing man closer to God. The suffering could be physical or psychological, but the effects in both cases are unpleasant. Natural catastrophes may directly affect non-sentient objects but the result that a destructive event produces upon the sentient being can be psychologically painful.

Clement's is a religious approach to the question of evil. Consequently, it is different from the modern approaches which seek to explain the origins of evil from a strictly scientific angle, apart from any moral or supernatural context. Yet even among the scientists there is no unanimous explanation of evil. Each one of them or each school of scholars has produced different answers to the question of the origins of evil, all of them interesting, but none so satisfactory as to enjoy unanimous and general approval, as it has been shown from the representative sampling mentioned

in the introductory section.[1]

This variety of existing theories shows that we lack today anything that might be a satisfactory and comprehensive theory of human nature. This may be a good thing, for theories of human nature have too often been exploited for purposes inimical to human welfare. But it is important to be aware of the fact that the special sciences of psychology, anthropology, sociology, biochemistry, along with philosophy, and religion, to mention only the most representative, are all attempting to say something about different aspects of the same thing, man.

The distinctions between natural and moral evil, between evil imposed on us by other individuals and by us on others, and between the "acts of God," and those of nature, tend to blur when one reflects on the concept of God. For God is a sentient being inflicting suffering upon other sentient beings. Other efforts to explain evil deal with mental disturbances, ignorance, class distinction. Despite the plethora of theories, we are still left with the irreducible fact that none of these theories singly provides a completely satisfactory answer to the vital question of the origins of evil. In this respect we are not in a better condition than many of the ancients in the pre-Christian era who toiled with the same question and came up with as many theories to answer it. Irrespective of the validity of the ancient theories on evil, they are extremely important as the background from which scholars like Clement drew their inspiration or their negative reaction before they formulated their own theory of evil. A quick overview of some of the most important ideas regarding evil in the Near Eastern and the Greco-Roman world area may not therefore be futile exercise.

Evil in the Near East and the Greco-Roman World

The civilization of Mesopotamia and of the Syrian Palestinian coastline helped shape the Western concept of evil more directly than that of any other area in the Near East. Sumerian civilization stands directly behind that of the Canaanite and Hebraic. Religious ideas from the Sumero-Semitic culture may have permeated the Greek civilization through the pre-Achaean peoples of Greece and through other avenues. The extent of cultural diffusion in the Near East is not always clear, although there is very little doubt that it was present. Fragments of the Epic of Gilgamesh found in Boghazkoi show that the work had been translated even into Hittite and

[1] The theory is elaborated by Konrad Lorenz in his *Das sogennante Boese zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression* (Vienna, 1963) which was later published in translation as *On Aggression* (New York, 1966). Also Robert Ardrey, *African Genesis* (New York, 1966); --- *The Territorial Imperative* (New York, 1966). J. B. Russell, *The Devil, Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1977) 26-29; B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York, 1971); ---, *Walden Two* (New York, 1948); Nevitt Sandford and Craig Comstock, *Sanctions of Evil* (San Francisco, 1971); J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors* (New York, 1969); Kai Erikson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York, 1960); Robert A. Nisbet, ed., *The Sociological Tradition* (New York, 1966); Ira Levin, *This Perfect Day* (New York, 1970). Erich Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (New York, 1973).

Hurrian. This epic, one of the earliest pieces of literature in Mesopotamia to reach us in fairly complete form, contains elements reminiscent of the Biblical story of paradise. Enkidu, one of the epic's heroes, originally lived with the wild animals in the primeval woods unaware of the "blessings" of civilization. He was finally lured to the ways of civilization by a woman who ensnared him with her charms. His innocence now lost , the beasts no longer accepted him among them, and he was forced to abandon his paradise for the city of Erech. Just as the woman deprived Enkidu of his primeval paradise so later on in the same story the snake deprived Gilgamesh and his people of immortality by destroying the plant Gilgamesh had brought up from the bottom of the waters. The Jews will later remodel the story for their own theological purposes, but the essential features, such as the evil role played by the woman and the snake, will remain as central parts. In both cases the loss of innocence and immortality were due not only to the snake's deception but also to man's irresponsibility. The ordinary man in the Sumerian-Babylonian religion saw himself surrounded by forces which to him were awesome, some of them friendly like the gods, others, like the devil and other evil powers, hostile.[2] For protection against perils from demons, prophylactic amulets were worn and incantations or other rituals were performed. Far from scorning such devices, religion embraced them.[3] A Babylonian story similar to the Book of Job gives us a dialogue between a sufferer and his friend. The sufferer asks why the good who respect the divine often suffer, while those who ignore it seem to prosper. His friend does not seem to have an easy answer but entreats the sufferer to submit to his lot and be of good cheer. Like Job, the sufferer receives no satisfactory reply to his legitimate inquiry.[4] The Egyptian myth of Seth where Seth poses as the antagonist of the sky god Horus is as ancient as the Pyramid Texts. The hostility between the two gods grows in history and by the Hellenistic period Seth has become almost entirely evil. Some scholars insist that the two divinities stand for ecological antithesis. Seth represents the dry desert and Horus or Osiris the black fertile land of the Nile. This is one of the few instances in which black is not the color of evil while red is.[5]

The themes of opposites, of good and evil as supernatural forces, are frequently complementary in the Near East. The basic premise is that all things, good and evil alike, rise from God's scheme. But to the extent people feel that God is good they do not wish to ascribe evil to Him. They therefore postulate an opposite force, independent from God but subject to Him, as the force to which they ascribe evil. The coincidence of opposites is frequently expressed by the notion of war in the universe. Often a set of

[2] H. W. F. Saggs, *The Greatness that Was Babylon* (New York, 1962) 84.

[3] Saggs, *Babylon*, 302.

[4] D. W. Thomas, ed., *Documents from the Old Testament Times* (New York, 1958) 97-104; B. Landsberger, "Die babylonische Theodizee," ZA 43 (1936) 32.76.

[5] J. G. Griffiths, *The Conflict of Horus and Seth* (Liverpool, 1960) explores the political ramifications of the story.

gods, having been deposed by a younger generation of gods, were considered evil. The Olympic gods transformed the Titans into evil spirits. In Iran the Ahuras defeated the daevas; the chief Ahura then became the High God. Ahura-Mazda and the daevas were consigned to the rank of evil spirits, the minions of Ahriman, the lord of darkness.[6]

Religious dualism is best expressed in antiquity by Zoroastrianism, which posits the existence of two principles. But whereas in the rise of good and evil both proceed from a monist concept, in Zoroastrianism evil is not a manifestation of the divine. Thus Zoroastrianism moves from monism to dualism to explain evil, but at the same time it subordinates Ahriman to Ahura-Mazda, thereby reversing the process. The two principles are not equal or equally divine, although presented as entirely independent. Each of the principles is absolute in itself, but neither seems to have absolute or omnipotent power, though again there is no doubt about the final outcome of the struggle since the good will eventually triumph over evil. This definitive end of evil postulates the superiority of good over evil, despite the apparent separateness and the absolute character of the two forces. It also demonstrates the compatibility of this modified form of dualism with monotheism in that it posits a spiritual ruler of evil inferior to the spirit of good as does Christianity, as long as this spirit of evil, no matter now strong, does not possess the characteristics of a God. Zoroastrian dualism wrests from the unity of Ahura-Mazda a portion of his omnipotence in order to protect his perfect goodness. It makes that wrested portion responsible for evil in the world, thereby preserving God's perfect goodness and explaining satisfactorily from its own standpoint the evident presence of evil in a world dominated by a force representing perfect goodness, or so it thought. Indeed, if it is certain that the good force will prevail over the opposite why does it require the element of time? Why has it not defeated evil immediately to avoid so much pain? If the good force is so superior to the evil why does it tolerate the existence of evil at all? Like Zoroastrianism Christianity and Judaism also assert the omnipotence of God and have also found it difficult to explain the presence of so much evil in this world. They have made a valiant effort to explain the tolerance of evil by God. Whether this explanation is satisfactory, is another matter.[7]

In the Ancient Near East evil existed ontologically, represented as it was by a supernatural power whether independent and absolute or somewhat subordinate and absolute and quasi-equal to God. But it was the Greeks perhaps who first posed the question of the origins and the nature of evil in strictly philosophical form. Yet, before the Greeks treated evil from a philosophical standpoint, they dealt with it on a popular plane. In the Greek religion there does not seem to be a single source of evil. Zeus was responsible for lightning, hail, and destructive winds as well as for light and

[6] Mircea Eliade, *The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion* (Chicago, Univ. Press, 1969) 138-39; Russell, *The Devil*, 58.

[7] Russell, *The Devil*, 101.

the much desired rain. His offspring Hephaestus was god of the catastrophic volcanic eruptions while he was also the master artisan. Ares as god of war was a mad killer, worshipped by warriors who valued martial valor. Athena was goddess of wisdom and art, but she could also preside over war, albeit disciplined war. Hermes was a messenger but could also be a trickster and a thief. In its popular form Greek religion often presented each god as a manifestation of both the benevolent and destructive aspects of divinity. The duality manifests itself throughout Greek literature, myth, and philosophy in the classical period. Homer himself contains no clear separation of good and evil and no hypostatization of either.

Beyond men and gods there is an impersonal force called *Moira* that assigns to gods and men their proper role in the world.[8] In this concept, elaborating upon but not dismissing the popular religion, *Moira* is a cosmic order that rules human affairs as well as natural events. Themis is the force that holds things in order in heaven; on earth the force is justice (δίκη). Both forces seem to correspond roughly to the Egyptian concept of *ma'at*. Moderation and restraint are the underlying principles of order; excess constitutes a violation of that order and is bad. *Nemesis*, another force, punishes those who violate order. Violations of order are produced by human blindness, ἄτη, personified as the eldest daughter of Zeus. In the Iliad (19.87) Agamemnon argues that Zeus, Moira and the Erinyes all caused him to violate Achilles' honor. It is perhaps a subterfuge used to shift Agamemnon's responsibility for his costly quarrel with Achilles but it does not cease to reflect the perceived order of things. Aeschylus speaks of the πρώταρχον ἄτην (*Agam.* 1192), a blindness sent by the gods which drives to inevitable ruin an entire family to the last generation. Aeschylus argues that Fate is the equivalent of the will of Zeus, and that Zeus is responsible for all that happens everywhere. No mortal can escape the insidious guile of the God (*Pers.* 93). Elsewhere Aeschylus' point of view is even clearer. Orestes is driven by the Erinyes to avenge his father, but when he avenges his father the same spirits pursue him on behalf of his mother. Orestes complains that their torment is unjust, and the Erinyes answer that if he is released from them the house of justice will fall. Like the writer of the Book of Job, Aeschylus presents here the stark awesomeness of God. Orestes has, after all, no legitimate complaint, for to his mother's earlier pleas for mercy he had replied that Fate required her death. But as time passes, the responsibility of men continues to grow, although it is not completely separate from that of God. When a human being commits an evil deed, Fate as well as he are responsible for it. In the *Oedipus Rex*,

[8] F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (New York, 1957) 21; William C. Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought* (New York, 1963) 10-46. For *Moira* pp. 13;16; 124-25; Themis, 17;18;20; 24; 44; *Dike* 10; 14; 29; 32; 41; 55 ff.; *Nemesis* 18;19;20.

Oedipus suffers, but not arbitrarily, because he was not himself free of responsibility for his misfortunes.[9]

Toward the end of the fifth century, the difficulties posed by Greek theodicy become pronounced in the works of Euripides. In the world of Euripides man struggles in the grip of an irrational universe where the gods' role is moot and constantly questioned because they make no distinction between evil and good men (*Heracl.* 655-72). When Hecuba appeals to law and justice her plea fails, the play ending with the stark reply of the chorus that Fate spares no one (*Hec.* 1295). For Euripides goodness is a human virtue as evil is a human vice. No evil spirit urges men on to their ruin; the evil of men is of their own doing, a view that reminds us of some modern theories. This somber, down to earth conception of the world is also characteristic of Thucydides. The titanic conflict of the Peloponnesian War is not god-made. Gods have no place in it. Even the unpredictable and unforeseeable accidents belong to the agent Thucydides dubbed the irrational (παράλογος); they are not the work of God. Order is disrupted by the irrational activities of man. Even hybris has no divine connotation in Thucydides. It is a purely human quality that blinds man and leads him to his downfall. But Greek thought is not entirely free of dualistic implications. The dualism evident in the Zoroastrian religion manifests itself in a different form in the Orphic and Pythagorean traditions. The Orphic myth makes mankind a product of dual nature, spiritual and material. The material part of man's nature derives from the Titans who devoured Dionysus. The spiritual part comes from Dionysus who is devoured. The teachings of Pythagoras and his school were even more influential in the development of the dualist tradition. For the Pythagoreans soul is immortal, flesh mortal. The soul is trapped in the body like a prisoner (σῆμα-σῶμα). Man's task on earth is to escape his fleshly prison. But the dualism of the Orphics and Pythagoreans was different from that of Iran. Iranian dualism posited a conflict between two spiritual powers, one of light and the other of darkness. Orphic dualism assumed a conflict between divine soul and the titanic body imprisoned in it. The dualism between matter and spirit, body and soul is here strongly enunciated and may well have influenced the later Platonic, Christian, Gnostic, and Medieval thought. Though the majority opinion in Christianity has rejected the dichotomy between spirit and matter and the idea that the latter is evil, in Gnosticism it was the most persistent element of its belief. The doctrine that the body was the prison of the soul led to metempsychosis. One can escape the flesh only through a series of incarnations where one practices ritual purity until purity itself is finally achieved.

In common with other peoples, the Greeks believed in a number of minor spirits of a malicious nature, and as with most other peoples none of these spirits approached the stature of a principle of evil. Even the word de-

[9] 1329-1333. The same can be said about Oedipus' encounter with Laius. Laius' driver hurt him, but Oedipus did not have to kill both driver and Laius.

mon (δαίμων), which with us is synonymous with evil spirit, did not necessarily connote evil among the Greeks. In the Iliad it commonly stands for a divinity (θεός). In the Odyssey its meaning is ambiguous, in several instances meaning something negative. After Homer the term points to minor divinity. Similarly, its problematic nature is denoted by Socrates who is guided by a demon, a spirit of some sort, not negative in outlook. The demon was that strange inner voice which turned him away from doing something at crucial moments of his life.[10] He believed that this voice was the command of the divine. He could not rationally explain it and he therefore concluded that it must have been of divine origin. This assumption led him also to the belief in the prophetic meaning of dreams. His belief in the prophetic character of dreams is the revenge of mysticism against rationalism.[11] After Plato the term seems to be increasingly identified with negative powers.[12] Hades, an early god is soon considered more a place than a god. The underworld abode, where the dead went to pine not to suffer (Od. 11.489), gradually becomes transformed into a place of damnation and torture. Already in the Odyssey Titurus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus undergo torment for their crimes, and from their punishment it was assumed that all might suffer in the afterlife for their evil acts.[13]

Greek religion, mythology, and legend were influential in shaping the concept of the demon, but hardly of a being which truly personified the principle of evil. Soon the refinements of theodicy in Greece passed out of the hands of mythologists and into those of the philosophers. It was they who posed the question of the origins of evil. For some of the philosophers evil was merely a human concept born of lack of understanding of the divine plan. To the God, said Heracleitus, all things are beautiful, good, and right; men, on the other hand, consider some things right and others wrong.[14] Monism is also predominant in the Eleatic philosophy. For Parmenides everything including evil is in essence part of the One. For the Eleatics and other philosophers who followed them, as well as for Socrates, the Stoics, the Sophists, the Cynics, and the Epicureans, evil had no hypostatization; it lay in the flaws of human character. Socrates found its source in the inability of man to seek virtue and shun vice. Stoics and Cynics perceived it to reside in the misunderstanding of man who sought happiness in material things. Plato wrestled with the idea of evil persistently, and his philosophical ideas had a great impact upon the development

[10] Apol. 40 E; Phaedr. 242 B-C; Theaet. 151 A.

[11] Crit. 448; Phaed. 60 C; K. Joel, *Geschichte der antiquen Philosophie*, 1 (Tübingen,1921) 817

[12] U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, vol. 1 (Darmstadt, 1959) 357.

[13] Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube* 1, 337 ff,; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechische Religion*, 1, 2nd ed., (Munich, 1955) 452-56.

[14] Fr. 102; Russell, *The Devil*, 144; Philip Wheelwright, *Heracleitus* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1959) 90.

of the concept of evil. Plato began with the Socratic notion that evil arose from lack of true knowledge of the good, but he elaborated upon the idea.[15]

Protagoras argued that good had no nature, therefore no existence, and that good and evil were merely conventional and relative terms. Thrasymachus went even further than Protagoras. He rejected such notions as good and evil and argued in favor of power and expediency as the only possible measures of good and evil. Plato battled against such theories and inclined towards the absolute, although at times he seemed to have doubts and to have resigned himself to the idea of the world as a mixture (μῖξις). So Plato often wavered between dualism and monism. He tended to be a monist in that all emanated from one principle. But this monism is qualified by the acknowledgment of another element in the world which is the lowest emanation of the one principle or an element entirely independent. This lowest or independent element is matter. He does not perceive a conflict between the material and spiritual, since for him the spiritual world is more real than the material, therefore in its very essence better. In such a world evil has no real being at all; rather it consists of a lack of perfection or of a privation of goodness. The world of ideas is perfect, real, good. The phenomenal world is a perfect reflection of the world of ideas and in consequence less real and good. Ontologically, evil does not exist since it is only a lack or privation.[16]

This notion made possible the confusion of ontological evil with moral evil, though neither Plato nor those who followed him have argued that the ontological non-being of evil meant that there was no evil in the world. The ontological non-being of evil did not remove moral evil from the world; rather it removed the responsibility for evil from the creator who, in Plato, is a spiritual being but not a figure of worship. Evil is simply an abstract principle. Matter was not in any sense an emanation from the creator. The creator found it necessary to use matter which, however, proved refractory to his purposes. For the good we must assume no other cause than God, while for the cause of evil we should look in other things, not in God.[17]

Defects in our moral actions are the result of our defective knowledge, or constitution, or bad environment, or our free will, or all four. This explanation does not entail a principle of evil that is easily personified, nor does it clearly place responsibility. In book Ten of the Laws Plato flirts with another possibility as the cause of evil: the soul or part of it. Was this part of the soul owing to an evil element in the creator or a spirit other than

[15] I assume here that the early Platonic dialogues express Socratic thought whereas the middle and later dialogues contained Plato's ideas. If this assumption is not true --we have no absolute way of judging-- then confusion is inevitable.

[16] This idea was adopted by Augustine and Aquinas and deeply affected Western Christian theology.

[17] Rep. 379 C, ἀλλ' ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν.

the creator, bringing evil into the world? Plato did not elaborate upon these ideas. The existence of an evil soul was for him nothing more than one of his many fleeting thoughts.[18] In fact, there is no other thinker in the history of humanity who has examined the problem of evil from so many angles. All answers that have been given in the course of the centuries from the philosophical, ethical, and theological standpoint, had already been addressed by Plato.[19] His efforts to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of evil are extremely important also because they help us penetrate the depth of his religiosity and to understand the peculiar shades of it.

Regarding the question of the motives of the morally evil act his early views are to be found in the Protagoras (355 A and passim) and in Meno (77 B and passim). In these two works Plato expresses the view that the evil moral act is due to the lack of prudence; hence no one is voluntarily evil (κακός). In this view is to be located Socrates, moral optimism that man is naturally good, free and ready for virtuous acts, but his mistaken opinion about the Good leads him to morally incorrect activities. In his later works, Plato abandons this view as the main source of evil and ascribes it to the domination of the lower parts of the soul or the physical formation of the body. He remains, however, faithful to the dogma that no one is voluntarily evil.[20] He was so convinced that the human soul had divine origin and that from its nature it inclines toward its heavenly relation (ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγενείαν) that he was unwilling to admit the possibility of a natural propensity to evil. This is further proof that Platonic ethics bear a religious seal.

According to Plato every activity must aim towards the world beyond, to have as its target man's likeness to God. The principal aim of ethics should not be the regulation of the mutual relations of people in such a way so that men will only live happily on earth. Rather, ethics should point the way by which the human soul will be able to return to its origins, to the bosom of the divine. All of Plato's ideas are characterized by his concern with the eternal and divine.

His two works, the Republic (4.436 A ff.) and Phaedrus (247 B ff.) constitute a watershed in Plato's ideas regarding the origins of evil. In these works he describes the soul as consisting not only of the rational part but also of two other lower parts, the impulsive and the appetitive . The influence of the latter two over the first accounts for the evil acts. If man wants to be in control of his actions he should exercise control over the lower parts of the soul. Otherwise he stands in danger of falling to the category of animals.

[18] Laws 896 C-E; 897 B.

[19] L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen* (Berlin, 1882) 282-83; E.P. Papanoutsos, *To Thrêskeutiko Biôma Ston Platona* (Athens, 1971) 138.

[20] Rep. 9.589C; Tim. 86D; Laws 9.860D.

Plato explores the problem of evil further. In the Sophist (227 D-228 E) he distinguishes between two kinds of evil. One stems from ignorance; the other from some disease of the soul. Such a disease can so strongly affect the soul that the latter can temporarily stop loving the good; nay, it can hate it, though it still perceives good correctly. Thus in the Laws ignorance as the motive of evil is overshadowed by a passion, or part of it (θυμός) and pleasure (ἡδονήν) (Laws 9.863 B ff.). In the Timaeus Plato investigates the subject closer and a new answer is given. Impulses and pleasures are not considered parts of the soul, but strong obstacles engendered by the association of the soul with the body. These obstacles must be overcome (42 A ff.). He also speaks of atavistic influences of hereditary nature which in Plato take the place of an original sin;[21] he recommends purging as a cure, a clearly religious approach. In spite of it all, Plato continues to hold the view that the responsibility for evil is man's, not God's.[22]

With the arrival of Aristotle we return to monism. All motion comes from the First Cause. Good and evil are not disparate forms. There is nothing good in itself or evil in itself. Good and evil can be applied to every category of nature. Evil is merely the failure to be directed toward the final cause; this failure may be a material imperfection or a moral one. If it is a moral one it stems from a departure from the golden mean either toward an excess or toward insufficiency. There is nothing in Aristotle to encourage the concept of the principle of evil or its personification. Matter may hinder progress toward the ultimate goal but it cannot be considered a principle of evil.[23]

The outstanding characteristic of Hellenistic religion was its syncretism, the search for a unified religion through combination of the gods of Greece with those cultures with which the Greeks came into closer touch than ever before. Zeus and Jupiter, Re and Ohrmazd all became one, and in the process the religions of the East penetrated the West. Overwhelmed by insecurity, religious sentiment turned away from the public worship of the polis to an emphasis upon individual salvation and frequently upon the dualism of good and evil. On the other hand, some of the Hellenistic philosophies did not posit basic principles of good and evil. For Epicurus the universe was a chance occurrence of atoms; good and evil were relative human constructs with no metaphysical content. For the followers of Pyrrhon and Carneades all knowledge was doubtful, including that of good and evil. The Stoics also avoided a dichotomy of good and evil, their teaching being anchored in the tradition of monism.

[21] Gorg. 523 A ff.; Phaed.112 C ff.; Rep. 10.614 ff.; Theaet. 177 A ff.; Tim. 42 B ff.

[22] Rep. 2.379 C; 10.617 E; Laws 5.372 C-D; 10.904 E.

[23] Physics 192 A 15; Met. 1027 A 13; 1051a 4-21; W. D. Ross, ed., Met. Vol. 2, pp. 226-68 suggests that Aristotle is answering the Platonic belief in evil,. Rep. 476 A; 402 C; Thaet. 176 E; Laws 896 E; 898 C; HSCP 47 (1936) 110-15.

The material world emanated from one Power and in time will return to that Power. The Stoic emphasis was on doing one's duty in life. Human beings possessed free will, but free will consisted in complying with the will of the One. Moral sin arises from turning the will away from the design of the One; a futile activity because it engendered unhappiness for the doer. The later Stoics preoccupied themselves with the question of evil. Epictetus argued that good and evil did not lie in things themselves. Marcus Aurelius believed that there was nothing evil according to nature; evil arose from human volition based on ignorance that frustrated God's intention.[24]

Thus Epicureans, Skeptics, and Stoics rejected the idea of cosmic good and evil in favor of strictly human responsibilities. Evil was merely a human construct, a futile effort to thwart the will of the One. The Neophythagoreans of the second and third centuries A. D. argued that the One, the Monad, was wholly good, but that the phenomenal world, the Dyad, that emanated from the Monad, was evil. Man's soul is confounded and tempted to a wrong choice by its association with matter. But why did the wholly good Monad emit the evil Dyad was a question with which the Neopythagoreans never dealt. The Neoplatonists spoke of spirit and matter. Evil was attributed to the resistance of matter to the divine will. Plutarch argued that it was impossible that a single being should be the cause of all that exists; and therefore we can easily admit two contrary principles, or two rival powers, especially since God could not be the author of evil.[25] With all his frequent misunderstanding of Plato, Plutarch believed that matter could not be the cause of itself; hence it was produced by spirit, resulting in the two contrary and opposed spirits, the good God and the evil spirit, the latter responsible for the creation of matter which resists the will of God.

Lastly, Philo of Alexandria attempted a new synthesis of the philosophical and religious ideas of his time. In this synthesis Philo assumed that Scripture was true, and that reason helped in leading to truth and to the Lord. His synthesis opened the way to the first, perhaps, coherent theological system in Judaism. In his interpretation of Scripture Philo followed the allegorical method that influenced several later writers including Clement. Philo relied heavily upon Greek philosophy, especially that of Plato. His synthesis of Greek and Jewish thought was imitated by later Christian and Jewish writers. For Philo the God is Jahweh and He is good. In the mind of God, the Lord, exists the Logos, the Word, the domain of ideas, what the Platonists called νοῦς. Matter is refractory, and to the extent that it resists the work of God it may be viewed as evil. Human sin

[24] This belief seems to stand in contradistinction to the Stoic idea of Fate which is assumed to be omnipotent. Chrysippus considered everything to be in accordance to Fate and Providence. Cleanthes seemed to have disagreed (SVF 2.933).

[25] Plut. *Isis and Osiris* 369 a-d. *In De Anima Procr. in Timaeo* 1014 d-1015 d he identifies the power of evil with Plato's απειρία (Philebus), ἀνάγκη (Timaeus) and innate desire (Politicus); A.E.Taylor's A *Commentary on Plato' Timaeus* (New York, 1987) pp.115-17.

consists in the corruption and contamination of the soul by matter, and results from free will, because each of us is free to resist the temptation of matter. Although Philo's philosophy seems to have greatly affected Clement's thought, as a Christian Clement could not entirely accept Philo's interpretation of matter and evil.

Clement on the Origins of Evil

Not surprisingly, Clement follows the Biblical interpretation about the entrance of evil to the world, which he ascribes to the Original Sin. Though he does not reproduce the details of man's fall, he makes several references to it throughout his extant writings, frequently with a variation. He felt no need to repeat the story because he accepted it as a given, and that Christians as well as Jews were familiar with it. What is this original sin? Simply put, it is the disobedience by the first man of the instructions or the commands of God. This violation of the command of God makes the concept of sin an evil of a fundamentally religious nature. It is not simply a fault on the part of man; it is a fault committed by man which impinges upon man's relation to God. Christian anthropology has imposed a characteristic interpretation of sin, removing to the margin many religious and philosophical views. Sin is presented as a transgression of the divine will, thereby creating a legal and moral problem in relation to the divine order. As a consequence, an abysmal and mysterious sense of guilt attaches to the life of the Christian. In this case God is painted as a coordinator of a legal order because , as we shall see, so His justice requires. The violation of the divine order constitutes an insult against God which arouses His divine wrath. In this context, the devil is a deceiver of man leading him into transgression. In essence the devil constitutes the punishing instrument of God.[26]

To the above concept of sin is related the concept of paradise and Hades. The righteous are rewarded as the keepers of the divine commandments, their reward consummated in paradise. The punishment of the unjust is irrevocably inflicted in Hades. Thus the relationship between God and man becomes, on the surface, a relationship of fear, or of calculation, or utility, despite the frequent references to the love of God in the Christian religion. This approach may lead to the wrong meaning of the concept of sin.

What is Clement's concept as embodied in the word "hamartia"? Though the term hamartia is not the only term Clement uses to interpret sin,

[26] This theory was expressed by Augustine as a preliminary to his theory of the satisfaction of the divine justice (*satisfactio Dei*). According to Augustine man fell into the hand of the devil since he violated God's law by insulting the moral order. This success of the devil resulted in the decision of God to free man from the bonds of the devil. In other words, the devil himself ought to pay for the commitment of wrong. The statement of Augustine on this occasion is characteristic: *non autem Diabolus potentia Dei, sed Justitia superandus fuit*. The devil was defeated by the justice of God, not by God's power, *De Trinitate* 13, 14, PL 42, 1027-28.

hamartia possesses a key role in Clement's vocabulary, with a considerable variety of meanings. Describing the great benefits that have been conferred on man through the advent of Christ, Clement urges man to allow the heavenly Word, the Savior, to be bound on him as an amulet. If man trusts in God's own power, he will be delivered from sinful passions which are the disease of the mind. Thus rescued from sin man will escape destruction, for sin is eternal death (Protr. 115.2).

Clement then proceeds to make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary sin. Clement portrays voluntary sin as sudden death, an idea he seems to borrow from Paul and the Old Testament, and also from Greek philosophy.[27] Involuntary sin is for Clement an irrational act, with the leading Logos, the Paedagogos, receiving the charge to so guide us that we will avoid irrational sins. Clement's allusion in several places to this idea of sin as irrational and his general description bears affinity to that of Philo.[28] In the *Paedagogos* (1.5.2) sin is portrayed as a mistake contrary to reason, an opposition which may or may not involve some moral violation but would be likely to result in injustice. To underline the importance of sin as an erroneous act, Clement uses the custom of Jews who offered the turtledove and the pigeon as sacrifice for the commission of such sins, in the hope that God would forgive them.[29]

Clement believed that the commission of hamartia was a morally serious act because it led to the disgracing of the soul.[30] Such being the character of sin, it follows that everyone who sins wrongs not so much his neighbor as himself by making himself a less estimable individual than before. A person's continuance in sin causes his abandonment by God as a dead body is abandoned by its spirit. Moreover, if disobedience to reason is the generative cause of sin, obedience to reason becomes the efficacious cause of dutifulness.[31]

Similarly, evil is a disposition of the soul which does not accord with reason (logos) in respect to the whole life. What is more important, Clement asserts that one can describe philosophy itself as the cultivation of reason so that what is done through error of reason is transgression, and is rightly called sin (ἁμάρτημα).[32] The first man sinned by disobeying God, that is, he committed a sin against Logos and was considered as deprived of reason and became like a beast.[33] Clement believes that involuntary evil is done frequently by free choice and inclination or through a mistaken judg-

[27] Str. 7.14.3; Eph. 4.22 - 4; Deut. 13.8 ff.

[28] Str. 7.32.7; Paed. 1.5.1-2; Philo, De agric. 175. Str.

[29] Str. 2.64.3. Str. 7.32.7. A 2, A similar idea is expressed in Paed. 1.14.3 where doves and pigeons signify innocence and gentleness (Lev. 15.29; 12.8; Luk.2.24)

[30] Paed. 1.59.2; 2.27.3; Str. 2.64.3

[31] Paed. 2.100.1; 101.3; SC ad loc.; Musonius 12, p.65, 1-2;

[32] .Paed. 1.101.1-4; SC ad loc. N.6 another Stoic view; Str. 2. 32.3; Paed. 1.10.2; SVF 2.36; 3. 445; 3.293;

[33] Paed. 1.101.3; Ps. 48. 13.21.

ment which rests on ignorance and weakness. And both depend on ourselves, inasmuch as we will neither learn nor restrain lust. Of these two failures one shows that people do not judge well, and the other that they cannot comply with right judgment. Anyone who is deluded will not be able to act rightly, though perfectly able to do what he knows; and, though capable of judging what is requisite, will not keep himself free of blame, if destitute of ability for action. For Clement there are two kinds of corrections applicable to each of these sins: for the one, knowledge and clear demonstration from the testimony of the Scriptures; for the other, the training according to Logos, which in turn is regulated by the discipline of faith and fear. Both corrections can grow to perfect love.[34]

Clement's argument is intended to free God of any responsibility for the commission of sin by man. Following this argument Clement proceeds to establish the involuntary character of evil in accord with the Platonic view that no one really prefers evil for its own sake. The person who practices evil does so for the pleasure that is supposedly part of it, imagining it as good because his mind is clouded by emotion or his judgment impaired by ignorance. (Str. 1.84.2-4). Here is the catch for Clement who again inserts the element of volition by claiming that it depends upon us to free ourselves from ignorance and evil and voluptuous choice. This we can achieve if we learn to follow the dictates of truth incorporated for Clement in the Christian teachings, although he begrudgingly admits elsewhere the value of philosophy as a fair guide to the truth. Clement uses at this point Aristotle's categories of evil to describe the character of the voluntary act. Accordingly what is voluntary is either by desire or by choice or by intention.[35]

Sinning arises from one's inability to determine what ought to be done, or the inability to do what ought to be done from lack of true knowledge, as one falls into a ditch through not knowing of its presence or from his physical inability to leap across the ditch. So far Socrates would have agreed with him. For Clement the solution to this absence of knowledge is the application and training of ourselves and our subjection to the commandments, something which is in our own power. But if we abandon ourselves wholly to lust we sin and thus wrong our own soul.[36] Clement was sensitive to the arguments by the Gnostics that God in his omniscience and omnipotence could have prevented evil; hence He bears the ultimate responsibility for the existence and commission of evil. Clement does not back away from such arguments but confronts them head

[34] Str. 7.101.1-7; 102.1.

[35] Aristl. Eud. Eth. 2.7; p. 1233a 23; Nic. Eth. 5. 10, p. 1135-36; Rhet. I, 13, p. 1374b 5-10. Further down in Str. 2.62.4 Clement repeats that obedience is in our power. Man is responsible for his own actions, see also Str. 1.4 1; SC ad loc. where error is voluntary, ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων Paed. 1.69.1 67; Plat. Rep. 10.617; Gorg. 477 A.

[36] Str. 2.62.3-63.1. Plato mentions this dogma in several places among which Crito and the Republic 10.617 E.

on by seeking to block them with a philosophical discourse. Those who hold these views argue, he maintains, that the person who does not take precaution against a theft, or does not prevent it is also the cause of it. Accordingly the person who does not prevent a conflagration or its genesis is equally the cause of the conflagration with the originator of it. This is the position in which the promoters of the aforesaid argument place God. Clement does not agree with them because he sees the blame of happenings in their execution, actualization and realization. Consequently, the act of not preventing something carries no blame. For Clement causation attaches to activity and not to abstinence from activity. That which does not prevent is separated from causation. In what activity does that agent which fails to prevent engage, Clement asks? Those who propound such arguments, the Gnostics, are reduced to absurdity if they maintain that the cause of the wound is not the dart, but the shield, which did not prevent the dart from passing through; and they blame not the thief but the person who did not stop the theft. Can they say that it was Achilles who burned the ships of the Greeks in Troy and not Hector because when Achilles had the power to prevent Hector he failed to do so? Was then Achilles the concurring cause because out of anger he did not keep back the fire?

In his effort to employ philosophical reasoning to expiate God from all responsibility for evil Clement gets on very slippery ground. For Achilles might not have been the cause of the burned ships but he was responsible for his irrational wrath which exacerbated his dispute with Agamemnon and led to the burning of the ships. But beyond the question of the applicability of such rhetorical syllogisms to a supreme being not constrained by human weaknesses and circumstances, Clement's examples are not even morally sound because humans do very often try to prevent mishaps or ascribe responsibility, albeit moral, to those who could have prevented something and did not. In the unfortunate occasion of the burning of the Greek ships Achilles was responsible not only for not preventing it but also because he wished it upon the Greeks, a wish that satiated his need for revenge.[37] In a way Clement here confuses the issues and argues against his own theory according to which sin is something that hurts man, not God, as Socrates would have argued in the case of revenge. Had not Achilles been so stubborn and adamant in his thirst for revenge, Patroclus would not have died. Since the death of Patroclus hurt Achilles more deeply than any of the other Greeks, one can easily argue that the death of Patroclus was the price Achilles paid for his pettiness. Yet, Clement who here twists the argument to prove a point against the Gnostics agrees overall with Plato that committing wrong hurts the individual who com-

[37] Str. 1.82.1-6; 4-83.2.

mits the sin, and that humans would avoid sin if they knew better, since in reality nobody wants to wrong himself. He buttresses this argument by a reference also to ancient tragedy where the famous Laius says,

> None of these things of which you admonish me have escaped me, but notwithstanding that I am in my senses, Nature compels me.[38]

> He who pollutes himself by sin destroys what is in him holy, that is, the Logos, by associating with vice and evil.[39]

Association with evil is tantamount to forsaking God, an act which provokes Him and angers Him.[40] As with the evangelist so also with Clement the range of sin includes the activity of looking, which legally may not have been reprehensible but morally was. For Clement sin is not only touching but also looking.[41] Simply put Clement views goodness in the Platonic manner as a totality. Anything less than that constitutes ignorance, human weakness, lack of perfection. He unreservedly rejects the view of the Basilidians and others who claimed that they could sin owing to their accomplishment of perfection by virtue of which they were destined for salvation; hence sin could not touch them, Str. 3.3.3. Clement does not recognize such a thing as "power" or "permission" to sin. As he so frequently stressed, the source of sin was dual: ignorance and human weakness.[42] For that reason Clement believed that whatever an individual did when ignorant of the truth of God, if on becoming conscious of Him he repented his sins, he was to be forgiven.[43] For God does not hate His sinning creatures. He could reward evil with evil but instead He rewards evil with good. What characterizes Him is forbearance and forgiveness of evil, (Str.7. 86.5). This belief leads Clement to the conclusion that the state of sinfulness is not permanent. The non-Christians who wished to escape that condition can easily do so through the illumination of baptism whose washing rinses man's sins away.[44] As to the Christian who has fallen into sin after baptism he could cleanse himself from it by prayer and repentance which free the sinful man from bondage to the devil. Sinners, says Clement, fancy themselves free of God's power. In essence they are subject to evil demons (Str. 7.4.3). These demons exhort an individual to the commission of evil

[38] Eur. *Chrysippé*, fr. 840. It reminds us of Paul's saying in Rom. 7.23; 25 which might even have its roots in Greek literature.

[39] Clement refers to Philebus for the Platonic notion but the reference seems to be misplaced, see Rep. 8, 549 B. For Clement the holy resides in us and any pollution is an abhorrence of the holy, which in turn abhors to be polluted, Paed. 1.100.4

[40] Paed. 1.78.2; Isa. 2.4; Jer. 2.12-13.

[41] Paed. 3.82.5; Matt. 20.15

[42] Str. 2.62.3; 7.101.6.

[43] Paed. 1.29.4; Str. 6.45.6; 48.6; Acts 3.17; 19; 17. 30.

[44] Paed. 1.30.1; 50.4; Mark 1.4 Michael Grant, *Jesus, An Historical Review of the Gospels* (New York, 1995) 46.

deeds, thereby exercising a tyrannical slavery over him.[45] But prayer for forgiveness should be made on the understanding that the recipient will try not to sin any longer. If he fell lightly into sin again the granting of forgiveness does not benefit the sinner because it does not respond to a true repentance, Str. 2.57.3.

Another way to escape from sin in Clement's days was through martyrdom. Clement believed that the Christian martyr, even though he might have sinned before his martyrdom, by shedding his blood acknowledged his faith and thereby rinsed himself of whatever sins he had formerly committed (ἀποκάθαρσις ἁμαρτιῶν). This is a view still prevalent in the church and among the Moslems. By dying for the sake of Christ the martyr severed himself from sins and entered the true life.[46]

Clement differed from the Gnostics in another respect which also impinged upon sin. Some Gnostics held that the Law was responsible for the introduction of evil. These Gnostics even recruited some of the sayings of Paul to support their arguments.[47] Clement rejects outright the notion that the introduction of the Law may have caused sin and points out instead that the Law showed what sin was and what one had to do and by thus showing what was to be done the Law revealed what ought not to be done (Str. 2.35.1-4). Obviously, Clement felt that the Gnostics had completely misinterpreted Paul's statement which in truth points out that by the Law the knowledge of sin is realized (ἐπίγνωσις), not that it derives its existence from it. Far from being bad, the Law was good because it trained man to avoid evil and do good and was given to man as an instructor to bring man to Christ (Gal. 3.24). It trained the Christian to perfection by preventing him from doing things that he should not do and by prescribing for him good actions. But one person's truth is not necessarily also another's unless it concerns mathematical truths, and at this point the Gnostics were not entirely wrong since Paul inclined to ignore the Law as having lost its utility since the coming of Christ.

Besides the use of the term hamartia as denoting some evil deed, a violation of the divine order (Str. 7.82.3), Clement uses other terms, some related to hamartia. Hamartêma, for example, is an impure act connoting a transgression of some moral order which has been committed by the senses. It is something spiritually injurious and as such it impedes man on his journey to perfection.[48] Similarly, the term *examartanein* connotes a vio-

[45] Str. 2. 114.1-6; 117.1-2; 1.92; Paed. 2.164.1-6; 117.1-2.

[46] Str. 2.32.1-34.4; Rom. 3.20. It was Marcion who utilized the text of Paul to condemn the Law, see SC ad Str. 2.34.4. The idea of the Law as enjoinder of what is to be done and what is not is also a Stoic idea that Clement here applies to the Mosaic Law. See Paed. 1.2.65; G.C. S. 1.95. p. 128; Str.1.166.1- 5;SC ad loc. which Clement combines here with Paul, Rom. 5.13 and 7.7 to prove that the Law was not the cause of sin.

[47] Paed. 1.101.1-2. Str. 2.64.3; 3.99.1; 7.49.2; 56.3; 73. 1; 74.6; 80.1; QDS 38.4; Paed. 2.62.1; 2.73.1; 2.51.2;1.68.3; Str. 7.74.1-7; Ecl. Proph. 9.3; 11.1-2;

[48] Str.1. 110.5; QDS 42.18; Protr. 83.2; 111.1-2.49. Paed. 1.102.3-4; Str.59.6; 4.124.1;

lation of the divine order, while *epexamartanein* points to a continuous state of sin.[49] *Diexamartein* means to fall short of one's expectations, or to make a mistake in judgment, which is another form of hamartia.[50]

This brief investigation of the term hamartia in Clement demonstrates first the variety of nuances the term had in the first centuries of Christianity and in Clement's writings and secondly the nature of the concept. Hamartia is an activity of the human soul or mind not a substance, unless we identify the nature of the activity with its substance. It is a human activity injurious to man in a dual sense: it destroys what is holy in him and it offends God. In both of these instances sin is related to the divine in the sense that if there were not a God creator and man had nothing of the divine in him, or had not God expected perfection from man, the activity regarded as sin would have been devoid of any metaphysical content. Some of its externalizations might simply have been considered as acceptable or unacceptable conventional activities as they would be for the Sophists. Plato and the pre-Socratics may have attached some metaphysical value to evil and good, but even in their case the concept of evil as a pathos or affection of the soul did not have the religious content it acquired in the Christian era. Judging from Clement's description of it, hamartia is not a thing; it has no hypostasis. Everything sensible and intelligible is good but owing to its having been created it runs the risk of becoming nothing. It can be changed, altered, corrupted. This change, in its turn corruptive, is hamartia, evil. Evil has no hypostasis because it is not an object nor a being, the μή ὄν, but it can corrupt the essence of good. For that reason it produces pain to everything good. Man desires the realization of the good but often fails because he mistakes what is good, thereby transfiguring the good. Clement's reference to doing good to one's fellow-man as a form of escaping from sin also indicates that one's insistence on individuality is an indication of his falling away from the fullness of existence and love. This falling away is sin (hamartia) which means missing the mark as to the essential truth. Clement seems to insist on sin as "failure" and "missing the mark," as the loss of that aim which for human nature is its existential self-transference. Failure and weakness have no communion with incorruptibility (Str. 3.104.4). They introduce evil which is doing what is against nature because of the lack of that which is in accordance with nature.

Clement's view of sin is historically important because it set the stage for the later Fathers of the Church who refused to perceive sin hypostatically. Sin is not an evil nature which stands hypostatically as the opposite pole to the divine existence of life and love. There is nothing hypostatically and naturally evil. Sin is a failure as to existence and life. The failure of a person to realize the end of his being. It distorts man's na-

[49] QDS 3.4; 4.3; 33.2; SVF 3.377-78.

[50] ἐγγραφῇ καὶ πολιτευθῇ, Protr. 82.5 reminds us civic practices in the ancient world. Maximus the Confessor, *Scholia on the Divine Names*, PG 4.348 C; Chr. Giannaras, *The Freedom of Morality* (New York, 1984) 33-34.

ture and fragments it. In this light, Adam's freely chosen sin subjected his nature to passion and the corruption of death. This new "change" of nature did not mean a change into evil nature but the separation from the true life prepared for man by God.

For Clement then sin is not a legal but an existential fact. It is not simply a transgression but an active refusal on man's part to be what he truly was made to be: the image and likeness of God. Sin, understood in this way is not simply a denial of social categories of "propriety." By love of one's fellow-man Clement does not mean what the conventional idea of altruism implies. He means much more than that; he means the refusal of the sinful man to live in accordance with the nature with which God endowed him, since sin constitutes for him a distortion of his true end, natural disintegration, corruption, death. Man's often desperate clinging to the safeguarding of his individual self, his prosperity, his social standing, is simply adding to the disintegration of his being. Man's acceptance or rejection of the authenticity of his being reveals the infinite and dynamic magnitude of his personal relationship with God, or his distance from Him. Consequently, man's daily sins, his failures to attain the "end" which is personal fulfillment in God, are not errors or violations of established human conventions. They are dynamic manifestations of the distance that separates man from God. This separation can be closed through repentance which is the restoration of man's communion with God. In that case the unjust and sinful saves himself from eternal punishment and restores his relations to God and fellow-man. For repentance, like sin, means change, radical change of his overall behavior, and man is free to bring about this change, if he so wishes.[51]

God created the world out of goodness and His crowning achievement is man, whom God made by his own hands, unlike everything else whose creation He commanded. Unfortunately, man disobeyed God's commands and fell from grace. Man alone is responsible for his fall and for the punishment that follows, which, like sin, is twofold: ignorance and the triumph of the irrational part over the rational, that is spiritual death.[52] The description of hamartia as failure or suffering experience (pathos) leads us to Clement's discussion of the term pathos as something also injurious to man's spiritual welfare, a missing of his intended end.

Pathe as Sin

In the description of pathos as a passion of the soul Clement follows the Stoic definition. Accordingly, passion is an excessive appetite surpassing the measures of reason, or an appetite unbridled and disobedient to reason. Passions are perturbations of the soul contrary to the true nature of man and

[51] Protr. 115. 2-4; Paed. 1.101.1.
[52] Str. 2.56.6; SVF 3.337-78

in disobedience to reason. Revolt and disobedience are in our power, as obedience is also in our power. Wherefore, voluntary actions are judged not the standard of the involuntary actions since man is responsible for his voluntary activities. But should one examine each one of the passions, he will find them to be mostly irrational impulses.[53]

For Clement as for Plato many of the soul's passions stem from that state of the soul we call desire (ἐπιθυμία).[54] As in the case of harmartia the forms of passions or desires can manifest themselves in a variety of states. Some of these can be neutral, or good, or reasonable, or unreasonable, or lustful, or vicious. Needless to say that the unreasonable, lustful, and vicious states are usually harmful to the soul, whereas the reasonable or neutral are not. The neutral desires are classified in a similar manner as ὀρέξεις of the soul which connote something natural, pertaining to the human properties of man.[55]

Among such desires are thirst and hunger.[56] Ὄρεξις is to be distinguished from the irrational desires because its motives originate in the reasonable necessities of life. In the category of legitimate passions or affections one can place the human desire for acquisition of material things, provided it is not indulged to an excess (πλεονεξία).[57] Clement's emphasis on greediness follows a tradition of moral thought which has its origins in the first years of Christianity and is pursued by the Fathers of the Church. Greediness is the sacrifice of man to idols. Paul characterizes the greedy man as idol worship (Eph. 5.5) and considers greediness as the source of all evils (Tim. 6.10). The greedy persons place greediness in the place of faith and truth and freedom. They become slaves to greediness instead of being free men since they despise the freedom giver.

Beyond these rational passions there is a diversity of irrational ones that Clement criticizes as harmful to Christians, or to man in general. Among them the sexual passion occupies a prominent place in Clement's writings. But, as we shall show later on, Clement does not reject sexual relations entirely as carnal and therefore material, as many of the Gnostics did. He only rejected what in his view was illicit sex, that is contrary to what he perceived as the commands and the law of God. Clement did not consider matter qua matter to be evil and to that effect he cited the argument of Plato who recognized the excellence of the government of the

[53] Paed. 2.89.2-3; SC ad loc.; 3.1.2; Phaedr. 238 A; 254 C-E; Jer.5.8; Following the Platonic divisions of the soul, Clement here, as in many other places adheres to the Platonic terminology, Rep. 4.439 D-E. He also uses the verbs ἐθέλειν καί βούλεσθαι Rep. 4.437B, 435 B; 441 C. The use of such terms is understandable. If Clement were to engage in philosophical discourse he had to follow the model established by his pagan predecessors.

[54] 119.1-2.

[55] Str. 4. 117.5; Str. 2.118.7-119.2; SVF 3.442; 445.

[56] Str. 2.118.7-119.3; 2.119.3; Paed. 1.101.1; SVF 3.442.

[57] Str. 4.34.3; Protr. 53.1; 83.3; 104.4; Paed. 2.98.1; 2.103.2; 2.128.1; 3.78.2; Str. 1 173.2; 2.10.2; 3.28.5; 3.89.1; 6.48.4; 7.84.7.

world when he said that "a man ought not to release himself from that government and run away."[58] This position is intended to block the view of Marcion, who seems to have used Plato in support of his assertion that matter is evil. Clement uses Plato to prove that matter is not evil and that Plato himself did not think it so.

Fortunately, not all passions are simply neutral or evil. Many are good and suitable for man, Str. 3.69.1. Among them is the passion or the desire to be with Christ, the desire for the kingdom of God and for heaven as a dwelling place. Similar desires which are good and pure are equally positive. Since the term pathos in Greek is multidimensional, in Clement it covers a wide spectrum of meanings. Pathos thus could mean physical suffering like that of Croesus who learned from bitter experiences about the adversities of life.[59] The suffering of Christ on the Cross is also described as pathos.[60] The death and burial of Lazarus and the fearful experience of Isaac in the hands of his father, who almost sacrificed him to please God, is also a suffering (pathos); so is Christ's incarnation.[61] Any emotion that may affect us is a pathos and so also are the various conditions or properties such as wealth, poverty, glory or the absence of it, health, pleasure or the impressions these make upon the soul.[62] Certain states of humankind such as marriage including a wife's devotion to her husband are categorized as passions (Paed. 2.109.4). Passions can also be mental disturbances when they are characterized as illness of the soul or irrational human reactions.[63]

Surprisingly, physical and atmospheric changes are also described as passions (πάθη ἀέρος καὶ νεφῶν).[64] Other broad categories of passions are those which affect morality and express vices or indicate some form of spiritual disease.[65] These passions proceed from man's own soul when his soul is vexed by impious lusts and diverse pleasures, by base hopes and destructive dreams, leaving the soul always grasping at more, and driven to

[58] Str. 3.19.1-4. Plat. Phaed. 62 B.

[59] Protr. 43.4; Paed. 1.1-2. The idea is borrowed here from Aristl. Poet. 1447a where Aristotle utilizes the same distinction to analyze the expressive content of dance, see also Paed. 1.1.4; 1.34.3 for uses of *pathê* as physical sufferings.

[60] Paed. 1.74.4; 2.62.3; 2.73.3; Str. 1.145.4-5; 4.43.1-3.

[61] Paed. 1.6.2-3; 23.2; .74.4; John 11.43; Paed. 1.1.4; 23.2. Paed. 1.74.4; F. Quatember, *Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandrien nach seinem Paedagogus* (Vienna, 1946) 129, n. 163.

[62] *enaperismata*, Str. 2.110.1; 2.109.3.

[63] Paed. 2.109.4; Protr. 115.2. The latter seems to be a Stoic idea, and so is the terminology which Clement uses here, see SVF 3. 421-23; Str. 74 1-4.

[64] Protr. 102.1-2; 34.5; 36.1; see also in Panyassis, Heraclea fr. 6 and 20 (ed. Kindel); Paed. 1.6.1-2; 1.43.1; SC ad 43 1, n. 2; Quartember, *Die christliche Lebenshaltung* , p.102, n. 75; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 598-600; Paed. 2.86.2; 2.93.3; 2.100.4; 101.1; 3.10.1; 43.5; Str. 2.32.1; 41.2; 109.2; 3.43.1; QDS 14.6; 19.3.

[65] QDS 25.4-5 ·ἀγρίων ἐρώτων, Plat. Phaed. 81 A; Rep. 1.329. C; Soph. 252 C; I Cor. 3.13; Rom. 5.4; II Cor. 4.18; Mark 10.30;

insane pursuits which lead her to despair of life and show contempt of God. The base individual carries these passions everywhere in himself.[66]

In brief, passions in the form of moral evils are defined by Clement as excessive appetites, that is, exceeding the measure of reason, or appetites unbridled and disobedient to God. They are perceived as perturbations of the soul contrary to nature in disobedience to reason (Str. 4.59.6), a deadly malady or separation from what is designated by the Word as wholesome. Viewed from this angle, passions for Clement cannot be simply an outgrowth of our human nature independent of moral and supernatural connotations. They constitute irrational impulses contrary to the divine commands; they are distractions and disobediences which we have the duty to curb exactly as obedience is in our power to practice. Clement recognizes the Divine Being as alone passion-free, needing nothing and suffering nothing and consequently incapable of self-restraint as It is never subjected to passion over which It must exercise control. Man's goal is to try to approach God's passion-free state.[67] As something caused through folly is not folly itself and as action arising from ignorance is not in itself ignorance but an evil through ignorance, so passions of the mind are not evil but proceeding from some evil cause and intent.[68]

Taken strictly his statement would mean that it is not the activity itself, that is, but the intention that makes the activity evil. This cannot be what Clement means to say. Rather, his statement should indicate that frequently the activity itself must be evil along with the intention, provided again that the individual is aware of the activity and its nature. Thus in his eyes the act of adultery is not evil because of some excess arising from evil passion but because of the activity itself. Adultery, whatever its intention, must be evil as constituting a violation of the divine command. Unless what he is addressing here is the question of such human passions as drinking or eating, which are neither evil in intention nor good but simply bare necessities of life, when not indulged in excess. Where so indulged they become irrational acts, therefore reprehensible, something like hamartia or the Platonic κακία, which Clement, like Plato, uses to denote some sort of evil.

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[66] Str. 1.40.4-5; 2.59.6; SVF 3.378; 379; 462; Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992) 65 A-Y and commentary.

[67] Clement's views here seem to follow Philo's *De Virtibus* step by step, see Stählin ad Str. 2.81.1. The ideal of Clement's gnostic is to imitate god and to become the Stoic *apathês*; SC ad loc. n. 2

[68] Str. 7.66.2; Clement's following of Platonic reasoning here may be responsible for a confusion, Plat. Prot. 360 C; Lach. 197 A. Awareness and freedom are the two ingredients that Clement stresses. Aristl. Nic. Eth III, 2.111a; Ovid Metam. 4.516; Hdt. 6.75; Gen. 19.26; Philo, *De Somn.* 1.247; Str. 2.60.1 -61.2; Irenaeus Ad Haer. 4.37.1-2.

Pleasure (Ἡδονή)

Closely related to desire is the question of pleasure, which Clement, following the earlier Greek philosophers, defines as an agreeable motion accompanied by a certain sensation.[69] Clement connects the feeling of pleasure with the fall of man, and imitating Philo he allegorizes sin with pleasure, to which Adam succumbed by listening to the serpent who signified pleasure.[70] The serpent is the same deceiver (ἀπατεών) who brought Eve down to death (Gen. 3.1). Then in a fascinating twist of a passage dealing with the bacchic orgies Clement refers to Evan as that Eve through whom error came into the world in the form of disobedience.[71] By disobeying God Adam dishonored himself. Such was the temptation regarding pleasure that man, who had hitherto been free by reason of his simplicity, was now fettered to sin. Wondrously man, deceived by pleasure and bound to corruption, had now his hands unloosed, set free by a sympathetic God who laid Himself low by becoming flesh and suffering as a human being in order to raise man to his former state. Thus he who was formerly expelled from paradise for his disobedience could now enjoy once again heaven itself.[72] The good Christian should abandon pleasure by seeking the Lord, the son and creature of God. If he continues in pleasure, he will remain engrossed in sin (Protr. 99.4).

Among the worst passions for Clement is love of luxury and the love of self, both pleasures of the world which are contrary to the love of God.[73] The question of pleasure is further complicated whenever people identify pleasure with good and truth. According to Clement this misconception stems from ignorance which is persistence in sin that hinders men from living in accordance with reason.

Like the Cyreneans, Clement rejects the Epicurean view of pleasure as life's purpose (Str. 2.130.8). Pleasure is itself a source of pain since every

[69] Str. 2.106.3; Str. 2.127.2; Aristip. of Cyrene in Diog. Laert. 2.85-86; Eus. PE 14. 28.32; Xen. Mem. 2.1.30.

[70] Protr. 111.1. Also Philo, *De opif.* 157; *Leg. Alleg.* II, 72; *De agr.* 97;.

[71] Protr. 12.2, Εὔαν ἐκείνην, δι'ἣν πλάνη παρηκολούθησε,. To stress the point even further Clement argues that the strict Hebrew interpretation of the aspirated *Hevia* signifies a female serpent. Elsewhere he warns women of cosmetics as dangerous; for as the serpent deceived Eve, so has also jewelry misled women to vicious practices. See also Gen. 3.105 and SC Paed. 2.123.3; SC Protr. 12.1, n. 3.

[72] Protr. 111.1-3. The story of God's incarnation for the salvation of man is repeated in Protr. 7.1-4 where Clement dwells upon the coming of Christ as the cause of our well-being. The Logos appeared as man, he alone being both man and God and the author of all our blessings, the one by whom we are taught to live well and are sent on our way to life eternal. Clement's play on being and well-being is reminiscent of Aristl. Pol. I, 2. p. 1252b 29.

[73] Str. 7.17.4; Paed. 2. 17. 3; 3.53.2.

desire has its origin in a form of pain, (λύπη) a yearning for something missing.[74] Clement's consideration of the ancient sources led him to the conclusion that the feeling of pleasure was not a necessity but the accompanied fulfillment of certain natural needs, such as hunger, thirst, cold reproduction. If it were possible to drink without pleasure, or take food or beget children without pleasure, pleasure would be needless. For pleasure is neither a function of a state of being, nor any part of us, but a feeling introduced into life as an auxiliary outcome,. as salt savors the food. In this capacity, pleasure is harmless; but if, from innocent accompaniment it becomes instead the ruling element over us, it generates concupiscence, an irrational propensity or an impulse towards that which gratifies it. It was this misunderstanding of the nature of pleasure that induced Epicurus to lay down the principle that pleasure was the aim of philosophy.[75] In essence, Clement asserts that neither food nor drink is our business in life, and that pleasure is not our aim. Rather, we eat and drink in order to live. Food and drink are bare needs of subsistence, whereas man's ultimate goal in life is the winning of immortality.[76]

Consequently, Clement divides pleasure into different categories, some of them dangerous and harmful to man's spiritual destiny, others neutral, while still others conducive to man's spirituality. Among the first are the carnal and lusty pleasures which are bad in themselves and therefore abhorrent to God, especially when practiced in excess.[77] Some of these pleasures are particularly dangerous and shameful because they lead man

[74] Epicurus, fr. 68 in H. Usener, ed., *Epicurea*; Str. 2.118.7 ff.; 131.1; SVF 3. 392; 396; 438. In opposition to the Epicureans Clement mentions the saying of Socrates who urged people to guard against unnecessary enticement, Xen. Mem. 1.3.6.ff.; Antisthenes, fr. 65 in Mullach and also Crates fr. 3.8.9.17:

ἡδονῇ ἀνταποδώσει ἀδούλωτοι καὶ ἄκαπνοι
ἀθάνατοι βασιλείαν τ' ἀγαπῶσιν.

SC ad Str. 2.120 4-121.1, n. 2.

[75] Paed. 2.1.4. Clement combats here some of the Greek philosophers. Specifically, in Str. 2.127. 1-2 he mentions Epicurus who translated happiness as not being hungry, thirsty, or cold, and the Cyreneans who argued that to live pleasantly was the chief end, and that pleasure was the only perfect good. Dinomachus and Calliphon maintained that the chief end for anyone was the attainment and enjoyment of pleasure. The peripatetic Hieronymus believed that the great end was to live unmolested, and that the only final good was happiness. Likewise, the peripatetic Diodorus held that the greatest end was to live undisturbed and well. Calliphon went as far as to say that virtue was introduced for the sake of pleasure, but that it subsequently became equal to the first principle, that is pleasure. Unfortunately, there is not much information on the names mentioned here. Clement SC ad loc. argues that Clement quotes some sort of a florilegium or some treatise on the End of Man (*Peri Telous*). Some of these ideas are also treated by Cicero in *De Finibus*. At any rate, Clement again inclines toward Plato's theories on the definition of pleasure and well-being and tries to strengthen them with the teachings of the Bible. For the Stoic formulas on pleasure see Chrysip. SVF 3. 405.

[76] Protr. 118.3-4; Paed. 1.75.3; 2.1.4; 3.2; 5.2-3; 3 26.3.

[77] Paed. 2.119.1-3; 2.120.4-5; SVF 3.405 which seems to express Chrysippus' idea of ἡδονή.

away from truth, disturbing his reason and making a slave out of him.[78] Pleasures of neutral nature are such as accompany the fulfillment of needs like eating, drinking, child begetting (Str. 2.119.1).

The last category is that of useful and good pleasures. Though Clement does not explicitly state which are the good pleasures, he would undoubtedly so classify the pleasure derived from doing good because it is pleasing to God. He therefore advises the gnostic to be careful in deciding what the good pleasures are. Choice and avoidance of pleasure are to be exercised according to knowledge, and the true Christian should bear in mind that in essence it is not pleasure in itself that is the good thing, but the knowledge by which he chooses pleasure at a certain time and of a certain kind along with the end result of pleasure which renders it allowable. Thus once again Clement falls back on Platonic theories (Str. 4.22.1-5).

As when Clement fought against the Gnostics who argued that the Law was the source of sin, so here Clement again combats the Gnostics who believed that man had to fight pleasure with pleasure. The Gnostics believed that abstinence from pleasure by someone who had not even tried it was no great accomplishment. But for a person who had experienced pleasure to overcome it was quite an achievement. The person who had trained himself to overcome pleasure by means of it was a better person in the sense that his experience had become his training ground for moral betterment. Clement cites the famous Nicolaus and his followers as an example given by these Gnostics of fighting pleasures by pleasure and considers the saying that "the flesh must be abused" as having been perverted by the Gnostics.[79] For Clement the person given to pleasures is like an irrational beast surrendered (ἔκδοτον) to pleasure and evil.[80]

[78] Str. 2.118.3. Clement adverts here to the Nicolaitans but does not attribute the saying to the apostasy of the deacon Nicolaus (Acts 6.5), though other Fathers did. Clement refutes the Carpocratians, who slandered deacon Nicolaus, by showing that the Nicolaitans had abused his name and words, Str. 2.36.3. Concerning Matthias, the apostle, he exposes a similar falsehood. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* 1.26; 3.11; Hippol. *Haer.* 7.36, and Epiphanius, *Haer.* 25 make Nicolaus of the Acts responsible for the original error, while Theodoret, *Haer. fab.* 3.1 and Eus. HE 3.29 side with Clement and describe Nicolaus as an ascetic who gave his wife to another in marriage and had no sexual relations with any other women, Str. 2.20; 3.25.6. Clement and those who agreed with him depict his daughters as virgins and his son as uncorrupted. Clement also castigates the Prodicians, Str. 3.30.1, who called themselves Gnostics for their practice of all sorts of disgusting profligacies and convicts them by arguments derived from right reason, the Scriptures, and by human laws.

[79] Paed. 2.86.2; 102.1-43; Sirac 36 (33) 61; Plat. Phaedr.254 D.

[80] Clement's distinction between voluntary and involuntary evil acts is not clear. For the problem see A. Mehat, *Vigiliae Christianae* 8 (1954) 225-33; B. Poschmann, *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte* 4, 3 (Freiburg, 1951) 33-34; Str. 2.64.3; Aristl. Nic. Eth. 5.10, p. 1135-36. God is never the author of evil, Str. 5.136.4; Plat. Rep. 10. 617 E. This brief account of the freedom of Man is related to the idea in Plato's passage used by the Middle Platonists, see Albinus, *Did.* 26.2 in the debate on the goodness of God, related to Rep. 2. 379 B-380 C and the existence of evil. Maximus of Tyre asked, "if God is the cause of good where does the evil originate?" (in Hobein, 41.5); see also similar references to Clement Str. 1.84.1; 2.75.3; 4.150.4; 7.21.1-2; QDS 14.4. For more details see SC ad Paed. 3.5.3-4; Str. 2.114.3; 116.3; 117.1. Clement blames the devil for filling man's soul with passions.

Κακία (evil)

Closely related to hamartia is the term *kakia*, found extensively interspersed throughout Clement's writings. Like hamartia, kakia is a multifaceted term with a wide range of nuances. In one sense, the belief in idols is kakia, i.e., the ignorance of truth and of the true God. With such a definition of kakia it follows that no one in his right mind will abandon the good and array himself with evil. Nor will any one avoid God to join evil. The good person regards ignorance and all activities contrary to reason as evil (κακόν), Protr. 92.3. Evil as the product of ignorance is, according to Plato, something involuntary to be contrasted with injustice which Clement presents as voluntary malice. Involuntary evil is for Clement an irrational act, an evil that occurs contrary to calculation, an involuntary mistake, while voluntary evil is a crime (ἀδικία) or sin that ought to be avoided. Sin then is voluntary on the part of the doer who bears the responsibility for it.[81]

Besides its moral connotations, kakia, as in the case of hamartia and pathos, has physical implications. Thus in Str. 2.106.4 the term κακόν implies a misfortune as does Str. 2.142.2 where Clement refers to the loss of one's children. Similarly, Str. 3.26.3 may refer to something moral as well as physical, and so does Str. 1.18.3 where something that causes trouble, not necessarily in the moral sense, is adverted. In the category of kakon Clement includes evil speech; for those who practice it are no better than those who practice evil. Calumny is the servant of the sword and like the sword evil-speaking inflicts pain.

This quick summary of the uses of kakia-kakon in Clement leads one to the conclusion first that evil is conceived as an activity of the soul (ἔργον) which may have no substance, unless we consider the nature of the activity as its substance but does have existence. The same can be said of sin (hamartia). Evil, on the other hand, seems to be contingent upon the existence of man and of the physical world and has no meaning without such existence. Even the presence of an evil force, whether in the Zoroastrian sense or in the Christian idea of a fallen angel, does not seem to become intelligible except in relation to man. Lastly, abstinence from evil on the part of man does not guarantee him goodness. Clement contends that he who is refraining from evil acts falls short of being just as did the Pharisees who supposedly abstained from evil (Str. 7.59.2) though abstinence did not make them righteous.

What emerges from this quick discussion of Clement's view of the origins of evil is that Clement, like all Fathers of the Church, accepted the story of the Fall as a convenient tool for explaining away the contradiction in monism between the all good and the all mighty nature of God and the presence of evil. The basic postulate of God's omnipotence is that all things

[81] Not one but many were the angels that fell from grace, but devil is the name ascribed to the leader of these evil spirits, Str. 5.92.5; Laws 10.896 D-G; Eph. 6.12; and the Comm. Ad 5.92.5; Eus. PE 11.26.2; 12.51. 19; Str. 4.95. 2-3; 5.92.2.

good and evil alike come from Him. But to the very extent people feel that God is an all-good and also almighty God, they somehow posit an opposite force separate from God. It is in this context that the story of the fall serves neatly to shift responsibility from God to another force for the obvious presence of so much evil in the world. Furthermore, man's fall is predicated on another story of fall, the fall of angels from God's grace through some sort of hybris and disobedience.[82] Theses angels now become the force standing against the plan of God, trying futilely, it is true, to frustrate his creation.[83] They acquire hypostatization or objectification in the Old Testament which Clement accepts and perceives as a hypostasis external to our consciousness known with the common name of devil. Clement describes this devil as the father of evil desire, man-killer, enemy of truth, a liar, and father of lies, but not averse from using truth to trap people in his schemes. He is the adversary of man (ἀντίδικος), especially of those who assimilate themselves to him and his activities as these activities infiltrate and becloud the soul of the sinners. Since the devil entices people to his schemes he never ceases to remain their enemy and prosecuting attorney. As a pernicious and superworldly force the devil is as much a manifestation of the religious sense as any other power. As a being in the ontological sense he is the very essence of a force negative to God's positiveness. But unlike the all-knowing God, the devil, as inferior power, lacks the ability to know in advance whether or not a person will hold out and for this reason tempts all indescriminately, including even a Job, in his effort to subject man to his power. In thus describing the nature of the devil Clement draws not only on the Bible but also on ancient Greek philosophy.

On the existence of the devil as a superworldly power history can make no methaphysical judgments. What history can do is to show the concept of the devil as a coherent development growing from the early Mesopotamian civilizations through the rest of the Near East and into the times of Clement and beyond. Irrespective of the existence of the devil as historical reality, we cannot deny the central importance of the concept of the devil in history, including the history of early Christianity. Such denial would be to run counter to the apostolic teaching and to the entire historical development of Christian doctrine. To define Christianity in terms other than the hypostasis of the devil is literally meaningless and intellectually in-

[82] Str. 1.85.2-4; 2.56.2.

[83] Str. 2.114.3-4. For Valentinus the pneumatic soul, originally connatural to God, had fallen in the psychic and material world and became totally estranged. It is saved through the care of the Good Father because of connaturality and not by a personal conversion. In opposition to Valentinus' theory, Clement proclaims the responsibility of man for his actions, G. Quispel, *Eranos*-Jahrbuch, 15 (1947) 258.-62; F. M. Sagnard, *La Gnose valentineinne* (Paris, 1947) 122-23; 560. Clement makes several allusions to his intention to write a treatise about the soul in which he probably meant to treat the doctrine of Valentinus. Whether he ever wrote such a treatise we do not know, Str. 2.113.2; 2.2.13; 5.12.88; Stählin, B.K.V. i (Munich, 1934) 40.

coherent. If objectively the devil does not exist, traditional Christianity has been dead wrong on a very central point of its theology, but this is a point that history has no power to prove or disprove. History cannot properly make judgments about metaphysical, transhuman realities or the absence of them; nor can it be based on a priori assumptions or revelations that cannot be objectively validated, as theology appears to do. Of metaphysical realities history will recognize nothing but what historians know or presume to know of human perceptions and experience of such realities. This essay seeks to analyze Clement's beliefs and statements and not the metaphysical reality of his beliefs.

Although Clement argues frequently that the devil is an agent of evil forever tempting man to violate the order of God, he never accepted the notion that man was totally subject to the devil's whims. The notion that the evil spirits possessed the human heart had been strongly suggested by Basilides. According to him, the many evil spirits who dwelt in the human heart did not allow it to be pure, and each of the spirits performed its own work by insulting the heart with unworthy desires. Consequently, the heart suffered something analogous to the inn which was often filled with dung. Like the filthy inn, the human heart became the habitat of many evil spirits unless the Good Lord visited it and cleansed it.[84] Basilides also pointed out that man was like the Wooden Horse, embracing in his body many different spirits. According to Clement, Basilides' son Isidorus spoke of his father's theory of the soul in a treatise entitled *About the Soul in Us* (Περὶ προσφυοῦς ψυχῆς) where he had sensed the contradictions existing in his father's theory. Accordingly, if we were to agree that the soul was not simple and that the passions of the wicked were occasioned by the violence of the evil spirits in that soul, someone could make the argument that in doing wrong he is driven by an inner compulsion over which he had no power, though in reality it is he who commits the desired evil and does not try to resist the compulsions of these spirits (Str. 2.113.3-4). Isidorus felt that if we strengthened the rational part of the soul, we would become masters of the inferior creation.

Basilides' theory implied that man was unable to resist evil even if he so wished; consequently, man was not endowed with free will. Lack of free will on the part of man would have made God responsible for man's faults; but this was diametrically opposite to Clement's theory. Though Clement, like many other Fathers of the Church, presented the devil as a fallen angel and consequently, like other angels, a creature of God, he disinclined to believe that God was responsible for the evil actions of this angel even though God had created him. Like man, the angels enjoy free will and the fall of the devil was due entirely to his revolt against God's plan. The devil's free will was also responsible for his evil actions. In a way, the devil seems permanently locked to an opposition to God without any avenue of escape. Whereas God pitied man upon his fall and devised the grand scheme of

[84] Str. 2. 114.5.

man's salvation through the incarnation of the Logos, He provided nothing analogous for the salvation of the fallen angel, who seemed to have been permanently condemned to the condition of inferior rival to the Supreme Being. This inevitability and inescapability of the devil's status, devised to explain and free God from the consequence of evil action in the world, tends to compromise the monism of the Christian religion, though neither Clement nor many other Fathers of the Church would be willing to accept this interpretation. Similarly ingenious and convoluted is Clement's discussion of the fall of man, since his argument credited God with everything that is good in man and absolved Him from man's fall. Although Adam was perfect as respects his formation, yet none of the destructive characteristics of the idea and form of man was wanting to him. Adam had in him the potential not only for perfection but also for destruction. The cause of his fall lay in choosing what was forbidden, and since that act of choosing was his, God was not the cause of man's fall (Str. 2.98.3-4)

Clement thus refused to ascribe to God the responsibility for the perversion by man of those characteristics of idea and form that contributed to man's perfection. He was equally unwilling to accept the postulate that God could have created a man free of any ability to abuse these characteristics, thus depriving man of his freedom. Man's potential for perfection consisted of choosing and practicing what is best. (Str. 2.98.3) The circumstances of the First Man's creation were exceptional since he came out of God's hand directly and no mortal was his father. This fact strengthened his nature. He could have achieved that "best", but he failed to take advantage of this freedom. By choosing the base, he neglected the true good, thereby exchanging immortal life for a mortal one. While Clement is primarily shifting the responsibility from God to man for the evil in the world, he also answers the question posed by the Gnostics about the imperfection of the First Man.

The Gnostics believed in man's imperfection as caused by his material nature. Inasmuch as matter is evil the creator of a universe composed of matter was neither a perfect being nor the Supreme Being. This approach absolved the Supreme Being from the imperfections of the material world, and consequently the problem of evil for the Gnostics was solved by ascribing creation to a lesser deity. Not so for Clement and other Fathers of the Church. They could take only the "high road" regarding God as the creator of all since the Bible ascribed creation to the One God and Clement had ascribed evil to the disobedience and imperfection of God-created man. He therefore argues that man is adaptable by nature to virtue but does not possess virtue by birth. What he possesses is the ability to acquire virtue. It follows from this argument that man was not perfect at his creation but capable of developing virtue. Since creation man has in him the ability to be virtuous or not, and therefore the ability to be saved or not (Str. 6.96.1-2). For Clement, man's capacity to become virtuous was tantamount to his perfection, in contrast to the Gnostics who would have expected man to be perfect inescapably if he were created by a perfect God. Clement agrees

that a perfect God would create a perfect creature, but he locates man's perfection in man's adjustability. His argument is an adroit one that the Church is going to adopt as its official position, although it borders on the disingenuous. The Gnostics had obviously placed the Fathers on the defensive at this point.

Despite the objectification of the devil, who in Clement assumes an ontological form, Clement strongly maintains that he who does wrong or sins does not do so through the agency of demons, because in that case he could be guiltless. Simply by choosing the same things as the demons do, he becomes an ally of the demons. He who is bad, having become so through evil, becomes further depraved by performing the evil actions he has opted for.[85] The question of man's freedom in the commission of good and evil acts leads Clement to ponder man's ability to escape evil altogether. If man is free to determine his actions it would follow that man could choose never to sin. Is that possible? Theoretically such a possibility may be true and Clement urges man to try not to sin as far as it is possible for him. On the other hand, he seems to hint at the practical impossibility of the state of sinlessness in light of human limitations when he explains that though it is best not to sin at all, the condition of complete sinlessness is the prerogative of God. This explanation demonstrates his moderation and his adherence to common sense solutions within the bounds of the Christian precepts.[86]

Clement considered anything that hurts or alienates us from God evil. While he views some acts more seriously harmful to us than others, he does not hesitate to regard them all as evil to be avoided because of their harmful potential. In more concrete terms, then, what is evil for Clement? Clement considers as evil whatever has been condemned by the Law and the Bible: adultery, uncleanliness, which to Clement entails fornication, pederasty, lasciviousness, wickedness, and similar activities, theft, bearing false witnesses, and lack of respect for parents. Clement would add ignorance, which is not explicitly listed by the Law, but which is no doubt comprised in the First Commandment, since he characterizes it as a disease that severs the soul from the truth, a condition tantamount to death.[87]

Some apparently less serious evils such as luxury of vestments, overindulgence in food or drink, voluptuousness, and similar vices he con-

[85] Str. 6.98. 1; 7.66. 1.SVF 3.110; Plut. Mor. 20 B

[86] Paed. 1.94.1; 1.4.3. Epict. 2.12.19; Stelzenberger, *Die Beziehungen*, p. 269. Clement explains that sinlessness belongs only to God and so does apathy. Therefore the gnostic, as Clement pictures him in Str. 6.72 ff.; 7.67.8; 88.3-6 will sin little and will not repeat his offenses. Str. 6.72.1 seems to have been inspired by Philo *De agric.* 178, though Clement has attached his beloved distinction about the gravity of sins from the New Testament sources I John 5, 16-17; Str.2.66.4; SC ad loc. Clement includes at this point a lyric poem to show that the Greeks also agreed with his view of the blamelessness of God:

> High ruling Zeus, who beholds all things,
> Is not the cause of great woes to mortals,
> But it is in the power of all men to find justice, ...

See LCL, *Lyra Graeca*, 3. 94 under dithyrambs.

[87] Str. 2.34.2; Paed. 3.89.1. Clement equates here ignorance with idolatry.

siders excesses. Although he does not describe them as hamartia or hamartema he views them as leading man away from the truth and as such equally dangerous.[88] To highlight his point he reminds us that some of these excesses led the rich man of the gospel to damnation (Luk. 16.19-23). Food is an essential gift of God to man, provided man does not overindulge in it but uses it without undue attachment, not as its slave but as its master.[89] Overindulgence is evil because it is an irrational and unhealthy habit that leads to "fattening and to a life of gluttony, luring man towards the table, then, towards the earthly and towards voracity.[90]

The Christians should never lose sight of the divine good which is the only food that produces certain and lasting pleasure, manifesting love of Christ. Clement exhorts the Christians of his time to avoid invitations to dinner by non-believers. But if for whatever reason a person decides to accept the invitation, he should always bear in mind the advice of Paul that one should eat what was laid before him without raising any questions in order to avoid scandalizing another's conscience.[91] Generally, one should partake moderately of what is set before him out of respect to him who has extended the invitation in a fashion harmless and moderate.[92]

The variety of food laid on the table should be an object of indifference if the Christian remembers that food will cease to matter in the future life. Restraint in eating is not only good for Christians but may also help win others to the Christian cause.[93] To be sure Clement does not greatly deplore the use of some of the luxuries he inclines to condemn, provided people are not carried away by them to the extent of making them the aim of their lives. For the person who has achieved excellence and reached the point of perfection visualized by Clement, luxury becomes incidental and immaterial, that is, valueless for itself. Just as the Sophists held that man was the Measure of All Things so Clement held that the Christian should

[88] His views on gluttony are strengthened by the Greek medical beliefs, Paed. 2.2.3. As Clement says in Paed. 2.5.1, God has provided for His creature food and drink for sustenance, not for the sake of pleasure (ἡδεσθαι).

[89] Paed. 2.9.2; SC ad loc. n.5; Gen.1.28; Luk. 15.11; PS Justin, *Léttre à Zenon et Sérèna* 12;

[90] Paed. 2.9.3-4; Plat. Rep. 9, 586 A. The statement about voracity seems to have been borrowed by Clement from Musonius 18 A, p. 97 5H; Clement proceeds, Paed. 2.9.3 with several more references to overeating as an evil drawing from Musonius 18 B, p. 104, 1-4 and makes a play on the words *symperiphora* and *symphora*, PS Justin, *Léttre*, 13.

[91] Paed. 2.10.1-2. Clement exhibits here severity but not inflexibility, see Introduction to Paed. in SC p. 60 and comment on Paed. 2.10.2 and SC ad loc. n. 2; I Cor. 10.25-27.

[92] Something reminiscent of Aesch. Eum. 285; SC ad Paed. 2. 10. 2, n. 5.

[93] Paed. 2.10.4; SC ad loc. n. 8; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 592, n.1.

reflect true beauty and virtue and goodness.[94]

Clement is particularly critical of what he considers the evil of pederasty and homosexuality since they are so strongly condemned in the Bible. He characterizes the former as an insane and unnatural love for boys, an evil that does not escape the all-seeing eye of God, and finds the punishment that befell the two Biblical cities to be a fitting one.[95] Clement finds here an interesting comparison between the punitive fire that fell upon and consumed the two cities and the Heracleitean and Stoic fire.[96] Clement's emphasis on the redeeming punishment of fire is a contrast to the laxness and permissiveness of the Greek laws beginning with the legislation of Solon which placed these types of indulgences in bodily pleasure under the category of morally indifferent acts.[97] The idea that homosexuality was due to the biological nature of the homosexual who would consequently be driven by it is not entertained by Clement. Nor is Clement willing to blame the creator for such an aberration or perversion. He is reasonable enough to realize that human beings are fallible qua human and that only God is free of sin.[98] In this context Clement shows again his realism and moderate approach to religion. He admonishes the Christians to avoid sin while he stresses that sinlessness is the exclusive realm of God.[99] If sinlessness is impossible for man, Clement suggests that he at least avoid voluntary transgressions, a state which seems to him within the realm of possibility and characteristic of the prudent man. The next step for the good man is to avoid many involuntary offenses, a mark of those who have trained themselves to virtue. Lastly, for those who for whatever reason fall into sin the least they can do is to discontinue their commission of sin.[100]

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[94] Paed. 2.121.2. Clement argues that good is beautiful, see citation of comic poet C.A.F. 3. p.486, No. 412; SC ad Paed. 2.121.2. The love of finery is not tantamount to the love of the beautiful which Clement identifies with the good and God. The excellence of man is right-eousness, temperance, manliness, godliness. We have here the Platonic-Stoic tetradic virtue with the only exception that Clement's εὐσέβεια replaces φρόνησιν, a term Clement frequently uses, Str.2.96.2; 6.95.4; 7.17.3; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, pp. 290-92; Stelzenberger, *Die Beziehungen*, pp. 362-64; SC ad Paed. 2.121.2, n. 7; Epict. I, 1.6.

[95] Paed. 3.44.1 refers to the Biblical fire that fell on Sodom and Gomorrah as a good thing; SC ad loc. n.3; Gen. 19.1-25; Esther 5.1; III Macc. 2.21;.

[96] Paed. 3. 44.1-2; Str. 7.34.4; Eclog. Proph. 25.4; Heracl. fr. 14; Kirk and Raven frg, 425; SC ad Paed. 3.44.1-3.

[97] Paed. 3.22.1; SC ad loc. n.5. Clement refers to Plato's Laws 4.716 A where God holds in his hands the beginning and middle of all that is and moves through the cycle of nature, while at his side walks Right (δίκη), personifying justice which delivers them who forsake God's laws.

[98] Paed. 1.4.2; Epict. 4.12.19; Stellzenberger, *Die Christliche*, p. 269.

[99] See also Philo, *De Fuga and Inv.* 157; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 164.

[99] Paed. 1.4.3; Epict. 4.12.19; Stelzenberger, *Die Christliche*, 269. The entire passage seems to have been inspired by Philo, *De Agr.* 178 but Clement has attached his beloved distinction about the gravity of sins to the New-testamental sources, I John 5, 16-17; Str. 2.66. 4; SC ad loc.

[100] Str. 1.167.1; John 1.17; Gal. 3.19; Str. 2.68.1; Paed. 1.16.1 - 17.1.

Though the avoidance of evil might be impossible for man, Clement suggests ways, borrowed from the Bible, partly to avoid the commission of evil. Not to keep company with the ungodly, or stand in the way of the sinners, or sit in the chair of pestilence, shunning heresies, theaters, tribunals, and so on, are some of the prescriptions for the avoidance of evil. He further suggests that curing evil is within man's power since the Law is a beacon that illuminates our path and teaches us to eschew evil.[101] His discussion of repentance demonstrates once more his moderation and realism in the face of sin, while he does admit that he who receives forgiveness of sins ought never again to fall into sin.[102] But he also recognizes the fickleness of man and the astuteness and craftiness of the devil. He knew how the devil, jealous of the pardon given to man's sins, would tempt man with further opportunities of sin, skillfully working mischief. God, therefore, being merciful provides a second opportunity for repentance to those who now in faith, after baptism, fall again into some transgression. They may again obtain forgiveness.[103]

Repeated commission of evil acts by a believer differs from such commission by those who have not believed at all only in the consciousness of the believers that they have committed something forbidden. It is unclear to Clement which of the two is worse, the case of the person who sins knowingly but is not seriously bothered because he has not known the truth of Christ, or of the person who, after repenting of his sins, transgresses again. Clement finds not much difference in the two cases, since in both the respective persons commit evil willingly.[104] The frequent asking for forgiveness for repeated transgressions makes mockery of repentance (Str. 2.59.1).. The shedding of the old self through repentance is for Clement the discharge of past sins which constitutes the vital step toward union with God (Paed. 1.52.3). The essential ingredient in the process is human volition to prevent perdition. Having bound himself to the "wood of the

[101] Str. 1.167.1-2; Paed. 2.68.1; 1. 16.1-17.1.

[102] Clement's ideas on the lure of sin are nearly inspired by Hermas (Mand. 4.3) which contains the locus classicus on penitence in the 2nd cent. AD. Like Hermas, Clement admits a "second penitence," Str .2.57.1, for sins committed after baptism, but also like Hermas he rejects the idea that this penitence could be repeated (Mand. 4.3.6). He who repents in order to fall back to the same sin is not a real repenter (Str. 2.59.1). More than Hermas Clement does not give any indication of the sacramental and ecclesiastical character of this second penitence. On this last point Poschmann, *Handbuch*, 33; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, p.192, n.1; SC ad Str. 2.56.2.

[103] Str. 2.57.1; II Cor. 7.10. The use of the terms μετάνοιαν ἀμετανόητον by Clement and *αμεταμελήτον* by Paul advert to the fact that God may be merciful but His mercifulness cannot be abused. See also Hebr. 10.25-28 for the seriousness of falling into sin after the first forgiveness.

[104] Str. 2.57.3-4 - 58.2; John 1.13.

Cross," so to speak, man can now avoid destruction.[105]

Before concluding this discussion of evil, a mention should be made of Clement's view of "heresy" as another form of evil. Clement believed that apostasy from the teachings of Christ and of the apostles and of those who followed in their steps constituted an evil which took the form of heresy. For just as a disordered eye cannot perceive correctly, so the soul that has been darkened by incorrect dogmas cannot perceive distinctly the light of truth. The upshot is that heretics stitch together a multitude of lies and figments of the imagination so that they appear to be acting in accordance with reason, justifying their deviations from the correct scriptural teachings. In doing so they err; consequently, they become impious and so displeasing to God, and displeasing God is evil. Like almond shells without contents so also heretics are empty shells because they are destitute of the contents of God and the traditions of Christ (Str. 7.99.1-5).

The Christians as true soldiers of the truth of Christ should not abandon the position to which they have been assigned. If somebody made a mistake, the Christians should inquire as to the cause of his errors and try to stop his erroneous course. They should further train themselves to oppose such tendencies.[106] And if it appears that conflicting dogmas become the cause of heresy, these dogmas should be taken out of the way, and the Christians should have recourse to persons who have the ability to reconcile dogmas and explain the truth through the Scriptures. Obviously, Christianity had not yet reached that point when doctrines represented the absolute truths of God, and deviation from them was tantamount to heresy.[107] In so consulting Christians Clement felt that they should bear in mind that man inclines (ῥέπομεν) to what appears true, that is, the opinion rather than the truth, another Platonic idea.[108] Those who shun the teachings delivered by the blessed apostles and teachers, those that are wedded to inspired words, are heretics because they oppose the divine tradition replacing it with human teachings. Such heretics were Marcion and Prodicus who, instead of learning the messages laid down before them, tried to surpass their predecessors by engaging in innovations. Innovations

[105] Clement uses the following interesting verses,

> To sin is natural and common to all, but to return [to God] after sinning is characteristic not of any man, but of a worthy man (ἀξιόλογον).

Paed. 3.93.3. Blass attributes it to Menander, *Hermes* 35 (1900) 340-41; SC ad Paed. 93.3, n. 6. Needless to stress here that the commission of evil or error does not necessarily carry with it the moral association implied by Clement.

[106] Clement draws an interesting parallel between the avoidance of destruction by Odysseus who asked to be bound to the mast of his ship to shun the lure of the sirens and the saving grace of the Cross for the Christians. The latter can only save themselves from life's temptation by binding themselves to the Cross of Christ, Od. 12.178; Protr. 118.1-4.

[107] Str. 7.99.1-5. Clement's advice has its origin in Greek philosophy, esp. Plato, see Str. 7.101.4; Ael. Var. Hist. 4.16; Xen. Oec.7; Plut. Mor. 787 A; 234 F; Dem. 3.5; Plin. Nat. Hist. 34;76.

[108] Str. 7.100.4- 6; Epict. 2. 18. 23 ff.; 3 10.1; Matt. 5.9; Str. 4.40.2

in teaching resemble the spell of Circe who converted her victims to irrational beings. So also he who spurns the Church tradition and darts off to the opinions of heretics has ceased to be a person of God.

The evolution of Clement's religious road is not unique of the newly established "revealed" religion. We often meet it in other religions and other deeply religious natures. These persons are so certain of the correctness of their convictions that they cannot even imagine that others have the incontrovertible right to doubt their doctrines. They live the truth of their religion so deeply that they are unable to understand that somebody else may not be entirely convinced by their ideas. Consequently, they consider the non-believer as a strange phenomenon, would attach him, often without mercy, to avoid the contamination of the entire social body. The faithful have the conviction that they possess the absolute truth by which salvation is possible. If they are to save the members of society from the non-believers, they do have the right to eliminate them from their world. This affirmation leads to what is often characterized as intolerance from which even Plato does not seem to have been entirely free (Laws 4. 716 D-E). In his Ideal Republic he could have given up on the salvation of those who differed from him. His republic ran the risk of dangerous contamination, and Plato opted for a more drastic solution because of his strong religious sentiments: his belief that he ought to stop by whatever means he could the victory of evil over good. Thus like Paul who claimed for himself a special invitation sequestered for this purpose from the womb of his mother (Gal. 1.15), Plato also believed that he had the divine gift and the invitation. He wanted to make sure that the majority of the people must be convinced that they should confide their governance in the small member of special individuals. Clement who, though a Christian, followed Plato closely, unquestionably believed that the divinity of the soul may be ἄπιστος to non-believers but true to the believers, identified with the wise, simply because the former lacked that religious experience it takes to understand things.[109]

Clement's advocacy of Christian orthodoxy does not prevent him from sensing the slippery ground of what a correct interpretation of the Christian teachings is and how one cannot always be certain of standing on solid orthodox ground. In his effort to answer such questions Clement claims that what is subject to interpretation and criticism cannot be a first principle. He then proceeds with a convoluted explanation claiming that as is reasonable (!) people grasp by faith the indemonstrable First Principle , receiving from that source in abundance (ἐκ περιουσίας) demonstrations that refer back to Itself. Thus Christians are by the voice of the Lord trained to know the truth, and once they have known it they will not give credence to innovators who might equally reverse their statements. It is hardly enough

[109] Rep. 3. 415 A ff.; 5.473 C. ff.; 6.501 E; Seventh Epistl. 326 A-B. Phaedr. 245C; Seventh Epistl. 341 C ff..

to state an opinion, he continues. What is stated must be proved by the voice of God, which is the only true demonstration. The voice of God is represented by those who have advanced far in the study of the teachings of Christ and the apostles, and not simply by those who have merely tasted (ἀπογευσάμενοι) the Scriptures. As in ordinary life craftsmen are superior to ordinary people in the knowledge of their particular craft, so the true craftsmen of the Scriptures give a complete exhibition of the scriptural knowledge, another Platonic thought. In contrast, heretics avail themselves of the Scriptures by picking and choosing what seems to support their arguments, generally ambiguous passages on which to establish their theories.[110] A thorough analysis of the Scriptures as a whole is the nature of orthodoxy for Clement, an approach which presages more or less the course the Fathers are to follow in the establishment of what they considered the true dogmas of the Church.

Clement's brief discussion of heresy is interesting because it provides an inkling into the theological approaches of the emerging Christianity. It introduces in the Greco-Roman world, to which he and most of the Christians of his era belonged, the idea of dogma accompanied by the element of exclusivity. Greek and Roman religion did not consist of dogmas but of a set of ritualistic practices. Even non-believers were members of the religious world and of the society they lived in as long as they went along with these ritualistic customs. When Socrates was charged for non-belief in the city gods, he countered by arguing that he always offered prayers and sacrifices to the divine. Greek and Roman rites were actions in themselves and not expressions of a world wide theology. The adherents of these religions did not much speak of sins of a transcendent nature. Nor were prospective proselytes asked to set aside their "idolatry" and "immoral practices" that supposedly went with the religion they practiced thus far in order to become naturalized members of the religions of Greece and Rome. Foreigners might have been thought as "barbarians" but not as idolaters. Both Greek and Roman religion give the picture of piety without conflict and without zeal or fanaticism. Neither claimed exclusive knowledge of the true God. Both represented conformity to traditional rites.

The same is almost true of the Hellenistic religions that flourished in the post-Alexander period. There is ritual and belief in union with a patron god who would secure blessedness in the afterworld for the believer, but little talk about idolatry and even less evidence of exclusivity or monopolization of the truth and the true God. A follower of Cybele could easily be invited to attend a session of the Mithra devotees without fear that his presence might be a violation or offense to the presiding divinity. It was not of course so with the Israelites who claimed for themselves the exclusive possession of the only true God and a special relationship with Him. Chris-

[110] Str. 7.95.8-96.2.

tianity inherited this exclusivity. Non-believers were idolaters whose life and beliefs were wrong. As for others who might call themselves Christians, if they did not follow what was supposedly the true meaning of the Scriptures and the correct teachings of the apostles they were branded as heretics and shunned as dangerous as the pagans and the sinners. And who really was the true interpreter of the Scriptures and the teachings of the apostles was often a question of opinion. Before the cardinal doctrines of the Christian religion were affirmed as the true measures of orthodoxy, the Christians had to fight for the establishment of their ideas as doctrines, and those who prevailed became the representatives of what became orthodoxy. In this crucially formative period of the first three centuries of the Christian era, the "heretics" played a key role. Unbeknownst to them, they became instrumental in the clarification of the "orthodox" dogma of the Church. It was on their intellectual anvils that the "orthodox" pounded and shaped the "correct" doctrines of the Church.

CHAPTER TWO

GOD 'S RIGHTEOUSNESS

God's righteousness is described in a variety of ways in the work of Clement, generally in connection with other qualities of God. In this sense, Clement's idea of God's righteousness cannot be investigated in isolation because it is part of a complex of ideas that have to be analyzed if it is to be understood. On the other hand, such a detailed investigation of the subject is impossible in this study for it would need a separate treatment. Clement himself does not attempt a systematic definition of the concept of righteousness. His ideas regarding righteousness or justice, the righteousness of God and its relation to the world in general and man in particular, are scattered throughout his works and are discussed circumstantially, especially in connection with certain divine and human activities and their consequences.[1] Clement's interest in the subject of justice is primarily focused on the divine quality and its relation to the world. Thus Clement states that God is righteous and just; the only being in Whom there is no injustice.[2] God is forever the same and His qualities are unalterable (Str. 6.102.4-5). Therefore His justice is always the same as God Himself is the same. God's justice being a divine quality is eternal and has no beginning as God Himself has no beginning (Str. 5.141.1-2). But what is the purpose of God's justice?

According to Clement the purpose of God's justice is to judge rightly and according to the merits of each person. God then judges flawlessly, rewarding what is good and punishing what is evil (Str. 7.20.5-6). Yet God is not the judge of men in the same sense that a magistrate is a judge when he passes sentences and imposes punishment but rather in the sense that God's very existence serves as the judge of men. When man voluntarily cuts himself off from the possibility of true existence, he is automatically judged. It is not God's sentence but man's existence that judges him. Thus the God of Clement does not really seem to be quite the God of judicial tradition as He is described in the judicial tradition of Anselm and Abelard.[3] He is not conceived as a vengeful God who rules by fear, meting out punishment and torment to men. The divine power is a power that manifests itself with justice and equality (Str.6.47-4). It is a power displayed in a manner appropriate to the goodness and justice of God and

[1] I use the two terms here interchangeably to avoid repetition, though some may prefer righteousness as a better translation of the term δικαιοσύνη.

[2] Paed.1.71.1-2; Protr. 79.4; Str. 1.89.3

[3] John S. Romanides, *The Original Sin* (Athens,1957) 12 ff.; 87 ff.

aims at the correct and just attitude of man towards God. Man becomes properly familiar with God only when he acts in accordance with God's will, that is, with justice and goodness. So, the divine power is externalized beneficially to man, concerting man's activities with the divine will. When man distances himself from God, God's justice acts differently. It acts as a punisher of injustice, aiming at the education of the aberrant man and his restoration to the correct path of life for his own good (Ecl. Proph. 26.5). In this light, the effect of the divine power serves a dual purpose as fire does, cleansing and destroying (Ecl. Proph. 26.5). Such effect produces different feelings. Among the good it leads to the praise and gratitude of God, Who makes known His power to man for the purpose of his returning to Him and winning eternal life; among the sinners it produces fear and resentment against God.[4]

Clement's emphasis on the righteousness of God is partially an answer to the Manicheans who claimed that the righteousness of God was not part of His substance. Since the Manicheans drew a line between the justice and the goodness of God, they recognized the true God as good, while they ascribed justice, particularly as it was described in the Old Testament, to another lesser god whom they deemed the creator of the universe; hence their rejection of the Old Testament.[5] It is most probably in reaction to the theories of these Gnostic groups that Clement hastens to explain God's justice in relation to His goodness. Accordingly, he "seems" to contradict himself to an extent when he explains that God is good (ἀγαθός) on His own account and just on ours, and that He is just because He is good. The highest degree of perfection represented by God does not permit Clement even to think for a minute the existence of injustice in God.[6] Though Clement had earlier described justice as one of the eternal qualities of God, here he seems to subordinate it to God's goodness, and since God is just on our own account one may be tempted to think that the justice of God was not a quality of God before the world's creation. Before He became a creator, he was God and also good and the nature of all God's goodness and love became the source of His righteousness (Paed. 1.97.3). Clearly, the quality of God's righteousness is here secondary to His love and goodness. Righteousness is a quality of God; it is something that belongs to the substance of God but not His divine substance, of which goodness is a defining attribute . Yet, God's righteousness cannot be comprehended without God's goodness. Both of these qualities are virtues of the same God. Righteousness does not exist in God without goodness nor goodness without righteousness. This is Clement's answer to those of the Gnostics

[4] Protr. to Patience fr. 5, Stählin, 44.

[5] Str. 2.39.1-2; E. F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957) 57 ff.

[6] Paed. 1.88.2; Str. 1.89.1-2; Rom. 9.14; Philo *De Plant.* 25.108; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 84.

who claimed that what is just is not good, and that the Lord by reason of the rod, the threatening, and the fear is not good. For Clement the same God is good as well as righteous (Paed. 1. 62.1; 71.1).

God is from the beginning good on His own account and independently of the world. No other of the world's creatures is on its own account good. All goodness in which they participate has its source in God (Str. 6.160.3), and it is through the divine power and might that justice comes to the aid of man. Only God is absolutely good (Str. 3.43.2), and this goodness He has not received from something outside of Him, but has always possessed it (Str. 5.141.2). Nor does God do good by necessity, but by his free choice (Str.7.42.4-6). His goodness is a bouletic power, a conscious and free activity, not a blind and mechanical expression; for God is not involuntarily good, like the fire which produces heat because this is its only nature, presupposing no bouletic power.

God's goodness is due to the absence of any malice in Him. God has no passions. Only His creatures possess passions be they animals or humans. The only distinction between men and animals is that man's passions are the outflow of a diseased soul and a perverted judgment, something that cannot be said about animals which are not endowed with man's rational processes. God has neither physical passions as the animals have nor psychic as men have. If He had such passions He would not have been perfect but imperfect and subject to weaknesses (Str. 7.6.5).

Consequently, God does not commit nor can He practice evil because the commission of evil would have meant the violation of His total goodness, something that would have been tantamount to the loss of His divine nature. Since God cannot commit evil it follows that in no respect whatever is He the cause of evil (Str. 7.12.1). God lives in a state of perpetual goodness (Str. 1.141.2; Paed. 1.88.2). His relationship to the world is nothing but the manifestation of His love and goodness. His work tends constantly to the salvation of the human creatures (Protr.116.1). His goodness towards the world, especially to man, is manifested in the form of philanthropy (Protr. 91.3). Since God is goodness and this goodness is expressed in the form of philanthropy, then God's righteousness implies that He acts always righteously. Righteousness and goodness at this point are thus identical inasmuch as God's righteousness is good and His goodness is righteous (Str.6.109.5). Simultaneously, God's goodness is ineffable inasmuch as it cannot be fully understood by man; yet, despite man's inability to comprehend fully God's goodness, the completeness of His goodness is revealed in the fact that He loves the world while in the same breath He remains the master of Himself and His creation.

Justice as Wisdom

Everything that God does is well planned and aims at the best end of all men (Paed. 1.93.3-94.1). Wisdom is not a quality resting in God but an activity manifested in the world. Through it man knows God because

through it man learns the truth (Str.2.45.2). The concept of wisdom has a redemptive power for man inasmuch as it leads to the knowledge of truth and the proper relationship to God (Str. 1.27.1). As God by His wisdom knows Himself and the world, by the same token true human wisdom consists in the knowledge of the world and God (Str. 4.163.4; 6.54.1). This wisdom is not a human product but comes to us from above, God-given and God-taught.[7] God's wisdom par excellence is Christ, "Whom we call wisdom" (Str.6.61.1), through Whom we know God and the world correctly (Str. 1.178.2). Thus God's wisdom is not a simple property alone, but also a person, the divine word Himself, and in this God's wisdom differs from all other wisdom. And as the wisdom of God is not a simple property but also life, by the same way man's true wisdom is not only theory but a way of life manifested in man's every activity. Man's wisdom is not only the possession of knowledge but even more a relationship to his fellow man. It is a definite expression of love towards his fellow-man through good works (Str.2.122.1). In relation to himself wisdom is the liberation from sin (Paed. 1.4.3). It is perfection consisting in the harmonious relationship with God and obedience to His will (Paed. 1.22.1). This harmonious living of the believer with himself, his fellow man, and God is also good living (Paed.2.25.3).

Contrary to the wisdom that comes from God is the wisdom of the philosophers. Their wisdom is often simple theory without life and benefits nothing. Such wisdom leads neither to the true knowledge of God with happiness in the present life nor to salvation in the future life, simply because the wise according to the world do not know the correct way of life.[8]

A basic feature of true wisdom is the realization of man's own limitations and sinfulness as well as his awareness that true wisdom comes from above. In contrast, the main feature of worldly wisdom is that it inflates man's egotism (Paed. 1.37.1-2). In essence Clement is not opposed to worldly wisdom which implies the effort of man to know himself and the surrounding world. On the contrary, he considers this sort of wisdom a gift of God bestowed upon man with his creation. It is the type of wisdom that does not hinder man's good relationship to God. It contributes to his congruous life with God as it recognizes the role of God in man's creation. This wisdom differs from the type of worldly wisdom which distances him from God (Str. 1.32.2-3).

What is the relationship between the wisdom and the justice of God? Clement does not address this question directly, and thus only indirectly can we draw some conclusions. Clement seems to imply that the relationship of justice to wisdom is similar to that of justice and goodness. When it comes to justice in relation to goodness, the work of justice con-

[7] Str. 1.178.1; 4.43.1 (θεὸς γὰρ ἐγγίζων ὁ σῴζων...), 5.83.4; 6.166.4; Paed. 1.54.2.

[8] Paed. 2.25.3-26.1; Str. 1.87.7; 88.5.

sists in acting rightly, while as it concerns wisdom the role of justice consists in knowing rightly. Simple acting and knowing is the area of goodness and wisdom, whereas correctly acting or doing the right thing and knowing correctly is the work of justice. Thus justice becomes a regulating function of wisdom; it is a divine activity (ἐνέργεια) manifesting itself to the world. By it man gets to know God and the truth regarding the world, and this knowledge leads him to a correct relationship with God (Str. 2.45.2). Human wisdom comes from below (ἐκ τῶν κάτω); it is a human product and possession of man who cannot know God only by his own power. In contrast, true wisdom is "divine power" which comes from above.[9] In a final analysis all of God's properties are identified with God, or are one with God, since He is a indivisible monad, Str. 5.81.6 (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ τὸ ἓν). In essence these properties are different manifestations of the same God, Whom man cannot grasp as a totality inasmuch as man's nature is weak (Str. 6.166.1-2). No divine property can be fully understood without the other properties. And the same is true of God's justice.

Divine Righteousness as Communion

The justice of God denotes primarily an activity which is manifested outwardly towards His creation (Str. 6.103.4). As such, justice indicates above all a relationship of something to something else; hence the substantive characteristic of justice is its communicative power (τὸ κοινωνικὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης).[10] God created the world; thus the world is a creature of God's justice (Paed. 1.73.1). Justice is first manifested as a mutual relationship between God the Father and the Son. Before the world was created God the Father lived together with the Son in communion of love and that community was characterized by justice. This community of justice itself between Father and Son constitutes justice (Paed. 1.88.2). The justice of God is similarly externalized as a communion between God and the world. The maintenance of this communion between the world and God holds steady when each of the participants plays justly the part befitting to each party, by which Clement means the way befitting the nature of the participants.[11] On his part God cannot treat anyone or anything unjustly and

[9] Str. 6.166.2; 5.83.4; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 95.

[10] Str. 4.33.6. Earlier, Philo seems to have rejected the communicative character of justice, *Quod Deter. Potiori Insid. Soleat*, 21.

[11] Paed. 1.73.1;1.88.2. Clement uses a rich vocabulary of abstract terms and philosophical concepts about his teaching regarding justice. Yet he intends them in Christian context, Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 95: Entscheidend für seine Frömmigkeit sind diese abstrakten Termini sicher nicht gewesen, herrschend is vielmehr das lebhafte Gefühl für den gütigen Gott, der liebend jedem einzelnen Menschen nachgeht und dessen Endziel die Rettung aller ist.

unequally because that would be contrary to His nature.[12]

The justice of God is expressed as a benefaction to man since a central feature of justice is the act of giving and God's benefits include the sinners.[13] His benefaction is expressed as concern for man's welfare in the present life and as salvation in the life to come.[14] Thus the work of divine justice is eternal and indissoluble, reaching into the life beyond. God's justice manifests itself especially toward the sinners who lost or do not want communion with God and therefore refuse to abide by His will.

In accordance with the concept of human justice transgressors of the law are punished by it. In contrast, God benefits and forgives sinners and returns them to their destiny.[15] God cannot do otherwise because justice without goodness and forgiveness is truly injustice.[16] He who repays injustice with injustice is not following the justice of God, especially since all of us are sinners before God, and thus dependent on His grace (Protr. 27.3; Str.4.113.4-5). The justice of God is necessary for the maintenance of the true loving relationship to God and one's fellow man. The community of the just is a community of compassion and forgiveness which fulfills the purpose of divine justice (Paed. 1.68.3-69.1). Hence divine justice is not just words or mere theoretical knowledge but a way of life (Str. 4.99.2).

Justice is also expressed as relationship and communion between Father and Son in their divine character. The communicative character of justice explains its eternal existence because before the universe was made the Father lived in a communion of love with the Son and that communion became the "beginning of righteousness" and the cause of lighting up the Sun and sending down His Son (Paed. 1.88. 2; Matt. 5. 45). Whatever we know about the justice of God has been revealed to us by His Son. Because of the Son's role Clement makes Him the center of his work. Christ, as the visible personification of God, carries all of God's qualities and represents Him in the world (Protr. 7.3). From Christ we know what the justice of God is and how the just person should live. Christian justice is an existential state expressed by its relationship toward God, ourselves, one's fellow-man, and the world. The violation of this relationship is characterized by different names. Toward God it is expressed as ἀσεβεια and godlessness, toward ourselves as selfishness, egotism, and so on. All these names denote the alienation of human life and existence, a situation incongruous to God's will and contrary to man's nature (παρὰ φύσιν) and purpose.

[12] Str. 7.20.7-8. Justice or the equality of justice was a favorite topic of the Harpocrateans whose ideas Clement criticized, Str. 3.6.1 ff.

[13] Paed. 1.30.2; 72.3; 1.88.2.

[14] Paed. 3.76.2; Str. 2.91.1.

[15] Paed. 1.70.2; 92. 2.

[16] Str. 4.113. 4. Here Clement is following not only the Christian ideal as is expressed in the Gospels but also the Platonic ideal of the Republic.

Justice in relation to man is not a self-created virtue, as Greek intellectualism would have it, but comes from God. It is a gift of God granted to us.[17] Man cannot by himself know or practice justice. He needs first to meet and know God. Only then he will know what justice is. Only then man can appropriate justice and make this possession into a way of life. Yet man has a part to play in the appropriation of justice inasmuch as its acquisition depends on us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν, Str. 4.124.2) on the understanding that it comes from God from Whom man should constantly ask for it for his own good. God in his love for man will grant justice to man, a quality that characterizes also the relationship between God the Father and the Son. The relationship between Father and Son is a bond of love, and this bond contains in itself righteousness which signifies the degree and extent of love and the correct relationship in the communion of love which is the symbol of primeval justice (Paed. 1.88.3).

Justice and Love

Justice is not something different or subordinate to love; rather, love contains in itself the true meaning of justice, for without justice love ceases to be real (Str. 6.164.2). The essence then of love is righteousness, although both love and righteousness derive from the same source, that is, God. The man possessed by the love for God practices justice which springs spontaneously from his soul (Str. 6.125.5-6). Both of these qualities find themselves in a dialectical relationship inasmuch as love is the complement of justice while justice is the correct manner of expressing love. Furthermore, the justice of God is primarily manifested in the world as a relationship of communion. By this justice God benefits the world, (Paed. 1.63.1-3). Because His righteousness is good God created the world as a work of communion, an act which shows that the world as a work of communion is the product of His righteousness (Paed. 1.73.1). As God the Father stands in special relationship to his Son and their relationship is characterized by righteousness, so the peculiar relationship of God to the world is similarly characterized by righteousness, a benefit to the world.

The major benefit of the world from this mutual relationship between God and the world is that its creation was the offshoot of God's goodness. In creating the world God showed his righteousness, since in so doing He manifested what is agreeable to His nature. Consequently, the creation of the world, though a product of God's goodness, is clearly a proof of His righteousness.[18] Through the creation of the universe God also created a concordant relationship between Himself and the world. The concordance is maintained as long as each party does what it must, i.e. as long as God remains --as He always will--the all-good God, and the world, especially man in it, remains dependent on God. Each party here is considered right-

[17] Str. 6.122.3. 1.31.1-5. 1.100.4.

[18] Paed. 1.72.1-73.3; II Cor. 1.3; Matt. 5.45.

eous owing to the maintenance of this relationship, as in the case of the relationship between Father and Son (Paed. 1.71.3). Thus the righteousness of God is displayed not only in the creation of the world and man but equally in the continued adherence to the relationship of Himself and His creation. By so doing, God remains true to Himself as well as to the world which He continues to benefit, thereby acting justly as befits His nature.

The quality of justice as fairness was especially emphasized by the Gnostics Carpocrates and Epiphanes, who commanded Clement's considerable interest.[19] These Gnostics based their conclusion on their observation of nature and the divisions that existed in nature.[20] Ignoring divine revelation, they accepted justice as something natural. Clement charges that with their teaching they sought to justify their peculiar way of life, that is, the common possession of women.[21] Clement sees their theory of justice as a combination of commonality and equality (Str. 3.8.1). He rejects their teachings because they isolated one side of divine justice, which they objectified, and rejected all other expressions of justice. Consequently, they completely distorted the true meaning of justice. Furthermore, their theory did not rely on the source of revelation, but on natural observations as the theories of the Greek philosophers did. By ignoring revelation, they contravened the Law and the Gospel alike (Str.3.8.4). The outcome of their theory is that they ended up advocating a notion of righteousness that did not come from God and was not continuously granted by God but is a "natural" (ἔμφυτον) quality to be found in the present world. Such righteousness was for Clement ungodly. Hence both Carpocrates and Epiphanes were actually battling against God (Str.3.9.2). Their goals underlined the impious character of their idea of righteousness which was clearly worldly. Their conclusion was that the righteous one is the person who attained happiness on this earth. This type of righteousness Clement viewed as "fornicating," (πορνικὴν) which they and their co-religionists practiced after their notorious dinners which they misnamed Christian love-feasts.[22] According to Clement, the really righteous person was the one who, by sharing his earthly and temporal goods, gained an eternal reward in heaven (Str. 3. 56.2). The practice of sharing goods carried eternal reward and signified the nature of righteousness as a true act of love which was different from the Carpocratean idea of sharing (Str.3. 55. 2). In addition, this latter form of love pointed to another trait of righteousness which translates as obedience to the commandments of God.

[19] Str. 3.6.1; H. Chadwick, *Alexandrian Christianity*, LCC 2.25.

[20] Str. 3.6.1; Gal. 3.28; Col. 3.11; Matt. 5.45; John Ferguson, transl., *Stromateis I-III* (Catholic University of America, 1991) ad Str. 3.6.1.

[21] Str. 3.5.1; Ferguson, *Stromateis* ad loc. n. 16 with bibliographical information.

[22] Str. 3.10.1; Athen. 6.270 C; Origen, *Against Celsus* 6. 40.

The righteousness of God in the form of benefaction does not manifest itself only towards those who lived without Christ after Christ's coming, but also to those who lived before Christ. God offers salvation, which is the primary goal of His righteousness, in many different ways because He is good and because the roads to righteousness are many. They all lead to the main road and the main gate (Str. 1.38.6). Before Christ's coming philosophy was an essential guide to righteousness for the Greeks (Str. 1.28.3). But Greek philosophy remained incomplete since it could not bring salvation. It was only a contributory cause to the final grasping of truth, a search for truth, and as such a kind of preparatory education. Philosophy did bring the Greeks to righteousness, though not to perfect righteousness, since only the teaching of God is complete in itself and without defect, "being the power and wisdom of God."[23] While Greek philosophy did not make the truth more powerful, it nonetheless helped to frustrate the treacherous plots laid against the truth acting as a proper fence and wall of the vineyard.(Str. 1.99.3-100.2).

The reliance of Clement on Greek philosophy is here obvious, despite Clement's reservations and qualifications about philosophy's importance as a path to real knowledge. This reliance should not be interpreted as complete dependence. Yet his explanation that injustice is a form of ignorance to be corrected by education and training goes a long way to prove Clement's admission of the validity of Greek education.[24] Clement accepts that ignorance leads to error, and error produces passions (sins) and irrational urges which are the source of all evil.[25] Error is aberration from right reason and a way of life away from God, which is tantamount to spiritual death.[26] Ignorance is not simply the lack of intellectual development but something more than that: blindness of heart and darkness of sinfulness.[27] Through ignorance comes our corruption, since corruption is produced by man's alienation from God, which is the result of ignorance (Str. 5.63.8). One can come to the right wisdom by education and training, but, as Clement asserts, this training is triggered by faith and obedience to God. Herein he departs from the Platonic idea.[28]

The work of righteousness is an act of endless good-doing and has two results: First, it sanctifies us in this life and, secondly it sends us on the

[23] Str. 1.99.2-100.2; I Cor. 1.24.

[24] Str. 1.35.2-3. A similar idea is belabored in the *Republic* and other Platonic dialogues.

[25] Str. 1.84.2; 7.16.2.

[26] Str. 6.113.3; Protr. 114.1; Str. 5.63.8.

[27] Str. 3.43.1-2; Protr. 83.1-2; Paed.1.29.4.

[28] Str. 7.16.2-3. In other words training and obedience are within man's power to achieve with the grace of God. They are within man's power because of God's gift of wisdom to arouse man's free will so that he can accept faith.

way to the future life.[29] The work of divine righteousness does not have temporary effects as the worldly things have; it has eternal usefulness that reaches beyond the present life. This work is simultaneously historical as it is accomplished in the present life.

The returning of injustice for injustice is alien to true justice which never injures or takes revenge but always does good.[30] Anyone who renders injustice for injustice does not follow the justice of God, especially in view of our sinfulness against God and our dependence on His grace (Protr. 27.3). The justice of God is necessary for the preservation of the right relationship of man to God and between the members of the human community. The community of the righteous is a community of justice and goodness. Only through mutual justice and goodness is the purpose of divine justice accomplished.

Knowledge and the exercise of righteousness are not dependent on human ability; they depend primarily upon God. Man cannot force God to grant him justice. God acts willingly by Himself and grants His blessings wherever He pleases. Appropriately, He saves us not by our works of righteousness, but because of "his mercy" (Tit. 3.5). Righteousness is a gift of God,[31] and the measure of God's righteousness to man responds to man's interest. Yet despite the goodness of God and His justice not everyone follows God's rules. In this case, God uses punishment to return man to the right path. This side of His justice and the relation of punishment to justice is another phase of God's righteousness that Clement seeks to explore.

The Law, Its Redemptive and Pedagogical Qualities

According to Clement, the law is the statement of that which is good, and what is good is that which is true, and what is true is that which approaches perfection. In concert with good opinion, some have called the law the right reason, which enjoins what should be done and forbids what is not to be done. In Clement's view, the Law in the pre-Christian era was the Law given by God to Moses, and is similar to what the Greeks called *thesmos*, a divine ordinance of what is the just and unjust.[32] Clement realized that his limitation of the Law to the Mosaic ordinances was not satisfactory and expanded the concept to include the laws of the Greeks and of other nations as legitimate sources of the law, when these laws were for the good and expressed what was generally accepted by the nations as the truth, an idea similar to *ius gentium*.

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[29] Paed. 3.76.2; Ps. Barnabas 10.11; also Str. 5.51.4-5; SC ad loc. n. 2.

[30] Str. 4.113. 4; Deut. 9.13 ff.; Clement of Rome ad Cor. 53.3 which presents Moses in a better light than God.

[31] Str. 4. 132.3- 134.2; I Cor. 7.7; Isa. 7.9; Il. 13.730-31.

[32] Str. 1.167.1; Walter Gutbrod, "Das Gezetz im Alten Testament," in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, vol. 4 (1934) 1029. ff., G. Kittel and G. Friedrich eds.

The term "law" seems to have had a dual nuance among the Hebrews. In a narrow sense it meant the Law allegedly given to Moses on Mt. Sinai. It also served as a translation of the Hebrew term Torah, which contained a richer meaning compared to that "Law," in the sense of a code of obligations imposed by the community or by convention.[33]We need only recall how God gave the Law to Moses as an act described in the Book of Exodus with the revelation by God's name to Moses in order for Moses to understand that the Law becomes thereafter the manifestation of God, a gift of grace.[34]It was not juridical legislation serving a social purpose. Observance of the Law in the Old Testament was not compliance with some objective legislation which insured orderliness in society. To the individual in the Israelite community the Law had to be observed not only because ordained by God but because this observance secured his participation in the people of God. The Law was God's covenant with His people and revealed the truth of the living God. This is the reason for which it had to be respected and kept. With this interpretation of the Law as the dynamic revelation of God in human life, we can more easily understand Christ's saying that He did not come to "destroy" but to fulfill the Law (Matt. 5.17). All the exhortations in the gospel have as their goal not simply the fulfillment of objective regulations but the transcendence of the egocentric individuality aiming at the realization of the image of God in the human being. The fulfillment of the Law (Rom. 13.9-10) does not advert to a more perfect Law nor to a supplement to the Law; it was aiming at more than that, that is, at its completion and end, which is the accomplishment of man's likeness to God. Love of one's neighbor, though good, it is for Clement an insufficient application of the message of salvation. If only so interpreted the message seems to miss the true meaning of the first exhortation of Christ that His followers love God with all their heart. So understood the Law is the justice of God which is love that moves within the order set by him. It is in this context that Clement writes what he does about the value of the Law in man's life.

Attached to the idea of the Law is also the administration of justice which is the branch of knowledge that deals with the correction of transgressors. Allied to it is the science of dealing with punishment which is for Clement the knowledge of the due measure to be observed in punishment as the corrective of the soul (Str. 1.166 4-168.2). Its ability to lead back anyone from the practice of evil to virtue and well-being is the highest and most perfect quality of the Law and it resides in its very function (Str. 1.173.1-3).

Clement, like the other Fathers of the Church, believed that Christ was the fulfillment of the Law. He therefore accepted the view that the Mosaic

[33] We have something similar in Greek where Zeus is responsible for the Law among men.
[34] Str. 1.168.4-169.2; 170.2; Str. 3. 46.2; Rom. 7.12 and 10.4; 13.10; 8.14-17; Gal. 3.4.

Law was preparatory to the coming of Christ Who was the fulfillment of the Law.[35] But while the Mosaic Law was good and necessary as preparatory to the coming of Christ it was not always sufficient, and there were those who abided by it and others who often misunderstood its meaning and role in the evolution of the divine plan. The wealthy and legally correct young man (ἔννομος) of the gospel, for example, did not understand the distinction Christ made between wealth and poverty, and their role and serviceability in man's life. As a result, the young man could not see how the same person could be poor and rich, have wealth and not have it at the same time. No wonder he went away sad and downcast abandoning the state of life which he thought he deserved but was not able to attain by attempting what was difficult yet not impossible.[36] Had he penetrated the true meaning of the Law and realized the essence of Christ's advice, he would have escaped the trapping of luxury and wealth and, having learned to go beyond the dead letter of the Law, he would have used material things indifferently, while aiming at eternal life (Mark, 10.23-27). This is not meant to minimize the importance of Law. Despite these shortcomings of the Law, it did serve as preparatory to the coming of Christ, and from this standpoint Clement did not mean to minimize its importance.

Man has in his power the possibilities of choice, and the decision depends upon him alone. The Law has been given for his benefit, to instruct him in the making of the right decision. Beyond that, the Law may or may not be followed by him. In that case he is subject to praise or blame. Owing to the preparatory character of the Law, the wrong deeds done before the coming of Christ are remittable (Str. 4.153.2-6). The preparatory nature of the Law is also recognized by the pagan philosophers who pointed out that men would not have known the name of justice were it not for the law that designates what is unjust.[37] But as the New Testament recognized that the Law was not made for the just so did pagan philosophy admit that the law was not made for the good.[38] On the other hand, the law is not simply what people consider or perceive as good, nor is it merely any opinion we designate as law but rather that opinion which is good (χρηστή); good opinion is the true one if it is the one that seeks the true being and attains to it. Whence the Law is rightly said to have been given to Moses as a rule for right and wrong. It is called a divine ordinance since Moses received it from God.[39]

[35] Str. 7.20.8-21.1; θεσμὸς τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε, Phaedr. 248 C; Areios Didymos fr. 29 in Diel's *Doxog. Graeci* p.465; SVF 2. 528; Eus. Praep. Ev. 15.15.6; Suidas s.v. Ἀδράστεια.

[36] QDS 20.1; Mark. 10.22-27;

[37] Heracl. fr.23.

[38] Str. 4.9.7; I Tim. 1.9. Socrates is supposed to have expressed the idea that the law was not made for the sake of the good. Though the expression is in line with his teachings, the saying cannot be located and is unknown.

[39] Str. 1.166.4; 167.1; 168.1-2; John 1. 17.

The Law stands for the benefit of Man and should not be criticized. And if the prescriptions instituted for the sake of driving away bodily diseases are viewed as beneficial, much more beneficial are the prescriptions of the Law that help deliver the soul from its inequity, since the soul is a much more precious thing than the body (Str. 1.171.1; 1.173.1). We should then be ready to submit for the soul's sake to every kind of punishment, even banishment and bonds, provided only that from unrighteousness we shall attain to righteousness. The goal of the Law is dual: first, to train to piety by restraining the individual from spiritual sins, and, secondly, to condemn and sever the individually sick members of society, just as the bodily doctor amputates the infected part of the body in his solicitude for the rest (Str.1.171.4). When this dual goal is achieved, it is the highest and most perfect good. Consequently, those who denounce the penalties of the Law assail the Law itself and also God, Who gave the Law. Clement's conclusion might have sounded to some as a call to semi-slavery, but Clement saw no limitation to man's freedom in such a result. On the contrary, he considered the Law's penalties as the fulfillment of man's freedom in life. Men are born, he said, to obey the commandments, if they wish to be saved. Man's duty is obedience to God who has proclaimed manifold salvation through obedience to the commandments.[40]

The mystery of God's love is thus expressed in the Law, and God's love is boundless and many-faceted. Here it is manifested in the world in a certain order which constitutes the justice of God. It is this justice that imposes law and order (Paed. 3.35.4-5). Law and order serve in the maintenance of the world as set by God. This Law is unitary but often it appears subdivided into several categories with different purposes. It came at first in the form of right reason since man was made "in the likeness" of God and by this right reason he was guided to a special end (Str. 2.19.1-2). Later it came in the form of the Israelite special Law through Moses and the prophets (Str. 2.21.5). Because the purpose of the Mosaic Law was to prepare the Jews to receive God it was limited in scope and temporary in nature. It was a shadow of the truth and was designed to be outmoded (Str.4.134.4; 6.58.3). It was imperfect and unable to deify man, and necessitated the coming of Christ (QDS 8.2). Yet Christ's coming did not abolish the Law. Christ did not give a different Law but became the Law Himself by coming and restoring complete communion with man . This new Law that Christ introduced appears in the gospels. Thus Law and gospel stem from the same source, God, and there is no contradiction between them. Nor is there a different purpose in them; Law and gospel tend toward the same goal (Str.3.70.3-4). Both aim at keeping man near God. Far from enslaving man, the Law bestows on each what belongs to him (Str. 6.159.3-4). It maintains the order between God and man, inasmuch as only man can, on account of his free will, disturb that order,

[40] Str. 7.20.8; Diels *Gorg.* fr 8; Str. 1. 51. 3.

and it is for that reason the Law is made especially for him.[41] To those who promptly submit themselves to the will of God, the Law is a source of joy and pleasure (Protr.115.1). He who respects the Law is grateful to God for His gift (Str. 2.96.4).

In summary, the Law has its source in God and aims at the fulfillment of divine justice. It maintains all beings in their natural relationship and under God's order. For man this order consists in his obedience to God's will and commandments. The aim of the Law is justice and justice is God's love for man and all creation. When Clement speaks of the Law given to the Israelites through Moses and the prophets, he accepts the Jewish version of the special relation between God and the Jews as the select people of God. The birth of Christ from parents, or more properly by a Jewish woman, corroborates for him this fact.

Clement therefore does not ask why God selected the Jews from all people on earth to make them His chosen people. Nor is he concerned with many of the similarities of the Mosaic Law to the chronologically earlier Mesopotamian laws. For him whatever similarities there exist are the result of the earlier enlightenment and insight owing to the grace of God in the same way as many of the good ideas of Greek philosophy are the result of divine illumination. People like the Gnostics who emphasized reason may have difficulty in accepting truth by revelation as readily as Clement did.

Many Gnostics and pagans found the idea of God as the supreme being, the creator of the universe, omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving, difficult to reconcile with the existence of so much evil in the world.[42] They were critical of the Christians who saw no contradiction between evil and the existence of an all-loving God. Many of the Gnostics attempted to solve this contradiction by distinguishing between a creator God and a higher divinity not responsible for the universe and the creation of matter, which is evil. Clement rejected this dualism, accepting one God, who is the creator of the universe. But the theory of dualism stung Clement deeply to the point where he had to answer the specific examples cited by these critics. Indeed, several of the Church Fathers since Clement's time had to grapple with this universal and legitimate question. The answers provided by Clement and other apologists of the early Church set the philosophical or theological model other Christian writers were to follow.

One of Clement's points in answering the question of evil in the world is that the will of God is beneficent and that certain of God's apparently punitive acts are disciplinary and benevolent to man.[43] How the good and

[41] QDS 10.1-2; Paed. 1.58.1. Matt. 19.21.

[42] For references to statements expressive of these concerns see Str. 1.82.1; 2.32.3; 4; 4.44.1; 78.1; Paed. 1.62.1; 64.2; 68.3; 74.2; 87.3 ff.; 88.2 ff.; 93.2; 93.2.

[43] Str. 6.52.1. Stählin has changed Silburgius' εὐεργετικὸν to ἐνεργητικὸν, see SC ad loc. app. criticus, which he probably interprets as an action for the benefit of man. In what way the specific action of God was here benevolent and saving for those who drowned on account of the deluge is not clear, since presumably all humanity drowned with the exception of Noah an his family.

loving God can be so angry as to destroy man was a question that bothered many, but not Clement who found the cure of man's passions in God's punishment and the inculcation of sterner principles. If passions are an abscess of the soul and of truth, this abscess can best be cured by a sort of surgery and an incisive amputation. Like the farmer, the Word, the knife, clears away wanton shoots, compelling the impulses of the soul to fructify, and not to indulge in lust.[44] Clement compares the punishment of God to the punishment by an army general who inflicts fines, corporal punishment, and the extreme disgrace that includes death for offenders as he exercises his authority for the improvement of his army. By the same token, the great Christian general, the Word, by punishing those who throw off the restraints of His instructions, aims at their redemption from greater evils that would certainly lead to moral slavery and captivity by the adversary, that is, the devil. His purpose is to bring the violators peacefully to the sacred concord of the Christian life. Through His love of goodness, God seeks man's repentance, and by means of threats He shows His own love for man (Paed. 1.70.1). God punishes the disobedient inasmuch as punishment is for the good and profit of him who is punished, the correction of a refractory subject. This punishment, Clement continues, should not be mistaken for vengeance, since the purpose of vengeance is to render evil for evil and is inflicted for the benefit of him who exacts punishment (Paed. 1.70.3). But he who teaches us to pray for those who treat us badly does not certainly wish to exact revenge.[45] God's plan for dealing stringently with humanity is good and salutary and necessarily adopted by the Word as conducive to repentance and the prevention of sins. God sets before us His own inclinations (γνώμας) which invite us to salvation and by which He wishes to make known to us the good and the useful (Paed. 1.89.1).

Clement was aware that the use of the "rod" by God had been criticized as unbecoming to the divinity. Yet Clement thinks that the critics of the Christian belief regarding punishment misconstrued God's intent and the Bible which teaches that he who fears the Lord will turn to his heart.[46] The critics were also oblivious of God's love, and did not realize that the Lord sympathizes with our nature (Ps. 103.14). Clement is not content with just the Scriptural reference to support his belief in the love of God. He also embarks on a sophisticated argument to prove his point, thereby demon-

[44] Paed. 1.66.4. The comparison of punishment to therapeutic medicine goes at least as far back as Plato, Laws XI, 934 A; Gorg. 478 D. Philo also makes a similar reference, thus serving as an intermediary between Plato and Clement, *Qu. Gen.* I 89; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 84-85. The reference of Clement to ἀληθείας creates some problems since there are different readings, ἀπαθείας, ἀτιμίας, see SC ad loc. n. 2.For the passions as maladies of the soul see Protr. 115.2 and the Stoic notion, Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 2nd ed., vol. I (Göttingen, 1959) 142- 42; SVF I, 570.

[45] Paed. 1.67.1; Matt. 5.44. Clement sees the corroboration of his theory in a saying of Plato (Gorg. 477 A), which explains that punishment benefits the spirit of those who are justly punished.

[46] Paed. 1.62. 1-2; SC ad loc. n. 1; Sirac 21.6. Clement's comments concern the Gnostics. His polemic is repeated by Origen.

strating very clearly his knowledge and use of Greek oratory and philosophy, despite his frequent tirades against it.

Clement contends that God does not hate anything; so He cannot allow that which He hates to exist.[47] Nor does He wish anything not to exist, so He can hardly become the cause of existence of what He wishes not to exist. Similarly, He does not wish anything not to exist which is in existence. It follows then that if God should hate anything He would not want it to exist. Yet nothing is hated by God, since God does not hate, and nothing exists which is not caused by God. If then He hates none of the things He has made, it is likely that He loves them all. If He loves everything He has made much more does He love man, and justifiably so because man is the fairest and noblest of the creatures made by Him. It goes without saying that whoever loves something, he also wishes to do it good. And that which does good is in every respect better than that which does not do good. But nothing is better than the good. Now, God is generally accepted as being good; God therefore does good. And the good, by virtue of its being good, does nothing else but good. Consequently, God always does good. And He does no good to man without taking care of him. That which does good purposely is better than what does not do good. But nothing is better than God. And to do good purposely is nothing else than to take care of man. God, therefore, cares for man and takes care of him.[48]

In pursuit of his argument Clement calls the useful good, not because it is pleasing, but because of its doing and being good, clearly a Platonic argument as well. And the good is not said to be good on account of its possessing virtue --for it is virtue-- but on account of its being in itself and by itself good. The good is consequently righteous, since it does not do what it does in order to win favor, but dispenses to each according to its merit.[49] As much as the beneficial follows the useful, righteousness has characteristics corresponding to all aspects in which goodness is examined, and it therefore follows that righteousness is a good thing (Paed. 1.64.1-2).

Clement's argument thus far does not overcome the objection of those who could not understand how the Lord, if He loves man and is good, can be at the same time angry and can mete out punishment. Clement does not have much new to say in answer to this question. He simply reiterates the notion that passions are evil and are best cured by punishment and by the inculcation of the sterner precepts, as well as by instruction in certain principles. He then proceeds to use once more the surgical analogy for the

[47] Paed. 1.62.3; SC ad Paed.1.62.3. n.6 Wisd. 11.24. Seg. 11. 24-26.

[48] Paed. 1.63.1-4. The inspiration for Clement's argument is fundamentally Stoic and Arnim attributes it to Chrysippus, SVF 2. 1116.

[49] Paed. 1.64.1; SC ad loc. n.3; Str. 2.66.3. This is a Stoic definition of justice, SVF 3. 266, which Clement recognizes through Philo, *Leg. Alleg.* I, 87; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, pp. 290-291; Andronicus, *About Passions*, Schuchhardt, p.19.

abscesses of the soul.[50]

The goodness of God in dealing with man's misconduct is often manifested in a different fashion. God speaks many a time before He proceeds to act. Furthermore, the divine being does not get angry the way some think.[51] Often He restrains man's misconduct and always exhorts humility, and shows what ought to be done, warning us to abstain from things He does not like. If, despite His restraining activities, man continues to sin, then God inflicts punishment for our correction. Yet this punishment is not the result of wrath but of His concern for justice, since it is not right that justice should be neglected on our account. God, therefore punishes because His justice requires it and not on account of wrath. Wrath implies some sort of change in the wrathful individual, but God never changes. Consequently, God punishes without change in His essence. The same is true of His attitude toward sinners.[52] God's forms of punishment are different from person to person befitting each one's sins and his need of therapy, not excluding death (Paed. 1.66.5). In this light, punishment distinguishes the believer from the unbeliever. The believer loves God not only for his goodness but also because He can become seemingly wrathful and impose punishment. In this seeming wrath the believer feels God's love (Paed. 1.75.3 ff.). In this circumstance the punished one does not react adversely, nor does he consider himself just but accepts God's punishment, while admitting his sinfulness. He does so because he has confidence in God's goodness and knows His many-sided ways of therapy (Paed.1.68.1; 74.2). Clement obviously perceives justice as a universal balance, the disturbance of which requires restorative measures, such as punishment. Each one of us who sins of his own free will disturbs that universal equilibrium and invites punishment on himself by which the disturbed balance is restored. The fault thus lies with him who disturbs the world equilibrium; God is without blame.[53]

Sinning constitutes unrighteousness and our unrighteousness calls forth the righteousness of God. Can we consequently say that God is unrighteous because He inflicts on us punishment?[54] Surely not, since God repeatedly warns us that He will sharpen His sword; He will lay hold of judgment, and render justice to His enemies, to those who disturb His uni-

[50] Paed. 1.64.3-4; 66.4-5; SC ad loc uses apostasis because of Str. 2.55.1, while Stählin uses cut (τομῇ) see ad loc. n. 2.

[51] Paed. 1.68.3. The reference is to the Gnostics.

[52] Paed. 1.68.2-3; 70.3; SC ad loc Str.7.102.5 ; Ch. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, (Oxford, 1886) 112; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 14. Clement often ridicules the Greek gods who become frequently angry like old women, Paed.1.68.3 to be contrasted to Str. 7. 23. 2-3.

[53] Paed. 1.69.1; Plato. Rep. 10, 617 E which Clement loves to repeat ad infinitum, SC ad loc. n.4.

[54] Paed. 1.69.1; Rom. 3.5-6.

versal equilibrium, and He will rebuke those who hate Him by hating His truth.[55]

Since Clement begins with the premise that God is goodness and love, it follows that in meting out punishment God does not cease to be good and loving. To cease being so, would have implied that God changed His substance, something that is unthinkable. For God to have changed into something other than goodness and love would have made Him less than the perfect being He is. It is therefore the sinful man who changes toward God rather than the reverse. God does not countenance evil nor is He responsible for evil and injustice.[56] The penalties He inflicts cannot be considered as revenge or punishment.[57] If God's action sometimes takes the form of punishment it is because this is His most effective means of restoring man to order. The love of God is not changed in His judgment and punishment of the sinner; it is simply manifested in another form (Paed. 1.87.3-88.1).

God's punishments are of two kinds: the temporary kind which is meted out in the present life and the permanent kind that is imposed in the after-life upon those who failed to repent, despite God's warnings. The first kind is for the salvation of the sinner; the second is for the restoration of the disturbed order, since temporary punishment has failed as a way of salvation. God does not want His creatures to die but to live. But when someone sets himself outside of the order prescribed by God he self-destructs because only in God is life. Outside of God there is nothing, which is death. The Bible calls those without faith wild beasts (Str. 6.50.5). Such men God visits not as the God of love but as a judge (Paed. 1.86.1). Such visitations are simply manifestations of His true justice (Protr. 116.1). Clement further explains that those who are punished on account of sins are punished for those sins alone; for what is done belongs to the past and what is done can never be undone. The sins committed are accordingly forgiven by the Lord, not that they be undone, but as if they had not been done. Clement appeared to agree with Basilides who maintained that not all sins are forgiven but only involuntary sins committed in ignorance (Str. 4.153.3-4).

In sum, the good God corrects for the following purposes: first, that he who is corrected may become better than his former self ; secondly, that he who is capable of being saved by example may be resaved; thirdly, that he who is injured may not be readily despised by the injurer. God will eventually punish the injurer, and thus the injured will be able to receive justice for the injury suffered. The upshot of all this is that punishment and

[55] Paed. 1.69.1; 85. 3-4; Str. 7. 102.5; Deut. 32.41-42; Jer. 6; Lev. 26; Prov. 1.24-25.

[56] Paed. 1.70.2; Str. 4.170.2; Rom. 9.14.

[57] Paed.1. 70.3. Clement sometimes draws a distinction between the two terms κόλασις and τιμωρία, though this distinction is not steady and consistent, and this inconsistency leads to confusion in his texts, Völker, *Der Wahrer Gnostiker*, p.14.

its pain are beneficial as a healing art, and as discipline. By them man's manners are corrected to their advantage.

Punishment as presented by Clement seems to satisfy the justice of God. For if God failed to punish the aberrant, this would have meant that God acted unjustly, and so contrary to His nature. The punishment by God is useful for two reasons. First, because sin is not only an individual problem but has also social implications. Man is not only an autonomous person but a member of the social organism as well. His actions affect the social body. His evil actions can be contagious and may affect adversely other members of his social unit. By inflicting punishment on the unjust, God does not only satisfy His own justice but He also aims at the health of the social whole. He stops others from imitating unjust acts and benefits those who suffer unjustly because of the actions of the unjust. Thus the social order is restored by the punishment of the unjust, clearly a Greek philosophic idea (Str. 7.102.5). Yet all of these refined arguments that Clement marshals to explain the correctness of the idea of punishment do not effectively answer the objections of those who believe that God in His infinite wisdom and all-mightiness could have devised better means to render justice and improve sinners. Such a position, however, implies that the evil is God's responsibility, not man's fault, something that Clement was not willing to admit. Clement believed that this world must be the best of all possible worlds, as far as its constitution and nature are concerned, and that God must not be charged with the evil which we experience in it. Man alone is responsible for it.

Pedagogic Methods of God: Fear

The Gnostics criticized some of the means the Christians defended as legitimately conducive to the salvation of mankind. In a way, Gnostics, Christians, and Greek philosophers agreed that when man reached that superior moral state desired by all of them, all punitive or restrictive means imposed for the improvement of man would be rendered useless. There, however, the unanimity stopped. How and by what means that final stage of man's perfection could be achieved was a matter of lively debate and recrimination. One of the means whereby the mighty God turned man to salvation was, for Clement, the element of fear, for fear of the Law produces life.[58] Those therefore who believed that the Law produced fear only and failed to perceive the ultimate purpose of fear did not really understand the Law.[59] Moreover, if those who are corrected receive good at the hands of justice and, according to Plato, what is just is acknowledged to be good, fear itself does good, and has been found to be for men's good

[58] Str. 2 84.2; Prov. 19.23.

[59] Paed. 1.61.1; 63.1-2; 67. 1-2; Plat. Gorg. 477 A.

(Paed. 1.67.2). But by inspiring men with fear God cuts off the approach to sin, and shows His love to men by declaring what they shall suffer if they continue as sinners. God intervenes not like a serpent, which the moment it fastens on its prey destroys it.[60] God administers the mild as well as the stiff medicine and the bitter roots of fear arrest the ulcers, Paed. 1.83.2. The Law was given to men and fear was implied for the prevention of transgressions (ἁμαρτημάτων) and the promotion of good deeds. The purpose was to win obedience to the true instructor who is adorned with the best qualities: knowledge, favor, authority.[61] Consequently, the view of the Gnostics that the lord who uses the rod and fear as means of discipline is not a good lord is misplaced.[62] On the contrary, the soul that fears the Lord shall live with the help of Christ Whom God has assigned as a corrector and reformer. Christ alone is able to forgive our inequities appointed as He is as our instructor, and though He threatens, he manifestly is unwilling to inflict evil to execute His threats. But by inspiring men with fear, He cuts off the approach to sin and shows His love to man, declaring to him what he would suffer if he continued to sin (Paed. 1.68.1-3).

Clement explains the meaning of several passages in the Psalms 78. 32-35 and cites the saying of David, "They believed not in His wonderful works. When He slew them, they sought after Him and turned and inquired early after God; then they remembered that God was their helper." So God knew that they had turned to Him from fear, while they despised His love. For the most part, goodness is despised, but he who admonishes by the loving fear inspired by righteousness is reverenced (Paed. 1.86.3). Clement then proceeds to divide fear into two categories..[63]One kind of fear is accompanied by reverence, such as citizens show towards good rulers and the Christians towards God and right minded children towards their fathers. The other kind of fear is accompanied by hatred which slaves feel towards hard masters, and those Hebrews felt who made God a master not a father.

[60]Paed. 1.68.1; Il. 4.217-18; 11. 515; 830 reminds us of Aeschylus, s.e V.J. Dumonter, *Le Vocabulaire medical d' Eschyle et les ecrits hippocratique* (Paris, 1935) 59-60, n.1; ἁμαρτιῶν νομὰς, classical expression of Aphthonios in Leonard Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1894) 23.

[61] Paed. 1.97.3. The choice of these three virtues comes from Plato's Gorg. 487 A. They reflect Christian ideals and are only leaning on Scriptural citations: see Quatember, *Die christliche Lebenshaltung*, p. 76 and the perspicuous observations of P. Nautin, "Notes sur le Stromate I de Clément d' Alexandrie," *Revue d' Histoire Ecclesiastique* 47 (1952) 631. It seems to be stemming from the Stoic Andronicus, SV F 3. 431- 432, where εὔνοια is at least mentioned and is distilled into Clement no doubt through Philo *De Plant*. 106.

[62] Paed. 1.62.1; 64.1; 67.1; Ex. 20.20.

[63] Str. 2.40.1-2. The distinction appears also in Plat. Laws 1, 646 E; Aristl. fr. 184 in Rose 3rd ed. It is repeated with the same reference to filial fear in Str. 2.53.4; Völker, *De Wahre Gnostiker*, p. 269 see note as it relates to Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer*. 4.13.2.6. Also Paed. 1.33.3.

Clement is in sympathy with those who display voluntary respect which greatly differs from the hatred resulting from fear of the second kind (QDS 42).

Clement considers fear a drastic form of medicine analogous to surgery, cauterization, or amputation when medical treatment is needed, and in contrast to cataplasms, rubbings and fermentations which may be more palatable but less effective and wise. As the good doctor uses the most effective ways of treating a disease so the spiritual doctor will pick the most effective treatment for a sick soul, even this treatment involves fear(Protr. 8.2; 95.1). In this context, fear and terror are not seen as evil by Clement if they are employed for the prevention of transgressions and for the promotion of right actions that win obedience to the true instructor (Paed. 90.1). By drawing the distinction between fear as a passion and as constructive means of moral edification Clement wants to dispel the reasonable objections of the Gnostics regarding fear as a pedagogic device.[64]

Clement's treatment of fear differs from the views of the Gnostics, especially the Marcionites, who rejected the use of fear since they perceived it only as passion and consequently as something evil. For this reason they attributed the creation of the world to a secondary god and minimized the moral value of the Old Testament which ascribed to fear good results. The Gnostics and Marcionites had a strong rational point the acceptance of which, however, would have forced a radical reinterpretation of the Bible. Clement, following the Bible, accepted the only God as creator of the universe and pointed to God's use of fear as a tool of moral edification. Clement, therefore, rejected the Marcionite interpretation which, from his point of view, led to heresy. His argument again is that the Gnostics misunderstood the Bible and the Law thus failing to interpret it correctly. In a similar fashion, Clement chastized the Stoics, the name inventors as he calls them, for rejecting the use of the term fear and replacing it with the Greek term εὐλάβεια (Str. 2.32.4). But in spite of his obvious distaste for the Gnostics, Clement does not resist the temptation to adopt their argument techniques for his own.

That fear can be conducive to the moral edification of man Clement makes clear in several places.[65] Fear leads to the abstinence from evil deeds and in doing so is good. Furthermore, fear can be a means for the attainment of the final and supreme good which is the deification of man. But reverence for Law and the fear of God are only the beginning of that

[64] Str. 2.34.1-4. For the distinction see also Maximus the Confessor, PG 91.1440; H. Balz in ThWNT, vol.9, pp.186-216. The Greeks employed another form of fear as a technique of their tragedy, W. Schadewald, *Hermes* 83 (1955) 129-171; M. Pohlenz, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 49-74.

[65] Str. 2.32.3; Protr. 69.4 and SC ad loc. Str. 2 132.2; Plat. Laws 4.715 E - 716 E; *Mélanges Saunier* (Paris, 1951) 34-35.

wisdom that attains to the divine and are therefore of secondary importance. Only the type of fear that produces reverence, such as that of the son for the father, and precludes disrespect and opposition to the father remains Clement's concern as the means to the final end. Fear is useful only as a means to an end; consequently Clement does not make fear an element of the permanent relationship between man and God.

Unfortunately, his treatment of fear is unsatisfactory chiefly because Clement does not seem interested in showing the psychological or philosophical ramifications of fear. His lack of interest may be due to the pitfalls that any elaboration might contain, and one of them, the principal one, is that it might lead him to contradictions of the Bible with its emphasis on fear as simply a utilitarian tool of God. Clement thus wished to support the Old Testament against the attacks of the Gnostics who deflated its moral value as a pertinent description of the relationship between the people of Israel and the creator God. He could have espoused the definition of fear by the Stoics as an irrational diversion and a passion or a disobedient departure from reason; however, fearing possible conflicts with the Bible, he chooses not to elaborate in order to avoid pitfalls.[66] For this reason he avoids the reasonable definition of fear by the Stoics that would have led him into conflict with the Old Testament. Indeed, he refers to fear as a wound of the soul and as such something bad; but again he fails to develop his ideas. The philosophic conceptualization of fear by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics as anticipated evil does not move him to a general discussion of the problem.[67] This failure on the part of Clement constitutes additional evidence that Clement used a utilitarian approach to ancient philosophy. He borrowed its methodological approach or its conclusions whenever that suited his argument while on the other hand he criticized it or ignored it whenever it differed from his Christian world-view, or was likely to disrupt his arguments.

Other Means for Man's Perfection

In Clement's view fear is a legitimate weapon in the panoply of God for the moral edification of man. In such a context, Clement did not perceive any conflict between the use of fear by God and God's grant of freedom to man, though others did denounce fear and reject it as a means towards the perfection of man. Other means toward the betterment of man were persuasive discourse (Paed. 1.66.1; Str. 6.28.3), hortatory and consolatory discourse, the encomiastic discourse, inculpatory and reproachful type of discourse, all of them intended to urge man to further achievements. They

[66] Str. 2.40.1 ff.; SC ad loc. n.2

[67] Plat. Prot. 358 D; Aristl. Nic. Eth. 3. 9. 1115 a9; Rhet. 2. 5. 1381 a 21-22; SVF 3. 386; Nemesios of Ephesos, *About the Nature of Man*, 17 (BEP 267, 32); B.Kotter (ed.), *Die Schriften Des Johannes von Damascus* (Berlin, 1969) 2.80.

are all technical terms of ancient oratory which Clement employed for Christian purposes. The inculpatory and reproachful techniques constitute an art of censure but censure stemming from good will. According to Clement two sorts of individuals engage in censure: friends and non-friends. The non-friends do so in scorn; the friends in kindness. In a similar fashion when God chides us He does it as a dear friend and father, not out of hatred. Had He hated us He could have destroyed us for our faults or allowed us to perish; instead He Himself suffered for our sake.[68] His censure also restores justice which is disturbed by our wanton activities. To those like the Gnostics who criticized the belief in God's employment of rebuke as inconsistent with God's nature, Clement answered that God's rebuke, dictated as it was by divine solicitude, acted as the medicine of divine love which ameliorated the shame of sin. By rebuking and striking the apathetic soul, God secured its exemption from everlasting death by a little pain.[69] God does not conduct Himself differently than we do toward our children. We rebuke them and chide them, supposedly, out of concern for their future welfare not for our personal interest. Our rebuke saddens them temporarily, but in the long run benefits them. It is not the deprivation of the immediate pleasure that we have in view but their future enjoyment (Paed. 1.75.1-3). As the biological father has a plan that aims at steering his children in the right direction, so the Heavenly Father sets before us His own inclinations (γνώμας) inviting us to salvation by making known to us the good and the useful (Paed. 1.89.1-91.2). He summons forth to better things those that are called; He dissuades from their attempts those who are hastening to do wrong, and exhorts them to turn to a better life. His admonition is not full of anger but full of love, with God condescending to seeming anger on man's account; yet, unlike man, not undergoing change because of this emotion.[70]

In his attempt to justify the actions of God that save people from damnation Clement often denies the concept of freedom of the will which he elsewhere employs to counter the arguments of the Gnostics about the predestination of man and to justify the punitive actions of God. In the case

[68] Clement's explanation is answering the claim of the Gnostics, cited in Paed. 1.62.1-4.

[69] Paed. 1.74.1-4 where one sees the insistence of Clement's emphasis on the Christian theme of divine philanthropy and the reality of His incarnation, Quatember, *Die Lebenshandlung*, 129, n. 163.

[70] Paed. 1.4.1-2. Ἀπαθής, the term ascribed to God the Father and Son is typical of the second century AD and Clement uses it frequently. J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig, 1907) 37; T. Rüther, *Theologische Quartalschrft* (Tübingen,1926) pp.231-54; ----, *Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in der beiden ersten christilichen Jahrhunderten und bei Klemens von Alelxandrien*, (Freiburg, 1947); M. Spanneut, *Le Stoicism et les Peres de l' Eglise de Clement de Rome à Clement d' Alexandrie* (Paris, 1957) p.133; 166-175; Paed. 1.62 ff. It is evident that Clement insists upon returning to the theme of the philanthropy of God, the anthropomorphism of God, and the reality of God's incarnation, see Paed. 1.74. 4 ff. and SC ad loc., n.3; Paed. 68.3; 70.1. It is evident that Clement insists upon returning to the theme of the philanthropy of God, and His incarnation.

of heretics Clement is ready to accept their chastisement as legitimate because they remain deaf and do not listen to the right teaching. Thus Clement seems to be making the mistake that most of us make in history when we believe that our ideas are the correct ones while those who differ from us are wrong, and so excusing the persecution of those "wrong believers" on the premise that their punishment is for their benefit. He does not even call that type of chastisement punishment for he considers punishment retaliatory for evil done. God's punishment is not retaliatory but a form of partial correction, which men who transgress God's will usually incur so that they will come to their senses, feel shame for their transgressions, and repent before their final judgment.[71] The extension of this type of thinking toward the presumed heretics can lead and has led to ecclesiastical totalitarianism, a danger that does not seem to bother Clement, or which he refuses to acknowledge, especially since the Christians of his time were clearly in the minority and the Church had not yet been founded as an ecumenical organization. Whether Clement would have agreed with the idea of chastisement by the Church as well, he does not say, but his train of thought does not preclude such a policy. Indeed, it was this reasoning which in the latter part of the fourth century AD led the emerging Christian Church to proceed with the closing and destruction of the pagan temples and unfortunately soon after with the pagan schools. Clement sees no conflict in his statements. On the contrary, in interpreting the "true" sense of various Scriptural passages in Paed. 1.85.3 he emphasizes that God has explained that if we walk straight to Him, He will come straight to us, but that if we walk crooked, He too will walk crooked.[72] He insists that God's chastisement is most beneficial.

Socrates, Plato and those who followed their ethical intellectualism, which seems to include many of the Gnostics, placed emphasis on goodness and justice as positive values on their own merit and often refused to underscore the idea of rewards and punishments. For them, being good and just was good for the individual who practiced the goodness whereas the non-practice of goodness and justice was in itself evil. For Clement what prevented the individual from being good and practicing the good in life was tantamount to evil. From this standpoint any other punishment was superfluous. In the Christian world such a concept of ethical intellectualism that limited its radius to the decisions of man must have seemed very cold-hearted to people like Clement. In such a scheme the character of the personal God propounded by Christianity would have a very limited role. Man simply fell or stood on his own. He was not the concern of God. Under such circumstances even the incarnation of God would have a mechanistic purpose: the spread of the true teaching and the call to salvation, without much concern beyond that on the part of God as to whether man really wished to be saved or not. Clement's God never ceased

[71] Protr. 87.1-3; Paed. 1.67.1; Ex. 20.20; Plat. Prot. 323 D-24.

[72] Paed. 1.61.3; 85.1-4; 97.1; Lev. 26.21; 23.27; Jer. 6; Prov. 1.24.25.

to take a personal interest in man after the Fall and continued to do so after His world saving incarnation. It is not therefore odd that God's personal interest and intervention in the world led to punishment of those who refused to choose a life of goodness. In a way it seems inevitable. If He chastised people roughly He did so in order to drag them back from their impetuous rush toward spiritual death.[73] In a double pronouncement borrowed from Epictetus (Disc. II, 14.21) Clement portrays God as good in Himself and just because of us and because He is good. He shows to us His justice by His own Word. Before becoming creator He was God, and was good, and it was because He was good that He wished to be creator and Father.[74] God's goodness becomes an important position in Clement's anti-Gnostic polemic. His thought reveals the link between "genesis" of the Logos and creation, a characteristic of the theology of the time. It also pronounces the justice of God, and that justice and goodness far from being different or antithetical are one in God.[75] Because God is good and is concerned with man's salvation He invented spiritual remedies for man, in order to impart to him a moral sense and lead him to the path of salvation. He administers those remedies most discretely by waiting for the right moment; by denouncing evil; by explaining the cause of passions; and by uprooting the illogical desires.[76] He commands us to refrain from wrong-doing, while offering antidotes for those who are spiritually ill, since the greatest and most royal work of God is to save humanity. For it has been God's fixed and constant purpose to save the flock of men, and to this end the good God sent the good Shepherd. And the Word having unfolded the truth showed to men the way of salvation that men repenting might be

[73] Paed. 1.86.1-2; 1.33.3; Plat. Laws 646 E; Aristl. Frg. 184, Rose 3rd ed. Str. 2.53.4; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, p. 269, p.2; Irenaeus, *Ad Haer.* 4.13.2.6; Plato, who placed emphasis on individual perfection, also recognized the validity of reproof for the sake of correction. The person who committed base acts was for Plato uninstructed because he had not been trained to learn that he who is destined to be really happy ought to be good, Plat. Soph.. 230 D-E; Laws 7. 805 D. Clement further cites the example of Paul who employed the stringent language to the Churches saying, "Am I your enemy because I tell you the truth?" Gal. 4.16.

[74] Paed. 1.88.2. That the creation is a manifestation of God's goodness is a view adopted by most of the Fathers of the Church.

[75] P. Nautin, Hippolyte, *Contre les Héresies* (Paris, 1949) 196-97; 201-202. Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, p.83; Irenaeus 3. 25. 2.3; Matt. 5.45; SC ad Paed. 1.88.2.n. 2. Clement interprets the Biblical saying "No one knows the Son but the Father, neither knows any man the Father save the Son," Matt. 11. 27, as indicative of a mutual and reciprocal knowledge which is the symbol of primeval justice. This justice descended among men to constrain humanity to salvation in the form of the letter and the body, i.e. through the Logos and the Law (chiasmus: la lettre de la Loi and la corps du verbe incarne, SC ad Paed. 1.88.3). If somebody refuses to obey the Word, he draws upon himself God's judgment.

[76] Str. 2.119.3; SC ad loc.(p. 124) n.2. Stoic definition SVF 3. 391;396;438; and Paed. 1.101. 1 and SC n. 3. The pejorative notion of "desire" is of Stoic origin, Str. And Paed. 1.101.1; SC ad loc. where the editors maintain that the interpretation of the term "desire" might have come to Clement through Philo, Völker, *Der Wahre* Gnostiker, p.130.

saved, or, refusing to obey, might be judged. And God's righteousness is manifested in both cases inasmuch as to those that obey Him He bears good tidings, while to those that disobey, judgment.[77]

It is natural that God should be concerned with man because man is dear to God, being the work of His workmanship. The other works of creation God made by the word of command alone, but man He framed by Himself, by His own hand, and breathed into him what is peculiar to Himself, His spirit.[78] Following the philosophical method, Clement explains that what was fashioned by God after His likeness either was created by God as being desirable on its own account, or was formed as being desirable on account of something else. If man is an object desirable for itself, then God who is good loved what is good, and the particular good of man is within him and resides in that very thing which is called inspiration or breath of God. God had no other reason for creating man than that unless man came into being it would not be possible for God to be a good creator, or for man to arrive at the knowledge of God. God's purpose and the climax of the creation was man. Man then whom God made is desirable for himself, and that which is desirable on its own account is allied to Him to Whom it is desirable on its own account (Paed. 1.7.1-2; 8.1). God then is good on His own account and just on ours, and He is just because he is good.[79] But since God endowed man with free choice and free choice and inclination originate sins, and since mistaken judgments sometimes prevail from which we do not take pain to recede, punishments are rightly inflicted, proceeding from God's righteousness (Str. 1.84.2) Bad conduct which comes forth from a bad disposition can be guided by a universal Providence to a salutary issue, even though bad conduct is productive of disease. Providence cannot allow evil which has sprung from voluntary apostasy to remain useless and not to become in all respects injurious. For it is the work of the divine wisdom and excellence and power, not alone to do good, since

[77] Protr. 116.1; 69.3; 87.3. For the use of the terms τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλην see Jn 10, though direct borrowing from the gospel may not be correct. There are other possibilities such as Philo (Str. 1.156.3) or Plat. Polit 266 C and 268 C. Clement's idea has some similarity to the idea expressed in Plato's Phaedo 78 C-D; SC ad loc. Similar ideas are to be located in Plat. Laws 4.715 E-716 A; Str. 1.22; 2.132.2; 7.100.3; Ps. Justin, *Hippolytus*. For references in Irenaeus, Origen, Olymp. Methodius, see SC ad Protr. 69.4 n. 1 and des Places *Mélanges Saunier*, 34-35.

[78] Paed. 1. 7.1; Gen. 2.7 combined with Gen 1.26; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, pp.111-12 where the Philonian sources are pointed out, SC ad loc. n. 2.

[79] Paed. 1.88.2. It is likely that this somewhat tortuous explanation of Clement becomes further complicated by his use of the Greek philosophical method. Clement refers here to the ideal man in the divine mind, whom he identifies elsewhere with the Logos, the ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθής, of whom man was the image. He speaks of man as existing in the divine mind before his creation, and creation is represented by God's seeing what He had previously within Him merely as a hidden power, Paed. 1.7.2-8.1. See note by the eds. of Eerdmans' edition, *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 2, (Grand Rapids, 1989) n.1. (p. 211).

the nature of God is to do good, as it is of fire to warm and of light to illuminate, but especially to ensure that what happens through evil may come to a good and useful issue.

Those then who denounce God's reproof are in the same class as those who denounce fear, because, if reproof is done away with, it follows that, as in the case of fear, each one who is led by lust and evil disposition will neglect what is right and will despise the commandments of God, indulging in impiety and injustice with impunity.[80] The argument that punishment is an irrational aberration that causes perturbation of the mind is baseless because reproof emanates from God and whatever emanates from God cannot be bad or irrational (Str. 2.32.2-4).

Still another objection on the part of the Gnostics regarding punishment allowed by God pertains to the persecutions and the killing of the Christians by the Roman authorities who put them to death. God had not delivered the Christians to such punishment nor did He wish calamity upon them.[81] He simply foretold prophetically what would happen, namely that the Christians would be persecuted for his name's sake, slaughtered, impaled. It was not that He wished them to be persecuted, but He simply intimated before hand what they would suffer, thereby training them to endurance by which He promised them His inheritance. And if the Christians are unjustly punished as even their critics recognized, their unjust punishment bears witness to the righteousness of their cause. But the injustice of the judge does not affect the providence of God. Both judges, the earthly and the divine, are judged in respect to their judgment. The earthly judge concluded that the Christians were doing wrong, though they were not. He did so because he neither knew nor wished to know, in Clement's view, about the true nature of Christianity but was influenced by unwarranted prejudice. In allowing himself to be carried away by such feelings he condemns himself as judge, a pathetic indication in the eyes of Clement of the indifference of the Roman law to the rights of the people. Accordingly, the authorities persecuted the Christians not from the supposition that they are wrong-doers, but by imagining that because they were Christians they sinned against the state and the community.

Clement's answer thus far overcame the objections of the Gnostics only partially. For if men persecuted the Christians wrongfully and out of ignorance and prejudice why did not God interfere on their behalf? Clement's answer in support of God draws its logic both from the beliefs of the early Christians and from Greek philosophy. Clement's answer was that as far as the Christians were concerned no wrong was done or could be done to them in being released by death to join the Lord. They simply underwent a change of life and a change from a worse life to one infinitely better. If the Christians deliberated seriously about persecution and death,

[80] Paed. 1. 83.2-3; 100.1. Sext. Emp. ad Math. 9.124; Mullach 2. fr.

[81] Str. 4.78.1-79.3; Epict. fr. 374 in Usener and Loeb; Lact. *De Ira Dei* 13.14-19; Min. Felix, Oct. 12.1.

they should have felt obliged to those who afforded them the means for a speedy departure.[82] Clement's typical answer to the critics of Christianity and his conception of hardship and punishment was that though disease and accident and what is most terrible of all, death, come upon the Christians, they remain inflexible in soul, knowing that all such things are a necessity of creation, and that by the power of God, they become the medicine of salvation, benefiting by discipline those who are difficult to reform.[83]

Most of the problems discussed by Clement regarding evil had preoccupied the attention of the Near Eastern theologians and poets before Clement and are the same problems that engaged the genius of the Greek philosophers and poets as we have seen in the introduction to this essay. In its simplest form the crux of the problem of evil in Clement can be summarized thusly: There is only one God; God is omniscient, omnipotent, and all good; evil exists. All three of the above premises are essential parts of the Judeo-Christian theological position. Clement accepted the term omnipotent without dilution; that is, he was prepared to accept that there is nothing that God cannot do. Otherwise, He would not have been omnipotent in the absolute sense Clement believed Him to be. Furthermore, Clement is not willing to accept that evil is an illusion and that those we call evil are not evil in our temporal world, though he was prepared to argue that evil has a utilitarian purpose. In his view evil is an activity contrary to the will of God; therefore, it is not merely the privation of good,

[82] Str. 4.80.1. For the idea Clement relies on Plat. Apol. 3.C-D where Socrates maintains that even if Anytus and Melitus killed him, they would not hurt him in the least since he did not think it possible for the better to be hurt by the worse.

[83] Str. 7.61.5; Eur. Phoen. 893. Clement cites an interesting lexicographical exercise in which he explains that redemptive punishment takes the following forms: 1) Νουθέτησις (Paed. 1.76.1), 2) "Admonition", a censure of loving care that produces understanding (Paed. 1.76.2; Ezekiel 2. 6-7, though not a literal translation, 3) Ἐπιτίμησις (Paed.1.77.1; Jer. 5.8-9; Prov. 1.7; Hos. 4.14), 4) Μέμψις(Paed. 1.77.3), Ἐπίπληξις, (Paed. 1.78. 1; Isa. 30.1), 5)Ἔλεγχος (Paed.1. 82. 2; Prov.3. 11-12; also Plat. Soph. 230 D-E), 6) Φρόνησις (Paed. 1.79. 1-2) and 7) Ἐπισκοπή, a strong ἐπίπληξις first found in the Septuagint and thereafter used extensively sometimes to strengthen the same verb, ἐπισκοπὴ ἐπισκεψεται, Gen. 50. 24. It also appears in the form of punishment or revenge Lev. 19.20; Nu. 16.29 where it denotes something beyond man's power (death). Sirac 18.20 speaks of an ὥρα ἐπισκοπῆς with a special meaning and Jer. 6.15; 10.15 of ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς, which may mean καιρός ἐλέους. We find the term with still another meaning in Nu. 3.32 and 4.16 where office or ownership (possession) is adverted to. In the New Testament, Luke 19.44 it means a visit (ἐπίσκεψις) while in Acts 16 ff. it refers to the office of the apostle (apostolate) and in I Tim. 3.1 it clearly refers to the bishop's office (Gerhard Kittle, *Theologisches Wörterbuch im Neuem Testament*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1935) pp. 602-04). 8) Λοιδορία, (Paed. 1.80.1 in Matt. 23.33; 3.7;), 9) Ἔγκλησις(Paed. 1.80.2), 10) Μεμψιμοιρία (Paed. 1.803), 11) Διάσυρσις (Paed. 1.81.1-2). All of the above techniques are geared to inspire fear whose purpose is salvation. All along, however, His mercy is on all flesh, while He reproves, corrects and teaches as a shepherd does his flock. He pities those who receive His instructions in the above fashion and those who eagerly seek union with Him, Paed. 1.82.3.

as Augustine contended. Evil is a bad activity or judgment springing from some error opposite to good.

Clement does not think that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good, and that if there were no evil there could be no good either, an argument that would go a long way to the solution of the problem of evil. God did not create evil. Evil was introduced into the world as a result of disobedience to God's commands. With his fall man alienated himself from God; he lost his dominant power in the world and was subjected to corruption and death. The command of God to man was closely related with the use of the world by man (Gen. 2.16-17); man's disobedience created the hostility between God and man (Gen. 3.17-19). His alienation from God led man to his alienation from his fellow man, from his environment, and from his own self. The man of the Fall becomes self-centered; he fortifies himself with his individualism but still cannot easily find the fullness of his personal life. It is true, of course, that even in this state he retains some love as a spermatic word. With this love he comes out of his self-centerness, becomes religious, and develops a social life. But this limited love is not sufficient for his fullness; it simply reminds him of the need to rediscover his true identity. Everything created was created good and only man's transgression is responsible for the introduction of evil. Once man lost his special status through his own fault, evil is used by God not as a counterpart of good but as a means to good.

On the surface, this notion has little plausibility as an answer to the problem of evil, since it seems to imply a severe restriction of God's power, such as a "causal law" that we cannot have a certain end without a certain means, so that if God used evil as a means to good, God is subject to at least some law. This would apparently conflict with what Clement meant by God's omnipotence. Yet, Clement tried at the outset to eliminate this seeming contradiction by underlining that God was not responsible for the introduction of evil; man was. Thereafter God only used evil to undo what man had foolishly incurred. This argument does not at all imply that the universe is better off with the existence of evil than if there were no evil. Because Clement accepted the idea that the universe as it was created by God did not presuppose the existence of evil, one might say that evil and nothingness are not powers that rival God's for ever but simply set temporary obstacles to God's will. At the end, despite evil and the devil, God would lead the world to salvation.

It was argued that God could or should have made men such that they would always choose freely the good. On man's so choosing the good on every occasion, God would have acted on the better possibility open to him of making beings who would act freely but always do right; hence there was no possibility that man would opt for a bad choice that would lead to the introduction of evil in this world, as it has happened. Clement answers that what seems to be a better possibility for God is actually an absurdity that would have reduced man to an automaton. Aware of the anticipated and legitimate objections to his thesis, Clement seeks to block such

objections by counterproposing that freedom which can lead man astray and cause him so much grief is more valuable than man's inability to do evil. Whether his argument blocks the objections is something that depends on one's philosophical or theological viewpoint. But under the circumstances, it seems that this is the best Clement could offer as a explanation of God's punishment, or to put it in a different way, man's pain.

Another problem which relates to evil as a concomitant of man's actions is whether man's will and actions are really free in the sense that even God could not control them. This problem is in reality a non-problem since Clement does not accept that man is unable to engage in evil actions, for such an inability would mean that the omnipotence of God would have been circumscribed by His own decision to create a creature whose actions were uncontrollable. But this is not so. God simply refrains from controlling evil will because if He did not, man's freedom would automatically be limited.

Not withstanding Clement's rational argument, his explanation does not seem to meet completely the objections of those disagreeing with him. Why, for example should God refrain from controlling evil actions? Why should He not allow free men to act rightly but intervene when He observed them beginning to act wrongly? God could do this as omnipotent and benevolent, and if He does not, it might be said that even the commission of an evil act has a value which outweighs its evilness or that God has made men so free that He cannot control their actions, a conclusion with which Clement violently disagreed.

Clement realizes that for God to make beings which He cannot control would be absurd because that would limit God's omnipotence. On the other hand, it might be more difficult for Clement to extricate himself from the view that God bound Himself to rules which He set. For Clement the answer here might be that God set rules indeed but that God's abiding by the rules He set does not restrict in the least His omnipotence. An opposite admission that would have restricted God's freedom would have placed Him in the category of lesser beings, a category similar to men who invent and make things but who are often unable to foresee and control the effects of their inventions. Such a conclusion would have been not only preposterous for Clement but also heretical. It would be contrary to Clement's views regarding God's omnipotence and omniscience.

Lastly, Clement recognizes the existence of evil in a world made by an all-benevolent God and tries to show that the existence of evil, be it moral or physical, is not 1) the responsibility of God but of man; 2) that the existence of evil is not incompatible with the existence of God who is an all- perfect being; and 3) that given the existence of God, which Clement considers a given, and the existence of evil, God must have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the presence of evil in the world. Thus, Clement believes that he has provided an adequate explanation of God's theodicy.

Moral and physical evil came into the world as a result of man's hybris though Clement does not much speak about natural catastrophes. It would stand to reason that several at least of these physical evils are the by-product of man's evil side. War, many diseases, famine, and similar disasters Clement perceives as man-induced. Even earthquakes, floods, and the like misfortunes that befall man are viewed as the concomitants of man's original sin. This is for Clement the justification of physical evil which also makes possible the achievement of a large variety of moral goods, such as moral striving, courage, fortitude, endurance, compassion, all of which would be impossible without physical evil. Since Clement believes that after the fall of man this is the best possible world, Clement, like Plato before him (Laws 896 D), believes that grievances and doubts which man may entertain concerning divine providence are the result of his limited range of vision. Man presumes to take the deity to task if he is allotted less happiness than he thinks he deserves. He regards his own well-being as the end towards which God must have worked, instead of regarding himself as a part, no matter how important, in the vast order of things, and admitting that what is an unwelcome experience to him may yet have beneficial results in the economy of the whole. In other words, belief in divine justice is warranted as long as man does not look for it within too narrow a sphere. It is to be found in the wider reaches to which Clement refers us but which is beyond human understanding. Nor does Clement himself make a systematic attempt to assess or specify the good that may accrue to the whole from what for the individual is merely an unpleasant and, to the best of his conscience and insight, undeserved experience. To treat individuals according to their quality and merit and to give them a status corresponding to the degree of their goodness is the only function suitable to God in a universe in which the absolute discretion belongs to Him alone. That the ways of God are too difficult for man to comprehend and a single human life span is too short to show the working of divine justice is something that the Greek poets had long before Clement explained.

For the atheologian this explanation is plain nonsense. The highest moral achievements and goods of man are not of the kind that are brought into being by the existence of suffering. Consequently, this explanation of physical evil is not convincing to the atheologian. Yet, Clement insists that for God to have limited man's exercise of choice to the doing of good only would have meant that God interfered with man's free will, something that God was not willing to do. Despite the disobedience of man, God used evil hereafter for the salvation of man, God's ultimate goal. This is Clement's theistic argument which opens itself to a vast array of controversial questions. Despite the controversy which has raged on both sides for centuries, the answers given by Clement on the question of evil still remain the core answers of Christianity. Great scholars of the Church such as Augustine and Aquinas have endeavored to provide more elaborate answers through more refined rational arguments but have not really illuminated the

question of evil much more. Conversely, while the atheologians have pointed out the many weaknesses of the theistic arguments about evil which have tormented humanity from time immemorial, they too have been laboring under the same impossibility, that is, the undemonstrable reconciliation of the existence of a divine being with the existence of evil. To be sure, some of the theists have offered arguments which mitigate the notion of God's omnipotence as an absolute being. At any rate, the argument continues. But as if realizing that to end his presentation of the ethos ushered in by the new religion with the discussion of evil would not do justice to Christianity, Clement proceeded to a discussion of man's theosis, the ideal stage to be desired by the true follower of the founders of the new religion, something analogous to the human perfection envisaged by the ethical intellectualism of a few of the Greek philosophical systems.[84] But before the discussion of the topic of theosis, a brief analysis of the important subject of sexuality and Freedom of the Will may be useful for the better understanding of Clement's thought.

[84] The debate between the so-called apologists for theism and the atheologians has produced not only heated controversy in modern times but also a mountain of literature. I refer here only to a small number of works which can give the reader a bird's eye-view of the arguments on both sides. David Basinger, *Sophia* 19 (1980) 20-33; R.P. Casey, *Journal of Theological Studies* 43 (1924) 43-56; Harold Cherniss, PAPS 98 (1954) 23-30; D.H.Doit, *Theology* 69 (1966) 485-492; Jonathan N. Evans, *International Journal for Philosophy* 14 (1983) 117-121; Anthony Flew, *Philosophy* 48 (1973) 231-44; Thomas D. Flint, *Sophia* 23 (1984) 41-52; Norman Gulley, *Phronesis* 10 (1965) 882-96; John Hick, *Journal of Theological Studies* 21-22 (1970) 419-22; D. Haight, and M. Haight, *Monist* 54 (1970) 218-220; G. Stanley Kane, *New Scholasticism* 50 (1976) 435-46; Morton T. Kelsey, *Journal of Religion and Health* 13 (1974) 7-18; Theodore J. Kondoleon, *Thomist* 47 (1983) 1-42; Eric Kraemer and Hardy Jones, *Philosophical Topics* 13 (1985) 33-49; Frederick W. Kroon, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 12 (1981) 75-96; Hugh LaFollette, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 11 (1980) 123-132; J.L. Mackie, *Mind* 64 (1955) 200-212; H. J. McCloskey, *Journal of Bible and Religion* 30 (1962) 187-197; McCloskey, *Philosophical Quarterly*_ 10 (1960) 97-114; M. Meldrum, JHS 70 (1950) 65-74; Paul L. Moser, *International Journal for Philosophy* 15 (1984) 49-56; Terence Penelhum, *Religious Studies* 2 (1966) 95-107; Robert J. Richman, *Religious Studies* 4 (1969) 203-211; Trevor J. Saunders, *Symbolae Osloenses* 49 (1984) 37-59; Frances M. Young, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 24 (1973) 113-126. Extensive bibliography on the topic of evil can to be found in Michael L. Peterson, (ed)., *The Problem of Evil, Selected Readings* (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1992) and in M. McAdams. Adams and R. M. Adams (eds.), *The Problem of Evil* (Oxford University Press, 1990).

CHAPTER THREE

SEXUALITY AND EVIL*

The belief of the Gnostics in their possession of celestial knowledge led them to the rejection of the prevalent conception of morality. Two opposite and often extreme views seemed to predominate: the ascetic and the libertine or amoral. Both reflected the same basic attitude: a protest against the pretensions of the world and its legislative ruler. I have already mentioned the view of some Gnostics about fighting pleasure with pleasure. Some others considered themselves above pleasure, believing that the true Gnostic could engage in pleasure at will. Since the true Gnostic stood above pleasure, he was destined for salvation so that the practice of pleasure could not affect him negatively. Libertinism was an attitude which by its very nature appealed to the "pneumatics" as it expressed in the best way possible their self-esteem and sense of freedom from every kind of cosmic coercion.[1]

This attitude centered in the conception of the pneuma as the noble privilege of a new type of person, subjugated neither by the conventions nor the standards of the present world of creation The pneumatic person in contrast to the unilluminated, is free from the Law while the unrestrained use of this freedom is not just a matter of negative libertinism but a positive expression of freedom of itself. That this libertinism was present as early as the second century AD is shown by Clement, who imputes to some Gnostics licentious gatherings which generated gluttony and sexual dissipation. He regrets that they described these abominations as "love feasts.[2]

The other side of the Gnostic 'coin' portrays them as supporting asceticism and abstinence. The early Fathers who also supported the trend towards abstemiousness deprecated Gnostic asceticism as duplicity, as Epiphanius shows.[3] Irenaeus had earlier struck a tone similar to Epiphanius with regard to the followers of Saturnilus (or Saturninus?) when he charged that they held marriage and procreation as stemming from Satan like certain

*Since I began researching Clement there has been a plethora of publications on the history and role of women in antiquity and the early Christian centuries. Many of the writers have taken advantage of anthropological, psychoanalytic, and structuralist methodologies to add new dimensions to the topic on women. In light of the new evidence, I am sure that Clement's ideas on sexuality can easily be the topic of a new, book-length, independent treatment.

[1] H. Jonas, *Gnosis und Spätantiker Geist* , vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1954) 170 ff.

[2] Str. 3.10.1; Epiph. *Panarion* 26. 4.3-8; 5.5; Irenaeus *Adv. Haer.* 1.23.4

[3] *Panarion* 40.1.4.

animal foods.[4] Consequently, rejection of marriage was among the early beliefs of Gnostic asceticism. Women were regarded as the work of Satan; hence those who consorted in marriage fulfilled the work of Satan.[5] Man from the navel upwards is a creature of God, but from the navel downwards a creature of evil power. Thus for some Gnostics everything relating to pleasure and passion and desire originated from the navel down.[6] To be sure, this line of argument was not much different from the views of the Christian ascetics and monastics. Here the lines become blurred. The concept of abstinence became a popular bridge which facilitated the infiltration of Gnostic ideas into the Christian community and perhaps vice versa.

While these groups may have stood at the extreme of the Gnostic movement, there were others who moved between these two extremes. Isidorus, the son of Basilides, in his treatment of ethical problems so interpreted the passage in the gospel of Matthew regarding the eunuchs as to make it comparable to the famous passage of Paul that it was better to marry than to burn, although the unmarried state was preferable.[7] In his approach to sexual relations and marriage Clement treads the middle road away from the extremes. It is in the face of this historical and sociological background that Clement formulated his ideas. Thus his position can be construed as moderate in comparison to the general ideas of his time. Clement rejects the dichotomy of matter and spirit as the equivalent of evil and good. He maintains that the body as matter is useful in the scheme of creation because without it the spirit could not have achieved its end and because the existence of the body teaches us to focus our gaze on the formless incorporiality of the divine cause.[8] In this context, he protests the Gnostic position that the union of husband and wife in marriage, which the Scriptures call knowledge, is sin produced by the eating from the tree of good and evil.[9] The Gnostics found plenty of references in the Bible to support their conclusion. Some prophets indeed cursed the day of their birth, claiming that man was born to see trouble. David also says that he was brought into being in sin and that his mother conceived him in disobedience to the Law.[10] The Scriptures cite Eve as the mother of all men; therefore all men are conceived in sin because Eve herself sinned. If man was brought into being in sin, does it follow that he himself is in sin, or that

[4] Irenaeus *Adv. Haer.* 1.24.2.
[5] Epiph. *Panarion* 45.21.
[6] Epih. *Panarion* 45.21-22.
[7] Str. 3.2.1-5; Matt. 19.11 ff.; I Cor. 7.9.
[8] Str. 3.103-104.4.
[9] Gen. 3. 3.
[10] Ps. 51.7.

he himself is sin?[11] To avoid the perpetuation of this sinful condition in which man found himself should he abstain from marriage completely? Clement's answer was negative. Nor did he accept the notion that no eunuch shall enter God's assembly. The reference in Deuteronomy (23.1) that apparently denied admission to the Lord's congregation of the sexually mutilated meant for Clement that no one unproductive and unfruitful in either behavior or speech would enter the Kingdom. But those who had made themselves eunuchs, remaining free from every sin, fasting from worldliness "for the sake of the kingdom of heaven" would certainly inherit the kingdom of God.[12] The Lord said that the natural eunuchs and those who made themselves eunuchs to the world for the sake of God should keep His Sabbath and fulfill all His commandments. If they did so He would give them a place which would be preferable to that of the sons and daughters of non-eunuchs.

Eunuchs did not claim an inheritance in Jewry since they could not found a family and carry on the family's name. But in the Christian world such a denial of inheritance was not true of those who made themselves eunuchs for Christ. The Matthaean reference (19. 10-12) about those who make themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven indicates that the principal renunciation of marriage and family life was an influential option in some circles in earliest Christianity, not just for the men but for women too.[13] To be eunuch, however, did not of itself make a person righteous, still less the eunuch's mere keeping of the Sabbath, useless he performed the rest of the commandments (Str.3.98.1-2) The line supposedly laid down by Jesus and followed by Clement certainly was meant to provide a new ray of hope to the natural eunuchs whose social status in society was not very envious. It demonstrates also the strong appeal of the teaching of the rising new religion in providing hope to the poor, the downtrodden, the social outcasts with the promise of acceptance in the Christian community and the bosom of God. The requisite was common for all: acceptance of the Christian teaching.[14]

The answers Clement provides to several other problems relating to sexual relations show his middle of the road approach to a subject that must have preoccupied the attention of the early Church. Many of the answers he gives served as the guidelines for the Church in the years to come. Among

[11] Gen. 3.20; Str. 3.100.1-7.

[12] Matt. 19.12. An allusion to words attributed to Jesus in the *Oxyrhychus Papyrus* 1.3 about those who fast "to the world," John Ferguson, trans., *Stromateis, Books I-III*, (Catholic University of America, 1991) ad Str. 3.99.1-4; n. 409.

[13] Isa. 56.3-5; I Cor. 7.32-35;40. It is surprising that such prevalent ideas at the time of Clement led, nonetheless, individuals like Origen to make themselves eunuchs.

[14] It is true that eunuchs occupied a high position in the Roman Imperial administration and later on in the palaces of the East, especially in the harems, but their position was not due to the social esteem they enjoyed; on the contrary.

the questions he tackles is the issue of celibacy in its various forms, an issue also treated in the Bible. In the category of those he criticized as unproductive and allegorically (if not physically) eunuchs he must have included those who today are classified as homosexuals. Since in other places he inveighs against sodomy, Clement seeks to liberate homosexuals from the bond of sodomy by admonishing this type of "eunuchs" to devote themselves to the ordinances of God and to abstain from what he considered immoral acts. He does not elaborate on the cause of his broadly defined eunichism which he simply attributes to the quirks of nature. But if for everything in nature the principal cause was God, then it would follow that God was responsible for the natural condition of eunichism. Clement, however, bypasses this inevitable conclusion by accepting the biological quirks of nature that result in homosexuality as some sort of natural condition not necessarily evil. To so describe it would attribute responsibility to God. Nor does he seem to consider the condition important, let alone morally fatal. On the contrary, he places eunuchs and homosexuals in the same moral category as heterosexuals inasmuch as both ought to be guided by the same obligation, that is, respect for and practice of the ordinances of God (Str. 3.79.1). Natural eunuchs and celibates by choice as well as married persons owe their distinct and distinctive services to the Lord and a different ministry. Speaking of more common differences among men, especially that between a servant and a free man, Paul admonishes that each person, whatever his station in life, should fulfill his service by the work to which he was called.

In Paul's view, unlike that of some ascetically oriented writers of his day, sex was not so much the moral problem as much as sexual desire was. Sexual intercourse within the bounds of marriage served to prevent desire from overwhelming the individual. Sex within marriage was not the expression of desire, proper or improper, rather it was the prophylaxis against desire. We do not find the romantic modern Christian attitude, prevalent especially among some Protestant circles today, that marriage's functions as the fulfillment of divinely ordained 'healthy' human sexuality or at least heterosexuality, as the normal outcome of love for which human beings were created. On the contrary, marriage is the option for weak Christians who cannot otherwise avoid desire. To what extent this Pauline position towards sexuality was influenced by the Stoic theories regarding the evil side of passion and desire is indeed difficult to say. After all, Paul was born and raised in the city of Tarsus, and Tarsus was a considerable intellectual center in the first century BC. This exclusion of sexual desire is reflected in several Pauline passages. Thessalonians (I. 4.3-4) says that the will of God is the holiness and sanctification of the Christians and that the major issue threatening this holiness is πορνεία. Consequently, Christian men should possess their wives not in the passion of desire like the pagans who do not know God so that they would become free in Christ and would receive the appropriate reward for their labors. A favorite slogan among

later ascetic Christians like Jerome had its source in stoicism: the man who loves his wife too much is also an adulterer. The good Stoic will be a good citizen, will marry, have children, and participate in society. But he must do all of these things without suffering from pathos or desire (ἐπιθυμία), and for that purpose he must completely extirpate desire. To the question that sex and compulsion or ἐπιθυμία were bound together, the Stoics answered that the natural compulsion for intercourse, like that for food, did spring from nature and that human beings shared these impulses with animals which, as non-rational beings, could not experience passions or emotions. Natural impulse is not pathos (ἐπιθυμία); it is ὁρμή common to animals plants and humans. Hunger and thirst are natural impulses necessary for self-preservation, placed there by nature. Giving in to such an impulse is not immoral. But such impulses must not be confused with that harmful and dangerous emotion that people experience when they fall in love and feel as if they cannot live without it.[15]

Clement praises celibacy while on the other hand is critical of those who praise abstinence as opposed to marriage; for although it is good to choose celibacy corresponding to the norm of health, it is also good to combine marriage with piety in gratitude for God's creation. The universe itself is the product of creation and so is celibacy. Both the celibate and the married individual should be grateful for their appointed condition, if they know what that condition is (Str. 3.105.1). To say, as the Valentinians did, that marriage is evil is to imply that birth is also evil, a view leading to the conclusion that the Lord Who experienced birth and the Virgin who gave Him birth belong to those tainted by evil (Str. 3.102.1 ff.). This inference is an abomination. Those Gnostics who attack birth are therefore maligning the will of God, and the mystery of creation.

Besides persons like Marcion and Valentinus who denounced sex as material and carnal, therefore evil, there were others in the second century who shared these views and against whom Clement argued but whom he does not name. Most probably they too belonged to some Gnostic branches. Among them was a certain person who, Clement says, in running down

[15] Str. 3.79.5-7. Echoes of this passage of Clement can be found in I Cor. 7.24; Rom. 12.2 ff.; Eph. 5.3-5; I Peter 1.14 ff. For further discussion see the collection of articles in Halvor Moxnes, ed., *Constructing Early Christian Families* (Routledge, 1997); Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (Yale Univ. Press, 1995); M. C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1994); Seneca 116, 5; Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 35. 75; 4.11. 25-27. Seneca explains sexual love as a state of disorder, as any one who has experienced it, he says, can attest; it is a lack of control. Thus, one must learn to have sex without love, without passion, without desire. And one can learn to do so. Critics of the Stoics claim that such a state is contrary to human nature. Seneca asserts just the opposite, i. d. that it can be done. The nature of human beings is to be rational and free. Only with the extirpation of passions, including sexual desire, can one be free and self-sufficient (See Seneca Ep. 116.7); F. Haase, *L. Annaei Seneca, Opera Quae Supersunt*, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1872) his fr. on *De matrimonio;* Diog. Laert. 7.85.

birth described it as subject to decay and death. Like other Gnostics this individual used the Bible in support of his argument, specifically the admonition of Christ that we should not store up treasures on earth (Matt. 11. 19).

Presumably, this treasure included children. For Clement, such an interpretation constituted an unnecessary stretching of Christ's words, and a violence to the Biblical text for at least two reasons: first, because Christ was not speaking about having or not having children in this particular biblical passage but about the accumulation of that wealth which could be corrupted by moth or rust or stolen by thieves; secondly, the view that birth is subject to decay and death is similarly a violence to the concept of birth as generally held by Christ. To be sure, inasmuch as our bodies are subject to growth and decay and are naturally unstable this Gnostic theory is true.[16] But man consists of body and soul, and the latter is something eternal, not subject to decay.

Clement denounces another view similar to that of the Gnostics but expounded by the docetist Julius Cassian who maintained that sexual intercourse did not have God's approval.[17] Clement strikes back at his view by observing that it could not be one of Jesus' genuine sayings because it is not found in any of the four gospels but rather in *The Gospel According to the Egyptians*, a Gnostic source which Clement did not recognize.[18] In addition, by interpreting the text of the Egyptian gospel in his own allegorical fashion Clement attributed to it a different meaning.[19] Clement further criticizes Julius for doing violence to Paul's text by suggesting that birth is the product of evil.[20] In contrast, by giving a special twist to the Platonic word genesis Clement asserts that it was through birth that the universe was set up along with the substances, the creatures, the subjects, the powers, the Law, the gospels, and the revealed knowledge of God. True, long before Marcion and the other Gnostics, Plato in the First Book of the Republic recognized sexual intercourse as the origin of birth and

[16] An allusion to Heracleitus' dictum that everything is in a state of flux, Str. 3.86.3. Also Hercl. fr. 21; Diog. Laert. 1.35 about Thales, οὐδὲν ἔφη τὸν θάνατον διαφέρειν τοῦ ζῆν.

[17] Str. 3.91.1. Not much is known about him outside of Clement's writing and a statement of Jerome dependent presumably on Clement Str. 1.101. Cassian was not the founder but most probably the leading exponent of Docetism. Clement of Rome, *Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, 12.2.

[18] Str. 3.92.2. I checked J. Robinson, (ed.) The *Nag Hammadi Library in English (*Harper Collins, 1992*)* but could not find the exact quote, unless it is no. 59, p.215. Most probably Clement had in his possession a more complete copy of the ms.

[19] Clement interprets "temper" as male impulse and "desire" as the female inferior parts of the soul, both of which Clement admonishes people to bridle. He also urges Julius to consider the Platonic view in Phaed. 81 C; Phaedr. 248 C; Rep.. 6.492. A; 495 A; Phaedr. 254 C-E. These inferior parts are to be governed by reason, Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad Str. 3.91.2; n.377; Str. 3.68.5; and SC ad loc.

[20] Str. 3.94.1; II Cor. 11.3.

rejected it accordingly. Most emphatic is the remark of Cephalus to Socrates.[21] But to Clement Plato's was a jocular remark which could not be considered as his philosophy on sexuality or birth. Birth for Clement is holy; he therefore denounces outright Marcion and his followers who plowed into the ancient philosophers for evidence to support their blasphemous doctrine on birth which they then passed as their own. These philosophers, according to Clement, do not hold that birth is naturally evil, but evil only to the soul which has discerned the truth.[22]

Clement inveighs as strongly against Carpocrates who, following Plato, (Rep. 5.457 D), spoke about the commonality of women. Carpocrates, like many others, did violence to the philosophic theory. For Clement holds that the correct interpretation of Plato is that a woman is to be available only to man who carries out his promise to marry her. Her potential availability was like that of the theater which was open to all spectators. But once a woman had married she belonged to the particular man who secured her first and was not to be the common property of all. Communion is good when it involves a sharing of money, food or clothing, but any kind of communal sexual intercourse is irreligious. Communal sexual freedom and lustfulness pervert not just philosophy but actual human life. Wretches may make a religion out of physical union and sexual intercourse, but this is not Christ's way.[23] On the other hand, Marcion's recommendation of abstinence from marriage was predicated on the idea that sex was material and evil, and that it was instituted by an unjust creator for the purpose of procreation which was also evil.[24]

Clement protests the description of sex for procreation as evil with the observation that food and air are matter and as matter should be evil. Yet

[21] Rep. 1. 328 D-329 D which quotes Sophocles; Str.3.18.3.

[22] Str. 3.13.1. The doctrine belonged to Platonists and Pythagoreans, though we have no details of it. Clement speaks of them further in Str. 3.12.1-4.

[23] Str. 3.27.2 - 28.2; Plat. Symp. 181 A. Clement's version of the famous Platonic theory does violence to what Plato said and seems to be borrowed from the Stoic Epictetus 2.4.8-10. In Plato communion of women applies only to the ruling class where men and women have equal status and neither possesses the other. There is sexual abstinence and no promiscuity; copulation is permitted at festivals with a partner allocated by lot; see Ferguson, *Stromateis*, p.293, n. 40. By his interesting version Clement not only sought to overturn Marcion's position but he equally tailored Plato's view to the Christian measure. The theory about the common possession of women was not uncommon in antiquity and the Stoics seemed to subscribe to it, see Diog. Laert. 7.33 and 131. Epictetus accepts the practice only with such limitations as to make it compatible with the contemporaneous matrimonial institutions. Compare also fr. 15. Where he recurs to the topic.

[24] Str. 3.10.2-12,1 ἐκ δικαίου γενομένην δημιουργοῦ is considered an error and is corrected to ἀδίκου, a logical correction, see Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad. loc. The son of Carpocrates who died at the age of 17 had written a work, *About Justice*, fragments of which are saved by Clement, Str. 3.2.3-5; 3.2.9. In his effort to find a way out of Plato's and his father's theory about the evil quality of matter the son preached common ownership and sharing of women. Since God shines His sun on all men and bestows his goods on all, private ownership based on mine (τὸ ἐμὸν) and yours (τὸ σὸν) is a violation of the divine will. The same is true about the common ownership of women.

Marcion and his followers eat food and breath the air. He finds it ironic that although the Marcionites are the work of the creator and live in his world they preach a faulty and "foreign" Gnosis, that is the ascription of the creation to another God. The reason for the prohibition of procreation by the Marcionites was their belief in the injustice of the demiurge of the material world, and their unwillingness to cooperate with the unjust creator by bringing into and filling this world with people for which this creator was ultimately responsible. They had no desire to leave anything of theirs behind them on this earth. So they preached abstinence not as the result of an act of will but as the result of hatred of the creator and the refusal to employ any of his output. Clement, who understood their reasoning,maintained that their conclusion was faulty because it was based on faulty premises. For some similar reason Clement disliked the doctrine of transmigration as expressed by some philosophers. Transmigration implied that the soul was connected to the body simply for purification and punishment and that the body as material was evil, a theory that Clement rejected.[25]

If Clement opposed the Marcionite view on sex and marriage, he equally disliked the Basilidian belief that Gnostics had a right to sin on account of their perfection. This belief Clement considered blasphemy and incompatible with the measure of moderation he propounded (Str. 3.3.3). He admitted Paul's saying that the person who is unmarried cares for the Lord (I Cor. 7.32 ff.) while the married person cares how to give his partner pleasure; yet, Clement finds no conflict of interest in spite of this Pauline observation. It is possible to give pleasure to one's husband or wife in ways acceptable to God and at the same time show gratitude to God. It is possible for the married person to have a harmonious conjugal relation and also look after the Lord's business. Just as the unmarried women can be looking after the Lord's business in seeking to be holy in body and spirit (I Cor. 7.34), so the married woman cares for both God and her husband's business in seeking to be holy in body and spirit (Str. 3.88.2-3). In Clement's opinion, those who went so far as to call marriage another form of fornication were reverting to blasphemous slander upon the Law and the Lord (Str.3.89.1). Fornication is a sin, but marriage is not, and those who maintained the opposite as to marriage imputed sin to birth and birth's creator (Str. 3.90.5). When the Lord said that "in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage" (Matt. 22.30), he was not denigrating marriage, as some Gnostics assert, but only purging the expectation that physical desire would be satisfied in the resurrection (Str. 3.87.1-2).

[25] Plat. Phaedr. 248-49 B; Crat. 400 C; Hdt. 1-3; Plut. Mor. 58. E; Solon 27; Philolaos in Diels fr. 14; Pindar, OCT fr. 121; Theognis 245-47 ; Str. 3.13.2-3.

Clement further criticized those, most probably Gnostics, who called sexual pleasure "mystical communion." Such practices outside marriage were for Clement "communion of lewdness" (ἀσελγείας κοινωνοί, Str. 3.27.4) and their practitioners miserable ministers of carnal and sexual drives who mistakenly believed that such communion led them to the kingdom of God (Str. 3.27.5). In reality, Clement said that these practitioners were led to the dungeons and were made into pigs and billy-goats (Str. 3. 28.1). Among those who propagated such ideas were the followers of Prodicus who called themselves falsely Gnostics.[26] They arrogated to themselves nobility of nature and freedom, thus presuming to live as they wished. Consequently, they lived in pleasure and confined themselves by nothing, deeming themselves above the Sabbath (κύριοι τοῦ Σαββάτου) and of any species that has been born. This mode of life Clement considered lawless since the author of I John (2.16-17) relays a message from Christ which says that if we claim to have communion with God and walk in darkness, we are lying. Those who claim superiority of birth ought to show superiority in character. These pleasure-seekers sinned voluntarily and elevated to dogma adultery, sexual pleasure, and the exploitation of other peoples' marriage, so much so that they were denounced even by the pagans. And if the pagans denounced them for failure to follow what had been established by custom, how can those who are unjust, adulterers, greedy, and lewd assert that they alone know God? They ought to live uprightly among pagans to show themselves of spiritually royal origin. Instead they loathe the human and divine law and conduct themselves illicitly. They are no different from those pagans who conduct themselves similarly. Those who claim to be superior in origin should behave in a morally superior manner.[27]

Still others, devising excuses for their lewd and unworthy practices, argue that man was created by diverse powers and that from top to his belly he was created by godlike art, (θεοειδεστέρας τέχνης) but below the umbilicum by a lesser art, hence his sexual drives.[28] In so doing and saying they ignore that the upper part of the body also needed food and other material things. By so arguing they stand in opposition to Christ who declared that the same God made the "inner" and "outer" man and that desire did not originate in the body, although it is fulfilled for the body's sake.

[26] Little is known of Prodicus who claimed revelations from Zoroaster. He denied the need for prayer (God being omniscient) and propounded some sort of election doctrine, Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad. 3.30.1.

[27] Str. 3.30.1; 31.1; 4; 32.1; 35.5.

[28] Attributed by Epiph. *Panarion* 45.2 to the sects of the Severians. A similar view is found in *On Virginity* 7 attributed to Basil of Caesarea, perhaps by error, instead of to the Arian Basil of Ancyra, Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad. 3.34.1-2, n. 114.

Clement fights still another interesting theory about sex, propounded this time by a group called Opponents (*Antitactae*). They affirmed a monistic view of God, identifying Him with an inferior force responsible for evil. The God of the universe is one Father by nature and everything He has produced is good, but one of those who came from Him sowed weeds and brought into being the growth of evil things.[29] The creature has surrounded us all with these evils and set us in opposition to the Father (Str. 3.34.4). Consequently, we set ourselves to vindicate the Father by counteracting the will of the second spirit. Since these Opponents attributed to his latter force the saying, "You shall not commit adultery," they championed adultery so as to annul the order of this spirit.[30] The argument of the Opponents contained weaknesses which Clement immediately perceived and exposed. In so doing he reveals once more his training in philosophical argumentation (Str. 3.35.2-3). His answer to them was that either there was no such thing as evil, in which case the one they charged with opposition to God did not merit reproof, since He has never created anything evil, or else, if evil really did exist, they must tell us what is their view of the commandments regarding righteousness, and especially continence. If these commandments are bad, then vice has legislated against itself to its own undoing, which is impossible. If they are good, then the inferior spirit is opposing good and acting wickedly. This teaching is contrary, not simply contradictory, to the commandments since either the commandments were God-given and had to be obeyed, in which case their teaching was evil, or they were not given by God and their teaching about a good God and evil was an absurdity.

Some other Gnostics arrogantly claimed that they had already attained the state of resurrection referred to in Matthew, 22.30, thereby repudiating marriage. If this theory, Clement said, were true then these Gnostics too should stop eating and drinking, since both these necessities terminated with their resurrection (I Cor. 6.13). The kingdom of God did not involve eating and drinking.[31]

Lastly, there were those who openly stated that marriage was fornication and that it was instituted by the evil force, the devil. They further arrogantly puffed themselves by claiming that in avoiding sex and marriage they were emulating the Lord who did not marry and had no worldly possessions (Str. 3.49.1). In so claiming they pretended to have profounder understanding of the gospel than anybody else. Their arrogance

[29] Matt. 13.25. What is used by Jesus in Matthew as a parable seems to have existed as cosmology, see Str. 3.34.3 and Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad. loc.

[30] Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad 3.34.3-4, n. 119. Theodoret in his compendium of heretical narratives 1.16 uses μοιχεύσομεν which Stählin changed to μοιχεύομεν and Ferguson correctly accepts it.

[31] Rom. 14.17; Str.3.48.1.

Clement punctured with evidence from the Scriptures which clearly said that God is against the proud and gives grace to the humble.[32] Clement contends that these Gnostics did not know the reason why Christ did not marry. For Clement, Christ did not marry primarily because He had his own bride, the Church, and secondly because He did not have an obligation to produce children. He was born as God's only Son and remained so eternally, an explanation that does not really answer his opponents' argument.

Referring generally to those who rejected matrimony, Clement adverts to the words said to be given to Salome by Christ.[33] In these words Christ is not speaking of life as evil and the creation as rotten. He is speaking about the normal course of nature, apart from any evil, in which death follows on the heels of birth. Knowing this inevitability, the choice of celibacy or wedlock is in our power and is not a matter of any absolute constraint of the commandments. He is emphasizing the point that marriage is cooperation with the work of creation.

Among the many Gnostic sects we can include also that one represented by Tatian, an educated Syrian who converted to Christianity sometime after 150 AD, not much earlier than Clement. In his work *Diatessaron* he defended Christianity and the harmony of the gospels. He was something of a free thinker and perhaps the founder of the ascetic Encratites. Their name denotes that they avoided marriage as evil. The orthodox rejected him but his memory remained alive among the Christian Syrians.[34]

Clement, Sexuality, and Marriage

In the discussion of sexual relations and marriage thus far we have witnessed some of Clement's viewpoints in an indirect way, through his arguments against Gnostics and cognate groups. What follows is a brief summary of Clement's direct ideas on the subject. Clement had written an essay on continence where evidently he spoke extensively of marriage and abstinence from marriage, but the essay has been unfortunately lost. This

[32] Str. 3. 49. 2; Jm. 4.6; I Pet. 5.5; Prov. 3.34.

[33] The reference is in the *Gospel According to the Egyptians,* E. Hennecke and W. Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1975) 166-69; Str. 3.63.4-64.2; *Excepta ex Theodoto*, 67; Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad. Str. 3.63.4, n. 163.

[34] tr. 3.81.1. The sect of the Encratites originated in the second century, but the name was also indiscriminately applied to many different groups with rigorous teachings. Irenaeus relates that the Encratites proceeded from Saturninus and Marcion (*Adv. Haer.* 1.28), but Eus. HE 4.29.6 and Jerome, *Jov.* 1.3 describe Tatian as the founder of the sect. According to Irenaeus, Tatian condemned matrimony and regarded all sexual relations as impure. He even compared marriage with fornication and the corruption of boys (*Orat.* 8).

lost essay seems to have followed the classic line of the Cynic-Stoic thought.[35] In it he admonishes those who decide to get married to think how to practice sexual intercourse as something necessary in the way that good is necessary, not simply pleasurable (Paed. 2. 95.2-3). In a cautionary note on sexuality he resorts again to Greek philosophy by reminding his readers that the Abderite Democritus called sexual relationship a light form of epilepsy, an incurable malady.[36] Sexual encounters are accompanied by weakness, owing to the loss of semen, since man, although born of man, is detached from him.[37] This "turbulence of matter" upsets corporeal harmony. In furtherance of his cautionary note Clement produces Cephalus' story and the "worthy" response of Sophocles who when asked how he managed sexually in his advanced years answered that he was glad to have been rid of a mad and wild tyrant.[38] The stories of Democritus and Cephalus are given by Clement because of his wish to put sexuality in perspective, although he generally approved of it for the variety of reasons given in the Scriptures.[39]

In Clement's view God did not wish us to indulge in sensual pleasures intemperately. In support of this view he points out that even the irrational animals had periods of fecundation. Thus he is again pursuing the middle of the road course by accepting sexuality but not license. He does not believe, as some of the Gnostics did, that marriage and sexuality in marriage were evil, but he does not approve of sex outside of the ordinary matrimonial institutions. If, when legally constituted, marriage remained nevertheless a sin, as some of the Gnostics maintained, then God's commandments sanctifying marriage perpetrated sin.[40] Since God's commandments cannot be conducive to sin, those who condemned marriage were spreading deceitful teachings and demonic ideas. Everything created by God is good; nothing is to be rejected, provided it is taken in a spirit of gratitude (Str. 3.85.1) . It follows then that there is no ban on marriage as there is no ban on eating meat or drinking wine, unless a person gives offense by so doing.[41] The means of regulating both eating and sexual intercourse is self-control and self-discipline, using such activities according to logos, that is, reason (κατὰ λόγον). Generally, all the apostles followed the same line, according to Clement, by embracing the instructions about marriage, the procreation of children, and domestic life in general. Nowhere, however, do

[35] Str. 2.137. 3; and ns. 2 and 4 ad loc. in SC; Str. 2.137. 1.147.5; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, p. 29. n.1

[36] Paed. 2.94.3; Democr. fr. 32, Diels.

[37] Democr. fr. 32; Gen. 2.23.

[38] The incident is related by Cephalus to Socrates in the First Book of the Republic. Clement returns to it in Str.3.18.5, see Paed. 2.95.1 and SC n.4.

[39] Gen. 1.28; Str. 2.145.4; 126.1.

[40] Str. 3.84.2; Gen.1.28.

[41] Rom. 14.21; I Cor. 7.8.

they blackball marriage, provided it is lived in a responsible manner. On the contrary, they welcome the person who embarks responsibly on marriage with gratitude to God, making his choice in maturity and firmness of mind.[42]

The law wanted men to have responsible sexual relations with their wives solely for the procreation of children (Str. 3.71.4). The practice of responsible sexual relations is further supported by Clement's recruitment of examples from the Bible, the contemporary social customs of the day in the Near Eastern environment, and the Roman legislation, particularly the Augustan legislation with which Clement must have been familiar. For example, according to the existing Neareastern customs a bachelor was prevented from enjoying immediate sexual relations with a woman prisoner of war. If, however, he fell in love with her and wanted to take her as wife, he ought to let her cut her hair short and mourn her father and mother for thirty days. If his love for her was not abated in the meantime, he could proceed to marry her and father her children.[43] The interval of the thirty days supposedly enabled the overpowering impulse to be scrutinized and be turned into a rational appetency. The same measure of moderation and reason in sexual contacts is also Clement's guiding principle in other cases which he borrows from the Scriptures. Clement suggests that the same caution guided devout men of earlier generations in their attitude towards pregnant women. Only after the birth and weaning of the child would they find themselves again in physical relation with their wives, undoubtedly, an incorrect or exaggerated statement (Str. 3.72.1). Yet the examples Clement gives do not necessarily lend support to the universality of sexual practices among even Christian couples. No doubt, moderation and reason were proposed as the ideal toward which the Christians should aim rather than an ideal all Christians and Jews adhered to strictly in their daily life. Clement is interested in the principle rather than the exceptions or the violations. In pursuit of this ideal, he mentions the example of Moses' father who observed this principle when he left a three year interval after Aaron's birth

[42] Str. 3.86.1; Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad loc. n.343; Stählin ad loc. That one of the purposes of marriage, indeed the primary, was to produce children is frequently attested in the ancient sources. The phrase *liberorum quaerendum gratia* recurs often enough, with minor variations, to suggest that it was a legal or ritual formula. From early Roman Republican times the phrase appears to have been part of a citizen's declaration to the censor that he would marry to produce children, Aulus Gellius 4.3.2; Beryl Rawson, ed., *The Roman Family in Ancient Rome* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1987) p.9. n. 9. Augustan family laws reinforced the idealization of marriage, procreation, and sexual virtue, Moxnes, *Constructing Early Christian Families*, 114.

[43] Str.3.71.4; Deut. 21.11-13. The "shaving" and the "paring" in 21.12. may be mourning rites or acts of purification cleansing her from her previous environment, or they may express symbolically that her forlorn condition is at an end now that she has found a husband and a home. This case excluded the Canaanites with whom the Israelites were forbidden marriage. If the husband found no pleasure in his wife he was allowed to let her go but not sell her. The last prescription is contradictory to Christ's statement about letting a wife go only in the case of adultery.

before fathering Moses (ex. 7.7). The tribe of Levi observed this law from God although its members were fewer in number than the other tribes when they entered the promised land (Str. 3.72.1-3). The history of moderation in sexual practices among the Israelites made it easier to move the Jews toward self-discipline when God through Moses ordered them to abstain from sexual pleasure for three successive days before hearing the commands of God.[44] In sexual relations then as in other human manifestations of life the final aim is self-control. Christians should never act from desire, since man is a child of will not desire. Even the person who marries in order to have children ought to practice self-control. He ought not to have a sexual desire even for his wife to whom he has a duty to show Christian love, a rather idealistic and somewhat wishful theory.[45] He ought to produce children by a reverent, disciplined act of will (Str. 3.58.1-8). To illustrate the importance of self-control Clement points out that even angels (sons of God) who failed to show self-control and were overpowered by sexual desire fell from heaven to earth (Gen. 6.2). Men then should embrace self-control out of love for the Lord and for the sake of the good itself; in this way they consecrate the temple of the spirit that dwells in them (I Cor. 3.16). It is honorable to "emasculate oneself" of all desire for the sake of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 19.12), but those who renounce marriage out of hatred of the flesh are ignorant and irreligious (Str. 3.60.1).

History also displays the value of self-control and moderation in sexual affairs, and Clement uses several examples in demonstration. Tradition records that quite a number of athletes made it a practice to abstain temporarily from sexual intercourse as part of the discipline of physical training.[46] For instance, the guitarist Amoebus, newly married as he was did not touch his bride because such contact would have affected his impending musical performance negatively.[47]

Clement's argument in favor of self-discipline raised a major question his opponents immediately perceived. This was that self-disciple had to be the issue of mutual understanding between the partners if it were not to result in conjugal problems (Str.3.46.4). Clement found this objection rather strange since those who propounded it were the same ones who denigrated sexual intercourse as polluted, not admitting that they them-

[44] Ex. 19.15; Str. 3.73.1.

[45] Agape here is contrasted to ἔρως, sexual passion, see A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, transl. by Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia, 1953).

[46] Plato Laws 8. 840 A and scholia give the example of Astylus and Croton, early fifth century BC, friends of the dictator Hiero, who won races in their successive Olympics and merited an ode by Simonides. Crison from Himera in Sicily ran in the Olympics of 447 (Plat. Prot. 335 E; Str. 3.51.4; Ferguson, Stromateis, ad loc., n. 186.

[47] Aelian, *On the Nature of Animals*, 6.1; *Varia* Historia 3.20, who also mentions Diogenes, a tragic actor, and Cleitomachus, the pancratian, and their attitude towards aphrodisiacs. Amoebus, third century BC, was an Athenian who lived near the theater, won the approval of Zeno the Stoic and received one talent per performance (Athen. 14. 623 D; Plut. Mor. 443 A; Ferguson, *Stromateis*, ad Str. 3.51.4, n. 187.

selves owed their existence to sexual intercourse; therefore, that they too were polluted. Clement believed, without accepting any such thesis, that true Christian partners would understandably agree to practice self-discipline.[48] Clement stresses the words "by agreement" to prevent a greater evil, that is, the dissolution of the marriage, because if one of the partners was thus forced to practice celibacy that partner could slip into sin instead. The emphasis on mutuality and Clement's concern for the preservation of marriage indicates again Clement's practicality, since the preservation of the marriage obviously was for him more important than self-discipline, which here stands in secondary importance, compared to the survivability of the family. At any rate, to underline his theory of self- control, Clement reverts to the paradigm of the Pythagoreans who entered into marriage and procreated only until the begetting of children, after which they refrained from the pleasure of sexual intercourse (Str.3.24.1).

Clement believed that the seed coming from consecrated people was also sacred (Str. 3.46.5). At this point he propounded the interesting, though somewhat peculiar idea, that the womb accepts the semen, thus negating the blame of copulation. Blame would have incurred if the partners entered into sexual intercourse solely for pleasure and not for procreation. But since their purpose was procreation no blame was attached to the act. The womb upon fecundation excluded the effect of lascivious action upon itself by closing its opening. The womb's activities, up to now amorous, are henceforth occupied with the growth of the fetus, thereby collaborating with the creator.[49] It is not proper, when nature is "working," to be disturbed by superfluous activities which amount to hybris, for it is hybris which, with its many names and faces here takes the form of sexual indiscipline, that is continuing intercourse with a pregnant woman.[50]

From the above discussion, it becomes apparent that Clement believed in two types of human needs: The necessary physical (ἀνάγκη, ὁρμή) like

[48] Str. 3.46.5; 3.79.1; I Cor.7.2; I Cor. 7.3-5.

[49] Paed. 2.93.1. See also SC ad 2.83 and note. Clement's theory confirms a common theory accepted in antiquity, notably among the Stoics, Jan. H. Waszink, ed., *De Tertullian, De Anima* (Amsterdam, 1933) p. 342-46. Clement believed that the necessary elements for the formation of the embryo were contained in the sperm, as the ancients believed, Spanneut, p.184; 194-95. Also Paed. 2.91.1; 102.1

[50] The use of the noun hybris here comes from Plato's Phaedr. 238 A. When desires drag us irrationally toward pleasure and have come to rule within us, the noun given to that rule is hybris, wantonness. But in truth, wantonness itself has many names and many ways and forms, and when one of those forms is conspicuously present in a person it makes that person bear its name, a name that yields no credit or distinction. Though some of Clement's ideas linked to human physiology may sound strange to us today, he was not unique in antiquity. For similar ideas see Joyce E. Salisbury, *Perpetua's Passion* (Routledge, 1997) 142; Clarisssa W. Atkinson, *The Oldest Vocation: Christian Motherhood in the Middle Ages* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1991) 58; Danielle Jacquart and Claude Thomaset, *Sexuality and Medicine in the Middle Ages* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1988) 72.

food and water, and the merely physical. The physical needs were not as a rule necessary (Str. 3.1.2; 3.3.2). Sexual needs fall under this category. Clement further believed that all things created for our use are good, as for example sexual intercourse, when used prudently and in moderation for the purpose they were given. He does not seem to recognize the physical need as fulfilling sexual desire in itself, and argues against the high frequency of sexual activities by pointing out that the rarer the act (χρονιωτέρα) the better the enjoyment of it (ποθεινοτέρα). Darkness should not become a license for sexual engagement; moderation at all times should be the guiding principle.[51] Obviously, Clement in trying to strike a middle course between the extreme theories of his day which he has criticized, is following not only what he considers Biblical and Christian lines but also the evidence from Greek authors whom he highly values. Sexual union without the purpose of procreation was for him an affront to nature.[52] Marriage is the conjunction of man and woman, according to law, for the purpose of procreation. Law was obviously whatever the practice of the early Christians was; however, Clement's description of the Christian practice does not point to an officially recognized sacrament of the Church as yet, though it certainly refers to a sacramental element.[53] Since the purpose of marriage is procreation, those intending to get married had to follow the precepts of the right time, and right time did not permit sexual relations to the young. He does not specify what is too young an age for marriage while in forbidding marriage to the old he most probably have meant those past the age of begetting or

[51] Paed. 2.97.1. Clement proposes restrictions analogous to those of Plutarch, *Quest. Conv.* 3. 654 C-D.

[52] This idea is a product of Stoic rationale, Paed. 2.95.3; Str. 3.79.3-5; SC ad loc. On the surface at least, Clement seems to differ here from Paul who did not speak of marriage as a means of procreation or as an important social institution, but considered it primarily in relation to sexuality. It appears that marriage was not prescribed or taken for granted as an institution for all Christians. In Jewish tradition as well as in Roman regulations of the first century BC, marriage was strongly encouraged. From what Clement says in relation to marriage in the early Christian community opinion was divided; there was a strong tendency to encourage asceticism, or a non-married life. On the other hand, Clement seems inclined to curtail asceticism.

[53] His theory of procreation he supports by references to Plat. Laws 6.773 E; 776 B; Symp. 207 D; 208 B. In Str. 2. 137.1 and 2.138.5-6 he blasts the Stoics, the Epicureans, Democritus, and the Peripatetics for presumably carrying out their doctrines and becoming slaves to pleasure, Athen. 13.588 B; Diog. Laert. 10.4.

bearing children.[54] Whether social factors are part of his considerations here is not very clear, although one would think so. Would Clement forbid marriage to a child old enough to beget children but not socially mature, if such were not the custom of his day? Would he allow marriage to older persons for the single purpose of companionship? One would think so but Clement does not elaborate on such details.

Clement's theory of procreation as the basic purpose of marriage and sexual intercourse suggested that the childless person fails in that perfection which, according to nature, consists in leaving behind the proper successor. Perfect in nature is he who has produced from himself his like; but even that definition he did not consider sufficient since he proceeds to interject another important justification of procreation as a necessity which is partially reminiscent of Pericles' advice to the Athenians.[55] Procreation, he adds, is needed for the sake of one's country, and for the improvement of the world, as far as it is possible for the Christians to improve it. Not to procreate is unholy because such a failure does away with divine generation. Moreover, it is unmanly and weak to shun living with a wife and children. For that of which the loss is an evil, the possession is by all counts a good. The loss of children is counted by some among the greatest of evils. That being true, then the begetting of children is a great good and so must be marriage (Str. 2.141.1-5). And if marriage for non-Christians finds its concord in pleasure, for those who practice philosophy, for the true Christians, it should lead to concord in accordance with reason, bidding the wives to adorn themselves not with things that add to their outward appearance, but with things that add to character. Similarly, reason bids the husbands not to treat their wives as mistresses but partners(Str. 2.143.1). In their sexual relations the partners should decide (σκοπεῖν) the time of sexual

[54] In this respect the Church after Clement digressed from his teaching by allowing marriage to older people, though seemingly past the age of child bearing. In spite of this permission, the Church continued to accept marriage as a childbearing institution if one is to judge from the wedding prayers which are filled with references to childbearing. Besides Plutarch, Clement finds analogous support for this theory in Philo who forbids union with a sterile woman, *De Spec. Leg.*, *III* 34-36. Philo's view is that those who marry maidens in ignorance of their capacity for motherhood and refuse to let them go after it was shown by time that they are barren deserve pardon. The reason he gives is interesting. His concern is not for the woman's future well-being but for the familiarity and love developed by the husband toward his sterile wife. It is a reasonable and strong enough factor for Philo, preventing the husband from getting rid of his mate. He only blames those who knowingly marry a sterile woman, i.e., somebody who had a previous husband and produced no children for him. Clearly, Philo has very little consideration for the sexual needs of the presumably barren woman, nor does he entertain the suspicion that sterility might not be entirely owing to the female partner. Clement himself does not elaborate on this point. It would have been interesting if he did so in view of his concern for procreation, his respect for the admonition of Jesus that one should not dismiss a wife except for adultery, and the frequently touted examples of the Church that supposedly sterile but devout women produced children of distinction later in their lives (Sarah, Hannah, and so on).

[55] Str. 2. 139.4-5; 140. 1; Thuc. 2.44.3.

contact, provided they keep in mind what the purpose (τέλος) of marriage is.[56] As the farmer sows quiescent seed with the purpose of harvesting, so much more the farmer who sows active seed. The one is after temporal seed for himself; the other perpetuates the universe and farms for God. Beyond the family partnership, there must have been additional reasons for Clement which made woman a valuable partner to man. Man and woman could work side by side, preaching and spreading their beliefs about the new religion. Women could also opt out of the domestic sphere and enter the public world; they could exist apart from their husbands. The order of "widows" was a means for realizing this option. By taking the dress of a widow, a woman gained the ability to move freely, protected from sexual harassment or assault. In one sense, the guise of widowhood was a means of escaping the norms of patriarchy, and allowing for an alternative form of independent existence.

It follows that Clement does not consider celibacy particularly praiseworthy, unless it arises from love of God (Str. 3.52.1). If a person wished to be unencumbered and preferred to avoid the begetting and upraising of children because of the time and pain it takes, then he had better listen to Paul and stay unmarried.[57] Needless to stress that in view of Clement's attitude toward celibacy, marriage, and the production of children, the idea of abortion was an anathema to him. Once more he supported his views with references to the Greek philosophers as he also used such references to defeat the notion suggested by some that children were a curse.[58] The surprising thing is that in view of the frequent practice of abortion among the Greeks throughout their history and the exposure of children, Clement fails to elaborate on the subject. Perhaps he felt that given his emphasis on the sacredness of marriage and its purpose not much needed to be said about past practices. Clement has repeatedly insisted that rearing children in accordance with the Christian precepts and educating them in the Christian religion was an arduous and tortuous task; yet he was

[56] Paed. 3.83.1. We find here the Stoic distinction between σκοπός and τέλος, Paed. 1.102.2 and SC ad loc., n. 2 for sex without telos. It is put here somewhat clumsily. On the one hand, the purpose pursued by the couple is procreation, on the other, the telos, if God permits, is to have good children. Augustine spoke of *proles, fides, sacramentum*. Clement is satisfied with the ancient tradition of the concept of marriage as *procreadorum liberorum causa* (Musonius 12, p.64.2) and defends marriage against perversion and homosexuality, SC ad Paed. 3.83., n.1; Spannet, p. 260. Plutarch, among Clement's pagan predecessors, could have been one of his main witness in moral philosophy. For although Plutarch retained many traditional ideas about the inferior position of women, he still emphasized the equality between men and women in terms of friendship, a category which in Classical times was not applied to a man's relationship to a woman, Moxnes, *Constructing Early Christian Families*, 32; Gen. 1.28. Like Paul, Clement makes man God's collaborator, II Cor. 6.1 ff.

[57] Str. 3.68.1; I Cor. 7.8; yet in Str. 3. 53.1-3 Clement says that even Paul had a wife (σύζυγον) but did not take her around with him, as other apostles did, for the convenience of his ministry. Other sources do not confirm Clement's statement about a wife.

[58] Plat. Laws 8.838 E; Str. 3.98.5.

not willing to accept the proposition that children were a curse rather than a blessing.

Conclusion

Clement viewed sexual relations from the angle of contemporaneous theories and the Christian religion. His conclusion is that sexual intercourse is not a sin and therefore evil, if practiced within the confines of Christian life. Sexual desire is instituted by God for the single purpose of the procreation of the species, not for pleasure; although Clement would be willing to admit that sexual relations involved pleasure in the sense that pleasure was a by-product of the sexual act not its purpose, exactly as satisfying one's hunger or quenching his thirst engendered a certain amount of pleasure. The married partners should engage in sexual activities for the procreation of children in order to fulfill God's purpose, but beyond that they should look upon each other as Christian brothers and sisters. Eunuchs by nature and those made so by men can easily inherit God's kingdom if they dedicate themselves to the will of God. Among eunuchs by nature Clement would include those considered as homosexuals. They too will easily inherit the kingdom if they abstained from the evil practice of homosexuality and gave themselves to God as those who practiced self-imposed celibacy for God's sake. In this sense all human beings are placed on the same level and are all given the same equality of opportunity to inherit the kingdom of God, if from their different vantage points they still adhered to the divine commands. Otherwise, Clement does not discuss sexual desire as a biological need to be fulfilled apart from the Christian precepts he expounded. The physical attraction and sexual relation controlled by the institution of marriage have undoubtedly a value within the life of the fallen man. Moreover, the sexual attraction in the relationship between man and woman possibly preserves some natural original layer or a presupposition of the loving power with which God endowed man's nature to realize the goal of his being in acquiring a physical existence.[59] Since God created man, male and female (Gen. 5.2), this living communion and unity does not constitute diversion from or perversion of the plan of God but compliance with it. That is what the Old Testament teaches and Christ refers to with approval (Matt. 19.4-6). Marriage is not, however, simply the approval of a biological phenomenon but the supervention of this phenomenon within the prospect of the kingdom of God. In this sense the natural pull between sexes finds its meaning when it leads man to supersede the "I" and to come

[59] Maximus the Confessor who seems to follow Clement's line of thought sees the physical presupposition of this "loving power" of man in the power of desire. Without it, he says, there is no attraction, whose purpose is love. To be attracted to somebody is characteristic of desire and without this power that drives an individual to unite with another individual there cannot be fulfillment (ειρηνη).See his *Theologica Kephalaia*, 2. PG. 90, 1248 C-D. Desire for Maximus does not refer to sexual pleasure but to the pleasure of the mind, *Hetera Kephalaia*, PG 90, 1437 B.

to communion with the "you." When that happens, love moves from a self-centered state to a state of selfless communion. Marriage becomes a communion of true love. In this communion husband and wife are not only a man and a woman, concrete and unique persons that make up the pair, but a new and complete unit.

With the union of the two persons for the purpose of childbearing man frees his loving power from its subjection to its physical necessity and converts it into a communion between persons. Man and woman live not simply in the context of the physical relation and of the family, but also in a possibility of a dynamic transformation of the physical attraction into a "personal" spiritual relationship where the meaning of "person" or "personal" differs from the meaning of the term "individual" as "atomon" or a single unit, in that it denotes man as the image of God. The conjugal relationship in marriage does not deny or despise its biological beginning and fulfillment. It simply refuses to exhaust its meaning only within the context of this biological hypostasis condemned eventually to separation by death. The union of the two persons transforms the physical relationship into a relationship free from the physical necessities and into a living oneness through Christ. Clement seems to recognize in the physical attraction the existential propensity of man, but he does not identify this attraction only with the childbearing function, but with a spiritual relationship that transcends reproduction and survives beyond death.

While the main purpose of marriage is procreation, that is not its only end. Otherwise we ought to consider every marriage which does not result in procreation as invalid. Such a theory does not fully cover the purpose of marriage and would contradict common sense because of the occasional sterility of couples. Furthermore, to limit marriage to the production of children would imply restriction of its meaning to "carnal" relations between the couple, something that does not harmonize with Clement's views.

It is true that between the conjugal relations and the production of children there is a direct link which Clement emphasizes. The begetting of children is the fruit of the union of the couple and the expression of their participation in the creative work of God. With the production of children man becomes creator of life, which he himself has received as a gift of God. Whereas with its prevention he interferes negatively in the creative work of God and confines himself selfishly to himself. Procreation of children becomes the natural consequence of marriage and a fundamental component of the "in the image of God" creation of man. The opposite is also true. Unwillingness to produce children denotes the absence of an important characteristic of the "in the image of God" creation, that is, lack of cooperation with the work of God. The danger of overpopulation and its consequent problems are facets of the problem that did not occupy Clement's concern or a subject that he was willing to expatiate upon.

The lifting of the distinction of sexes is a fact that for Clement represents the eschatological fulfillment of existence in God' kingdom. Life in this kingdom abolishes the differentiation of earthly beings into men and women.[60] Though the separation into sexes is a natural necessity to assure survival, it has no place in the kingdom of God where survivability of the species is no longer a necessity and the autonomous person is immortal. The distinction between the sexes does not represent an ontological distinction; it does not refer to the manner of existence God has impressed upon man. The distinction of the sexes involves differentiation of the physical activities which do not reflect the divine original (ἀρχέτυπον) as Gregory of Nyssa later said.[61] It represents only a "prognostic" of man's fall, and for this reason will be swept away at the end of time. In the main, Clement seems to follow a moderate and understanding course towards sexual relations and does not give the impression of an extremist as several of his contemporaries often did. Clement's position on sexual relations is the official position the Church followed over her long history down to our times. The natural contraception of the rhythm method is a rather modern attempt at tackling a thorny problem.

In his explanation of the institution of marriage Clement follows closely the apologists Justin and Athenagoras, who held that the conjugal relations of the Christians are exclusively connected with procreation.[62] This attitude toward marriage has been articulated owing to the attacks by the pagans, especially because of the promiscuity of some of the Christian groups. Though this consideration might have been one reason for Clement's emphasis on procreation, it does not explain fully his motivations. Stoicism seems to have another serious influence in shaping his ideas regarding marriage.[63] Whatever these influences might have been Clement goes beyond them. Marriage ceases to act simply as procreational devise; it is perceived, at the end, as a spiritual relationship of persons which has received its existential hypostasis through the partners' participation in a spiritual communion whose purpose is the attainment of God.

Clement's view of marriage has influenced the ideas of the later Church immensely, though some of the later Fathers differentiated their position from that of Clement's.[64] By the end of the fourth century the Gnostics and their ideas were not as strongly felt and the reaction they had earlier triggered seem to have abated. Consequently, the issue of marriage could be seen more objectively. John Chrysostome, for example, maintains

[60] Matt. 22.30; Mark 12.25; Luk. 20.34-35.

[61] Gregory of Nyssa, *Peri Kataskeuês tou* Anthrôpou, PG 44, 184 D-185 A

[62] Athenagoras, *Embassy for Christians*, 33; Justin, Apol. 1.29.1.

[63] M. Spanneut, *Le Stoicism des Pères de l' Eglise de Clément d' Alexandrie* (Paris, 1957) 166 ff; George Mantzarides, *Christianikê Ethikê* (Thessalonika, 1991) 302.

[64] John Chrysostome, *On Virginity* 19, PG 48, 457.

that marriage was given to man for the production of children as well as for the purpose of quenching man's sexual drives. In support of this view he quotes Paul, who implies that marriage protects man from promiscuity.[65] This theory shifts the emphasis away from the need of procreation which loses is overriding significance.(I Cor. 7.2). Chrysostome recognizes that in the beginning of time procreation was very important, but that after the growth of the population this factor became less significant.[66] This added factor should not be so interpreted as to mean that marriage was no more than a refuge for the avoidance of fornication. On the contrary, Chrysostome would agree with Clement that the Christian marriage must progress continuously from the physical element to the spiritual. This progression is possible only within the framework of the spiritual improvement of the couple. The transformation of marriage is only possible through a life in Christ. If such a transformation does not occur then the members of this union are lacking the most important ingredient of marriage, spiritual depth. Spiritual depth means that both members are called upon to free themselves from everything that holds them tied to the world and to direct themselves towards the kingdom of God. Only then does marriage become a symbol or microcosm of the kingdom of God. This orientation is so important in Clement's view of marriage that he does not hesitate to place the true Christian family man higher than the person who has remained unmarried for the sake of God. This view stands in opposition to later Fathers who classified the state of virginity for the sake of God as a higher state of human perfection.[67]

[65] I Cor. 7. 2-5; Mantzarides, *Chrêstianikê Ethikê*, 303.

[66] John Chrysostome, About *Fornication*, 3, PG. 51, 213.

[67] Athanasius of Alexandria, *Letter to Amoun*, PG 26, 1175 C; Greg. Nazianzinus, PG 36, 386 B; Chrysostome, *On Virginity* 9; *Apostolic Rules*, 51; I Tim. 4.1-4.

CHAPTER FOUR

FREEDOM OF THE WILL

As with his treatment of other human concerns, Clement approached the problem of Free Will through the diverse intellectual currents of his time, sometimes by inspiration, sometimes in opposition, but always as the champion of the Christian viewpoint. Explicit in his argument are the following: 1) that God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent; 2) Evil exists; 3) God is not responsible for the introduction of evil into this world but once introduced He would not prevent it because by doing so He would limit man's freedom. Clement's argument contends that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good being is not inconsistent with the existence of evil in the world, and that it is not wrong for a moral agent to permit evil that he could prevent, since there are morally sufficient justifications for its existence. Once again, the dominant systems of thought that affected Clement's argument are Greek philosophy, the Gnostic ideas, and the Judeo-Christian beliefs. This interlocking of views makes Clement's analysis of man's freedom difficult as well as interesting. This analysis becomes even more complex as it touches upon other subjects among which the most essential are the terminology Clement uses to express the concept of man's Freedom of the Will, αὐτεξούσιον, προαίρεσις, ἑκών, ἄκων, ἐλευθερία, ἐφ' ἡμῖν, to mention only the most common. Clement's intertwining of freedom and human passion, such as fear, the role of the divine will in the manifestation of freedom, the differences in our understanding of concepts like freedom and his understanding of it become intriguing in his discussion of the freedom of the will. The obvious complexity relating to an analysis of this nature becomes even more bedeviling when he inevitably attempts to combine the various parts in a unity. For example, do the passions of man depend upon or manifest themselves with the agreement of man's free will? Is man's free will capable of controlling human passions totally, partially, or not at all? In what way does the manifestation of these passions restrict the will of man in his further actions? Allied with some of these problems are the social, intellectual, and moral values and the degree to which these values play a role in the externalization of man's free will. For instance, moral ideas, despite their central unity in the history of the Ancient Near East, display a diversity in detail from culture to culture, from nation to nation, and from one religious system to another. Bearing these facts in mind we can get a general idea of the intricacies of the problem. The same is true of the state laws and rules, the political obligations and rights, and the customs under

which people live. All of these exert an influence and play a significant role in the formation of what is morally acceptable, and affect man's moral conscience and ethical conduct.

The derivation of "ethics" from "ethos" is a clear indication of the diversity of the moral principles, since "ethos" is not a natural or spontaneous power, but the offshoot of habit which, though it resembles a natural instinct, can vary greatly from culture to culture.[1] The connection between morality and human activity connotes variability, the active variety of being and becoming not admitting procrustian solutions. Although certain basic principles might have remained in history fundamentally unalterable, in the main, customs and moral practices changed from era to era, culture to culture, and people to people. In historical cases some of these practices may even be entirely inconsistent. One could array a regiment of historical examples to illustrate this variety of values but since they are so well known to most serious students of history their enumeration becomes superfluous. This observation does not imply the much touted theory of relativism. It simply posits the danger that lurks in our tendency to assume as absolute and one dimensional what in reality is many sided and complex. Owing to these factors, careful attention should be given to the problems before we recognize a view as a stable and solid principle of moral science. The study of Clement, provides a splendid opportunity for us to revisit some of the writings of the ancient Greek philosophers and take a look at some of their values in revealing the degree of Clement's dependence on them and the extent to which he and other

[1] Aristl. Nic. Ethics, 2.1.1103a 17. Virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching, thus requiring experience and time. Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence its name ἠθική, formed by a slight variation from the word ἔθος (habit). From this it is also plain that some virtues arise in us naturally (φύσει), Met. 40.1078b 17; 1.5.1185b 38. Morality has its root in nature while ἦθος takes its name from ἔθος and is called ethics (ἠθικὴ) because of habit, Plut. Mor. *The Education of Children*, 2-3: For character (ἦθος) is habit (ἔθος) practiced for a long time, and if one were to call the virtues of habit virtues of character he would not go astray. Aristotle's designation of virtue as habit (ἕξεως) that is "praiseworthy" and "excellent", Aristl. Nic. Eth. 1.13. 1103a 9; 7.2.1139 a 16 suggests the mutability of habit. In other words, what we call virtue is under certain circumstances subject to change. Also Aristl. Nic. Eth. 7. 10. 1152a 29; H. Kron, *Ethos und Ethik. Der Pluralismus der Kulturen und das Problem des Ethischen Relativismus* (Frankfurt-Bonn, 1960) 6-7. See Il. 6.511 where ἤθεα stands for "habitat" of animals. Hesiod WD 167; fr. 204 1.104; 525; 67; 78; 137; 22; 699; Theog. 66; Sc 103. In the singular the word alludes to the relation of man to God or man's character and conduct. Hence Heracleitus: the ethos for man is his demon, Diels, fr. 119; Arrian, Anab. 5.20.4; Strabo, 1.1.18; Philo *De Mut. nom.* 10, ἠθικὴ as a noun; N. Test. ἔθος is custom, Luk. 1.9;2-42; 22.39; John 19.40; Hebr. 10.25; Acts 25.16 and 6.4 as tradition. In I Cor.15.33 Paul refers to the saying of Menander where ἤθη is used as moral manners and sets a precedent for the Christian writers, Clem. of Rome I Cor. 1.2; 21.7; Clem. of Alex. Str.1.176.1-2; 4.162.5. After Clement the Fathers will use the word in the same moral sense.

Fathers distanced themselves from earlier ideas in establishing the ethos of the new religion.[2] Such an investigation is necessarily sketchy, involving only the basic outlines as they appear in Clement's writings in connection with the topic of evil. If occasional brief anthropological observations are made the purpose is to underline their importance to the subject under discussion. A more detailed analysis would have been a distraction from the focus on freedom of the will and how this freedom relates to the existence of evil. Despite Clement's frequent differences from Greek philosophy, the overpowering continuity of his thought underscores the reconciliation effected between Greek philosophy and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Though a detailed analysis of the ideas of Stoics and Epicureans are beyond the competence of this author, a few comments as background for the understanding of the intellectual trends which prevailed during Clement's time and affected his thought will be attempted here.

The Influence of the Hellenistic Philosophy

A fleeting examination of the subject of "heimarmene" (fate) in the Stoic writings might lead to the conclusion that this Stoic theory eliminates the possibility of human freedom. Yet the Stoics themselves do not accept this conclusion since they underscore the significance of moral life. Moral life requires the existence of choice between good and evil. How can their views then about heimarmene be reconciled with the possibility of choice? In essence the Stoics attempted to adjust this contradiction so that man's freedom will be spared and heimarmene will remain strong. Inasmuch as the human soul is a part of "divine logos" who rules freely the world, the human soul is in its activities free.[3] Chrysippus tried to use his dialectic power to demonstrate that heimarmene and individual freedom can coexist.

He therefore distinguished between heirmarmene and ἀνάγκη (necessity) viewing the former as leading to a variety of mutual possibilities. Thus heimarmene predetermines under which conditions something can happen. When, for example, somebody gets sick heimarmene determines that if the relatives call upon a competent physician the patient will probably be saved. If they do not he will die. These mutually dependent possibilities Chrysippus called "syneimarmene." In several other cases when a person gets sick calling upon a physician is useless since it has already been predetermined whether the patient will survive the sickness or not. Though the existence of a set of conditions conducive to one's death or survival is recognized as important, Chrysippus added that individual activities, one may call them "external" at this point, are also significant. Within the context of these individual activities free-

[2] W. Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker* , passim, brings this point out repeatedly in his works which deal with the Fathers of the Eastern Church, and he also shows the pioneering position of Clement in Christian literature.

[3] Hüsler, FDS, 2. 771; SVF, 2. 945.

dom of the will becomes essential. The activities of the individual will in this case constitute the immediate cause, while the long range cause is that of heimarmene. The "external" conditions are important as possibilities to which the individual offers his concurrence. Herein lies the responsibility of man. His freedom manifests itself in the form of judgment by which the possibilities at his disposal can be realized. For this reason the individual's freedom is limited to the activities that stem from him and depend upon him, (ἐφ' ἡμῖν). The external conditions at our disposal trigger our bouletic activities in the same way our activity causes a cylinder to move.

Cicero, who saved for us some morsels of the thought of the Stoics, in his treatise *On Fate* claims that the ancient philosophers have taken two views. There are those who thought that all things came about by fate. This view was expressed by Democritus, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle.[4] The holders of the other view believed that there are voluntary motions of man's mind which are free from all fate. One would have expected the Stoics to stand with the first group in view of their theories regarding heimarmene. This is partially correct as Cicero admits that Chrysippus stood in the middle of these two schools. He used the example of the cylinder and the spinning top to sequester himself partially from the Stoic philosophy on fate. True, cylinder and spinning top roll and spin in a certain way in harmony with their nature, but in order to do so they need an external push. In the case of human beings the initial push or external force exerted upon them by fate slides over them fairly smoothly and without obstruction if their mind's make-up is healthy and disciplined by wisdom and training. In the opposite case, human beings allow themselves to plunge into desperation, wrong doings, and transgressions.[5] The necessity of fate (whatever is meant by it) may set in motion causes and their beginnings, but the deliberate impulse of man's mind and actions are controlled by his own individual will and intellect. Chrysippus thereby sympathized with the reasoning of the Pythagoreans who maintained that men "chose their own troubles," by which they meant that the harms they suffered lay in their own hands and that they went mostly wrong and were harmed owing to their own mentality and character.[6]

Cicero further stated that Stoic ideas of happiness as the end of life and their talk of virtue and vice presupposed the exercise of human reason and will. But this emphasis on reason and will makes these elements appear contradictory to their theory on fate. Of course, they are not the first to have fallen into such contradictions between fate and moral goodness, the quality

[4] Cicero *On Fate*, 39-43; A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, 1 C. In the comm. of vol. 2 the authors find the inclusion of Aristotle infelicitous; SVF 2.974

[5] Gellius 7.2.2-4 D, in Long and Sedley, vol. 1,

[6] Diog. Laertius and Diogenianus 7.23 E and F, Long and Sedley, vol. 1; Eus. PE 6.8.25-29; SVF 2.998.

that makes man happy. A life of moral goodness is what we all desire, or would desire if we were capable of fully grasping its benefits to ourselves and others who benefit from our virtuous actions. But all of this implies some freedom and initiative on our part. How does it square off with fatalism? Without the presupposition of freedom and initiative how else can the perfection of reason as it contributes to virtue and happiness be achieved? It follows then that the Stoics were not as committed to fatalism as it appears from first sight from some of their statements, at least not all of the Stoics.[7] Stoicism should not be confused with materialism, either. The materialistic world view explains the world as mutual dependency of mechanistic cause and effect. In contrast, the Stoics envisage the world as predesigned by the dominance and intervention of Logos. The Stoic heimarmene is identified with Divine Providence and in this respect it comes closer to the Christian ideal, though it does not clearly explain providence as Christianity does. Who or what, for example, determines the right reason and how? This is a difficult question to which there are no easy answers. Clement, on the other hand, had an easier task since the answer to this question was already provided for him by the "revealed truth" in the Old and New Testaments. While moral life in Stoic philosophy consisted in our understanding of and conforming to the universal order, whatever that order might be, in Christianity moral life is life conformable to the divine ordinances.

Epicureans

Belief in the freedom of the individual to act and be responsible for his actions was strongly expressed by Epicurus and his followers, despite their adoption of the mechanistic atomistic system, which at first sight may seem to exclude acceptance of the freedom of the will. While some things are inescapable and beyond the individual's control, there are also things that depend upon us and with which culpability and its opposite are associated.[8] Many naturally capable of achieving these things and those results fail to achieve them because of themselves. Thus the believer of the atomic make-up of nature decries the notion that all the responsibility for what happens should be placed on the atoms' behavior.[9] It is at this point that in his effort

[7] Hippolytus, Long and Sedly, 1, 1.21; SVF 2.975 claimed that Zeno and Chrysippus affirmed that everything is fated. Epictetus seems to allege the same thing about Cleanthes, 62 B. From the evidence we have what Hippolytus affirms about Chrysippus does not seem to be true; SVF 3.585.

[8] Long and Sedley, 70 G and commentary, p. 110-111; 463-67; Long and Sedley, *Epicurus*, 20 E 3 21-25; Long and Sedley, Diogenes of Oenoanda, 20 G; D. Constant, *Phronesis* 17 (1972) 269-78; Konstant, *Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1982) 60-75; T. G. Saunders, *Symbolae Osloenses* 49 (1984) 37-59; D. Sedley, "Epicurus Refutation on Determinism," in *Syzetesis. Studi sur l' epicureismo greco e latino offerti aMarcello Gigante*, 2 vols. (Naples, 1983) 11-51; P. M. Huby, *Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action* (Atlanta, 1987).

[9] Long and Sedley, 70 G and commentary pp.110-111;463-67.

to avoid the trap of Democritus' theory which seemed to preclude freedom of the will Epicurus introduces the swerving movement of atoms, for if fate is believed as the ultimate force in life, it would put an end to the value of any admonition and censure. A person is what he is and even the wicked cannot be open to blame.[10] Epicurus maintained that if the 'self" and its volitions were reducible to mere sequences of atomic motions human action would easily become mechanistic, fully explicable in terms of primary physical laws, with no additional explanatory or descriptive role left for such psychological entries as belief and volition. The reality of the self and its volition are something over and above the underlying patterns of atomic motion.[11] Epicurus therefore underlines the distinction between physical and psychological causation as critical to an understanding of human responsibility, and this is a viewpoint with which Clement will wholeheartedly agree, despite his differences with the Epicureans on other matters. The self which is responsible for human actions is, Epicurus would argue, more than a mere aggregate of atoms. Physical laws are not sufficient to determine the precise trajectory of every atom. There is a minimal degree of physical indeterminism, which he ascribed to the "swerve" motion. In the case of the mind there is also a non-physical cause, volition, which can affect the atoms of which it is a property. The mind thus has the ability to choose between alternative possibilities which the laws of physics leave open.

Epicurus found support for this view in the person of Carneades who, defending Epicurean libertarianism for his own dialectical purposes, suggested that Epicurus' view on volition was a sufficient answer to determinism. By positing the problem of determinism he becomes arguably the first philosopher to recognize the philosophical centrality of what we know as the Free Will. His strongly libertarian approach can be usefully contrasted to the somewhat stronger determinism of the Stoics. We start with a wide range of potentials (seeds) for character development. Our actual character development is not physically determined but is "up to us," as Clement would say later, perhaps even repeating the Epicurean phrase itself. There are physical influences but we can control them.[12] If on the other hand, we allowed them to have control over us our moral and critical attitudes would fall in abeyance.[13]

From this dangerously quick analysis (quick discussions of philosophically complex problems by the uninitiated are always dangerous) some things should be made clear. According to the Stoics, man's irrational desires often rise and interject their own demands, challenging the existing

[10] Diogenes of Oenoanda 32. 1.14.-3.14, Long and Sedley, vol. 1, 20 G.
[11] Long and Sedley, vol. 1, 20 B, C2, 9 and p. 109.
[12] Long and Sedley, vol. 1, 20 E (4-7) and pp. 110-111
[13] Long and Sedley, vol. 1, 20 C2, p. 103.

order. Man is expected to struggle against them using the rational and hegemonic part of his being. Thus the rational part subdues the irrational desires in submitting to the world order as established by the universal logos. By thus submitting voluntarily to the flow of the universal order, man becomes free. Living according to nature implies that man should submit to the world course, and that he should not be ruled by passions or comply with the demands of his individual life. Chrysippus even went as far as to say that evil (κακία) is necessary because without it man could not have had the concept of virtue. Evil, which Chrysippus saw as some sort of character imperfection, as the opposite of virtue, serves to illuminate the brilliancy of virtue just as defects underscore the beauty of perfection.[14]

Clement does not possess a fixed terminology for freedom of the will comparable to the Latin *liberum arbitrium*. Instead, he employs interchangeably the usual Stoic terms given above.[15] Similarly, he speaks sometimes of mind (νοῦς, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), and free will, or power (προαιρετική δύναμις), terms which stand for self-determination, freedom of the will or choice, the αὐτεξούσιον.[16] This term we find among the early Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus. It is a word used in moral philosophy.[17] It seems to be the most important of these various terms for the expression of the idea of free will since the ecclesiastical Fathers took it over and used it extensively in their theological language. As a term expressing an element of moral activity and logical process it denotes man's will-power which is free from external influence, choosing and acting freely. Freedom of the will is thus associated closely with man's reasoning. That is the conclusion not only of Clement but generally of all Greek philosophers.

Autexousion is not found in the Old Testament or the New Testament, though as Origen said, a thousand other periphrastic expressions describe freedom of the will. In spite of its absence in these two authorities in the early years of Christianity it crept from the Stoics into the ecclesiastic writing[18].Of the early Fathers before Clement, Justin used autexousion most

[14] SVF 2. 1181; Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 1050; Plat. Laws 903- 04 Tim. 75 A-C.

[15] Str. 4.153.1-2; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 115, n.3

[16] Str. 6.134. 1-2; 135.1-2; 4.136.2.

[17] SVF II, 975; Origen, *De Princ*.3.1.5; BEP 16, 312; 328; Demetrakopoulos, *Thelesis* in ThHE, vol. 6, col. 135; Methodius Olympius, in Bonwetsch GCS 143-206 or BEP 18,93-110; Str. 6.135. 4; QDS 14,4; SVF, I, 59; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 115, ns 4 and 5. D. G. N. Bonwetsch, GCS, 143-206.

[18] Fr. Field, *Origenis Hexaplorum...*, 2 (Oxford, 1868) 674; *De Princ* .3.1.6; BEP 16, 9-11; Clement of Rome, *Disc.* 19, 15-16; 20.2;60; *Apostolic Instructions* 6, 22; Athenag.*Emb. about the Christians* 24 in BEP 4, 321. 11 ff. where instead of autexousion one encounters the rather rare term αὐθαίρετον; Theoph. *Autol.* 2.27 where autexousion is combined with ἐλεύθερον; Tatian, *To the Greeks* 15a. SVF 2. 975; Diod. 14.105.4; Tertul. *De anima* 21; CSEL 20. 334. 27; SVF 2. 990; P. Demetrakopoulos, Θέλησις, in ThHE, vol. 6, col. 135; Str. 1.83.2; 5.3.2; 5.83.1;4; 5.133.7; 5.136.4; QDS 10.1; 14; Paed.1.76.3; SC ad. loc. n. 7.

prominently. He assaulted Stoic philosophy and the Stoic teaching about heimarmene and necissity (ἀνάγκη) countering it with the theory that God made from the beginning the angelic and human species autexousion, by which he wants to stress that man has the freedom to choose[19].

Clement uses the term more often than his predecessors and more deliberately, perhaps, as a reaction to the Gnostic theories. This reaction we are able to trace by reading Origen's first chapter of *De principis*. In 1-3 of this chapter Origen explains the Christian concept of autexousion as it developed in Alexandria, particularly in Clement's writings under the influence of Greek philosophy. Origen goes on to interpret the passages of the Bible misinterpreted by the "heterodox" Gnostics who almost denied the autexousion by introducing the idea of lost nature incapable of salvation and denying condemnation[20]. Clement had already strongly objected to this distinction between the elect and non-elect maintaining that men, all men, are the work of the one existing God and all possessed the possibility of being saved[21]. In all being we distinguish two categories, the animate and the inanimate and among the animate the irrational and the rational[22]. Man alone is endowed with logical power and can use his judgment so that he will not behave as an animal does. Clement shows that man's freedom regarding choice is connected with his logical power[23]. The association between autexousion and judgment is the result of Clement's view about the logical power of the soul, the substance and focal point of man. The moral freedom of man depends on the essential power of man. This has been clearly pointed out, according to Clement, by the Greek philosophers, starting with the Pythagoreans down to the Stoics[24].

Clement derived his true inspiration from Paul where man is the icon of God, where the icon of God refers to the logos or mind of man[25]. Thus Clement makes the association between the "Logos of God" and the logos of man, a concept which was first developed by the Greek philosophy and

[19] Justin, *Apol.* 2.3 and 4-7; *On the Resurrection* 1; BEP 3.204.3 ff.; *Apol.* I, 283; *Dialogue to Trypho* 102.4 ff.; BEP 3.303. 28 ff. *About Monarchy*. 6; BEP 4.50.3.

[20] Paed. 1.76.3; SC ad loc. n. 7; Origen, *De Princ.* 3.1-8; BEP 16. 316. 10-13; Meth. Olymp. work on the autexousion was equally critical of the Gnostic ideas of election and non-election, Bonthwetsch, *GCS*, 143-206; T. Boreas, *Ethikê* (Athens, 1959) 204, n. 2; PAA 23 (1948) 220, n. 2; P. Demetrakopoulos, ThHE, vol. 6, col. 138 defines autexousion as absolute freedom of the will within the context of human possibilities. Th. S. Nicolaou, *E Eleuyeria tês Boulêseôs kai ta Pathê tês Psychês* (Thessalonica, 1981) 14; Boreas, *Ethikê*, 202; H. Groos, *Willensfreheit oder Schicksal*? (Munich, 1939) 11.

[21] Str. 7.81.2-4; 85.3.

[22] Str. 2.111.1-2; Philo, Sacr. *Laws Alleg.* 2.7; SVF 714 and 715; Origen, *De Princ.* 3.1.2; BeP 16, 312.14 ff.; *About Prayer*, 6.1; BEP 10, 242. 36. ff..

[23] Str. 5.3.2; Paed. 1

[24] Str. 5.89.1-7; Philo, *De Fuga et Invent.* 13 (65).

[25] I Cor. 15.49; Col. 3.15; I Cor. 11.7.

was further elaborated and refined by Philo and by the Christian Fathers. Other writers after Clement would follow in his steps and would further expand and defend the concept of image and freedom so important in the history of Christianity[26]. The close relationship between reason and autexousion is to be seen in the definition left to us by Maximus the Confessor, according to whom it is an activity of the mind, not mind itself but a mind movement. This mind movement should not be dictated to by an outside agent if it is indeed to be self-moving, in accordance with nature. Like Clement, Maximus stressed that there is no one without the autexousion power because without it there would be no propelling power to forward man's likeness to God. The chief role of this power is to choose the God of salvation Who constitutes the correction and therapy of the natural man, so that man will partake in the divine glory.

The natural endowment of man with the an autexousios mind which can use its power to make choices is a topic of extreme interest to Clement. This momentous idea about the autonomy of the mind is clearly expressed perhaps for the first time by a Christian philosopher.[27] As he does very often, Clement supports the theory of mind's autonomy with evidence from Greek philosophy and the best example is Plato's statement in the Republic where Plato points to the self-determination of man's mental faculties.[28]

Plato deals with the question of free will and predestination in the

[26] John Damascene in B. Kotter (ed), *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskus* 2(Berlin, 1969-) 76; Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.63; BEP 10, 108, 5 ff. and 15.133; Meth. Olymp. *Aglaophon or on the Resur.* 2.24; BEP 18, 166.17; Greg. Nanz. *Disc.* 45. 7; PG 36. 632; Max. the Conf. *Epist.* 6.5; PG. 91. 429 B; P. Nella, in *Kleronomia* 2 (1970) 297, n. 1.

[27] Clem. fr 40,where he explains that θέλησίς ἐστι φυσικὴ αὐτοκράτορος νοῦ αὐτεξούσιος κίνησις ἥ νοῦς περί τι αὐθαίρετως κινούμενος. αὐτεξουσιότης ἐστὶ νοῦς κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενος ἥ νοερὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις αὐτοκρατὴς. See also Max. the Confessor, E Minge, P 2, 91; SVF 3. 4; Diog. Laert. 7.87, where the Stoic phrase "according to nature" expresses the idea of freedom of action, SVF 2. 5; Str. 5.95.1; Philo, *De Plantatione* 12 (49); Str. 2. 101.1; Max. the Conf. PG 91, 276 C; 277 C; See also 96.996 B; *Johannes von Dam.* in Kotter, 2, 139-40; PG 95, 161 A. Clement refers to Plato indirectly in 5. 136.4; *Bacchylides*, LCL, *Lyra Graeca,* vol. 3, ll.50-56 who makes men, not Zeus, responsible for their actions; Eur. fr. 913; Origen's Book 3, ch.1 carries the title *About the Autexousion* in BEP 16, 312-328; QDS 14.4; 10. 1; Str. 7. 15.2 . 6.166.1-3; fr .37; 39 God's substance can only be an object of faith. Clement distinguished between the substance and the activity (ἐνέργεια) of God to be learned through His works and power (δύναμις), Protr. 104.3; Stählin, fr. 228; Str. 7. 8.1-3; Heracl. fr. 17. Those who consider God a teacher barely approach the concept of God, Str. 6.165.5-166.3 (he may allude to Plat. Laws 897B here); Str. 6. 150.6-7; 2. 5.4: πόρρῳ μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν...ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ δυνάμει. According to W. Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965) p. 60 Clement's title *Paedagogos* is due to Plato; R Witt, *Class. Quart.* 25 (1931) 195-204; Str. 2. 6.1-2; Plat. Phaed. 79 A; Philo, *De Post. Caini* 14. Michael Mueller, "Freiheit über Autonomie und Gnade von Paulus bis Klemens von Alexandrien" in ZNTW, 25 (1926) 218; Ch. Briggs, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (Amsterdam, 1968) 79 ff.

[28] Str. 5.136.4-5; 5.3.1; 5.14.2; 5. 23.2; Justin, *Apol.* 1, 44.8; BEP 3. 184. 31 ff. Human reason is incapable to grasp and express the substance of God, Str.

form of a myth. According to it, every soul before it enters its early existence chooses by lot its life on earth. Each soul is responsible for its choice; God is free of guilt. Plato thus denies Sophocles' view that some divine urge drives human will to evil acts (Phil. 1039). With this conviction about freedom of the will is associated Plato's belief about the distribution of responsibility, a constant theme in his dialogues. Accordingly, the doer of evil is punished after death by being degraded into a lower form of existence as payment of his due. In contrast, the good is rewarded by coming closer to his final redemption. Man is naturally free because he has been made by a good and wise creator; consequently, his soul does not have in it the root of evil. It is the body which is responsible for evil because, owing to its substance it is evil, in contrast to the soul which on account of its divine origin desires always the good, since the *summum bonum* is deity itself, with which man has spiritual relation. Yet since God created man's body from which evil proceeds could he be free from responsibility for evil? Plato's faith in God's kindness was so deeply entrenched that Plato sought to overcome all doubt by insisting on the goodness of the divine. Both in the Phaedrus (245 A ff.) and the Timaeus (30 E), he rejects the possible guilt of God. In the first dialogue he ascribes it to the inability of the driver of the chariot of the soul, while in the second he attributes the flaw of man's corporeality to some fateful law. God created man as best as he could, without being able to change completely matter's nature. The difficulty notwithstanding, God destined man to overcome the body's heavy obstacles (Tim. 42 B). When Plato perceives matter as the source of evil, he wants to attribute responsibility to it and not to the creator, who made everything to be good.

This is a weakness in Plato's philosophy that restricts the allmightiness of God and leads to the ancient belief in dualism. The force of evil and goodness fight between them for predominance. To avoid man's destruction by the evil force God intervenes constantly.[29] This is Plato's way out of the impasse which his theory led him. Man's most urgent duty is to become God's assistant in the struggle for the good. We are therefore responsible for our deeds from which one day we shall give account. Becoming God's partners in this struggle denotes moral perfection which is likeness to God (Theaet. 174 B-C). In this case, we can even ascribe to the power of evil a purpose since our struggle against it brings us closer to our "τέλος," that is, likeness to God. Good needs an opposite; evil exists to

[29] Plat. Laws 10.896 E; Rep. 272 D ff.

awaken in us love for good.[30]

Like Plato, Clement believes that free choice belongs to man and that the responsibility for his actions is his, since he was made free. God is free of blame. Clement's emphasis on voluntary action makes it clear that man's autexousion does not refer to his relation to nature and nature's activities, but to man's moral action. The emphasis on moral action is expressed by the other terms borrowed from Greek philosophy which have been mentioned above together with the autexousion. Thus the ἐφ' ἡμῖν indicates the range of man's moral freedom and coincides with the autexousion. The οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν (not depending on us) on the other hand, expresses the actions beyond our reach.[31] An essential sequitur of the action in the area of our responsibility is praise or blame[32]. This area is much wider for Clement than that of the Stoics who limited it by the introduction of heimarmene.[33] In their effort to define consent in relation to heimarmene which acts as cause, the Stoics described freedom of the will as that which is under our authority and power, some element that is connected with order and the administration of heimarmene[34]. Thus heimarmene plus man's action are the fulfillment of freedom of the will. The heimarmene constitutes the first step of action, but the completion of this action depends on our initiative which constitutes the second step. Failure or success is not only subject to heimarmene but depends also upon our caution or carelessness. Man's participation or cooperation in the work of heimarmene becomes important[35]. This combination of heimarmene and man's cooperation was an effort, according to the Christian writers, to get out of the morass in which the Stoics had placed themselves by their description of heimarmene. In contradistinction to Clement's view, man saved his freedom only by cooperating with the command of heimarmene, thereby exercising his autexousion along with necessity[36]. Autexousiotes is not arbitrary. Man cannot choose as he wishes but according to the will of God (Str. 5.83.1). Clement will expatiate further on this idea, but before he does he again delves into a philosophical discussion of the concept of freedom.

[30] Plat. Theaet. 176 E-177 A. The Stoics believed that the world was providentially organized to be the best possible world. Here they faced difficulties akin to Plato and to those of the Christian Fathers who sought to solve the problem of evil with the use of the original sin argument. The Stoics therefore affirmed that vice is compatible with cosmic order, since without it its opposite could not exist, Long and Sedley, vol. 1, see comm. P. 386. They otherwise agreed that vice was negation of virtue and that the foundation of vice was ignorance or error in value judgment. In line with Socrates they believed that vicious men hurt themselves, Plat. Prot. 352 C; 509 E; Tim. 86 B.

[31] Str. 5.7.2-3; Kotter, *Johannes von. Damascus*, 2. 90.

[32] Str. 4. 153.1- 2; 2.11.1; 7.21.3.

[33] Hüsler, 437; SVF 2. 1002; 1003; 1004.

[34] Hüsler, 363; SVF 2. 115, *quae est in nostra potestate sita.*

[35] SVF 2. 998; Eus. PE 6.265.

[36] SVF 2. 975; Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, 5.10.

Freedom of the will for Clement implies man's moral freedom unrestrained by necessity, resulting in his autonomous and autexousios existence. Man's way of life depends upon himself, as Clement clearly states in the passage of Str. 6. 135. 1. Man's life depends on this leading faculty (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν τῆς ψυχῆς) because in it are to be found the various logical powers of man, such as learning, knowledge, will (βούλησις-προαίρεσις) among which the will is the primary power[37]. The bouletic part is the leading part of logos, the center of man's essence, the first and chief power which Clement defines as the concrete externalization of βούλεσθαι or θέλειν.[38] The power of wanting exists in every man and manifests itself regardless of his ability to do what he wants. Doing what one wants is an active matter. Clement therefore does not hesitate to paraphrase the evangelical "want and you will be able."[39] Needless to say, Clement does not perceive man's bouletic power as unlimited. Inability to achieve something may be due simply to our limited nature, as when we may wish to fly but our nature does not permit us to do so. Clement is here concerned with what is among our possibilities (ἐφ' ἡμῖν), especially in the field of moral action. Our activities are not judged simply by their results but also by our intent and choice[40]. Our intent is not identical with the autexousion but an expression of it.[41]

Intent (προαίρεσις), a characteristic term of the Aristotelian ethics is for Clement a preference for or choice of either good or evil (Str. 1.84.2). Clement differs from Aristotle in that for Aristotle προαίρεσις is the right choice whereas for Clement it is simply a choice.[42] Already, before Clement, Justin had spoken about προαίρεσις as action which separated man from the trees and animals enabling man to make a choice between good and evil[43]. Generally speaking the expansion of the meaning of the term is in agreement with Christian teaching about man as an autexousios being. Man's freedom is abolished when his possibilities do not include his right to choose evil or good, (QDS 27.1-28.4). But one should not misunderstand the consequence of choice. This consequence is only understood if it is pre-

[37] Theodore Nicolaou, *Philosophia* 7 (1977) 393-94, n. 38.

[38] Str. 2. 77. 5. It is obvious that at this point Clement once again follows closely Greek philosophical ideas, especially those of the Stoics, SVF 1. 56-59; Diog. Laert. 7.49-

[39] Str. 2. 77. 5 θέλε ...καὶ δυνήσῃ, he is either paraphrasing or he has in front of him a different version of John's Gospel) ; John 5.6; Str. 1.35.2.

[40] Str. 2. 34.1 -35.6; 4.26. 3; 30. 3.

[41] Str. 2.70.2; W.E.G. Floyd, *Clement of Alexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil* (Oxford, 1971) 29.

[42] Nic. Eth. 3. 4. 1112a 17; K. Despotopoulos, *Festschrift in Honor of G.S. Meridakis*, vol. 2 (Athens, 1963) 63-91.

[43] *Apol.* 2.43. 3-4; 8; BEP 3. 183, 36 ff.; and 284. 8; BEP 4, 78. 22-39; 126; 133. 40-41; Clement of Rome 1.17; BEP *Disc.* 1.64.18 ff.; Disc. 11. 161.10; *Disc.* 19. 216. 17; 37-38.

ceded by free choice. That is why freedom viewed by the Stoics as a mere appendix to heimarmene, with man's limited possibility of choice, is only the shadow of freedom, not the reality.

Man is called upon every minute in his life to choose. Every choice is a step toward freedom or subjection. The wrong choice leads him away from God and His will; right choice is a step toward freedom and life. Clement emphasizes the side of freedom which means to him right choice, because it implies victory over destructive powers. He views man's true freedom as victory over passions, while the opposite, the falling into passions, as the ultimate form of slavery (Str. 2.118.6). Dominance over passions means intentional avoidance of those powers that lead us to the absence of freedom and into slavery. Avoidance of passions signals turning to the opposite direction, that is, to freedom[44].

At first sight there seems to be a close similarity between the Stoic and Christian freedom, since both are concerned with internal freedom. As Christian freedom is not dependent on external circumstances or on what we call the civil rights enjoyed by man in Western societies, so in Epictetus freedom is not dependent on outside concession and kindness. A slave can be in essence free while a free man can be really a slave. Yet there remains a basic difference between Stoicism and Christianity. In Stoicism this internal freedom is won with the power of logos -reason- itself and the self-emanating will of man. In other words, this internal freedom is the result of man's moral practice. In Christianity the moral force springing from man is not sufficient. The gift of God is also required. There is another pronounced difference. In Stoicism man is free even when events beyond his control or somebody else has authority over him, as Epictetus maintained. In contrast, the Christian man is a servant even when he has civil freedom, if he has not allowed Christ to have authority over him. In Stoicism the ideal is reconciliation with one's self; in Christianity freedom means transcendence of one's self, giving one's self to God and one's fellow man, thus releasing himself from all sorts of license and boasting. In Stoicism, freedom is the achievement of imperturbability and inner peace (αὐτάρκεια). In Christianity freedom has no relation to the autarky of Stoic imperturbability; it is conceived as tantamount to unlimited love. The Christian does not want to live for himself as the Stoic did. He does not wish to be autarkic. He needs and wants the divine grace and help. The Stoic does not know the meaning of divine grace and help since in the struggle of life he is dependent on his own powers. The Stoic god remains a stranger to the constant struggle of man. He points out only the purpose or end, while not helping in the achievement of this purpose. So for the ancient philosopher freedom may mean absolute rule over his entire life achieved through constant struggle and through learning and knowledge inaccessible to the common man. For the Christian freedom is the dom-

[44] Str. 3. 41. 2; 42. 6; I John 3.3. Paed. 3.1.1.

ination over him of God and His spirit, proving the wise unwise and the unwise wise. The Christian peace and joy as the fruit of the spirit have no relation to the Stoic imperturbability and autarky.

Christ offers man the true freedom. Christian life is the road to true liberty (Gal. 5.13). For man to win this liberty he must become a servant of God . To be subject to God for the Christian means to be free of that sin and death which constitute the presupposition for the Christian's true freedom (Rom 6.22).With his subjection to God man finds again his real nature and the road to the attainment of the image and likeness of God, i. e. his deification. Unfortunately, man often misunderstands the true meaning of freedom and confines himself to its superficial observation, which is the fulfillment of his desires. He mistakenly believes that he is free only when he can satisfy his desires. Beyond this superficial freedom there is the deeper freedom when man desires what he must and what is the real good. The accomplishment of this type of freedom presupposes the removal of the dichotomy which entered the human realm with sin and death. This freedom begins with the incorporation of man into the body of Christ and his freedom from corruption and death. The true Christian gets his freedom from Christ Who is the liberator of men. Simultaneously, the Christian is the collaborator of freedom thus won. His active participation in freedom is accomplished by the translation of the gift of God's grace into a way of life. Man's moral perfection is in reality his perfection in freedom. The stages of moral perfection are stages of perfection in true freedom. Christ identifies the liberation of man with the knowledge of truth (John 8.32). This knowledge of the truth coinheres with true freedom and is manifested chiefly as freedom of choice between evil and good. Yet absolute freedom is not even the one bound by this choice but goes beyond this distinction. Absolute freedom is in God Who stands above this distinction between good and evil and the necessity of choice. Man acquires absolute freedom when he frees himself from this necessity of choice in the world and unites himself with God.

The Gnostics assigned faith to simple people like the Christians, while they arrogated to themselves the special knowledge (γνῶσις) to which they ascribed their superior excellence. By drawing a distinction among spiritual, psychic, and the physical part of man, they argued that this knowledge was different from faith as the spiritual part was superior to the psychic (Str. 2.10.1-2). Basilides, for instance, preached that one knew God by nature. Consequently, faith was not a rational assent of the soul as it exercised free will but a "supereminent beauty." If this theory is true, Clement argues, then according to Basilides' rationale the precepts of the Old and New Testament would be superfluous if one is saved by nature as a believer and isone of the elect by nature. Clearly, Clement rejects this theory which makes man a sort of mechanistic appendage to some universal power, leaving no room for repentance of sin by him who was once an unbeliever. In this Gnostic context baptism and the blessed seal are not

rational Christian practices[45]. Nature, according to Basilides, would have been able at one time or another to have shone forth, apart from the Savior's appearance, rendering the Savior's incarnation unnecessary. As Basilides, and those who argued with him maintained, the theory of salvation of the elect by instruction and purification and good works is superfluous. Clement evidently thinks that the Gnostic explanation destroys from top to bottom Christianity and the essence of the Bible. The pretense of Gnosticism to be a religion of salvation becomes therefore absurd (Str. 5.3.2-3).

Like Basilides, so Valentinus in a letter to a group of individuals expounded that there was only one good being, which he equated with God and which manifested Himself through the Son. It was through the Son that the heart became pure by the expulsion of every evil spirit. The many spirits that dwelt in the heart did not permit it to be pure, with each one of them performing its own work, insulting the heart with unworthy desires. For Valentinus the heart's suffering was analogous to the inn which had holes and ruts or was filled with dung. So the heart became the dirty hearth of many evil spirits. But when the only Good Father visited it, then it became sanctified and gleamed with light. He who possessed a pure heart was blessed with the prospect of seeing God. Valentinus' doctrine assigns an important role to the Son, but he held that although souls are inherently unworthy those who are saved are saved from the beginning because of their affinity to God, a doctrine similar to the Calvinist doctrine of the predestined elect. In this doctrine as preached by Valentinus the element of repentance was not as essential as it was among the Christians. Clement consequently rejected this Valentinian view and insisted that only repentance which stems from a change owing to obedience or persuasion rather than to nature can be an instrument of salvation. Accordingly, Clement emphasized the importance of the independence and freedom of the will for the salvation of man. One should want to believe in order to be saved. Salvation is a voluntary act, not involuntary, as the Gnostics would have it. Man would be judged for what he could do, for his voluntary acts,

[45] By the blessed seal he means baptism. The formula was current in the 2nd and 3rd centuries. We meet it in Hermas (Sim. 8.6; 9.16-17); in *The Epistle of Clement* 7.6; 8.6; in Irenaeus, *Dem.* 3; Tertul. *On baptism* 13, *obsignatio baptism.* 35, p.84; *On Penitence* 5; *On the Prescr.* 36; Str. 5.11. 73; QDS 39-42; GCS II, p. 375; III, p. 185; 188; F.J. Dölger, *Sphragis* (Paderborn, 1911) 76; F. M. Sagnard, *Clement d' Alexandrie, Extracts de Theodote* SC 23 (Paris, 1948) R.F. Refoule, *Tertullian, Traeté du Baptisme* SC 35 (Paris, 1952) 49-51.

not his involuntary ones which proceed from ignorance or necessity.[46] To support his argument Clement resorts once again to historical examples to demonstrate the responsibility accruing from voluntary as opposed to involuntary acts[47].

Deliberate acts are judged as voluntary. God turned Lot's wife to a column of salt because she intentionally (ἑκουσίως) turned toward worldly wickedness, thus doing deliberately what she knew to be wrong, since she had been forewarned by God.[48] No external circumstances constrained her to do something against her will. Her contravention of God's will stemmed from her internal impulsion when external circumstances allowed her to achieve what was good, as commanded by God. On the other hand the commission of wrong by those who believe, owing to their ignorance, that they are acting rightly when they are not, may be justifiable. But no justification exists for a voluntary defiance of the known will of God. The Scripture also plainly states that the power to choose has been given by the Lord to man and that the privilege of choice in accepting faith manifests a willing spirit, which has chosen life and believed in God as revealed in his voice. And he who has believed knows the truth thereby making faith the ticket to the correct knowledge which is Christ.

Antitactae and Free Will

Another source from which some of Clement's ideas regarding freedom of the will can be culled is his polemic against the heretical group which went by the name Antitactae. It seems that like the Gnostics Antitactae was a collective name for a variety of splinter Christian groups. Clement examined the ideas of only two groups among them: the licentious and the ascetics. His analysis of them is brief and at times obscure. According to Clement some of them preached a way of life which made no distinction between right and wrong, while others defended asceticism only out of a

[46] Str. 2.114. 3-6; 2.115.1-2. For Valentinus, the pneumatic soul as connatural to God has fallen in the psychic and material world in which it was totally estranged. Through the care of the Good Father, it is saved because of its connaturality and not by a personal conversion. Clement proclaims the free will and responsibility of man, G. Quispel, *Eranos Jahrbuch*, 259-62. Aristl. Nic. Eth. 3.2. p. 1110b 17. Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary. For the person who has done something owing to ignorance and has thus not acted voluntarily, see also 1111a; Plat. Laws 863 B ff.. As well as Irenaeus, *Ad Hear.* 4, 37.1-2, Clement shows that to deny freedom of the will as the Gnostics did, is to render futile the context of punishment and rewards, Str. 1.17; 83; 84; S.G. p. 110 2. 16. 75.

[47] He adverts to the case of Cleomenes and Athamas who acted at one point without their full senses (Hdt. 6.75; Ovid, Metam. 4.516) and the case of Aeschylus who, charged with an act of impiety for divulging the practices of the Eleusinian mysteries on stage, was tried by the Areopagus and was found innocent on his showing he had not been initiated and did not know the mysteries, Str. 2.60.1-4.

[48] Str. 2.61. 2-4; Gen. 19.26; Philo, *De Sumno* 1, 247.

spirit of irreligiousness and quarrelsomeness[49]. In his answer to the first group, who evidently emphasized some sort of freedom in life while criticizing Christian self-discipline, Clement pointed out that if it was legitimate to choose any way of life, then it was legitimate to choose the way of life that involved asceticism.

Like some of the Gnostics, the Antitactae apparently preached the imperviousness of the "elect" to the dangers of life; consequently, they granted the privilege to the "elect" to live as they pleased. Clement answers that if it is possible for someone to choose any way of life he wishes, then it is imperative to choose the way that involves spiritual asceticism. If there is no way of life that carries danger for the elect, as the Antitactae maintained, then clearly this is particularly true of the life of virtuous self-discipline[50]. The Antitactaa further asserted that the Lord of the Sabbath had been granted freedom from accountability even for a life of licentiousness. In that case, Clement retorted, the person whose social life is orderly will be even freer from accountability[51]. A person should use his given right of choice to live a virtuous life, and only if he did so would he be worthy of praise.

The ulterior purpose of the Antitactic philosophy of freedom for the "elect" seems to have been their desire to rid man of fear of punishment for things he did. Clement responded to this with the counterargument that if the one who chooses to ignore fear is free so is the one who chooses discipline; moreover, the one who chooses discipline is in a better state because he will never have an occasion for fear. For Clement the person who drifts into pleasure is merely gratifying his body, while the ascetic has freed his soul from passions, giving the soul authority over the body. If we are summoned to freedom we are not, the apostle stresses, to use that freedom as an invitation to things pertaining to our lower self[52]. Obviously, Clement is not willing to grant full rein to human beings in the exercise of their freedom, as some of the Gnostics and the Antitactae proposed. For Clement Christian life and free rein for human behavior were incompatible. If he wisely did not underline the importance of a code of ethics at this point, he was not, on the other hand, willing to allow what he and society in general understood as a reprehensible manner of life to be a matter of moral indifference. In this he would have received the support of Socrates and many other Greek philosophers, though they looked at human conduct from a slightly different angle. For Clement the Antitactic view stood in danger of leading to confusion, namely to the possibility of a life of unbridled serv-

[49] Ferguson, ad Str. 3.40.1, n. 142.

[50] Ferguson, ad Str. 1.40.3, n. 143.

[51] Str. 1.40.4-5; I Cor. 6.12; 10.23; Str. 3.40.4; Ferguson ad loc.; Matt. 12.8; Mark 2.18; Luk. 6.5

[52] Str. 3.41.2-3; Gal. 5.13.

itude to man's least flattering desires and morally irresponsible acts (Str.3.41.4-5). Lustful sin, he says, is nurtured and vitalized if men minister to its enjoyment; it fades away if it is kept in check (Str.3.41.6). Clement constantly recurs to his Platonic view that the sources of evil action impinging on our freedom are ignorance and weakness, and that both depend on us inasmuch as we will not learn or restrain ourselves[53]. Our ignorance is due to our defective knowledge that prevents us from judging correctly, while weakness impairs our right judgment. The antidote to the first is the acquisition of knowledge from the testimony of the Scriptures; for the second, training according to the Word, which is regulated by the discipline of faith and fear. Knowledge frees (ἀφαιρεῖται) the soul of passions, a statement which corresponds to the Socratic notion that the truly wise man cannot engage in wrong doing.[54] The free will in us is aroused by wisdom and wisdom leads to faith in Christ. Not death, not life, not evil angels, not powers such as Satan, not things present, not height, not depth, not any other creature can oppose the faith of him who acts according to free choice (προαιρουμένου).[55]

[53] Str. 2.62.2-4; 7.16.2; 7.101.6.

[54] Paed. 1.6.2; Democr. fr. 31 in Diels no doubt known to Clement from a Stoic source. He repeats it in Str. 7.3.1 without reference to Democritus this time. See SC ad Paed. 6.2; J. Stelzenberger, *Die Beziehungen* 220, n. 117.

[55] Str. 5.83. 1-4; Plat. Meno 99E. The text of Plato forces us to drop the negative given by one of the MS, L (Laurentianus). It is not impossible, however, that Clement has modified the passage of Meno οὐκ ἄνευ νοῦ το οὐ χάριτος ἄνευ to obtain a symmetrical formula. Clement's metaphor ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα (Str. 5.83.1) was popular since at least Plato's time (Crat. 1.413A) and indicated an excessive requirement. The phrase had become proverbial, Zenobius 6.23 (*Paroem. Gr.* 1. 168) L. Früchtel, *Nachträge*, 535; A. Decker, *Kenntnis und Pflege des Körpers bei Clement Alexandrinus* (Innsbruck,1936) 46, n. 47. The themes in Phaedrus appear at the end of this phrase (πτεροῦται see 246 E; 255 C-D; τὸ βρῖθον, 247 B) to evoke the action of grace, as that of eros, in the same Christian sense as in Str. 4.145.2; Str. 4.96.1; 5.3.2; 2.9.2; 3.11.1-2; 4.12.2; 5.23. 5; 6.26.1; 27. 1-2; 31.3; 9.45.1. Clement insists on faith as the voluntary assent of the soul; hence the foundation of moral conduct. Faith as much as προαίρεσις is the beginning of action, Camelot, *Foi et gnose*, 31 and 51. The use by Clement of δικαιοπραγία (Str. 5.86.1) in connection with faith reminds us of Aristotle in Nic. Eth. 1133 b 30 where it is present as the mean of committing an injustice or being done one. It is a definition which implies that justice both admits excess and comprises in itself the two extremes, in contrast to vices. Aristotle specifies in 1134a 1-6 what he understands by justice (δικαιοσύνη). Clement does not enter into details at this point. His reference is simply an allusion to a prestigious construction among the Greeks in the matter of ethics. For Clement the word serves to introduce what follows, and he also uses the word to make it an emblem of virtuous action. The brightness of glory on Moses' face (Ex. 34.29) is a reflection of δικαιοπραγία (Str. 6.104.1; 4.117. 1). It is associated with gnosis which is never separate from the practice of justice (Str. 2.47.4). One becomes gnostic (the state of perfection for the Christian) by the practice of justice when the spirit of light comes to him (Str. 4.107.6). In the passage under discussion the coherence of the thought is emphasized by the picture of a foundation stone (θεμέλιος): faith is the foundation of the activity conforming to justice, as it is the foundation of the way to superior knowledge (Str.5.2.5).

All of this, however, subsumes freedom (*autexousion*) of the individual. God will help but the final choice depends on the individual who is a free agent. God impels but does not compel, for compulsion is repulsive to God[56]. Volition takes precedence of all other faculties for the intellectual powers are ministers to volition. Intelligence is thereby placed at the service of the will, a remarkable admission by Clement which allows us to gauge his emphasis on intellectualism[57]. It is in man's power to choose what is right or what is wrong and choosing the wrong is for Clement tantamount to committing injustice.[58] The universal law from the very beginning was that the attainment of virtue which makes man good should be an object of voluntary choice. For this reason the universal law has allowed man to consort with virtue or vice, whatever the object of his choice is. The human soul is endowed with the free choice of knowledge which is in its power to pursue or reject.[59] But salvation means conformity to God's commandments. Clement sees no conflict here since man is free, like Hercules in the Greek legend, to make a choice between the good and evil path.[60] The requisite of right choice is faith which, as Clement understands it, produces that combination of knowledge and courage conducive to reaching of the correct decision. As he has pointed out repeatedly, knowledge is the offshoot of faith in the true God. Here, however, Clement grasps the chance to praise the contributions of Greek philosophy, which he often has maligned, to the formulation of man's knowledge.

Philosophy was not sent by the Lord in the way the prophets were but possibly came stolen by a thief and then given to the world. This thief might have been some power or some angel who learned about it, either

[56] QDS 10.1; Str. 7.6.3; 7.9.4; Plat. Rep. 10, 620 D-E: the fulfiller of his choice. Stählin ad loc. points to the similarity between Str. 7.6.3 and Hebr. 6.18.

[57] Str. 2.77.5 Clement refers to the Bible as saying that where there is a will there is a way, though it is not known where this quote is to be found. The editors of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Alexander Roberts, James Donalson, and A. C. Coxe in the Eerdman series surmise that it refers to the words of Christ, Mark 1.40; see also SC ad. loc. n.3.

[58] Str. 2.62.4; 63.1; Aristl. Eud. Eth. 1223a 23 where Aristotle defines the voluntary and involuntary, the purposive choice, and the three divisions and subdivisions of what he meant by voluntary. Also Nic. Eth. 1135-38; Rhet.1374b 5-10. Clement reemphasizes this idea of man's freedom of action again and again, Str. 2.26.3; SC ad loc.; Paed. 1.69.1 which also refers to Plat. Rep. 10, 617 E. In Str. 2.63.1 Clement refers to Eur. *Chrysippe* fr. 840 where Laius admits, λέληθέν δέ με οὐθὲν τῶνδε ὧν σὺ νουθετεῖς γνώμην δ' ἔχοντά γε ἡ φύσις βιάζεται with a similar idea in *Medea* 1078.

[59] Str.7.9.4; 10.1; 12.4; I Cor. 7.21; Rom. 5.13. ff.; 2.14.ff.; I Tim. 1.9.

[60] Str.7.20.8; 1.51.3; Gorgias, fr. 8 in Diels. In a way Clement's interpretation of the validity of philosophy brings to mind the myth of the Promethean fire. Clement here presents several sides of a story. He tells that some believe that philosophy was given the Greeks by someone, while there were those who believed that Greek philosophy apprehended the truth only partially, while still others believed that certain powers descending from heaven inspired men with Greek philosophy. Behind this explanation lurks Clement's conviction that Greek philosophy is a good training for the comprehension of truth, Str. 1.80.5-6.

wholly or a portion of it, and did not keep it for himself, but imparted it to men teaching and inspiring them with it. The Lord, who knows the outcome of the future from before the foundations of the world, knew about this act of transmission and did not stop it, since it brought some profit at that time, although the thief hardly had the advantage of man in mind. It was Providence that directed the result of this daring act to man's advantage.[61]

Irrespective of the final outcome of the theft God does not bear responsibility for not stopping it, though He knew that it was done in violation of His will. Clement generally adheres here to the view that responsibility lies in an action. Failure to prevent is no part of an action, aswas argued above. Clement's effort to exonerate God leads him to a skimpy syllogism; for if intention and actualization are the operative factors and not failure to act, how can he conclude that failure to act on God's part, when action was needed to prevent the commission of a wrong act, leaves Him free of censure? If somebody knows that failure to act, when e.g. he could have protected a fellow man from fatal exposure to cold, would result in the individual's death, does not that make him guilty for not acting? This is an embarrassment which Clement feels deeply and will try to answer elsewhere in a different mode, despite his efforts here to answer the question by resorting to rhetorical, one might even say sophistical, syllogisms which are not totally satisfactory.

Clement's efforts to extricate God from the implications of foreknowledge, omniscience, and the existence and commission of evil in a world created by an all-good God arouse the suspicion that the opponents he castigates might not have been so illogical after all. In one respect, however, Clement was right. Since God had endowed man with absolute freedom to decide and act for himself any preventive move on God's part to avert man from doing evil would have limited man's freedom. Praise, honors, and punishment would not be justified, he said, if man did not possess the initiative of inclination or disinclination, and if good and evil were involuntary. He who does not judge justly is alone responsible for his act. So, in no respect is God responsible. Sins have their origin in our choice and desire, and a mistaken choice sometimes prevails, owing to our ignorance and lack of a cultivated mind, which we do not take pains to cultivate. Hence the responsibility is ours. It is up to us to free ourselves from ignorance and the choice of evil. Above all, it is up to us not to succumb to delusions and fantasies.[62] It is important that we want to be saved. Only then will God help.

[61] Str. 1.87.1-7; Ferguson ad loc.; John 10.8.

[62] Str. 1.87.7. Clement supports his argument with references to the Greeks, Str. 5.136.4-5; Plat. Rep. 10, 617 E; Str. 5.133.7; SC and Commentary ad loc. Also Paed. 1.69.1; Str. 1.4.1; 84.1; 2.75.3; 4.150.4; 7.12.1; 6.95.5 - 96.3.

This passage expresses clearly a doctrine which is in concord with the gospels as well as with the ideas of Philo who speaks of the cooperation between the free decision of man and the grace of God.[63] Man, according to Clement, is not an inanimate being to be saved involuntarily. Moreover, man has been given the commandments that he might be guided to whatever should be chosen or avoided. Therefore, God does not do good by necessity but rather from his free choice he benefits those who spontaneously turn to him.[64]

Doing the right thing should stem from knowledge of what is good, freedom of the will to exercise that knowledge, hatred of evil, and freedom from the fear of punishment. He who on account of the last of these considerations abstains from anything wrong is not voluntarily good but acts righteously out of fear. Fear then is another important element in man's action and in Clement's philosophy. He who abstains from wrong action only in the hope of the recompense given by God for righteous deeds is not totally a free man. As fear makes a person act justly, so reward makes another appear just. In each case good is not the outgrowth of righteous intention but of fear or self-interest, a conclusion in harmony with Platonic theory. But the person who does not wish to do anything contrary to right reason, having once made his choice of what is truly good and worthy proceeds to act accordingly.[65] Here Clement confronted at least two serious problems with the issue of fear. Before we can discuss both of these questions briefly, it would be useful to describe the definition of fear given by Clement.

Fear

Clement delineates two kinds of fear, the one which is accompanied by reverence, such as citizens show towards good rulers, children toward their parents, devout people toward God, perhaps an echo of the political conditions of the era of the Good Emperors.[66] The fear of God or of parents is also designated by the term δέος(awe).[67] The other form of fear is accompanied by hatred which slaves feel toward hard masters, "and those Jews felt who made God a master and not a Father." For Clement voluntary

[63] Str. 5.7.1.2; SC comm. ad loc.; QDS 10.1-2; 16.2; Eph. 2.5; *Proairesis* is indispensable, Clement affirms. Commenting on Matt. 19.21 "if you wish" he perceives in it the seal of free will. The choice depends upon Man as much as he is free while the gift depends on God.

[64] Str. 7.42.4; 48.7; Origen, *De Orat.* 29.15; p.390 23 ff.

[65] Str. 4.135.2-3; 143.4; 144.1.

[66] The distinction echoes Plat. Laws 1.646 E; Aristl. fr.184 in Rose, 3rd ed. It is repeated in reference to filial respect in Str. 2.53.4; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker,* p.269, n.2. There is something similar in Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* 4.13.2-4.

[67] Paed. 1.87.1; Str. 2.40.1; Clement's use of fear in the sense of *deos* or reverence is derived from the Greek Il.3.172 (αἰδοῖός τε ... δεινός τε) Plat. Prot. 358 D; Euthyd. 12 B; Hdt. 4.115; Dem. 555.15; 654. 24; Soph. Aias 1074; Arist. Ach. 581; Eccl.30.8; Thuc. 1.26.

respect differed greatly from that based on force or fear.[68] Another manifestation of the form of fear is what Clement characterizes as stupefaction (ἔκπληξις) created by a strange apparition or unexpected representation, or fear as an excessive wonderment at something we see for the first time unexpectedly.[69]

The Stoics described fear as the perturbation (ἀταραξία) of the mind and as such they considered it something evil for man. They consequently aimed at freedom from such perturbation. Another definition of fear by some heretical Christian groups which Clement quotes is that fear is an irrational perversion (ἄλογος ἔκκλησις, Str. 2.32.4). Clement does not agree with this definition, believing that whoever rejects fear distorts the Christian concept of God since he ignores the justice of God and emphasizes only His goodness. Because God is good and just He provokes corresponding emotions among his creatures, awe and fear. Fear is an ingredient of man's life and as such is necessary, as love is, for right living and salvation. Thus, Clement distinguishes between the fear felt by the just and that felt by the unjust. The fear of the just stems from God and takes the form of care and love for God; it has God as its end. The just man places God at the center of his life. For him, fear assumes the form of passionate love for God and stems from uncertainty lest he lose God's love. The fear of the just thus springs from the love of God and is love (Str. 2.53.3). This fear holds the just in constant alertness and does not allow him to distance himself from God (Str. 2.40.2). This fear is rational and leads to wisdom (Str. 2.32.4). Because of its end this type of fear is godly, distinguished from similar emotions, and called fearful respect, δέος (Str. 2.4.4; 40.1). Simple fear on the other hand, comes from the knowledge that the power of God not only benefits but also destroys. This knowledge produces "fear" among men (Ecl. Proph. 19.2). As we shall see Clement seeks to justify this stern side of the divine on the basis of God's other quality, justice. Fear of God for Clement is the necessary presupposition for man's rebirth and salvation. Nobody can truly love God if he does not first feel a fear of God. It is by the fear of God that the soul is purified and sanctified before it arrives at the stage called love (agape, I Peter 1.17-19).

While mere compliance with the specific commands of God is not rejected outright by Clement and those who follow him, it is not at the same time considered an ideal Christian state. At this stage, the Christian remains slave because he is still missing the deeper meaning of the Christian message and his awareness of the new life in Christ is still atrophied. Not fully aware as yet of the richness of God's gifts he obeys God's command to avoid punishment. He who obeys God's will and practices His commands in the hope of recompense stands on a higher spiritual level than the person

[68] Paed.1.87.2. The same meaning is in QDS 42.

[69] Str. 2.37.4. The definition borrowed from the Stoics, Chrys. SVF 3, 411; Aristl. Topics 4.5. 126b 17.

who does not obey God's commands at all. But he too has not reached the state of perfection and cannot be considered yet a true son of God but a servant. Only he who has made the love of God his way of living walks in the path of true freedom and is elevated to the category of the son of God. Virtue for him is not the means of reconciliation with God but a consequence of his living in the grace of God.

Even when one reaches the stage of love he still possesses the fear of God in a different form and with perfect love. This fear is now produced by the realization of God's grace and the danger man always runs, owing to his weaknesses, to be proved unworthy of God's invitation and love (Str. 2.40.2). Man's fear at this point of his development is not of God but the fear that he might prove unworthy of God's gift. Clement believes that not all fear is bad. Superstition is indeed perturbation of mind being the fear of demons that subject the mind to the excitement of passions. On the other hand, fear of God is not perturbation. For according to Clement it is not fear of God but falling away from God that terrifies, and he who fears falling from God into evil, fears that evil (Str. 2.40.1-2). True fear of God resembled what the Stoics called piety (εὐλάβεια), and was a positive state.

Aside from the Stoic concept of fear as harmful perturbation with which the Gnostic also agreed, some of the latter opposed the use of fear as pedagogical devise. The vagaries of the Gnostic theories worried Clement so deeply that he tried to dispel their "inventions and chirping," (Str. 2.36.1). When Basilides interpreted the biblical phrase "the beginning of wisdom is the fear of God" (Prov. 1.7), so as to claim that this God was not the true God but the Prince of the evil angels and of the Jews , Clement violently condemned Basilides as a prattler.[70] Basilides further asserted that this evil prince was present at Christ's baptism, and when he heard the speech of the spirit, and saw the dove, this prince of evil was struck with amazement because the phenomenon was beyond his expectations. Clement considered Basilides' theory a chirping, if nothing else, because it resulted in two Gods, for Clement an anathema. The same chirping was also attributed to Valentinus who held a theory similar to Basilides.[71]

Clement set out to demonstrate that the criticism of fear by Stoics and Gnostics was criticism of the Law and indirectly of God who gave the Law.[72] Clement justifies fear on the basis of the Bible.[73] The elimination of fear implied the doing away of the Law with the consequence that each per-

[70] SC ad Str.2.36.1, n.1; Irenaeus *Ad Haer.* 1.24.4. According to Basilides this God assisted at the baptism of Christ, but when he saw the dove and heard the celestial voice, he was struck with terror and this terror gave birth to the aeon Sophia.

[71] Str. 2.36. 2; Ferguson, ad loc., n. 33.

[72] For the Stoics the element of fear was an irrational agent unworthy of a wise man, SVF 3. 411; 431; Diog. Laert. 116; Paed. 1.101.1; Str. 2.40.1; GCS I, p. 150.

[73] Many of the Fathers of the Church take a similar position, Basil, *Discourse on Ps* 33.8; J. Chrysostome, PG 48. 956; Max. the Confessor, *Epistle* 20, PG. 91. 600 D. Also Hermas, *Poimandres*, *Commandm.* 10.1.6.

son would be driven by desire alone and would abandon himself to pleasure, living in impiety and injustice, indifferent to the truth. Indeed many people conform to religion because of fear; but whether in fear's absence all people, as Clement seems to indicate, would abandon propriety, decency, piety, and justice and would live indifferently to moral norms, be they conventional mores or strictly philosophical tenets, is not at all certain. Whether Clement really believed in such a sequence of events or not is also uncertain. The overriding principle for him was that the commandment about fear had a divine origin and such an origin itself invalidated the concerns of those who argued against fear as an irrational and disturbing aberration. Fear of the commandments of God far from being irrational is rational inasmuch as it exhorts men to abstain from what is evil and spiritually damaging.[74] If the Law produced fear, this fear became responsible for the knowledge of the Law which was the beginning of wisdom.[75] Clement stresses once again man's rational and irrational parts, soul and body, to reemphasize that the body tills the ground and remains close to it, whereas the soul is raised to God trained by true philosophy, with patience and fear as instruments of good.[76] Clement resorts to Plato to find support for his argument, since Plato also used fear as an instrument for the achievement of cautious behavior on the part of man. Fear, according to Plato, was given both for the prevention of transgressions from the good and for the promotion of good deeds which lead to the salvation of man.[77]

In brief, Clement was violently opposed to those Gnostics and Antitactae who equated the notion of freedom and knowledge with the license to do almost everything they wanted, owing to their presumption that they stood above evil. Clement feels that if everything were legitimate and there was no fear of missing out on the ultimate hope because of immoral actions, these Gnostics and Antitactae might have had some reason for their "wretchedly vicious" views. But since through the commandments men had a guide to a blessed life, they ought to pursue this guide without any misunderstanding or any neglect. Men are to follow where the Word leads. But if they slipped up continually, they could not avoid falling into "undying evil".[78] Men should follow God's Scriptures, the road taken by the believers, and so far as possible become like the Lord.[79] Men are not to live

[74] Str. 2.32.1-4; 33.2; Ex. 20.13-16.

[75] Str. 2.33.2; 4.9.7; Heracl. fr. 23 which for us is very incomplete but Clement must have had the entire text of Heracleitus, Str. 4.10.1. Clement also mentions the unknown saying of Socrates, that the law was not made for the sake of the good.

[76] Str. 2.39.4; 4.9.4;; Paed. 1.67.2; Rom. 3.20;5.13; 7.8.

[77] Plat. Laws 4.715 E -716 A; E. des Places, transl. *Plato's Laws* (Paris, 1951) ad. loc.; des Places, *Mélanges Saunier* (Paris, 1944) 34-35; Protr. 87.3; 6.69.4; SC ad loc., n. 1; Paed. 1.77.1.

[78] H. J. McCloskey, *God and Evil* (Hague, 1955) 81.

[79] McCloskey, *God and Evil*, 76.

amorally or immorally but are, as far as possible, to purify themselves from immoral pleasures and lusts and to take care of their spiritual part, which should continue to be preoccupied solely with the pursuit of the divine. For if it is pure and free from all vice the mind is capable of receiving the power of God, when the divine image is established within that mind.[80]

Clement's treatment of God's power and knowledge allows that it was and is within God's power to create a world containing free agents acting for an end freely chosen in a world without moral evil. Indeed God's purpose for the world he created was to be free of moral evil, and he warned man not to transgress His commandments, if the world was to remain free of evil as He wanted it. Clement's treatment also raises the question whether God in His omnipotence and omniscience should have created a world free, particularly on the human level, of the possibility of moral evil. Since He did not, should not then God be faulted for creating this evil-containing world when there was available to Him the apparently much better alternative of creating a world containing moral free agents yet a world free of moral evil? Indeed, should He not be faulted for creating a world containing any form of evil? An all-perfect God must prefer the better to the good, and the best to the better.[81] If this best world did not obtain then either God is to be faulted for not creating the best, evil-free world, or the existence of evil is essentially incompatible with the existence of God. The presence of evil in excessive amounts, as it prevails in this world, strengthens the belief of the atheist that God does not exist. Clement has tried to avoid this conclusion by maintaining that God had wanted an evil free world and had warned Adam and Eve of the certainty of evil if they disobeyed His will. By disobeying God's will Adam and Eve were clearly responsible for the introduction of evil into the world.[82]

Clement's explanation of the physical evils befalling man, presumably such as hunger, sickness, pain and death, is that they are the penalty for the original sin. Had not Adam and Eve committed that original sin the physical evils which so plague man in his earthly life would not have been introduced into the world where they serve not only as punishment but are also an essential part of God's method of bringing man back to the right path. Clement does not ask why God had to put the appletree, which became the cause of the original sin, in the Garden of Eden. He takes it for

[80] In his own discussion of the problem of evil Aquinas proposes a different view: that the existence of evil is actually necessary in a God-created universe complete in every way, *Summa Theol.* I, Q. 22 a w, ad 2; Q. 48, a. 2, and ad 3 and Q. 49. a. 2; also *Summa contra Gent.* III-1, ch. 71; III-II, ch. 94. For Aquinas, while moral evil, unlike evil of nature, is in no way intended by God, not even indirectly, its occurrence in many cases accords with the nature of fallible freedom. God permits such failure in some cases but draws good from it.

[81] Paed. 1.63.1-3. The paragraph is said to be of Stoic inspiration, see SC ad loc. and SVF 2. 1116.

[82] Str. 3.64-65.1; 3.100.5-6; 3.102.4; 4.150.4; Extr. Theod. 41.4; fr.23.

granted that this placement was good, because, if it were not, the all-knowing God would not have so placed it. Nor does he think that the apple constituted a temptation that man could not have resisted. Rather Clement indicates that Adam and Eve did willingly what they knew to be wrong, without any external circumstances forcing them to do so. Man should have avoided the tasting of the apple simply because God so ordered. Consequently, there is no incompatibility between the goodness of God and the existence of evil in this world. On the contrary, Clement sees the existence of the apple tree as a variation for man that significantly increased his opportunity to exercise the free will with which God endowed him. For God not to have placed the tree of knowledge in paradise would have meant that man would not have lived a full existence. A world containing creatures who are significantly free to choose between good and evil is more variable and valuable than a world containing no free creatures with the privilege of choice. For God to have caused or determined these otherwise free creatures to do only what is right would not be just, since this limitation would have denied their freedom. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness. For those who do not accept the so-called apocalyptic truth Clement's argument would sound like a resort to the unprovable; consequently as begging the question. On his part Clement would have attributed such arguments to their unbelief and their ignorance of the gospel.

Those who operate from a rational basis may perceive the presence of the tree of knowledge as a temptation put in the way of Adam and Eve. Since we do not commend those who put temptation in the way of others, such rationalists might be inclined to blame God or to believe in the non-existence of God. The same people do not accept the notion of the permission of evil, --where it could be prevented--, for the sake of a higher virtue, nor do they believe in the sacrifice of the many --even as a result of their own freely chosen actions-- for the sake of the higher virtue of the few. To put severe temptation in the way of the many for the sake of the few, knowing that many and perhaps even most will succumb to the temptation, is considered blatant immorality, whether those who yielded to the temptation possessed free will or not. The holders of this view, therefore, do not subscribe to the theory of the freedom of the will, if such freedom would lead most of humanity to moral evil. In their view, God could have created man with a strong bias to the good, while still leaving scope for a decision to act evilly. Such a bias would be compatible with freedom of the will. An omnipotent God could so have ordered the world that it was less conducive to the practice of evil. But Clement would have repudiated this line of argument. For Clement the creation of man with a very limited bias to evil would still mean the limitation of his freedom of the will, something that God in His fairness could not do. This God-created world is the best of all possible worlds as far as its constitution and nature

are concerned, so God must not be charged with the evil which we find in it. Since each man falls of himself, he must not trace his fall to Adam, who is merely the prototype of all transgressors (Str. 2.98.3). Each one of us is alone responsible for his transgressions, and each of us bears his own responsibility for his own punishment which, like his sin, is two-fold, first ignorance, and secondly the triumph of the irrational animal over the rational. Just as we cannot know the inscrutable ways of God, so also we cannot find proof that God is unjust for permitting evil. On the contrary, we can assume that morally sufficient reasons justify such permission. The question of evil and the justice of God might be a matter of dispute for the agnostics and non-believers, but for the believer it is not a matter of proof because he assumes that God must have had morally sufficient reasons for permitting the presence of evil in the world. Perhaps one day we shall know what these reasons are, so the believers hope. But whether or not we shall ever know what they are, we may rest assured that they must exist. This may strike the unbeliever as a very unsatisfactory argument, but it is unsatisfactory to him exactly because, as the believer observes, he lacks belief in the omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence of God. Thus the argument becomes circuitous, but this circuity does not bother the believer.

Critics of Clement's concept of freedom would agree with him that freedom is a reality which men either live or reject. Man does not find this reality outside of himself as he does mere objects. Freedom is something that becomes realized in man's spiritual depth, something that grows from the root of the human spirit. It is a way of life, a constant living struggle. Whether one is a non-believer or a believer true freedom cannot be gotten from outside himself as he gets a slice of bread or a piece of clothing. It is something that a man himself achieves.

That freedom of the will is not always tantamount to independence can be shown by contrasting Gide's interpretation of the prodigal son with the Christian parable. To the modern French writer the return of the prodigal son was not owing to true repentance but was simply an admission of hunger and misery, a yielding to his weaknesses and cowardice. When his mother asks him to advise his brother, who thought of leaving the house, not to do so, the prodigal son advises the opposite. He further advises him not to return. When the brother finally leaves, the prodigal bids him farewell with the words: you take with you all my hopes. Be strong, forget me, forget us. Hopefully, you will manage not to return. For Gide's prodigal there is no coexistence for both humility and dignity, repentance and freedom, return and independence. Whoever returns loses his dignity and freedom, since freedom is a real revolution inside us. Clement would have agreed with Gide that freedom is a state of mind, a true internal power. But he would have distanced himself from Gide's method of achieving that power. For Gide departure from the paternal household was liberation; for Clement it is death and destruction. Unlike Gide, freedom for

Clement is struggle, return, the constant fight for God's grace and love that blesses the paternal home. The prodigal's departure did not lead him to freedom, as he had hoped, but to prodigality, loss of freedom, alienation. There is no freedom or autonomy outside of and away from God and the family He has created. Freed from the paternal authority the son became subject to the authority of passion and egotistic pleasure. As a consequence he experienced humiliating failure, misery, and the fear of death. In the parable, the prodigal comes to understand that the meaning of real freedom was self- restraint, not licentiousness, not permissiveness, not separation. He realizes that the real essence of freedom is not complete independence, or denial of sonship, but the mature relationship of son to father.[83] He recognizes that true freedom and theonomy are not conflicting concepts since God is not "another law" for man; he is not another despot, but the essence of man's being and his true identity. In Clement's idea of freedom the foundation is the personal relationship, humility and return to Christian life; there is no freedom outside Christian life. Christian life and freedom are interdependent and coequals. Alienation from God is loss of freedom and is tantamount to death. Clement adheres to a key phrase of Paul's theology that Christ liberated us, giving us freedom (Gal. 5.1.). Two important points that Paul implies are that Christ lays the foundation of freedom and that the new condition He thus grants to the believers is the only true freedom. Freedom is understood here not as a psychological, political, or philosophical concept, but as the surpassing of the propeudeutic Law, of sin, and of spiritual death, things man could not have achieved with only his own powers. Clement, like Paul, seems to point out that this form of freedom, though an individual effort, has nothing to do with individualism. The spirit of freedom is the spirit of communion. Yet though the spirit of true freedom leads to salvation by the grace of God, grace and salvation are not imposed upon man. God gives him the freedom to accept salvation or reject it, to approach perfection in communion with God, or reject it. God may be the fountain of all good, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, but the benefits of His fountain are largely dependent upon us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν). It is in our discretion and authority to follow or not the path of freedom God has opened up for us with the key to our salvation and doom.

Clement would have violently disagreed with some modern champions of humanistic ethics for whom the idea of freedom involves traits of anthropocentrism, subjectivism, and eudemonism along with the tendency toward self-salvation. Such humanists, like the Sophists of old, make man the measure of all things.[84] Good is the only criterion of value. No God

[83] Echoes the famous phrase of Plat. Thaet. 176 B, replacing God (θεῷ) with the word "Lord", τῷ Κυρίῳ.

[84] H. Thielicke, *Menschsein, Menschcwerden, Entwurf einer christlicher Anthropologie* (Munich, 1976) 238.

alone saves man; only man can find a purpose for himself and the realization of that purpose. The superior good in humanistic ethics is love for one's self. Neglect of one's self is evil.[85] We exist from ourselves, with ourselves, and for ourselves, a view opposite to the Christian ideal expressed by Clement. Even though our contribution to a life of freedom is great, Clement nonetheless believes that we exist from God, with God, and for God. Any false deification of man apart from God does not constitute true freedom but destruction. True freedom for Clement is our giving ourselves to God by which we achieve proximity to God, theosis. Man's life is seen by Clement as a constantly painful road, a stubborn struggle for personal freedom, an endless and many-sided effort sustained by the limitless mercy and love of God.

Like Clement, Epictetus, with whose ideas Clement was well acquainted, considered freedom the supreme good in the possession of man. For Epictetus freedom is located in the innermost part of man and is the very essence of his existence. This inner freedom has no relation to the possession of power or to comfortable material living. It only relates to our inner inalienable peace. This type of freedom is a release from what is not under our authority but retaining dominance over our impulses and desires, the ἐφ' ἡμῖν. If one bears in mind that what is in our power we can and should control and what is not in our power we cannot control, no one will be able to exert compulsion on another person and no one will be able to harm that person even if he tries to do so.[86] The Stoic philosopher wants to be the king of the area of his inner self where no one can ever upset him or enslave him.[87]

Throughout history innumerable persons in a state of legal slavery finally received their freedom, while an equally great number of people fell from freedom into slavery. And yet many of those who won their freedom never really became free except in a political or legal sense, while among those who lost their freedom many remained truly free. For true freedom is not the result of manumission nor is it necessarily lost by the fall from political and legal freedom into slavery. True freedom is something higher than legal freedom; it is a spiritual state to be reached only after a long and arduous struggle with ourselves. We are wont to repeat the dictum that "Man is born free." The truth is that man is not born really free but becomes free after a ceaseless struggle against his own spiritual weaknesses. It is more congruent with reality to admit that man comes into the world as if born in a cave. Each one of us comes out of this cave only after he liberates himself from his own spiritual deficiencies and the morally deleterious

[85] Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself, An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics* (New York, 1947) 53; Erich Fromm, *Beyond he Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud* (New York, 1962) 222; Fromm, *Man for Himself*, 461.

[86] Epict. *Encheir.* 1. 1-4.

[87] Epict. *Disc.* 1.29.9; 2. 1.23.

temptations of this world. Only if we engage in a constant struggle against these elements can we achieve the high moral level of near perfection, and when that state has been achieved it must be similarly maintained through constant struggle. Otherwise, in every moment of his life man is subject to his own enslavement. Loss of freedom means the loss of the power and courage to pursue moral struggle for improvement and also the loss of spiritual alertness to pursue the highest good. The struggle is constant because during every step of the way there lurks in us that siren of moral subjection that seeks to enslave us, and whose charms man cannot easily resist. If only for a short while man loosens up his guard he is likely to fall victim to his own passions and lose track of the true knowledge and of the true good.[88] For Clement, as for Plato, true knowledge is the practice of the true good which alone leads to true freedom. True freedom is for the non-believer or the agnostic the accomplishment of the supreme moral goal; while for Clement it is man's subjection to the will of God achieved only by a life-long conformity with His commandments.

[88] Plat. Soph. 256 E.

CHAPTER FIVE

CLEMENT'S GNOSTIC

It is certain that Clement's basic purpose in writing his various treatises was to sketch the picture of the perfect Christian, the *gnostic*, as he visualized him. Clement's picture differs fundamentally from that offered by the Gnostics who, in his view, diverted from the true apostolic tradition, ending up with a caricature of the perfect Christian. Had they grasped the true spirit of the Law and adhered to the teachings of Christ, of his apostles, and of the actual Christian tradition, they might not have strayed so far from the truth. References to the perfect Christian are scattered throughout Clement's writings, but makes an effort to develop the topic more systematically in Book Seven. It has been left to modern scholars to cull the scattered evidence and present a picture of the truly Christian man as sketched by him. This chapter has not been written with the aim of duplicating or improving upon what other scholars have said, nor is it an attempt to give a systematic view of Clement's theory of the gnostic. It has only been added here because I did not think that an essay on Clement's conception of evil could be complete without mention, no matter how brief, of his notion of the perfect Christian, his gnostic.

It should be made clear that adhesion to the Mosaic Law, though commendable, was not sufficient for the achievement of that spiritual state Clement identified with the gnostic. Conformance to the ordinances of the law, any law, is useful socially and not infrequently a personal source of satisfaction and contentment. But as it has already been pointed out the truth of the Law denotes something much more than a legal instruction. It expresses a reality which is richer and deeper.[1] An analogy closer to the truth would be a comparison of the Torah with the artist's conception of the laws of artistic creation, or of musical composition. The artist who wants to express beauty through colors must go beyond the rules of color and harmony in order to discover and to express the relations that constitute the beauty of the subjects he is treating. The Biblical Law is closer to this conception. This is how Christ viewed the Law and why He intermittently leveled His vehement criticism against the Scribes and the Pharisees. Not

[1] Walter Gutbrod, *Das Gesetz im Alten Testament* in the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, G. Kittel, ed., vol. 4, p. 1029 ff.; also Walter Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, part I (Berlin,1948) 31 ff.; Str. 7, 14.3; Chr. Giannaras, *The Freedom of Morality* (Athens, 1982) 72. This is the new title of the translation of this book which came to my attention belatedly. Hereafter I will refer to it with this title.

that they did not fulfill the regulations of the Law or that that such a fulfillment was not a major accomplishment. The Pharisee in the parable of the Publican and the Pharisee fasted twice a week and tithed his revenue. This tithing was in itself a major feat. How many of us, how many Christians can today boast as he did that they tithe their revenues. Yet that was not what the spirit of the Law required. Fasting and tithing, important regulations of the Law though they might have been were not enough. The person who remained limited to these parameters of the Law had failed to penetrate its true meaning, since the Law consisted of more that rigid regulations.

The Mosaic Law is a revelation of God Himself, a gift of His grace, not a legalistic statute. It is an invitation to the people of Israel to become the receiver and carrier of the name of God, to become the reflection of that truth which is God Himself. The revelation of God's name denotes His communion and relationship with the person to whom He is revealing His name, and a possibility of that person's substantive acquaintance with the revealer. For this reason Moses, when he assumed the mission God gave him, asked that God reveal His name to him (Ex. 3.13). It was in this sense that the Israelites perceived the Law as having established a special relationship with them, a compact, a covenant, revealed by the commandment in Leviticus: "you shall be holy; as I, the Lord your God, am Holy" (19.2).

Thus, even in the Old Testament adherence to the Law did not simply mean compliance with some objective legislation designed to secure the social order or individual virtue. Maintenance of the Law instead elevated each Israelite to membership in the people of God. The Israelite ought to adhere to the Law not to secure for himself some special reward, but to secure his belonging to the people of God on whom God's promise had been bestowed. Adherence to the Law did not aim at private justification but at the revelation of the truth of the living God through the covenant of God with His people. It is through such an understanding of the Law, through such a dynamic revelation and unfolding of God to man that one can also understand the saying of Christ that He came not to abolish but to fulfill the Law (Matt. 5.17).

From this standpoint Christ's admonition to the rich young man to sell his possessions and to distribute them to the poor shows the extent of the young man's misunderstanding of the Law he claimed to have so faithfully respected. Respect for the Law as a sort of training for the real thing was good, and Christ was the first to admit it. But respect of the Law had not made yet the young man perfect in terms of eternal life. He, like the priest and the Levite in the parable (Luk. 10.31-32) was in reality a "doer" of the Law but idle (ἀργὸν) in regard to the true life.[2] If the young man wished to

[2] QDS 9. 1-2; Str. 4.29.3; Rom. 7.12; 10.4; 8.14-17; Gal.3.24.

be perfect he should have freed himself from the passions that bound him to the weakness of this life. Consequently, the "if you wish" denotes the freedom the individual has and the choice he has to make as a free agent. But even that choice is not sufficient because the achievement of perfection depends on God, Who gives it to those who are willing and are exceeding earnest (ὑπερεσπουδακόσι) as the young man was obviously not. Man's willingness and God's grace were necessary for the accomplishment of man's perfection. In this sense God does not compel; compulsion is repulsive to God. On the other hand, God supplies grace to those who seek it and bestows it on those who ask for it (QDS 10.1). Those who earnestly seek it and acquire it achieve what is above the Law and its gifts.[3]

The way for men to acquire God's grace is to follow Christ's example. Christ became perfect and sanctified in His humanity through His baptism and the descent of the Holy Spirit.[4] The same takes place in our case, according to Clement.[5] So, when we are baptized we are illuminated and acquire the potential to become sons of God. We are made perfect, and being made perfect we become immortal.[6] The acquisition of perfection is thus partly but significantly the result of the grace of God.[7] Washing and illumination are the means by which the Christians cleanse their sins and by which the penalties accruing for transgression are remitted.[8] It is called illumination because by it that holy light of salvation is beheld; that is, we clearly see God. Through baptism man dies with Christ and is resurrected with Him in the life of the new time. Man at first dead in sin enters into the life of grace, which is offered to him through the seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit. By this granting of the seal of the gift of God the baptized obtains

[3] QDS 10.3; 12.1; Matt. 19.21; Mark, 10.21; Stählin points to the similarity between Str. 7. 6.3 and Hebr. 6.18. See also Str.3.83. 1-5; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 254-56. Plato seems to think that *nomos* is not the source from which one should expect salvation. He may well conceive of a political order in which positive laws are of but small importance. In fact they may even be outright detrimental. In the Republic the value of laws as stabilizing element in the proposed state is decidedly inferior to that of education, 4.425.A-C. Even in the Laws itself there are passages, as in book nine where it is said that if true knowledge and reason are present laws may be dispensed with, since written laws with their rigid and dogmatic regulations have inevitable shortcomings. In the Statesman the same view is developed at greater length. Polit. 293 E ff.; and Laws 9.875 C-D; 6.769 D with Shorey's note, Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (University. of Chicago, 1933) 635. For Plato laws are but poor imitation of the right type of law and the origin or status of the right law must never be confused with that of imitations. True law is the manifestation of the perfected individual who has achieved the Platonic justice, Friedrich Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (Cornell University Press, 1942) 163-64.

[4] Paed. 1.25. 3 and SC ad loc. n. 2.

[5] Paed.1.26.1; Clement prefers ὑπογραφή to ὑπογραμμὸς as more classical in imitation of Plat. Laws 5.737 D; see also Introduction to *Paedagogos*, in SC, p. 81..

[6] Ps. 82.6; Paed. 1.26.1; SC Introduction to Paed. pp. 39-41 and ad loc. p. 158, n. 4; Ps 72. 6.

[7] Paed. 1.26.2; SC ad loc. n.5; Rom. 6.23.

[8] Paed. 1.26. 2; SC ad loc. n. 7 ff.; Rom. 6.23; I Cor. 4.4; Tit. 3.5; James. 1.17.

the ability to achieve deification, something that had become impossible after his fall. The baptism as a new birth of man bestowed by the Holy Spirit supersedes his natural birth. The baptized becomes a spiritual being since he was baptized in the Spirit. The father of the baptized is Christ Himself. Thus all those baptized in Christ, while physically children of various fathers, become supernaturally children of Christ, in supersession of all physical relations. It is for this reason that Christ calls His disciples not only "friends" but also "little children" (John, 13, 33). The rehabilitation of the soul has its beginning in baptism and its completion through the vision of God in the future time. The baptized receives God's gift and awaits deification (θέωσις). The period of man's life after his baptism affords him the possibility of maturation in the life according to Christ and the development of communion with God through the cooperation of God's gift. This life in Christ must be witnessed in the daily conduct of the baptized.

Faith as a Prerequisite of Perfection

Though baptism is so essential for man's advancement to the state of perfection, baptism itself does not automatically guarantee its attainment without certain indispensable spiritual requisites and the constant effort to maintain this state of grace and perfection. One basic prerequisite for baptism, also necessary in the struggle for deification, is faith. Faith is that internal good (ἐνδιάθετον ἀγαθὸν), that inward power that leads man to confess and glorify God's existence. Man has to start with faith and develop it with the help of the grace of God (Str. 7.55.2-3). Faith is the property of the wise man who is not wise according to the world but according to God, and who is taught without training in the usual texts which represent the wisdom of men but rather through the spiritual texts (Paed. 3.78.2). The truth of this process is demonstrated by the fact that though many faithful are ill-disposed to any formal form of training they nonetheless attain spiritual excellence, while others whose natural disposition toward education is good do not attain the excellence adverted to by Clement, because through neglect or indifference they do not free themselves from evil.[9] A man of faith is perfect, according to Clement, because nothing is wanting to faith since it is perfect and complete in itself. If ought is wanting to it, then it is not wholly perfect.[10] Faith then is that experience of the presence of God which brings man into personal communion with God and makes him a communicant of His goodness (Str. 4.143.3). When this personal element is absent faith becomes empty, a formal convention, which objectifies God and makes Him into an indifferent object of worship. This object becomes eventually surrounded by other objectified values

[9] Str. 1.34.4; Str. 4.8.5; SC ad loc., n.1; Paed. 1.26. 3-27.1; Plat. Gorg. 478 C-D.
[10] Paed. 1.26.2; 29.2

which in the end are not related to God and make communion with God a matter of indifference. Piety, prayer, fasting, alms-giving, sacrificing easily become independent values not simply means of communion with God. Something like it had happened to the Pharisee of the parable who boasted about his compliance with the Law. Those accomplishments of his had not succeeded in bringing him into communication with God, because they were perceived by him as self-values. Something similar had happened to Euthyphro in the corresponding Platonic dialogue when he confused external formalities with piety. It took a Socrates to disabuse him of his error.

The external world constitutes a reference to God, and the observation of our surrounding world leads us to the search of God. Yet faith in God should not be viewed as an imposition by external necessity but should remain an expression of freedom. Without faith in God man becomes alienated from this world; on the other hand, the simple recognition of God as creator does not save man either. Man's salvation requires his personal encounter and communion with God. Though faith as a personal relation and communion with God is not identified with the social conventions, it nevertheless possesses a social dimension since man's faith in God is connected directly with man's relation to his fellow-man.

Man by himself has no power to acquire faith unless God bestows it on him (Str. 1.38.5). The believer therefore depends largely on God. If God withdrew His grace even for a minute, man's faith would cease. The question that naturally arises is why God does not bestow faith on everybody, not just on the few. This question is difficult to answer and Clement comes up with various responses. First, that if some believe and others do not this is not due to God but to those who do not believe. The second answer relates to the first, that not everybody seeks out God and that only those who seek receive faith (Str. 5.12.1-2). Thirdly, even among those who seek out God not all will find him, but only those who go about it rightly.

Clement does not seem to confront the question of how man is moved to seek out God, especially seek him out rightly, since by himself man does not have this ability. If there are certain presuppositions and qualifications for seeking out God is the grace of God fundamental or simply ancillary? Clement does not answer this question satisfactorily. He simply states that faith is a divine gift and a human propensity or ability but which he does not say how it originates. He simply states that faith is a divine gift that thus becomes a human propensity or ability but does not say how it originates in man except by the power of God. Thus the question becomes circuitous (Str. 5.9.2). He adds only that when the urge for the development of faith appears, it has to be cultivated by listening to the catechism or that it can, on occasion, be grasped without knowledge (Ecl. Proph. 28.3). By introducing the element of knowledge Clement reverts to Greek philosophy wherein character improvement depends on intellectual discipline and

training. However, realizing the insufficiency of his answers to the question of faith, he tries to escape from the difficulties by adding that faith is a gift of God and hence different from knowledge (Str. 7.55.1-3)

Clement persists that the essential characteristic of Christian faith is that it permeates man's whole being and becomes a way of life. It is not a simple learning (ψιλὴ) of some teaching which requires only the approval of reason but a way of life. And although it is not an inherent virtue, it nevertheless saturates the whole being of the believer, thereby becoming an "internal good" which admits God's existence and glorifies Him. Whereas elsewhere he makes faith the product of a divine gift which is the sine qua non for the origin of faith, he at the same time describes it as if this gift were something secondary (Str. 7.55. 2-3). It becomes easier for him when he explains that the object of faith is God, though again he gets into trouble when he maintains that the believer does not arrive at faith by a deductive process but accepts it as something given. His assertion that faith is a relationship or way to approach God does not shed much more light on the question. What, apparently, Clement has in mind is the Judeo-Christian God as He has been revealed through the prophets and Christ, not just a form of deism.[11]

Faith is essentially acquired by the knowledge of Christ's teachings (Str .4.159.1) which connect the believer with God and with himself. This relationship established by faith is unique to the Christian man and Clement implicitly denies that faith in other Gods connects the believer to the believed. For Clement to have made such a statement would have been absurd since the believed was viewed by him as the one perfect reality. What Clement refuses to admit here is that the faith of the pagan believer engendered a relation analogous to the Christian faith, and that the pagan believer accepted the believed as much of a reality as the Christian accepted his God.

Furthermore, Clement views the Christian faith as "born in time," perhaps for two reasons: first, because the incarnation of Christ and His teachings took place in time, and, secondly, because the of faith of most Christians at his time was born at a certain time, this being the time of their conversion (most of the Christians in Clement's time were converts) which can be seen as new birth and new life. This new life is not easy; on the contrary, like the life of Christ it is full of suffering and sacrifice because belief is not simply faith in some abstract philosophical theory but a living and active faith (Theod. Extr. 86.2). Clement seems to think that faith in some abstract philosophical theory is easy compared to the Christian faith, something that might have been preponderantly but not absolutely true if

[11] M. Farantos, *Peri Dikaiosynês, Systematic Ereuna eis to Ergon Klementos Alexandreôs* (Athens, 1971) 163-64.

we look at the life of Socrates and others who chose to live consistently with their philosophical beliefs.

Faith and Justice

Though many may disagree with his assessment of the difficulties stemming from living a life consistent with the ideals of Christian faith most would agree with him that the end of such a life is perfection (τὸ ὁμοίωμα πληρῶσαι) to be accomplished by the Christian's strict compliance with the will of God (Paed. 3.101.1-2). Clement adds that faith and justice are often identical because the non-believer cannot really be just, a view that again may not be true (Protr. 104.2). He qualifies his statement by saying that justice is not the "common" faith but the special all-inclusive faith which is knowledge of God (Paed. 1.103.1-5). Justice and faith are similar because faith, like justice, expresses a relationship to God (Str. 7.78.7). In a sense, faith can be seen as the foundation of justice (Ecl. Proph. 37.2) while justice is the end of faith (Paed. 2.103.2-3). Faith ends with life's existence whereas justice partakes of the divine presence with its knowledge of God (Str. 6.78.1 and unknown fr. 48). Those who died in Christ are not called believers any longer but righteous. Faith is thus temporal leading to justice and eternal life, while justice is participation in the divine life, that is, the constant vision of God. At the end, despite the distinction between the two concepts Clement concludes that neither faith can exist without justice nor justice without faith (Protr. 116.3) The just is just when he has faith in God and His will (Ecl. Proph. 60.1).

Knowledge

While Clement thus seems to place faith above knowledge, he did not mean to downgrade the importance of knowledge as an element conducive to the perfection of the Christian man. As in the case of the Law, so knowledge (γνῶσις) for Clement is something much more than what we consider formal education. It is the understanding of things present, future, and past, things which are certain and reliable because imparted and revealed by the Son of God. But Clement warns that those whose purpose in life is contemplation toward perfection can reach it only by learning the prophetic utterances by which they will grasp the present, the future, and the past.[12] Thus true knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) deals with intellectual objects which are beyond the sphere of the world, and with objects more spiritual than those which the eye can see, and the ear can hear. The gnostic learns of these things from the teacher who unveils the holy of holies in an ascending order to those who are truly recipient of the Lord's adoption.[13] The things the

[12] Str. 6. 61.1-2; Gal. 5.19.23.

[13] Str. 6.68.1; I. Cor. 2.6

gnostics learn are contained in the prophecies which are full of knowledge as it has been given by the Lord. This knowledge is an attribute of the rational soul which trains itself so that by knowledge it may become entitled to immortality. For Clement learning is the beginning of all rational action since learning is older than the action that follows it.[14]

In his discussion of knowledge Clement tries to differentiate between what men regard as knowledge and what he considers knowledge from the Christian standpoint. In this sense knowledge is not simply a field of education in which someone has specialized. It is not even just the knowledge of good and evil, the ethical intellectualism suggested by Socrates. It is that but also more than that. It is that knowledge which provides an irrefragable comprehension of things divine and human, of those that Christ has taught men through the prophets and through His advent. It is irrefragable because it has been revealed to us by him. This knowledge is not acquired through reason (νοῦς) trained by that education through which the latent powers of man are developed and self-perfection is accomplished.[15] True, Clement admits that the realization of God in man begins through the function of the mind (Str. 5.73.2; 7.5). The next step is meeting God and remaining obedient to His will (QDS 18.7). Part of this obedience is expressed not as compliance with humanistic action but as a conviction of anthropognosy and autognosy, that is, the "know thyself." Through this self-knowledge we acquire the right relationship to God. Thus the knowledge that springs from logical inquiry is related to the knowledge that comes through faith and illumination. Both are interdependent things conducive to the accomplishment of the same goal. But the first is not sufficient. Man needs also God's gift, His light. Without this light we cannot know God as perfectly as possible. In that state of imperfection we may know God as others did, which implies that Clement is aware that pagans also knew of the direct relation of light to the knowledge of God. True philosophy, according to the Sibyl, is that which is deposited in the heart of people and which is the knowledge of God Who is likened to the light and the sun, an agent opposed to the darkness and ignorance (Protr. 77.2-3). This knowledge the believer receives through revelation by the Holy Spirit (Protr. 78.1). The light, which Clement identifies with God, Who is the creator of light, can help man disperse the darkness and ignorance of his life.[16] Whereas the Greeks had knowledge of the God, their knowledge was imperfect. Even such a great genius as Plato merely touch-

[14] Str. 6.68.2-3; 69.2; SVF 3. 462.

[15] Str. 6.137.1; 2.50.1-2; Philo, *De Mutat. Nom.* 111; W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (Oxford, Univ. Press, 1965) 286-331.

[16] Protr. 67.2; 7; 84.2; Str. 6.148. 1-2; 5.100. 4; SVF 2.1134.

ed the truth about God without really grasping it perfectly.[17] Only God's grace is a sure means to know the truth about God and the salvation that comes from Him.[18] The knowledge of God Clement refers to is knowledge as through a mirror (δι' ἐσόπτρου); that is, this knowledge is not of His substance but of His activity through revelation.[19] That is why the knowledge of God and His truth differs in the Bible from that of the Greek philosophy as much as a dream from reality (Protr. 64.1).

The human body is also instrumental in the knowledge of God because by virtue of our being alive we posses knowledge and through living we learn and achieve the good (Str. 4.18. 1-2). Here Clement seems to follow again in the footsteps of Plato who speaks of the harmony between body and soul, an idea Clement adapts to the Christian message.[20] He reasons that the loving God appears in the Church as activity (ἐνέργεια) which has manifested itself in human form through live agents, such as the apostles, who continued His teaching after His coming, as He had also manifested Himself through the prophets and through His own incarnation. The physical element is useful because God in human form was most suitable to serve the humanity of man (Ecl. Proph. 23.1-2). Owing to His saving activity our spiritual way of life and our body have been sanctified and Christ is glorified through our body.[21]

Clement consequently rejects the ancient notion that the body was evil and that it served as the tomb of the soul, an idea quite different from his concept of harmony.[22] In rejecting this ancient theory he combats the similar Gnostic ideas about the body, claiming that in essence the body is a thing indifferent (ἀδιάφορον), a theory propounded earlier by the Stoics.[23] But whereas the Stoics spoke of the body as an indifferent thing, Clement went a step further by asserting that the body can be sanctified and that the importance of the body should be seen in Christ's incarnation by which He saved humanity. He also stresses that God is glorified through our physical nature and that man can attain moral progress through his physical being.[24]

Clement equally reminded us that the knowledge of God begins with the aid of our senses and our reason, provided that sensory perception is

[17] To support his view he refers to Greek philosophy in several places, Str. 1.98.4; Plat. Phaedr. 246 C-D.

[18] Protr. 79.1-2; Str. 2.6.1.

[19] Protr. 79.3; Str. 2.6.1; I Cor. 13.2. Clement recognizes the difficulty of grasping the substance of God when he says, Οὐσία ἐστὶν ἐπὶ θεοῦ θεὸς, Οὐσία ἀΐδιόν τι καὶ ἀναρχον ἀσώματόν τε καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον καὶ τῶν ὄντων αἴτιον. Οὐσία ἐστὶν τὸ δι' ὅλου ὑφεστὸς, fr. 37, fr. 39 describes God as πνεῦμα...οὐσία ἀσώματος καὶ ἀπερίγραπτος.

[20] Plat. Rep. 410 C; 591 D.

[21] Str. 3.59.4; 62.1; 65.2.

[22] Str. 3.17.1-18.5; Plat. Phaedr. 64 A; 69.C;.

[23] Str. 4. 164.2-4; SVF 3. 122; Diog. Laert. 7. 104-5.

[24] Ecl. Proph. 23.2-3; Str. 7.61.1-2; SC ad loc. ns. 1 and 2; Str. 8.23.2; 7.53.3; SC ad loc. n.3; Ps. 93.11.

combined with prudence. In this way the individual is led gradually to sound (ἐπιστημονική) knowledge, though he agrees with Philo that the process is difficult (δυσάλωτον), making the object difficult to attain, (δυσθήρατον).[25] Clement draws from Aristoboulos, who seemed to have had similar ideas about the knowledge of God, which he had purportedly borrowed from Plato.[26] He mentions with approbation Plato's and Aristoboulos' theory that wonder is the first step of philosophical inquiry and that man should start with the intelligible things if he were to understand the causes of the visible order (Str. 5.8.6).[27]

The knowledge of God has its beginnings in the knowledge of ourselves. By this statement Clement gives to the Socratic apophthegm a Christian twist. When one knows himself he learns that he is a child of God and is thereby led to the attainment of the knowledge of the Father by seeking to liken himself to God.[28] He learns that Christ's church is a school, and that Christ is the only true teacher who bestows the sacred and saving knowledge.[29] Through self-knowledge he comes to know his purpose in life which is none other than the fulfillment of the commandments, which obtain his adoption as child of God and his salvation.[30] For Clement the purpose of the creation of man's soul is knowledge which in the end is the knowledge of our sinful nature that leads us to repentance, from which springs the finding of our soul and our salvation.[31] Clement's idea of the importance of self-knowledge as a means of finding ourselves is substantially different from Philo's theory where self-knowledge is the awareness of our smallness, the knowledge of the nothingness of our mortal nature.[32] Such an awareness of our nothingness is primarily a help in the attainment of the knowledge of God since only when the creature recognizes its own nothingness is it ready to encounter the creator.

Self-knowledge is a topic to which Clement frequently returns. The study of ourselves begins with the knowledge of our body and what happens to our nature. From there it proceeds to more intellectual things whose guide is reason. When the individual cleanses his flesh and his spirit, he is freed from those influences that keep him earth-bound and nothing else is left but for him to get on the road that leads to the understanding of God.[33] Though Clement here never loses sight of the role of revelation in

[25] Philo De Som. 1.62-65; Str. 2.5.3; 5.73.3; Comm ad loc.; Plat. Phaedr. 509 D; 517 B.
[26] Str. 6.137. 5-138.4; Eus. PE 13.12-13; Paed. 2.25.3; Plat. Theaet. 155 D;
[27] Aristl. Met. I 2 (892b); Plat. Rep. 511 C-E.
[28] Paed. 3.1.1; 2.1.2; I John 3.2;
[29] Paed. 3.98.1; I John 2.2; Str. 6.2.4.
[30] Str. 7. 20.7-8; SC ad loc. ns 2-4; Plat. Rep. 10.617 E; 620 E-621 A; 2.75.2.
[31] Str. 4.27.3; 7.79.7.
[32] Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston, 1963) 280; Philo, Mut. Non.54; Matt. 10.39.
[33] Paed. 2.1.2-3; Str. 4.18.1-2; 32.1-2.

knowledge, he nonetheless seems to adhere closely to philosophy as the road that brings to God. True, knowledge of God through philosophic inquiry alone is impossible, but Clement inclines to believe that the best road to knowledge includes philosophy, provided one does not mistake this road as the desired terminal.[34] The guide in the discovery of knowledge should be Christ, the Logos of God.[35] After he has said that, Clement does not hesitate to voice his difference to philosophy. The knowledge of God through self-knowledge is not a theoretical knowledge of the road to God nor is it the simple knowledge of either the simple or difficult concepts of revelation. Nor is it the knowledge of the works of God. It is knowledge and participation in the divine will and activity, especially that activity which was unknown to philosophy but which relates to the salvation of man. Self-knowledge is also found in the Gnostic texts except that there it concerns the knowledge of the former state of the soul and not participation in the will of God or man's salvation.[36] True knowledge provides an irrefragable comprehension of things divine and human, and of everything that Christ has taught men through the prophets and through His advent. It is irrefragable because it has been revealed to us by Him. This knowledge is what produces true wisdom.[37] Only by the acquisition of this knowledge which does not puff up and does not work conceit can man acquire trust in the truth and so live in accordance with the gospel and discover the proofs for which he has searched in the Law.[38]

Clement's emphasis on knowledge carries the mystical implication that God is not only inaccessible and invisible but also accessible and visible. The possibility of communion with God and the seeing of His glory depends on the accessibility and understanding of His divinity. Invisible and inaccessible in His substance God becomes visible and accessible in His activity. This distinction between the substance and activity of God is already known to Clement from Athenagoras.[39]

The vision of God is of course granted as a divine gift but also as a recompense for human effort towards spiritual advancement and perfection. One must labor constantly, however, to be granted this vision. This effort is seen as a constant human exercise of cleansing and return to himself and God. Attachment to the carnal desires and the deceitful pleasures removes man from God. Sinlessness is not understood here as a negative situation limited to the abstinence from sin but is something active, directly connect-

[34] Str. 5.49.1; Protr. 80.1; Str.1.93.3-4; SC ad loc.; Plat. Rep. 7. 534 B-C.

[35] Str. 2.18.1; SC ad loc. ns.2-4; Str. 2.9.4; 6.61.1; Plat. Euthyd. 291 D; Polit. 259 A-B.

[36] J. M. Robinson, *The Nag Hammadi Library*, 3rd ed., (San Francisco, 1990) 126-34.

[37] Str. 6.54. 1; Str. 1.24. ff.; 177. 1; Str. 2.9.4; 6.61.1; Paed. 2.25.3.

[38] Str. 7. 104.1-2; SC ad loc. ns.1-2; II Tim. 2.15; I. Cor. 4.19

[39] Athenagoras, *On the Resurrection of the Dead*, 1. Irenaeus fr. 5, PG 7, 1232B. This distinction between substance and activity (οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας) is thereafter well made among the Fathers of the Eastern Church, most probably because of the Christological controversies that followed the second century AD.

ed with the exercise of virtue and especially love.[40] Love exemplifies the superseding character of virtue over sin. Sin is a later product of man's disobedience while virtue is without beginning since it stems eternally from God and is granted by him to the spirit of man. This does not reduce man's responsibility nor the importance of his cooperation with God. But before man can "see" God, he has to find the truth and orient his existence toward God while at the same time converting his passionate tendency for himself and the world into a selfless and "divine" love.[41]

Knowledge and Truth

Closely associated with knowledge is the issue of truth and how to find it. Clement here tackles the problem arising from the attempt to interpret the true tradition as handed down by the apostles and by the teachings of Christ. His solution is an awkwardly axiomatic but reasonable statement that what is subject to interpretation and criticism cannot be a first principle (Str. 7.95.5-6). This is an irreducible and self-evident fact to him. He then advances to the inevitable conclusion that we can grasp by faith the indemonstrable first principle which he equates with truth and God.

Truth for Clement is a reality that resides outside of the world. The present world is subject to change and corruption (Str. 7.30.2). Truth is eternal and changeless, identified with God. Truth is the real being; it is God. All truth has as its criterion and measure God (Protr. 1.69.1). Truth being God does not stay in itself but comes into the world. Truth is "eternal food" (Str. 5.70.1) and he who attains to it and distinguishes himself in good works shall gain the prize of everlasting life (QDS. 1.4). Doubting truth ends up in the opposite, that is, death and destruction (Str. 4.8.3-4). Because God did not wish to abandon man after his fall, He allowed him to have some truth. This kindness on the part of God explains the traces of truth to be found in Greek philosophy. Since philosophy is a search for the truth and the nature of things, it is not totally ignorant of truth (Str. 1.32.4). In philosophy itself there is truth, and true beauty (Str. 6.150.6). The truth of philosophy is not only the product of investigation "from below" by man; it is also divine grace given to the Greeks from above.[42] But this truth in philosophy is mixed with many lies and much error. Philosophy contains a part of truth; it is not itself the truth (Str. 1.87.1). How can we distinguish the truth from the lies in philosophy? Clement's answer needs no great elaboration: through the revealed truth by Christ Who is the only true phil-

[40] QDS 28-29.6.

[41] Str. 4.113.4; 5.13.2; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 489, n. 1.

[42] Str. 1.20.1; 6.67.1; 7.12.4-5. That philosophy is a gift of God to the Greeks as preparation to higher knowledge is a new idea in Christian theology, Stählin, *Einleitung* 558-59.

osophy (Str. 6.58.2). When one realizes that Christ as the Son of God is our true teacher, he is convinced that Christ's teaching is truth (Str. 5.85.2). Thus Clement answers a difficult problem without the need to analyze it thoroughly. Without Christ's revelation there cannot be full knowledge of truth, and without the full knowledge of truth there can be no knowledge. The Greek philosophers themselves are intellectually infants if they have not been made men by Christ (Str. 1.53.1-2).

On the other hand, those who are afraid of philosophy and avoid it resemble children who are afraid that phantoms may abduct them (Str. 6.80.5). Here Clement attempts to combine his admiration for Greek education with the newly revealed truth. Philosophy, according to him, is not only the method for the development and understanding of the Christian truth but it also contains truth. Philosophy thus becomes necessary for the better understanding of truth because it serves as the underpinning of Christian theory (Str. 6. 62.1). Clement's view constitutes a scathing criticism of the opponents of Greek education. If one can know the truth about Christ, he feels, he can more readily grasp it with the knowledge of Greek philosophy (Str. 1.178.1). The dialectician proceeds with his ascent to the hierarchy of essences, forms, or powers until he climbs, as Plato did, to the highest essence of all, the ultimate reality which is the Good or God. To this Platonic dialectic process Clement added the element of faith. Faith and dialectic joined together and led to knowledge of reality and to the real God, although not the God of Platonic intellectualism. Thus Clement does not stray too far from Greek philosophy which seeks to know God through human effort, relying on an innate original communion between man and heaven (Protr. 25.3). We can say that as Christ came to fulfill the Law so Clement sought to fulfill Greek philosophy with revelation. In this respect he saw no antithesis between the two, despite his occasional protests about philosophy, and contrary to the many reservations and fears expressed by many of his contemporaries.[43] In essence, Clement reemphasized the "likeness" between God and the world and the continuity between creation and redemption. Greek philosophy therefore accomplished two most important tasks: first it prepared its students for the reception of the Christian message, the true philosophy, Truth itself. In a typical Heracleitean fashion Clement again reminds us that this truth can be known only by a select few and is the object of esoteric knowledge. The teacher of this knowledge is the historical Christ, the incarnation of the Divine Logos. Those who want to become gnostics must study and take into account philosophy (Str. 2.45.6). Granted that even without philosophy a person can become a gnostic, but philosophy makes it easier to achieve this goal since it provides the background for the right interpretation of the Scriptures. This leads to the second task philosophy performs: it becomes the key to

[43] Str. 6.80.5; Farantos, *Peri Dykaiosynês*, 30.

the disclosure of the inner meaning of the Scriptures."

Those who accept the bond between philosophy and revelation become trained to the knowledge of truth (Str. 7.95.6). Truth which is accepted as knowledge is not a simple statement which may also recognize ignorance; that type of truth is simply an opinion. What is stated by men must be proved by the voice of God, the only demonstration Clement accepts as valid. The voice of God is in the Bible and in the tradition passed onto us by the apostles and their disciples. This tradition was a body of sayings and doings ascribed to the apostles which was universally accepted by the Christians of Clement's time. Living in the sub-apostolic era, so close to the founders of the new religion, Clement realized that Bible and tradition were the only interpretations of truth he held as authentic (Str. 7.95.3). Those who had merely tasted (ἀπογευσάμενοι) the Scriptures he classified as believers, whereas those who had advanced further and had become correct expounders of the truth were the gnostics. As in life craftsmen are superior to ordinary people and can model beyond the common man's ability, so those who give a complete proof of the Scriptures based on their faith in the Scriptural writings themselves can best persuade with their demonstrations the common man (Str .7.96.1).

Beyond the definition of truth and knowledge as the scientific possession of what is good and unchangeable, things divine and human (Paed. 2.25.3; Str. 7.70), truth and knowledge are also described as the rational guide that leads the spirit away from the passions and death and into the path of good-doing.[45] This type of knowledge pilots to the infinite and perfect end, showing men the future life they will lead according to God "among other Gods," by which he means among other gnostics (Str. 7.56.4). Knowledge is quick in purifying and transforming a person. With ease it removes the soul to what is akin to the soul and by its own light conveys man through mystic stages until he can gaze on God face to face (πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον) with understanding and comprehension (Str. 7.57.1). In this understanding consists the perfection of the gnostic soul, because this understanding means that the soul is with the Lord, and so the soul is also in immediate subjection to him (Str. 7.57.1-2). While faith is a comprehensive knowledge of the essentials, knowledge itself is the strong and sure demonstration of what is received by faith from God's teaching, conveying the soul on to infallibility, science, and comprehension (Str. 7.56.2-3).This knowledge terminates in love-giving and in turning the loved from that which is unknown to that which is known, making the knowing one a creature equal to angels (ἰσάγγελος).[46]

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[44] Lilla Salvatore, *Clement of Alexandreia, A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford Univ. Press) 57

[45] Str. 7.71.3; SC ad loc. n.2; Plat. Phaed. 67 D. Clement uses here Plato's reference and gives it a Christian twist.

[46] Str. 7.78.6; SC ad loc. n. 1; I Thess. 4.17.

It is therefore impossible for those who are still under the direction of passions to receive true knowledge of God, and if they have no true knowledge of God they do not have any final hope. The person who fails to attain this end is liable to the charge of ignorance of God, an ignorance which is displayed by one's way of living (Str. 3.43.1). The conduct of one's life reveals him who knows and follows the commandments, the very light that is in us.[47] Knowledge is a form of divine understanding and light, engendered in the soul from obedience to the commandments, which makes everything clear and enables man to know himself and God. For knowledge stands to the mind as the eye to the body.[48] That is the reason Clement considered faith "cultivated" by knowledge as worth more than "simple" faith (Str. 1.43.1-3). His distinction between cultivated and simple faith seems to concern those Christians who in reacting against the rationalism of heterodoxists went to the extreme in underlining only simple faith as the basic ingredient of salvation and perfection. They rejected the learning of philosophy and natural science, (φυσικῆς θεωρίας), to the chagrin of Clement who, though himself critical of the pagan beliefs of the Greeks, found their education nonetheless conducive to the better understanding of the Christian truths. Hence his intriguing comment that to demand faith alone without knowledge is as if one wished to gather grapes immediately, without bestowing care on the vine (Str. 1.43.1) But he who directs everything towards an upright life, procuring examples from the Greeks and barbarians, is an experienced searcher after the truth and a man of wisdom possessing the qualities of the Lydian stone which was believed to have the power of distinguishing the spurious from the genuine gold. The true and knowledgeable gnostic can distinguish sophistry from philosophy, rhetoric from dialectic, truth from a lie.[49]

Clement considers the ability to distinguish among these intellectual differences as well as between expressions of double meaning whether in philosophy or in the Bible as very important. Even Christ, when questioned, sought to answer occasionally by expressions of double meanings. Consequently, knowledge of philosophy is important because it enables a person to avoid deception by ambiguity and helps him attain to the supreme knowledge that frees him from restrictions; it metamorphoses him into a perfect moral entity.[50] What Clement wishes for the Christian here is the achievement of the Christian ethos and of personal distinctiveness and freedom. This can be realized if only man can effect a change in his mode

[47] Str. 3.44.2; Ferguson *Stromateis* ad. loc.

[48] Str. 3.44. 3; Aristl. Nic. Eth. 1.4. 1096 b.

[49] Str. 1.44.2. Clement here clearly alludes to the celebrated passage of Plat. Gorg. 465 C where Plato calls pseudo-knowledge (τέχνην)

[50] Str. 1.44.4; Matt. 4.4.

of existence, the end-result of the realization of the Christian message. Clement's gnostic must free himself from the oppressive claims of his individual nature which binds him to the weaknesses and the impersonal survival of the species. Only through this liberation from natural necessity can the Christian man exist as a distinctive personality in a life with Christ, a life of love. Only by this road of freedom can man achieve his likeness to God and become a gnostic. And only by becoming a gnostic will man achieve the reality of unity with the good that will free him from corruption and death. Essential to the achievement of this goal is that the Christian understand fully the prophets and apostles, especially since some of their sayings have a hidden meaning which demands skill in understanding (Str. 1.45.1).

Clement realizes at this point that he may be falling into the trap of contradiction because the apostles and prophets were demonstrably lacking in formal education. He seeks to escape from this predicament by pointing out that the prophets and the apostles knew infallibly the meaning of what the spirit had said in a way that others cannot easily know it. Hence, he concludes that it is not for those without knowledge to explain casually the prophets and the apostles (Str. 1.45.2). Knowledge will also help the gnostic to identify what is safe and good with what seems dreadful in appearance, though not necessarily in reality. This identification enables him to know what is truly to be dreaded and that which is dreaded because of a false opinion rather than its truth. So he discriminates intelligently what the Word intimates to him as requisite and necessary, and really safe for him: that is, what is good from what appears to be so.[51] Pursuing Plato's thought, Clement avers that it is from ignorance of what is and what is not to be dreaded that man acts. Therefore, the only man of courage is the gnostic who knows present and future good things and the things to be dreaded. Since the gnostic knows that vice (κακά) is alone hateful and destructive, he makes war against it.[52] Clement's distinction between of dreaded and non-dreaded things provides him with the opportunity to express his reservation about those "martyrs" who precipitously exposed themselves to danger and to praise those, who when called by God, surrendered themselves promptly to martyrdom in the exercise of rational fortitude, simply obeying the call from a love of God.[53]

[51] Str. 7.65.1-3. SC ad loc. ns 5-6; SVF 3.117; Plat. Lach. 198 B-199 D; Prot. 359 D - 360 E; Clement follows here Plat. Menex. 247 E; Rep. 436 B.

[52] Str. 7.65.6; SC ad loc n. 5; CAF Adesp. 245; Plat. Prot. 360 C: οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη; Plat. Lach. 197 A-B.

[53] Str. 7.66.4; SC ad loc. n.5; Plat. 68 D. Since even those who endure punishment for the sake of delight and reward may be blessed after death, a concession on the part of Clement to the idea that Christians should not do things for the sake of reward. Gnostics live for the love of God, not for the expectation of rewards. Love is to be chosen for itself not for anything else, Str. 7.67.1; SC ad loc. ns 4-7; Plat. Phaed. 68 D.

Virtue, Knowledge and Theosis

In a way Clement seems to believe that virtue is the inclination to hunt for the best and the disposition of the soul to regard everything in life in the light of reason.[54] To a limited degree virtue is inherent because every man by nature possesses the ability to perfectibility. Even though we do not originally possess virtue we have the propensity for it (Str. 6.95.5). This natural propensity man must develop through training and learning, turning it into an activity that dominates the passions (Paed. 1.16.1-3). When man becomes the master of his passions he becomes virtuous. Clement inclines to believe that once an individual has achieved virtue he is not very likely to lose it, though he recognizes that the maintenance of virtue requires constant vigilance. The theory that a person can become perfect in virtue is wrong since virtue is the voluntary and conscious effort toward the perfect (Paed. 1.34.1-2). If nature affords us the possibility of near perfection in virtue, it is only as an act of will developed through learning and training, which is achieved in a different degree by different persons.[55] Clement does not forget to add, however, that the most essential part in the achievement of virtue is God's grace and help. The propensity to virtue is the objective factor while the perfection through training is the subjective element. Without these two factors there is no attainment of virtue. Yet the two factors are not enough for the development of virtue because both factors are of this world. If they were sufficient man would not need God's help. He could achieve virtue by himself. Thus virtue is not only moral perfection, it is also to a great extent a divine contribution. Here again Clement's thinking remains consistent with the Christian theory as he distances himself from the Greek ideal of virtue which emphasized primarily the human element. Clement does not deny man's freedom of the will in the accomplishment of virtue, but points out that this accomplishment is not possible without God.[56]

In a similar vein, Clement stresses that growth in virtue is not something done because of the perfectible hopes to acquire something in

[54] Protr. 61.4; Paed. 1.101.2; SVF 3.293 which relates to 262; SVF 2.36 and note; Plat. Rep. 4.444 D-E; Phaed. 279 B-C; Phil. 52. B. Virtue for Plato is not the impeccable conduct of citizen in his private or public life nor the avoidance of extremes in the Aristotelian meaning. The essence of virtue goes deeper. In Plato's view important is man's beauty and power of soul (Rep. 4.444 D-E) and likeness to God. These must be the primary targets of the good man's efforts and of the responsible political leader. All other values are judged from their contribution to the moral betterment of man (Phaedr. 279 B-C). Only the salvation of the soul, the providential preservation of that treasure which lies hidden inside man, must be the aim of life. In this resides the true happiness and pleasure which only the few, the eclectic are in a position to taste (Phil. 52.B).

[55] Str. 6.96.3; Plat. Phaed. 69 C; F. J. Winter, *Die Ethic des Clements von Alexandrien* (Leipzig, 1882) 127.

[56] Str. 4.124. 2-3; 6.157.4.

this world, though there might be beneficial offshoots from this attainment. Neither happiness nor worldly goods are the object of the virtuous person, as they are in Greek philosophy. The ultimate aim of this perfection is being with God which produces the real happiness.[57] This happiness of the gnostic obtains even when external conditions for him are not so fortunate. The virtuous is internally calm and lives at peace with God; consequently, he is in peace with the world and himself. Virtue thus leads to likeness with God (Str. 6.114.6). The gnostic becomes similar to God, to paraphrase Heracleitus, because he wills what God wills.[58]

That it is Greek philosophical thought that Clement paraphrases in Christian terms becomes obvious from a quick survey of Plato's treatment of the subject and from the very fact that Clement himself does not hesitate to refer occasionally to Plato's theory of man's perfection. A brief discussion of Plato's religious ideas will sufficiently demonstrate the dependence of Clement gnostic model on Plato's theory of the "ideal" person. The teachings of Plato (no distinction between Socratic and Platonic ideas is made here; this is not a study on Plato) can be summarized in three quick propositions: his description of the perfection; man's moral autonomy and self-sufficiency; and man's self-knowledge which unmistakably leads to the inner understanding of the basic principles of the good. Plato believed that virtue was knowledge (Lach. 194 D) and that when one possesses the knowledge of good, he will try to follow it in his life.[59] Evil for Plato is not part of human nature (he will modify this view in some of his later works) but of human ignorance. In opposition, human nature is not voluntarily evil.[60] His conviction was that reason is capable of perfecting humanity. He thus presents Socrates as adhering to this proposition and as dedicating his life to it.

Plato's conviction has a rationalist basis, though the mystic, the religious, element is not absent from it. Yet Plato's rationalism should not be confused with the ideal of the Enlightenment. His idea was not the possession of knowledge as the proponents of the Enlightenment presented rational knowledge but a total development of one's personality under the guidance of reason, by which he means the spirit as a superior, guiding principle. This coinherence of reason and spirit is what Plato calls the "true harmony" (Lach. 188 D), the pairing of words and deeds, which Plato so admired in the character of Socrates (Apol. 33 A).

[57] Paed. 2.121.2-3; Str. 5.95.4. Clement seems to respond here to the Hellenic idea that the good person should also be looking good in his outside from, i. e. fortunate in life.

[58] E. F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandreia* (Cambridge, 1957) 93-94.

[59] Plat. Meno 77 B; Prot. 352 C; Gorg. 440 B.

[60] Plat. Prot. 345 E; Laws 5.731 C; 9.860 D.

The program in the life of Socrates, Socrates' own perfection, the perfection of his fellow citizens he so ardently pursued, his zeal in the accomplishment of this ideal have a missionary, religious tinge about them. His steady faith in the idea that a divine reason governs the world and puts order and shape to all points to the fact that Socrates was a person of a deeply religious nature who believed that only when man surrenders voluntarily his own self to reason and its dictates he allows the divine proclivities in him to reveal themselves.[61] How is this religiosity reconciled with Socrates' rationalism? Socrates lived the "feeling of mystery." He realized that the human ability for knowledge was not unlimited.[62] This side of his character is evinced by his faith in the δαιμόνιον, that strange inner voice which turned him away from doing something at crucial moments of his life.[63] He believed that this voice was the command of the divine. He could not rationally explain it and concluded that it must have been of divine origin. The assumption led him also to the belief in the prophetic meaning of dreams.[64] His belief in the prophetic character of dreams is the "revenge of mysticism against rationalism."[65]

The philosopher pays no attention to beauty, riches, bodily rigor, political power, and glory, things that the common people admire. He disdains such possessions because they are not conducive to the improvement of his soul.[66] He preoccupies himself only with spiritual things that motivate the soul to look upwards and preaches the gospel of "refuge" from the world which he understands as "likeness to God." (Plat. Theaet. 176 A-B). He is possessed by a burning desire for the paternal home, that is the divine kingdom. He feels as stranger in the visible world of evil and desires to elevate himself to the divine eternal kingdom. The fundamental presupposition for the accomplishment of this task is for him to deny decisively the body with its senses and to fly with the wings of spirit to our heavenly country. When man accomplishes this goal, he will come close to God.

This incessant struggle that Plato felt was also felt later by another religious personality (Rom. 7.22-25).The Pauline struggle between the law of his body and mind Plato ascribes to two different worlds. On the one hand is the kingdom of God and eternal being; on the other, the world of nature and sinfulness. The soul belongs to the first, the body to the second. The soul strives to elevate itself to heavens; the body ties it to the earth. The difference between the Platonic and Pauline view lies in the fact that Paul expected redemption from the grace of God, while Plato expected man to

[61] Plat. Apol. 41 C-D; Phaed. 62 D.
[62] Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1901) 453.
[63] Apol. 40 B; Phaedr. 242 B-C; Theaet. 151 A.
[64] Crito 44 A-C; Phaed. 60 C.
[65] K. Joel, *Geschichte der antiquen Philosophy* (Tübingen, 1921) 817.
[66] Plat. Rep. 6. 491 C; 7. 519 B; 9.591 D.

fight for his own salvation. Both, however, agree that man should try his best not to allow the enslavement of the soul by the body. Both concur that the destiny of our life is to leave this life.

Only through death of the body the soul manages to live its own life. Conversely, the soul dies when human corporeality grows. For man to partake of the eternal life, which only befits the soul, man must die as to the body; he must free himself of his earthly life. Death is the freeing of the soul from the body and its physical demands (Phaed. 64 C; 67 D). This happens only when the body's physical demise is achieved, and the soul is freed from the body. This is indeed the liberation from the body that the philosopher anticipates since it frees him from sensual pleasures and deadens his desires (Phaed. 64 D; 65 B). In the former case, death is not an evil, as people commonly believe but the desired goal (Phaed. 68 D; 65 B; 83 A). Philosophy then can be defined as the study and the exercise of death.[67]

Plato therefore stresses the nostalgic expectations of death that characterizes people of strong religious propensities. It is a feature of the deeply religious natures of all times and in all sorts of civilizations that they are not terrified by death. On the contrary, they make it the center of their life's theory. Death not only as physical dissipation of the body, but also death in life, that is the moral mortality of the sinful body, opens up the road to another life where the troubles of earthly life are not counted, and where eternal happiness always shines. An understanding God, full of love and kindness has destined and invited man to this happiness. Man will reach this destiny if he makes it the main objective of his life by acting in accordance of the philosophical ideals.[68] This ideal has no relation to earthly happiness; it supervenes it. It is man's perfection, his likeness to God.[69] Man's guide towards this goal is not only the measure set by himself, but the measure also set by God for man's thought and action (Plat. Laws 4. 716 C), a position contrary to that of Protagoras. The true philosopher who stands closer to God lives as if in a cloud that passes over the earth, Plato says quoting Pindar.[70] Pluto, Plato continues, must be honored of all gods because it bestows upon man the most wishful thing: death (Rep. 8.828 D). Coward and slave is he who is afraid of death. The accomplished philosopher does not consider death fearful (δεινόν). On the contrary, it is life that is fearful (Gorg. 492 E).

[67] Phaed. 80 C - 81 A; 67 E; Rep. 6. 488 B; 492 E.

[68] Tim. 90 A; Rep. 6.490 B; 10.611 E; Laws 10.899 D.

[69] Phaed. 82. B-C; Rep. 2.383 C; 6. 498 E; 10.613 B; Theaet. 176 B; Tim. 41 C; 69 A-C; 71 D-E; 90 C.

[70] Theaet. 173 E τᾶς τε γᾶς ὑπέρνεθε ... οὐρανοῦ θ' ὕπερ; *Pindari Carmina*, OCT, fr. 302a ; Rep. 1.500. B-C; Soph. 216 C.

It was mentioned above that Plato intimates that man cannot understand the divine solely with the aid of reason, a position with which Clement wholeheartedly would later concur. Reason cannot go that far. This leap can be made only by him who has been given divine inspiration (θείαν ἐπίπνοιαν) and grace. Only he can experience such a *contemplatio sui generis*. One could call this leap upwards "divine logos" or theory, (θεωρία).[71] What one feels inside him is impossible to explain in human terms (Rep. 6. 509 A). This feeling which amounts to the possession of the soul by the divine, creates in the possessed an ineffable state that Plato understood when he called it "divine madness," created by the gods.[72] Only few are given this privilege to divine madness (Phaedr. 69 C-D). For this reason the many consider the philosopher who is possessed by this ecstatic mania a fool. (Phaedr. 249 D). But this "fool" experiences directly the miracle of the power that possessed him and lifts him from earth to heaven. In this heaven he lives the indescribable sensation of internal transformation. He feels that wings grow in his soul. His soul finds itself in a flood of passion and is filled with joy, throbbing like a fevered pulse (Phaedr. 252 D). She tastes a pleasure which is sweet beyond compare (Phaedr. 252 D).

By the use of this simile Plato endeavors to describe the erotic suffering of the philosopher's soul for the divine and to define what he means by divine madness, which he identifies with the religious experience. This experience produces pain and happiness. Pain is caused by the realization of one's imperfections, while happiness is caused when he finally attains that which he dreams of, the saturation of his soul by the holy and its emotional wrenching by a superhuman force that makes man similar to God. All these characteristics of the mystical religious experience Plato portrays symbolically with the madness, the divine eros.

The soul is redeemed through eros, because through it it tastes happiness; through it it plunges in the "ocean of the good" (Symp. 210 D). Through eros it attains the direct view of the eternal, pure, and beautiful (Symp. 211 A) which is also the Supreme Good, the Pure Truth, God Himself (Phaedr. 249 D). Thus it is freed from its pain; enjoys the decorous pleasure; and finds at last life worth living .[73]

Clement, like Plato above, affirms that the few are the chosen, the bacchoi, who are initiated in the divine mystery of virtue and knowledge; they are those inspired by God, the true philosophers. In contrast, most of the people do not enter into the sacred mysteries of philosophy. They are those who stay at the entrance (ναρθηκοφόροι) and, like the plain worship-

[71] Phaed. 85 D; Rep. 7. 517 D; Tim. 28 C.

[72] Phaedr. 244 A-D; 245 B; 256 B.

[73] Symp. 211 D; Phaedr. 249 C; 245 B-C; R. Lagersborg, *Die Platonische Liebe* (Leipzig, 1926) 115 for the mystical, religious significance in Plato.

pers of Dionysus, carry only the external symbols of worship, like the rod from the plant narthex.[74] This difference between the many and the few in regard to philosophy Clement relates to the saying of the gospel that those invited are many but the chosen are few.

The same selectivity pertains to faith which is also the privilege of the few. This is logical since faith is the base on which knowledge is built.[75] It is not far fetched to conclude from Clement's observations that he is here also critical of the Gnostics, or some of them at least. His description of the elect as those who abandoned evil habits may be an indirect criticism of those sects of Gnostics who resorted to all sorts of immoral activities on the premise that being elect they could not be touched by evil. Clement clearly implies that the adherents of immorality, Gnostics or not, are neither elect nor gnostics in his sense of the word.[76] He rejects unreservedly the Gnostic theory that man is saved by nature. He considers this theory false from the Christian standpoint and contradictory to the Gnostics' own theories.[77] Because the true Christian gnostic believes that the world is the creation of the good God, he uses the world's goods as a means of his moral improvement. In contrast, many of the "elect" of Gnosticism believed that the world is the creation of a lower divinity, hostile to their nature. This misconception led them to two extremes. Some of these Gnostics avoided the goods of the world owing to their extreme continence, whereas others over utilized the material goods in complete disregard of morality.[78] By taking this position they felt they showed contempt for the creator god, his creatures and his laws (Str. 3.34.1-4). Clement's gnostic shows disregard for the material goods only when they become an impediment to his salvation. His attitude to material goods springs from his knowledge of God's commands recognizing that through this knowledge he partakes of the divine will and becomes a child of God, οἰκεῖος, (Str. 7.78.4-5). The Gnostic elect stands apart of the world not through the knowledge of the commands of God and his respect for them but through his natural choice for salvation.

In a somewhat over optimistic fashion Clement believes that all the Christian wise men know that there exist many unintelligible things in the world but that the gnostic understands them whereas the non-gnostic does not. The difference is owing to God's assistance. It would have been incongruous for him who suffered for man out of love to hide anything which is conducive to man's knowledge, a statement contradictory to his criticism of the Gnostic sects (Str. 7.68.1). Such a statement can be justified

[74] Str. 1.92.3-4; Plat. Phaed. 69.C-D; Str.5.17.4-5.

[75] Str. 6.126.2; 7.57.2-4; SC ad loc ns. 8 and 1-7; Matt. 5.8; I Cor. 13.12; I Thess. 4.17.

[76] Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 270; K. Rudolf, *Gnosis. The Nature and History of Gnosticism* (New York, 1987) 249-50.

[77] Str. 2.113. 1-114.6; 2.115.1-2; Str. 7.40.1; SC ad loc. ns. 5-6 and 1-2.

[78] Str. 3.8.1-2; 9.2-3; 12.1-3; 54.1; 45.1-2; 7.78.1-3; SC ad loc. ns. 1-3.

only on the premise that Clement relied more on faith for the acquisition of that knowledge than the Gnostics who spoke of illumination (Str. 6.68.2; 8.5.4). He relies on his conviction that knowledge stems from the belief that Christ's revelation given to the apostles is complete, and that the apostles, versed as they were in this complete knowledge, are the first gnostics. The same is true of those who followed them and who interpret the Scriptures as authentically as the apostles.[79] The inference is again that Christ could not have concealed anything from his disciples, or they from theirs. The practical outcome of this knowledge is good works, a conclusion with which neither Plato, nor Aristotle, or other Greek philosophers would have disagreed, their emphasis on knowledge notwithstanding.[80] The accent on knowledge by Clement may be due to his effort to balance his former emphasis on faith in opposition to the Gnostic who underrated faith in comparison to knowledge. What Clement may be trying to show here is that the true Christians accepted faith as the cornerstone of their belief, without ignoring the importance of knowledge. No doubt Clement is also influenced by or reacting to Plato and Philo here. The first viewed knowledge of God as the aim and end of life without any reference to faith; the second underrated faith in relation to knowledge.[81] Philosophy in general emphasized the importance of knowledge and its beneficial effects.[82] Clement himself recognized the significance of Greek education, and would not have wished to leave the impression that he was casting aspersion on its value, because of his concern for faith. After all, the purpose for which we were created, says Clement, is to reach the knowledge of God (Paed. 2.14.6). The knowledge of God is in accord with the divine will and becomes "communion with immortality".[83]

Knowledge, the Few, and the Many

The Greeks believed that knowledge and truth were the privilege of the few.[84] Clement, as we have already seen, agrees with this notion, but he proceeds to say that the knowledge of God is impossible in this life and that only the pure in heart will see God when they reach perfection. He who lives in ignorance is sinning, but he who lives in knowledge of the truth is equal to God because he is spiritualized, therefore elect (Str. 4.168.2). Knowledge becomes a light which when used properly by man disperses the darkness of lies and ignorance (Protr. 77.3). With the weapons of true

[79] Str. 4.75.1-4; Str. 7.52.1-2; SC ad loc. ns. 3-6.

[80] Str. 6.99.5; QDS 19.3-5; Plat. Rep. 2. 362 E; Gorg. 500 D; 501 A; Aristl. Met. 983b 12-28.

[81] Str. 1.100.3-4; Plat. Phaedr. 266 B; Theaet. 176 B; Philo De Vit. Mos. 7.22.

[82] Str. 6.99.1-3; Paed. 2.15.4; Plat. Soph.230 E.

[83] Str. 4.27.3; John 17.3.

[84] Str. 5.7.6; 5.17.4-6; Plat. Rep. 6. 494 D; Epim. 973C; Phaed. 69 C.

knowledge the gnostic fights off the force of evil (Str. 2.111. 2-3). By this knowledge the gnostic begets strength which enables him to work his own salvation and that of others.[85] The knowledge of Christ, renders the gnostic close to God and makes him a partner of the divine power and nature.[86]

Once again Clement does not reject the pagan knowledge, but taking his cue from Heracleitus who said that the philosophers must be knowledgeable of many things and mindful of Protagoras for whom a logical argument should always be opposed by another logical argument, he concludes that the gnostic Christian should be well grounded in everything to answer properly and at all times.[87] Christian knowledge is thus a mixture of the Scriptures and pagan philosophy, a mixture whose aim is the realization of the will of God and one's salvation thereby. Thus, knowledge has also a practical end.[88] Knowledge and experience are associated with virtuous life since they help us distinguish between correct and false life and know the past and foresee the future as it relates to our salvation . A man's virtue demonstrates his relation to goodness and since goodness is God virtue denotes a relationship of man to God. Virtue then is the participation of man in the goodness of God. Beyond this type of virtue there is no true virtue. The autonomous virtue is false because it is alienated from its source, which is God. The pursuit of virtue has as its result the transfiguration of life, not merely a change in external behavior, "except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God" (John 3.3). The rebirth of man requires a mode of existence wherein life is realized as communion in love and relationship. Christianity then as well as pagan education became for Clement the sources from which he drew for the formulation of his own ideas about the wise man whom he contrasted to the wise man of the philosophers (Str. 1.37.6). Understandably, Clement's gnostic is the perfect type of man since this gnostic conducts himself according to human reason and more particularly according to the Logos revealed to us by God. Clement also contrasts his gnostic to the ideal man of the Gnostic system. His gnostic is the knower and participant of the divine activities and qualities whose aim is the perfection and salvation of man (Paed. 3.101.1-2). Such perfection is accomplished by the study of the divine way of life and conduct, that is, by doing what is pleasant to God. This divine activity is the outgrowth of the knowledge of God, which is likened to the sun and light in contrast to the darkness of ignorance (Protr. 77. 2-3). This knowledge of God the Christian receives through the revel-

[85] Str. 2.122.1; 3.42.6-43.1.

[86] Str. 7.44.5; SC ad loc. ns 5 and 1; Str. 2.96.4-97.2; R. Casey, *The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria* (Clement, 1934) 10 on exc. 17.3-4.

[87] Str. 7.46.9 - 47.1; SC ad loc. ns. 4-5; Plat. Rep. 2, 361 C-D; Phil. 64.C; Apol. 30 C-D; Epict. *Enchir.* 53; Disc. 2.23. 42.

[88] Str. 2.97; 4.147.1; 7.86.1-6; SC ad loc. ns.2-8; I Cor. 6.9; Gal. 3.24; I Cor. 6. 11; Matt. 5.45.

ation of the Holy Spirit, the agent that spoke to the prophets (Protr. 78.1).

There is another way in which knowledge of philosophy is useful. That is because by it one can comprehend natural science which treats all phenomena in the world of sense. This knowledge constitutes the first step by which the spirit elevates itself to the knowledge of God.[89] For those who are really interested in the truth, knowledge is the purification of the soul (Str. 4.39.1).

He who trained himself to the summit of knowledge and the elevated height of the perfect man obviously made it his choice to live infallibly and to subject himself to constant training for the attainment of the steadfastness of knowledge (Str. 7.46.7). By this attainment his habit of doing good has become nature (virtue) and through the exercise of the will by the force of reason and care, virtue is incapable of being lost (Str. 7.47.3) Knowledge also teaches us to perceive all things that are capable of contributing to the permanence of virtue. The highest contributor is the knowledge of God. And he who knows God is holy and pious (ὅσιος and εὐσεβής, Str. 7.47. 2-3) and is in command of himself and what belongs to him. Since he has a firm grasp of divine science (θείας ἐπιστήμης) he makes a genuine approach to the truth (Str. 7.17.1). The knowledge and apprehension of intellectual objects must be called firm scientific knowledge whose divine function is to consider the First Cause, namely God, by "Whom all things were made, and without Whom nothing was made" and to further consider what is joined and what is disjoined, and the position each object holds and what power and service each contributes.[90] He who has no knowledge of good is wicked (πονηρός). There is only one good, the Father, and to be ignorant of the Father is death, whereas to know Him is eternal life.[91] Paraphrasing Plato, Clement points out that knowledge is the "eating" and "drinking" of the divine Word.[92]

For Clement there is a distinction between wisdom acquired through learning and the wisdom which comes from some kind of natural disposition (ἐνδιάθετον). He does not belabor the degree to which the natural disposition benefits from the learning experiences in life outside of formal education. He does not evaluate the extent of natural wisdom as against the acquired (ἐπίκτητος). He seems to incline toward the view that the acquisition of virtues is a combination of knowledge and training which

[89] Str. 7.17.1-3; SC ad loc. ns 6-8 and 1-3; John 1.3; Origen, *Contr. Celsus* 6.71; Prot. 66.3 with note in SC; Str. 1.51.1-52.3; 5.14.1-8; SVF 2.1039.

[90] Str. 7. 17.2; SC ad loc. ns. 7-8.

[91] Str. 5. 63.8; Rom. 1.11. Perhaps there is an anti-Gnostic thrust in this passage, see Comm. to Clement's reference above.

[92] Str. 1.43.1-4; 5.66.2-4 (βρῶμα δὲ ἡ ἐποπτικὴ θεωρία); Plat. Letter 7. 341 C 6-D 2; Rep.II, 378 A 5-6. Plato speaks of the searcher for God as the great and invaluable victim. Similarly Paul says that in our Pascha Christ sacrificed Himself for us, thus becoming the invaluable victim, I Cor. 5-6; John 17.19. See also SC comm. ad 5.66.2 ff.

ends up in a kind of habit-forming disposition toward the good. Knowledge is not innate in men but it is acquired, that is, attained by a process which requires long training, application, and progress (Str. 6.78. 3). Then through incessant practice it passes into the habit of virtue. When perfected, virtue becomes infallible inasmuch as its possessor has apprehended the First Cause and what is produced by it, and is sure about them. He also knows what is good and evil and has learned from his apprehension of the truth, which is God, the most exact truth from the beginning of the world to the end (Str. 6.78. 4).

While Clement says that faith is indispensable and nothing is above it, elsewhere he intimates that knowledge is the highest good (Str. 6.109.2). Not simply the believer but the gnostic believer is the righteous man. After a circuitous argument Clement ends up admitting the interdependence of knowledge and faith. Real faith cannot exist without knowledge and knowledge without faith. On this premise, Clement concludes that the nature of the beneficent is to do good and a good person will not do evil as evil cannot result in aught virtuous. Philosophy is not the product of vice since it makes men virtuous (Str. 6.159.6; 1.80.5). It follows then that philosophy is the work of God, whose work is solely to do good by making men virtuous. Further proof of the beneficent character of philosophy is that its practice does not belong to the wicked but was accorded to the best of the Greeks and that it was bestowed upon them manifestly from Providence which assigns to each what is befitting in accordance with his deserts (Str. 6.159.8).

By a similar, somewhat circuitous argument, Clement intends to answer the question posed to the Christians by the Gnostics as to whether Adam was created perfect or imperfect. The question really shows how overriding to the Gnostics was the issue of the real creator of this universe. For if Adam was created imperfect how can he be the work of a perfect God? If perfect, how then did this perfect being transgress God's commandments? (Str. 6.96.1).

Clement tries to escape the dilemma by counter-proposing that Adam was not perfect in his creation, but adapted to the reception of virtue. He considers it of great importance in regard to virtue for men to be made fit for its attainment (Str. 6.92.2-3). Here knowledge helps since we are rational beings and philosophy is a rational study. Therefore we have some strong affinity to education by which we improve ourselves to the point of attaining the perfection Clement visualized for the gnostic person. It is true that some men are more apt to attain perfect virtue and others some kind of it, particularly since some of them apply themselves more and others less to training in virtue.[93]

[93] Str. 6.96.3; 2.5.1-4; Plut. Mor. 2; Aristl. *De part. anim.* 1.1. 13, 642 a 27; Met. 5.1.8 (1025b 17).

Exercise in virtue leads to perfection, but this perfection, which is assumed to be the most desirable and highest thing, is not identical with God. Clement rejects the theory of the Stoics that virtue in God and man is the same.[94] Such a theory is impious because it presents man as God, thereby reducing the uniqueness of the unattainability of God's perfection. Though the gnostic may be perfect, his perfection should not be equated with the perfection of God as it is impossible for any one to become as perfect as God.[95] Human perfection is relative and is understood as a blameless living in full compliance with the gospel. Certainly one could argue that there might be a logical error on the part of Clement here since perfection is an absolute, but Clement tried his best to express in human terms the perfection of the Christian man vis-à-vis the perfection of God. The relativity of human perfection leads Clement to the discussion of still another facet of the gnostic concept of human affections.

Affections or Passions

Clement considers the gnostic qua human as subject to human affections such as hunger and thirst, which are necessary for the maintenance of the body. Somehow Clement is trying to draw a distinction between human needs and the spiritual status of the gnostic on earth, but his views at this point get him in muddled waters and even the Church later refused to entertain the implications of his argument. Clement rejects as ludicrous the supposition that Christ's body qua flesh required the necessary aids for its maintenance. He thus concludes that Christ did not in reality need to eat, being a God, but that he ate not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order to avoid creating the impression on those who were with Him that He was not also human. According to Clement Christ on the earth was entirely impassible (ἀπαθὴς) and impervious to feelings of pleasure and pain (Str. 6.71.2). In contrast, the apostles originally were subject to such human feelings, but through the Lord's teachings, a steady conditioning of their minds and unvarying exercise, they achieved that gnostic state, after Christ's resurrection, that rendered them impervious to human passion and affections (Str. 6.71.1-3).

Even if it should be granted that human affections such as courage, joy, desire, zeal and so on when ruled by reason are good, they are irrelevant in the case of the gnostic. For instance, the gnostic does not do what inspires fear, since he regards none of the things that occur in life as

[94] Str. 7.88.5; SC ad loc. n.3; SVF 3. 250; 2.135.3; 6.114.4-5.

[95] Elsewhere Paed. 3.1.5 Clement comes closer to stating that man becomes God, but again he qualifies it by adding only because God so wills it, Diognetus, 10.4; SC ad Paed. 3.1.5. Clement refers here to Heracleitus' saying, ἄνθρωποι θεοί, θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι. λόγος γὰρ ωὑτός, etc. This must be some kind of paraphrase because Heracl. Fr. 62 in Diels is different. M. Mercovich, *Heraclite*, (Merida, 1967) thinks that the words λόγος etc. are Clement's, not Heracleitus'.

things to be dreaded. The only affection that possesses him is the love towards God, and nothing can dislodge him from that love. He does not need cheerfulness because he does not fall into pain; not that he does not feel pain, but that he knows that even pain happens for the good. Consequently, he does not allow pain to trouble him. Nor does he get angry since there is nothing to move him to anger, inasmuch as his love of God makes him feel no anger toward any of God's creatures. Nor does he envy, for nothing is wanting to him, once he has reached the gnostic stage (Str. 6.71.4-5). The good man then is Godlike in form and semblance as these concern his soul (Str. 6.72.2)

Someone may argue that the gnostic may still be subject to desires and passions by pointing out that love is a desire. Clement does not accept this type of love as desire on the part of him who loves but calls it affection. He who by virtue of love is already in the midst of that which he is destined to be, does not desire anything, inasmuch as he has, as far as possible, the very thing that is desired, love. And he who has reached the state of perfection has gained the exceptional light and has no need to revert to the "delights" of the world. Anything beyond the necessary is viewed as luxury and luxury is an excess that leads man away from the truth.[96] The gnostic has freed his soul from passions no longer making use of the body, but allowing the body only the use of necessities so that he may not give it cause for dissolution.[97] It was this love of unnecessary luxury that prevented the rich young man of the parable from winning the everlasting life, in spite of his attention to the commandments of the Law (Luk. 16. 19-23).

In essence Clement does not seem to mind the possession of luxuries he condemns, provided men did not make them the aim of their lives and ipso facto a hindrance to their perfection. For a person who has achieved excellence and is good luxury becomes incidental and valueless, or valuable only as a means to the exercise of the good. Here Clement seems to agree with the Gnostics who had argued in a similar manner on other occasions, and with Plato.[98] Clement once again here advises use not abuse of what God has bestowed on mankind, since he who has learned to rein in his passions, to train himself to impassibility, to develop the beneficence of gnostic perfection has become like God and equal to the angels.[99] The attainment of excellence is for Clement reflected in the Platonic and Stoic

[96] Str. 6.75.1-2; I Tim. 6.16; Paed. 2.102.2.

[97] Str. 6.75.3; 7.17.4; SC ad loc. n. 4; Plat. Rep. 3. 413 B.

[98] Paed. 2.120.4; SC ad loc; reminds us of Plat. Phaedr. 279 C; Laws 5. 739 C cited in Protr. 122. 2; CAF 3. p. 486 no. 412; Epict. 3. 1.6. The community of goods is a Stoic idea.

[99] Str. 6.105.1; I. Bywater, *The Journal of Philology* 4 (1872) 210, τελειότητος ἁψάμενος.

tetradic virtues of righteousness, temperance, manliness, Godliness.[100] Of these virtues righteousness is square, equal on all sides and alike in word, in deed, in abstinence from evil, and in beneficence, forming gnostic perfection, nowhere and in no respect halting, so that the righteous never appear unjust and unequal.[101] The righteous are believers but not every believer is necessarily righteous. Clement visualizes a progression to perfection according to which only he who attains perfection is righteous (Str. 6.102.5). The believer who merely abstains from evil conduct is not righteous unless he also attained beneficence and knowledge, and the work of righteousness, i.e. the activity of doing good in every circumstance (Str. 6.103.1-2). This righteousness of the gnostic does not rest on civil contracts or on the prohibitions and commandments of the Law but flows from the gnostic's spontaneous action and his love for God.[102] The ethics of the gnostic has nothing to do with good and evil whose conclusions and developments cannot be other than conventional. It precludes relativity in values which would permit objective valuations and judicial calculations. The good man's ethics measure man by revealing the image of God in the person. The good man's ethics aim at that morality that restores him to the fullness of life, transcending the limitations created by his nature. This is accomplished only if he undergoes a change in his mode of existence. To do so he must free himself from the claims of his individual nature which binds him to the impersonal survival of the species.[103] No doubt the change which is the goal of the Christian can sometimes be measured by social criteria and objective ethics, with the evaluation categories of good and virtue. But it is not identified with them. Clement does not reject these evaluative criteria but in no way does he confine them within the limits of social behavior and the conventional obligations that govern such behavior. The righteous will maintain prudence and exercise moderation in the calmness of his soul, and he will also be receptive to what is commanded, with aversion to what is base as alien to him.[104] He is decorous and supramundane and he will do everything in an orderly fashion, while he will never do what he is not allowed to do.[105] He is rich in the highest de-

[100] The only exception is that εὐσέβεια here replaces φρόνησις which Clement loves to evoke, Str. 6.95.4; 7.17. 3. SC ad loc. ns.2-3; Völker, *Der Wahre Gnostiker*, 290-91; Stelzenberger, Die *Beziehungen*, 362-64; CAF 3. p.486, Adesp. fr. 412; Plat. Theaet. 176 B-C for the righteousness of the divine.

[101] Str. 6.102. 4; SC ad loc.; Plat. Prot. 339 B; 344 A; Aristl. Nic. Eth. 1.10 (1100b 21);

[102] Str. 6.125.5-6. Plato regarded ὁσιότης as identical to δικαιοσύνη, while Clement ascribed the former only to the immortals since ὁσιότης, as a more inclusive concept, entailed, δικαιοσύνη, see Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. IX 124 and Stählin ad Str. 6. 125. 5-6.

[103] Giannaras, *The Freedom*, 37.

[104] Str. 7.18.2; Plat. Crat. 411 E; Aristl. Nic. Eth. 6.5 (1140b 11 ff.).

[105] Str. 7.18.2; SC ad loc. ns. 2-5; Paed. 2.39.4 with SC note. The author here plays on the adjective produced by κόσμος, κόσμιος, and ὑπερκόσμιος.

gree in desiring nothing. He has a few elementary wants, and yet he is in the midst of an abundance of all good through the knowledge of the good. The first consequence of his righteousness is to love and to associate with those of his own kind both on this earth and in heaven.[106] He is liberal of what he possesses, a philanthropist, and a hater of the wicked, entertaining a perfect aversion to all villainy. He is the true servant of God and spontaneously subjects himself to His command, pure in heart not through the commandments but through the knowledge of God. As such he is the friend of God.[107] Things which are really to be dreaded are foreign to him and what is contrary to good cannot be sheltered by him because it is impossible for contraries to meet in the same person at the same time. The gnostic acts well the drama of life which God has given him to play and knows both what is to be done and what is to be endured.[108] Day and night, doing and reciting the Lord's commands, the gnostic rejoices exceedingly not only in resisting villainy, in the morning and at noon, but also when walking about, when asleep, when dressing and undressing. He is even giving thanks to God like Job who resigned himself to God's love throughout his suffering.[109]

Like Paul, Clement makes love (ἀγάπη) a concept superior to righteousness (δικαιοσύνη). Love is the most sacred and sovereign of all concepts and makes the gnostic the perfect individual that he is. Because the gnostic, by virtue of being a lover (ἀγαπητικός) of the one true God, he is the really perfect man and friend of God placed in the rank of a son. He is crowned as one judged worthy to behold the everlasting God Almighty face to face.[110] His whole life is a holy festival.[111] His soul is a holy statue similar to God (ἄγαλμα θεῖον καὶ Θεῷ προσεμφερές). He is the truly begotten of God, the express image of the universal king and almighty Father, Who impresses on him as a gnostic the seal of perfect contemplation.[112] His

[106] Str. 7.18.3; SC ad loc. n.6; Andronicus , *Peri Pathon*, Part II, Karl Schuchhardt (ed.), (Heidelberg, 1883) 25 ff.

[107] Str. 4.39.5; Matt. 5.8; James 2. 23

[108] Str. 7.16.5; SC ad loc. ns.5-6; Plat. Rep. 4. 436 B; TGF *Adesp.* 117; Epict. *Enchir.* 17; Diog. Laert. 7.160; Suet. Octav. 99; Seneca, Epistl. 77.20; Plat. Phil. 50 B; Marc. Aur. 12.36; p. 167. 6.

[109] Str. 7.80.3-4; SC ad loc. ns 2-4; 7.36.2-37; SC ad loc.ns. 2-7 and 1-5; 1-4; Plat. Theaet. 173 D; Plat. Phaed. 84 B; The passage is reminiscent of Epict. 8.12 by whom no doubt, Clement is here strongly influenced, Str. 7.78.5-6. SC ad loc. ns. 5 and 1.

[110] Str. 1.94.6; 6.102.2; 7.57.1; SC ad loc. n.8; Plat. Phaed. 84 B; Paed. 1.58.1; Str. 7.68.4; SC ad loc. ns. 5-6; 6.108.1; Str. 2.88.2; 7.57.1; SC ad loc. ns. 8 and 1-3; Plat. Phaed. 84 B; Matt. 5.8; I. Cor. 13.12 He does everything by means of which he shall be able to acquire the knowledge of what he desires, Str. 7.60. 2-61.1-6; SC ad loc. 3-6; 1-8; 1-2; 1.65.5.

[111] Str. 7.35.6; SC ad loc. ns. 7 and 1; 7. 48.3; SC ad loc. n.2; Plat. Phaedr. 247 A; Matt. 6.7; 9-13

[112] Str. 7.16.6; SC ad loc. ns. 1-5; Kannicht, Bruno, Snell (eds.), TGF, vol. 2 (Göttingen, 1981) fr 117.

function is to have converse with God through the Great and High Priest (Hebr. 4.14), up to the measure of his capacity.[113] Each person who is admitted to this state of holiness is illuminated (ἐκφωτιζομένου) and in an indissoluble union with God.[114] He who contemplates the unseen God lives as a God among men. The soul of the gnostic, rising above the sphere of generation, is by itself apart and dwells among ideas, and like the Coryphaeus in Plato's Theaetetus becomes an angel rapt in contemplation, forever keeping in view the will of God, "Alone wise, while these flit like shadows".[115]

The attainment of perfection is possible equally for men and women, but for both Clement underscores the importance of education, application, and training, thereby clarifying that perfection is not an objective matter but a subjective one, depending on the individual's effort (Str. 4.118. 1; 124.1). Equally, the way to the attainment of that perfection may not be one-sided but many-sided. One thing is, however, certain: the gnostic, though stretched on the rack, his eyes gouged and brutally tormented, or submitted to what is most terrible of all, death, will remain happy. The gnostic will never have the ultimate end placed in this world and he will never be wrenched from his freedom and his signal love of God.[116]

From this very brief exposition of Clement's idea of Christian perfection some important generalizations can be gathered. To begin with, the common and unquenched thirst of the Christian man is for his salvation, not for conventional improvements of one's character and conduct. For this reason, the basic moral problem for man is the realization of the freedom of ethos far from any conventional evaluation or utilitarian prearrangements.[117] In Clement's works ethos is associated with the description of the essence of truth about man. We start that is, with the ontological question, What is Being? What does it mean to be a man and what is the relationship of the biological being to itself? The creation of man as an image of God is to be located in this unity of ethos and being.

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[113] Str. 7.13.2; SC ad loc. ns. 7 and 1; Plat. Rep. 10. 613 B.

[114] Str. 7.14.1; SC ad loc. n.6; 7.103.1; SC ad loc. n.6; II Cor. 10.5; Matt. 16.25; Eph. 4. 22-24. Clement recognizes that the Greek intellectuals preceded the Christians in deifying the "gnostic" life, without the knowledge Christ Whom they could not have known, Str. 5.68.4 and Comm in SC ; 5.69.6; Isocr. Paneg. 30-32; CAF 3. p.490; D . L. Page, *Hellenistic Epigrams*, vol. 2 (Cambr. Univ. Press, 1968) 157. Plato rightly comments (Str. 4.155. 3) that he who devotes himself to the contemplation of ideas will live as a God among men. He further says that he who contemplates the unseen God lives as a God among men. Stählin believes that there are at least three such references to Plato in the Sophist, but fails to give the exact references. One certainly is in the beginning, 216 A-C. See also Phaedr. 247 C; Rep. 6. 509 D; 7. 517 B; Str. 5.73.3 and Comm. in SC.

[115] Str. 4.155.4; Plat. Theaet. 173 C; Aristl. De Anim. 429a 27; Od. 10. 495

[116] Str. 7.61.5; SC ad loc. ns 6-8; 4.32.1-2; Str. 5.108.2-4; SC ad loc. in comm.; Plat. Rep. 2. 361 E;

[117] Str. 4.35.1-2; Plat. Phaed. 114 B-C; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la lange Grecque*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1974) 942; H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg, 1960) 602.

Man is created after the image of God and this image is identical in nature to God's, though many-sided in the particular persons (Protr. 120.3-5). Man's being symbolizes God's presence which makes man participant in true being. Man is the image of God not because he has common physical characteristics with him, but because he has the capacity to be free from space and physical necessities since, though a human being subject to limitations, as a personal being he is capable of superseding his physical limitations. In other words, man is created to become a communicant of the qualities of God, especially God's love which is the real life (ἡ ὄντως ζωὴ) .

Though fallen once from God's grace man does not cease to be a creature of God. His nature is created with a natural individuality that is mortal and perishable. But on this created and mortal nature God impressed His image and His likeness (Gen. 2.7), opening the possibility of real life. The "image and "likeness" of man are directly connected to the knowledge of God by the constant effort of man to convert the assertion "in the image of God" to the "likeness of God".[118] Clement's idea about the "image" and "likeness" may be following the biblical model but is also affected by Clement's other favorite source, Greek philosophy. He uses the statement of the Pythagorean Eurysus contained in his treatise *About Fate* where God used Himself as model for the creation of man.[119] In other places he borrows several expressions by the Greeks which to him allude to the idea of "in the image and likeness" of God (Str. 4.171.3-4). He sees no contradiction in so doing since the Greeks "copied" these ideas from the Bible, according to a misconception popular at his time among Christian writers.[120] Elsewhere he identifies "in the image and likeness" with mind (νοῦς) as Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle did when they considered nous as coming from God.[121] Clement adds to the philosophical interpretations the notion that the Holy Spirit acts on the nous by bestowing its gift, (χάρις), to guide man's spiritual qualities toward his perfection, since the perfection of man consists in the activation of the potential powers in man through self-knowledge, a process by which God also becomes known. The gnostic arrives by the unalterable custom of good-doing to the "likeness" of God inasmuch as good-doing is a facet of man's likeness to God.[122] The good cannot be looked on as an idea because it must be a reality, since only as a reality can it be connected with human life. If it were only an idea it could not have been associated with the reality of life. If it is a reality, then it can be connected with man's life

[118] Gen. 1.26; Protr. 120.3-5; Str. 2.131.2-6-132.2; 7.86.5; SC ad loc. n.4; I Cor. 6.11; Matt. 5.45; 7.101.4-5; SC ad loc. ns. 2-5; Str. 2.134.2; 2.97.1-98.3; 7.13.3; SC ad loc. ns. 2-4.

[119] Mullach, FPG 2, P.112; Str. 5.29.1; SC ad loc. comm.

[120] Str. 5.29.3 SC ad loc. comm.; H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought* (New York, 1962) 44 something that Celsus reverses, see Lilla, *Clement of Alex.* 30-40.

[121] Str. 4.139.4; Plat. Theaet. 176 B; Str. 2. 136.6; Protr. 98.4; Str.6.72.2.

[122] Str. 6.166.1-4; I Cor. 2.10-14; Paed. 98.2; Plat. Laws 777 B.

and be defined accordingly. Good must be sought both within the world and within man, for if it existed only in the world and was not attainable by man, it would not have been a true and real good. According to Clement's teaching then the good is not an idea but a personal present; it is God himself. Clement, who used the Old Testament text of the Septuagint, explain that the "in the image" description denotes the spirit in which God created man while "in the likeness" denotes man's dynamic potential. When man who was created "in the image" of God becomes a consummate human being he approaches the likeness of God. Behind both these pictures, the "image" and "likeness," are for Clement a mystery, similar to the incarnation of God.[123] Consequently, the biological individuality of every person does not exhaust his being. What makes a person a true being is man's privilege in the freedom of choice and in his personal distinctiveness which is realized and revealed in the act of his communion and relationship with God and his fellowmen. Unlike the animals that are subject to the activity of nature, man is the dynamic revelation of the image of God, and a being of personal uniqueness with the potential of being free from all prearranged limitations on his spiritual side. Through his free will man can accept or reject the purpose of his being; he can refuse the freedom of love and personal communion and reject God's invitation and by so doing, he can exclude himself from real life, that is, his union with God. By saying yes to God he can exercise that privilege to become almost equal to God. But by saying no to God he can lose his privileged status as distinctive person, by which is meant something that has its face (sight) turned towards something other than itself, namely God.[124]

Person (πρόσωπον) represents a way of life which presupposes natural existence but is also distinct from the way of other persons, though not in its basic spiritual potential. The elements of the image of God are the spiritual elements of man: his reason and his freedom. His reason and freedom provide man with the possibility of superseding his nature and becoming equal to God (Gen. 3.5). Man partakes of true being to the extent that he controls the autonomy of his nature. He partakes in the true life to the degree that he supersedes his natural limitations and his mortality. From the moment he rejects God's invitation and seeks to assert his independence by separating himself from God, he jeopardizes his true being and alienates himself from his destiny in life. The physical necessities of his individual

[123] Str. 6.65.6; 7.13.3; SC ad loc. ns.1-2; Paed. 3.1.1; Str. 6.60.3; Plat. Meno 97 ff.; Phaedr. 266 B; Od. 5.193; SVF 3. 264; Paed. 2.83.2-3; Str. 7.52.3; Str. 6. 72.1-2; Aristl. Met. 1072b 24-30; Politics 1325b 1721 where theory is more praxis than any other activity. Protr. 120.3-4; Paed. 1.4.2; Col. 1.15; II Cor. 4.4.

[124] Protr. 3.1-4; Str. 6.48.3; Deut. 30.15-19; Str. 7.56.2; SC ad loc. n.2; 57.1; SC ns. 8 and 1-3; I. Thess. 4.17; Protr. 120.1.

nature become his real purpose in life; they master him and end up as "passions" and causes of pain and ultimate death instead of useful tools towards his final end of theosis. It is unfortunate that we, after the fashion of the prodigal son in the gospel, abuse God's gifts.[125] We should use them as their masters without undue attachment. We are enjoined to rule over them and not to be slaves to them. We should raise our eyes aloft to what is true and fill ourselves with the divine food, thereby enjoying that certain and lasting and pure pleasure. This way of partaking of food manifests the love for Christ. Conversely, those who live fattening themselves like beasts feed themselves irrationally to spiritual death, looking downwards towards the earth and bending continuously over tables, in pursuit of a life of gluttony. They bury in the earth what is good in order to pursue a life without future, courting voracity alone.[126]

Clement's concern should not be taken to mean that he ever wanted to remove man's social intercourse; only that he simply regarded with suspicion the slippery customs of man which he considered a potential for spiritual calamity. Man should partake of the necessities and avoid daintiness.[127] The natural needs for survival should not compete with that personal freedom and distinctiveness of man which can only be realized as love beyond any natural necessity. Freedom of the individual is never lifted; it only changes to antithetical rivalry with nature. It becomes a tragic division of the human being (Rom. 7.23). That is the reason Clement insists on the interpretation of sin as failure, the missing of the real target of life which is for human beings the supersession of their nature and the attainment of personal freedom and individual uniqueness. Failure of the individual to realize his essential aim is tantamount to failing to maintain the uniqueness of his existence through love. Thus the moral dilemma which stems from Clement's interpretation of sin as failure or missing the mark is not the conventional idea of good and evil, of merit or social conventions. It is that and more; it is the dilemma between life and death, between purity or existential indigence and corruption.[128] Thus Clement's morality goes beyond good and evil; it refers to ontological realities not to meritorious conventions.

After the fall of man his personal uniqueness and his freedom could not have superseded the physical necessity of his biological autonomy. But with the incarnation of God, the natural distance between man and God, created after man's fall, was removed. The union of the human with the divine nature in the person of the Second Adam freed human nature from

[125] Paed. 2.9.2-4; SC ad loc. n.4; Luk. 15.11; Ps. Justin, *Léttre*, 12; Plat. Rep. 9.586 A.

[126] Paed. 2.9.4. Some expressions are probably borrowed from Musonius 18 A, p. p.97. 5 H; 18 B, p.104.1-2.

[127] Paed. 2.9.3; SC ad loc.; Ps. Justin, *Léttre* 13; Aesch. Eum. 285.

[128] Str. 4.27. 3; SVF 3.221; Plat. Rep. 8.521 C.

its imprisonment within the limits of its individuality.[129] What this Second Adam made now possible was the possibility for man to participate in the "new" way of life, in the new ethos, enabling man to resist his instincts and impulses and to live loving and being loved.

In the first Adam the natural desire for subsistence became the driving force which condemned his race to alienation and concern with the survival of mortal individuality. With the coming of Christ this process is reversed: the divine and human natures are brought together in Christ, the second Adam. This bringing together of the two natures frees humanity from its self-imposed bondage within the limits of mortal individuality. Now human nature subsists as a personal hypostasis of communion with the divine. The second Adam became responsible for a new creation and a new humanity which exists in communion with God. He became the visible archetype of the Christian gnostic to whom he now gave a concrete example for his eyes to follow.

What this regeneration of man through the Second Adam requires is the cooperation of man's freedom, the supersession of his natural limitations, his ascent to God's love, his becoming a person. What God asks of man is an effort, however small, to reject his individual weaknesses, to resist his deleterious impulses and to will to live as a loving being and a loved one. He asks him to empty himself (κένωσις) of every element of individual autonomy for the sake of a life of love and communion with his fellow man and God. Man's compliance with this ethos defines his practical piety. This practical piety is the effort that assures the freedom and the volition of man to deny the rebellion of the individual will, and to imitate the obedience of the Second Adam. This obedience consists not in subjection to any conventions of a legal order but in faithfulness to the image and likeness of God.

Compliance with this ethos aims at the regeneration of one's whole life, not simply at the change of one's external conduct (Str. 1.26.1-4). The external forms, the objectified criteria of individual virtue, are not identified with the truth of salvation. On the contrary, it is possible that they mislead man inasmuch as they distance him from salvation because they tend to bewitch him to the glory and praise of men. The change of the Christian may sometimes be measured by the criteria of the objectified social morality, with the evaluative categories of good and evil. But they are not identical with them and are essentially different. The individual virtue does not always imply a true change that can lead to salvation. If man is to imitate God's picture he cannot remain within the bounds of the socially good conduct and conventional obligations. He must supersede them. It is

[129] Str. 2.98.2-3 and SC ad loc. n.1, an extremely important note explaining the unique significance of the idea of freedom among the Greek Fathers of the Early Church; Irenaeus, Ad Haer. 4.27.1.4. Also Paed. 1.31.1-2; P. Th. Camelot, *Foi et Gnose* (Paris, 1945) 30; Theod. Extr. 45, 1-3.

to such a supersession that Clement points the way in his scattered exhortations throughout his work. All the evangelical admonitions have as their goal love, that potent element that overcomes human egocentrism and individuality for the sake of the realization of the image of God. The attainment of this love is the true fulfillment of the Law, making the aims of the Law become reality provided that this reality is not to be interpreted as an altruistic end. It does not aim simply at the improvement of social conduct but at that union whose end is God (Str. 4.52.1-2). In this sense, love is not an easy beginning, but the uninterruptedly searched for end, the "never fulfilled perfection" or satisfaction of the moral journey of man. The beginning is the realization of man's inadequacy and hence his search for the grace of God, which will convert man's isolated life to one of communion and relationship.

This type of relationship and union was expressed by those Christians whose biological relations were often superseded by devotion to Christ in the transfer to the Church of the terms that belonged to the family relationship. For the new ecclesiastical order "father" was not necessarily the natural person but the Father in heaven, while brothers were the members of the Church. Equally, a Christian's mother was not only the person that gave him natural birth but the spiritual institution that gave him a new birth and made him member of a new complex of relations that superseded all exclusivity.[130] He wanted to be a friend and son of Christ and aspired to become worthy and be called brother of the Lord. The early Christians' removal of the distinction between male and female is a fact that refers to the eschatological fullness of existence. This eschatological fullness abolishes the separation between men and women because this differentiation is a natural not a spiritual one. It is a necessity of nature that secures its survival. It has no place in the kingdom of God. The distinction into sexes does not reflect an ontological distinction, nor does it refer to the manner of existence or to the image God impressed upon man. For this reason it is removed at the end of life.[131] No wonder Clement, like Paul, exhorted the man to treat his wife as a sister and not as sexual object.

[130] Str. 2.100.1-3. This idea comes from Philo, *De Nobil.* 3-4

[131] John Zezioulas, *Apo to Prosôpeion eis to Prosôpon* (Thessalonike, 1977) 315-16; Giannaras, *The Freedom* , 62, n.7.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

In summary, Clement's theory of evil and the exercise of free will demonstrate his reliance on the wealthy history of the subject in the Near Eastern literature, the Judaic sources, and the New Testament background. Clement connects freedom of the will with the higher, logical power residing in man. The connection reflects, on the one hand, the central importance of Reason in Greek philosophy, and on the other, the Biblical conception of man's creation by God. With the aid of Plato Clement absolves God from any responsibility for evil. God is all goodness and His association with evil is a priori impossible. Nonetheless, shunning dualism Clement adheres to monism for the explanation of evil. There is only one supreme power from which everything originates, except for evil of course. Yet in one sense, one might argue as Clement does that evil and sin stem from the abuse of the very kindness of God and the gifts with which God, in His boundless goodness, endowed man. By endowing man with the priceless gift of free will, God allowed him complete freedom to abide by His commandments or disobey them. It was this fatal decision to transgress God's will on the part of the First Adam that caused the first break between God and man and led to the introduction of evil into the world. Thereafter, the practice of evil resulted in the failure of man to accomplish his goal, which is his final union with God. Evil and sin alienate man from God thereby leading him to death. Thus Clement, unlike Augustine, perceived sin not simply as the absence of good, but as an deleterious activity the commission of which distances man from God. Sin is an activity that man engages into, owing to his mistaken belief that by so doing he will enjoy pleasure and happiness. Yet the opposite occurs. In the pursuit of the violation of God's wish he misses the target of life , which is the supersession of his nature and his being with God. This is the moral dilemma emerging from Clement's interpretation of evil as a failure. Clement's explanation of evil is not the conventional explanation of good and evil but something more than that: the choice between real life and death. Thus Clement's idea of evil, as that of Plato's earlier, deals with the existential essence and the ontological realities of man.

Man's freedom is associated with the spirit breathed into him by God at the time of his creation. Unlike the other creatures, the life-giving and divine spirit possessed by man makes him a unique being. His uniqueness stems from his status as a "free person," autexousion and responsible for his actions. Man's reasonable part, his soul, is designed to be his commanding element, ruling over his body needs and his unreasonable passions.

Clement is the first among the early ecclesiastic writers to deal extensively, though not always systematically, with the freedom of man's will. Freedom of the will and the responsibility that flows out of it are described by him not as a pre-existing state of the soul as has been presented by Plato, nor as an inevitable subjection to the commands of heimarmene, as it often has been portrayed by some of the Stoics. Freedom of the will is an element bestowed by God on man before his fall and exercised by those who live in Christ. Whereas man's disobedience to God affected negatively his freedom, Christ's coming on earth and man's participation in Christ's life and work restored man to the pre-fall state. Man's "proaeresis," his ability to choose between evil and good, is the product of the noetic process of his freedom of the will. For Clement, however, freedom of the will and his right to choose are in operation only when man denounces the spiritually dangerous and mortally wounding choices of evil and becomes compliant with the commands of God.

Before man's fall human passions existed only as subordinate and obedient inclinations that served the needs of man. After man's fall passions deteriorated to dangerous inclinations capable of leading man astray. This theory of the distortion of the earlier healthy passions is a new one, invented by the Christian writers to explain them now in the context of Christianity. There is no counter to this theory in the area of Greek philosophy. Clement does not consider passions as congenital to man (οὐ φύσις, Paed. 2.84.1), and rejects the views of the Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus who perceived them as co-inherent false judgments from which we should rid ourselves. For Clement passions are distortions to which we voluntarily agree. Thus, even though in many areas Clement follows Plato and other philosophers, here he seems to introduce a new approach, differing from the established philosophical theories, which is the fruit of the Judeo-Christian teachings. This approach is going to be followed by other Christian writers in the future, a fact which makes Clement's knowledge essential for the understanding of the later Christian literature.

Clement also differed from the Greeks on the position of women. Faced with the discovery of feminine desire, Euripides' Hippolytus (Hipp. 616-19) complains about women as fraudulent curse whom Zeus wrongly put in this world. Is this the misogyny of an innocent, youthful hunter or an expression indicative of the Greek attitude toward women? In truth, it is expressive of an attitude frequently repeated on both the tragic and the comic state. Lyric poetry also is not devoid of such pronouncements. The female genre is often seen either as a curse or as unbearable in prosperity as it is in misfortune. Yet women are a necessary curse for a variety of reasons. They are necessary, first of all, for procuring children. The chorus in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousae* adds another dimension: the erotic urge that binds man to the very curse he denounces. In addition, they are necessary for the chores that women so superbly perform around the household for which they are uniquely endowed by nature.

In Homer still a different picture emerges. Agamemnon swears a great oath that he never entered into union with Briseis as is normal among humans of the opposite sex (Il. 9.134). By assuring publicly the Greeks of his proper behavior Agamemnon showed respect to that immemorial Greek tradition that forbade such unions since the girl belonged to somebody else. He also implicitly referred to a definition of humanity that involved a relationship of "happy complementarity" between the sexes, i.e. the love that unites men and women. The above pictures in Ancient Greek literature portray the ambivalent attitude of the Greeks toward women.

This oxymoronic attitude is further reflected in the political and social arena. Women were not considered citizens of the Greek city in the same way that men were. The exclusion of this "paradoxical" half of the Greek polis without which no polis could ever hope to survive or even prosper becomes an exclusion that is necessary and impossible at the same time.

Semonides of Amorgos lists ten types of women of whom eight are offspring of animals. Of the ten only one is good. The good and loving woman grows old by the side of her husband (7.86) who returns her love. There is reciprocity in their conjugal relations. The household flourishes and its wealth prospers. The others, like a series of variants, illustrate the ideas of women as evil. In view of these other types of women the best alternative when it comes to women would be simply not to have to speak of them at all. Semonides devotes a poem in illustration of his belief. Pericles will express a similar idea at the Funeral Oration, dedicated to the glory of those Athenians who fell for the city. The talk that surrounds women is ambivalent, whether it is to boast about their merits or to impress blame. It is better if women provided no opportunity of talk about them.

No such ambivalence characterizes Clement's position toward women. Women are the creatures of God as men are; they possess a valuable soul as men do. They have been made by God for the propagation of the species and the fulfillment of God's purpose in the world. They have the same shortcomings as men and possess the same potentialities for the achievement of that perfection that would enable them to enter the Kingdom of God. Men should look upon them and treat them as partners and as part of themselves. Any differences between men and women are due to their biological make up and nothing else. Christ accepts both as equals. There is no prosopolepsy practiced by God, no discrimination between male and female. Thus the position ushered in by Christianity toward women is considerably higher than that held by the Greeks. Excluding some social reservations that can be attributed to the prevailing social thought at the time of Clement, he came close to and in many respects even surpassed the modern conceptions about women.

Clement's monistic world theory and his insistence on the omnipotence and omniscience of God leads him, as it has led others, to inevitable difficulties which he seeks to supervene by reinforcing his monistic theory with evidence from Greek philosophy, especially Plato.

Simply put man is made free but fell from grace, owing to the abuse of his God-given freedom. For Clement, freedom implies the ability to choose evil, for otherwise there would not have been true freedom, though the exercise of true freedom is to choose good, which he identifies with God's will. Clement answers the question why God allowed evil to exist in two ways: first, because without its existence there would not have been true choice, therefore no true freedom; secondly, because the existence of evil is attributed to the fall of angels in disobedience of God's commands. This event happened before man's fall. Consequently, God is not responsible for evil; only the practitioners of evil are responsible for it. In a way Clement's theory becomes a circuitous answer which does not answer satisfactorily the questions of the non-believers or agnostics.

The question of evil leads to the problem of punishment. Punishment is seen as a corrective measure by God in his concern for the spiritual well-being of man. It becomes no more that a pedagogic or therapeutic means to remind man of his transgressions and restore him to the state of grace. In no way should punishment be interpreted as revenge. Revenge is contrary to the goodness of God. But this explanation also leads other writers to the same insurmountable difficulties which are associated with the existence of evil. Without evil the necessity for punishment would not have existed. Clement's answer does not again satisfy the question of the skeptics.

Clement's treatment of theosis is much more convincing and high-minded. Like Plato he believes in the idea that man's ultimate purposes to unite himself with God. This is achieved only when man's will becomes one with God's will. In these circumstances man's life becomes a life-long obsession with the ἐρώμενον (the object of love). The lover seeks to identify himself with the loved to the extent this is humanly possible, for man can never hope to become identical to God. Becoming like God was the original purpose of man's creation, but man forfeited this purpose as a result of his disobedience. However, man was restored to his original status with the incarnation of God, Who now called man to live in Christ. Living in Christ means achieving the supreme good which is union with God. Clement's living in Christ is the corresponding attainment of the Supreme Good in the Platonic philosophy. But unlike Plato who identifies the Supreme Good with an intellectual abstraction intelligible mainly to the privileged few, the lovers of philosophy, Christ in Christianity is a personal God and a historical person with Whom the average man could easily identify.

With his mystical theory of theosis, Clement set the stage for the great mystics of the later Church. The shedding of one's self for the sake of union with God becomes the most intense preoccupation of many of the Christian writers, especially in the East. This preoccupation, begun so passionately but wondrously by Plato, is going to lead to the monastic ideal and culminate with the thirteenth century writings of Gregory Palamas. It is this marvelously wrought union of Greek paideia with the Christian ideas,

so dexterously elaborated by Clement of Alexandria, that gave a new impulse to the new religion.

Clement's ideal of the Christian man has its roots and finds its intellectual support in Greek philosophy and Greek education, whose avid student and lover Clement had been. Despite his understandable criticism of Greek paideia, Clement built on it a great part of his Christian intellectual edifice. No wonder he has been frequently criticized by contemporary scholars for having "hellenized" Christianity. The criticism is as true as it is unfair. It is unfair because Clement lived and breathed in a world imbued with the Greek spirit, and it would have been an irony --perhaps even a tragedy-- if Clement had failed to be affected by it. Christianity is none the worse for the strong Greek influence upon it. Beyond this "hellenization" of Christianity, Clement is responsible for something else which is equally important in the history of Christianity. His ideas about sin, evil, freedom of the individual the distinctiveness of man as a person, and his ideal of the Christian gnostic constitute not only a complement to Plato's philosophy but they also set the pattern most of the important Fathers of the Eastern Church were to follow for centuries to come. If Clement is the first of the Christian Fathers to elaborate on man's theosis, Gregory Palamas is going to be the last major representative to complete this cycle. The latter, who lived only a few years after Thomas Aquinas, not only completed what Clement had started but, by so doing, he drew a distinguishing line between the two Churches, the Eastern and the Western Church, which was going to persist for centuries thereafter.

It is true that the Christological and Triadological doctrines of the Early Church, through which profound beliefs in the renewal and deification of humankind have been expressed, have ceased to hold their emotive grip any longer. They have only become topics of discussion among a few theologians or Religion buffs. Despite these changes, the "deification of man" continues to be the ideal of the Christian World and the main goal of the existence of the Church. This last remark may seem like a mirage in view of the modern reality in the ecclesiastical life. The truth is that the secularization of the Church membership, the weakening of the live link with the ecclesiastical traditions, the irresponsible imitation of traditions of doubtful origin and religiosity, and the consequent rationalistic and moralistic reappraisal of Christianity at the expense of its sacramental character and its mystical dimension have changed Christianity so that the phrase "deification of man" sounds frequently today otherworldly and paradoxical on the ears of Christians. Yet the ideal of man's deification and the dominion over the world granted him by God should really be reviewed very seriously once again. In that case, Clement of Alexandria may still have something important to teach us, if we look at him freshly and objectively from this standpoint.

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