

[CICERO]
AD C. HERENNIUM
DE RATIONE DICENDI
(RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM)

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
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BOOK III

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1 I. In the preceding Books I have, as I believe, shown amply enough how to apply the Invention of topics to any judicial cause. The method of finding the topics appropriate to deliberative and epideictic causes I now carry over to the present Book,^a in order that I may as speedily as possible discharge my task of explaining to you all the rules of Invention.

Four departments of rhetoric are left us to consider. Three are treated in the present Book: Arrangement,^b Delivery,^c and Memory.^d Style, because it seems to require a fuller treatment, I prefer to discuss in Book IV,^e which I hope to complete quickly and send to you, so that you may not lack anything on the art of rhetoric. Meanwhile you will learn all the principles I first set forth,^f with me, when you wish, and at times without me, by reading, so that you may in no way be kept from equal progress with me towards the mastery of this useful art. It is now for you to give attention, while I resume progress towards our goal.

2 II. Deliberative^g speeches are either of the kind in which the question concerns a choice between two courses of action, or of the kind in which a choice among several is considered. An example of a

^f Of judicial oratory, the most difficult and important kind; cf. 2. i. 1 above.

^g See note on the epideictic kind, 3. vi. 10 below.

choice between two courses of action: Does it seem better to destroy Carthage, or to leave her standing? ^a An example of a choice among several: If Hannibal, when recalled to Carthage from Italy, should deliberate whether to remain in Italy, or return home, or invade Egypt and seize Alexandria. ^b

Again, a question under deliberation is sometimes to be examined on its own account; for example, if the Senate should deliberate whether or not to redeem the captives from the enemy. ^c Or sometimes a question becomes one for deliberation and inquiry on account of some motive extraneous to the question itself; for example, if the Senate should deliberate whether to exempt Scipio from the law so as to permit him to become consul while under age. ^d And sometimes a question comes under deliberation on its own account and then provokes debate even more because of an extraneous motive; for example, if in the Italic War the Senate should deliberate

the prisoners at public cost; others opposed the disbursement of money by the state, but not ransoming at the expense of individuals, and would have granted, on surety, loans from the treasury to those who needed money. T. Manlius Torquatus spoke against the proposal, which failed. This *suasoria* was popular with the rhetoricians; cf. Cicero, *De Oratore* 3. 28. 109, *De Offic.* 1. 13. 40 and 3. 32. 113.

^a Although Scipio Aemilianus was in fact seeking the aedileship, and not the consulship, for 147 B.C., he was exempted from the law requiring a candidate for the consulship to have been praetor (and at least two years previously); at 36 (or 37) he was also well under the age required (in Cicero's day 43 years) for holding the consulship. He was elected consul in order to deal with Carthage.

Our author's consistent rule is to refer to the younger Scipio simply as *Scipio* (see also 4. v. 7, 4. xiii. 19, and 4. xxxii. 43 below) and to the elder as *Africanus* (see 4. xv. 22, 4. xxv. 34, and 4. xxxi. 42).

whether or not to grant citizenship to the Allies.^a In causes in which the subject of itself engenders the deliberation, the entire discourse will be devoted to the subject itself. In those in which an extraneous motive gives rise to the deliberation, it is this motive which will have to be emphasized or depreciated.

- 3 The orator who gives counsel will throughout his speech properly set up Advantage^b as his aim,^c so that the complete economy of his entire speech may be directed to it.

Advantage in political deliberation has two aspects : Security^d and Honour.^e

To consider Security is to provide some plan or other for ensuring the avoidance of a present or imminent danger. Subheads under Security are Might and Craft, which we shall consider either separately or conjointly. Might is determined by armies, fleets, arms, engines of war, recruiting of man power, and the like. Craft is exercised by means of money, promises, dissimulation, accelerated speed, deception, and the other means, topics which

^a τέλος. In Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1. 6 (1362 a), σκοπός. The topics drawn from the "ends" of the three different branches of oratory were later called τελικὰ κεφάλαια. Volkmann, pp. 299 ff., discusses the treatment of these by different rhetoricians. Cf. Cicero, *De Inv.* 2. li. 156 ff.

^d τὸ χρήσιμον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἀκίνδυνον.

^e τὸ καλόν. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1. 3 (1358 b), makes Honour (and Justice) subsidiary to Advantage, but Cicero in *De Inv.* 2. li. 156 sets forth Honour and Advantage as coördinate aims, and Antonius in *De Oratore* 2. 82. 335 considers the situation in which Advantage and Honour oppose each other. The Stoics believed a conflict between Honour and Advantage to be impossible; see Cicero, *De Offic.* 3. 2. 9 ff. Perhaps because of Stoic influence, Cicero makes Advantage the sole aim in *Part. Orat.* 24. 83.

I shall discuss at a more appropriate time, if ever I attempt to write on the art of war or on state administration.^a

The Honourable is divided into the Right and the Praiseworthy.^b The Right ^c is that which is done in accord with Virtue and Duty. Subheads under the Right are Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Temperance.^d Wisdom is intelligence capable, by a certain judicious method, of distinguishing good and bad; likewise the knowledge of an art is called Wisdom; and again, a well-furnished memory, or experience in diverse matters, is termed Wisdom. Justice is equity, giving to each thing what it is entitled to in proportion to its worth.^e Courage is the reaching for great things and contempt for what is mean; also the endurance of hardship in expectation of profit.^f Temperance is self-control that moderates our desires.^g

- 4 III. We shall be using the topics of Wisdom in our discourse if we compare advantages and disadvantages, counselling the pursuit of the one and the avoidance of the other; if we urge a course in a field in which we

Justinian, *Dig.* 1. 1. 10. On this concept (which was Greek in origin; cf., e.g., Aristotle, *Top.* 6. 5 [143 a 16], 6. 7 [145 b 36], *Eth. Nic.* 5. 9 [1133 b], *Rhet.* 1. 9 [1366 b 9], and the Stoic definition in Stobaeus, *loc. cit.*) see Leopold Wenger, "Suum Cuique in antiken Urkunden," in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters* (Grabmann Festschrift), Münster, 1935, 1. 1415-25, and Felix Senn, *De la justice et du droit*, Paris, 1927, pp. 1-54.

^f Cf. 3. iii. 6 and 4. xxv. 35 below, and the definition in Cicero, *De Inv.* 2. liv. 163.

^g Cf. Plutarch, *De virt. mor.* 2 (441 A): "Virtue, when it moderates our desires (ἐπιθυμίαν κοσμοῦσα) and defines the mean and the seasonable in our pleasures, is called Temperance."

have a technical knowledge of the ways and means whereby each detail should be carried out; or if we recommend some policy in a matter whose history we can recall either from direct experience or hearsay—in this instance we can easily persuade our hearers to the course we wish by adducing the precedent.

We shall be using the topics of Justice if we say that we ought to pity innocent persons and suppliants; if we show that it is proper to repay the well-deserving with gratitude; if we explain that we ought to punish the guilty; if we urge that faith ought zealously to be kept; if we say that the laws and customs^a of the state ought especially to be preserved; if we contend that alliances and friendships should scrupulously be honoured; if we make it clear that the duty imposed by nature toward parents, gods, and fatherland must be religiously observed; if we maintain that ties of hospitality, clientage, kinship, and relationship by marriage must inviolably be cherished; if we show that neither reward nor favour nor peril nor animosity ought to lead us astray from the right path; if we say that in all cases a principle of dealing alike with all should be established. With these and like topics of Justice we shall demonstrate that an action of which we are sponsors in Assembly or council is just, and by their contraries we shall demonstrate that an action is unjust. As a result we shall be provided with the same commonplaces for both persuasion and dissuasion.

- 5 When we invoke as motive for a course of action steadfastness in Courage, we shall make it clear that men ought to follow and strive after noble and lofty

actions, and that, by the same token, actions base and unworthy of the brave ought therefore to be despised by brave men and considered as beneath their dignity. Again, from an honourable act no peril or toil, however great, should divert us; death ought to be preferred to disgrace; no pain should force an abandonment of duty; no man's enmity should be feared in defence of truth; for country, for parents, guest-friends, intimates, and for the things justice commands us to respect, it behoves us to brave any peril and endure any toil.

We shall be using the topics of Temperance if we censure the inordinate desire for office, money, or the like; if we restrict each thing to its definite natural bounds; if we show how much is enough in each case, advise against going too far, and set the due limit to every matter.

- 6 Virtues of this kind are to be enlarged upon if we are recommending them, but depreciated if we are urging that they be disregarded, so that the points which I have made above ^a will be belittled. To be sure, no one will propose the abandonment of virtue, but let the speaker say that the affair is not of such a sort that we can put any extraordinary virtue to the test; or that the virtue consists rather of qualities contrary to those here evinced. Again, if it is at all possible, we shall show that what our opponent calls justice is cowardice, and sloth, and perverse generosity; what he has called wisdom we shall term impertinent, babbling, and offensive cleverness; what he declares to be temperance we shall declare to be inaction and lax indifference; what he has named

^a 3. iii. 4-5.

courage we shall term the reckless temerity of a gladiator.^a

- 7 IV. The Praiseworthy is what produces an honourable remembrance, at the time of the event and afterwards. I have separated the Praiseworthy from the Right, not because the four categories which I list under the appellative Right usually fail to engender this honourable remembrance, but because, although the praiseworthy has its source in the right, we must nevertheless in speaking treat one apart from the other. Indeed we should pursue the right not alone for the sake of praise; but if praise accrues, the desire to strive after the right is doubled. When, therefore, a thing is shown to be right, we shall show that it is also praiseworthy, whether in the opinion of qualified persons (if, for example, something should please a more honourable class of men, and be disapproved by a lower class), or of certain allies, or all our fellow citizens, or foreign nations, or our descendants.

Such being the division of topics in deliberative speaking, I must briefly explain how to develop the cause as a whole.

The Introduction may be made by means of the Direct Opening or of the Subtle Approach, or by the same means as in a judicial cause. If there happens to be a Statement of Facts, the same method will properly be followed in the narrative.

- 8 Since in causes of this kind the end is Advantage, and Advantage is divided into the consideration of Security and the consideration of Honour, if we can prove that both ends will be served, we shall promise

and sagacity in all things as general fecklessness;" see also Cato in Sallust, *Cat.* 52. 11. Our author here uses the figure *distinctio* (παραδιαστολή); see note on 4. xxv. 35 below.

to make this twofold proof in our discourse; if we are going to prove that one of the two will be served, we shall indicate simply the one thing we intend to affirm. If, now, we say that our aim is Security, we shall use its subdivisions, Might and Strategy. For that which, in instructing, I have, in order to give clarity and emphasis, called Craft, we shall in speaking call by the more honourable name of Strategy. If we say that our counsel aims at the Right, and all four categories of Right apply, we shall use them all. If these categories do not all apply, we shall in speaking set forth as many as do.

We shall use Proof and Refutation when we establish in our favour the topics explained above, and refute the contrary topics. The rules for developing an argument artistically will be found in Book II.^a V. But if it happens that in a deliberation the counsel of one side is based on the consideration of security and that of the other on honour, as in the case of those who, surrounded by Carthaginians, deliberate on a course of action,^b then the speaker who advocates security will use the following topics: Nothing is more useful than safety; no one can make use of his virtues if he has not based his plans upon safety; not even the gods help those who thoughtlessly commit themselves to danger; nothing ought to be deemed honourable which does not produce
9 safety. One who prefers the considerations of honour to security will use the following topics: Virtue ought never to be renounced; either pain, if that is feared, or death, if that is dreaded, is more

^a A *suasoria* used also by Cicero, in *De Inv.* 2. lvii. 171, concerning the inhabitants of Casilinum in Campania, after the heroic defence of 216 B.C. against Hannibal.

tolerable than disgrace and infamy; one must consider the shame which will ensue—indeed neither immortality nor a life everlasting is achieved, nor is it proved that, once this peril is avoided, another will not be encountered; virtue finds it noble to go even beyond death; fortune, too, habitually favours the brave;^a not he who is safe in the present, but he who lives honourably, lives safely—whereas he who lives shamefully cannot be secure for ever.

As a general rule we employ virtually the same Conclusions in these as in judicial causes, except that here especially it is useful to present examples from the past in the greatest possible number.

- 10 VI. Let us now turn to the Epideictic kind of cause.^b Since epideictic includes Praise and Censure, the topics on which praise is founded will, by their contraries, serve us as the bases for censure. The following, then, can be subject to praise: External

deliberative and judicial causes the speaker seeks to persuade his hearers to a course of action, in epideictic his primary purpose is by means of his art to impress his ideas upon them, without action as a goal. On the scope and purpose of epideictic, and on the discrepancies between our author's treatment and that of Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1. 3, 1358 b), see D. A. G. Hinks, *Class. Quart.* 30 (1936). 170-6; cf. also Quintilian, 3. 4. 1 ff., and Volkmann, pp. 19 ff. In the Stoic scheme "encomiastic" was used instead of "epideictic"; see Diogenes Laertius 7. 42. This term, for which *laudativum* (see Cicero, *Part. Orat.* 3. 10, and Quintilian, 3. 3. 14, 3. 4. 12) would be the Latin equivalent, actually corresponds more closely to our author's definition of the *genus* than does *demonstrativum*. Doxapatres (Rabe, *Proleg. Syll.*, pp. 149 ff.) argues for the primacy of the deliberative kind, setting the judicial in the second place, and the epideictic (panegyric) last; cf. Isocrates, *Paneg.* 4, *Antid.* 46 ff., *Panath.* 271. See also Stanley Wilcox, *Harvard Studies in Class. Philol.* 53 (1942). 121-155.

Circumstances, Physical Attributes, and Qualities of Character.^a

To External Circumstances ^b belong such as can happen by chance, or by fortune, favourable or adverse: descent,^c education,^d wealth,^e kinds of power,^f titles to fame,^g citizenship,^h friendships,ⁱ and the like, and their contraries. Physical Attributes ^j are merits or defects bestowed upon the body by nature: agility,^k strength,^l beauty,^m health,ⁿ and their contraries. Qualities of Character ^o rest upon our judgement and thought: wisdom, justice, 11 courage, temperance, and their contraries. Such, then, in a cause of this kind, will be our Proof and Refutation.

The Introduction ^p is drawn from our own person, or the person we are discussing, or the person of our hearers, or from the subject-matter itself.

^ν εὐδοξία, τιμή.

^h πατρίς, πόλις, ἔθνος, πολιτεία.

ⁱ φίλοι. Cf. Eutychus in Plautus, *Mercator* 845-6: "What I kept seeking was at home. There I found six companions: life, friendship, native land, gladness, fun, and sport."

^j σῶμα.

^k ποδώκεια.

^l ἰσχύς, ῥώμη.

^m κάλλος.

ⁿ ὑγίεια, εὐεξία.

^o ἀρεταὶ ψυχῆς—properly, Virtues of the Soul. See note on 3. ii. 3 above. Our author and Cicero in *De Inv.* differ from the *Rhet. ad Alex.*, Aristotle, and Theon in including only the "primary" virtues; see Georg Reichel, *Quaestiones Pro-gymnasm.*, diss. Leipzig, 1909, pp. 90 ff.

^p The *tractatio* is based upon the parts of the discourse, and thus follows the pre-Aristotelian rhetorical theory.

Note that unlike judicial (see 1. iv. 6) and deliberative (3. iv. 7) oratory, epideictic lacks the Subtle Approach (*insinuatio*).

From our own person: if we speak in praise, we shall say that we are doing so from a sense of duty, because ties of friendship exist; or from goodwill, because such is the virtue of the person under discussion that every one should wish to call it to mind; or because it is appropriate to show, from the praise accorded him by others, what his character is.^a If we speak in censure, we shall say that we are justified in doing so, because of the treatment we have suffered; or that we are doing so from goodwill, because we think it useful that all men should be apprised of a wickedness and a worthlessness without parallel; or because it is pleasing to show by our censure of others what conduct is pleasing to ourselves.

When we draw our Introduction from the person being discussed: if we speak in praise, we shall say that we fear our inability to match his deeds with words; ^b all men ought to proclaim his virtues; his very deeds transcend the eloquence of all eulogists. If we speak in censure, we shall, as obviously we can by the change of a few words, and as I have demonstrated just above, express sentiments to the contrary effect.

- 12 When the Introduction is drawn from the person of the hearers: if we speak in praise, we shall say that since we are not delivering an encomium amongst people unacquainted with the man, we shall speak but briefly, to refresh their memories; or if they do not know him, we shall try to make them desire to know a man of such excellence; since the hearers of our eulogy have the same zeal for virtue as the subject of the eulogy had or now has, we hope easily to win the approval of his deeds from those whose approval we desire. The opposite, if it is censure: we shall say that since

our hearers know the man, we shall confine ourselves to a few words on the subject of his worthlessness; but if they do not, we shall try to make them know him, in order that they may avoid his wickedness; since our hearers are unlike the subject of our censure, we express the hope that they will vigorously disapprove his way of life.

When the Introduction is drawn from the subject-matter itself: we shall say that we do not know what to praise in particular; we fear that in discussing a number of things we shall pass by even more; and add whatever will carry like sentiments. The sentiments opposite to these are drawn upon, if we censure.

- 13 VII. If the Introduction has been developed in accordance with any of the methods just mentioned, there will be no need for a Statement of Facts to follow it; but if there is occasion for one, when we must recount with either praise or censure some deed of the person discussed, the instructions for Stating the Facts will be found in Book I.^a

The Division we shall make is the following: we shall set forth the things we intend to praise or censure; then recount the events, observing their precise sequence and chronology, so that one may understand what the person under discussion did and with what prudence and caution. But it will first be necessary to set forth his virtues or faults of character, and then to explain how, such being his character, he has used the advantages or disadvantages, physical or of external circumstances. The following is the order we must keep when portraying a life:

^a 1. viii. 12-ix. 16.

(1) External Circumstances: Descent—in praise: the ancestors of whom he is sprung; if he is of illustrious descent, he has been their peer or superior; if of humble descent, he has had his support, not in the virtues of his ancestors, but in his own. In censure: if he is of illustrious descent, he has been a disgrace to his forebears; if of low descent, he is none the less a dishonour even to these. Education—in praise: that he was well and honourably trained in worthy studies throughout his boyhood. In censure: . . .

- 14 (2) Next we must pass to the Physical Advantages: if by nature he has impressiveness and beauty, these have served him to his credit, and not, as in the case of others, to his detriment and shame; if he has exceptional strength and agility, we shall point out that these were acquired by worthy and diligent exercise; if he has continual good health, that was acquired by care and by control over his passions. In censure, if the subject has these physical advantages, we shall declare that he has abused what, like the meanest gladiator, he has had by chance and nature. If he lacks them, we shall say that to his own fault and want of self-control is his lack of every physical advantage, beauty apart, attributable.

(3) Then we shall return to External Circumstances and consider his virtues and defects of Character evinced with respect to these: Has he been rich or poor? What kinds of power has he wielded? What have been his titles to fame? What his friendships? Or what his private feuds, and what act of bravery has he performed in conducting these feuds? With what motive has he entered into feuds? With what loyalty, goodwill, and sense of duty has he

conducted his friendships? What character of man has he been in wealth, or in poverty? What has been his attitude in the exercise of his prerogatives? If he is dead, what sort of death did he die,^a and what
 15 sort of consequences followed upon it? VIII. In all circumstances, moreover, in which human character is chiefly studied, those four above-mentioned virtues of character will have to be applied. Thus, if we speak in praise, we shall say that one act was just, another courageous, another temperate, and another wise; if we speak in censure, we shall declare that one was unjust, another intemperate, another cowardly, and another stupid.

From this arrangement it is now no doubt clear how we are to treat the three categories of praise and censure—with the added proviso that we need not use all three for praise or for censure, because often not all of them even apply, and often, too, when they do, the application is so slight that it is unnecessary to refer to them. We shall therefore need to choose those categories which seem to provide the greatest force.

Our Conclusions will be brief, in the form of a Summary at the end of the discourse; in the discourse itself we shall by means of commonplaces frequently insert brief amplifications.

Nor should this kind of cause ^b be the less strongly recommended just because it presents itself only seldom in life. Indeed when a task may present itself, be it only occasionally, the ability to perform it as skilfully as possible must seem desirable. And if epideictic is only seldom employed by itself independently, still in judicial and deliberative causes extensive sections are often devoted to praise or

censure. Therefore let us believe that this kind of cause also must claim some measure of our industry.

Now that I have completed the most difficult part of rhetoric—thoroughly treating Invention and applying it to every kind of cause—it is time to proceed to the other parts. I shall therefore next ^a discuss the Arrangement.

- 16 IX. Since it is through the Arrangement ^b that we set in order the topics we have invented so that there may be a definite place for each in the delivery, we must see what kind of method one should follow in the process of arranging. The kinds of Arrangement are two: one arising from the principles of rhetoric, the other accommodated to particular circumstances.

Our Arrangement will be based on the principles of rhetoric when we observe the instructions that I have set forth in Book I ^c—to use the Introduction, Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion, and in speaking to follow the order enjoined above. It is likewise on the principles of the art that we shall be basing our Arrangement, not only of the whole case throughout the discourse, but also of the individual arguments, according to Proposition, Reason, Proof of the Reason, Embellishment, and Résumé, as I have explained in Book II. ^d

- 17 This Arrangement, then, is twofold—one for the whole speech, and the other for the individual

the latter to our author's *genus ad casum temporis accommodatum*. Cf. Quintilian's *oeconomica dispositio* in 7. 10. 11. Athanasius (probably fourth Christian century), in Rabe, *Proleg. Syll.*, p. 176, distinguishes *τάξις* from *οικονομία* on the same principle.

^c 1. iii. 4.

^d 2. xviii. 28. *Conclusio* is there called *complexio*.

arguments—and is based upon the principles of rhetoric.

But there is also another Arrangement, which, when we must depart from the order imposed by the rules of the art, is accommodated to circumstance in accordance with the speaker's judgement;^a for example, if we should begin our speech with the Statement of Facts, or with some very strong argument, or the reading of some documents; or if straightway after the Introduction we should use the Proof and then the Statement of Facts; or if we should make some other change of this kind in the order. But none of these changes ought to be made except when our cause demands them. For if the ears of the audience seem to have been deafened and their attention wearied by the wordiness of our adversaries, we can advantageously omit the Introduction,^b and begin the speech with either the Statement of Facts or some strong argument. Then, if it is advantageous—for it is not always necessary—one may recur to the idea intended for the Introduction. X. If our cause seems to present so great a difficulty that no one can listen to the Introduction with patience, we shall begin with the Statement of Facts and then recur to the idea intended for the Introduction. If the Statement of Facts is not quite plausible, we shall begin with some strong argument. It is often necessary to employ such changes and transpositions when the cause itself obliges us to modify with art the Arrangement prescribed by the rules of the art.

^b But in I. vi. 10 our author advises us in such circumstances to use the Subtle Approach, and to open with something that may provoke laughter.

18 In the Proof and Refutation of arguments it is appropriate to adopt an Arrangement of the following sort: (1) the strongest arguments should be placed at the beginning and at the end of the pleading; (2) those of medium force, and also those that are neither useless to the discourse nor essential to the proof, which are weak if presented separately and individually, but become strong and plausible when conjoined with the others, should be placed in the middle.^a For immediately after the facts have been stated the hearer waits to see whether the cause can by some means be proved, and that is why we ought straightway to present some strong argument. (3) And as for the rest, since what has been said last is easily committed to memory, it is useful, when ceasing to speak, to leave some very strong argument fresh in the hearer's mind. This arrangement of topics in speaking, like the arraying of soldiers in battle, can readily bring victory.

19 XI. Many have said that the faculty of greatest use to the speaker and the most valuable for persuasion is Delivery. For my part, I should not readily say that any one of the five faculties^b is the most important; that an exceptionally great usefulness resides in the delivery I should boldly affirm.^c For

as how we deliver it; " 11. 3. 7: " Cicero also thinks action to be the dominant element in oratory; " 11. 3. 5-6: " For my part I would affirm that a mediocre speech supported by all the power of delivery will have more force than the best speech devoid of that power. That is why Demosthenes, asked what was primary in the whole task of oratory, gave the palm to delivery, and gave it second and third place as well. . . . So that we may assume that he thought it to be not merely the first, but the only virtue of oratory " (cf. also Philodemus, *Rhet.*, ed. Sudhaus, 1. 196; Cicero, *Brutus* 37.

skilful invention, elegant style, the artistic arrangement of the parts comprising the case, and the careful memory of all these will be of no more value without delivery, than delivery alone and independent of these. Therefore, because no one has written carefully on this subject ^a—all have thought it scarcely possible for voice, mien, and gesture to be lucidly described, as appertaining to our sense-experience—and because the mastery of delivery is a very important requisite for speaking, the whole subject, as I believe, deserves serious consideration.

Delivery, then, includes Voice Quality and Physical Movement.^b Voice Quality ^c has a certain character of its own, acquired by method and application. It has three aspects: Volume, Stability, and Flexibility. Vocal volume is primarily the gift of nature; cultivation ^d augments it somewhat, but chiefly conserves it.

fourth *officium oratoris* (adding to it Invention, Style, and Arrangement, Aristotle's scheme in the *Rhetoric*); Aristotle (see *Rhet.* 3. 1, 1403 b) did not fully develop the theory of delivery. The Stoics followed Theophrastus; for their scheme see note on I. ii. 3 above. See also Philodemus on delivery, in H. M. Hubbell, *The Rhetorica of Philodemus*, New Haven, 1920, pp. 300-1.

^b The divisions are probably Theophrastan (ἡ κίνησις τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὁ τόνος τῆς φωνῆς); see Athanasius, in Rabe, *Proleg. Syll.*, p. 177. Cf. Longinus, in Spengel-Hammer 1 (2). 194: διαθέσις σώματος τε καὶ τόνου φωνῆς, and Dionysius Halic., *De Demosth.* 53: τὰ πάθη τὰ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τὰ σχήματα τοῦ σώματος.

^c Cf. Cicero's study of Voice in *De Oratore* 3. 56. 213-58. 219, 3. 60. 224-61. 227, and *Orator* 17. 55-18. 60; Quintilian's in 11. 3. 14-65.

^d *Cura* comprised methods derived from rhetoric, music, and acting, but was in part also dietetic and medical in nature; see Armin Krumbacher, *Die Stimm- und Sprechbildung der Redner im Altertum bis auf die Zeit Quintilians*, Paderborn, 1920, esp. pp. 101-7.

Stability is primarily gained by cultivation; declamatory exercise augments it somewhat, but chiefly conserves it. Vocal flexibility—the ability in speaking to vary the intonations of the voice at pleasure—is primarily achieved by declamatory exercise.^a Thus with regard to vocal volume, and in a degree also to stability, since one is the gift of nature and the other is acquired by cultivation, it is pointless to give any other advice than that the method of cultivating the voice should be sought from those skilled in this art.^b XII. It seems, however, that I must discuss stability in the degree that it is conserved by a system of declamation, and also vocal flexibility (this is especially necessary to the speaker), because it too is acquired by the discipline of declamation.

- 21 We can, then, in speaking conserve stability mainly by using for the Introduction a voice as calm and composed as possible. For the windpipe is injured if filled with a violent outburst of sound before it has been soothed by soft intonations. And it is appropriate to use rather long pauses—the voice is refreshed by respiration and the windpipe is rested by silence. We should also relax from continual use of the full voice and pass to the tone of conversation; for, as the result of changes, no one kind of tone is spent, and we are complete in the entire range. Again, we ought to avoid piercing exclamations, for a shock that wounds the windpipe is produced by shouting which is excessively sharp and shrill,^c and the brilliance of the voice is altogether used up by one outburst. Again, at the end of the speech it is proper to deliver long periods in one unbroken

^c The Rhodian school opposed the overloud delivery of the Asiatic orators.

breath,^a for then the throat becomes warm, the wind-pipe is filled, and the voice, which has been used in a variety of tones, is restored to a kind of uniform and constant tone. How often must we be duly thankful to nature, as here! Indeed what we declare to be beneficial for conserving the voice applies also to agreeableness of delivery, and, as a result, what benefits our voice likewise finds favour in the hearer's
 22 taste. A useful thing for stability is a calm tone in the Introduction.^b What is more disagreeable than the full voice in the Introduction to a discourse? Pauses strengthen the voice. They also render the thoughts more clear-cut by separating them, and leave the hearer time to think. Relaxation from a continuous full tone conserves the voice, and the variety gives extreme pleasure to the hearer too, since now the conversational tone holds the attention and now the full voice rouses it. Sharp exclamation injures the voice and likewise jars the hearer, for it has about it something ignoble, suited rather to feminine outcry than to manly dignity in speaking. At the end of the speech a sustained flow is beneficial to the voice. And does not this, too, most vigorously stir the hearer at the Conclusion of the entire discourse? Since, then, the same means serve the stability of the voice and agreeableness of delivery, my present discussion will have dealt with both at once, offering as it does the observations that have seemed appropriate on stability, and the related observations on agreeableness. The rest I shall set forth somewhat later, in its proper place.^c

precepts of delivery. See Johannes Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 70; Maximilian Schmidt, *Commentatio de Theophrasto rhetore*, Halle, 1839, p. 61.

23 XIII. Now the flexibility of the voice, since it depends entirely on rhetorical rules, deserves our more careful consideration. The aspects of Flexibility are Conversational Tone, Tone of Debate, and Tone of Amplification. The Tone of Conversation is relaxed,^a and is closest to daily speech. The Tone of Debate is energetic, and is suited to both proof and refutation.^b The Tone of Amplification either rouses the hearer to wrath or moves him to pity.

Conversational tone comprises four kinds: the Dignified,^c the Explicative, the Narrative, and the Facetious. The Dignified, or Serious, Tone of Conversation is marked by some degree of impressiveness and by vocal restraint. The Explicative in a calm voice explains how something could or could not have been brought to pass. The Narrative sets forth events that have occurred or might have occurred.^d The Facetious can on the basis of some circumstance elicit a laugh which is modest and refined.^e

In the Tone of Debate are distinguishable the Sustained and the Broken. The Sustained is full-voiced and accelerated delivery. The Broken Tone of Debate is punctuated repeatedly with short, intermittent pauses, and is vociferated sharply.

24 The Tone of Amplification includes the Hortatory and the Pathetic. The Hortatory, by amplifying

^c Cf. the definition of *dignitas*, 4. xiii. 18 below.

^d The same definition of *narratio* as in 1. iii. 4 above.

^e The Facetious belongs naturally to *sermo*; see note on *contentio* above. The definition recalls the difference (*e.g.*, Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 4. 14, 1128) between the wit whose jests are in good taste (*εὐτράπελος*), and the buffoon (*βωμολόχος*).

some fault, incites the hearer to indignation. The Pathetic, by amplifying misfortunes, wins the hearer over to pity.^a

Since, then, vocal flexibility is divided into three tones, and these in turn subdivide into eight others, it appears that we must explain what delivery is appropriate to each of these eight subdivisions.

XIV. (1) For the Dignified Conversational Tone it will be proper to use the full throat but the calmest and most subdued voice possible, yet not in such a fashion that we pass from the practice of the orator to that of the tragedian.^b (2) For the Explicative Conversational Tone one ought to use a rather thin-toned voice, and frequent pauses and intermissions, so that we seem by means of the delivery itself to implant and engrave in the hearer's mind the points we are making in our explanation. (3) For the Narrative Conversational Tone varied intonations are necessary, so that we seem to recount everything just as it took place. Our delivery will be somewhat rapid when we narrate what we wish to show was done vigorously, and it will be slower when we narrate something else done in leisurely fashion. Then, corresponding to the content of the words, we shall modify the delivery in all the kinds of tone, now to sharpness, now to kindness, or now to sadness, and now to gaiety. If in the Statement of Facts there occur any declarations, demands, replies, or exclamations of astonishment concerning the facts we are narrating, we shall give careful attention to expressing with the voice the

^b On the speaker's delivery as against the actor's see 3. xv. 26 below; Cicero, *Orator* 25. 86; Quintilian, 11. 3. 57, 181 ff.

25 feelings and thoughts of each personage. (4) For the Facetious Conversational Tone, with a gentle quiver in the voice, and a slight suggestion of a smile, but without any trace of immoderate laughter, one ought to shift one's utterance smoothly from the Serious Conversational tone to the tone of gentlemanly jest.

Since the Tone of Debate is to be expressed either through the Sustained or the Broken, when the (5) Sustained Tone of Debate is required, one ought moderately to increase the vocal volume, and, in maintaining an uninterrupted flow of words, also to bring the voice into harmony with them, to inflect the tone accordingly, and to deliver the words rapidly in a full voice, so that the voice production can follow the fluent energy of the speech. (6) For the Broken Tone of Debate we must with deepest chest tones produce the clearest possible exclamations, and I advise giving as much time to each pause as to each exclamation.

For (7) the Hortatory Tone of Amplification we shall use a very thin-toned voice, moderate loudness, an even flow of sound, frequent modulations, and the utmost speed. (8) For the Pathetic Tone of Amplification we shall use a restrained voice, deep tone, frequent intermissions, long pauses, and marked changes.

XV. On Voice Quality enough has been said. Now it seems best to discuss Physical Movement.

26 Physical movement^a consists in a certain control of gesture and mien which renders what is delivered more plausible. Accordingly the facial expression should show modesty and animation, and the gestures should not be conspicuous for either elegance or

grossness,^a lest we give the impression that we are either actors or day labourers. It seems, then, that the rules regulating bodily movement ought to correspond to the several divisions of tone comprising voice. To illustrate: (1) For the Dignified Conversational Tone, the speaker must stay in position when he speaks, lightly moving his right hand, his countenance expressing an emotion corresponding to the sentiments of the subject—gaiety or sadness or an emotion intermediate. (2) For the Explicative Conversational Tone, we shall incline the body forward a little from the shoulders, since it is natural to bring the face as close as possible to our hearers when we wish to prove a point and arouse them vigorously. (3) For the Narrative Conversational Tone, the same physical movement as I have just set forth for the Dignified will be appropriate. (4) For the Facetious Conversational Tone, we should by our countenance express a certain gaiety, without changing gestures.

- 27 (5) For the Sustained Tone of Debate, we shall use a quick gesture of the arm, a mobile countenance, and a keen glance. (6) For the Broken Tone of Debate, one must extend the arm very quickly, walk up and down, occasionally stamp the right foot, and adopt a keen and fixed look.

(7) For the Hortatory Tone of Amplification, it will be appropriate to use a somewhat slower and more deliberate gesticulation, but otherwise to follow the procedure for the Sustained Tone of Debate. (8) For the Pathetic Tone of Amplification,

that Theophrastus gave free play to gestures in his own delivery. Cf. 3. xiv. 24 above; also Cicero, *De Oratore* 2. 59. 242, 3. 59. 220; Quintilian, 11. 3. 89; Gellius 1. 5.

one ought to slap one's thigh ^a and beat one's head, and sometimes to use a calm and uniform gesticulation and a sad and disturbed expression.

I am not unaware how great a task I have undertaken in trying to express physical movements in words and portray vocal intonations in writing. True, I was not confident that it was possible to treat these matters adequately in writing. Yet neither did I suppose that, if such a treatment were impossible, it would follow that what I have done here would be useless, for it has been my purpose merely to suggest what ought to be done. The rest I shall leave to practice. This, nevertheless, one must remember: good delivery ensures that what the orator is saying seems to come from his heart.

28 XVI. Now let me turn to the treasure-house of the ideas supplied by Invention, to the guardian of all the parts of rhetoric, the Memory.^b

The question whether memory has some artificial quality, or comes entirely from nature, we shall have another, more favourable, opportunity to discuss. At present I shall accept as proved that in this matter art and method are of great importance, and shall treat the subject accordingly. For my part, I am

25 (1932). 105-110; on Memory in oral literature, J. A. Notopoulos, *Trans. Am. Philol. Assn.* 69 (1938). 465-493. The rhetorical interest in *memoria* appears early, among the sophists, who valued its uses in the learning of common-places and for improvisation. Our author's mnemonic system is the oldest extant. Whether such pictorial methods were widely used by the orators we do not know, but the theory persists to this day. See also Longinus, in Spengel-Hammer 1 (2). 197-206; Cicero, *De Oratore* 2. 85. 350-88. 360; and esp. Quintilian's historical and critical treatment, 11. 2. 1-51.

satisfied that there is an art of memory—the grounds of my belief I shall explain elsewhere.^a For the present I shall disclose what sort of thing memory is.

There are, then, two kinds of memory: one natural, and the other the product of art. The natural memory is that memory which is imbedded in our minds, born simultaneously with thought. The artificial memory is that memory which is strengthened by a kind of training and system of discipline. But just as in everything else the merit of natural excellence often rivals acquired learning, and art, in its turn, reinforces and develops the natural advantages,^b so does it happen in this instance. The natural memory, if a person is
 29 endowed with an exceptional one, is often like this artificial memory, and this artificial memory, in its turn, retains and develops the natural advantages by a method of discipline. Thus the natural memory must be strengthened by discipline so as to become exceptional, and, on the other hand, this memory provided by discipline requires natural ability. It is neither more nor less true in this instance than in the other arts that science thrives by the aid of innate ability, and nature by the aid of the rules of art. The training here offered will therefore also be useful to those who by nature have a good memory, as you will yourself soon come to understand.^c But even if these, relying on their natural talent, did not need our help, we should still be justified in wishing to aid the less well-endowed. Now I shall discuss the artificial memory.

tion to *memoria* Antonius in Cicero, *De Oratore* 2. 88. 360, and Longinus, in Spengel-Hammer 1 (2). 204.

^c Cf. 3. xxii. 36 below.

The artificial memory includes backgrounds and images. By backgrounds I mean such scenes as are naturally or artificially set off on a small scale, complete and conspicuous, so that we can grasp and embrace them easily by the natural memory—for example, a house, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch, or the like. An image is, as it were, a figure, mark, or portrait of the object we wish to remember; for example, if we wish to recall a horse, a lion, or an eagle, we must place its image in a definite background. Now I shall show what kind of backgrounds we should invent and how we should discover the images and set them therein.

XVII. Those who know the letters of the alphabet can thereby write out what is dictated to them and read aloud what they have written. Likewise, those who have learned mnemonics can set in backgrounds what they have heard, and from these backgrounds deliver it by memory. For the backgrounds are very much like wax tablets ^a or papyrus, the images like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the images like the script, and the delivery is like the reading. We should therefore, if we desire to memorize a large number of items, equip ourselves with a large number of backgrounds, so that in these we may set a large number of images. I likewise think it obligatory to have these backgrounds in a series, so that we may never by confusion in their order be prevented from following the images—

450 ab. Cf. also, in Theophrastus, *De Sens.* 51-2, Democritus' theory that in vision the air is moulded like wax, and see the interpretation of this passage by Paul Friedländer, *Die platonischen Schriften*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1930, p. 448, note 1.

proceeding from any background we wish, whatsoever its place in the series, and whether we go forwards or backwards—nor from delivering orally what has been committed to the backgrounds. XVIII. For example, if we should see a great number of our acquaintances standing in a certain order, it would not make any difference to us whether we should tell their names beginning with the person standing at the head of the line or at the foot or in the middle. So with respect to the backgrounds. If these have been arranged in order, the result will be that, reminded by the images, we can repeat orally what we have committed to the backgrounds, proceeding in either direction from any background we please. That is why it also seems best to arrange the backgrounds in a series.

We shall need to study with special care the backgrounds we have adopted so that they may cling lastingly in our memory, for the images, like letters, are effaced when we make no use of them, but the backgrounds, like wax tablets, should abide. And that we may by no chance err in the number of backgrounds, each fifth background should be marked. For example, if in the fifth we should set a golden hand, and in the tenth some acquaintance whose first name is Decimus, it will then be easy to station like marks in each successive fifth background. XIX. Again, it will be more advantageous to obtain backgrounds in a deserted than in a populous region, because the crowding and passing to and fro of people confuse and weaken the impress of the images, while solitude keeps their outlines sharp. Further, backgrounds differing in form and nature must be secured, so that, thus distinguished, they

may be clearly visible; for if a person has adopted many intercolumnar spaces, their resemblance to one another will so confuse him that he will no longer know what he has set in each background. And these backgrounds ought to be of moderate size and medium extent, for when excessively large they render the images vague, and when too small often seem incapable of receiving an arrangement of
 32 images. Then the backgrounds ought to be neither too bright nor too dim, so that the shadows may not obscure the images nor the lustre make them glitter. I believe that the intervals between backgrounds should be of moderate extent, approximately thirty feet; for, like the external eye, so the inner eye of thought is less powerful when you have moved the object of sight too near or too far away.

Although it is easy for a person with a relatively large experience to equip himself with as many and as suitable backgrounds as he may desire, even a person who believes that he finds no store of backgrounds that are good enough, may succeed in fashioning as many such as he wishes. For the imagination can embrace any region whatsoever and in it at will fashion and construct the setting of some background. Hence, if we are not content with our ready-made supply of backgrounds, we may in our imagination create a region for ourselves and obtain a most serviceable distribution of appropriate backgrounds.

On the subject of backgrounds enough has been said; let me now turn to the theory of images.

33 XX. Since, then, images must resemble objects, we ought ourselves to choose from all objects likenesses for our use. Hence likenesses are bound to

be of two kinds, one of subject-matter,^a the other of words. Likenesses of matter are formed when we enlist images that present a general view of the matter with which we are dealing; likenesses of words are established when the record of each single noun or appellative is kept by an image.

Often we encompass the record of an entire matter by one notation, a single image. For example, the prosecutor has said that the defendant killed a man by poison, has charged that the motive for the crime was an inheritance, and declared that there are many witnesses and accessories to this act. If in order to facilitate our defence we wish to remember this first point, we shall in our first background form an image of the whole matter. We shall picture the man in question as lying ill in bed, if we know his person. If we do not know him, we shall yet take some one to be our invalid, but not a man of the lowest class, so that he may come to mind at once. And we shall place the defendant at the bedside, holding in his right hand a cup, and in his left tablets, and on the fourth finger ^b a ram's testicles. In this way we can record the man who was poisoned, the inheritance, and
 34 the witnesses. In like fashion we shall set the other counts of the charge in backgrounds successively, following their order, and whenever we wish to remember a point, by properly arranging the patterns of the backgrounds ^c and carefully imprinting the images, we shall easily succeed in calling back to mind what we wish.

(witnesses). Of the scrotum of the ram purses were made; thus the money used for bribing the witnesses may perhaps also be suggested.

^c At 3. xvi. 29 above *formae* is used to describe the images.

XXI. When we wish to represent by images the likenesses of words, we shall be undertaking a greater task and exercising our ingenuity the more. This we ought to effect in the following way:

Iam domum itionem reges Atridae parant.^a

“And now their home-coming the kings, the sons of Atreus, are making ready.”

If we wish to remember this verse, in our first background we should put Domitius, raising hands to heaven while he is lashed by the Marcii Reges^b—that will represent “Iam domum itionem reges” (“And now their home-coming the kings,”); in the second background, Aesopus and Cimber,^c being dressed as for the rôles of Agamemnon and Menelaüs in *Iphigenia*—that will represent “Atridae parant” (“the sons of Atreus, are making ready”). By this method all the words will be represented. But such an arrangement of images succeeds only if we use our notation to stimulate the natural memory, so that we first go over a given verse twice or three times to ourselves and then represent the words by means of images. In this way art will supplement nature. For neither by itself will be strong enough, though we must note that theory and technique are much the more reliable. I should not hesitate to

^b The scene is doubtless our author's own creation. Rex was the name of one of the most distinguished families of the Marcian gens; the Domitian (of plebeian origin) was likewise a celebrated gens.

^c Clodius Aesopus (a friend of Cicero) was the greatest tragic actor of the first half of the first century B.C.; Cimber, mentioned only here, was no doubt also a favourite of the day. See Otto Ribbeck, *Die römische Tragödie im Zeitalter der Republik*, Leipzig, 1875, pp. 674-6.

demonstrate this in detail, did I not fear that, once having departed from my plan, I should not so well preserve the clear conciseness of my instruction.

- 35 Now, since in normal cases some images are strong and sharp and suitable for awakening recollection, and others so weak and feeble as hardly to succeed in stimulating memory, we must therefore consider the cause of these differences, so that, by knowing the cause, we may know which images to avoid and which to seek.

- XXII. Now nature herself teaches us what we should do. When we see in everyday life things that are petty, ordinary, and banal, we generally fail to remember them, because the mind is not being stirred by anything novel or marvellous. But if we see or hear something exceptionally base, dishonourable, extraordinary, great, unbelievable, or laughable, that we are likely to remember a long time. Accordingly, things immediate to our eye or ear we commonly forget; incidents of our childhood we often remember best.^a Nor could this be so for any other reason than that ordinary things easily slip from the memory while the striking and novel stay longer in
- 36 mind. A sunrise, the sun's course, a sunset, are marvellous to no one because they occur daily.^b But solar eclipses are a source of wonder because they occur seldom, and indeed are more marvellous than lunar eclipses, because these are more frequent. Thus nature shows that she is not aroused by the common, ordinary event, but is moved by a new or

^b Cf. Lucretius 2. 1037-8: "So wondrous would this sight have been. Yet, wearied as all are with satiety of seeing, how truly no one now deigns to gaze up at the bright quarters of heaven!"

striking occurrence. Let art, then, imitate nature,^a find what she desires, and follow as she directs. For in invention nature is never last, education never first; rather the beginnings of things arise from natural talent, and the ends are reached by discipline.

- 37 We ought, then, to set up images of a kind that can adhere longest in the memory. And we shall do so if we establish likenesses as striking as possible; if we set up images that are not many or vague, but doing something; if we assign to them exceptional beauty or singular ugliness; if we dress some of them with crowns or purple cloaks, for example, so that the likeness may be more distinct to us; or if we somehow disfigure them, as by introducing one stained with blood or soiled with mud or smeared with red paint, so that its form is more striking, or by assigning certain comic effects to our images, for that, too, will ensure our remembering them more readily. The things we easily remember when they are real we likewise remember without difficulty when they are figments, if they have been carefully delineated. But this will be essential—again and again to run over rapidly in the mind all the original backgrounds in order to refresh the images.

- 38 XXIII. I know that most of the Greeks who have written on the memory^b have taken the course of listing images that correspond to a great many words, so that persons who wished to learn these images by heart would have them ready without expending effort on a search for them. I disapprove of their method on several grounds. First, among the

Aurelius, *Medit.* 11. 10; Plotinus, *Enn.* 5. 8. 1; Cicero, *Orator* 18. 58; Quintilian, 8. 3. 71; Dante, *Inferno* 11. 97 ff.

^b Precisely who these predecessors were we do not know.

innumerable multitude of words it is ridiculous to collect images for a thousand. How meagre is the value these can have, when out of the infinite store of words we shall need to remember now one, and now another? Secondly, why do we wish to rob anybody of his initiative, so that, to save him from making any search himself, we deliver to him everything searched out and ready? Then again, one person is more struck by one likeness, and another more by another. Often in fact when we declare that some one form resembles another, we fail to receive universal assent, because things seem different to different persons. The same is true with respect to images: one that is well-defined to us appears relatively
 39 inconspicuous to others. Everybody, therefore, should in equipping himself with images suit his own convenience. Finally, it is the instructor's duty to teach the proper method of search in each case, and, for the sake of greater clarity, to add in illustration some one or two examples of its kind, but not all. For instance, when I discuss the search for Introductions, I give a method of search and do not draught a thousand kinds of Introductions. The same procedure I believe should be followed with respect to images.

XXIV. Now, lest you should perchance regard the memorizing of words either as too difficult or as of too little use, and so rest content with the memorizing of matter, as being easier and more useful, I must advise you why I do not disapprove of memorizing words. I believe that they who wish to do easy things without trouble and toil must previously have been trained in more difficult things. Nor have I included memorization of words to enable us to get

verse by rote, but rather as an exercise whereby to strengthen that other kind of memory, the memory of matter, which is of practical use. Thus we may without effort pass from this difficult training to ease
 40 in that other memory. In every discipline artistic theory is of little avail without unremitting exercise, but especially in mnemonics theory is almost valueless unless made good by industry, devotion, toil, and care. You can make sure that you have as many backgrounds as possible and that these conform as much as possible to the rules; in placing the images you should exercise every day. While an engrossing preoccupation may often distract us from our other pursuits, from this activity nothing whatever can divert us. Indeed there is never a moment when we do not wish to commit something to memory, and we wish it most of all when our attention is held by business of special importance. So, since a ready memory is a useful thing, you see clearly with what great pains we must strive to acquire so useful a faculty. Once you know its uses you will be able to appreciate this advice. To exhort you further in the matter of memory is not my intention, for I should appear either to have lacked confidence in your zeal or to have discussed the subject less fully than it demands.

I shall next discuss the fifth part of rhetoric. You might rehearse in your mind each of the first four divisions, and—what is especially necessary—fortify your knowledge of them with exercise.