Fourth Generation Warfare and the Moral Imperative

Greg Wilcox
LTC USA (Ret.)
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Readers may already be familiar with the term and meaning of "Fourth Generation Warfare" (4GW) as first identified in an October 1989 *Marine Corps Gazette* article: "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation".[1] The authors characterized the war in which we are now engaged.

> In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.[2]

In this classic article, the first three generations of warfare were described as follows: First generation warfare was characterized by the advent of firearms and conscript armies practicing rigid drills to achieve massed firepower.[3] Second generation warfare was a response to the technologies of the 19th century such as the machine gun and indirect fires which so characterized the attrition warfare of World War I.[4] Third generation warfare was motivated not by technology but by ideas and called maneuver warfare.[5] The Germans, in the early part of World War II, practiced third generation warfare in what they called the blitzkrieg, and the United States practiced maneuver warfare in the opening round of the invasion of Iraq, before the occupation.

The authors of that 1989 piece, William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightingale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR) stated that 4GW may be visible in terrorism, but that terrorism is not necessarily 4GW. Further, they posited that the components of 4GW might be:

- A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion
- A direct attack on the enemy's culture
- Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through *manipulation* of the media[6]

It is significant that these insights were drawn almost twelve years before the events of September 11, 2001 which at last brought home to the American public that we were indeed at war, and a new kind of war that we little understood. In fact, we had been at war for at least a decade without fully realizing that this was a global war.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, wrote a subsequent article on 4GW in the *Marine Corps Gazette* in September 1994 titled: "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation", in which he identified significant factors shaping the future of war.[7] Politically, he identified transnational actors as playing an increasingly important role while operating within and among traditional nation states. Economically, rapid integration of world economies diminished the ability of nation states to exercise sovereignty. Socially there was, and is ongoing, a rapid expansion of transnational associations which provide a vast network of mutual interests outside the traditional boundaries of nation states. Hammes identified the result of this vast change as "netwar" which refers to information-related low-intensity conflict to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population thinks about itself and their world view.[8]

Many others, including Martin van Creveld, have written on this netwar vision of future war which is antithetical to what is commonly referred to in American military circles as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Simply put, RMA touts the technological solutions to warfighting almost to the exclusion of all other approaches, and it represents the economic engine of the military-industrial complex in the United States. The netwar vision more closely approximates the global war in which we are now engaged where battles are fought with AK-47s and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) at close ranges and the enemy doesn't wear easily identifiable uniforms. Command detonated mines and suicide bombers target civilians just as much as, if not more than, soldiers.

So just what is unique about 4GW as opposed to what we have historically called "guerilla war" or "low-intensity conflict" or "irregular warfare"? There seem to be some very distinct characteristics that we have not experienced in any recent wars or even in times before the nation state was identified as the sovereign entity. Some of these characteristics may have been present in historical examples, but taken together, they amount to a new breed of war, Fourth Generation Warfare.

- Global (not just isolated or even regional) threat
- Loose-knit cellular organizations of self-generating action groups
- Strong religious, moral, and/or ethnic convictions on the part of action groups
- Vulnerable open-societies with even more vulnerable economic targets
- State sponsorship of or acquiescence to terrorist cells (funding, facilities, sanctuary)
- Wide use of the media by groups to influence public opinion and obtain recruits
- Terror is the tool of choice
- Access to latest high-tech weaponry available on world market

If 4GW has any form at all, it is like that of an amoeba. It appears amorphous, adapts easily, and transitions rapidly. It can be a terrorist group one day and a guerrilla group the next. Al Qaeda, for one, is striving to achieve chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities, further adding to their potency and threat. Some of us may live to see that happen. 4GW warriors will then be able to operate in the gaps between Western Armies' comfort zone of conventional war, but their targets are anything but the armies. The targets are the civilians, the infrastructure, the political and social systems, and everywhere there is weakness.

There are some who believe 4GW is nothing new. Retired General Montgomery C. Meigs, writing in *Parameters* likens this phenomenon which he calls asymmetric warfare to 11th and 12th century Assassins of the Middle East who were a fundamentalist group which sent small teams to assassinate targeted enemy leaders.[9] In Meigs opinion, only the mechanism of attack has changed.[10]

While there is something to be said for Meigs' argument, the environment has changed to such an extent that the application of 4GW presents a threat of enormous magnitude not only to the United States but other countries at the same time. Perhaps, the threat extends to the very culture of the West as Samuel Huntington suggests in his *Clash of Civilizations*. This is a very different type of war, one which James Woolsey, former director of the CIA, labeled "World War IV". Speaking to the soldier-students at the National War College in November 2002, Woolsey identified at least three movements coming out of the Middle East: the Islamist Shia, the Ba'athist parties of Iraq and Syria, and the Islamist Sunni.[11] Woolsey posited the theory that these groups have been at war with us for a long time but are only loosely connected if at all. Further, Woolsey suggested that we were attacked for our many freedoms and what we have done right, not what we have done wrong, and the reason we were attacked is that we presented what was believed to be an easy target.[12]

Essentially, this 4GW is being fought on a global scale with never-before seen impositions on the freedoms we enjoy. It is fundamentally different from what we have ever experienced in the past, and despite what the President may say, the outcome is not all that certain.

The great fear is that we do not have a clue as to how to fight such an enemy. The evidence is on the rebellious streets of Baghdad with the assassination of those who would work with the U.S., and in the hinterland of Afghanistan where opium production, disrupted during the reign of the Taliban, is at an all-time high. Just look at the confusion surrounding "homeland defense". We have an organization with the hope that ideas will follow.

The purpose of this paper is to identify some avenues that might be considered a start in trying to deal with 4GW. There is still much to learn about this new generation of warfare and there is very little in the way of guidance toward winning this World War IV. It is very much a war of ideas, and our American penchant for quick technological solutions does not seem to be of value except at the margins.

The focus of this paper is on the moral aspects of 4GW. There are several reasons for this focus, but the most important is the distinct possibility that the moral war may be the key to combating 4GW.

The late Colonel John Boyd (USAF) brought a new way of thinking about war to the U.S. military. Not only was he a tactical practitioner, but also he was a theoretical genius in the art of war.[13] In his briefing, "Patterns of Conflict", Boyd identified 3 aspects of war, physical, mental, and moral. The physical aspect of war involves warfighting, and it is one aspect where American military forces excel. The second aspect is the mental war to

include how we think about fighting in a war of ideas. It is in this aspect of war that Boyd presented his famous OODA Loop concept. OODA stands for: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. This process that is engaged between combatants is a time cycle where the one who can out-process (multiple fast unexpected transients) his enemy in a continuum will force the enemy to react in a never-ending "death spiral".[14] The third aspect, moral war, represents the cultural codes of conduct, or standards of behavior, that constrain, as well as sustain and focus our emotional and intellectual responses. [15]

The objective of the 4GW warriors is to create as many casualties and as much disruption as possible to demoralize and persuade others that they cannot win. John Boyd described the threat in his essence of moral conflict analysis.

ESSENCE OF MORAL CONFLICT

Create, Exploit, and Magnify:

• Menace
 Impressions of danger to one's well being and survival.

• Uncertainty:
Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous, contradictory, erratic, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.

• Mistrust
Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes.

Idea

• Surface fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity thereby magnify internal friction

AIM

Destroy moral bonds that permit
an organic whole to exist.

Figure 1: Boyd's Essence of Moral Conflict[16]

How closely does this paradigm fit the current situation in Iraq? How closely does this fit the stated and demonstrated Al Qaeda aims against America?

While Boyd did not address 4GW specifically, he did address how to defeat what he termed "guerrillas" in his synthesis of ideas surrounding guerrilla warfare:

Break guerrillas' moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of action and cohesion of overall effort.[17]

Clearly we have the capacity to do at least part of the solution which Boyd identifies as critical. We have demonstrated the ability to conduct relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action attacks on the Taliban in the initial phases of the war in Afghanistan and we are doing so aggressively now in Iraq, but the other elements of the recipe are missing. We still do not understand how to gain and maintain the moral-mental-physical hold over the population and to bring about the collapse of these new enemies.

In the opinion of this author, if we are to understand better how to fight 4GW, we should look at Boyd's prescription and analyze the requirements.

The Physical – Mental – Moral Aspects of War.

Physical Aspect of War

If anything, Americans understand physical war. Our technologies help us fight and win physical war, and it is where we are at our best. Unfortunately in 4GW, the enemy has neutralized much of the U.S. high-technology high-cost weaponry that applies to this type of conflict. F-22s and nuclear submarines do not have relevance in this war. Star Wars acquisition programs, by whatever name add to the red ink in buckets. The acquisition of new military technology has taken on a life of its own, however, and gathers even more momentum with the influence of defense industries and Congress as well as some generals and admirals who are aligned to the processes through promotions and deferred monetary rewards upon retirement.

The needs in this war include some important technologies, but for the most part what we need most are ground forces for deployments all over the world to attack the practitioners of 4GW where they live. Unfortunately, we do not have enough ground forces to do all the things we wish; for example, our ground forces would be stretched to the breaking point if we were to experience an outbreak of war in Korea. Already our volunteer force shows some signs of decay of readiness skills because of deployments. Overuse of National Guard and Reserves may end in a failure to recruit sufficient militia forces. Even our professional army may decide that they do not want to continue to rotate to remote areas every other tour and vote with their feet. Only time will tell.

And finally, we are not properly configured to fight the 4GW terrorists. As Woolsey suggests we need a lot more military police, civil affairs units, and psychological warriors than we have. Too many of our tank and artillery units are trying to conduct infantry operations in Iraq without proper training or equipping. Our force is organized to fight a conventional war, not a war in the shadows. Of the ten active divisions in the force, six

are heavy divisions and four are light divisions. Some of the new STRYKER brigades may leaven the force with some medium units, but for the most part, our force structure is like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians.

The Special Operations Forces are ideally suited to take on the 4GW terrorists. They have proven abilities to deal with the Third Generation Warfare forces in Afghanistan and they have the most potential for dealing with 4GW, but none of the fronts, with the exception of the Philippines, has been commanded by special forces warriors. They have been commanded by conventional generals. The problem is that the SOF is supporting various theaters and is spread too thin. We cannot build SOF or train SOF overnight, nor can we afford to do so, but we could make better use of our unconventional force talents by letting them lead in the arena where they operate routinely.

Mental Aspect of War

But the physical war is not the problem. If we look at the mental aspect of 4GW, we find that we need to out-think the enemy with fast transients and deceptions in numerous ways in a continuous tempo to force him on the defensive. Boyd's OODA Loop describes the process.

Figure 2: Simple Representation of Boyd's OODA Loop[18]

This representation is frequently misunderstood in its simplicity to be a sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A cycle. Boyd developed the OODA loop in much more detail that needs to be understood more fully lest it be misapplied as a too-simple construct.

Figure 3 depicts a more detailed Boyd OODA process and the emphasis on the Orientation of the actor. All of the processes are happening to some degree all of the time. There is no time-out in war. Of course there are two actors, and the one who is more agile, more adaptive, more unfair, and can transition faster will theoretically prevail in a war of ideas. If anything, the War on Terrorism is a war of ideas.


Figure 3: Detailed OODA Loop sketch[19]

As illustrated in Figure 3, the orientation of the actor relies on perspective from his environment, upbringing, and education in addition to the things that are of immediate attention such as the observation of a threat. In this war, the orientation factor is of key importance. The mindsets of the opponents are totally and inalterably different in almost every respect. The opponent who understands his enemy better clearly has an advantage in the mind war. Ho Chi Minh understood America better than we understood him. If we are to believe what has been reported, Osama Bin Laden understands us better than we understand him.

In the mind game, we aim to defeat the enemy despite his advantages by turning his advantages against him. We must do the unexpected. Some will say that we have done so already by attacking the terrorists where they live. For the most part, they believed that we would react to terror in only limited ways, but the Bush Administration defied what had been done in the past and took the strategic offensive which in a way was a serious setback for the terrorists. However ill-advised politically, the invasion of Iraq

may have been another unexpected act on our part to disrupt the Al Qaeda and Ba'athist mind sets. There was evidence also that the speed and ease with which the Americans took Baghdad was translated into "shock and awe" to the outside Arab world. But the "shock and awe" rapidly wore off, and it now appears that the other side may have the upper hand in the OODA loop game.

We have to learn to operate in faster transients and become much more agile with respect to operations against the enemy.   This requires a lot more thinking about 4GW.

<u>Moral Aspect of War</u>

What is moral war? About the closest we may come to a definition is that the moral aspect of war involves the cultural codes of conduct or standards of behavior that constrain, as well as sustain and focus, our emotional/intellectual responses.[20] To be clear, Boyd never talked about Moral War but rather he discussed moral war as a category of conflict and as an aspect of war. Boyd argued that the physical, mental, and moral dimensions of war should re-enforce one another. This is a tall order, because very often they are in opposition, as certainly turned out to be the case in Vietnam where America's moral strength was weakened by divisions on the home front. Boyd recognized the pre-eminence of the moral aspect of war in his discussions of guerrilla conflict. It is the belief of this writer that Boyd would have recognized the pre-eminence of the moral aspect of war in 4GW, and he would have considered morality worthy of a unique place in dealing with 4GW.

If we look at Al Qaeda or the phenomenon it represents as the principal enemy, we see that they place only limited, but effective, emphasis on the physical aspect of war. More Al Qaeda emphasis is on the mental aspect of war with respect to psychological operations and information/disinformation. But far and above, the major emphasis of Al Qaeda is on the moral aspect of war. Their fundamentalist outlook is attributed to the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia dating back to the 18th Century. The Wahhabis might be likened to a very strict fundamentalist sect not unlike some of the fundamentalist religions in early America such as the Puritans.[21] The Wahhabis, however, developed their own peculiar customs which were added into their understanding of Islam such as the central element of their beliefs: the pursuit of Jihad, the Holy War.   Wahhabis became intolerant of other Muslims who would not adhere to their understanding and practice of Islam.   The extreme views that surfaced projected hostility towards any Muslim or non-believer who failed to adhere to Wahhabi fundamentalist doctrine. It is clear from Osama's writings (or what he calls "fatwahs," even though he does not have the scholarly training needed to issue fatwahs) that he is trying to tap into the moral dimensions of spiritual leadership as well as Wahabbism.

The House of Saud originated in the mid-1700s from nomad and village tribes in Central Arabia, unlike the kings of Jordan and Morocco who claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed. Legitimacy was therefore dependent on a concept of "caretaking" of Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed, and Medina, where the Muslim state was originally established. Not only are the Royal Family Wahhabi themselves, they are also dependent

on the Wahhabist establishment for support. Thus, the consensus of the generally conservative Imams and their followers restrict much of what the Royal Family can do.

The Saudi Government walked a tightrope between being friends with the U.S., and adhering to the Wahhabi fundamentalist views. Allowing U.S. troops to be stationed on Saudi Arabian land was not acceptable to the most conservative Imams and their congregations. Still, the Saudis would not tolerate the practice of terrorism within the state. Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi by birth, was stripped of his citizenship, for example, and the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh served as a wake-up call for increased crack-downs on all forms of extremism.

Where the Saudis did err was in turning a blind eye to activities outside the Kingdom. They did not know what their citizens did outside the country and as long as it stayed outside the country, the government did not appear to care. Disaffected Saudi youth who wanted to turn jihadi and go fight in another country were no concern as long as they didn't bring back weapons into the country or openly criticize the royal family. The House of Saud ignored the extremists in the vain hope that their violence would be limited to targets in far off and unimportant lands like Afghanistan or against the Israelis.

The Wahhabis gained control of the education system in Saudi Arabia which continues to spread their particular version of Islam and jihad. Not only is this education process endemic to Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabis export it around the world. In the United States, they control the education of Islam which is the fastest growing religion in this country, particularly in our prisons.[22] According to a Washington Post article, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona) said: "A growing body of accepted evidence and expert research demonstrates that the Wahhabi ideology that dominates, finances, and animates many groups here in the United States, indeed is antithetical to the values of tolerance, individualism and freedom as we conceive these things".[23]

The extremists of the Wahhabis (even Right of Right) considered the Royal Family failing in their duties, and initially, Osama Bin Laden focused on the suborning of the House of Saud. But Saudi Arabian leaders were not the only target of the extremists. Anwar Sadat, for example, was an early casualty of the Egyptian extremists. Only in the early 1990s did the Al Qaeda turn their attention to the U.S. as the "Great Satan" and that was because Osama objected to the Saudis inviting the U.S. in to fight Saddam Hussein. Osama wanted to lead a jihad against the secular Hussein and Iraq's secular Ba'athist Government, whom he considered an infidel. While we cannot say that Al Qaeda was behind all the terrorism of the 90s, they were responsible for attacks on the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia's Khobar Towers as well as the attack on the USS Cole. The objective was to throw the infidel out of the Holy land, a moral cause to rally supporters.

The reason is clear. Osama and his fellow extremists fear that America's very freedoms may appeal to many in the Middle East. American music, American idols, American lifestyles are all very threatening to a Wahhabist, and even more so to the extremists of the Wahhabis.

Repressed during the era of Saddam Hussein, Iraq's Wahhabis as well as other extremely conservative religious factions are finding a new influence among people distraught by the American presence in their homeland.[24]

It may seem a supreme irony that the most rigid, literalist, disciplined version of Islam has assumed the mantel of 4GW, the most fluid, adaptive, irregular form of warfare. But the fact is that 4GW offers a strategic advantage to the practitioner: Undermatch.

In 4GW, asymmetries are apparent. Many things that are moral to the Al Qaeda are immoral to the United States of America and conversely. It was all right for the terrorists to slit the throat of journalist Daniel Pearl on camera and to send the videotape to Al Jazeera as long as one subscribes to the code of those Islamic fanatics, but it is not all right for Americans to use torture as a means of extracting information out of Al Qaeda prisoners. We have to assume the moral high ground.

Similarly, many American freedoms which are taken for granted in the United States offend the religious sensitivities of many strict Muslims. Simply the way we dress offends, but is that sufficient grounds to advocate and actually kill Americans? It is hard to believe to many Americans, but it is allowed – and even demanded – under strict interpretation of Wahhabism, who rationalize it as a legitimate "defense" of Islam, which in their imaginations is under mortal attack from the West. Perhaps this intolerance is the root cause of their desire to kill Americans. But what of the other millions of non-Wahhabi Islamics? Where are they in this jihad? There is hardly one Arab who does not believe that there are serious moral inequities with regard to the Palestinian issue. The United States is seen as favoring Israel, and unless the American Government can bring about some equitable solution, they will continue to blame Americans for this failure. No matter that Hamas and Hezbollah are deliberately sabotaging the processes. This is the one key strategic moral issue that affects the entire conflict with the extremists, and it demands attention while we are actively engaged on many other fronts. The U.S. must have the moral courage to bring the two parties to a peace – despite a cultural and religious bias.

The American Way of War

Is it possible that an army or a nation can lose its soul in fighting terrorism? The answer may be found in "The Battle of Algiers" a documentary movie on the French Army and paratroopers in Algeria during the uprising of the 1960s. The French Paratroopers were called in to quell the riots and terrorism that the provincial French Army could not put down. The Paratroopers accomplished their mission by applying terror in a more massive scale than the terrorists themselves to include the use of torture. They may have won the battle of Algiers, but they lost their souls and the war.[25] The moral victory was won by the FLN.

The American Way of War does not accept the use of torture and terror against the terrorists. And as a nation-state, we can never claim to be 4GW warriors, but we must learn how to fight the old terrorists in a new environment called Fourth Generation Warfare, and it is the opinion of this author that we have to retain our own morality to win in the face of all odds. Yet we too have our moral dilemmas: Should we support

governments who support terrorists? Should we prop up dictators? Was there reason to invade Iraq? And the biggest of all moral dilemma is how much of our freedom do we trade away for security at home?

The United States is not always the model of correct moral behavior. For 150 years, the white supremist Ku Klux Klan terrorized the South, and it was not until there was a bottoms-up populist movement with some aid from the Federal Government in the 1960s, that the Klan was subdued. It is not entirely subdued today, and there are other extremist sects such as the Ayrian Nation and the Survivalists (by whatever name) that would do harm if they thought they could impose their ideas on our society. The question this raises with regard to the moral aspect of war is whether or not there is a different timeline associated with the Boydian OODA loops.   How long does it take until the people themselves rise up against internal brands of tyranny? How long would it take the Iraqis or the Afghanis or even the Saudis to throw off the yokes of their own extremists?

<u>Constructs for thinking about moral war</u>

Napoleon Bonaparte is reputed to have said: The moral is to the physical as three to one". If he did actually say this, he forgot his own axiom.

Clausewitz provided some insights with respect to moral war. He identified the strategic elements of war as: moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical.[26] Of these, he believed the moral elements among the most important in war, but he said:

> …next to nothing can be said about these things (moral aspects) in books, they can no more be omitted from the theory of the art of war than can any of the other components of war.[27]

And later he said:

> If the theory of war did no more than to remind us of these elements, demonstrating the need to reckon with and give full value to moral qualities, it would expand its horizon and simply by establishing this point of view would condemn in advance anyone who sought to base and analysis on material factors alone.[28]

So while Clausewitz does not dismiss moral war, he says we cannot talk about it because it is too nebulous.

Clausewitz' construct of war is generally attributed to his holy "trinity": government, army, and people. He discusses the need for unity and commonality of purpose, but in general, Clausewitz is directing his theory to European nation states and European morals of the time. Clausewitz wrote about First Generation Warfare because of his own personal experiences fighting Napoleon. Massed armies slugged it out with each other

with the emphasis on attrition warfare. Of far more significance to Fourth Generation warfare is Sun Tzu.

Sun Tzu wrote of the five factors of war: moral influence, weather, terrain, command, and doctrine.[29]   What he meant by moral influence was "that which causes harmony of the people with their leader", and it took priority in the list of five factors.[30] The most important virtue of a military commander to Sun Tzu was not to win in battle, but rather to "subdue the enemy without fighting".[31] It has been said that during the time of Genghis Kahn, and the Mongol invasion of Europe, the mere sight of a few Tartar horsemen was enough for an entire city to surrender.

Sun Tzu was from the Orient, and his theory of war, even today, is likely to have more significance for Muslims than does any other theorist, particularly Clausewitz.

It may be that the Arabs choose to fight in the ways of Sun Tzu simply because it is the way they have fought historically. It is clear in this war against terrorism that the Iraqis stood little chance fighting Americans in a Clausewitzean war.

Clausewitz is irrelevant and counterproductive in this war, but our American generals have been schooled in Clausewitz. It is Sun Tzu who should be studied and re-studied for insights into 4GW.

It is quite likely Sun Tzu's ideas influenced Mao and Ho Chi Minh (Uncle Ho) particularly with respect to moral war. Mao taught protracted war and patience while proselytizing the people. Ho taught how the unity with the people could bring victory over even the United States.

Mao used the idealism of Communism to organize and inspire the peasants. Ostensibly the war against the Japanese was the cassus belli, but in fact the organization and war was for control of China. Mao resorted to guerrilla warfare to preserve his own force while seeking to annihilate the enemy. To do this, he developed a strategy of "protracted war".[32] Eerily, Mao wrote about and preached against "liberalism". [33]   The morality of Mao was not unlike that of the Wahhabis. Mao said:

> In revolutionary organisations liberalism is extremely harmful. It is a corrosive which disrupts unity, undermines solidarity, induces inactivity and creates dissention. It deprives the revolutionary ranks of compact organisation and strict discipline, prevents policies from being thoroughly carried out and divorces the organization of the Party from the masses under their leadership. It is an extremely bad tendency.[34]

Although we think of Communists as atheists and perhaps amoral, Mao was extremely moralistic in his approach to the treatment of the fish within the sea in which he and his peoples' army swam. Mao created strict disciplinary codes for the treatment of civilians, and "boy scout" rules of behavior by his "regulars" were strictly enforced. If anything, Mao believed in independent organization as the way to win against the Japanese and the Kuomintang.[35] He proved his point.

Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, although fiercely independent, took Mao's Little Red Book a step further in organizing against the French and later the Americans.

> The Vietnamese people's war of liberation was a just war, aiming to win back the independence and unity of the country, to bring land to our peasants and guarantee them the right to it, and to defend the achievements of the August Revolution. That is why it was first and foremost a *people's war*. To educate, mobilize, organize and arm the whole people in order that they might take part in the Resistance was a crucial question.[36]

Yet Mao and Ho were inwardly focused with their morality. In this new 4GW, the enemy actively uses moral war as an offensive weapon against outside as well as inside enemies.

In the American Army, there is pride in the historic roots of the American Revolution which started as a guerrilla war and ended as a conventional First Generation War. But the American Way of War found its maturity in the Union army of the Civil War, and has been in lock-step with second generation attrition warfare ever since. During the Cold War, there was even a time when the U.S. strategy was to resort to nuclear defense regardless of the threat.[37] Our generals are steeped in 2GW, but in recent years have shown themselves able to adapt to maneuver warfare concepts when prompted. Bill Lind, one of the authors of the original 4GW article, author of *The Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, and American military reformer icon recently commented that he thought the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were getting a handle on 3GW as evidenced by the recent Iraq combat phase.[38] According to Lind, this is critical to attaining an understanding of 4GW as we will have to fight 4GW with a foundation of 3GW thinking.[39]

Current U.S. military doctrine addresses the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, but it emphasizes the strategic level. It is a top-down formalistic approach to war; whereas, the Al Qaeda approach is informal, bottom-up, evolutionary, and constantly adapting to changing conditions. The U.S. military teaches three types of war: nuclear war (high intensity), conventional war (mid-intensity), and Operations Other than War (low-intensity). These are considered an almost linear function, with arrays of battle lines and rear areas that Napoleon would recognize, but the battlespace of modern day 4GW warriors is amorphous and ever changing – it can easily shift from assassinations to weapons of mass destruction to hit and run raids to car bombs. And 4GW is high intensity combat because it involves everyone. The Chechnians have proven skills in modern urban combat in Grozny that resembles the mid-intensity combat in cities in World War II. The categories of combat that we teach in American military universities need to be rethought in terms of modern day technologies and global access. There is very little on moral war or 4GW in American military texts. At times, "Just War" theory is trotted out to explain why we are fighting in some location or the other against a particular enemy, but in moral terms it applies only to Americans and not to the enemy. Just war is an attempt to make war civilized by agreed rules of conduct, but in this war, there are no agreed rules of conduct.[40] Just War was turned on its head in Vietnam and

resulted in a moral separation of the American people from the Army and from the Government.

If Boyd were alive today, he might say we are practicing attrition warfare against an immoral enemy fighting unfairly.

A new way of thinking about war?

President Bush has stated, the fight is against "evil", and the neo-conservatives seem to picture it this way, but the morality play does not extend to our military forces. We have yet to put things into context to fight on all three planes: physical, mental, and moral. Figure 4 attempts to depict a suggested way of looking at 4GW.


Figure 4: Boyd's Categories of War

The problem with Figure 4 is that it weights each category equally and begs the question: Is any category more important that the others? If Napoleon was near to being correct when he said that the moral is to the physical as three to one, it suggests another construct as in Figure 5.

The appearance of the graphic in Figure 5 is distorted to reflect the importance of the moral aspect of 4GW, but it is not disconnected from the physical and mental aspects of war. They are inextricably intertwined and should be mutually reinforcing. The consideration of moral aspects must be executed through mental and physical means.

The construct does not differ in form for the enemy. He has the same construct, but his morals are different and his mental processes are different, but his physical acts may be similar or entirely different. The ambush is a regular physical tactic performed by both

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enemy and friendly forces, but the suicide bomber is a unique physical act that the terrorists have been able to employ using moral righteousness and promises of martyrdom in the next life. We eschew such tactics as immoral, but their psychological effects have profound moral and mental reverberations within us because the kamikaze appears almost unstoppable as if powered by some supernatural force we cannot understand.

Moral Aspects of War:

- <u>Webster</u>: "Relating to principles of right or wrong in behavior"

- Just War

- Crusade

- Manifest Destiny

- Jihad

Physical Mental

Moral

Audiences:

- Own forces

- Own population

- Enemy forces

- Enemy Commander

- Enemy Population

- Coalition Forces

- World opinion

Figure 5: Importance of Moral Aspect of War

The OODA Loop processes for friendly and enemy forces are fundamentally the same construct because they are both grounded in the evolution of the brain, but they differ vastly in orientation because of the different cultural histories and live experiences, as was pointed out earlier in this paper.

If we are to defeat the enemy in this War against Terror, we have to focus on its moral essence: the rightness of our cause.   We have to convince several audiences of that moral correctness and make them empathetic to our success. That fight is being waged right now in Iraq in a race against time to see who can convince the Iraqis of the rightness of our actions to liberate all Iraqis from tyranny. There is no intent to ignore the physical and mental aspects of war, but it appears, at least to the author, that serious attention is needed with respect to understanding and winning the moral aspects of this war.

In the case of the Islamic audience, no matter what we hear about the Al Jazeera television or the Sunni newspapers or the radical radio stations, the principle medium of

information in Iraq and most likely in all of the Middle East is rumor with a hint of conspiracy. We have yet to learn how to use our information warriors to pass our message through rumor. Horror stories abound about insulting and laughable American leaflets constructed and distributed by our Psychological Operations forces. We all know of the boom boxes used in Panama to get Noriega to come out of the Chancellery, another embarrassing moment in playing the mental/moral war. Our nascent television station in Baghdad is underfunded and undersubscribed in favor of the radical Arab stations.[41] So why do we have it if no one is listening: lip service? Do we not believe our own message enough to put our money where our mouth is?

There are other equally important audiences including our own troops. If our soldiers are not convinced of the moral rightness of the cause, it is unlikely that we will be able to win in a moral war – especially a 4GW moral war. The American public likewise has to be convinced of the moral rightness of the war. So far, the War against Terrorism has widespread public support, but the failures to find weapons of mass destruction or links between Saddam and Al Qaeda have created moral vulnerabilities that can be exploited by our adversaries. If the moral war is lost because of a wedge between the leaders and the people or the army, we will find ourselves in another quagmire like Vietnam.

Conclusion

The bottom line is that this war against terrorism is not a war to be fought only by foot soldiers. This war has to be fought by experts at every level and with every agency and resource at our command. America will have to be mobilized to fight this war. We will need the best minds available to aid in the information war, the economic war, the social war. Army Special Forces ought to be our military force of choice, and we should withdraw our conventional forces as quickly as possible. Rather than restoring security and order, our conventional maneuver force could easily be doing more harm than good in the post-war reconstruction phase. We still have a lot to learn about nation-building, and we could learn a lot from the Canadians and the British if only we would.   There is considerable reason to doubt America can pull it off alone. There is reason to doubt a world coalition can succeed.

Human source intelligence (HUMINT) is the key to combating 4GW, and since we will not be able to use the terrorist and torture techniques of our enemies, we have to be all that much better at collection, analysis, and rapid dissemination of information. In the HUMINT business, we are almost starting from zero, and let there be no mistake, it takes years to develop effective HUMINT.   Ironically, there is a finite time limit to achieve progress in the eyes of the civilians in whose lands these wars are being fought. That puts a great deal of pressure on the intelligence community, and one has to ask if they are up to it after having relied so much and for so long on technical intelligence sources for our primary information. TECHINT is still an important contributor to the intelligence picture, but it is the HUMINT side that has been so long ignored and is now so needed as an essential part of the overall puzzle.

One way to start is to establish permanent local intelligence centers that contain both U.S. and indigenous intelligence personnel to process information. A highly active

counterintelligence force must also be instituted with trusted agents to vet the personnel with whom we work.

One Robert Hanssen can destroy a HUMINT organization and its efforts. It will do no good if the intelligence flow is to the terrorists as well as our own forces. The intelligence force will thrive or strangle on the ability to win the concurrent moral war. If we can win the moral war, information will flow. If we lose the moral high ground, the intelligence function will not be able to function. In any case, establishing and maintaining a productive HUMINT machine will not be easy.

Our Chaplains ought to get smart on the Koran and teach the soldiers how to understand what it really says. Where are our Muslim Chaplains? We learned just recently that one of our Muslim Chaplains, Captain Yousef Yee, a West Pointer, may be guilty of espionage.[42] Would this be the embodiment of moral conflict? It brings the moral question to the forefront if the charges are true. At a minimum, we must investigate the spread of radical Islam here in the United States to protect ourselves from infiltration. It appears that the extremists have already been successful at infiltrating our institutions and growing a generation of 4GW warriors within our own state. And what of other nation states? Will this process succeed in destroying the state from within? We need strong counterintelligence support.

We ought to be educating our troops to speak at least some Arabic to relate to Iraqis and Pashtu to relate to Afghanis. We need more General Abizaids who are fluent in Arabic and understand the culture. The dearth of Arabic Foreign Area Officers is not only disappointing, it may be a major factor in winning or losing the moral high ground.

At the strategic level, the U.S. must come to grips with the Palestinian issue and assist in its resolution. At the operational level, the U.S. must recognize that the root cause of the war against us is not centered in Iraq nor is it just Al Qaeda or the Feyhadeen or the Jihadists, but rather the root cause is centered in radical extremist Wahhabism, and we will need every ally we can get to combat it. At the tactical level, the U.S. must recognize the inability to comprehend the suicide bombers and "cowardly" attacks of ninjas are the way the enemy will fight this war and we must learn to counter it – without losing our souls in the process.

Perhaps the most important imperative in 4GW is educating ourselves as to the nature of the threat and determining how to cope with it. We should insist on open fora throughout the government to understand this World War IV enemy and derive appropriate plans of action. Our First, Second, and Third Generation solutions will not provide appropriate responses.

An adaptation of John Boyd's "essence of moral warfare" graphic may be the synthesis of a prescription for winning. The figure below is an attempt to portray what that synthesis might be with regard to 4GW.

Create, Exploit, and Magnify:

Security
 Impressions of safety to one's well being and survival.

Certainty:
Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear routine, normal, calm, familiar, pacific, etc.

Trust
Atmosphere of relying on others to do the right thing that normalizes human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes.

Idea
Make life routine and ordered with guaranteed freedoms and the expectation of justice. System of governing that creates trust

AIM
Create moral bonds that permit
an organic whole to exist.

Figure 6. Taking on the Moral Aspect of War

It may be that only the Iraqis themselves or the Afghanis themselves can create these moral bonds regardless of the money and blood the U.S. pours into these stricken states. But it is morally right to help them try to do so. Wahhabism will be difficult to overcome.

4GW is here to stay because our adversaries have learned how to bypass conventional military forces intent on fighting 2GW or 3GW but otherwise ignorant of their 4GW enemy. We can plan on fighting this type of war for many years to come. All the STRYKER vehicles and all the F-22s will be of limited help in winning this war. We have to win at the heart of 4GW: MORAL WAR, and this will take a lot more than just soldiers.

[1] Lind, William S., Colonel Keith Nightingale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): 22-26. See this article and many other 4GW articles at http://www.d-n-i.net

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1994). All articles referenced as Fourth Generation Warfare can be found on the d-n-i.net web site.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Montgomery C. Meigs, "Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare", *Parameters* (Summer 2003) pp. 4-5.

[10] *Ibid*., p.5.

[11] James Woolsey, speech titled: "World War IV", National War College, Washington, D.C., 16 November 2002. A copy of the speech is in the possession of the author.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] There is no denial that Colonel Boyd was controversial, but many have attributed the successes in maneuver warfare in Iraq to the theories of Colonel Boyd. Boyd wrote very few articles, but he spoke extensively and persuaded other soldiers to listen. More can be found on Boyd at http://www.d-n-i.net; in Robert Coram, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2002, and in Grant Hammond, *The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security*, Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, April 2001.

[14] See Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict", and Franklin C. Spinney on Boyd in http://www.d-n-i.net.

[15] *Ibid*.

[16] Extracted from Boyd's "Patterns of Conflict" briefing, December 1986 version, p. 122.

[17] *Ibid*., p. 108.

[18] Taken from Franklin C. Spinney presentation on Boyd, "Evolutionary Epistemology" see: http://www.d-n-i.net

[19] *Ibid*.

[20] Boyd, *Patterns… op.cit.,* p.35.

[21] Much of the discussion of Wahhabism that follows is attributed to commentary by Col Chester W. Richards, USAF (Ret.), who is both very familiar with the Middle East and the late Col. John Boyd. Col. Richards is the web Master for d-n-i.net and a respected consultant to business and industry.

[22] Susan Schmidt, "Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S.", *Th e Washington Post*, October 2, 2003, p.A01.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Scott Peterson, "How Wahhibis Fan Iraq Insurgency", *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 17, 2003

[25] Suggested reading: Jean Larteguy, *The Centurions*, New York: Avon Books, 1961.

[26] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 183.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 184.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 63.

[30] *Ibid*., p. 64.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[32] Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2., New York: International Publishers, 1954, pp. 121-122.

[33] *Ibid..*, p. 74

[34] *Ibid..,* p. 75.

[35] Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Trans. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffin, USMC (Ret), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961, pp. 51-52.

[36] General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962., p. 27.

[37] See Maxwell Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, Greenwood Publishing Group, June 1974.

[38] William S. Lind, "Army and Marines Show Real Progress Toward Third Generation Warfare", e-mail to netnews forum: G2-Forward.org, 13 September 2003, 12:05:51 EDT.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] See The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Just War Theory". http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm.

[41] "America's Television Flop in Iraq", *The New York Times* (August 9, 2003) received via Milinet newsgroup Sat, 9 Aug 2003 07:06:08 EDT

[42] Robert Burns, "Guantanamo Chaplain Held in Investigation", *USA Today* (September 22, 2003), 10A