



II: Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"

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WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

kept returning to questions he had treated earlier. This was not a fault, and repetition of this sort can stand.

RUSH RHEES

London, England

II: NOTES FOR LECTURES ON "PRIVATE EXPERIENCE" AND "SENSE DATA"

The experience of fright appears to us (when we philosophize) to be an amorphous experience behind the experience of starting.

All I want to say is that it is misleading to say that the word "fright" signifies something which goes along with the experience of expressing fright.

The "far away" look, the dreamy voice seem to be only means for conveying the real inner feeling.

The philosophical problem is: "What is it that puzzles me in this matter?"

Es läßt sich über die bestimmte Erfahrung einiges sagen und außerdem scheint es etwas, und zwar das Wesentlichste, zu geben was sich nicht beschreiben läßt.¹

Man sagt hier, daß ein bestimmter Eindruck benannt wird. Und darin liegt etwas seltsames und problematisches. Denn es ist als wäre der Eindruck etwas zu ätherisches um ihn zu benennen. (Den Reichtum einer Frau heiraten).²

Du sagst, Du hast einen ungreifbaren Eindruck. Ich bezweifle nicht, was Du sagst. Aber ich frage ob Du damit etwas gesagt hast. D.h., wozu hast Du diese Worte geäußert, in welchem Spiel?³

¹ Some things can be said about the particular experience and besides this there seems to be something, the most essential part of it, which cannot be described.

² We say here that a name is given to a particular impression. And this is strange and puzzling. For it seems as though the impression were too ethereal to be named. (Marrying a woman's wealth.)

³ You say you have an intangible impression. I am not doubting what you say. But I question whether you have said anything by it. I.e., what was the point of uttering these words, in what game?

It is as though, although you can't tell me exactly what happens inside you, you can nevertheless tell me something general about it. By saying e. g. that you are having an impression which can't be described.

As it were: There is something further about it, only you *can't say* it; you can only make the general statement.

It is this idea which plays hell with us.

"There is not only the gesture but a particular feeling which I can't describe": instead of that you ought to have said: "I am trying to point out a feeling to you"—this would be a grammatical remark showing how my information is meant to be used. This is almost similar as though I said: "This I call 'A' and I am pointing out a *color* to you and not a shape."

How can we point to the color and not to the shape? Or to the feeling of toothache and not to the tooth, etc.?

What does one call "describing a feeling to someone"?

"I'm giving the feeling which I'm having now a name."—I don't quite know what you are doing.

"This pain I call 'toothache' and I can never make him understand what it means."

But we are under the impression that we can point to the pain, as it were unseen by the other person, and name it.

For what does it mean that this feeling is the meaning of this name?

Or, that the pain is the bearer of the name?

"I know what I mean by 'toothache' but the other person can't *know* it."

When one says "I talk to myself" one generally means just that one speaks and is the only person listening.

If I look at something red and say to myself, this is red, am I giving myself information? Am I communicating a personal experience to myself? Some people philosophizing might be

inclined to say that this is the only real case of communication of personal experience because only I know what I really mean by "red."

Remember in which special cases only it has sense to inform another person that the color which he sees now is red.

The difficulty is that we feel we have said something about the nature of pain when we say that one person can't have another person's pain. Perhaps we shouldn't be inclined to say that we had said anything physiological or even psychological, but something metapsychological, metaphysical. Something about the essence, nature, of pain as opposed to its causal connections with other phenomena.

Es scheint etwa als wäre es zwar nicht falsch sondern unsinnig zu sagen "ich fühle seine Schmerzen," aber als wäre dies so infolge der Natur des Schmerzes, der Person etc. Als wäre also jene Aussage letzten Endes doch eine Aussage über die Natur der Dinge.

Wir sprechen also etwa von einer Asymmetrie unserer Ausdrucksweise und fassen diese auf als ein Spiegelbild des Wesens der Dinge.⁴

Kann man sagen: "In das was ich über die Erfahrung des Andern sage, spielt solche Erfahrung selbst nicht hinein. In das was ich über meine Erfahrung sage, spielt diese Erfahrung selbst hinein?"

"Ich spreche über meine Erfahrung, sozusagen, in ihrer Anwesenheit."⁵

Aber die Erfahrung, die ich habe, scheint eine Beschreibung dieser Erfahrung, in gewissem Sinne, zu ersetzen. "Sie ist ihre eigene Beschreibung."⁶

⁴ It seems as though it would be not false but meaningless to say "I feel his pains," and as though this were because of the nature of pain, of the person etc. So that the assertion would after all be an assertion about the nature of things.

So we speak perhaps of an asymmetry in our mode of expression and we look on this as a mirror image of the nature of the things.

⁵ Can one say: "In what I say of someone else's experience, the experience itself does not play any part. But in what I say of my experience the experience itself does play a part?"

"I speak about my experience, so to say, in its presence."

⁶ But the experience which I have seems, in a certain sense, to take the place of a description of this experience. "It is its own description."

(I can't know whether he sees anything at all or only behaves as I do when I see something.) There seems to be an undoubted asymmetry in the use of the word "to see" (and all words relating to personal experience). One is inclined to state this in the way that "I know when I see something by just seeing it, without hearing what I say or observing the rest of my behavior, whereas I know *that* he sees and *what* he sees only by observing his behavior, i. e. indirectly."

(a) There is a mistake in this, viz.: "I know what I see because I see it." What does it mean to know that?

(b) It is true to say that my reason for saying that I see is not the observation of my behavior. But this is a grammatical proposition.

(c) It seems to be an imperfection that I can only know — — — — [indirectly that he sees]. But this is just the way we use the word — — — — ["see"]. Could we then — — — — [say I know directly that he sees] if we would? Certainly.⁷

Should we say that the person who has not learned the language knows that he sees red but can't express it?—Or should we say: "He knows what he sees but can't express it"?—So, besides seeing it, he also knows what he sees?

Now suppose I asked: "How do I know that I see, and that I see red? I.e., how do I know that I do what you call seeing and seeing red?" For we use the words 'seeing' and 'red' in a game we play with one another.

Use of: "He knows what color he sees," "I know what color I saw," etc.

How do we know what color a person sees? By the sample he points to? And how do we know what relation the sample is meant to have to the original? Now are we to say "We never know . . ." Or had we better cut these "We never know" out of our language and consider how as a matter of fact we are wont to use the word "to know"?

⁷ The manuscript contains only the dashes, not the words suggested in brackets.

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What if someone asked: "How do I know that what I call seeing red isn't an *entirely* different experience every time? and that I am not deluded into thinking that it is the same or nearly the same?" Here again the answer "I can't know" and the subsequent removal of the question.

"He's in a better position to say what he sees than we are."—That depends.

If we say "he'll tell us what he saw," it is as though he would make use of language which we had never taught him.

It is as if now we have got an *insight* into something which before we had only seen from the outside.

Inside and outside!

"Our teaching connects the word 'red' (or is meant to connect it) with a particular impression of his (a private impression, an impression in him). He then communicates this impression—indirectly, of course—through the medium of speech."

As long as you use the picture direct-indirect you can't trust yourself about the grammatical situation otherwise [in other ways].

Is telling what one sees something like turning one's inside out? And learning to say what one sees learning to let others see inside us?

"We teach him to make us see what he sees." He seems in an indirect way to show us *the object* which he sees, the object which is before his mind's eye. "We can't look at it, it is in him."

The idea of the private *object* of vision. Appearance, sense datum.

Whence the idea of the privacy of sense data?

"But do you really wish to say that they are not private? That one person can see the picture before the other person's eye?"

Surely you wouldn't think that *telling* someone what one sees could be a more direct way of communicating than by pointing to a sample!

If I say what it is I see, how do I compare what I say with what I see in order to know whether I say the truth?

Lying about what I see, you might say, is knowing what I see and saying something else. Supposing I said it just consists of saying to myself 'this is red' and aloud 'this is green.'⁸

Compare lying and telling the truth in the case of telling what color you see, with the case of describing a picture which you saw, or telling the right number of things you had to count.

Collating what you say and what you see.

Is there always a collating?

Or could one call it giving a picture of the color I see if I say the word red? Unless it be a picture by its connections with a sample.

But isn't it giving a picture if I point to a sample?

"What I show *reveals* what I see"—in what sense does it do that? The idea is that now you can so to speak look inside me. Whereas I only reveal to you what I see in a game of revealing and hiding which is entirely played with signs of one category. "Direct-indirect."

We are thinking of a game in which there is an inside in the normal sense.

We must get clear about how the metaphor of revealing (outside and inside) is actually applied by us; otherwise we shall be tempted to look for an inside behind that which in our metaphor is the inside.

"If he had learned to show me (or tell me) what he sees, he could now show me." Certainly—but what is it like to show me what he sees? It is pointing to something under particular circumstances. Or is it something else (don't be misled by the idea of indirectness)?

You compare it with such a statement as: "If he had learned to open up, I could now see what's inside." I say yes, but remember what opening up in this case is like.

⁸ See below, page 294.

But what about the criterion whether there is anything inside or not? Here we say "I know there's something inside in *my* case. This is how I know about an inside and am led to suppose it in the other person too."

Further, we are not inclined to say that only hitherto we have not known the inside of another person, but that the idea of this knowledge is bound up with the idea of myself.

"So if I say 'he has toothache' I am supposing that he has what I have when I have toothache." Suppose I said: "If I say 'I *suppose* he has toothache' I am supposing that he has what I have if I have toothache"—this would be like saying "If I say 'this cushion is red' I mean that it has the same color which the sofa has if it is red." But this isn't what I intended to say with the first sentence. I wished to say that talking about his toothache at all was based upon a supposition, a supposition which by its very essence could not be verified.

But if you look closer you will see that this is an entire misrepresentation of the use of the word 'toothache.'

Can two people have the same afterimage?

Language game: 'Description of the picture before one's mind's eye.'

Can two persons have the same picture before their mind's eye?

In which case would we say that they had two images exactly alike but not identical?

It seems as though I wished to say that to me L.W. something applied which does not apply to other people. That is, there seems to be an asymmetry.

I *express* things asymmetrically and could express them symmetrically; only then one would see what facts prompt us to the asymmetrical expression.

I do this by spreading the use of the word "I" over all human bodies as opposed to L.W. alone.

I want to describe a situation in which I should not be tempted to say that I assumed or believed that the other had what I have. Or, in other words, a situation in which we would not speak of *my consciousness* and *his consciousness*. And in which the idea would not occur to us that we could only be conscious of our own consciousness.

The idea of the ego inhabiting a body to be abolished.

If whatever consciousness (there is) spreads over all human bodies, then there won't be any temptation to use the word 'ego.'

If it is absurd to say that I only know that *I* see but not that the others do—isn't this at any rate less absurd than to say the opposite?

*Ist eine Philosophie undenkbar, die das diametrale Gegenteil des Solipsismus ist.*⁹

The idea of the constituent of a fact: "Is my person (or a person) a constituent of the fact that I see or not?" This expresses a question concerning the symbolism just as if it were a question about nature.

Language game: I paint, for myself, what I see. The picture doesn't contain *me*.

What if the other person always correctly described what I saw and imagined, would I not say he knows what I see?—"But what if he describes it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't I say he was mistaken?" Why should I say this and not, rather, he has forgotten the meanings of his words?

"But after all, only I can finally decide whether what he said is right. We can't assume that *he* knows what I see and *I don't!*" We can also do this!

Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green? (Elaborate this.)

⁹ Is it impossible to imagine a philosophy that would be the diametrical opposite of solipsism?

"Surely if he knows anything he must know what he sees!"—It is true that the game of "showing or telling what one sees" is one of the most fundamental language games; which means that what we in ordinary life call using language mostly presupposes this game.

I can for what I see use the impersonal form of description, and the fact that I say "for what I see" doesn't say at all that after all this is only a disguised personal description! For I just expressed myself in *our* ordinary form of expression, in English.

Does the solipsist also say that only he can play chess?

But he will say that behind the sentence 'I see . . .' when he says it and it's true, there stands something which does not stand behind "he sees" or "I see" when the other man says it.

"Surely," I want to say, "if I'm to be quite frank I must say that I have something which nobody has."—But who's I?—Hell! I don't express myself properly, but there's *something!* You can't deny that there is my personal experience and that this in a most important sense *has no neighbor*.—But you don't mean that it *happens* to be alone but that its grammatical position is that of having no neighbor.

"But somehow our language doesn't bring it out that there is something unique, namely real present experience, and do you just wish me to resign myself to that?"

(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel that we have to resign ourselves to something by using ordinary language.)

The normal use of the expression "he sees red where . . ." is this: We take it as the criterion for meaning the same by 'red' as we do, that as a rule he agrees with us in giving the same names to the colors of objects as we do. If then in a particular instance he says something is red where we should say it's green, we say he sees it different from us.

Notice how in such cases we would behave. We should look for a cause of his different judgment, and if we had found one we should certainly be inclined to say that he saw red where we saw green. It is further clear that even before ever finding such a

cause we might under circumstances be inclined to say this. But also that we can't give a strict rule for. . . .

Consider this case: someone says "I can't understand it, I see everything red blue today and vice versa." We answer "it must look queer!" He says it does and, e.g., goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks and how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what we saw blue. And again we should say that we know that he means by the words 'blue' and 'red' what we do as he has always used them as we do.

On the other hand: Someone tells us today that yesterday he always saw everything red blue, and so on. We say: But you called the glowing coal red, you know, and the sky blue. He answers: That was because I had also changed the names. We say: But didn't it feel very queer? and he says: No, it seemed all perfectly natural. Would we in this case too say:?

The case of contradictory memory images: tomorrow he remembers this, the day after tomorrow something else.

The whole trend, to show that the expression "letting one look into his soul," is often misleading.

Now I ask what are our criteria for there being or having been a personal experience besides the expression? And the answer seems to be that for the other man the criteria are indeed mere outside expressions, but that I myself know whether I have an experience or not; in particular, whether I see red or not.

But let me ask: what is knowing that I see red like? I mean: look at something red, 'know that it is red,' and ask yourself what you are doing. Don't you mean seeing red and impressing it on your mind that you are doing so? But there are, I suppose, several things that you are doing: You probably *say* to yourself the word 'red' or 'this is red' or something of the sort, or perhaps glance from the red object to another red one which you're taking to be the paradigm of red, and suchlike. On the other hand you just silently stare at the red thing.

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In part of their uses the expression "visual image" and "picture" run parallel; but where they don't, the analogy which does exist tends to delude us.

(Tautology.)¹⁰

The grammar of 'seeing red' is connected to the expression of seeing red closer than one thinks.

We may say a blind man doesn't see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see. I don't mean "he agrees with us that he does not see—he doesn't dispute it," but rather: he too describes the facts in this way, having learned the same language as we have. Now whom shall we call blind? What is our criterion for blindness? A certain kind of behavior. And if the person behaves in that particular way, we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in *this* sense his behavior also determines the meaning of blindness for *him*. But now you will say: "Surely blindness isn't a behavior; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man and not be blind. Therefore 'blindness' means something different; his behavior only helps him to understand what we mean by 'blindness.' The outward circumstances are what both he and we know. Whenever he behaves in a certain way, we say that he sees nothing; but he notices that a certain private experience of his coincides with all these cases and so concludes that we mean this experience of his by saying that he sees nothing."

The idea is that we teach a person the meaning of expressions relating to personal experiences *indirectly*. Such an indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. I teach a child the names of colors and a game, say, of bringing objects of a certain color when 'the name of the color' is called out. I don't however teach him the color names by pointing to a sample which I and he see and saying, e.g., the word red. Instead I have various spectacles

¹⁰ A few pages later in the same manuscript:

"But it seems to me that I either see red or don't see red. Whether I express it or not.

"Picture we use here.

"This picture is not questioned, but its application.

"Other cases of tautologies."

each of which, when I look through it, makes me see the white paper in a different color. These spectacles are also distinguished by their outside appearance: the one that makes me see red has circular lenses, another one elliptical ones, etc. I now teach the child in this way: that when I see him putting the circular ones on his nose I say the word 'red,' when the elliptical ones 'green,' and so forth. This one might call teaching the child the meanings of the color names in an indirect way, because one could in this case say that I led the child to correlate the word 'red' with something that I didn't see but hoped the child would see if he looked through the circular glasses. And this way is indirect as opposed to the direct way of pointing to a red object etc.

(Mind-reading)

From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly, teach a man to say that he is blind: for what if he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved exactly like a blind man?—Or should we say: "Nature wouldn't play such a trick on us!"

We can see here that we don't quite understand the real use of the expression "to see something" or "to see nothing."

And what is so misleading to us when we consider this use is the following. We say, "Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do, and on the other hand we can say that we see so-and-so without ever seeing it; therefore seeing is *one* process and expressing what we see another, and all that they have to do with one another is that they sometimes coincide—they have the same connections as being red and being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet—etc." Now this is obviously not quite true and not quite false. It seems somehow that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language use the words 'seeing red' in such a way that we can say "A sees red but doesn't show it"; on the other hand it is easy to see that we should have no use for these words if their application was severed from the criteria of behavior. That is to say: to the language game which we play with these words it is both essential that the people who play it behave in the particular way we call expressing (saying, showing) what they see, and also that sometimes they more or less entirely conceal what they see.

Balance.¹¹ The point of the game depends on what *usually* happens.

But doesn't the word "seeing red" mean to me a particular experience, a *fact* in the realm of primary experience—which surely is utterly different from saying certain words?

The words " 'seeing red' means a particular experience" are useless unless we can follow them up by: "namely this—(pointing)." Or else they may say experience as opposed to physical object; but then this is grammar.

How does he know that he sees red (or has the visual image), i.e. how does he connect the word 'red' with 'a particular color'? In fact what does the expression 'a particular color' here mean? What is the criterion for his connecting the word always to the same experience? Is it not often just that he calls it red?

In fact, if he is to play a language game, the possibility of this will depend upon his own and other people's reactions. The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions; i.e., they must *call* the same things 'red.'

"But if he speaks to himself, surely this is different. For then he needn't consult other people's reactions and he just gives the name 'red' now to *the same color* to which he gave it on a previous

¹¹ Weighing. Later in the notebook: Sometimes these bodies change their weight, and then we look for the cause of the change and find, say, that something's come off the body. Sometimes however the weight of the body changes and we can't account for the change at all. But we nevertheless don't say that weighing it had lost its point "because now the body really doesn't have any weight." Rather we say that the body had changed somehow—that this was the cause of the change of weight—but that so far we have not found this cause. That is, we shall go on playing the game of weighing, and we try to find an explanation for the exceptional behavior.

We use the form of expression "the weight of this body" to designate something inherent in the body, something which could only be diminished by destroying part of the body. The same body—the same weight.

Grocer.

Supposing what in fact is the rule became the exception. Under certain peculiar circumstances indeed a body kept on weighing the same; say, iron in the presence of mercury. A piece of cheese, on the other hand, though keeping its size, calories, etc., weighed different weights at different times unaccountably. Would we still. . .

occasion.” But how does he know that it is *the same color*? Does he also recognize the sameness of color as what he used to call sameness of color, and so on ad infinitum?

“Surely seeing is one thing, and showing that I see is another thing.”—This certainly is like saying “skipping is one thing and jumping another.” But there is a supplement to this statement—“skipping is this (showing it) and jumping is this (showing it).” Now how about this supplement in the first case? “Seeing red is this (showing it) and showing that we see red is this (showing it).” The point is that there just isn’t a ‘showing that I see’ except showing that I see. “But can’t I say ‘seeing red is what I’m doing now’ (looking at something red)? And although in a sense the other man can’t directly see what I’m talking about (be aware of the activity), I certainly know what it is that I’m talking about. That is, although for him I can’t point directly to my seeing red, for myself I can point to it; and in this sense I can give an ostensive definition of the expression to myself.” But an ostensive definition is not a magic act.

So what does giving myself the ostensive definition of red consist in?—Now how am I to describe it? shall I say: seeing red and saying to myself ‘I see red,’—or is it “seeing a certain color sensation and saying ‘I see red’ ”? The first version I don’t like. It assumes that the other knows the very same private impression which I am having. So I would rather leave it open what color I am concentrating my attention on. But then how can I call it a color? Isn’t it just as uncertain that I mean by ‘color’ what they mean as that I mean by ‘red’ what they mean? And the same applies of course to ‘seeing’ (for what here I mean by this word is not an activity of the inner eye).

“But it’s a blatant error to mix up ‘seeing red’ with showing that you see red! I know what seeing red is and I know what showing . . . is.” Couldn’t we say that knowing what showing . . . is is seeing showing? Now what is knowing what seeing is?

In knowing what seeing red is you seem to say to yourself ‘seeing red is this’—you seem to give yourself a sample but you don’t because the usual criteria for the sameness of the sample

don't apply. I can say I call 'red' always the same color, or whenever I explain 'red' I point to a sample of the same color.

Consider the proposition: He makes sure what it means *to him* by. . . . Would you say the word had meaning to him if it meant something else every time? And what is the criterion of the same color coming twice?

If we describe a game which he plays with himself, is it relevant that he should use the word 'red' for the same color in our sense, or would we also call it a language game if he used it anyhow? Then what is the criterion for using it in the same way? Not merely the connection between "same," "color," and "red."

"Let me see if I still know which of these colors is red?—(Looking about.) Yes I know." (Here I could have said "is called red.")

Making sure that you know what 'seeing red' means, is good only if you can make use of this knowledge in a further case. Now what if I see a color again, can I say I made sure I knew what 'red' was so now I shall know that I recognize it correctly? In what sense is having said the words 'this is red' before a guarantee that I now see the same color when I say again I see red?

The grammar of 'private sense data.'

"'Toothache' is a word which I use in a game which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to me."

In the use of the word 'meaning' it is essential that the same meaning is kept throughout a game.

"Are you sure that you call 'toothache' always the same private experience?"

What's the use here of being sure, if it doesn't follow that it is so and if your being sure is the only criterion there is for its being so?

This means: This isn't at all a case of being sure, of conviction.

"So-and-so has excellent health, he never had to go to the dentist, never complained about toothache; but as toothache is a

private experience, we can't know whether he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life."

How does one assume such and such to be the case? What is an assumption that, e.g., 'A has toothache'? Is it saying the words "A has toothache"? Or doesn't it consist in doing something with these words?

"A game of assumption."—

Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming: a gesture.

Certain behavior under certain circumstances we call showing our toothache, and other behavior hiding our toothache. Now would we talk about this behavior in this way if people didn't ordinarily behave in the way they do? Suppose I and they described my behavior without such a word as pain, would the description be incomplete? The question is: do *I* consider it incomplete? If so, I will distinguish between two cases of my behavior, and the others will say that I use two words alternately for my behavior and thereby they will acknowledge that I have toothache.

"But can't he have toothache without in any way showing it? And this shows that the word 'toothache' has a meaning entirely independent of a behavior connected with toothache."

The game we play with the word 'toothache' entirely depends upon there being a behavior which we call the expression of toothache.

"We use 'toothache' as the name of a personal experience."—
Well, let's see how we *use* the word!

"But you know the sensation of toothache! So you can give it a name, say, 't.' "

But what is it like to give a sensation a name? Say it is pronouncing the name while one has the sensation and possibly concentrating on the sensation,—but what of it? Does this name thereby get magic powers? And why on earth do I call these sounds the 'name' of the sensation? I know what I do with the

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name of a man or of a number, but have I by this act of "definition" given the name a use?

"To give a sensation a name" means nothing unless I know already in what sort of a game this name is to be used.

We describe a certain behavior by "it is obvious that he was hiding his pain," or: "I think he was hiding his pain," or: "I don't know at all whether he was hiding pain."

But can't I just assume with some degree of certainty that he has pain although I have no reason whatever for it? I can say "I assume . . .," but if I sent them all to the doctor although they showed no sign of pain (illness), I should just be called mad.

In our private language game we had, it seemed, given a name to an impression—in order, of course, to use the name for this impression in the future. The definition, that is, should have determined on future occasions for what impression to use the name and for which not to use it. Now we said that on certain occasions after having given the definition we did use the word and on others we didn't; but we described these occasions only by saying that we had 'a certain impression'—that is, we didn't describe them at all. The only thing that characterized them was that we used such and such words. What seemed to be a definition didn't play the rôle of a definition at all. It did not justify one subsequent use of the word; and all that remains of our private language game is therefore that I sometimes without any particular reason write the word 'red' in my diary.

"But surely I feel justified when normally I use the word 'red' although I don't think of a definition while doing so." Do you mean that whenever normally you use the word 'red' you have a particular feeling which you call a feeling of justification? I wonder if that is true. But anyhow by 'justification' I didn't mean a feeling. But I think I know what makes you say that on saying, e.g., 'this book is red' you have a feeling of being justified in using the word. For you might ask: isn't there an obvious difference between the case in which I use a word in its well known meaning

—as when I say to someone “the sky is blue today”—and the case in which I say any arbitrary word on such an occasion, e.g., “the sky is moo.” In this case, you will say, I either know that I am just *giving* a meaning to the word ‘moo,’ or else I shall feel that there is no justification whatever for using the word. The word is just *any* word and not the appropriate word. I quite agree that there is a difference between the cases of ‘using the name of the color,’ ‘giving a new name to the color,’ and ‘using some arbitrary word in place of the name of the color.’ But that doesn’t mean that it is correct to say that I have a feeling of appropriateness in the first case which is absent in the third. “But ‘red’ somehow seems to us to fit this color.” We certainly may be inclined to say this sentence on certain occasions, but it would be wrong to say that therefore we had a feeling of fitting when ordinarily we said that something was red.

“But do you mean that one man couldn’t play a game of chess with himself and without anyone else knowing that he did?”—What would you say he should do to be playing a private game of chess? Just anything?

I suppose you would say, e.g., that he imagines a chessboard with chessmen on it, that he imagines certain moves, etc. And if you were asked what it means to imagine a *chessboard*, you would explain it by pointing to a real chessboard, or say to a picture of one, and analogously if you were asked what does it mean to imagine the king of chess, a pawn, a knight’s move etc. Or should you have said: he must go through certain . . . ? But what private experiences are there? and would any of them do in this case? For instance, feeling hot? “No! The private experience I am talking of must have the multiplicity of the game of chess.” But again, does he recognize two private experiences to be different by a further private experience and this to be the same in different cases? (Private experience in fiction.) Mustn’t we say in this case that we can’t say anything whatever about private experiences and are in fact not entitled to use the word ‘experiences’ at all? What makes us believe that we are is that we really think of the cases in which we can describe his private experiences, describing different ways of playing chess in one’s imagination.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

What is it that happens when in the one case I say "I see red/have toothache/" and mean it, and am not lying, and on the other hand I say the words but know that they are not true; or say them not knowing what they mean, etc.?

The criteria for it being the truth are laid down in *language*, in rules, charts, etc. "But how am I to know how in the particular case to apply them? For in so far as they are laid down in common language, they join the rest of the rules of common language; i.e., they do not help me in my particular case. Is there such a thing as justifying what I do in the particular case, merely by what then is the case and not by a rule? Can I say I am now justified in using the sentence . . . just by what is now the case?" No!

Nor does it help me to say "I am justified—when I *feel* justified." For about feeling justified the same thing can be said as about feeling toothache.

But showing toothache can never be lying.

I must assume an expression which is *not* lying.

When I say that moaning is the expression of toothache, then under certain circumstances the possibility of its being the expression without the feeling behind it mustn't enter my game.

*Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der Ausdruck kann immer lügen.*¹²

The language games with expressions of feelings are based on games with expressions of which we don't say that they may lie.

"But was I when a baby taught that 'toothache' meant my expression of toothache?"—I was taught that a certain behavior was called expression of toothache.

"But surely there's a case in which I'm justified in saying 'I see red,' where I'm not lying, and one where I'm not justified in saying so!" Of course I can be justified by the ostensive definition or by asking the others "now isn't this red?" and they answer that it is. But you didn't mean this by justification, but one which justifies me privately, whatever the others may say.

¹² It is senseless to say: the expression may always lie.

If I say "I see red" without reason, how can I distinguish between saying it with truth and saying it as a lie?

It is important here that I exclude the case of saying the untruth by mistake.

*Wir haben hier keinen Vergleich des Satzes mit der Wirklichkeit! (Kollationieren.)*¹³

Imagine a Robinson Crusoe lying to himself.—Why is this difficult to imagine?

But one might call it lying to oneself if one, e.g., turns one's watch forward to make oneself get up earlier.

Falsifying an account. I add up numbers, arrive at 273 shillings, then rub out 3 and put a 5 instead.

When in this discussion we talk of lying, it ought always to mean *subjectively* lying, and subjectively lying to the other person and not to oneself.

One could imagine someone constantly lying *subjectively* but not objectively.

He always lies calling red 'green' and green 'red,' but as a matter of fact what he says agrees with the usage of other people and so his lying is never taken notice of.

"Der lügt, der sagt 'ich sehe rot' und sieht die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte 'grün' bezeichnen würde." Aber das heißt doch, wahrheitsgemäß so bezeichnen würde. Oder können wir sagen, "für sich so bezeichnen würde"?

*Daher ist die Idee, daß man lügen kann indem man laut das eine und leise das andere sagt—und was man laut sagt ist hier die Lüge.*¹⁴

¹³ Here there is no comparing of proposition and reality. (Collating.)

¹⁴ "He is lying if he says 'I see red' when he sees the color that he himself would call 'green.'" But this means: he would call it that if he were speaking truthfully. Or can we say, "would call it that to himself"?

Hence the idea that one may lie by saying one thing softly and something else out loud—and what one says out loud is the lie.

*Was soll es dann heißen: einen Farbeindruck wahrheitsgemäß mit "rot" bezeichnen? Paßt das Wort denn einem Eindruck besser als dem andern?*¹⁵

*Man könnte hier auch sagen: man solle gar nicht von subjektiver Wahrheit des Satzes sprechen. Die Wahrheit des Satzes "ich habe Zahnschmerz" habe nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden.*¹⁶

The word 'lying' was taught us in a particular way in which it was fastened to a certain behavior, to the use of certain expressions under certain circumstances. Then we use it, saying that we have been lying, when our behavior was not like the one which first constituted the meaning.

'Expressions can always be lying.' How can we say this of the expressions to which we fasten our words?

Suppose a child learned the word 'toothache' as an equivalent for its moaning, and noticed that whenever it said the word or moaned the grown-ups treated it particularly well. The child then uses moaning or the word 'toothache' as a means to bring about the desired effect: is the child lying?

You say: "Surely I can moan with toothache and I can moan without toothache; so why shouldn't it be so with the child? Of course I only see and hear the child's behavior but from my own experience I know what toothache is (I know toothache apart from behavior) and I am led to believe that the others sometimes have the pains I have."—The first sentence already is misleading. It isn't the question whether I *can* moan with or without toothache, the point is that I distinguish 'moaning with toothache' and 'moaning without toothache' and now we can't go on to say that of course in the child we make the same distinction. In fact we don't. We teach the child to use the words "I have toothache" to replace its moans, and this was how I too was taught the expression. How do I know that I've learned the word

¹⁵ What could be meant by: truthfully calling a color impression "red"? Does the word fit one impression better than another?

¹⁶ We might even say here: one ought not to talk of the subjective truth of the sentence. The truth of the sentence "I have a toothache" can be judged only objectively.

'toothache' to mean what they wanted me to express? I ought to say I *believe* I have!

Now one can moan because one has pain, or, e.g., one can moan on the stage. How do I know that the child, small as it is, doesn't already act, and in this case I teach it to mean by 'toothache' something I don't intend it to mean.

I have taught the child to use the expression 'I have toothache' under certain circumstances. And now it uses the words under these circumstances.—But what are these circumstances? Shall I say "the circumstances under which it moaned," and what are these?

But now I also teach the child to moan on the stage! That is to say, I *teach* it to use this expression in a different game. I also teach it to read out the sentence 'I have toothache' from a book, when it hasn't toothache. In fact I could teach it to lie, as a separate language game. (In fact we often play this kind of game with children.)

"But doesn't what you say come to this: that it doesn't matter what the persons feel as long as only they behave in a particular way?"

"Do you mean that you can define pain in terms of behavior?"

But is this what we do if we teach the child to use the expression 'I have toothache'? Did I define: "Toothache is such and such a behavior"? This obviously contradicts entirely the normal use of the word! "But can't you, on the other hand, at least for yourself give an *ostensive* definition of 'toothache'? Pointing to the place of your pain and saying 'this is . . .'?" Can't I give a name to the pain I've got? Queer idea to give one's pain a name! What's it to do with a name? Or what do I do with it? What do I do with the name of a person whom I *call* by the name? What connection is the name to have with the pain? The only connection so far is that you had toothache, pointed to your cheek, and pronounced the word 'moo.' "So what?" Remember what we said about private ostensive definition.

"But aren't you neglecting something—the experience or whatever you might call it—? Almost *the world* behind the mere words?"

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

But here solipsism teaches us a lesson: It is that thought which is *on the way* to destroy this error. For if the *world* is idea it isn't any person's idea. (Solipsism stops short of saying this and says that it is my idea.) But then how could I say what the world is if the realm of ideas has no neighbor? What I do comes to defining the word 'world.'

'I neglect that which goes without saying.'

"What is seen *I* see" (pointing to my body). I point at my geometrical eye, saying this. Or I point with closed eyes and touch my breast and feel it. In no case do I make a connection between what is seen and a person.

Back to 'neglecting'! It seems that I neglect life. But not life physiologically understood but life as consciousness. And consciousness not physiologically understood, or understood from the outside, but consciousness as the very essence of experience, the appearance of the world, the world.

Couldn't I say: If I had to add the world to my language it would have to be one sign for the whole of language, which sign could therefore be left out.

How am I to describe the way the child learns the word 'toothache'—like this?: The child sometimes has toothache, it moans and holds its cheek, the grown-ups say "...," etc. Or: The child sometimes moans and holds its cheek, the grown-ups ...? Does the first description say something superfluous or false, or does the second leave out something essential? Both descriptions are correct.

"But it seems as if you were neglecting something." But what more can I do than *distinguish* the case of saying 'I have toothache' when I really have toothache, and the case of saying the words without having toothache. I am also (further) ready to talk of any x behind my words so long as it keeps its identity.

Isn't what you reproach me of as though you said: "In your language you're only *speaking!*"

But why shouldn't I say "*I* have toothache in his tooth"? I would insist on his tooth being extracted. Who is supposed to cry out if it is?

What does it mean: distributing primary experience over all subjects?¹⁷ Imagine that they all have *real* toothache in their teeth. The one which you only have. I now describe certain facts. (Not metaphysical ones, but facts about the coincidence of certain experiences.)

He gets a blow and cries—I think: "no wonder for it really hurts." But wouldn't I say to myself: Queer that *he* cries, for *I* feel the pain all right—but *he*?!

It seems there is a phenomenon which in general I refer to as 'my toothache,' which, experience teaches me, is always connected with one particular person (not 'I' but) L.W. I now imagine facts other than they are and connect up this phenomenon to all sorts of persons so as to make it not at all tempting to call this phenomenon "my toothache."

"I see so-and-so" does not mean "the person so-and-so, e.g., L.W., sees so-and-so."

A language game in which everybody calls out what he sees but without saying "I see . . ." Could anybody say that what I call out is incomplete because I have left out to mention the person?!

A language game in which everybody (and I too) calls out what *I* see without mentioning *me*.

They always know what I see. If they don't seem to, I misunderstand what they say.¹⁸

I am tempted to say: "It seems at least a fact of experience that at the source of *the visual field* there is mostly a small man with grey flannel trousers, in fact L.W."—Someone might answer to this: It is true you almost always wear grey flannel trousers and often look at them.

¹⁷ Cf. above, p. 281.

¹⁸ Cf. above, p. 282.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

*"Ich bin doch bevorzugt. Ich bin der Mittelpunkt der Welt." Denken wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel das sagen und auf mich zeigen! Wäre es noch richtig?*¹⁹

When I say I play a unique role I really mean the geometrical eye.

On the other hand, if I describe the visual appearance of my body around the geometrical eye, this is on the same level as saying that in the middle of the visual field there is in general a brown table and at the edges a white wall (as I generally sit in my room).

Now suppose I described this in the form: The visual world in general is like this: (follows the description). Would this be wrong?—Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game I intend to be played with this sentence; e.g., who is allowed to say it and in what way are those to whom it is said to react to it? I should like to say that it's I who say it—not L.W., but the person at the source of the visual field. But this I seem not to be able to explain to anyone. (Queer state of affairs.) The game played might be the one which is in general played with "I see so-and-so."

What if I see before me a picture of the room as I am seeing the room? Is this a language game?

Can't I say something to nobody, neither to anybody else *nor* to myself? What is the criterion of saying it to myself?

I want to say: "the visual world is like this . . ."—but why *say* anything?

But the point is that I don't establish a relation between a person and what is seen. All I do is that alternately I point in front of me and to myself.

But what I now see, this view of my room, plays a unique rôle, it is the visual world!

¹⁹ "But I *am* in a favored position. I am the center of the world." Suppose I saw myself in the mirror saying this and pointing to myself. Would it still be all right?

*(Der Solipsist flattert und flattert in der Fliegenglocke, stößt sich an den Wänden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu bringen?)*²⁰

But the real question for me here is: How am *I* defined? Who is it that is favored? *I*. But may I lift up my hand to indicate who it is?—Supposing I constantly change and my surrounding does: is there still some continuity, namely, by it being *me* and *my surrounding* that change?

(Isn't this similar to thinking that when things in space have changed entirely there's still one thing that remains the same, namely space.) (Space confused with room.)

Suppose someone asked me, "What does it mean to play a private game of chess with oneself?" and I answered: "Anything, because if I said I was playing a game of chess I would to be so sure that I was that I would stick to what I said, whatever anyone else might say."

Suppose someone painted pictures of the landscape which surrounds him. He sometimes paints the leaves of trees orange, sometimes blue, sometimes the clear sky red, etc. Under what circumstances would we agree with him that he was portraying the landscape?

Under what circumstances would we say that he did what we call portraying, and under what circumstances that he called something portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we said: "Well I can never know what he does inwardly"—would this be anything more than resignation?

We call something a calculation if, for instance, it leads to a house being built.

We call something a language game if it plays a particular rôle in our human life.

"But can't he play a game with color names, against whatever anybody else says?" But why call it a game with color names?

²⁰ (The solipsist flutters and flutters in the flyglass, strikes against the walls, flutters further. How can he be brought to rest?)

"But if *I* played it I would stick to saying that I was playing a game with color names." But is that all I can say about it; is all that I can say for its being this kind of game that I stick to calling it so?

Under what circumstances do I say that I'm entitled to say that I'm seeing red? The answer is showing a sample, i.e., giving the rule. But if now I came into constant contradiction with what anybody else said, should I not say that I am applying the rule in a way which prevents me from playing the game? That is: is all that is necessary that the rule I give should be the rule they give, or isn't besides this an agreement in the application necessary?

If "having the same pain" *means* the same as "saying that one has the same pain," then "I have the same pain" means the same as "I say that I have the same pain" and the exclamation "Oh!" means "I say 'Oh!'"

Roughly speaking: The expression 'I have toothache' stands for a moan²¹ but it does not mean 'I moan.'

If I say we must assume an expression which can't lie, this can't be explained by saying that pain really corresponds to this expression.

We aren't lying, we are speaking the truth, if a fact corresponds to the sentence. This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we can supplement it by 'namely this →' and a demonstration; and the whole explanation lies just in this demonstration. The whole problem here only arose through the fact that the demonstration of 'I see red,' 'I have toothache,' seems indirect.

²¹ In lectures W. said "is a substitute for moaning" and "replaces moaning": "Of course 'toothache' is not *only* a substitute for moaning—but it is *also* a substitute for moaning; and to say this shows how utterly different it is from a word like 'Watson.'" — And again: "Suppose you were asked 'What were the phenomena which were pointed out when you learned the word "pain"?' There were certain noises in others, and then one's own. Then one is taught to replace the moan by 'I have pain.' . . . You might ask 'What does the moan stand for?' Nothing at all. 'But you don't just wish to say that you moan?' No; but the moan is not the statement 'I moan.'" Cf. above, p. 295.

“But aren’t you saying that all that happens is that he moans, and that there is nothing behind it?” I am saying that there is nothing *behind* the moaning.

“So you really don’t have pain, you just moan?!”—There seems to be a *description* of my behavior, and also, in the same sense, a description of my pain! The one, so to speak, the description of an external, the other of an internal fact. This corresponds to the idea that in the sense in which I can give a part of my body a name, I can give a name to a private experience (only indirectly).

And I am drawing your attention to this: that the language games are very much more different than you think.

You couldn’t call moaning a description! But this shows you how far the proposition ‘I have toothache’ is from a description, and how far teaching the word ‘toothache’ is from teaching the word ‘tooth.’

One could from the beginning teach the child the expression “I think he has toothache” instead of “he has toothache,” with the corresponding uncertain tone of voice. This mode of expression could be described by saying that we can only believe that the other has toothache.

But why not in the child’s own case? Because there the tone of voice is simply *determined* by nature.

In “I have toothache” the expression of pain is brought to the same form as a description “I have 5 shillings.”

We teach the child to say “I have been lying” when it has behaved in a certain way. (Imagine here a typical case of a lie.) Also this expression goes along with a particular situation, facial expressions, say of shame, tones of reproach, etc.

“But doesn’t the child know that it is lying before ever I teach him the word?” Is this meant to be a metaphysical question or a question about facts? The child doesn’t know it in words. And why should it know it at all?—“But do you assume that it has only the facial expression of shame, e.g., without the feeling of shame? Mustn’t you describe the inside situation as well as the outside one?”—But what if I said that by facial expression of shame I

meant what you mean by 'the facial expression + the feeling,' unless I explicitly distinguish between genuine and simulated facial expressions? It is, I think, misleading to describe the genuine expression as a *sum* of the expression and something else, though it is just as misleading—we get the function of our expressions wrong—if we say that the genuine expression is a particular behavior and nothing besides.

We teach the child the use of the word "to speak."—Later it uses the expression "I spoke to myself."—We then say "We never know whether and what a person speaks to himself."

Surely the description of the facial expression can be meant as a description of feelings and can be meant otherwise. We constantly use such expressions as "when he heard that, he pulled a long face" and don't add that the expression was genuine. In other cases we describe the acting²² of a person in the same words, or again we wish to leave it open whether the expression was genuine or not. To say that we describe the feeling indirectly by the description of expressions is wrong!

Imagine a language in which toothache is called "moaning" and the difference between just moaning and moaning with pain is expressed by the moaning or dry tone in which the word is pronounced. People would not say in this language that it became clear later on that *A* didn't really have pain, but they would perhaps in an angry tone say that at first he moaned and then he suddenly laughed.

Suppose he says to himself "I lie," what is to show that he means it? But we would any day describe this lying by saying: "He said . . . , and told himself at the same time that he was lying." Is this too an indirect description of lying?

But couldn't one say that if I speak of a man's angry voice, meaning that he was angry, and again of his angry voice, not meaning that he was angry, in the first case the meaning of the description of his voice was much further reaching than in the second case? I will admit that our description in the first case

²² On the stage.

doesn't *omit* anything and is as complete as though we had said that he really was angry—but somehow the meaning of the expression then reaches below the surface.

But how does it do that? The answer to this would be an explanation of the two uses of the expression. But how could this explanation reach *under the surface*? It is an explanation about symbols and it states in which cases these symbols are used. But how does it characterize these cases? Can it in the end do more than distinguish two expressions? i.e., describe a game with two expressions?

"Then is there nothing under the surface?!" But I said that I was going to distinguish two expressions, one for the 'surface' and one for 'what is below the surface'—only remember that these expressions themselves correspond just to a *picture*, not to its usage. It is just as misleading to say that there is just the surface and nothing underneath it, as that there is something below the surface and that there isn't just the surface. Because we naturally use this picture to express the distinction between 'on the surface' and 'below the surface.' Because once we make use of the picture of the 'surface' it is most natural to express with it the distinction as on and below the surface. But we misapply the picture if we ask whether both cases are or aren't on the surface.

Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the expression "I have lied" the child must behave in the normal way. E.g., it must under certain circumstances 'admit' that it lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc., etc., etc. We may not always find out whether he lied or not, but if we never found out, the word would have a different meaning. "But once he has learned the word he can't be in doubt whether he is lying or not!"

This of course is like saying that he can't be in doubt whether he has toothache or whether he sees red, etc. On the one hand: doubting whether I have the experience *E* is not like doubting whether someone else has it. On the other hand, one can't say "surely I must know what it is I see" unless 'to know what I see' is to mean 'to see whatever I see.' The question is what we are to call "knowing what it is I see," "not being in doubt about what

it is I see." Under what circumstances are we to say that a person is in no doubt (or is in doubt) about this? (Such cases as being in no doubt about whether this looks red to the normal eye, and analogous ones, of course don't interest us here.) I suppose that the knowledge of what it is I see must be the knowledge that it is so-and-so I see; 'so-and-so' standing for some expressions, verbal or otherwise. (But remember that I don't give myself information by pointing to something I see with my finger and saying to myself I see this.) 'So-and-so' in fact stands for a word of a language game. And doubting what it is I see is doubting, e.g., what to call what I see. Doubting, for instance, whether to say 'I see red' or 'I see green.' "But this is a simple doubt about the appellation of a color, and it can be settled by asking someone what this color (pointing) is called." But are all such doubts removable by this question (or which comes to the same, by giving a definition: "I shall call this color so-and-so")?

"What color do you see?"—"I don't know, is it red or isn't it red; I don't know what color it is I see."—"What do you mean? Is the color constantly changing, or do you see it so very faintly, practically black?" Could I say here: "don't you see what you see?"? This obviously would make no sense.

It seems as though, however the outward circumstances change, once the word is fastened to a particular personal experience it now retains its meaning; and that therefore I can now use it with sense whatever may happen.

To say that I can't doubt whether I see red is in a sense absurd, as the game I play with the expression 'I see red' doesn't contain a doubt in this form.

It seems, whatever the circumstances I always know whether to apply the word or not. It seems, at first it was a move in a special game but then it becomes independent of this game.

(This reminds one of the way the idea of length seems to become emancipated from any particular method of measuring it.)²³

²³ Wittgenstein marked this whole passage as unsatisfactory and wrote "vague" in the margin.

We are tempted to say: "damn it all, a rod has a particular length however I express it." And one could go on to say that if I see a rod I always see (know) how long it is, although I can't say how many feet, meters, etc.—But suppose I just say: I always know whether it looks tiny or big!

But can't the old game lose its point when the circumstances change, so that the expression ceases to have a meaning, although of course I can still pronounce it.

He sticks to saying that he has been lying although none of the usual consequences follow. What is there left of the language game except that he says the expression?

We learn the word 'red' under particular circumstances. Certain objects are usually red, and keep their colors; most people agree with us in our color judgments. Suppose all this changes: I see blood, unaccountably sometimes one sometimes another color, and the people around me make different statements. But couldn't I in all this chaos retain my meaning of 'red,' 'blue,' etc., although I couldn't now make myself understood to anyone? Samples, e.g., would all constantly change their color—"or does it only seem so to me?" "Now am I mad or did I really call this 'red' yesterday?"

The situations in which we are inclined to say "I must have gone mad!"

"But we could always call a color-impression 'red' and stick to this appellation!"

*Die Atmosphäre, die dieses Problem umgibt, ist schrecklich. Dichte Nebel der Sprache sind um den problematischen Punkt gelagert. Es ist beinahe unmöglich, zu ihm vorzudringen.*²⁴

Do I by painting what I see tell myself what I see?

"This picture is unique, for it represents what is really seen."
What is my *justification* for saying this?

²⁴ The atmosphere surrounding this problem is terrible. Dense mists of (our) language are situated about the crucial point. It is almost impossible to get through to it.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

I see two spots on this wall and lift two fingers. Do I tell myself that I see two spots? But on the other hand couldn't this be the sign for my seeing two spots?

*Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder zeichne ich es aus?*²⁵

"Today he points at *me*; and yesterday he pointed at *me* also."

The meaning of: "He points at *me*."

"I see that he points at *A*."

"I see that he points at *me*."

Imagine a game: One person tells the other what he (the other) sees; if he has guessed it rightly he is rewarded. If *A* hasn't guessed correctly what *B* sees, *B* corrects him and says what it is he sees. This game is more instructive if we imagine the persons not to say what is seen but to paint or make models of it. Now let me imagine that I am one of the players.

Wouldn't I be tempted to say: "The game is asymmetrical, for only what I say I see corresponds to a visual image."

The problem lies thus: This ↗ is what's seen; and this is also what I see.

*Frage Dich: Kann das ↗ nur ich sehen, oder kann es auch ein Anderer sehen? Warum nur ich?*²⁶

*Für mich existiert kein Unterschied zwischen ich und das ↗; und das Wort "ich" ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort oder eine Person hervorhebt.*²⁷

*Ich versuche das ganze Problem auf das nicht-Verstehen der Funktion des Wortes "Ich" (und "das ↗") zu reduzieren.*²⁸

²⁵ Is it a special picture or do I give it special attention?

²⁶ Ask yourself: Can only *I* see this ↗, or can someone else see it too? Why only I?

²⁷ There is no difference, for me, between *I* and *this* ↗; and for me the word "I" is not a signal calling attention to a place or a person.

²⁸ I am trying to bring the whole problem down to our not understanding the function of the word "I" (and "this ↗").

When I stare at a colored object and say "this is red," I seem to know exactly to what I give the name red. As it were, to that which I am drinking in.

It is as though there was a magic power in the words "*this is* . . ."

I can bring myself to say: There is no toothache there ↗ (in the man's cheek who says he has toothache). And what would be the expression for this in ordinary language? Wouldn't it be *my* saying that *I* have no toothache there?

"But who says this?"—"I!" And who says *this*?—"I!"—

Suppose I give this rule: "Whenever I said 'I have toothache' I shall from now on say 'there is toothache.'"

I tell the waiter: Bring me always clear soup, and thick soup to all the others. He tries to remember my face.

Suppose I change my face (body) every day entirely, how is he to know which is me? But it's a question of the *existence* of the game. "If all chessmen were alike, how should one know which is the king?"

Now it seems that, although *he* couldn't know which is me, *I* would still know it.

Suppose now I said: "it wasn't so-and-so, it was I who asked for clear soup"—couldn't I be wrong? Certainly. I.e., I may think that I *asked* him, but didn't. Now are there *two* mistakes I can make: one, thinking that I *asked* him, the other, thinking that *I* asked him? I say: "I remember having asked you yesterday," he replies: "You weren't there at all yesterday." Now I could say either: "well then I suppose I remember wrongly," or: "I was here only I looked like him yesterday."

It seems that I can *trace* my identity, quite independent of the identity of my body. And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in a body, the identity of my mind.

"If anybody asks me to describe *what I see*, I describe *what's seen*."

What we call a description of my sense datum, of what's seen, independent of what is the case in the physical world, is still a description for the other person.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

If I speak of a description of *my* sense datum, I don't *mean* to give a particular person as its possessor.

(No more do I want to speak about a particular person when I moan with pain.)

It must be a serious and deep-seated disease of language (one might also say 'of thought') which makes me say: "Of course this \nearrow is what's really seen."

I can tell you the fact p because I know that p is the case. It has sense to say "it rained and I knew it," but not "I had toothache and knew that I had." "I know that I have toothache" means nothing, or the same as "I have toothache."

This, however, is a remark about the use of the word "I," whoever uses it.

Examine the sentence: "There is something there," referring to the visual sensation I'm now having.

Aren't we inclined to think that this is a statement making sense and being true? And on the other hand, isn't it a pseudo-statement?

But what (what entity) do you refer to when you say that sentence?—Aren't we here up against the old difficulty, that it seems to us that meaning something was a special state or activity of mind? For it is true that in saying these words I am in a special state of mind, I stare at something—but this just doesn't constitute meaning.

Compare with this such a statement as: "Of course I know what I am referring to by the word 'toothache.'"

Think of the frame of mind in which you say to yourself that $p \cdot \sim p$ does make sense and by repeating a statement of this form you are, as it were by introspection, trying to find out what it means.

The phenomenon of *staring* is closely bound up with the whole puzzle of solipsism.

"If I am asked 'what do you see?,' I describe the visual world."
—Couldn't I say instead of this "... I am describing what is there \nearrow " (pointing before me)?

But now consider the case of someone having a picture before him of the part of his room he is seeing, and he says: "This in the picture is like *this* (a part of his visual field as he is looking at his room)."

Supposing I said "there is something there"; and being asked "What do you mean?," I painted a picture of what I see. Would this justify making that statement?—Wouldn't this picture have to be understood 'in a system'? And mustn't I understand it as an expression within a system?

[Reference to a geometrical diagram of two perpendiculars drawn to a given point on a line:] 'Look at the geometrical proposition as a member of the whole system of geometrical propositions, then you will see whether you really want to accept this proposition!'

"It's no use saying that the other person knows what he sees and not what I see and that therefore all is symmetrical, because there is just nothing else corresponding to my visual image, my visual image is unique!"²⁹

"But I can persuade myself that nobody else has pains even if they say they have, but not that I haven't."

It makes no sense to say "I persuade myself that I have no pain," whoever says this. I don't say anything about myself when I say that I can't persuade myself that I haven't pain, etc.

If I say "*I see this* ↗" I am likely to tap my chest to show which person I am. Now suppose I had no head and pointing to my geometrical eye I would point to an empty place above my neck: wouldn't I still feel that I pointed to the person who sees, tapping my chest? Now I might ask "how do you know in this case who sees this?" But what is *this*? It's no use just pointing ahead of me, and if, instead, I point to a description and tap both my chest and the description and say '*I see this*'—it has no sense to ask "How do you know it's *you* who sees it?," for I don't *know* that it's this person and not another one which sees before I point.—This is

²⁹ In the margin: "*sehr wichtig, wenn auch schlecht gesagt.*" (Very important, although badly expressed).

what I meant by saying that I don't choose the mouth which says "I have toothache."

Isn't it queer that if I look in front of me and point in front of me and say "this!", I should know what it is I mean. "I mean just these shades of color and shapes, the *appearance*."

If I say "I mean the appearance," it seems I am telling you what it is I am pointing to or looking at, e.g., the chair as opposed to the bed, etc. It is as though by the word "appearance" I had actually *directed your attention* to something else than, e.g., the physical objects you are looking at. And indeed there corresponds a particular stare to this 'taking in the appearance.' Remember here what philosophers of a certain school used to say so often: "*I believe* I mean something, if I say ' . . . ' "

It seems that the visual image which I'm having is something which I can point to and talk about; that I can say of it, it is unique. That I am pointing to the physical objects in my field of vision, but not meaning them by the *appearance*. This object I am talking about, if not to others then to myself. (It is almost like something painted on a screen which surrounds me.)

This object is inadequately described as "that which I see," "my visual image," since it has nothing to do with any particular human being. Rather I should like to call it "what's seen." And so far it's all right, only now I've got to say what can be said about this object, in what sort of language game "what's seen" is to be used. For at first sight I should feel inclined to use this expression as one uses a word designating a physical object, and only on second thought I see that I can't do that.—When I said that here there seems to be an object I can point to and talk about, it was just that I was comparing it to a physical object. For only on second thought it appears that the idea of "talking about" isn't applicable here. (I could have compared the 'object' to a theater decoration.)

Now when could I be said to speak about this object? When would I say I did speak about it?—*Obviously* when I describe—as we should say—my visual image. And perhaps only if I describe it, and only if I describe it to myself.

But what is the point, in this case, of saying that when I describe to myself what I see, I describe an object called "what's seen"? Why talk of a particular object here? Isn't this due to a misunderstanding?

I wish to say that we can't adduce the 'private experience' as a justification for expressing it.

We can't say "he is justified in moaning because he has pains" if we call pain *the* justification for moaning.—We can't say "he is justified in expressing pain, because he has pain" unless we wish to distinguish this case of being justified in expressing pain from another way of justification, e.g., that he is on the stage and has to act as a sick man.

If I am tempted to say "my justification for moaning is having pain," it seems I point—at least for myself—to something to which I give expression by moaning.

The idea is here that there is an 'expression' for everything, that we know what it means 'to express something,' 'to describe something.' Here is a feeling, an experience, and now I could say to someone "express it!" But what is to be the relation of the expression to what it expresses? In what way is this expression the expression of this feeling rather than another?! One is inclined to say "we *mean* this feeling by its expression," but what is meaning a feeling by a word like? Is this quite clear if, e.g., I have explained what "meaning this person by the name '*N*' " is like?

"We have two expressions, one for moaning without pain, and one for moaning with pain." To what states of affairs am I pointing as explanations of these two expressions?

"But these 'expressions' can't be mere words, noises, which you make; they get their importance only from what's *behind* them (the state you're in when you use them)!"—But how can this state give importance to noises which I produce?

Suppose I said: The expressions get their importance from the fact that they are not used coolly but that we can't help using them. This is as though I said: laughter gets its importance only through being a *natural* expression, a natural phenomenon, not an artificial code.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

Now what makes a 'natural form of expression' natural? Should we say "An experience which stands behind it"?

If I use the expression "I have toothache" I may think of it as 'being used naturally' or otherwise, but it would be wrong to say that I had a *reason* for thinking either.—It is very queer that *all* the importance of our expressions seems to come from that *X, Y, Z*, the private experiences, which forever remain in the *background* and can't be drawn into the foreground.

But is a cry when it is a cry of pain not a mere cry?

Why should I say the 'expression' derives its meaning from the feeling behind it—and not from the circumstances of the language game in which it is used? For imagine a person crying out with pain alone in the desert: is he using a language? Should we say that this cry had *meaning*?

We labor under the queer temptation to describe our language and its use, introducing into our descriptions an element of which we ourselves say that it is not part of the language. It is a peculiar phenomenon of iridescence which seems to fool us.

"But can't you imagine people behaving just as we do, showing pain etc., etc., and then if you imagine that *they don't feel pain* all their behavior is, as it were, dead. You can imagine all this behavior *with* or *without* pain.—"

The pain seems to be the atmosphere in which the expression exists. (The pain seems to be a *circumstance*.)

Suppose we say that the image I use in the one case is different from the image I use in the other. But I can't point to the two images. So what does it come to, to say this, except just to saying it, using *this* expression.

We are, as I have said, tempted to describe our language by saying that we use certain elements, images, which however in the last moment we again withdraw.

Isn't the expression *in its use* an image—why do I refer back to an image which I can't show?

"But don't you talk as though (the) pain weren't something terribly real?"—Am I to understand this as a proposition about pain? I suppose it is a proposition about the use of the word 'pain,' and it is one more utterance, and essential part of the surrounding in which we use the word 'pain.'

Feeling justified in having expressed pain.

I may *concentrate on the memory of pain.*

Now what's the difference between using my expressions as I do but yet not using "toothache" to mean real pain, and the proper use of the word?—

The private experience is to serve as a paradigm, and at the same time admittedly it can't be a paradigm.

The 'private experience' is a degenerate construction of our grammar (comparable in a sense to tautology and contradiction). And this grammatical monster now fools us; when we wish to do away with it, it seems as though we denied the existence of an experience, say, toothache.

What would it mean to deny the existence of pain?!

"But when we say we have toothache we don't just talk of expressing toothache in this or that way!"—Certainly not—we express toothache! "But you admit that the same behavior may be the expression of pain or may not be that."—If you imagine a man cheating—cheating is done secretly but this secrecy is not that of the 'private experience.' Why shouldn't it be considered wrong in him to use language in this way?

We say "only he knows whether he says the truth or lies."
"Only you can know if what you say is true."

Now compare secrecy with the 'privateness' of personal experience! In what sense is a thought of mine secret? If I think aloud it can be heard.—"I have said this to myself a thousand times but not to anyone else."

"Only you can know what color you see." But if it is true that only you can know, you can't even impart this knowledge nor can you express it.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTES FOR LECTURES

Why shouldn't we say that I know better than you what color you see if you say the wrong word and I can make you agree to my word, or if you point to the wrong sample, etc.?

"I didn't know that I was lying."—"You *must* have known!"

Examine: "If you don't know that you're having a toothache, you aren't having a toothache."

"I don't just *say* 'I've got toothache,' but *toothache makes me say this*." (I deliberately didn't write 'the feeling of toothache,' or 'a certain feeling'.)

This sentence distinguishes between, say, saying it as an example of a sentence, or on the stage, etc., and saying it as an assertion. But it is no explanation of the expression "I have toothache," of the use of the word "toothache."

"I know what the word 'toothache' means, it makes me concentrate my attention on one particular thing." But on what? You're now inclined to give criteria of behavior. Ask yourself: "what does the word 'feeling,' or still better 'experience,' make you concentrate on?" What is it like to concentrate on experience? If I try to do this I, e.g., open my eyes particularly wide and stare.

"I know what the word 'toothache' means, it produces one particular image in my mind." But *what* image? "That can't be explained."—But if it can't be explained what was the meaning of saying that it produced one particular image? You could say the same about the words "image in your mind." And all that it comes to is that you are using certain words without an explanation. "But can't I explain them to myself? or understand them myself without giving an explanation? Can't I give a private explanation?" But is this anything you can call an explanation? Is staring a private explanation?

But how does this queer delusion come about?!

Here is language—and now I try to embody something in language as an explanation, which is no explanation.

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Privacy of sense data. I must bore you with a repetition of what I said last time. We said that one reason for introducing the idea of the sense datum was that people, as we say, sometimes see different things, colors, e.g., looking at the same object. Cases in which we say "he sees dark red whereas I see light red." We are inclined to talk about an object other than the physical object which the person sees who is said to see the physical object. It is further clear that we only gather from the other person's behavior (e.g., what he tells us) what that object looks like, and so it lies near to say that he has this object before his mind's eye and that we don't see it. Though we can also say that we might have it before our mind's eye as well, without however knowing that he has it before his mind's eye. The 'sense datum' here—the way the physical object appears to him. In other cases no physical object enters.

Now I want to draw your attention to one particular difficulty about the use of the 'sense datum.' We said that there were cases in which we should say that the person sees green what I see red. Now the question suggests itself: if this can be so at all, why should it not be always the case? It seems, if once we have admitted that it can happen under peculiar circumstances, that it may always happen. But then it is clear that the very idea of seeing red loses its use if we can never know if the other does not see something utterly different. So what are we to do: Are we to say that this can only happen in a limited number of cases? This is a very serious situation.—We introduced the expression that *A* sees something else than *B* and we mustn't forget that this had use only under the circumstances under which we introduced it. Consider the proposition: "Of course we never know whether new circumstances wouldn't show that after all he saw what we see." Remember that this whole notion need not have been introduced. "But can't I *imagine* all blind men to see as well as I do and only behaving differently; and on the other hand imagine them really blind? For if I can imagine these possibilities, then the question, even if never answerable makes sense." Imagine a man, say *W.*, now blind, now seeing, and observe what you do? How do these images give sense to the question? They don't, and you see that the expression stands and falls with its usefulness.

The idea that the other person sees something else than I,

is only introduced to account for certain expressions: whereas it seems that this idea can exist without any reference to expressions. "Surely what I have he too can have."

"And remember that we admit that the other may have pain without showing it! So if this is conceivable, why not that he never shows pain; and why not that everybody has pain constantly without showing it; or that even things have pain?!" What strikes us is that there seem to be a few useful applications of the idea of the other person's having pain without showing it, and a vast number of useless applications, applications which look as though they were no applications at all. And these latter applications seem to have their justification in this, that we can imagine the other person to have what we have and in this way the proposition that he has toothache seems to make sense apart from any expression at all. "Surely," we say, "I can imagine him to have pain or to see, etc." Or, "As I can see myself, so I can imagine him to do the same." In other words I can imagine him to play the same role in the act of seeing which I play. But does saying this determine what I mean by "he sees"?

We arrive at the conclusion that imagining him to have pain (etc.) does not fix the sense of the sentence "he has pain."

"He may all along mean something different by 'green' than I mean." Evidence (verification). But there is this consideration: "Surely I mean something particular, a particular impression, and therefore he may have another impression; surely I know what that would be like!" "Surely I know what it is like to have the impression I call 'green'!" But what is it like? You are inclined to look at a green object and to say "it's like *this*!" And these words, though they don't explain anything to anybody else, seem to be at any rate an explanation you give yourself. But are they?! Will this explanation justify your future use of the word 'green'? In fact seeing green doesn't allow you to make the substitutions of someone else for you and of red for green.

"The sense datum is private" is a rule of grammar, it forbids [rules out] the use of such expressions as "they saw the same sense datum"; it may (or may not) allow such sentences as "he guessed that the other had a sense datum of this . . . kind." It may only allow expressions of the form: "The other looked round,

had a sense datum and said. . . ." You see that this word in such a case has no use at all. But if you like to use it, do!—

"But surely I distinguish between having toothache and expressing it, and merely expressing it; and I distinguish between these two in myself." "Surely this is not merely a matter of using different expressions, but there are two distinct experiences!" "You talk as though the case of having pain and that of not having pain were only distinguished by the way in which I expressed myself!"

But do we always distinguish between 'mere behavior' and 'experience + behavior'? If we see someone falling into flames and crying out, do we say to ourselves: "there are of course two cases: . . ."? Or if I see you here before me do I distinguish? Do you? You can't! That we do in certain cases, doesn't show that we do in all cases. This to some of you must sound silly and superficial; but it isn't. When you see me do you see one thing and conjecture another? (Don't talk of conjecturing subconsciously!) But supposing you expressed yourself in the form of such a supposition, wouldn't this come to adopting a *'façon de parler'*?

Can we say that 'saying that I lie is justified by a particular experience of lying'? Shall we say '. . . by a particular private experience'? or '. . . by a particular private experience of lying'? or 'by a particular private experience characterized in such and such ways'?

"But what, in your opinion, is the difference between the mere expression and the expression + the experience?"

"Do you know what it means that W. behaves as he does but sees nothing; and on the other hand that he sees?"

If you ask yourself this and answer 'yes' you conjure up some sort of image. This image is, it seems, derived from the fact of your seeing or not seeing (if you close your eyes), and by this derivation, it seems, it must be the picture we interpret to correspond to our sentence "he sees," "he doesn't see."—As when I substitute for my body, his body, and for holding a match, holding a pen.—But substituting his body for my body might mean that my body has changed so as to be now like his, and perhaps vice

versa. It seems a direct and simple thing to understand "thinking that he has what I have," but it isn't at all. The case is simple only if we speak, e.g., of physiological processes. "I know only indirectly what he sees, but directly what I see" embodies an absolutely misleading picture. I can't be said to know that I have toothache if I can't be said not to know that I have toothache. I can't be said to know indirectly what the other has if I can't be said to know it directly. The misleading picture is this: I see my own matchbox but I know only from hearsay what his looks like. We can't say: "I say he has toothache because I observe his behavior, but I say that I have because I *feel* it." (This might lead one to say that 'toothache' has two meanings, one for me and one for the other person.)

"I say 'I have toothache' because I *feel* it" contrasts this case with, say, the case of acting on the stage, but can't explain what 'having toothache' means because having toothache = feeling toothache, and the explanation would come to: "I say I have it because I have it" = I say I have it because it is true = I say I have it because I don't lie. One wishes to say: In order to be able to say that I have toothache I don't observe my behavior, say in the mirror. *And this is correct*, but it doesn't follow that you describe an observation of any other kind. Moaning is not the description of an observation. That is, you can't be said to *derive* your expression from what you observe. Just as you can't be said to derive the word '*green*' from your *visual impression* but only from a sample.— Now against this one is inclined to say: "Surely if I call a color green I don't just say that word, but the word comes in a particular way," or "if I say 'I have toothache' I don't just use this phrase but it must come in a particular way!" Now this means nothing, for, if you like, it always comes in a particular way. "But surely seeing and saying something *can't be all!*" Here we make the confusion that there is still an object we haven't mentioned. You imagine that there is a *pure* seeing and saying, and one + something else. Therefore you imagine all distinctions to be made as between a , $a + b$, $a + c$, etc. The idea of this addition is mostly derived from consideration of our bodily organs. All that ought to interest you is whether I make all the distinctions that you make: whether, e.g., I distinguish between cheating and telling the

truth.—“There is something else!”—“There is nothing else!”—
“But what else is there?”—“Well, this \nearrow !”

“But surely I know that I am not a mere automaton!”—What would it be like if I were?—“How is it that I can’t imagine myself not experiencing seeing, hearing etc.?”—We constantly confuse and change about the commonsense use and the meta-physical use.

“I know that I see.”—

“I see.”—you seem to read this off some fact; as though you said: “There is a chair in this corner.”

“But if in an experiment, e.g., I say ‘I see,’ why do I say so? surely because I see!”

It is as though our expressions of personal experience needn’t even spring from regularly recurrent inner experiences but just from *something*.

Confusion of description and samples.

The idea of the ‘*realm of consciousness*.’

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN