

CLARENDON ANCIENT HISTORY SERIES

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**CICERO:  
ON DIVINATION  
BOOK 1**

TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION  
AND COMMENTARY BY  
**D. WARDLE**

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# CLARENDON ANCIENT HISTORY SERIES

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# CICERO ON DIVINATION

*De Divinatione*

BOOK 1

Translated

with Introduction and Historical Commentary by

DAVID WARDLE

CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD

# OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6DP  
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Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi  
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Published in the United States  
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First published 2006

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Data available

Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India

Printed in Great Britain

on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King's Lynn, Norfolk

ISBN 0-19-929791-6 978-0-19-929791-7  
ISBN 0-19-929792-4 (Pbk.) 978-0-19-929792-4 (Pbk.)

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

## Preface

In his excellent book on Roman ruler cult Ittai Gradel issues the following caution: 'Only with extreme caution should philosophical treatises, such as Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* or *De Divinatione* be employed in the study of Roman religion; and as for its interpretation, they are best left out of account altogether'. In trying to teach a course to postgraduates at the University of Cape Town on Roman religion, I have used *De Divinatione* as a central text. Through reading it, in a relatively short compass, students are exposed to a wide range of divinatory practices and differing views on their status and validity in a way that stimulates discussion and occasional interest. It is because Pease's magnificent, monumental commentary proved impenetrable for students without an excellent command of both Latin and Greek and because in the eighty years since it was published scholarly approaches to Roman religion have changed, that I embarked somewhat ambitiously on a new commentary. Recurrent fears of *hubris* were somewhat allayed by the appearance in Italian (Timpanaro), German (Schäublin) and French (Scheid and Freyburger and Kany-Turpin) of modern translations with commentaries of varying scope which suggested that others too were thinking that something new was needed for the late twentieth century.

The further into this project I have gone the deeper my appreciation of Pease's work has grown and greater has become my realization of the range of expertises necessary to understand Cicero's achievement. Although *De Divinatione* has justly been called 'the least philosophical of all Cicero's philosophical dialogues', an ancient historian has had to grapple with material and ideas he thought he had gratefully done with in Mods. If there are any philosophical pitfalls that I have avoided I owe that to Clive Chandler and David Charles. If it is the 'least philosophical', then it is also the most historical of Cicero's philosophical works; for book 1 in particular the Stoic case for divination relies upon a mass of historical *exempla* and even if individually they are mostly well-known, in their deployment Cicero has created an argument which needs to be assessed

overall and in its various parts. On such a basis this book has found a home in the Clarendon Ancient History Series.

Of the editors Miriam Griffin has nobly read through the whole in various forms at various times and Susan Treggiari has suffered a late draft. The 'anonymous reader' for the press, Professor A. R. Dyck, did a painstakingly detailed job which alerted me to many shortcomings. For advice on things avian I thank the late Nan Dunbar, for things pharmacological John Scarborough, for reading the philosophical bits David Charles, and last, but certainly not least, for casting an eagle eye over the proofs and compiling the index, Gerald Groenewald.

This project has been completed through three periods of study and research leave granted by the University of Cape Town in 1997, 2001, and 2004 and was assisted by a research grant in 1997 from the then Centre for Science Development (now National Research Foundation) of South Africa. I have been fortunate to spend each of those three periods in Oxford and to enjoy the unparalleled resources of the Bodleian and Ashmolean libraries. Latterly 'the Sackler experience' has proved interesting: the academic habit of going round in small circles has gained a physical dimension: perhaps the need to relearn where everything is when once you knew is an illuminating parallel for writing about divination. As always, the interlibrary-loan staff of the University of Cape Town have efficiently and cheerfully procured for me a wide range of obscure materials unavailable locally.

D.W.

Cape Town

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## Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors follow those used by the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edn. (1996), and *L'Année Philologique*.

<i>A&amp;A</i>	<i>Antike und Abendland</i>
<i>A&amp;R</i>	<i>Atene e Roma</i>
<i>ABSA</i>	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
<i>AC</i>	<i>L'Antiquité Classique</i>
<i>AClass</i>	<i>Acta Classica</i> (Pretoria)
<i>ACUSD</i>	<i>Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debrecenensis</i>
<i>AFLP</i>	<i>Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia. Perugia</i>
<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>ALL</i>	<i>Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie und Grammatik</i>
<i>AM</i>	<i>Athenische Mitteilungen</i>
<i>Anc. Soc.</i>	<i>Ancient Society</i>
<i>Anc. W</i>	<i>Ancient World</i>
<i>ANRW</i>	H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds.), <i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> (Berlin, 1972– ).
<i>ARW</i>	<i>Archiv für Religionswissenschaft</i>
<i>Arch. Class.</i>	<i>Archeologia Classica</i>
<i>ARG</i>	<i>Archiv für Religionsgeschichte</i>
<i>ASAA</i>	<i>Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene</i>
<i>ASGP</i>	<i>Annali del Seminario Giuridico dell'Università di Palermo</i>
<i>ASNP</i>	<i>Annali della Scuola Normale di Pisa</i>
<i>BABesch</i>	<i>Bulletin Antieke Beschaving</i>
<i>BBG</i>	<i>Blätter für das Bayerische Gymnasial-Schulwesen</i>

BCAR	<i>Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma</i>
BCH	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique</i>
BICS	<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Classical Studies</i>
BMCR	<i>Bryn Mawr Classical Review</i>
BNP	M. Beard, J. North, and S. Price, <i>Religions of Rome</i> (Cambridge, 1998).
BStudLat	<i>Bollettino di Studi Latini</i>
CA	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
CAH	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> , 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1990– ).
CB	<i>Classical Bulletin</i>
CCAG	F. Cumont <i>et al.</i> (eds.), <i>Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum</i> (Brussels, 1953–89).
CFC	<i>Cuadernos de Filología Clásica. Estudios Latinos</i>
CGL	H. Keil (ed.), <i>Grammatici Latini</i> (Leipzig, 1855–1923).
CHI	I. Gershevitch (ed.), <i>Cambridge History of Iran</i> , ii (Cambridge, 1985).
CIL	T. Mommsen <i>et al.</i> (eds.), <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> (Berlin, 1863– ).
CISA	<i>Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia Antica</i>
CJ	<i>Classical Journal</i>
CP	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CR	<i>Classical Review</i>
CRAI	<i>Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres</i>
CSCA	<i>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</i>
CW	<i>Classical World</i>
EMC	<i>Échos du Monde Classique</i>
FGrH	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Berlin and Leiden, 1923– ).
G&R	<i>Greece and Rome</i>

GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
HSCP	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
ICS	<i>Illinois Classical Studies</i>
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> (Berlin, 1873– ).
IGRRP	R. Cagnat (ed.), <i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes</i> (Paris, 1901–27).
IGUR	L. Moretti (ed.), <i>Inscriptiones Graecae Urbis Romae</i> (Rome 1968– ).
II	<i>Inscriptiones Italiae</i> .
JDI	<i>Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</i>
JHA	<i>Journal for the History of Astronomy</i>
JHI	<i>Journal of the History of Ideas</i>
JHP	<i>Journal of the History of Philosophy</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JNES	<i>Journal of Near-Eastern Studies</i>
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
JWIC	<i>Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes</i>
LCM	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
LIMC	<i>Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae</i> (Zurich, 1981–97).
LTUR	M. Steinby (ed.), <i>Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae</i> (Rome, 1999).
OLD	P. G. W. Glare (ed.), <i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> (Oxford, 1968–82).
ORF	H. Malcovati (ed.), <i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i> , 4th edn. (Turin, 1967).
MD	<i>Materiali e Discussioni</i>
MÉFRA	<i>Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome (Antiquité)</i>
MGR	<i>Miscellanea Graeca e Romana</i>
MH	<i>Museum Helveticum</i>
Mnem.	<i>Mnemosyne</i>
MNIR	<i>Mededelingen van het Nederlands Instituut te Rome</i>
NGG	<i>Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Göttingen</i>

NJ	<i>Jahrbuch für klassische Philologie</i>
OSAP	<i>Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy</i>
PBSR	<i>Papers of the British School at Rome</i>
PCPS	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
PHJ	<i>Philosophisches Jahrbuch</i>
PhW	<i>Philologisches Wochenschrift</i>
PLLS	<i>Papers of the Liverpool (Leeds) Latin Seminar</i>
PP	<i>La Parola del Passato</i>
PRIA	<i>Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy</i>
QS	<i>Quaderni di Storia</i>
QUCC	<i>Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica</i>
RCCM	<i>Rivista di Cultura Classica e Medioevale</i>
RdA	<i>Rivista di Archeologia</i>
RE	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll (eds.), <i>Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> (Berlin, 1893–1980).
RÉA	<i>Revue des Études Anciennes</i>
RÉG	<i>Revue des Études Grecques</i>
RÉL	<i>Revue des Études Latines</i>
RFIC	<i>Rivista di Filologia e Istruzione Classica</i>
RGEDA	R. K. Sherck, <i>Rome and the Greek East to the Death of Augustus</i> (Cambridge, 1984).
RHDFE	<i>Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
RHR	<i>Revue de l'Histoire des Religions</i>
RIL	<i>Rendiconti dell' Istituto Lombardo</i>
RPh	<i>Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire Anciennes</i>
RPL	<i>Res Publica Litterarum</i>
RRC	M. H. Crawford, <i>Roman Republican Coinage</i> (Cambridge, 1974).
RSA	<i>Rivista di Studi Antici</i>
SBAW	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft</i>

SCO	<i>Studi Classici e Orientali</i>
SE	<i>Studi Etruschi</i>
SIFC	<i>Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica</i>
SJP	<i>Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>
SLLRH	C. Deroux (ed.), <i>Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History</i> (Brussels, 1979– ).
SMSR	<i>Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni</i>
SO	<i>Symbolae Osloenses</i>
SVF	H. F. A. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</i> (Leipzig, 1903–24), i–iii.
TAPA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
WJA	<i>Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft</i>
WS	<i>Wiener Studien</i>
YCS	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

# Introduction

## 1. DIVINATION IN REPUBLICAN ROME

Divination is a phenomenon common to all human societies, to be defined in its broadest sense as methods by which knowledge is obtained of the future or of anything whose significance cannot be determined by ordinary perception, a means of extending the realm of rationality.<sup>1</sup> In the ancient Mediterranean world divination took many forms, some specific or particularly significant to individual peoples.<sup>2</sup> In the Roman context divinatory techniques were integral to the religious and political life of the state, and contributed to a distinctiveness in Roman religious practice that was commented on by outsiders such as Polybius.<sup>3</sup>

It would be wrong to take *De Divinatione* in isolation from Cicero's other philosophical works and claim that divination was a topic of particular importance for intellectual discussion in the mid-first century BC, even though various members of the elite produced works on different aspects of its theory and practice.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, the importance of divinatory practices within the state religion and particularly within the wider religious 'market' which resulted from Rome's interactions with the wider Mediterranean

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. the definitions in *OED*, J. Hastings (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh, 1908–26), iv. 775 (H. J. Rose), or M. Eliade (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion* (New York, 1986), iv. 375 (E. M. Zuesse) and the insightful summary of W. Burkert in Johnston and Struck 2005: 30.

<sup>2</sup> For a convenient treatment, see *New Pauly*, iv. 564–77.

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. Scheid 2003: 111–24; Polyb. 6. 56.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Rawson 1985: 299–316; Momigliano 1984.

world should not be minimized.<sup>5</sup> It could have been a subject with as practical a relevance for Cicero's contemporary, elite audience as his *De Officiis*, but he chooses to argue in his own *persona* that it is an empty idiom, proven to have no philosophical validity, useful only for the manipulation of the masses. While Cicero's attitude is not unique, it should not blinker us to the wider realities of the Roman world in the Late Republic and in particular to the sheer vitality of its religious life.

Scholarly approaches to Roman religion have changed dramatically since the influential monograph of Georg Wissowa that presented a ritualistic and legalistic religious system from which any original 'spiritual' element had been drained before Roman historians began to write their history, and which was a tool for the elite to use in political and factional contests.<sup>6</sup> Now there is a more sympathetic understanding of the interplay of the political and religious in the Roman context: the ability of ritual as a means by which the Roman worshipper could conceptualize his position in the world is better appreciated; and the problems of judging Roman religion from a perspective unavoidably influenced by Christian or christianizing assumptions on the centrality of 'belief' are consciously acknowledged.<sup>7</sup> Rather than being a dead or fossilized system, the Roman state religion of the Middle and Late Republic emerges as far more dynamic, capable of incorporating new rituals and of adapting to the challenges caused by becoming a world power.<sup>8</sup>

Within the state religion divination played an important role: of the three major colleges of priests, two were charged with oversight of areas of divination: the augurs and the *Quindecimviri sacris faciundis* (Board of Fifteen for Ritual Action). In addition the *haruspices*, although they were Etruscan exponents of the *Etrusca disciplina*, were inspanned to deal with lightning, portents, and the examination of entrails. The operation of these bodies has often

<sup>5</sup> For the use of 'market', see Bendlin 2000: 134.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. Scheid 1987.

<sup>7</sup> Bendlin (2000: 115–20) provides a succinct summary of the traditional and new orthodoxies with references to the key bibliography. King 2003 now presents a nuanced argument on the definition and place of 'belief' in Roman polytheism.

<sup>8</sup> e.g. North 1976, 1979.

been presented from the perspective of the elite—the augurs and the *Quindecimviri sacris faciundis* were comprised of the Roman elite,<sup>9</sup> and the *haruspices* were members of the Etruscan elite and played a limited role in Roman public life only at the direct invitation of the Senate as interpreters of specific phenomena. Through these separate bodies the Senate managed a division of religious authority and competence that prevented a dangerous monopoly or collocation of powers, just as the constitution of the Republic aimed to prevent any individual from exercising political power outside the limits set by the senatorial elite. Through the exercise of arcane knowledge such as the augural law, which governed all legislative and electoral gatherings, or the *Etrusca disciplina*, which dealt with the natural phenomena that could strike terror into the people (such as lightning or earthquakes), these priestly colleges were a powerful means of control. But in taking such an approach, which undoubtedly embodies important truths, we are in danger of looking at divination solely as a political phenomenon, and in effect of taking on the views of Cicero or elite cynics, or even covertly christianizing assumptions about the nature of a highly complex polytheistic system.<sup>10</sup>

Divination was a means of providing practical guidance for individuals and groups, and of assuring them in times of crisis or decision by confirming the existence, benevolence, and concern of their gods for them. Wolf Liebeschuetz, for example, has demonstrated well the way in which public panic could be averted by divinatory consultation by the state, thereby restoring confidence in the institutions and management of the state.<sup>11</sup> Within the state religion divination was concerned only with the well-being of the community and not that of individuals; among the state's priestly colleges there was no equivalent of a Delphic oracle to which individual citizens could go with their problems. The needs of individuals were met outside the state system, for example by

<sup>9</sup> See e.g. Szemler 1972.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. S. R. F. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge, 1984), 11–15, and I. Gradel, *Emperor Worship and Roman Religion* (Oxford, 2002).

<sup>11</sup> Liebeschuetz 1979: 7–17.



dream-interpreters and astrologers.<sup>12</sup> By following only Cicero's sceptical attitude towards any divinatory element in Rome's state religion, by accepting his denigration of the divinatory activities that took place outside the state religion as mere superstition, and by looking only at the *exempla* he provides (both those provided in defence of divination and those against) a limited and partial picture emerges. Some evidence suggests that the views of the elite differed from those of the ordinary people, for example, the different prominence Cicero gives to portents in speeches to the people as opposed to the Senate.<sup>13</sup> However, we know of members of the elite who were avid devotees and practitioners of many forms of divination and we cannot be sure that their characterization as ridiculous extremists is wholly fair.<sup>14</sup> It would be rash to assume that members of the elite did not consult diviners, and indeed would ignore examples that Cicero himself provides.<sup>15</sup> As for the ordinary people, the plays of Ennius and Plautus reveal the everyday presence of *harioli*, seers, and a full range of divinatory practitioners.<sup>16</sup> These unofficial practitioners would not have enjoyed the popularity they did, and would not have continued to find many customers long after Christianity began to offer a fundamentally different system of divine guidance, had they not met those customers' needs.<sup>17</sup> Divination provided a way for people of making sense of their lives and of receiving and understanding guidance from the gods who inhabited their world.

<sup>12</sup> The relegation of dreams from the Roman state religion, although they could be regarded as the 'oldest oracle' (Plut. *Mor.* 159a), is plausibly linked to issues of control. Astrology posed different problems—its late development as a divinatory discipline in the Graeco-Roman world (as opposed to the very long history of astronomical observations) and its inherent determinism fitted badly with the traditional Roman prejudice against novelty and the pointed absence of determinism from Roman and Etruscan religious thought.

<sup>13</sup> See § 2 below.

<sup>14</sup> For Appius Claudius Pulcher see commentary on 1. 29 and 105. For Nigidius Figulus see Rawson 1985: esp. 309–12. Harris (2003: 1–34) shows how complex the situation was in relation to belief in the predictive value of dreams—there was no simple elite–masses divide, no simple progression from credulity to rational rejection, no simple distinction between belief and disbelief.

<sup>15</sup> e.g. 1. 36.

<sup>16</sup> See on 1. 4 and 132. See also A. Traill, *CQ* 54 (2004), 124–7.

<sup>17</sup> See Lane Fox 1986: *passim*, but see e.g. 213–15.

## 2. CICERO ON DIVINATION OUTSIDE *DE DIVINATIONE*

It is not just in Cicero's philosophical work that divination obtrudes. Because of its centrality to public and private life, it appears in all of the genres in which he wrote:<sup>18</sup> and yet, because of the vast range of contexts in which it appears, a simple uniformity of attitude and presentation is not to be expected. Cicero's treatises on rhetorical theory and the practical demonstration of that theory in the political and forensic speeches he delivered form a group of texts in which the same criteria of persuasion apply. In the one he was advising would-be orators on how to create arguments that would be persuasive to jurors, senators, or the people gathered in an assembly; in the other he was producing these arguments. In both *Partitiones Oratoriae* and *Topica* Cicero rightly recognizes that a kind of evidence often accepted was that which comes from divination,<sup>19</sup> and he urges his would-be orator to utilize them where they would be appropriate. Concerning divinatory material, in three clear instances he tailors his argument to suit senatorial and popular audiences. First, in his popular oration on the discovery of the Catilinarian conspiracy, he mentions a vast array of divine warnings that had no place in his dealings with the Senate.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, in the two speeches *De Reditu*, delivered on 4 September 57, only the popular oration features a 'prodigy';<sup>21</sup> and thirdly in the *Fourth Philippic*, which develops for a popular audience arguments presented to the Senate earlier the same day, Cicero has the gods send signs.<sup>22</sup> In another speech before the Senate, *De Haruspicum Responsis* Cicero, in response to the rhetorical situation, logically plays up the prestige and importance of the *haruspices*, because the Senate, following its traditional practice, had delegated to them the responsibility of explaining a prodigy that had occurred. Cicero rebuts Clodius' interpretation

<sup>18</sup> See Guillaumont 1984. See also Setaioli 2005: 244–6.

<sup>19</sup> *Part.* 6; *Top.* 77. In this he was prefigured by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1376<sup>a</sup>) and followed by Quintilian (*Inst.* 5. 7. 35–6). See Reinhardt 2003.

<sup>20</sup> *Cat.* 3. 9–10, 18–22.

<sup>21</sup> *Red. pop.* 18; cf. *Dom.* 14–15.

<sup>22</sup> *Phil.* 4. 10.

of the haruspical response and point-by-point demonstrates that Clodius was responsible for the sacrileges to which the prodigy was alerting the state. In the broader context of Cicero's speeches divine *testimonia* play a very small role, and his deployment of them for the popular audience is significant, but by itself says nothing about his own attitude: the good orator will deploy the best argument available to convince his audience.<sup>23</sup>

In his philosophical works written in the 50s, *De Republica* and *De Legibus*, Cicero not only accommodates the traditional divinatory offices of the Roman state, but also argues for their retention as beneficial features of a state with a good constitution and good laws. In the former, when dealing with the regal creation of key institutions of the Roman state, he writes 'at that time Romulus obeyed very closely the auspices, which we retain today to the great security of the state'.<sup>24</sup> In book 2 of *De Legibus* he provides a set of laws to regulate the religious life of the state which prescribes their traditional roles for *pontifices*, *quindecimviri sacris faciundis*, and augurs.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, in the extended commentary on these laws, in response to questions from his interlocutor Atticus, Cicero both reiterates the importance of the role played by the augurs in particular, and justifies the existence of divination: 'I think that divination, what the Greeks call *mantike*, does really exist.'<sup>26</sup> When pressed on whether the future could be predicted through augury, Cicero affirms that, even among the Romans, augury had *once* involved predictions, but that in his own day it merely sought permission for actions.<sup>27</sup> If (as I shall argue) in the literary setting of the *De Legibus* Cicero clearly indicates that he is not arguing as a sceptical academic,<sup>28</sup> then there is no contradiction with his consistent philosophical position towards divination, but when dealing with politics he emphasizes the great utility of the auspices.

<sup>23</sup> See e.g. *Clu.* 139.

<sup>24</sup> *Rep.* 2. 16.

<sup>25</sup> *Leg.* 2. 20. See Dyck 2004: 302–3.

<sup>26</sup> *Leg.* 2. 32. Cf. Guillaumont (1984: 54–8) for Cicero's arguments on the political utility of augury. For the equivalence of the two terms see on 1. 1, but for crucial differences see below p. 20.

<sup>27</sup> *Leg.* 2. 33. Cf. Guillaumont 1984: 135–40.

<sup>28</sup> See below § 3 (ii).

In speeches from the early 50s, which impinge on the political struggles of Julius Caesar's consulship and its consequences, and in his correspondence of the time, Cicero mentions the use of augural law by Bibulus to block Caesar's legislation, Clodius' defiance of augural law, the repeal of the *leges Aelia et Fufia*, but none of his comments sheds light on his attitude to the truly divinatory aspects of the debates rather than on his support for the optimate position.<sup>29</sup> From his private correspondence, but also from *Brutus*, emerges Cicero's great desire and delight at becoming a member of the college of augurs, a public elevation which secured his place among the social elite—it was highly prestigious to be elected by the *comitia tributa* on the recommendation of members of the college.<sup>30</sup> Certainly it appears that Cicero took his duties seriously, as he became the author of a *De Auguriis* which indicates some mastery of the technical details and application of augural law.<sup>31</sup> But in this it must be emphasized that Cicero did not see the augural competence extending to knowledge of the future, indeed his remarks in correspondence are sceptical as to the possibility of any useful predictive science.<sup>32</sup> Divination as practised by the official colleges of the state religion was traditional, guaranteed the cohesion of the state and assisted the elite in maintaining control over the people, but did not reveal the future.

Although in some of his speeches to the masses Cicero includes material which suggests he believes in divination, when speaking to the elite of the Senate and in his private correspondence he says

<sup>29</sup> See Guillaumont 1984: 59–77.

<sup>30</sup> *Att.* 2. 9. 2; *Fam.* 15. 14. 13; *Brut.* 1; *Phil.* 2. 4.

<sup>31</sup> The fragments of this are so exiguous (see C. F. W. Müller, *M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia*, 4/iii (Leipzig, 1890), 312) as to give no clues as to its scope or purpose. Perhaps his researches for this, as much as his general knowledge of the use of augury in Roman politics, informed his augural disputes with M. Antonius in 44 (cf. *Phil.* 2. 80–1, 5. 8).

<sup>32</sup> In a letter to A. Caecina, the great expert on the *disciplina Etrusca*, Cicero is politely and wittily dismissive of divinatory techniques that rely on anything other than political experience (*Fam.* 6. 6. 7; cf. 6. 1. 5; *Att.* 16. 8. 2). See Guillaumont 1984: 114–16 and B. Cuny-Le Callet, 'La Lettre de Cicéron à Cécina: Vers une divination rationnelle?', in Kany-Turpin 2005: 223–39. Cicero's comments to Quintus on the flooding of the Tiber in 54, interpreted as divine punishment for the acquittal of Gabinius (*Q. Frat.* 3. 5), if not ironical, certainly do not indicate his belief (pace Guillaumont 1984: 128).

nothing which is at odds with the views he expresses *in propria persona* in *De Divinatione*:<sup>33</sup> for the consumption of the ordinary people he wishes the divinatory rituals of the state religion to continue in the hands of their elite priests. None of these rituals, however, can predict the future.

### 3. NATURE, FORM, AND PURPOSE OF THE WORK

A pair of articles appearing in 1986 marks a watershed in the interpretation of *De Divinatione*, and must form the starting point for any discussion of these interrelated questions.<sup>34</sup> Beard and Schofield both argue that *De Divinatione* 'is no simple tract', rejecting the view that Marcus' demolition of the Stoic arguments advanced by Quintus in book 1 can be taken as a straightforward expression of his personal beliefs on the practice of divination, or as the triumph of a rationalist approach to Roman divination.<sup>35</sup> Their conclusions are reached after consideration of the literary form of the dialogue: the reader is presented with arguments both for and against divination; the views expressed by Marcus do not thereby have greater authority; and the conclusion, in the words of Marcus who has put the sceptical case, explicitly leaves the issue open. While it is often difficult to disentangle the several questions raised here,

<sup>33</sup> Privately (*Fam.* 1. 1. 3) Cicero denounces a Sibylline oracle which it was essential for him not to expose publicly (cf. *Pis.* 48, 50).

<sup>34</sup> Schofield 1986: esp. 47–65, and Beard 1986: 33–46. Despite the concerns of Timpanaro (xcvi; developed a little further in Timpanaro 1994: 259–64), Brunt (1989: 194 n. 33), and Setaioli (2005: esp. 249–51), the general acceptance of this 'Cambridge' approach is clear (e.g. Douglas 1995: 197–8; Krostenko 2000: 354; Morford 2002: 66–7) and above all by the most distinguished authority on Roman religion, John Scheid (1987–9: 127–8). The brief discussion of Leonhardt (1999: 66–73) sets out clearly the alternative ways of approaching *De Divinatione*, but comes down firmly on the side of Beard and Schofield, emphasizing the balance between Quintus' and Marcus' speeches, the weight of the Academic conclusion, and the consistency of Cicero's position between *De Legibus* and *De Divinatione*.

<sup>35</sup> As held e.g. by Momigliano 1984: 209 and Linderski 1982: 15–16 = 1995: 461–2. Cf. Pease (12–13): 'against popular ignorance...and political and antiquarian obscurantism..., the *De Divinatione* stands forth as a vigorous rationalistic protest'.

it is necessary, for the sake of clarity, to attempt to do so in the following discussion.

### (i) The Place of *De Divinatione* in Cicero's Philosophical Oeuvre

If Cicero was to fulfil his intention to complete an encyclopedic treatment of Greek philosophy in Latin, which he conceived and executed more or less in the order of logic, ethics, and physics,<sup>36</sup> then that last category had to include a treatment of divination, which naturally and logically followed from discussion of the nature of the gods. Schofield suggests that *De Natura Deorum* fulfilled Cicero's obligations to the category of physics and that the writing of *De Divinatione*, 'that the enquiry might be fully and more than fully completed', and of *De Fato*, 'in superabundant sufficiency', shows that he 'is going to town on theology, and he indicates that he knows very well that *De Natura Deorum* on its own would have sufficed'.<sup>37</sup> However, any survey of Hellenistic philosophy would show a fascination for works on divination and fate, seen notably and at greatest length among the recent notables of Stoicism, Panaetius and Posidonius, subjects without which Cicero could not do justice to physics.<sup>38</sup> If his audience was more receptive to religious issues at a time of civic turbulence and if he felt a competitive desire to engage in debate with contemporary Latin writers on divination, those will have been subsidiary factors at best in the decision to write *De Divinatione*.<sup>39</sup> If the philosophical encyclopedia was to be truly

<sup>36</sup> So Schofield 1986: 48, in examining the *catalogue raisonnée* of works in the prologue to *De Divinatione* 2. 1–3. Although there is reason in talking of an 'encyclopedic' treatment, it is clear that Cicero did not treat any part of physics other than metaphysics, i.e. theology. Dyck (2004: 222) demonstrates that there was no one traditional order (*pace* Schofield). If the *Academici libri* represent logic, then Cicero has followed the order preferred by Chrysippus.

<sup>37</sup> Schofield 1986: 48. Schofield's translation of *ut [quaestio] plene esse cumulateque perfecta* (2. 3), which incorporates the suggestion of R. G. M. Nisbet for the manuscripts' *plane* (accepted by Schäublin). Cf. Shackleton Bailey's 'to the very uttermost' (*Fam.* 10. 23. 6).

<sup>38</sup> As Schofield admits (1986: 50), quoting Balbus' remarks (*ND* 3. 19).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Schofield 1986: 49. Some at least of Cicero's literary competitors may have included elements of philosophical justification or attempts to reconcile philosophy and their area of divination (Rawson 1985: 302–5).

encyclopedic, it had to cover divination; consequently, the link between *De Divinatione* and *De Natura Deorum* is important.<sup>40</sup>

## (ii) Cicero, Marcus, and Authorial Comments—the Question of ‘Voices’ and ‘Beliefs’

Several questions can be posed concerning the significance of Cicero’s appearance as the character Marcus and the sceptical attack on divination put in his mouth: is this what Cicero himself ‘believed’ or—given his adherence to the sceptical Academy—found more plausible? Is the *persona* of Marcus consistent? Is it legitimate even to search for Cicero’s own voice? Beard argues strongly against the attempt to determine Cicero’s voice, because the author deliberately conceals it, just as he elsewhere expressly criticizes those who seek to learn his personal opinions of ‘an unreasonable degree of curiosity’.<sup>41</sup> But, as Schofield notes, in *De Divinatione* ‘Cicero goes out of his way to focus attention on this very question of his own beliefs’, in both books, by Quintus’ use of Cicero’s own writings and experiences in one and by specific statements by Marcus in the other (1986: 56).

Against the notion of a clear authorial voice is raised the apparent inconsistency of the views of Marcus between *De Natura Deorum* and *De Divinatione*. In the conclusion to the former Marcus says, in a form which fits well with Academic caution, ‘[the discourse] of Balbus seemed to me a closer approximation to the truth’,<sup>42</sup> whereas in the latter Marcus argues polemically against traditional

<sup>40</sup> See esp. 1. 9, where Quintus paraphrases Marcus’ words from *ND* 3. 95. Cf. the explicit links drawn at 1. 117 and 2. 148. Indeed, *De Divinatione* can be seen as the continuation of the argument which Balbus had desired, but which was artificially terminated by sunset (*ND* 3. 94).

<sup>41</sup> *ND* 1. 10. Beard 1986: 35; cf. 45: ‘it is not justifiable to extract one part of one work and to claim for that part the status of Cicero’s “real views”’.

<sup>42</sup> *ND* 3. 95: *mihi Balbi [disputatio] ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior*. This view is regarded as disingenuous by Momigliano (1984: 208–9; countered by Schofield 1986: 57 n. 20) and as a mere pedagogical device by Pease (9). For the view that Cicero’s conclusion, which creates an equal division of opinion between Marcus and Balbus on the one hand and Cotta and Velleius on the other, is ‘fairer to his own position and to historical verisimilitude’, see Tarán 1987: 1–22 (followed by Leonhardt 1999: 61–6).

Stoic arguments in favour of divination.<sup>43</sup> Certainly the Academic philosopher was free to choose individual doctrines from any philosophical school while rejecting others, so Cicero could accept the general Stoic view on the nature of the gods, while rejecting their views on divination.<sup>44</sup> But crucial here is that there is no inconsistency between Marcus' position in both dialogues, for, although the doctrines on the nature of the gods and on divination were intricately linked in early (and 'orthodox') Stoicism, they could be separated: prominent Stoics, notably Panaetius, had themselves expressed doubts on the existence of divination, while remaining 'orthodox' on the nature of the gods.<sup>45</sup> Throughout *De Divinatione*, in fact, the consistency of Marcus' arguments with the conclusion to *De Natura Deorum* is re-emphasized—Beard's contrast is illusory.<sup>46</sup>

While Cicero as an Academic philosopher had a free hand to pick and choose his doctrines, as an author he was free to choose his characters for any dialogue and also the form of any work. Nothing prescribed that it should be a dialogue rather than a sustained argument (as previous treatments of divination had been) or that the speakers should be contemporary, as they are in *De Divinatione*. So, for Cicero to include himself and to give himself the arguments he has were deliberate choices; he could have used the same characters as in *De Natura Deorum*. There is no evidence that he attributes to the contemporary Roman characters of his dialogues views that are opposed to their philosophical affiliations or views which are inconsistent between dialogues.<sup>47</sup> Where the possibility occurs of

<sup>43</sup> For a discussion of the conclusion to book 2, which is important to evaluating the work, see below § 3 (iii).

<sup>44</sup> See Long 1995: 41–2. For an extreme example of this within the speech of Cotta in *De Natura Deorum*, see Dyck 2003: 10.

<sup>45</sup> For traditional Stoic linking of the arguments as the Stoic citadel see 1. 10 (cf. 1. 81–2); for Panaetius' views, see on 1. 6.

<sup>46</sup> *Div.* 1. 10, 2. 41 and 148. Acknowledged by Schofield 1986: 58.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Beard 1986: 38–9, for the analogous concern for historical accuracy in the setting of the dialogues. It seems that we may need to draw a distinction between the contemporary and the Heraclidean dialogues. In the latter, notably *De Re Publica*, the views attributed to Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius are not secure, despite their definite association with Panaetius (e.g. Dyck 1998: 151–63; *pace* R. E. Jones, *AJP* 60 (1939), 313–16). Cicero's second thoughts on the *libri academici* further support this: in the first version he put in the mouths of Lucullus and Catulus epistemological arguments that were inappropriate to them; in the revised version these were attributed more plausibly to Cato, Brutus, and Varro (cf. *Att.* 2. 16. 1, 13. 12. 3).



convicting him of inconsistency, for example between his arguments in *De Finibus* 4 and *Tusculanae Disputationes* 5.33, Cicero expressly confronts it as a right of the Academic: ‘we live from day to day—whatever strikes our minds as deserving approval we maintain, and so we alone are free’. His use of the Peripatetically inclined Quintus as a mouthpiece for what is basically a Stoic case in *De Divinatione* 1 is the closest Cicero comes to non-verisimilitude, but again in this case he is careful to show that Quintus was really a Peripatetic: Quintus is made to affirm that he prefers Peripatetic reasoning and their affirmation of natural divination and that he considers Stoic arguments ‘too superstitious’.<sup>48</sup>

I suggest that the practice is no different when Cicero chooses to use Marcus as a participant in his dialogues. If Marcus does reflect the philosophical position of Cicero in early 44, we have to face up to a philosopher who *appears* to have changed his mind.<sup>49</sup> Even if, for the sake of argument, the many references to divination in Cicero’s public speeches are considered as conventional only, that is, for public consumption, in *De Legibus* 2, written in the late 50s, Marcus accords full recognition and their traditional divinatory functions to augurs, *haruspices*, and *quindecimviri sacris faciundis*: ‘I think that divination, what the Greeks call *mantike*, really exists.’<sup>50</sup> The apparent change of view has been explained both with and without reference to philosophy: first, as Cicero saw the sustained manipulation of the Roman religious system by Caesar for his personal ends, he abandoned his earlier acceptance of divination (whether that was motivated by belief in the validity of the phenomenon or is to be explained only in terms of the *genus civile* of theology;<sup>51</sup> or the change was a result of his switch of philosophical allegiance to the sceptical New Academy probably early in the 40s,<sup>52</sup> and perhaps owed something to a specific acquaintance with Carneades’

<sup>48</sup> For Quintus’ philosophical inclinations, see on 1. 8. His Peripatetic self is revealed at 2. 100.

<sup>49</sup> Denied by Beard (1986: 45) on the grounds that it is illegitimate to equate the views of Marcus with those of Cicero.

<sup>50</sup> *Leg.* 2. 32–3. See Schofield 1986: 63 n. 30. For example, the distinction between public and private discussion is taken seriously by Pavis d’Escurac (1981: 34).

<sup>51</sup> Linderski 1982: 37–8 = 1995: 483–4; cf. Krostenko 2000: 384–5 n. 83.

<sup>52</sup> J. Glucker, *LCM* 17 (1992), 134–8; cf. Steinmetz 1989: 1–22.

arguments against divination.<sup>53</sup> Although a change of view is neither a priori impossible nor psychologically implausible, nonetheless a careful reading of the key passage in *De Legibus* (1. 39) demonstrates that this is unnecessary.

Marcus: As for the Academy which throws all these things into confusion, this New Academy of Arcesilas and Carneades, let's ask it to remain silent. For if it intruded itself into these matters, which we think have been constructed and composed nicely enough, it would create too much destruction. But I am eager to win over this Academy and don't dare to remove it... <Lacuna>

This last sentence in particular shows the reader that Marcus is still an adherent of the New Academy, but that, as a statesman dealing with the specific preserve of the statesman, and one putting forth views which do not admit of strict proof, he is putting to one side the destructive logic of the Academy.<sup>54</sup> In the literary setting of the dialogue, Cicero advertises that both Marcus and his interlocutor Atticus are taking a break from their regular philosophical positions in order to express dogmatic and non-Epicurean views respectively.<sup>55</sup>

If within *De Divinatione* Cicero does not indicate that something similar is being done by Marcus, it is unproblematic to assume that Marcus is representing Cicero's philosophical opinions in *De Divinatione*. Indeed, as Schofield argues, there is a powerful case that, in using Marcus as a spokesman for a sceptical attack on divination, Cicero wants his to be seen as his official 'voice' in the dialogue.<sup>56</sup> To get behind the 'voice', to *know* if Cicero did not *believe* in divination or *think* that the sceptic arguments were stronger, is

<sup>53</sup> Schofield 1986: 63 n. 30. At the beginning of the same article Schofield (1986: 47–8) suggests that Cicero did not have a purely philosophical conversion to a sceptical position, but grew to appreciate the advantages of an Academic mode of enquiry for the effective presentation of conflicting views in a literary work. Cicero had, however, expressed his allegiance to the Academy in his *Academica* (1. 13), which were written in mid-45 and in the authorial prologue to *De Natura Deorum* (1. 11–12). Schofield is followed by Tarver 1997: 142.

<sup>54</sup> In different ways both Long (1995: 41–2) and Görler (1995: 86–8, 95–7) argue convincingly that this whole passage does not entail a rejection of Academic scepticism *per se*. See also N. Rudd, *Hermathena*, 170 (2001), 3–8.

<sup>55</sup> See Griffin 1995: 335.

<sup>56</sup> Schofield 1986: 56–61. I reject Schofield's argument from the alleged unification of the sceptic and the author in the conclusion to book 2 (see below).

impossible,<sup>57</sup> but, as there is no disclaimer to suggest his disengagement from the sceptical case, it is reasonable to conclude that ‘he inclines toward it’ (Schofield 1986: 61). The burden of proof that Marcus alone, and then only in the theological dialogues, should not be credited with holding the views he expresses lies with those who suggest this.

### (iii) Reading the Conclusion to Book 2

In the light of the above, and because the conclusion to the whole dialogue also plays an important part in the arguments of Beard and Schofield, it is important to discuss this in more detail. In those cases where the conclusions to his philosophical works have survived, Cicero regularly summarizes briefly how the arguments have fared, but avoids doing so in *De Divinatione*.<sup>58</sup> Marcus concludes his demolition of the validity of dreams (147), and emphasizes that his arguments have served to undermine superstition and not true religion (148),<sup>59</sup> so that every waking and sleeping hour should be free from worry (149), as Carneades had argued against the Stoics. Then follow the final sentences of the work:

<sup>57</sup> Even the expression of an opinion in private correspondence, as to the great expert on haruspicy Caecina (*Fam.* 6. 5 and 6), cannot prove what Cicero *believed*.

<sup>58</sup> Leonhardt (1999: 38–9) usefully tabulates the material. Cicero’s rejection of Epicurean arguments is always expressed in the strongest terms. Cicero can say explicitly that discussants remained unmoved by the arguments (e.g. *Acad.* 2. 148) and that one remained more convinced than another (*Fin.* 4. 80). Leonhardt (1999: 38) considers the conclusion to *De Divinatione* different and surprising after the convinced rejection of divination in Marcus’ speech. R. Gorman, *The Socratic Method in the Dialogues of Cicero* (Stuttgart, 2005), 186–7, contends that Ciceronian dialogues are usually unresolved, a function of both literary verisimilitude and philosophical intention, as Cicero did not want to impose his own views; an open ending prevents the sceptical voice having the final word and preserves the intellectual freedom central from Socrates onwards.

<sup>59</sup> Schofield (1986: 59) alleges that in 2. 148–9 we hear an Epicurean ‘voice’, which should be treated as a ‘rhetorical flourish’, and that he ‘unites the voice of the spokesman for scepticism with what appears to be his authorial voice, comparing the object of *Div.* with things said in *ND*’ (1986: 57). However, this seems over-elaborate—Marcus alone speaks, in character, with a voice consistent between the two works. If we infer authorial significance, that comes solely from the plausible equivalence between Marcus and Cicero that we have established above.

‘Since it is characteristic of the Academy to put forward no judgements of its own, to approve those which seem most like the truth, to compare arguments, to draw out all that can be said against each argument, and, without asserting its own authority, to leave the judgement of those listening free and all their own, we shall hold to this method, inherited from Socrates, and if it is agreeable to you, brother Quintus, we shall use it as often as possible in our future discussions.’ ‘Nothing could please me better’, Quintus replied. When this was said, we arose.<sup>60</sup>

Both Beard and Schofield emphasize that there is no guided conclusion here, in sharp contrast to the end of *De Natura Deorum*.<sup>61</sup> Beard lays particular stress on their being the final words of the work and as such particularly weighty in demonstrating that the discussion is open,<sup>62</sup> and Schofield emphasizes the two framing statements of the argument in book 2: ‘I must reply to what you say, but in such a way that I affirm nothing, but pose questions on all points, for the most part with hesitation and no self-confidence. For if I were to treat as certain anything I said, I would myself be playing the diviner while denying that there is such a thing as divination’,<sup>63</sup> and the passage quoted above, as guiding the reader how to approach the work.

Quintus is certainly not made to confess that he has been persuaded by Marcus’ arguments and what he gives his assent to is the future testing of hypotheses by the Socratic method. However, to conclude from this that the dialogue is truly evenhanded is to

<sup>60</sup> 2. 150: *cum autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum et liberum, tenebimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traditam eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur. ‘mihi vero’, inquit ille, ‘nihil potest esse iucundius’, quae cum essent dicta, surreximus; cf. Fat. 1, where Cicero explains why the format of *De Fato* differs from the Academic format of *De Natura Deorum* and *De Divinatione*.*

<sup>61</sup> If the conclusion of the *De Natura Deorum* is to be read as suggesting that where four learned speakers are unable to reach consensus about the nature of the divine in the universe, assent should only be lent to propositions about the gods with great caution (Dyck *per litt.*), then in fact the formal difference is small.

<sup>62</sup> Beard 1986: 35 n. 13. Schofield (1986: 59) prefers to see the attack on superstition as ‘a rhetorical flourish’.

<sup>63</sup> 2. 8: *Dicendum est mihi igitur ad ea quae sunt a te dicta, sed ita nihil ut adfirmem, quaeram omnia dubitans plerumque et mihi ipse diffidens. Si enim aliquid certi haberem quod dicerem, ego ipse divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego.*

misunderstand what Marcus has achieved in his argument and what he says in the words quoted above.<sup>64</sup> Given that the Academy did not state positively 'x is true', but demonstrated the weaknesses and implausibilities of other dogmatists' arguments, notably those of the Stoics, the conclusion to book 2 should be read as Marcus saying that he has demonstrated that Stoic (and Peripatetic) arguments in favour of divination are incoherent and not worthy of the philosopher's assent. *However*, he will not himself say how divination might work or state *for certain* that divination does not exist.<sup>65</sup>

In book 2, Marcus at the very least shows that the Stoic and Peripatetic arguments raised by Quintus can be powerfully countered and probably contradicts them successfully.<sup>66</sup> If he has demonstrated that his opposing arguments are closer to the truth, less inadequate, and more acceptable, then he has fulfilled his duty as an Academic sceptic; the search for greater verisimilitude excludes absolute certainty, but the Stoic position has been shown to be the weaker. If his arguments have indeed shown this, then *De Divinatione* is not without a definite philosophical conclusion that could easily be

<sup>64</sup> As Schofield shows (1986: 61 n. 27), Cicero carefully uses Academic terms in Marcus' summary: judgement (*iudicium*) is the strongest term for assent, one which expresses belief, whereas approve (*probare*) indicates a form of assent falling short of belief; (most) like the truth (*veri similis*) probably translates *eikos*, meaning something like plausible arguments, as in Carneades (Glucker 1995: 120–37).

<sup>65</sup> The assertion *esse divinationem nego* at 2. 8 should be understood as expressing how the truth seemed to lie, not a settled belief of Marcus in a way which would contradict the clear statement of 2. 150 (Schofield 1986: 59).

<sup>66</sup> Repici 1995: 175–92, esp. 189–92. Repici argues that modern criticisms of the Academic attack are not cogent (cf. N. Denyer, *PCPS* 31 (1985), 1–10; Schofield 1986: 62: 'on three crucial issues the criticisms of Book II leave divination and its defence in Book I more or less unscathed—or so at least it might reasonably appear', and Hankinson 1988: 123–60). Timpanaro (1994: 241–64) attacks Denyer's arguments. Even if they are cogent, on which 20th-century philosophers disagree, can we assume that Cicero's readers, however well-versed in Hellenistic philosophy, could spot the weaknesses and resuscitate Quintus' position? Krostenko (2000: 374–6) advances the view that Cicero has deliberately weakened the arguments of both Quintus and Marcus in order to show that neither provides an adequate basis for understanding Roman religion, for which a 'third way' was necessary—'a divination that was purely formal and symbolic, and thereby detached from questions of belief and immune to the probes of skepticism'. It is, however, not straightforward to extract from the overall structure of the work, if the even-handed conclusion is only an expression of politeness, that Marcus has not achieved his Academic ends, as is signalled at least partially by Quintus' capitulation (2. 100).

understood by the philosophically sophisticated audience for which it was intended.<sup>67</sup>

It is also worth considering the conclusion to the dialogue in terms of the courtesy Cicero extends particularly to the contemporary characters in his philosophical works. The emphasis on the argumentative methods of the New Academy both explains why Marcus' attack has taken the form it has, and explicitly leaves Quintus free to hold his own views.

#### (iv) Incongruity of Philosophical and Sceptical Priests?

In *De Natura Deorum* C. Aurelius Cotta, consul of 75 and member of the pontifical college, presents the case of the sceptical Academy against Stoic arguments, but also declares clearly his support for traditional Roman worship of the gods (*ND* 3. 5). Likewise Marcus in *De Divinatione*, a member of the augural college (as is mentioned and alluded to repeatedly, 1. 25, 29, 30, 105, 2. 70 and 75), attacks divination, but also upholds traditional religion which includes divinatory practices.<sup>68</sup> For Beard (1986: 45) the position of both Cotta and Marcus is deliberately ambiguous *in order to* highlight, through the conflicting role of priest and philosopher, the problems faced in 'reconciling traditional Roman practice and Greek philosophical theory'. While there are indeed fundamental problems

<sup>67</sup> Repici (1995: 192): 'the destined audience of this work would not seem to be readers who were unprepared or incompetent; the presence in it of reasoning of a philosophical character, rational arguments which are constructed and then demolished, seems to demand a conceptual equipping somewhat developed in a technical sense, hard to reconcile with an intention purely informative or exclusively rhetorical. Besides, how could the confrontation between (arguments of the) Stoics and (arguments of the) Academics be imagined in the terms of a simple rhetorical exercise?' Timpanaro (1994: 260): 'Cicero did not write Book I to defend divination, but to demonstrate its lack of rational basis, to prepare the ground for its refutation.' Leonhardt (1999: 66–73), however, maintains the position that all Marcus' arguments have achieved is to cast doubt on the Stoic position.

<sup>68</sup> See below. Marcus' position is defensible from the position of the New Academy, cf. Long 1995: 41–2. For Scheid (1987–9: 128) Marcus is concerned only to demonstrate that the gods play no role in divinatory rites, but not to argue that divination does not exist. While the first point is unobjectionable, the second seems to me to understate what Marcus' arguments have achieved.

in reconciling Greek theories on divination and Roman practice,<sup>69</sup> because Academic argument does not provide a dogmatic answer, Marcus' position as a Roman augur is not formally compromised: what has been demonstrated is that Stoic arguments in favour of, and explaining, divination are not plausible; alternatives have not been ruled out. Throughout the speech he is careful to state that belief in the gods is not prejudiced by any rejection of divination.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, the institutions of Roman state religion are explicitly supported: haruspicy is to be continued for the sake of the state and for the continuation of a state religion;<sup>71</sup> the Sibylline books are to have a role, albeit somewhat different from their historic role, in removing illegitimate cult practices (2. 112). The future role of Marcus' own augural college is slightly more problematic, in that, while Marcus accepts that augural law and the influence of the augural college are retained by the Roman state 'for the sake of popular opinion and to the great benefit of the state',<sup>72</sup> he does not expressly recommend a continuing role for them. However, such a role is not difficult to infer, given the treatment of the other two colleges concerned with divination and given the fact that the Romans did not employ augury as a method of prediction.

### (v) Greek Theories and Roman Practice

At the very basic level, in undertaking his philosophical encyclopedia Cicero was making available in Latin the kind of philosophical debates already available for around four hundred years in Greek, but particularly those of the Hellenistic schools.<sup>73</sup> Had he been

<sup>69</sup> See below § 3 (v).

<sup>70</sup> 2. 41. Similarly the tirade against superstition is fully compatible with traditional Roman attitudes; Marcus explicitly upholds religion and professes a personal belief in the existence of the divine (2. 148).

<sup>71</sup> 2. 28: 'Haruspicy, which I hold should be cultivated for the sake of the state and the state religion'. But for Cicero's comparative disregard for haruspicy as opposed to augury, see Haury 1966: 1623–33.

<sup>72</sup> 2. 70. Cf. Beard's comment on this passage: 'an attempt to negotiate... incongruity' (1986: 43).

<sup>73</sup> By contrast, in the 50s he had emulated Plato in writing *De Republica* and *De Legibus*.

content only to translate Greek works, as he did for Plato's *Timaeus* and *Protagoras* and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, that would have been a worthy and complicated enough task, as the process of translation means confronting practical and theoretical issues.<sup>74</sup> However, Cicero states that his aim is to do more than this, for example, 'I shall follow the Stoics above all, not as an expositor, but, as is my custom, drawing from these fountains when and as seems best, using my own judgement and discretion' and 'what if I do not fulfil the role of interpreter, but keep to what has been said by those whom I approve and to them add my own judgement and sequence of writing?'<sup>75</sup> One key element of this application of his own judgement to the literary and argumentative structure of his works was the choice of the dialogue format and the introduction of Roman characters and settings (Powell 1995: 9, 30–1).

However, how far did and could such Romanization go? For Beard, Cicero 'Romanised Greek philosophy, tackling Roman problems, with Roman *exempla*, in a Roman setting'.<sup>76</sup> The last two elements of this are unproblematic in relation to *De Divinatione*, and the other dialogues, but the first requires some refinement. Again, for Beard Cicero's philosophy 'is distinctive for its integration of Greek philosophy with Roman practice—...with Roman divinatory practice in *De Divinatione*'.<sup>77</sup> However, it is clear that there is no real engagement between theory and practice in this work—Roman *exempla* abound, but they are discussed in a strictly Greek theoretical framework. There are no signs within the dialogue of 'the complex process of active reinterpretation of the Roman inheritance within an overall Hellenising model [or] a rethinking of the theory itself in the light of

<sup>74</sup> The topic of Cicero as translator has received much attention, e.g. A. E. Douglas, *GR 9* (1962), 41–51; Müller-Goldingen 1992: 173–87; Powell 1995: 273–300.

<sup>75</sup> *Off.* 1. 6; *Fin.* 1. 6. For the suggestion that Cicero's statement on his philosophical judgement should be taken seriously, see J. Barnes, 'Cicero's *De Fato* and a Greek Source', in J. Brunschwig *et al.* (eds.), *Histoire et structure: A la mémoire de Victor Goldschmidt* (Paris, 1995), 230–2.

<sup>76</sup> 1986: 38. Cf. Schofield on the domestication of philosophy in the Roman habitat of book 1 (1986: 55).

<sup>77</sup> Beard 1986: 39–40. Cf. Schofield 1986: 50: 'it treats a subject of general interest, in ways palpably designed to appeal to the Roman reader and with comparatively little exposition or criticism of Greek philosophical positions'.



Roman practice'.<sup>78</sup> Because Cicero *was* well aware of the fundamental differences and incompatibility between Greek *mantike*, which he defines as the foresight and foreknowledge of future events, and official Roman divination, in which there was no predictive element, he does not integrate them, but rather clearly differentiates them—foretelling the future was not a 'Roman problem'.<sup>79</sup> This he says emphatically through Marcus' response to an imagined interjection by Quintus on the incongruity of an augur arguing against auspices: "It's a difficult position for an augur to be in, to argue against auspices." For a Marsian augur perhaps, but very comfortable for a Roman augur. For we are not the kind of augurs who tell the future from the observation of birds and the other signs', and through the detailed description and characterization of the Roman augur's activity which follows.<sup>80</sup>

### (vi) Form and Structure of Dialogue

Among Cicero's extant philosophical works *De Divinatione* is unique in being a clash of Stoic and Academic views expressed in a dialogue through contemporary speakers without an explicit authorial conclusion. As I have suggested,<sup>81</sup> Cicero had great freedom in choosing the form and characters he wanted; no known precedent for a work on divination took the form of a dialogue. Schofield sees *De Divinatione* as experimental, 'an attempt to do philosophy in as Roman . . . a way as

<sup>78</sup> Beard 1986: 43. Schofield (1986: 50–1), while noting the Roman *exempla*, frequent use of Latin poets and Cicero's excellent grasp of both Roman history and Greek theory, places no emphasis on tension and problems of integration; North (1990: 57): 'what Cicero is doing in his dialogue is to give a version, carefully adapted to a Roman audience, of a specifically Greek philosophical debate'. Nowhere, in fact, was Stoic theory applied to Roman divination (cf. Kany-Turpin 2003b: 71).

<sup>79</sup> Even if by prediction Cicero means the kind of conditional predictions that are typical of Roman divination, i.e. if you do x, y will happen (but you can avert y by not doing x), that is still incompatible with the determinism of Stoic philosophy.

<sup>80</sup> 2. 70–5. Cicero explicitly marks Romulus' belief in the predictive power of augury as an error of antiquity. Krostenko (2000: 361–5) discusses the polarity between Roman and foreign as treated by Quintus and Marcus respectively, showing that Quintus (using Stoic arguments based on *consensus*) is inclusive of foreign practices, even stating that they are superior to Roman (1. 27), whereas Marcus ignores and rejects the non-Roman. In *De Legibus* (2. 32–3) Marcus, while on holiday from his usual Academic scepticism, accepts that augury was a form of predictive divination used by the Romans in the past, but not in his own day (see Dyck 2004: 350).

<sup>81</sup> Above § 3 (ii).

possible'.<sup>82</sup> Certainly the basic structure of a two-sided disputation comprising essentially continuous speeches goes back to Aristotle, was carried on by both the Peripatos and the Academy,<sup>83</sup> and would for that reason alone have been attractive to Cicero as an adherent of the New Academy, but also with his interest in and enormous aptitude for rhetoric he clearly recognized the literary opportunity which the format gave.<sup>84</sup> Although there is some dispute whether the view of the character speaking second or last in these philosophical contests invariably indicates Cicero's preference, it is clear that the rhetorical advantage lies in responding to arguments.<sup>85</sup> Nonetheless, the variety of ways in which Cicero constructs his debates suggests a need for some subtlety. As he had used this basic format in *Hortensius*, *Lucullus*, *De Finibus* and in *De Natura Deorum*, the experimentation in *De Divinatione* does not lie in the choice of an Academic disputation, but in the particular shape he gives to each of the speeches. A notable feature of the dialogue is that the two speeches are of roughly equal length, which may suggest an equality of treatment.<sup>86</sup>

It is instructive to set out a structure for both books before discussing their respective characters.<sup>87</sup>

### Book 1

- 1–7 Introduction to the work as a whole
- 8–11a *Narratio*: setting of dialogue, link with *On the Nature of the Gods* and introduction to Quintus' argument

<sup>82</sup> Schofield 1986: 50. Cf. Douglas (1995: 214) who shows that experimentation is also present in *Tusculanae Disputationes*; but that the earlier confrontational form of *De Finibus* and *Lucullus* was put aside.

<sup>83</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 2. 9. Revived by Arcesilaus within the Academy (*Fin.* 2. 2).

<sup>84</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 2. 9. Schofield 1986: 51; Powell 1995: 21.

<sup>85</sup> See Leonhardt 1999: 25–31. Cf. Harris 2003: 27.

<sup>86</sup> Leonhardt (1999: 33) calculates on the basis of lines of Teubner text that Marcus' speech is 10% longer than Quintus', the smallest differential in the examples that he treats; in all cases the counter speech is longer than that to which it responds; cf. *ibid.* 34: 'wo die Widerlegung nicht durchschlagend sein soll, erhält der Dogmatiker mehr Redezeit'.

<sup>87</sup> I draw on the tables in Schofield (1986: 64–5) and Nice (1999: 81) and on Krostenko's analysis (2000: 370–1). MacKendrick (1989: 185–96) offers a very detailed summary and proposed analysis in terms of a speech, but the divisions he proposes are often arbitrary.

- 11b–12a *Partitio*  
*locus de vetustate* (argument from antiquity) A  
*locus de consensu omnium* (argument from ubiquity) B  
 There are two kinds of divination: natural and artificial c  
 Observe effects, not explain causes (*locus de ignorantia*) d
- 12b–33 *Confirmatio*  
 Discussion of d (12b–25a)  
 A and B illustrated through augury (25b–33)
- 34–84a Defence of natural and artificial divination  
 c, d, B, and A restated (34–7); illustrated for  
 Natural divination (37–71)  
 oracles (37–8)  
 dreams (39–65)  
 prophetic frenzy (65–9)  
 Cratippus’ theory of natural divination (70–1)  
 Artificial divination—examples of *coniectura* (72–9a)  
 Divination exists (79b–83):  
 individual gods do not intervene; divination is  
 a natural power (79–81)  
 existence of gods requires existence of divination  
 (82–84a)
- 84b–108 *Confirmatio*  
 Restatement of A, B, c, and d (84b–6); and illustration of  
 A *E vetustate* (87–9)  
 B *E consensu omnium* (90–108)  
 Barbarian *exempla* (90–4)  
 Civilized *exempla* (95–108)  
 Greek (95–6)  
 Roman (97–108)
- 109–31 d revisited; possible approaches to be articulated by c  
 (109)  
 natural divination (110–17)  
 artificial divination (118–25a) [incl. Socratic digression]  
 Posidonius’ arguments (125b–31)  
 from God (125b)  
 from Fate (125b–8)  
 from Nature (129–31)
- 132 Conclusion, rejection of quack divination

## Book 2

- 1–7 New introduction to whole work
- 8 Setting of dialogue
- 8–25 *Refutatio*. General arguments against divination
  - The subject matter of divination is pure chance (9–14)
  - Chance events are unpredictable (15–18)
  - Fate and predictability are incompatible ideas (19–25)
- 25b–6 Summary of Quintus' argument
- 26–7 *Partitio*
  - artificial divination
  - natural divination
- 28–99 Attack on artificial divination
  - haruspicy (28–69)
    - entrails (28–41)
    - lightning (42–9)
    - portents (49–69)
  - auspices (70–83)
  - omens (83–4)
  - lots (84–7)
  - astrology (87–99)
- 100 Introduction to the attack on natural divination
- 101–9 Digression: criticism of syllogisms of Chrysippus and Cratippus
- 110–48 Attack on natural divination
  - prophetic frenzy (110–18)
  - dreams (119–48)
- 149–50 Conclusion

There can be little disagreement over the structure of book 2. That of book 1 is far more complex, and perhaps unfairly criticized.<sup>88</sup> The great contrast between books 1 and 2 is characterized by Schofield as

<sup>88</sup> Schäublin (1986: 166): 'eine bloße Materialsammlung'; Schofield (1986: 52): 'messy welter of allegedly divinatory experiences...chaotic disorder of Quintus' examples... any table of contents for Book I would be a fairly optimistic and arbitrary construct... Quintus switching erratically both from one sort of divination to another, and from anecdotes and arguments and theories back to anecdotes again'; Timpanaro, lxxxiv: 'Quinto procede senz' ordine'; Krostenko (2000: 370): 'Quintus' argument is highly disorganised'.

between rhetorics of anecdote and cross-examination, although to call the former *exemplum* rather than anecdote would be less prejudicial, better acknowledging the emphasis placed by both Stoics and Romans on historical *exempla*.<sup>89</sup>

The most crucial advance in understanding the basic structure has been made by Krostenko, who isolates the four points which comprise the *divisio* that introduces the argumentative section.<sup>90</sup> Perception of Quintus' arguments as chaotic led Schofield to stress the literary opportunity Cicero has seized 'to indulge his skills as a story-teller (not to mention his ambitions as a poet)' and to make the impressionistic suggestion that 'the underlying philosophical thought is presumably that it is precisely an authentically messy welter of allegedly divinatory experiences which gives the best chance of persuading someone of the case for divination' and that 'he is deliberately avoiding too close an adherence to the definitions and divisions of philosophical traditions' (Schofield 1986: 52). Rather, we can see that Quintus is not the poor rider of a one-horse-definition, but attempts to marshal four lines of Stoic argument which are sometimes very closely interwoven. There is repetition, mostly of the four points from the *divisio*, and, as it were, a major re-emphasis of the *loci de vetustate* and *de consensu omnium* (1. 87–108), but not the chaotic grouping that has been alleged. For example, the structuring of the final battery of *exempla* (1. 90–108), once it is understood as occurring under the argument *e consensu omnium*, is well done, as Quintus moves from Greek to Roman *exempla* to a culmination in the foundation of Rome through divination, the

<sup>89</sup> Schofield 1986: 51–5. Cf. Krostenko's proposed polarity between *ratio* and *exempla* (2000: 370). Mainstream Stoic arguments seem to have relied on *exempla* (*dia tinas ekbasesis*: Diog. Laert. 7. 149), as Marcus acknowledges in his introductory compliment to Quintus (2. 8): 'you have defended the Stoic position with care and in the Stoic fashion'. Cicero's weakening of Quintus' argument by the use of unhistorical *exempla* (e.g. 1. 40–5) does make Schofield's 'anecdotes' more appropriate than it should be.

<sup>90</sup> These are A to D in the table. A necessary refinement to Krostenko's argument is that the four points must be distinguished from each other in relative importance, in order to bring out what is crucial for the development of the argument rather than for classification within it. Quintus deploys two main arguments, from antiquity and ubiquity, and two subsidiary categories of analysis. The various philosophical explanations found in book 1, discussing the *how* of divination, are of secondary importance compared to the establishing of the *existence* of divination.

weightiest example from the weightiest state. Within this argument the use of Roman *exempla* is not just literary, but also probative—instances of divination from the contemporary period would be far harder to deny.<sup>91</sup> Quintus' argument has, in Stoic terms, a perfectly defensible structure, and is carefully constructed as such by Cicero.<sup>92</sup>

The cogency of the argument is another question. Quintus has to establish that there is such a thing as divination, a challenge which the Stoics met by relying on arguments from experience: (i) innumerable instances of 'divination' can be demonstrated; and (ii) the reality of successful divination, that is, predictions which cannot be the result of chance or human knowledge or the like. The first of these is easily established through historical *exempla* (from all ages and peoples), the second is more difficult. Opponents pointed to the failures of diviners as suggesting the role of chance, and the Stoic response was to compare divination with other arts, such as medicine, whose reality was not doubted because their practitioners were not perfect, and to rely on a form of probability—that all successful instances of divination could not be explained away and, in an extreme form, the existence of one such unassailed instance proved the existence of divination. Quintus never really tackles (ii), which is Marcus' first target in his rebuttal of Stoic arguments.

Krostenko accuses Quintus of *petitio principii* in stating repeatedly that controversial descriptive categories, natural and artificial divination, exist because there are many examples of them; had Quintus not assumed the validity of the categories, he could have organized his examples as he does, so that 'the accumulation of *exempla*... becomes a kind of symbol for the cognitive habits of those who claim the existence of divination, revealing an imprecise, *a priori* enthrallment with various sorts of paranormal phenomena, which can be fitted into analytical categories only *a posteriori*' (2000: 372).

Book 2 has reasonably been compared with passages in which Cicero destroys an opponent whom he imagines in the witness box, by ruthless 'virtual' cross-examination.<sup>93</sup> The structure is simple:

<sup>91</sup> For Roman *exempla* improving the case, cf. Schofield 1986: 53.

<sup>92</sup> I dismiss the suggestions that Cicero has struggled to integrate material from several sources, toyed with by Krostenko (2000: 370–1), or that he aims to characterize Quintus as the disorganized individual he was in real life (Timpanaro, lxxxiv).

<sup>93</sup> Schofield 1986: 54. Cf. Cicero's cross-examination of Vatinius (*In Vatinium*).

after a fundamental assault on the weaknesses in the Stoic case (9–25), he attacks the *exempla* by type of divinatory practice in sequence. The categories of Quintus' argument are irrelevant—it does not matter to the sceptic whether instances of 'divination' can be multiplied, if the phenomenon has no reality, as Marcus has demonstrated. For the largest part of his speech Marcus can ridicule the individual *exempla*, giving vent to the kind of rhetorical, sarcastic attacks associated with Carneades, accusing Quintus of various kinds of irrationality.<sup>94</sup>

### (vii) Purpose of *De Divinatione*

If the arguments of the previous sections are valid, what can be said about the 'purpose' of the *De Divinatione*? Schofield (1986: 63) denies that there could have been a single meaning (or purpose) to the work and argues that it may have meant different things to different readers, but the crucial aspect here is not the reception of the work, but what Cicero intended, and whether or not he could have had a simple purpose in mind. While we cannot 'know' what Cicero was thinking, and can only interpret what he wrote and what has been handed down concerning his actions, the possibility of a simple authorial purpose is not precluded. The determination of the author's purpose, however, is not a simple matter.

Arising from her belief that the dialogue is balanced and that no clear authorial standpoint can legitimately be isolated, Beard (1986: 46) suggests that Cicero was 'attempting to establish the discourse within which... philosophical argument (in the area of religion) might be possible. In this sense Cicero's handling of state religion in his philosophical works does not constitute the argued presentation of an opinion or view; it constitutes rather the process of formation of a discourse on theology.' While it is perfectly reasonable to see a discourse between Stoic and Academic views on divination, that is, a philosophical debate, it is far harder to grasp what connection there might be between the philosophical debate and the Roman state religion, which must be fundamental for any meaningful

<sup>94</sup> See Schofield 1986: 55.

discourse within the Roman elite on theology or divination. Cicero's contemporaries had widely different views on the value of Roman divinatory practice and addressed this directly: Appius Claudius held that the signs seen by the augurs had a predictive function, whereas C. Marcellus held that augural activity was maintained simply for political purposes.<sup>95</sup> As we have seen, Cicero makes it clear that there is no similarity in the function of augury within the Roman state and in the world of the philosophical debate between Stoic and Academic.

For Krostenko, Cicero deliberately arranges the inconclusive structure (and the lack of integration between theory and practice) of *De Divinatione* in order to highlight the insufficiency of both the 'fideistic' and 'sceptical' positions for Roman social practice in relation to divination, and to point the reader towards the civic theology advocated by Q. Mucius Scaevola and Varro, a religion which cannot be the object of belief or the subject of scepticism by the one who understands its nature, a religion involving a limited, formal, and symbolic divination.<sup>96</sup> Guidance to this conclusion, it is argued, is to be extracted straightforwardly from those passages where Marcus departs from his sceptical assault to comment on the specific practice of Roman religion.<sup>97</sup> However, it must be emphasized that these comments are asides only to Marcus' argument and it is questionable whether a major purpose of the work, on this view, should be based on them alone and whether the reader, as he progresses through the argument, attaches such importance to them.

In somewhat wider terms, is it appropriate to look in a work like *De Divinatione*, which presents primarily a Greek philosophical debate, for advice on the practical conduct or theoretical construction of Roman divination? I prefer to stress the Greek philosophical context of the work, as part of a threefold philosophical treatment under the category of physics, rather than to isolate *De Divinatione* and extract from select passages within it an unexpressed

<sup>95</sup> For Appius Claudius, see on 1. 29–30; for Marcellus, see 2. 75.

<sup>96</sup> Krostenko 2000: 354: '*de Divinatione*... is an indirect and dialectical attempt to construct a normative definition for religious symbols in Roman culture'; 374: 'the arguments on both sides leave their proponents in peculiar, and ultimately undesirable positions'; esp. 377–80.

<sup>97</sup> See above, p. 18.



purpose.<sup>98</sup> As he was writing the greater part of *De Divinatione*, but not the last additions made after Caesar's death, Cicero was not actively engaged in Roman politics: the priority in his life was to complete the philosophical encyclopedia. The Roman elite reader, when confronted with the contrasting approaches to divination in the work, may have been stimulated to ask *how* this relates to the divinatory practice of the Roman state, but he receives no answer. By demonstrating that Stoic arguments were not worthy of assent and in particular in removing the notion of determinism, a subject which he was to treat in greater detail in *De Fato*, Cicero enables the reader to inhabit a universe which, from our knowledge of the practice of Roman religion, is far more 'Roman', where the gods warn and advise, and where the state (or individuals) by an appropriate response can avoid any disaster portended. What Cicero does not do is argue how this might be explained in philosophical terms; the beauty of being an Academic philosopher was that his job was to knock down others' sandcastles, not to build any of his own.

#### 4. THE SOURCES OF *DE DIVINATIONE*

For *De Divinatione* the Latin and Greek sources from which Cicero drew his historical *exempla* and his philosophical arguments are themselves lost, which poses problems for any source criticism. The danger of circularity is high, as lost or highly fragmentary works are reconstructed on the basis of a theory and the theory is then bolstered by the reconstruction. Such danger proved no obstacle to the assiduous exponents of source analysis of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who outdid one another in intricate hypotheses.<sup>99</sup> Even if these can be largely disregarded, the issues

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Beard 1986: 45 quoted above n. 41.

<sup>99</sup> e.g. Schiche 1875; Heeringa 1906; Sander 1908. This bout of source analysis had by and large exhausted itself by the appearance of Pease's commentary; his introduction gives a sober assessment of the arguments. Later developments, primarily concerned with the thesis of Karl Reinhardt on Cicero's use of Posidonius, are summarized helpfully by Pfeffer (1976: 44–53). Pfeffer, however, ignores an article by Finger (1929: 371–97) which attempts to illuminate the question of Cicero's

they raise are important for evaluating Cicero's role in the composition of *De Divinatione*. In *De Officiis* and *De Finibus* Cicero claims explicitly that he is not merely translating, and in the former names the sources he will use for books 1 and 2.<sup>100</sup> While there is no comparable statement in *De Divinatione*, a mere look at the structure of book 1 with its intricate combination of *exempla* and argument (see above § 3(vi)) shows that simple copying from one or more sources is not in the least likely, even when he deals most closely with philosophical argumentation.<sup>101</sup> Cicero's notorious comments to Atticus on his methods of composition, 'they are transcripts; they take little work; I provide only the words, which I have in abundance', contain a hint of irony and deliberate understatement; and may not even refer to his philosophical works in general.<sup>102</sup>

I shall separate the treatment of Cicero's philosophical and exemplary sources, since they are essentially different. For the production of an argument in a Stoic fashion, Cicero had to employ *exempla*, that is, examples from history, which could demonstrate the existence of undeniable divinatory phenomena and thus the existence of divination.<sup>103</sup> The Roman *exempla* that appear are not taken from Greek philosophical sources, even though, for example,

philosophical sources by a rigorous treatment of his philosophical formulations and creates for the most involved sections (109–31) an intricate interweaving of sources. While this removes Cicero far from the mechanistic copier he has sometimes been suspected of being, it smacks rather of hypersubtlety and a way of handling his material that should be rejected (cf. MacKendrick 1989: 197).

<sup>100</sup> *Off.* 1. 6: 'I shall follow the Stoics above all, not as a translator, but, as is my custom, drawing from their fountains when and as it seems best, using my own judgement and discretion'; cf. *Off.* 2. 60: 'in these books I have followed Panaetius, but have not translated him'; cf. *Fin.* 1. 6. Cicero distinguishes himself from *interpretes*, who produced close, literal translations (cf. Powell 1995: 278).

<sup>101</sup> Cicero has often been regarded as no more than a transcriber or translator of his Greek sources, but this view is unsustainable (cf. Powell 1995: 8 n. 20). For detailed argument on *De Officiis*, see E. Lefèvre, *Panaetios' und Ciceros Pflichtenlehre: Vom philosophischen Traktat zum politischen Lehrbuch* (Stuttgart, 2001) and the review by J. G. F. Powell, *BMCR* 2002.08.40.

<sup>102</sup> *Att.* 12. 52. 3: 'ἀπόγραφα sunt; minore labore fiunt; verba tantum affero, quibus abundo'. The textual corruption immediately preceding this quotation makes Cicero's reference uncertain (cf. Shackleton Bailey 1966: 341–2).

<sup>103</sup> Cf. 2. 8: 'Quintus, you have defended Stoic doctrine with care and like a Stoic; and what delights me most is that you have used a very large number of Roman examples, indeed ones that are famous and distinguished.'

Posidonius' historical researches and knowledge of Rome could have made him familiar with some of them.<sup>104</sup> In certain cases Cicero names his sources as leading historians, notably Coelius Antipater and Sisenna, or famous Roman figures;<sup>105</sup> other sources include his own works and experiences.<sup>106</sup> Pease, and the majority of source-analysts before him, considered it unlikely that Cicero consulted the works of Roman historians individually, but rather that he preferred epitomes where they were available and was content with secondhand knowledge.<sup>107</sup> It is even suggested that he took many *exempla* from a Roman work on divination, the most likely candidate being Appius Claudius Pulcher's work *De augurali disciplina* which was dedicated to Cicero and had been in his possession since 51.<sup>108</sup> It is, however, important to note that, while it is clear that Cicero used Appius on the most difficult of his augural *exempla*, the defeat of Crassus and the punishment of Ateius, Appius could not have been the source for examples relating to haruspicy, dreams, or other areas of divination. The work of Cicero's friend A. Caecina on haruspicy, an important source for Seneca, leaves no definite trace in *De Divinatione* 1 (Hine 1981: 62). Although Fleck may go too far in arguing that Cicero had firsthand knowledge of, and used directly, a range of historical authors, it is ridiculous to deny to someone with Cicero's education and training in rhetoric a broad and deep knowledge of Roman *exempla*.<sup>109</sup>

When it comes to Greek *exempla*, the tendency to attribute them to Cicero's philosophical sources, and particularly to Posidonius, is even more pronounced.<sup>110</sup> As outcomes, *ekbaseis*, were

<sup>104</sup> Panaetius' doubts about divination (see on 1. 6) make him a very unlikely source for historical *exempla* supporting divination.

<sup>105</sup> e.g. 1. 48–9, 99. Other Roman writers named are Fabius Pictor (1. 43), Sulla (1. 72), C. Gracchus (1. 56); and the generalizing plurals of Fabii and Gellii (1. 55), as typical annalistic historians.

<sup>106</sup> e.g. the quotations from his own poetry (1. 17–22, 106), his experiences from 58 to the Civil War (1. 58–9, 68–9).

<sup>107</sup> Pease, 27–8. In preparing for *De Natura Deorum* and *De Divinatione* Cicero had requested from Atticus a copy of Brutus' epitome of Coelius (*Att.* 13. 8). As we do not know how closely Brutus stuck to Coelius and what information he preserved, it is hypothetical whether we consider that Cicero went from the epitome back to the original or not.

<sup>108</sup> See on 1. 28.

<sup>109</sup> Fleck 1993. Indeed, Cicero had an extensive library, see Pütz 1925.

<sup>110</sup> e.g. Pease, 22.

fundamental to the Stoic case, they certainly appeared in profusion in their defences of divination: Cicero makes Quintus acknowledge this, and the attribution of specific *exempla* to philosophers like Posidonius is explicit.<sup>111</sup> If, however, we credit Quintus' claim that he is going to produce a set of examples on dreams superior to those of Chrysippus and Antipater (1. 39), and if that had not already been done by Posidonius (for which there is no certain evidence), then it is not impossible that Cicero has himself pulled together from Greek historians some famous examples.<sup>112</sup> Yet we cannot quantify what he may have done.

Scholars reserve the most extreme complications of source analysis for Cicero's philosophical sources for book 1, one extreme being the view of Heeringa (favoured by Pease) that even quotations of Cratippus come secondhand via Posidonius.<sup>113</sup> The subject of divination was treated by all branches of Classical and Hellenistic philosophy, as the doxography in the introduction to book 1 makes clear,<sup>114</sup> so a very wide range of authorities was available to Cicero. However, as far as we can gather from his citations and from general considerations of the way in which he wrote, his main philosophical authorities for book 1 were only Cratippus and Posidonius. The former is only tentatively credited with having left any written works, and that restricted to dreams, though he was well acquainted with Cicero and his family;<sup>115</sup> the latter produced a five-volume work *Peri Mantikes* (On Divination), which is the most obvious of his works for Cicero to have utilized.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>111</sup> 1. 39 for Chrysippus and Antipater on dreams; 1. 56 for two dreams ubiquitous in Stoic collections; and 1. 64 for the prophecy of the dying Rhodian attributed to Posidonius.

<sup>112</sup> Galen (*Plac. Hipp et. Plat* 4. 399K) comments on Posidonius' critique of Chrysippus on emotions, *ρήσεις τε ποιητικὰς καὶ ἱστορίας παλαιῶν πράξεων ματυροῦσας οἷς λέγει*. Chrysippus' use of quotations was notorious for the excess to which he took them (cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 180–1).

<sup>113</sup> Pease, 22. This would seem chronologically dubious, as Posidonius was dead by the mid-40s when Cratippus was still functioning in Athens.

<sup>114</sup> 1. 5–6; and in general, see Pfeffer 1976.

<sup>115</sup> See on 1. 5.

<sup>116</sup> See on 1. 6. Pease (23–4) counters the suggestion of Heeringa that Posidonius' *Peri Theon* (On the Gods) is the source of Cicero's information on divination in both *De Divinatione* and *De Natura Deorum* (see Pease, 19–24; Schäublin 1985: 163).

Cicero's debt to Posidonius and Cratippus remains the key question in relation to his philosophical sources for *De Divinatione* 1. Although Cicero mentions Posidonius as a source of an *exemplum* or argument only three times in book 1 and Cratippus only twice,<sup>117</sup> their influence goes far wider than the immediate paragraphs in which their names occur, the key battleground being the extended argumentative section on the *ratio* of divination (1. 109–31). As no substantial fragments of Posidonius' *On Divination* and no indication at all of Cratippus' views on divination exist outside what can be gathered from Cicero's *De Divinatione*, to prove the extent of Cicero's debt to either is impossible. There is even fundamental dispute as to the extent of the named fragments within Cicero's work between Kidd, who takes a minimalist approach, and Theiler, who is far more inclusive.<sup>118</sup>

To envisage Cicero producing an elaborate patchwork of different sources seems improbable, both on the evidence of his other philosophical works, where the question of his sources is less fraught, and because of the physical difficulties in using papyri rolls in a way necessary for such a production. I start from the simple notion that, in aiming to provide a defence of divination and an explanation of how it works, Cicero would not find an all-encompassing defence and explanation in Cratippus, as the Peripatetic denied the validity of artificial divination. Posidonius, however, accepted and defended both types of divination, and would be the obvious and easiest source for the overall argument. If we start from this presumption, the key question to ask is whether anything in the chapters of philosophical argument is incompatible with what we know of Posidonius' teachings elsewhere.

The most important and most problematic part of the book from this point of view are the final argumentative chapters (1. 109–31). Within these there is an indisputable break that separates sections 109–16 from 118–31; it is signalled by a paragraph in which Cicero recapitulates the argument before reposing the main question 'how

<sup>117</sup> Posidonius: 1. 64, 125, 130 (cf. 2. 35, 47); Cratippus: 1. 70–1, 113 (2. 108–9).

<sup>118</sup> Kidd restricts the fragments to the specific chapters listed in the previous note; Theiler includes the following: 1. 6, 63–6, 87b–96, 109–21 (minus a few Ciceronian additions) and 125b–131.

does one tell the future?’ After this paragraph Quintus presents an argument which is indisputably Posidonian in origin, even if there are no express citations of him. In short, then, can sections 109 to 116 be Posidonian?

The only way to proceed is to analyse the argumentative framework of the work and to attempt to isolate what is distinctively Posidonian and what is unlikely to be his. From the following survey-discussion of the differing conclusions reached by philosophers it is clear that this is no simple matter. I will omit the arguments of the earlier source analysts and begin with Karl Reinhardt, whose works marked a new epoch in Posidonian studies. Reinhardt argues that Posidonius’ and Cratippus’ explanations of divination are fundamentally different: Cratippus advanced a Platonizing and dualist theory according to which divination functions through the separation of the rational part of the soul from its other parts and from the body and its union with the divine from which it sprang.<sup>119</sup> Posidonius, by contrast, held that divination occurs through a characteristic ability of the soul, which comes into direct contact with the divine fluid which fills the universe; the soul is not divided; any differentiation is between its centre and periphery; the soul-body dichotomy is wholly absent.<sup>120</sup> On this basis Reinhardt divided the argumentative sections of *De Divinatione* between Posidonius and Cratippus.<sup>121</sup>

Reinhardt’s successors concentrated on showing that the distinctions he drew were not as straightforward as he claimed, in particular that not all Platonizing language could be automatically

<sup>119</sup> Cratippus hardly appears to be an orthodox Peripatetic in relation to dream divination: his argumentation is highly platonizing, based on his reading of Plato’s *Meno* (see on 1. 70–1) and, in sharp distinction to orthodox Peripatetic doctrine on the autonomous divinatory activity of the soul, he speaks explicitly about the divine origin of the divinatory part of the soul.

<sup>120</sup> Reinhardt 1921: 423–64. See the handy summary in Pfeffer 1976: 44–5.

<sup>121</sup> He divides the major argumentative section simply: 1. 109–16 to Cratippus, 117–31 to Posidonius. Within the former, however, he discerns two trains of thought that become confused, Cratippus’ explanation of natural divination and a polemic against artificial divination that Cicero has attempted to reform into a reason for artificial divination. In relation to the earlier philosophical section, he allocates the bulk of 60–71 to Cratippus, excluding the *exemplum* and theories that Cicero specifically attributes to Posidonius (1. 63–4).

denied to Posidonius.<sup>122</sup> For example, Heinrich Dörrie isolated three elements of Posidonius' thought on divination: (i) that divination was not conducted solely as an autonomous activity of the soul, but that the soul had some contact with the divine; (ii) that sense perception offers no analogy to divinatory recognition (*contra* Cratippus); and (iii) that the highest knowledge is that of causal connections, of which there are three kinds: the knowledge mediated by natural divination, the insight provided by artificial divination, and, thirdly, non-divinatory prediction. His Posidonius, then, incorporates into his theory elements of Peripatetic theory, namely the autonomous activity of the soul, which he equates with the lowest form of dream divination and which he uses to construe the division between body and soul differently from Plato, although he uses Platonizing language. Similarly, recent studies of Posidonius' views on the human soul emphasize the return to a Platonic psychology by Posidonius, that is, in speaking of reason, emotion, and appetite within the soul: the differences from Plato being of a kind that can easily be glided over even by those with a good grasp of the arguments.<sup>123</sup>

The content of 1. 109–16 concerns two separate areas, natural divination and non-divinatory, rational prediction. The argumentation relating to the latter, as *Cicero presents it*, is not compatible with Posidonius, for whom divine involvement in artificial divination was central.<sup>124</sup> The material on natural divination, is, however, compatible with the explanations attributed to Posidonius on dreams earlier in the dialogue: the soul associates with the divine soul on the basis of its relationship.<sup>125</sup> These chapters show how essentially Platonic

<sup>122</sup> Different distributions of material were proposed by M. Pohlenz (*NGG* (1922), 185–94), I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, ii (Breslau, 1928), 324–77, and H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' Symmiktá Zetemata: Ihre Stellung in System und Geschichte des Neuplatonismus nebst einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten* (Munich, 1959), 212–18. Pfeffer (1976: 49) considers the arguments of Pohlenz and Heinemann unconvincing, in that 1. 60–9 and 109–16 contain nothing that is specifically Posidonian. He also rejects the idea of W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus* (Berlin, 1930), 135–9, that 1. 109–16 in essence comes from Posidonius, although reworked by Cicero.

<sup>123</sup> See Reydams-Schils 1997: esp. 468–71.

<sup>124</sup> Pfeffer 1976: 88–92. Cf. 1. 120.

<sup>125</sup> 1. 110 (*mens divina, cognatio*) and 1. 111. In the paragraph explaining dream divination (1. 115), the language echoes both the Plato translation of 1. 60–1 and Posidonius' explanation at 1. 64 (cf. also Glucker 1999: 39).

doctrines such as *anamnesis* have been adapted. Platonic dualism has been transformed into a divine immanence in a way that could be fully compatible with Posidonius' beliefs; it would also be essential for the functioning of cosmic *sympatheia*, itself necessary for the accommodation of artificial divination. However, recent studies of these chapters by Gucker and Tarrant have in different ways sought to deny Posidonian authorship to 1. 115 in particular, and thereby to the whole of 1. 109–16. Gucker argues that no Stoic could say that any human soul, even its rational part, has lived from all eternity and certainly not Posidonius, who probably reintroduced the doctrine of *ekpyrosis*, the periodic conflagration of the universe, into Stoic physics; this chapter must derive from an unknown proto-Platonist.<sup>126</sup> Tarrant (2000a: 64–76) plausibly identifies this source with Cratippus on the grounds that Cicero is unlikely to have used a unique source for only one small section of the argument, and to have left him unnamed, and because the interpretation of the doctrine of *anamnesis* from Plato's *Meno*, which lies behind 1. 115, is wholly compatible with that attributed to Cratippus earlier in the dialogue and fits a pupil of the brother of Antiochus of Ascalon. Is it certain, however, that there is no appropriate sense in which Posidonius could have written of the soul as immortal? Hermeias' commentary on Plato's *Phaedrus* singles out Posidonius as one of those who interpreted Plato's words *psyche pasa athanatos* as meaning that only the world soul, that is, Zeus, was immortal.<sup>127</sup> From the nature of the fragment it is not certain whether this is merely Posidonius' exegesis of the Platonic text rather than his own belief, but it would in the latter case allow an accommodation between Plato and Posidonius' *ekpyrosis*.<sup>128</sup> Nonetheless it is hard to interpret the *animus* of 1. 115 in a general sense of 'soul as a whole', as would seem to be required, even if in some way the memories of individual souls were incorporated into the world soul before their destruction, as some Stoic texts suggest,<sup>129</sup> and were accessible to individual human souls in the next configuration of the universe. On balance,

<sup>126</sup> 1999: esp. 33–4. Cf. J. Bels, *RHR* 199 (1992), 169–82.

<sup>127</sup> Fr. 290 E-K, 393 Theiler.

<sup>128</sup> Kidd 1988, ad loc. Cf. Tarrant 2000a: 70.

<sup>129</sup> e.g. Arius Didymus 39, 471, 14; Olymp. in Plat. *Phd.* 124. 19.



then, it seems that 1. 109–16 must be denied to Posidonius and should plausibly be assigned to Cratippus.

The other section of philosophical argumentation where the origin of the arguments is important concerns the explanation of natural divination, dreams (1. 60–5, 70–1), and inspired prophecy (1. 66–7). This begins with a lengthy, translated quotation from Plato's *Republic* and ends with an argument that Cicero expressly derives from Cratippus. Within these chapters, as we have noted, Posidonius appears twice, as the source for an example of a prophetic Rhodian and for his division into three of the ways in which the human soul dreams. As with the closing section of book 1, the argument centres around the Platonic and the Platonizing material and whether it is compatible with Posidonius' unitarian view: Reinhardt and the majority of twentieth-century scholars, including Theiler, deny that anything other than 1. 63–4 comes from Posidonius.<sup>130</sup> Pfeffer, however, in effect returns to the nineteenth-century view and argues that nothing precludes 1. 60–3 being Posidonius'. As Philo's extended discussion of different kinds of dreams, which is greatly influenced by Posidonius, similarly makes much of the separation of the soul from the body in sleep, it seems that we can envisage Posidonius incorporating Plato's famous description of the soul's dreaming and the physical preconditions for the reception of true dreams into his threefold theory.<sup>131</sup> Hence Posidonius' influence in this section on natural divination through dreaming may be wider than is generally held. It is, however, not possible to state for certain the origin of the Platonic material.

With an appropriate degree of caution, then, it seems that Cicero supplied himself the *exempla* from Roman history which comprise a large part of book 1 from his own reading, while his Greek *exempla* plausibly owe more to his Greek philosophical sources. His philosophical sources are best restricted to Posidonius and Cratippus, the former cited rarely, but probably supplying the justification for all examples of artificial divination and the argument of 1. 118–31, the latter largely responsible for 1. 109–16 and the Platonizing arguments on natural divination.

<sup>130</sup> Reinhardt 1921: 439, 457–60; Schiche 1875: 20.

<sup>131</sup> 1976: 76. Cf. Schiche and Corsson.

## 5. DRAMATIC DATE, DATE OF COMPOSITION, AND PUBLICATION

The dates of composition and publication of *De Divinatione* and the issue of the dramatic date of the dialogue have not attracted much discussion since the 1920s, but are not unimportant.<sup>132</sup>

There is nothing in the dialogue itself that definitely clashes with a dramatic date sometime after Caesar's death, whereas the passages referring to Caesar's death should exclude the alternative. However, it is not simple to determine a dramatic date for the day's conversation with Quintus held at Cicero's Tusculan villa: for, although we can pin down Cicero's own movements with some accuracy from the evidence of his letters, the whereabouts of Quintus are revealed only occasionally and incidentally (1. 8). A date between the end of December 45 and early January 44 is possible, as a visit by Cicero to Tusculum is certain, but nothing fixes Quintus there.<sup>133</sup> Moreover, the clear references to Caesar's death (1. 119, 2. 99, 110) would have struck the reader as very odd anachronisms. A three-month gap in Cicero's correspondence with Atticus from January 44 suggests that they were both in Rome,<sup>134</sup> but makes tracing his movements and activities largely a matter of hypothesis. Nothing we know of Quintus' movements in 44 precludes a visit to the Tusculan villa coinciding with Cicero's brief stay there in April 44, which can be fixed from

<sup>132</sup> The ground-breaking treatment of the question was by Durand (1903: 173–83). Durand's detailed arguments on the date of composition are criticized powerfully by Falconer (1923: 310–27); Pease (*addenda*, p. 588) notes with approval Falconer's demolition of Durand's thesis that *De Divinatione* had been composed before Caesar's death but had been published after his death with several revisions, 'complété et ça et là retouché' (1903: 180). Giomini (1971: 10–13) discusses some aspects of the problem, but appears not to deal with all of the arguments raised by Falconer. Neither Timpanaro nor Schäublin (399: 'verfaßte... vermutlich in den ersten Monaten des Jahres 44 v.Chr.') devote space to these questions.

<sup>133</sup> The visit began after 19 Dec. (*Att.* 13. 52) and ended shortly after Cicero's birthday on 3 Jan. (*Att.* 13. 42).

<sup>134</sup> Durand 1903: 182. Atticus' presence in Rome has been inferred from *Fam.* 7. 30. 2: 'I couldn't bear all this if I had not taken myself to the port of philosophy and if I didn't have our Atticus as colleague in my studies', although no more than Atticus' interest in his philosophical endeavours may be meant (cf. Falconer 1923: 324–5). Cicero's own presence in Rome is secure, as Shackleton Bailey dates *Fam.* 7. 31 to Feb. 44.

his letters to Atticus of 8 and 9 April.<sup>135</sup> The dramatic date is perhaps not in itself crucial, as we do not have to believe that any conversation such as Cicero describes *actually* took place, nor that he devoted a large part of a day to a discussion of divination. The main consequence of putting the dramatic date in April rather than in December or January and of holding that it should be intelligible as such to the reader is that the publication of *De Divinatione* could not have occurred before the middle of April, at the earliest.

Discussion of the time of composition of the dialogue must fall into two parts, dealing with the prologue to book 2 and then the rest of the work. This lengthy seven-paragraph prologue is clearly no part of the original plan of *De Divinatione*: the dialogue picks up naturally at 2. 8 from the end of book 1; it serves as a postlude to the whole work, setting out Cicero's desire to continue with his philosophical works, but also to be available for his country. Cicero provides a retrospective of his earlier work and the most systematic presentation of his philosophical endeavours from the period of Caesar's dictatorship in the prologue to book 2 of *De Divinatione*. His three books *De Natura Deorum* led on to the *De Divinatione* and to complete the area of theological considerations a work on Fate had yet to be written.<sup>136</sup> When there seemed no prospect of an end to Caesar's domination Cicero envisaged an all-encompassing treatment of philosophy,<sup>137</sup> but the assassination of the dictator and Cicero's return to public life left him less time to devote to philosophy, although the warm reception of his philosophical works heightened his enthusiasm to complete the project.<sup>138</sup> In paragraph seven the words 'now, since I have begun to be consulted about political issues, my time must be devoted to the state...' must

<sup>135</sup> *Att.* 14. 2. 4, 14. 3. 1. The next visit to Tusculum was from 15 June (*Att.* 15. 18) to 30 June (*Att.* 15. 25).

<sup>136</sup> *Div.* 2. 1–7. Between *De Finibus* and *De Natura Deorum* Cicero produced a paraphrase of Plato's *Timaeus*, which he does not mention in the list of *Div.* 2. 8. This work may have been intended as a preface to the three metaphysical dialogues (MacKendrick 1989: 339).

<sup>137</sup> *ND* 1. 9, written in 45. The common description of 'encyclopedia' is endorsed by Tarver (1997: 142), but within the area of physics Cicero dealt only with metaphysics.

<sup>138</sup> Falconer (1923: 326) rightly argues against Durand that this prologue does not signal Cicero's abandonment of philosophy for politics.

be read as an allusion to the removal of Caesar and Cicero's renewed political role from 17 March onwards.<sup>139</sup>

Giomini argues that the composition of the prologue to book 2 can be dated precisely: the plan for *De Fato* was conceived between 11 and 16 May 44, when Cicero met with Hirtius at his Puteoli villa (*Att.* 14. 20, 21. 4) and that work was written between 28 May and 5 June at Tusculum (*Att.* 15. 10);<sup>140</sup> the proem to book 2 indicates only that *De Fato* has been planned, therefore it must fall between the two sets of dates given above, that is, 17–27 May.<sup>141</sup> This is tightly argued, but rests ultimately on accepting that the dramatic date for *De Fato* can be taken as the *terminus ante quem* for the writing of the work and may sit oddly with the references to the recent death of Caesar, which are discussed below on the question of the publication of *De Divinatione*.

When was the rest of *De Divinatione* written? As it survives, the work presents an ostensibly confused picture. On the one hand, there are passages that seem to suggest that Caesar is still alive: for example, in the prologue to book 1 Cicero's words on the impossibility of engaging in any other activity than philosophy with pleasure can be read as a reference to Caesar's dictatorship.<sup>142</sup> On the other hand, there are also indisputable references in both books to Caesar's death, (1. 119; 2. 23, 99, 110, 112) and passages where it is suggested that the language used is too strong to have been used openly during Caesar's

<sup>139</sup> Cf. Cic. *Att.* 14. 10. 1; Dio 44. 22. 3–34. 1 for Cicero's speech to the Senate.

<sup>140</sup> Falconer (1923: 314) argues that *De Fato* was composed in Mar.–Apr. 44, in order to make room in May–June for the composition of *De Gloria*. Given Cicero's speed of writing and the fact that material for *De Fato* had already been gathered in the course of researching *De Natura Deorum* and *De Divinatione*, a work as short as *De Fato* could have been polished off quickly, and then ample time is left in June and the first half of July for the composition of *De Gloria*: although Cicero had *promised* to send it on 3 July (*Att.* 15. 27. 2), and again on 11 July (*Att.* 16. 2. 6), it was not until 17 July that a revised text was dispatched (*Att.* 16. 3. 1).

<sup>141</sup> Giomini (1971: 13). Falconer (1923: 312) argues plausibly that the discussion Cicero had with Hirtius, which is the dramatic date of the *De Fato*, occurred on 16 May, not at their earlier meeting soon after 17 Apr. (*Att.* 14. 9. 2), around 21 Apr. (14. 11. 2), about which Cicero says nothing. The reference to the future *De Fato* at 1. 127 should not be ignored as a gloss (see commentary ad loc.).

<sup>142</sup> 1. 10–11 and 2. 142. It is not clear to me that the third passage cited by Durand (1903: 179) in this class (2. 52–3) is appropriate: nothing except the *ipse* gives it particular force (*pace* Giomini 1971: 19 n. 20).

life.<sup>143</sup> If the inference about the first group of passages is correct, it is clear that Cicero added the last passages after 15 March 44 to a text that was substantially complete. This would mean a procedure of revision similar to that which he mentions for book 5 of *De Finibus* (*Att.* 13. 21a. 1; 16. 3. 1). However, if the first passages can be plausibly shown to have been composed in the period after Caesar's assassination, there would be the possibility of a more consistent, thorough revision of the whole work after the assassination (even if it had been substantially completed before the assassination) than has been believed up to this point. They read as follows:

If you permit, I shall set out what I think about these things, provided that you have the time and that you have nothing you think should take precedence over this discussion. 'For my part, Quintus,' I said, 'I always have time for philosophy; and at this time when there is nothing else that I can gladly do, I am much more eager to hear what you think about divination.' (1. 10–11)

Now indeed because of the interruption to forensic activity I have given up working by night and have started taking siestas, which I didn't make use of previously; and although sleeping so much I have not been advised by any dream, especially about matters of such great importance; nor is there any time at which I seem more to be dreaming than when I see the magistrates in the forum or the senate in the senate house. (2. 142)

Certainly both passages could refer to Cicero's life in 45, especially after his defence of Deiotarus, or in early 44 when, although remaining largely in Rome, he was not practising forensic oratory or playing a political role.<sup>144</sup> Indeed the description of the period as a time

<sup>143</sup> Notably the description of Mithradates as 'some petty sycophant of his from Pergamum' (2. 79: *adseculae suo Pergameno nescio cui*), a passage first adduced to this end by R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i (Leipzig, 1895), 536 n.; cf. 2. 110–11, the description of Caesar as king could not have been written in his lifetime (cf. Giomini 1971: 30–3). The description of Deiotarus as 'deprived by Caesar of his tetrarchy, kingdom and money' (1. 27: *a Caesare tetrarchia et regno pecuniaque multatus est*) is not such that Caesar would necessarily have been offended (Falconer 1923: 321). Alternatively it may be an addition after the assassination (cf. Giomini 1971: 35 n. 57).

<sup>144</sup> Durand (1903: 179 n. 5) takes 'especially about matters of such great importance; nor is there any time at which I seem more to be dreaming than when I see the magistrates in the forum or the senate in the senate house' (*tantis praesertim de rebus, nec mihi magis umquam videor quam cum aut in foro magistratus aut in curia senatum video somniare*) (2. 142) as a general description of the political situation under Caesar's dictatorship, after Cicero had returned (cf. *Brut.* 6: 'the Roman forum...'

'when there is nothing else I can gladly do [than write philosophy]' does most naturally fit Caesar's dictatorship. But it is impossible to rule out a context soon after Caesar's death: the passage from the prologue to book 1 could describe Cicero's life in the prolonged period of absence from Rome (early April to 31 August), when he was disillusioned with events in Rome.<sup>145</sup> The second passage might fit between Caesar's death and Cicero's departure from Rome in early April, if we emphasize Cicero's *seeing* the magistrates' performance.<sup>146</sup> Nonetheless, the most plausible reference of the two passages is to Caesar's dictatorship, even though that means a certain inconsistency with the apparent dramatic date of the dialogue and with the other passages which clearly postdate Caesar's death.

Is it possible to define the period during which the bulk of the work was written? In June 45 Cicero asked Atticus for a copy of Brutus' epitome of Coelius Antipater and Panaetius' *On Providence*, works which were to be useful for both *De Natura Deorum* and *De Divinatione*,<sup>147</sup> and it seems clear that this marks a stage in his planning of the two works (and probably of the necessary corollary *De Fato*); in early August 45 he was working on the refutation of the Epicurean arguments in *De Natura Deorum*, which suggests that the work was far from complete; then, if the order of works in the prologue to *De Divinatione* 2 is to be believed, *De Senectute* intervened<sup>148</sup> before work on *De Divinatione* began in

despoiled and bereft', *Fam.* 6. 15. 3: 'robbed of both my domestic and my forensic ornaments and consolations').

<sup>145</sup> Stockton 1971: 280–6. Letters such as *Fam.* 12. 1, *Att.* 14. 4, 14. 6: 'I find no way in which I can possibly take part in politics... you see the consuls; you see the other magistrates, if they can be called magistrates.'

<sup>146</sup> Giomini 1971: 19–20 for various interpretations of these words, in particular excluding any reference to the period after 1 June 44. See *Att.* 14. 6 from 12 Apr., quoted in the previous footnote, for an almost identical sentiment.

<sup>147</sup> e.g. 1. 77. By ignoring the relevance of the Coelius epitome for *De Natura Deorum* 2. 8, Falconer (1923: 324) seeks to advance serious work on *De Divinatione* before the end of 45.

<sup>148</sup> *Div.* 2. 3. Cicero's order is followed by Philippson (*RE* 7A. 1156). Powell (1988: 267–8), however, argues that *De Senectute* was written mostly between Jan. and 15 Mar. 44, 'otherwise one would have to explain the apparent slowing down of his literary production in January–March 44, when he was otherwise working only on the *De Divinatione*'. It is preferable to push the work on *De Senectute* back to late 45.

earnest.<sup>149</sup> This suggests that composition did not begin before winter 45. Cicero's sojourn in Rome from early January and his apparent lack of interest in politics during that period, to judge from the paucity of letters *Ad Familiares*, would have allowed him ample time to compose both books before Caesar's death.

While this conclusion<sup>150</sup> has not been reached with arguments that are certain, it fits best into the most plausible overall schedule of Cicero's philosophical works. If it is incorrect, then time has to be found after the assassination for *De Divinatione*. Falconer believes, somewhat mechanistically, that there is no passage before l. 119 that must have been written after the Ides and that the rest was written after the Ides: 'we can understand how, in the ardour of actual composition and with the ineffaceable picture of Caesar's assassination in his mind, Cicero could commit anachronisms and other literary blunders, but it is inconceivable that he should write them into a work *already complete* and in the course of a *revision*, the purpose of which should have been to eliminate and not multiply errors' (Falconer 1923: 327). Falconer suggests that Cicero could have written something in that period (ibid. 320–1), rightly insisting on the use of *all* of Cicero's extant correspondence from the period to determine his state of mind and physical location. The correspondence with Atticus after 6 April reveals rapidly changing moods, not a deepening depression which would have prevented Cicero from writing. Also neither deep grief nor constant wandering hampered Cicero's philosophical productivity after Tullia's death or in July 44. The point is also well made that none of Cicero's correspondence from 7 April to 3 July mentions any literary activity, and then suddenly what appears to be an 'advertisement' for a well-advanced *De Gloria* appears (*Att.* 15. 27. 2). Certainty is unobtainable, but nothing

<sup>149</sup> Falconer's misguided identification of the *syntagma* of *Att.* 16. 3. 1 with *De Senectute* (1923: 323–4) leads him to argue that that work was not *published* before 17 July 44, and thus *De Divinatione* was published even later. Rather, the *syntagma* is the *De Gloria* (Shackleton Bailey 1967, ad loc.).

<sup>150</sup> Essentially that of Durand (1903: 176–7). To compress the writing into the period between the assassination and 7 Apr. seems very unlikely given Cicero's involvement in the political turmoil (Durand 1903: 178–9).

precludes the hypothesis that *De Divinatione* was essentially complete before Caesar's death and that minor alterations only, along with the writing of the prologue to book 2, were made in the next month or so.

Publication, that is, circulation of the work authorized by the writer, which is confirmed by the opening paragraph of *De Fato*, undoubtedly postdates Caesar's death.<sup>151</sup> Durand posits an almost immediate publication, before the beginning of April, on the basis of two passages in book 2: 'how many prophecies I recall were made to Caesar himself by the Chaldaeans' and 'an interpreter [of the Sibylline oracles], according to a recent rumour which proved false, was thought to be about to declare in the Senate that the man whom we had as king in fact, should also be called king'.<sup>152</sup> In the former *huic* is reasonably translated as 'recently' and in the latter *nuper* is clear.<sup>153</sup> Neither of these, however, can prove a period of less than a month after Caesar's death. Although the silence in Cicero's letters between 7 April and 3 July 44 on any literary activity could be 'a fairly powerful argument that *De Divinatione* was published before 7 April' (Dyck *per litt.*), as we have seen, he must have been working on *De Gloria* and so some activity relating to *De Divinatione* cannot be excluded. In fact, the question of the dramatic date is relevant: if I am correct in identifying this as 8 or 9 April, then publication occurred in April or May 44.

To summarize, it seems most likely that *De Divinatione* was written between late 45 and the death of Caesar; in the aftermath of that crucial event Cicero revised the work, eliminating for the most part any clear anachronisms and composing the prologue to book 2. Publication followed shortly thereafter, between mid-April and mid-May.

<sup>151</sup> *Fat.* 1: 'in the other books ... which I published on divination' (*in aliis libris ... quos de divinatione edidi*). Durand 1903: 174.

<sup>152</sup> *Div.* 2. 99: '*quam multa ... huic ipsi Caesari a Chaldaeis dicta memini*'; 2. 110: '*quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur eum, quem re vera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem*...' Durand 1903: 178.

<sup>153</sup> Durand 1903: 178: 'mort hier'; cf. Falconer's translation: 'now lately deceased' and Schäublin: 'jüngst'.



## 6. THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The good working texts of the *De Divinatione* produced by Timpanaro and Schäublin in their 1988 and 1991 editions form the basis for the text I have translated. Brief explanatory notes in the commentary indicate divergences only where the meaning of the text as it affects historical or philosophical issues is concerned. A new Oxford Classical Text is in preparation by Dr H. Hine.

## Translation

(1) There is an ancient belief, which goes right back to heroic times and which is reinforced by the approbation both of the Roman people and of all peoples, that there is practised among mortals a kind of divination, which the Greeks call *mantike*, that is a presentiment and knowledge of future things. It is a noble and beneficial thing, if in fact it exists, and one by which human nature is able to come closest to the power of the gods. So, just as we have done many other things better than the Greeks, so here our ancestors derived the term for this most excellent faculty from the gods (*divi*), but the Greeks, as Plato explains, from madness. (2) I see that there is no people so civilized and educated or so savage and so barbarous that it does not hold that signs of the future can be given and can be understood and announced in advance by certain individuals. In the beginning the Assyrians, to seek authority from the most ancient, because of the flatness and size of the areas they inhabited, when they looked at a sky unobscured and open on every side, observed the courses and movements of the stars; and having noted them, they handed down to posterity what they signified for each. Within this people the Chaldaean, who were so called not from the name of their art but of their nation, are considered to have developed the science by long observation of the stars, so that it could be predicted what would happen to each person and with what destiny each had been born. The Egyptians also are considered to have acquired the same skill over a very long time through almost countless centuries. The Cilicians and the Pisidians, and the latter's neighbours, the Pamphylians, peoples over whom I myself have been governor, hold that the future is revealed by the flight and singing of birds,

<as> very reliable signs. (3) What colony indeed did Greece send to Aeolia, Ionia, Asia, Sicily, or Italy without an oracle from Delphi, Dodona, or Ammon? Or what war has been undertaken by Greece without the advice of the gods?

Nor is there only one form of divination practised by states and individuals. For, to say nothing of every other nation, how many has our own embraced? At the outset the father of our city, Romulus, is held not only to have founded the city after taking the auspices but also himself to have been a very good augur. Thereafter the rest of the kings employed augurs and, after the kings had been driven out, no public business, either at home or on military campaign, was undertaken without the auspices being taken. And, because there seemed to be great efficacy in the lore of the *haruspices* both for seeking and consulting and in interpreting and averting portents, they took over this whole discipline from the Etruscans, so that there should be no kind of divination which might seem ignored by them. (4) And, as there are two ways in which spirits are moved by their own force and unfettered impulse and not by reason or knowledge—by raving and by dreaming—believing that divination from raving was best contained in the Sibylline verses, they decided that there should be ten interpreters of them chosen from the citizen body. They have often thought that an ear should be given to raving predictions of this kind from soothsayers and seers, as for example to those of Cornelius Culleolus in the Octavian War. Nor indeed have the more significant dreams, if they seemed to concern the state, been ignored by the highest council. For even within my own memory, L. Iulius, who was consul with P. Rutilius, restored the temple of Juno Sospita with senatorial authorization, on the basis of a dream of Caecilia, the daughter of Baliaricus.

(5) My own view is that the ancients approved of these things more because they were influenced by outcomes than because they were convinced by reason. Certain subtle arguments of philosophers as to why divination is true have been collected. Of these, to mention the most ancient, Xenophanes of Colophon, while he admitted the existence of the gods, was the only one who fundamentally rejected divination. All the rest, except Epicurus in his babbling on the nature of the gods, believed in the reality of divination, but not in the same way. For although Socrates and all the Socratics and Zeno and those

who followed him, along with the Old Academy and the Peripatetics, abided by the view of the ancient philosophers and although Pythagoras (who himself even wanted to be an augur) had previously conferred his considerable prestige on the practice; and although that weighty authority Democritus in very many passages argued for the presentiment of things to come, Dicaearchus the Peripatetic denied all other forms of divination except dreams and raving, and Cratippus, our friend whom I consider to be the equal of the finest Peripatetics, gave credence to these same forms, but rejected the other kinds of divination. (6) But, when the Stoics were defending almost all its forms, in that Zeno had, as it were, scattered various seeds in his commentaries and Cleanthes had developed them a little more, then came Chrysippus, a man of very sharp intellect, who set out the whole doctrine of divination in two volumes, as well as one on oracles and one on dreams. His pupil Diogenes of Babylon followed him and wrote one volume, Antipater two, and our friend Posidonius five. But Panaetius, although the leader of their school, the teacher of Posidonius and pupil of Antipater, deviated from the Stoics. However, he did not dare to deny the existence of a divinatory force, but said that he had his doubts. Will we not be permitted by the Stoics to do on all other points what was permitted to him on one point, although he was a Stoic and it was very much against the wishes of the Stoics, especially since what was not clear to Panaetius was clearer than the light of day to all the other members of that school? (7) At any rate, this virtue of the Academy has been approved by the judgement and witness of a most eminent philosopher.

So, as I myself am enquiring what verdict is to be reached in regard to divination, because of the many points that have been made by Carneades acutely and in great detail against the Stoics, and, as I am afraid to give my assent rashly to something untrue or to something insufficiently grounded, it seems that I should again and again make a careful comparison of argument against argument, as I did in the three books which I wrote *On the Nature of the Gods*. For haste in giving one's assent and erring is shameful in all things, especially in this topic where one must decide how much credence should be given to auspices, to the divine, and to religious observance. For there is a danger of rendering ourselves guilty of the crime of impiety if we neglect them or of old women's superstition if we accept them.

(8) I have often discussed these questions on other occasions, and recently in rather more detail when I was with my brother Quintus at my Tusculan villa. When for the sake of a walk we had reached the Lyceum (for that is what my upper gymnasium is called), he said, 'I have just read through the third book of your *On the Nature of the Gods* in which the argument of Cotta, although it has shaken my opinion, has not utterly destroyed it.' 'Splendid!' I said, 'for Cotta argues in this way to destroy the Stoics' arguments rather than to destroy men's religion.' Then Quintus said, 'That is indeed said by Cotta and repeatedly so, I think, in order that he may not appear to reject what is generally held to be right. But in his eagerness to argue against the Stoics I think that he utterly rejects the gods. (9) I am by no means at a loss how to reply to his argument, since religion has received a satisfactory defence by Lucilius in the second book and you yourself thought his argumentation was closer to the truth, as you write at the end of the third book. But there was an omission in those books (I believe because you considered it more appropriate to inquire into it and discuss it separately), namely divination, which is the prediction and presentiment of those things which are thought to occur by chance. If you wish, let us see what power it possesses and what its nature is. I hold that, if the types of divination we accept and practise are true, there are gods; conversely, if there are gods, there exist men who can divine.'

(10) 'Quintus,' I said, 'you are defending the Stoic citadel, if indeed those points of yours stand in reciprocal relationship, that "if there is divination, there are gods" and "if there are gods, there is divination". Neither of these is to be granted as easily as you think: for the future can be announced naturally without the involvement of a god and it may be that gods exist, but that no power of divination has been conferred by them on men.' He replied, 'As far as I am concerned, the fact that I consider that there are clear and obvious kinds of divination is sufficient proof that there are gods and that they have concern for human affairs. If you permit, I shall set out what I think about these things, provided that you have the time and that you have nothing you think should take precedence over this discussion.' (11) 'For my part, Quintus,' I said, 'I always have time for philosophy; and at this time when there is nothing else that I can do with pleasure, I am much more eager to hear what you think about divination.'

‘I assure you’, he said, ‘that I myself have no new views, nothing that everyone else has not said: for I follow the opinion that is both very old and is corroborated by the unanimity of all peoples and nations: that is, there are two kinds of divination, the one involving a technique, the other involving nature. (12) What nation or what state is there that is not influenced by the prediction of those who examine entrails or interpret prodigies and lightning or of augurs or astrologers or lots (these are the kind which as a rule involve a technique) or by dreams or prophecies (these are the two classed as natural)? I consider that the outcomes of these practices should be investigated rather than their causes. For there is a kind of natural force which both through signs observed over a long time and through some impulse and divine inspiration announces the future.

So let Carneades cease insisting as Panaetius used to do, asking whether Jupiter had ordered the crow to croak on the left and the raven on the right. These have been observed over an immense period of time and have become recognized and recorded according to the outcomes of their signs. There is nothing that length of time cannot accomplish and achieve, as long as memory records the facts and accounts are handed down. (13) One can be amazed at what kinds of herbs have been recognized by doctors and what kinds of roots are good for animal bites, for eye problems, and for wounds and, although reason has never explained their force and nature, by their usefulness both their application and their discoverer have won approval. So, then, let us consider things which, although they are of another type, are nonetheless similar to divination.

Moreover a swollen sea often gives warning of winds to come, when suddenly and from its depths it begins to swell, and rocks, white and foamy with snowy brine, strive to reply to Neptune with gloom-inducing voices or when a shrill whistle arising from a lofty mountain peak grows stronger, repulsed by the barrier of crags.

Your *Prognostica* are crammed with these presentiments of things to come. Who can uncover the causes of these presentiments? Yet I see that Boethus the Stoic has tried, and has succeeded in so far as he has explained marine and celestial phenomena. (14) But who can give a plausible explanation of why the following things occur?

Similarly the white egret, fleeing from the swirling of the sea, cries and announces the approach of frightening storms, as it pours from its vibrating throat no small noises. Often also does the *acredula* sing a very sad song from her breast and attack with her dawn calls, attack with her calls and emit from her throat continual complaints as soon as dawn releases the icy dews; and sometimes the dark crow, racing along the shore, immerses its head and takes the flood on its neck.

(15) We see that these signs almost never deceive, but we do not see why this is so.

You also see the signs, you daughters of fresh water, when you prepare to utter your empty cries and with your ridiculous sound stir springs and ponds.

Who is there who could imagine that mere frogs see that? But there is within frogs a kind of natural force for giving signs, sufficiently clear in itself but too dark for human comprehension.

Soft-footed cattle, looking at the heavenly lights, with their noses draw from the air moisture-bearing juice.

I do not ask why, since I know what happens.

Now indeed the ever-green and ever-burdened mastic, accustomed to swell three times with a triple production and three times putting forth its fruit, shows the three times for ploughing.

(16) Nor do I ask why this tree alone should flower three times nor why it makes the time for ploughing fit with the sign of its flowering. I am content with this, that, even though I do not know why this happens, I do know what happens. So for every kind of divination I shall give the same answer as I did for the things I have cited.

I see the efficacy of the scammony root for purging and birthwort for countering snake bites (the latter takes its name from its discoverer and the discoverer learnt of it from a dream) and this is sufficient; I do not know why they work. In the same way I do not understand adequately the explanation for the signs of wind and rain which I have mentioned; I recognize, I know, and I vouch for the force and the result of them. Likewise I accept what “the fissure” in entrails means or what “a thread” means; I do not know their cause. Life is indeed full of these things [for almost everyone uses entrails].

Again, surely we can have no doubts about the force of lightning? Do we not have many other instances, and this one among the first? When the statue of Summanus on top of the temple of Jupiter Best and Greatest, which was at that time made of clay, had been struck from heaven and the head of the statue could not be found, the *haruspices* declared that it had been hurled into the Tiber; and it was found in the spot which they had indicated.

(17) What better authority or witness could I use than you? I have even learnt by heart, and indeed with pleasure, the verses which the Muse Urania speaks in the second book of your *Consulship*:

First of all Jupiter, aflame with the fire of the ether, turns and bathes the whole world in his light; he searches the heaven and the earth with his divine mind which probes to the bottom the thoughts and lives of men, confined and hemmed within the caverns of the eternal ether. And if you want to learn the motions and wandering courses of the stars (which “stray” in the terminology and false nomenclature of the Greeks, but really move in a set course and track), in what part of the zodiac they are located, you will see that they all bear the mark of the divine mind. (18) For, during your consulship, you too first observed the swift motions of the heavenly bodies and the menacing conjunction of stars with glowing heat, when you performed purifying sacrifices on the snowy peaks of the Alban Mount and celebrated the Latin Festival with abundant milk, and you also saw shimmering comets with their bright light. And you thought that there was much confusion involving a nocturnal massacre, because the Latin Festival fell around a time of foreboding, when the moon hid its clear shape with dulled light and was suddenly removed from the starry sky. What means the torch of Phoebus, the herald of bitter war, which was climbing towards its zenith with blazing heat, while longing for the western parts of heaven and its setting? Or when a citizen struck by an awesome thunderbolt from a clear sky departs the light of life; or when the earth trembled with its pregnant body? Then indeed during the night various terrible forms were seen and warned of war and sedition; seers throughout the lands poured forth prophecies from frenzied breast warning of tragic outcomes. (19) Those things which after a long gap finally came to pass, the Father of the gods himself frequently foretold by clear and continual signs on the earth and in the heavens.

Now all those immutable prophecies which the Lydian *haruspex* of Etruscan descent had once uttered during the consulship of Torquatus and Cotta your year of office piled up and brought to fulfilment. For the Father who thunders on high, resting on starry Olympus, himself struck his own hills



and his own temples and hurled his fires at his Capitoline seat. Then fell the ancient and revered bronze image of Natta, and the laws long hallowed were liquefied and the heat of the lightning destroyed statues of gods. (20) Here was Mars' wood-haunting nurse of the Roman nation who suckled with life-giving dew from her swollen breasts the young sons of the seed of Mars. At the blow of the flaming lightning bolt she fell with the boys and, once torn from her position, left the marks of her feet.

Who, examining the writings and records of the art, did not utter foreboding words from the Etruscan pages? They all warned that a huge disaster and evil, that would affect the state and had begun from noble ancestry was looming, or in unvarying terms they announced the overthrow of the laws and ordered us to snatch the temples of the gods and the city from the flames and to fear a terrible slaughter and massacre? These things were fixed and determined by an unyielding fate, unless a holy and well-proportioned statue of Jupiter were set up on a high column and looked to the bright east. Then the people and holy Senate would be able to discern hidden plots, once that statue, turned now to the sunrise, could see the seats of the Senators and people. (21) This statue, long delayed and after many hold-ups, was finally set up in its exalted position during your consulship and at the very moment in time that had been fixed and marked, when Jupiter made his sceptre shine on the lofty column, the destruction of our country, prepared with torch and sword, was revealed to Senators and people by the words of the Allobroges.

So rightly did the ancients, whose writings you know, who ruled peoples and cities with moderation and virtue, rightly did your compatriots, whose piety and faithfulness are outstanding and whose wisdom far surpasses all, before all else worship the gods whose power is efficacious. Those who joyfully occupied their leisure with noble studies understood these duties profoundly in their wise reflections, (22) and in shady Academe or dazzling Lyceum poured out brilliant theories from their fertile genius. Your country set you, who had been snatched from these things in the first flower of your youth, in the midst of a burdensome place where manly virtues are exercised. Nevertheless, relieving your stressful worries in relaxation, the time which is not taken up by your country you have devoted to these pursuits and to us.

So will you be able to bring yourself to speak against my arguments on divination, you who have done what you have done and have written with the greatest care what I have quoted?

(23) How? You ask, Carneades, why these things happen in this way and by what technique they can be understood? I admit that I do not know, but I say that you yourself see them happen. "By chance",

you say. Can that really be so? Can anything happen by chance which bears upon itself all the marks of truth? Four dice cast produce by chance a "Venus throw"; but surely you don't think it would be chance if you threw 400 dice and got 100 "Venus throws"? Paint sprayed at random on a canvas can form the outlines of a face, but surely you don't think that the beauty of the Venus of Cos could be produced by a random spraying? If a sow should form the letter A on the ground with its snout, surely on that basis you couldn't think that Ennius' *Andromache* could be written by it? Carneades told the story that when a stone was split open in the quarries of Chios the head of a young Pan appeared. I accept that there was some such resemblance, but certainly not such that you would say it had been done by Scopas. For it is surely the case that chance never imitates reality perfectly.

(24) "But sometimes what has been predicted does not come to pass." What art, I ask you, does not experience this? I am speaking of those arts which are based on conjecture and involve opinion. Is medicine not to be considered an art? Yet how many mistakes are made! And pilots, do they not make mistakes? The army of the Greeks and the pilots of so many ships, did they not set sail from Troy in such a way that "happy at leaving, they watched the play of fish", as Pacuvius says, "and could not get their fill of gazing":

Meanwhile, as the sun was setting, the sea became rough, the gloom thickened and the blackness of night and storm blinded.

Surely the shipwreck of so many illustrious leaders and kings does not take away the art of steering? Is the science of generals nothing because the finest of generals recently lost his army and fled? Or is there no method or wisdom for governing a state because Cn. Pompey has made many errors, Cato a few, and even you yourself one or two? The response of *haruspices* and every kind of divination involving opinion is similar, for it depends on conjecture, beyond which it cannot go. (25) It errs perhaps occasionally, but nonetheless on most occasions directs us to the truth. For it stretches back over the whole of time, during which, because identical signs have preceded identical outcomes in identical ways on a number of occasions almost beyond counting, an art has been constituted through the repeated observation and recording of the same signs.

Indeed how trustworthy are your auspices! At the present these are neglected by Roman augurs (I say this with your permission) but are preserved by the Cilicians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, and Lycians. (26) Why should I remind you of our host, a most famous and excellent man, king Deiotarus, who never undertook anything without first having taken the auspices. When, because he had been warned by the flight of an eagle, he had returned from a journey which he had planned and decided on in advance, the room in which he would have stayed, had he continued his journey, collapsed the next night. (27) In this way, as I used to hear from him in person, he very often abandoned a journey, even when he had travelled for many days. The following saying of his is most remarkable: after Caesar had deprived him of his tetrarchy, his kingdom, and money, he said that he did not regret the auspices which were favourable as he set off to join Pompey in that the authority of the Senate, the liberty of the Roman people, and the prestige of the empire had been defended by his forces and that those birds on whose authority he had taken the course of duty and good faith had given him good advice. For a good reputation was dearer to him than his belongings. He seems to me to have employed real augury. For our magistrates employ “forced” auspices; for it is necessary for some of the dough that is offered to fall from the beak of the chicken when it is fed. (28) You have in your writings that a *tripudium* results from <any> bird if anything falls from it to the ground, and what I said is a forced *tripudium* you say is a *tripudium solistimum*. So by the negligence of the college, as Cato the Wise complains, many auspices and many auguries have been completely lost and abandoned.

In former times almost nothing of any importance was undertaken, even in private life, without first taking the auspices. What proves this even today are “wedding auspices”, the real practice of which has been discontinued and only the name survives. For just as today (albeit a little less frequently than formerly) on important matters the will of the gods is customarily sought by means of entrails, so in the past it was by means of birds. Because of this, as we do not look for the propitious, we run into the dire and unfavourable. (29) For example, P. Claudius, the son of Appius Caecus, and his colleague L. Junius lost very large fleets because they went to sea against the auspices. This befell Agamemnon in the same way, who when the Greeks had begun

to murmur among themselves and to despise the art of those who scrutinized entrails, gave the order to set sail, to general approbation but against the bird.

Why cite ancient examples? We see what happened to M. Crassus for having neglected the announcement of dire auspices. In this regard your colleague Appius, a good augur, or so I am accustomed to hear from you, with insufficient wisdom as censor stigmatized C. Ateius, a good man and a distinguished citizen, because—as Appius justified his action—“he had falsified the auspices”. Be that as it may, this may have been appropriate for him as censor, if he considered that Ateius had lied, but the following was by no means appropriate to him as augur, that he wrote that “it was for that reason that the Roman people had suffered a very great disaster”. For if the calamity occurred for that reason, there is no blame attached to the one who announced the adverse omens, but to the one who did not heed them. (For the outcome proved that the announcement had been true, as the same augur and censor says; if it had been false, it could not have been the cause of the disaster.) For dire auspices, just like all other auspices, omens, and signs, are not the cause of anything happening, but announce what will happen unless measures are taken. (30) So the announcement of Ateius did not produce the cause of the disaster, but, by presenting Crassus with a sign, warned him what would happen if he did not take heed. So, either that announcement had no validity or, if it was valid, as Appius thinks, it was valid in that the fault attached not to the one who gave the warning, but to the one who did not heed it.

And that staff of yours, which is the most distinguished emblem of the augurate, from where was it handed down to you? Indeed, Romulus delimited the regions with it when he founded the city. This staff of Romulus [it is a curved rod slightly bent in at the top which takes its name from its resemblance to a “staff on which music is sounded”], when it had been put in the hall of the Salii (which is on the Palatine) and the hall burnt down, was found undamaged. (31) Again, which of the ancient writers does not mention the division of the regions made by Attus Navius with the staff many years after Romulus, during the reign of Tarquinius Priscus. Because of poverty Navius was a swineherd during his boyhood. When one of his swine was lost he is said to have vowed that, if he recovered it, he

would give to the god the largest bunch of grapes in the vineyard. So, having found the pig, he is said to have stood in the middle of the vineyard facing south and when he had divided the vineyard into four parts and the birds had rejected three parts (and when the fourth part, which was left, had been divided into regions) he found a bunch of amazing size, so we see it recorded. When this had been made known and all his neighbours came to consult him on their own affairs, he won a great reputation and fame. (32) The result of this was that King Priscus summoned him to his presence. As a test of Navius' skill as an augur, Priscus said that he was thinking of something and asked whether it could be done. Navius took the auspices and replied that it could. Tarquinius said that he had thought that a whetstone could be cut by a razor. He ordered Attus to make the attempt. So the whetstone was brought into the Comitium and was cut in two by a razor under the gaze of the king and people. As a result of this Tarquin employed Attus Navius as augur and the people consulted him about their own affairs. (33) We understand that the whetstone and razor were buried in the Comitium and that the *puteal* was placed above them.

Let's deny all this, let's burn the annals, and let's say these things are false and let's admit anything rather than that the gods are concerned with human affairs. Now, what is written in your work about Tiberius Gracchus, does that not confirm the science of both augurs and *haruspices*? After he had unwittingly "taken possession of the tent irregularly" in that he had crossed the *pomerium* without first taking the auspices, he held the elections for the consuls. This is known to you and you yourself have enshrined it in literature. Moreover Tiberius Gracchus, himself an augur, confirmed the authority of the auspices by confessing his own error and great authority was added to the discipline of the *haruspices*, who, when brought before the Senate straight after the election, declared that the magistrate who had presided over the elections had not followed the rules.

(34) So I agree with those who have said that there are two kinds of divination, one in which technique has a part and the other which involves no technique. For there is a technique for those who by conjecture deduce new things and have learnt the ancient by having observed them. On the other hand, they involve no technique who foretell the future not by reason or conjecture (by having observed

and recorded signs), but by a certain stirring of the mind or some free and unrestrained movement, as happens often to people who dream and sometimes to those who prophesy in frenzy, like Bacis of Boeotia, Epimenides of Crete, or the Sibyl of Erythrae. Oracles of this kind should be considered, not those which are conducted by equalized lots, but those which are poured forth under a divine impulse and inspiration. The lot itself is not to be despised, if it also has the sanction of antiquity, as in the case of those lots which we are told sprang from the earth. I believe, however, that under divine influence it may happen that they can be drawn so as to fall appropriately. Those who interpret all these things seem to approach very closely to the divine intention of those they interpret, just as philologists do for poets. (35) What is that cleverness which seeks to destroy by false charges facts established by antiquity? "I do not see their cause." Perhaps it lies hidden, wrapped in the obscurity of nature; for god has not willed me to know such things but only to use them. So, I will use them and will not be led to hold that on the subject of entrails the whole of Etruria is out of its mind or that the same people are in error on lightning or that they interpret portents falsely, since often have crashes, often have groanings, and often have earthquakes given true predictions of many serious events to our commonwealth and many to every other state. (36) Why? Should the recent parturition of a mule (a creature which is naturally sterile), which was predicted by *haruspices* as an incredible progeny of evils, be ridiculed? Well, did not Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius, who was consul twice and censor, moreover an excellent augur, wise man, and outstanding citizen, summon *haruspices* when two snakes had been caught in his house (as his son Gaius Gracchus informs us in the writings he has left)? When they replied that, if he let the male go, his wife would die shortly and, if he released the female, he would die, he considered it more fitting that he should meet his death at the right time rather than the young daughter of Publius Africanus. He released the female and a few days later he died.

Let us ridicule *haruspices*, call them foolish and useless, and let us despise their science to which a very wise man, the outcome, and events have given proof. <Let us condemn> Babylon and those who from Mount Caucasus observe the celestial signs and by their calculations follow the courses of the stars. Let us condemn, I say, of folly

or stupidity or shamelessness those who cover 470,000 years in their works, as they themselves assert, and let us judge them liars and people who had no fear of what the judgement of future centuries on them would be. (37) Alright, barbarians are foolish and deceivers. But surely the history of the Greeks is not also falsified? To speak of natural divination, who is unaware of the responses Pythian Apollo gave to Croesus, the Athenians, Spartans, Tegeans, Argives, and Corinthians? Chrysippus has collected innumerable oracles, none without copious authority and evidence. I pass over these, as they are well known to you. I will make this one point. The oracle of Delphi would never have been so frequented, so famous, and so crammed with such gifts from all kings and peoples, unless all ages had not proved the truth of these oracles. "For a long time now that is not the case." (38) Although it now has a lesser reputation because the truthfulness of its oracles is less striking, nonetheless it would not have had so great a reputation in the past had its veracity not been of the highest level. It may be that the terrestrial force which used to rouse the mind of the Pythia with divine inspiration has vanished over time, just as we see that certain rivers have disappeared and dried up or have twisted and turned aside to another course. Explain its occurrence as you wish, for it is a great question, provided that what cannot be denied, unless we distort the whole of history, abides—that over many centuries the oracle was truthful.

(39) But let's leave oracles and let's come on to dreams. In his discussion of these Chrysippus, by collecting many trivial dreams, does what Antipater does, searching out those dreams which, when explained according to the interpretation of Antiphon, demonstrate the intelligence of the interpreter, but he ought to have used more weighty examples. As it is written in Philistus, a learned and careful man, a contemporary of the times, the mother of the Dionysius who was the tyrant of Syracuse, when pregnant and carrying this Dionysius in her womb, dreamt that she had given birth to a small satyr. The interpreters of portents, who at that time in Sicily were called Galeotae, replied to her, so Philistus says, that the son to whom she gave birth would be the most famous in Greece enjoying long-lasting good fortune.

(40) Shall I not remind you of legends related by our poets and those of the Greeks? For example in Ennius the Vestal recounts:

when roused terrified from sleep the old woman brought the lamp with trembling limbs, and in tears she told this story. "Daughter of Eurydice, whom our father loved, the force of life is now leaving my whole body. For a handsome man appeared to me and snatched me away amid pleasant willows, river banks and places unknown. So alone thereafter, my sister, I seemed to wander and slowly to track you and to search for you and to be unable to grasp you in my heart; no path kept my feet steady." (41) Then my father seemed to address me in these words: "Daughter, you must first endure miseries, then your fortune will rise from the river." When father had said this, my sister, he suddenly disappeared and did not offer himself to view, although I desired it in my heart, although I often stretched my hands to the blue expanses of heaven, tearful, and with pleading voice called to him. Then sleep left me sick at heart.

(42) Although these words are the creations of a poet, nonetheless they are not alien to the regular experience of dreams. The following too, I admit, is fiction, that by which Priam was troubled because:

The pregnant, mother Hecuba dreamt in her sleep that she gave birth to a flaming torch; after this the father, King Priam himself, stricken with fear in his mind over the dream, consumed with sigh-full cares, kept sacrificing bleating victims. Then, seeking peace, he demanded an interpretation, begged Apollo to explain the fate portended by such an extraordinary dream. Then from his oracle, with divine voice, Apollo told Priam not to raise the son who would be born next; he was the destruction of Troy, a plague to Pergamum.

(43) Although these are, as I have said, unhistorical dreams, to them should be added the dream of Aeneas, which is related in the Greek histories of Fabius Pictor, which is certainly of the same kind—everything that was done by Aeneas and occurred to him was that which appeared to him as he slept.

Let's look at examples closer to our time. What kind of dream is that of Tarquinius Superbus, of which he speaks in Accius' *Brutus*?

(44) When with the onset of night I surrendered my body to rest, soothing my tired limbs in sleep, I saw in a dream a shepherd driving towards me a fleecy herd of outstanding beauty. I chose from it two brother rams and sacrificed the more magnificent of the two; then its brother made for me with its horns, rammed me and with its blow knocked me down. Then, stretched on the ground, severely hurt, on my back, I beheld in the sky a great and wonderful occurrence: the flaming rayed orb of the sun melted away on a new path to the right.



(45) So let's see what interpretation of that dream was given by the diviners:

O King, it is by no means strange that the things which men do, see, think and worry about in their lives, the things they do and do habitually when awake, that those things appear to anyone in a dream; but the gods do not present so important a matter unintentionally and unexpectedly. So, take care that the one whom you consider as stupid as a sheep does not act, his heart armed with wisdom, a man out of the ordinary, and expel you from your kingdom. For that which was shown you with regard to the sun portends an immediate change in their affairs for the people. May this be a good omen for the people! For the fact that the mighty star took its course from left to right is the most favourable augury that the Roman commonwealth will be supreme.

(46) Now let us return to foreign examples. Heraclides Ponticus, a learned man, a pupil and follower of Plato, writes that the mother of Phalaris dreamt that she saw in her dreams the statues of the gods which she herself had dedicated in the house; of these the Mercury seemed to pour blood from the bowl which he held in his right hand; when it touched the ground, it welled up so that the whole house was awash with blood. The cruelty of her inhuman son confirmed the mother's dream. Why do I need to bring out from Dinon's *Persica* the interpretations which the Magi gave to Cyrus the First? For when, as he was sleeping, the sun appeared at his feet, Dinon writes that he grasped at it with his hands three times to no effect as the sun in its course slipped away from him and left; the Magi [considered among the Persians a class of wise and learned men] told him that his triple grasping of the sun portended that Cyrus would reign for thirty years. And so it came to pass, for he reached his seventieth year, having begun to reign when he was forty.

(47) Even among barbarian nations, there is definitely a power of presentiment and divination, seeing that the Indian Callanus, setting off to his death, as he was ascending his blazing pyre, said, "What a splendid exit from life when, as happened to Hercules, the soul leaves for the light once the mortal body has been burnt!" When Alexander asked him to say if he needed anything, he said, "Thank you, I shall see you soon." So it came to pass, for Alexander died a few days later at Babylon. I am digressing a little from dreams, to which I shall return soon. It is an accepted fact that on the night that the temple of

Ephesian Diana burnt down Alexander was given birth by Olympias, and when the first light of dawn appeared, Magi proclaimed that a pest and plague to Asia had been born that night.

So much for Indians and Magi. (48) Let's get back to dreams. Coelius writes that Hannibal, when he wanted to carry off the gold pillar which stood in the shrine of Juno Lacinia and was uncertain whether it was solid or gilded on the outside, drilled through it; and when he discovered it to be solid he decided to remove it, Juno appeared to him as he dreamt, ordering him not to do it and warning him that, if he did, she would see to it that he also lost the eye with which he saw well. That was not ignored by the clever man. From the gold which had been drilled out he had a small calf made and set on top of the column. (49) Likewise this is in the Greek history of Silenus (whom Coelius follows), who has reported the actions of Hannibal with very great care: When he had captured Saguntum, Hannibal dreamt that he was summoned into the council of the gods by Jupiter; when he arrived, Jupiter ordered him to take the war into Italy and a guide was given him from the council whom he employed when he began to advance with his army. Then the guide ordered him not to look back; he could not refrain from doing this any longer and, carried away by desire, he looked back. He saw a vast horrendous beast wrapped around with snakes destroying all trees, bushes, and buildings wherever it went; in amazement he asked the god what on earth such a monster was, and the god replied that it was the devastation of Italy and ordered him to press on and not to worry about what was happening behind him and in his rear. (50) In the history of Agathocles it is written that the Carthaginian Hamilcar, when he was besieging Syracuse, believed that he heard a voice saying that the following day he would dine in Syracuse. When that day appeared, a great conflict sprang up between Carthaginian and Sicilian soldiers; as soon as the Syracusans realized this, without warning they broke into the camp and Hamilcar was carried off alive by them. So the outcome confirmed the dream. History is full of such examples and everyday life is crammed with them. (51) It is a fact that the famous Publius Decius, the son of Quintus, who was the first of the Decii to become consul, when he was military tribune in the consulship of M. Valerius and A. Cornelius and our army was being hard pressed by the Samnites, when he was entering the

dangers of battle too rashly and was warned to be more careful, said, as it appears in the annals, that in his dreams he had seen himself die with very great glory when he was engaged in the midst of the enemy. On that occasion he extricated the army from encirclement without losing his life. But three years later, when he was consul, he “devoted” himself and in his armour dashed himself against the battleline of the Latins. By this action of his, the Latins were overcome and destroyed. His death was so glorious that his son ardently desired to do the same.

(52) So let’s now come, if you wish, to the dreams of philosophers. In Plato, Socrates, when in state custody, said to his friend Crito that he was to die in three days; for in his dream he had seen a woman of rare beauty who called him by name and quoted an Homeric line as follows:

the third good day will set you in Phthia.

It is written that it happened just as it was said. That follower of Socrates, Xenophon (what a man of quality, what a great man!), records his own dreams during the campaign which he served with Cyrus the Younger. Their remarkable outcomes are recorded. (53) Shall we say that Xenophon is a liar or mad? Does Aristotle, a man of unique and almost divine intellect, err or want others to err when he writes that his friend Eudemus of Cyprus, while travelling to Macedonia arrived at Pherae, which was at that time a renowned city in Thessaly and was held in domination by the cruel tyrant Alexander. In that town Eudemus was so severely ill that the doctors despaired of him. In a dream there appeared to him a young man of striking appearance saying that he would very soon recover, in a few days the tyrant Alexander would die and Eudemus himself would return home after five years. Aristotle writes that the first came true immediately, in that Eudemus recovered, and the tyrant was killed by his wife’s brothers. But at the end of five years, when he hoped because of that dream to return to Cyprus from Sicily, he was killed in battle before Syracuse. Consequently the dream was interpreted to mean that, when the soul of Eudemus left his body, it had returned home.

(54) Let’s add to the philosophers a most learned man, the divine poet Sophocles. When a heavy gold bowl had been stolen from the temple of Hercules, he saw in a dream the god himself saying who

had done it. He ignored it the first and second time. When the same dream came more frequently, he went up to the Areopagus and revealed the matter. The Areopagites ordered the arrest of the man who had been named by Sophocles. When the question was put to him, he confessed and brought back the bowl. Because of this episode that temple acquired the name of Hercules the Informer.

(55) Why am I speaking of Greek examples? Somehow our own give me more pleasure. All historians, like the Fabii, the Gellii, but with the greatest accuracy Coelius, record this. During the Latin War, when the great votive games were being held for the first time, the state was suddenly roused to arms, the games were interrupted, and it was decided that repeats should be held. Before these could happen and when the people had already taken their seats, a slave wearing a yoke was led through the circus and was beaten with rods. Afterwards there appeared to a Roman peasant as he slept someone who said that the opener of the games had not pleased him and that he had ordered him to tell this to the Senate; he did not dare to do this. The same order was given and a warning not to test his power. Not even then did he dare. Then his son died and the same warning was given a third time by a dream. Then he too became ill and told his friends, on whose advice he was carried by litter to the Senate-house, and when he had related the dream to the Senate he returned home on his own feet, restored. It is handed down that the dream was accepted by the Senate and the games were repeated a second time. (56) Gaius Gracchus told many, as it is written in the same Coelius' work, that when he was a candidate for the quaestorship his brother Tiberius had appeared to him in his dreams and said that, however much he wished to delay it, nonetheless he must perish sharing the same fate as he himself had. Coelius writes that this happened before Gracchus was elected Tribune of the People and that <Gracchus> had told many. What can be found better authenticated than this dream?

And who, I ask you, can despise those two dreams which are very frequently recounted by the Stoics? The one concerns Simonides: he saw a man he did not know dead and washed up and buried him. When he was intending to board ship he appeared to be warned not to do it by the very man whose burial he had undertaken; if he sailed, he would perish in a shipwreck. So Simonides went back and all the others who then sailed perished. (57) The second dream is very

well-known and is handed down as follows: when two friends from Arcadia were travelling together and came to Megara, the one stayed at an inn, the other with a friend. When they had eaten and had gone to bed, in the first part of the night the other appeared in the dreams of the one who was with his friend, begging that he should come to his aid as his death was being prepared by the innkeeper. Terrified at first by the dream he got up; then when he had collected himself and decided that what he had seen had no value, he went back to bed. Then as he was sleeping the other appeared to ask him, since he had not come to his aid while he was alive, not to let his death go unavenged; he had been killed, thrown into a wagon by the innkeeper and excrement had been thrown on top of him; he asked him to be at the gate early, before the wagon could leave the city. Moved by this dream he met the cart-driver early at the gate and asked him what was in the wagon. In terror he fled, the dead man was dug out, and the innkeeper, his crime revealed, was punished. What can be said to be more divinely inspired than this dream?

(58) Why search for more examples or those from antiquity? I have often told you of a dream I had and I have often heard yours. When I was proconsul of Asia, in a dream I saw you riding on a horse towards the bank of a large river, suddenly lurch forward, fall into the river, and not reappear anywhere. I trembled in fear, terrified, but then suddenly you reappeared joyful and climbed up the opposite bank on the same horse, and we embraced each other. The interpretation of this dream is straightforward and experts in Asia predicted to me the events which came to pass. (59) I come now to your dream. I have heard it, of course, from you yourself, but more often our Sallustius has told it to me. During your flight, which was glorious for us but calamitous for the country, you were staying at a certain villa in the plain of Atina and had spent most of the night awake and around daybreak you finally began to sleep deeply and heavily. So although your journey was urgent, he ordered silence maintained and did not let you be disturbed. But when you woke around the second hour you related your dream to him. As you were wandering sadly in desolate places, there appeared to you C. Marius with laurelled *fascēs* asking you why you were sad, and when you said that you had been driven out of your country by force, he took your right hand, told you to be of good cheer, handed you over to his

senior lictor to take you to his monument, and said that in it you would find safety. Sallustius relates that at that moment he cried out that a swift and glorious return was in store for you and you yourself seemed delighted at the dream. At any rate I was told swiftly that, when you heard that the magnificent senatorial decree about your return had been passed in that monument, on the motion of an excellent and most illustrious consul, and that it had been greeted in a packed theatre with incredible shouts and applause, you said that nothing could be more divinely inspired than that dream at Atina.

(60) “But many dreams are untrue!” Rather, perhaps their meaning is obscure to us. But granted that some may be false, what do we argue against those which are true? These would occur far more frequently if we went to bed in a healthy condition. In fact, when burdened with food and wine, we see dreams which are confused and troubled. See what Socrates says in Plato’s *Republic*. He writes:

When men sleep, that part of the soul which shares in thinking and reasoning is languid and inert, but that part in which there is a certain savagery and a brutish inhumanity when it is immoderately gorged with drink and food, leaps in sleep and hurls itself about without restraint. So every vision which presents itself to such a man is without thought and reason—for example, he dreams he is having physical intercourse with his mother, or with some other human being or god, and often with a beast; or even that he is killing someone and impiously staining himself with blood and doing many things impurely and hideously in recklessness and shamelessness. (61) But the man who has healthy and temperate habits and life surrenders himself to sleep, with that part of his soul which involves thought and reason active, alert and satisfied with a banquet of good thoughts and with that part of his soul which is nourished on pleasure neither enfeebled by abstinence nor sated with excess (both of these usually dull the sharp edge of thought, either if nature is deprived of anything or there is abundance and excess) and with that third part of the soul (in which is the fire of anger) calmed and quietened; when the two reckless parts of the soul have been subdued, then the third, the thinking and reasoning part of his soul shines forth and reveals itself to be alive and alert for dreaming and those things which appear to him in his sleep will be peaceful and veridical.

I have reproduced Plato’s exact words.

(62) Shall we listen rather to Epicurus? For Carneades, in his eagerness for polemic says now this and now that. “But he says

what he thinks.” But he thinks nothing that is ever elegant or fitting. Will you, then, prefer him to Plato and Socrates, who, although they do not give an explanation, nonetheless surpass these minor philosophers in authority? Plato commands people to set off to sleep with their bodies so disposed that nothing can affect their souls with error or confusion. For this reason it is thought that the Pythagoreans were forbidden to eat beans, because that food produces great flatulence which is prejudicial to the tranquillity of a soul in search of the truth. (63) So when the soul is separated by sleep from union with the body and the contagion it derives from there, then it remembers the past, sees the present, and foresees the future; for the body of a sleeping man lies like that of a dead man, but the soul is active and alive. And it will be even more so after death, when it has completely left the body. So, as death approaches, it has greater power to divine. For those in the grip of a serious and fatal disease see this too, the imminence of their death, and so visions of the dead often appear to them and at that moment they have the greatest desire for praise. Those who have not lived as they should have at that moment feel the greatest repentance for their sins. (64) That men at the point of death have the power to divine Posidonius confirms also by that example which he adduces: a certain Rhodian at the point of death named six men of similar age and said who would be the first to die, who second, and then who last. He maintains that there are three ways in which men dream under divine impulse. In the first the soul foresees all by itself because of the relationship with the gods it possesses; in the second, the air is full of immortal souls on which the marks of truth are clear, as though hallmarked; in the third, the gods themselves speak with people as they sleep. And, as I just said, it happens more easily that souls perceive the future as death approaches. (65) Of this kind are the examples of Callanus, about whom I spoke earlier, and Homer’s Hector, who, as he was dying, prophesied the imminent death of Achilles.

Common usage would not have rashly hallowed the use of the word *praesagire*, if it did not correspond to some reality:

As I was leaving home, my soul presaged that I was leaving in vain.

*Sagire* means to have a sharp perception, from which old women are called *sagae*, because they want to know much, and dogs are called

*sagaces*. So the person who has knowledge (*sagit*) of something before it happens is said to ‘presage’ (*praesagire*), that is to perceive the future in advance.

(66) There is, therefore, in the soul a power of presaging which is imposed from outside and which is kept in by divine power. If it manifests itself with some greater force it is called ‘madness’, since the soul is drawn from the body and is stirred by divine impulse.

CHORUS	But why does she seem suddenly to use her flaming eyes to grasp with? Where is her young girl’s modesty, which just a little while ago was sane?
CASSANDRA	Mother, you are by far the noblest of all noble women, I have been overcome by inspired prophesies; For Apollo, against my will, spurs me to frenzy to speak the future. I am ashamed in the company of girls my own age, my father is ashamed of my actions, the best of men. My mother, I have compassion for you and loathing for myself, For you have borne the finest of offspring to Priam, me excluded. This pains me That I bring loss, they profit, I oppose you and they obey.

What a sweet poem, expressive and suited to her character, but not relevant to the matter in hand! (67) But what I want to say, that frenzy frequently makes true predictions, has been expressed in the following passage:

It comes, the torch comes enveloped in blood and fire!  
It has lain hidden for many years; citizens, bring assistance and quench it.

The god, enclosed within a human body, now speaks, not Cassandra:

Already on the great sea a swift fleet  
Has been constructed; it is hastening a swarm of destruction;  
It will come, on ships with wings of sail,  
A fierce army will throng our shores.

(68) I seem to be presenting tragedies and stage-plays. But from you yourself I have heard an example of the same kind, not one made up but one which happened. C. Coponius, a man of the highest wisdom and learning, when he was in command of the Rhodian fleet



with praetorian *imperium*, came to you at Dyrrhachium and said that a rower from a Rhodian quinquereme had prophesied a Greece bathed in blood in less than thirty days, the plundering of Dyrrhachium, and an embarkation onto ships in flight, and for those fleeing the pathetic sight behind them of fires; but the Rhodian fleet would receive a swift return and journey home. At the time you yourself were not unworried and Marcus Varro and M. Cato, who were with you then, both learned men, were greatly alarmed. A few days later Labienus arrived in flight from Pharsalus. After he had reported the loss of the army, the rest of the prophecy was soon fulfilled. (69) For the grain plundered from the granaries was scattered through all the streets and alleys and in great terror you embarked on the ships and by night you looked back at the town and saw on fire merchant ships, which soldiers had torched because they did not want them to follow; lastly, after you had been deserted by the Rhodian fleet, you realized that the prophet had told the truth.

(70) As briefly as I could, I have set out divination by dream and frenzy, which, as I said, involve no technique. Both of these types share one principle, which our friend Cratippus regularly uses: the human soul is to some degree derived and drawn from something outside itself (from this it is understood that there is a divine soul outside, from which the human soul is drawn). That part of the human soul which is endowed with sensation, motion, and appetite is not separated from bodily influence. But that part of the soul which participates in rationality and intelligence is at its most active when it is furthest away from the body. (71) So, when he has set out examples of true prophecies and dreams, Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way: although without eyes the function and role of eyes cannot exist and although eyes sometimes do not perform their function, the person who has even once used his eyes to see things as they really are possesses the sense of eyes which see things as they really are. So in the same way, if without divination the function and role of divination cannot exist, although someone who possesses the power of divination can sometimes make mistakes and not (fore)see the truth, it is sufficient to establish the existence of divination if there is one instance of something being foretold in such a way that it evidently could not have happened by chance. There are

innumerable examples of this kind and so the existence of divination must be admitted.

(72) But those types of divination which are either interpreted by conjecture or have been recognized and recorded by their outcome are, as I have said above, called artificial, not natural. Among these are included *haruspices*, augurs, and interpreters. These types are considered invalid by the Peripatetics, but are defended by the Stoics. Some of them depend on records and lore, as the books of the Etruscans on haruspicy, lightning, and rituals show, and also your books on augury. Others are explained by unprepared conjectures in accordance with the situation. For example, in Homer Calchas predicts the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows and in Sulla's *History* we see an occurrence which you witnessed: while he was sacrificing in the territory of Nola in front of his headquarters, a snake suddenly emerged from the bottom of the altar and Gaius Postumius the *haruspex* begged him to lead out the army onto the offensive. When Sulla did this, he captured the strongly fortified Samnite camp which lay in front of Nola. (73) A conjecture was also made in the case of Dionysius shortly before he began to reign. When he was travelling through the territory of Leontini, and made his horse go down into a river, the horse was swallowed up in whirlpools and disappeared. When he could not extricate it despite his best efforts, he left, so Philistus says, taking it badly. But when he had gone on a little way, he suddenly heard a whinny, looked back, and to his joy saw his horse alive and on its mane a swarm of bees had settled. This portent had the following effect that in a few days Dionysius began his reign.

(74) Again, what a warning was given to the Spartans shortly before the disaster at Leuctra, when in the shrine of Hercules his weapons clanked and the statue of Hercules was covered with sweat! At the same time in Thebes, as Callisthenes says, in the temple of Hercules the doors, although they were barred shut, suddenly opened of their own accord and the weapons that had been fixed to the walls were found on the ground. At the same time at Lebadaea, as a rite in honour of Trophonius was in progress, the cocks in the neighbourhood began to crow so insistently that they would not stop. At this the Boeotian augurs said that victory belonged to the Thebans because it was the custom of that bird to be silent when defeated

and to crow when victorious. (75) At the same time the Spartans were warned by many signs of disaster in the battle of Leuctra. For on the head of the statue of Lysander, who was the most famous of the Spartans, that stood at Delphi there appeared suddenly a crown of wild, prickly grasses. Moreover there were the stars of gold, which had been set up by the Spartans at Delphi after the famous naval victory of Lysander in which the Athenians were defeated, because during the battle Castor and Pollux were said to have appeared with the Spartan fleet. The insignia of those gods, the gold stars which I mentioned had been set up at Delphi, fell just before the battle of Leuctra and could not be found. (76) But the greatest portent that was given to the Spartans was this: when they consulted the oracle of Jupiter at Dodona on the question of victory and their ambassadors had set up the <vessel> which contained the lots, a monkey, which the king of the Molossians kept among his pets, upset the lots themselves and everything else that had been prepared for the lot-taking and scattered them in every direction. Then it is said that the priestess who is in charge of the oracle said that the Spartans should think not about victory, but about safety.

(77) Again, during the Second Punic War did not C. Flaminius, consul for the second time, ignore the signs of things to come and cause a great disaster to the state? When he had purified the army, had moved camp toward Arretium, and was leading his legions against Hannibal, both he and his horse suddenly fell for no reason in front of the statue of Jupiter Stator. The experts' opinion of this sign which had been given, that he should not join battle, he considered as no obstruction. Again, when he was taking the auspices by means of the *tripudium*, the hen-keeper said that this was not a day for joining battle. Then Flaminius asked him what course of action he would advise if the chickens would not eat even at a later stage. When he replied that he should stay where he was, Flaminius said, "Remarkable auspices indeed if action can be taken when the chickens are hungry and no action can be taken when they are full!" So he ordered the standards to be uprooted and to follow him. At that moment, when the standard-bearer of the first manipule could not move his standard from the ground and even when more came to his assistance nothing availed, Flaminius, on hearing of it, in his usual way ignored it. As a result within three hours his army was destroyed and

he himself was killed. (78) Coelius has added this further notable information that, at the very time that this disastrous battle was taking place, earthquakes of such great force occurred among the Ligurians, in Gaul, on several islands, and throughout the whole of Italy, that many towns were destroyed, in many places landslides occurred and whole lands sank, rivers flowed in the opposite direction, and the sea flowed into their channels.

Reliable conjectures in divination are made by experts. When Midas the famous Phrygian was asleep during his childhood, ants heaped up grains of wheat in his mouth. It was predicted that he would be very rich. So it turned out. Again, while the tiny Plato was asleep in his cradle, bees settled on his lips; the interpretation was given that he would possess a unique sweetness of speech. So his future eloquence was foreseen during his infancy. (79) Again, was Roscius, whom you so love and admire, lying or was it the whole of Lanuvium on his behalf? While he was in his cradle and being raised at Solonium [a flat area in the territory of Lanuvium] during the night his nurse awoke, brought a light and observed him asleep, wrapped in the coils of a snake. Terrified at the sight she raised a din. Roscius' father referred it to the *haruspices* who replied that the boy would achieve unequalled fame and glory. Pasiteles has engraved this scene in silver and our friend Archias has described it in verse.

What, then, are we waiting for? Till the immortal gods converse with us when we're in the Forum, in the street, or at home? Although they do not present themselves to us directly, they spread their influence far and wide, enclosing it in caverns in the earth or fixing it in human nature. For a power from the earth used to inspire the Pythia at Delphi and a natural power the Sibyl. So what? Do we not see how many different types of earth there are? Of these one type is deadly, like that at Ampsanctus among the Hirpini, or in Asia Plutonia, which we have seen. And there are lands of which some parts are harmful, others health-giving, some produce men of sharp intellect, others fools. All this depends on the variety of climate and on the different exhalations of the soils.

(80) Also it often happens that by a certain image or depth of voice or by singing the soul is violently moved; the same thing happens often through worry or fear, just like her who:

with her mind changed as though mad or moved by the rites of Bacchus, was calling for her Teucer among the hills.

This exaltation shows that a divine power exists in the soul. For Democritus says that no poet can be great without frenzy, and Plato says the same. Let him call it frenzy, if he wishes, provided that the frenzy is praised as it was in Plato's *Phaedrus*. Again, your oratory in lawsuits, can the delivery itself be impassioned, weighty, and eloquent unless the soul itself is somewhat stirred? Indeed, I have often seen in you and, to turn to less weighty examples, in your friend Aesop such great passion in expression and gesture that some force seemed to have robbed him of his mind's understanding.

(81) Often, too, apparitions present themselves which have no reality but which have the appearance of reality. It is said that this happened to Brennus and his Gallic forces when they had waged an impious war against the shrine of Delphian Apollo. For they say that at that time Pythia spoke from the oracle:

I shall see to the matter, I and the white virgins.

As a result it happened that the virgins were seen to bear arms against them and the army of the Gauls was overwhelmed with snow.

Aristotle thought that those who rave because of illness and are called 'melancholics' have in their souls some divine, prescient power. But I have my doubts whether this should be attributed to those with disordered stomachs or minds, for divination is a quality of a healthy soul, not of a sick body.

(82) That divination really exists is established by the following Stoic reasoning:

If there are gods and they do not declare to men in advance what will happen, either they do not love men or they themselves do not know what will happen or they think that there is no advantage to men in knowing what will happen or they do not consider it in accordance with their dignity to forewarn men of what will happen or even the gods themselves are unable to give signs of these things. But it is not true that they do not love us (for they are friends and benefactors of the human race); nor are they ignorant of what has been decided and predestined by themselves; nor is it of no advantage to us to know what will come to pass (for we will be the more careful if we know); nor do they consider it inappropriate to their majesty (for nothing is more glorious than beneficence); nor are they incapable of

foreknowing the future. (83) So it is not true that there are gods and that they do not give signs of the future. But there are gods and therefore they give signs; and if they give signs, it is not true that they give us no avenue by which to understand the signs (for they would be giving signs to no purpose); nor, if they give the means, is there no divination; therefore there is divination.

(84) Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater employ the same argumentation.

So why should one doubt that what I have argued is absolutely true, if I have on my side reason, outcomes, peoples, nations, Greeks, barbarians, our own ancestors as well, the fact that it has always been believed to be so, the greatest philosophers, poets, the wisest of men—those who have set up constitutions and those who have founded cities? Do we wait until beasts speak? Are we not satisfied with the shared belief of mankind? (85) In fact no other argument is brought forward why the types of divination I have mentioned have no value, except that it seems difficult to say what is the rational process and the cause of each type of divination. “What explanation does the *haruspex* give why a split lung, even though the other entrails are fine, stops an undertaking and postpones it to another day?” “What explanation does the augur give why a raven on the right and a crow on the left provide a good omen? What explanation does the astrologer give why the conjunction of Jupiter or Venus with the moon at the birth of a child is favourable, but the conjunction of Mars and Saturn is unfavourable? Why does god warn us when we are asleep and ignore us when we are awake?” Finally, “What is the reason that Cassandra in her frenzy can foresee the future, but wise Priam cannot do the same?”

(86) *Why* does each of these things happen, you ask. The question is wholly legitimate, but not what we are dealing with now. We are asking *whether* it happens or not. It is as if I were to say that a magnet is a stone which attracts and fastens iron to itself, but that I cannot explain why it happens, and you were flatly to deny that it *does* happen. But that is what you do with divination, which we see for ourselves and hear and read about and have inherited from our fathers. Indeed before philosophy, a recent invention, emerged there were no doubts about it in everyday life, and after philosophy advanced, no philosopher of any authority thought otherwise.

(87) I have mentioned Pythagoras, Democritus, and Socrates and have omitted none of the ancients except Xenophanes. I have added the Old Academy, Peripatetics, and Stoics; only Epicurus disagrees. What could be more shameful than this, that Epicurus believes that no disinterested virtue exists?

Is there anyone whom antiquity, signed and sealed with evidence of the highest quality, does not impress? Homer writes that Calchas was by far the best of augurs and guided the fleet to Troy by his knowledge of auspices, I believe, not of geography. (88) Amphilochous and Mopsus were Argive kings, but also augurs, and founded Greek cities on the sea coasts of Cilicia. Even before them Amphiaraus and Tiresias, not men of humble or obscure status, nor like those of whom Ennius writes:

they invent false prophecies for the sake of personal profit,

but noble, outstanding men who, advised by birds and signs, foretold the future. Of the second of these, even in the Underworld, Homer writes that he alone has knowledge, the rest wander around like shadows. The reputation Amphiaraus has acquired in Greece means that he is honoured as a god and that oracles are sought from the place in which he was buried. (89) Furthermore, did not Priam, the king of Asia, have a son Helenus and a daughter Cassandra who were diviners, the one by auguries and the other by mental agitation and divine stimulation? We see it written that certain brothers Marcii, born of a noble family, were prophets of this kind in the time of our ancestors. And doesn't Homer record that Polyidus of Corinth prophesied many things to others and death for his son as the latter set off for Troy. Certainly among the ancients, those who held power were also masters of augury, for they considered wisdom and divination to be equal marks of kingship. Witness to this is our state, in which the kings were augurs and, later, private citizens who had been granted that priesthood governed the state by the authority of their religious beliefs.

(90) The same principle in regard to divinatory procedures is not ignored even among barbarian nations, for in Gaul there are the Druids, of whom I myself have known Divitiacus the Aeduan, your guest and admirer. He claimed that the science of nature, what the Greeks call *physiologia*, was known to him and he used to foretell

what would happen sometimes by augury and sometimes by interpretation. Among the Persians augury and divination are practised by the Magi who gather in a sacred place for discussion to meet with each other, as you were once accustomed to do on the Nones. (91) No one could be king of the Persians who had not first learnt the art and lore of the Magi. It is possible to see families and peoples dedicated to this science. In Caria there is Telmessus, in which city the art of the *haruspices* is pre-eminent; similarly in the Peloponnese, Elis has two separate families, the Iamidae and the Clutidae which are famed for their excellence in haruspicy. In Syria the Chaldaeans excel in their knowledge of the stars and the sharpness of their minds. (92) Etruria has the greatest knowledge of things struck by lightning and also interprets what is signified by each prodigy and portent. For this reason, in the time of our forebears, the Senate, at a time when our empire was thriving, decreed that of the sons of leading citizens groups of ten should be handed over to the individual Etruscan peoples to be instructed in the discipline so that an art of such great importance should not, because of a lack of manpower, lose its religious authority to become an object of commerce and profit. The Phrygians, Pisidians, Cilicians, and the Arab nation are guided particularly by the signs given by birds, as we know was also regularly done in Umbria.

(93) Indeed it seems to me that also the very places that are inhabited by each people determine what kinds of divination are appropriately practised. For the Egyptians and Babylonians, living in the expanses of open plains, since nothing sticks up from the earth to obstruct contemplation of the sky, have devoted all their effort to learning about the stars. Because the Etruscans sacrifice victims more carefully and more frequently on account of their religious scruples, they have dedicated themselves most of all to learning about entrails; and because many lightning strikes occur among them due to the thickness of the atmosphere and because, for the same reason, many unusual things arise from the air and the earth and some from the conception and generation of men and beasts, they have become the most skilled interpreters of portents. Their efficacy, as you yourself are accustomed to say, is demonstrated in the terms wisely applied to them by our ancestors. Because they demonstrate, portend, show, and predict they are called miraculous apparitions, portents,



*monstra*, and prodigies. (94) The Arabs, Phrygians, and Cilicians, because they are involved for the most part in the pasturing of animals, as they cross the plains in winter and mountains in summer, have noted more readily the songs and flights of birds. The same explanation goes for Pisidia and for our Umbria. The whole of Caria and particularly the Telmessians, of whom I have spoken above, since they inhabit very rich and highly fertile fields, in which many things are formed and created because of their fertility, they are sharp at noticing portents.

(95) Indeed, who does not see that in all the best states auspices and all the other kinds of divination have wielded the greatest influence? Has there ever been a king or a people that has not employed divine prophecy, not only in peace, but much more in war, since the contest and risk to life are greater? I do not speak of us Romans, who do nothing in war without examining entrails and nothing in the civilian sphere without taking auspices. Let's look at foreign examples. For the Athenians in all their public consultations always employ certain divinatory priests whom they call *manteis*, and the Spartans have given their kings an augur as assessor, and they wanted an augur to be present with their elders (for that is what they call their state council). On important matters too they used always to consult the oracle at Delphi or Ammon or Dodona. (96) Lycurgus, who regulated the Spartan state, confirmed his own laws with the authority of Apollo at Delphi. When Lysander wanted to change these, he was prevented by the same authority. Those who governed the Spartans were not content with the concerns they exercised while awake, but performed incubation in the shrine of Pasiphae, which is in the countryside near the city, in order to receive dreams, because they considered oracles received in dreams to be truthful.

(97) I now return to Roman examples. How many times has the Senate ordered the Board of Ten to consult the books! <In matters of what importance and how often has it heeded the replies of the *haruspices*?> For example, when two suns or three moons were seen, or when torches or the sun was seen at night, when sounds were heard in the sky, when the sky appeared to come apart and balls were noticed in it. Again a landslide in the territory of Privernum was reported to the Senate because the earth had disappeared to a great depth and Apulia had been shaken by very violent earthquakes. By these

portents warnings of huge wars and most ruinous revolts were delivered to the Roman people and in all these cases the responses of the *haruspices* coincided with the Sibylline verses. (98) When Apollo sweated at Cumae and Victory at Capua, when men-women were born, was it not a portent of disaster? When the river Atratus ran with blood, when it frequently rained stones, sometimes blood, now and then earth, or once even milk; when on the Capitol the Centaur or on the Aventine gates and men, at Tusculum the temple of Castor and Pollux and at Rome the temple of Piety were struck by lightning, in all these cases did not the *haruspices'* reponses conform with what happened and were not the same predictions found in the Sibylline Books?

(99) Following a dream of Caecilia, daughter of Quintus, during the recent Marsic War, the temple of Juno Sospita was restored by the Senate. Although Sisenna has demonstrated that this dream corresponded miraculously to the letter with what came to pass, he impertinently argues, under the influence of some Epicurean, I believe, that no credence should be given to dreams. He does not, however, argue against portents and writes that at the beginning of the Marsic War statues of the gods sweated, blood flowed, the sky came apart, voices were heard from unseen sources announcing the dangers of war, and at Lanuvium the shields were eaten through by mice—which the *haruspices* interpreted as most depressing. (100) Further, we find in the annals that during the war with Veii, when the Alban Lake rose beyond its usual level, a certain noble Veientine came over to us and said that according to the decrees of fate which the Veientes possessed in written form Veii could not be captured as long as the lake was full and that, if the lake overflowed and in its own course flowed to the sea, it would be disastrous for the Roman people; if, however, it was channelled so that it could not reach the sea, then it would be beneficial for us. As a consequence of this that wonderful irrigation of the Alban Lake was made by our ancestors. When the Veientes, tired by the war, sent ambassadors to the Senate, it is said that one of them said that the deserter had not dared to tell everything to the Senate: in the same books of fate possessed by the Veientes it was written that Rome would shortly be captured by the Gauls, as indeed we see happened in the sixth year after Veii was captured.

(101) Fauns are said to have been heard often in battles, and in times of trouble voices issuing from unseen sources which foretold the truth. So, let me give two of the many examples of this kind, but the most authoritative. For not long before the city was captured a voice was heard from the grove of Vesta, which extends from the foot of the Palatine along the New Road, saying that the walls and gates should be repaired; unless this was seen to, Rome would be captured. Because this was ignored when it was possible to take the necessary steps, expiation was made after that dreadful disaster. Opposite that place an altar (which we see fenced off) was consecrated to Aius Loquens. And it has been written by many that after an earthquake occurred and procuration was made with a pregnant sow, a voice was heard from the temple of Juno on the citadel, after which that Juno was called Moneta. So do we despise these signs given by the gods and sanctioned by our ancestors?

(102) Pythagoreans regularly observed what was said not only by gods but also by human beings, what they call omens. Our ancestors, because they considered these to be significant, prefaced all undertakings with "May this prove good, well-omened, successful, and fortunate", and for all religious business which is conducted publicly the command is given, "Guard your tongues", and in the proclamation of festivals, "Abstain from lawsuits and insults". Likewise in the purification of a colony by the man who was founding it, or when a commander purifies an army or a censor the people, men with names of good omen are chosen to lead the victims. Consuls do the same in the levy, so that the first soldier has a name of good omen. (103) You know that these practices were observed by you scrupulously as consul and commander. Our ancestors claimed the prerogative century to be an omen of an election which conformed to the laws.

I shall now set out well-known examples of omens. L. Paullus during his second consulship, when it had fallen to him by lot to wage war against King Perses, as he returned home on the evening of that very day, as he kissed his little daughter Tertia, who was quite small at the time, he noticed that she was rather sad. "What's the matter, Tertia?", he said, "Why are you sad?" "Daddy," she said, "Persa has died." He embraced the girl more tightly and said, "My daughter, I accept the omen." A puppy of that name had died. (104) I have heard L. Flaccus, the *Flamen* of Mars, say that Caecilia, the wife

of Metellus, when she wanted to marry off the daughter of her sister went into a certain shrine to receive an omen, as used to be the practice of the ancients. As the young girl was standing and Caecilia was sitting and for a long time no sound was heard, the girl in her tiredness asked her aunt to let her sit in her place for a little while. She said, "Yes, my girl, I give you my place." The omen occurred in the fulfilment—for she died soon after and the young girl married the man to whom Caecilia had been married. I understand full well that these things can be despised or even ridiculed, but to deny the existence of gods and to despise the signs given by them is the same thing.

(105) What shall I say about augurs? This is up to you, and you, I say, must defend auspices. To you as consul the augur App. Claudius reported that, as the augury of safety was doubtful, there would be a civil war, tragic and troublesome. A few months later this happened and in still fewer days was crushed by you. I give my strong endorsement to this augur, since he alone, for many years, has not restricted himself to the repetition of augural formulae but practises the discipline of divination. Your colleagues used to ridicule him and called him the Pisidian and Soranian augur. They believed that there was no presentiment or knowledge of future reality in auguries; in their "wisdom" they said that religious observances were made up to suit the opinion of the ignorant. This is far from the case, for neither the shepherds of whom Romulus was king nor Romulus himself were so ingenious as to fake religious practices to deceive the masses. The difficulty and hard work of learning the discipline has given their neglect eloquence, for they prefer to say that there is nothing in auspices rather than learn what there is.

(106) What could be more divine than the auspicial sign which is in your *Marius*? To use you above all as an authority:

Suddenly the winged minister of Jupiter who thunders on high,  
wounded by a snake bite, swoops down from a tree trunk  
piercing the snake with its fierce talons  
half-alive, its multi-coloured neck shining forebodingly.  
Tearing it as it writhed and bloodying it with its beak  
having satisfied its anger and avenged its bitter pains,  
it tossed it away still breathing, flung it torn into the water  
and turned from the sunset to shining sunrise.  
When flying on its wings of good-omen and swooping,

augur of the divine will, Marius saw it  
and recognised signs of good omen for his own glory and return,  
the Father thundered on the left side of heaven.  
Thus Jupiter himself confirmed the clear omen of the eagle.

(107) The famous augurate of Romulus was that of a shepherd not of a sophisticate, nor was it made up to satisfy the beliefs of the ignorant, but was accepted by the trustworthy and passed down to posterity. So the augur Romulus, as it appears in Ennius, along with his brother Remus also an augur:

Taking care with great care and desiring to rule, devoted themselves to both auspices and augury. On the Murcus, Remus took his seat for the auspication and watched alone for a bird of good omen. But fair Romulus sought on the high Aventine and watched for the tribe of those who fly on high. They fought whether to call the city Rome or Remora. Everyone awaited anxiously who of the two would be the ruler. They waited just as, when the consul is ready to give the signal, all eagerly look to the starting-gates, (108) from the painted mouths of which the chariots soon rush, in the same way the people, their faces showing their apprehension for the future, were expectant—which would be given the victory and a great kingdom? Meanwhile the blazing sun retreated to the darkness of night. Then a bright light revealed itself struck by rays and at that very moment, on high, flew by far the most beautiful bird, of good omen, on the left; at the very moment the golden sun arose, thrice four sacred bodies of birds fell from heaven and positioned themselves in fair stations of good omen. From this Romulus saw that he had been given preference and that a royal throne and kingdom had been secured for him by an auspice.

(109) But to return to the point from which my discourse broke off. If I cannot explain why anything happens and can only demonstrate that the examples I have mentioned did occur, would that be a weak answer to Epicurus and Carneades? And so, what if the explanation for artificial foreknowledge is straightforward, but that of divine foreknowledge is somewhat more obscure? For what is known in advance from entrails, lightning, portents, and the stars is recorded as a result of observation over a long period. In all these areas the great length of time produces an extraordinary science through prolonged observation. This can exist even without the intervention and inspiration of the gods, since through frequent experience it is clearly known what is the result of each sign and what

precedes any given event. (110) As I have said before, the second type of divination is natural and with the subtle reasoning applied to physics should be ascribed to the nature of the gods, from which, as the most learned philosophers agree, our own souls are drawn and gathered. Since the universe is filled and packed with eternal intelligence and the divine mind, human souls are necessarily influenced by their relationship with divine souls. But when they are awake our souls are subject to the necessities of life and, hampered by the restraints of the body, are hindered from association with the divine.

(111) (Rare is that class of men who call themselves away from the body and are possessed by an all-consuming concern and enthusiasm for the contemplation of things divine. The auguries of these do not derive from divine inspiration but from human reason. On natural evidence they predict the future, for example, floods and the conflagration of heaven and earth which is to come sometime. Some practised in statesmanship, as we understand of the Athenian Solon, foresaw the rise of tyranny far in advance. We can call these men prudent, that is, they take forethought, but we can in no way call them “divine”, no more than Thales of Miletus, who, to confound his critics and to show that even a philosopher could make money, if it were in his interest, is said to have bought up the whole olive crop in the region of Miletus before it began to bloom. (112) Perhaps he had noticed by virtue of some knowledge that there would be an abundant olive crop. Moreover, he is said to have been the first to predict the solar eclipse which took place in the reign of Astyages.

Doctors, pilots, and also farmers all sense many things in advance, but I call none of them “divination”, not even that famous instance when the Spartans were warned by the natural philosopher Anaximander to leave their cities and homes and to sleep in the fields under arms because an earthquake was imminent: that was the time when the whole city collapsed and the extremities of Mount Taygetus were torn away like a ship’s stern. Not even Pherecydes, the renowned teacher of Pythagoras will be considered a prophet rather than a natural philosopher because he said an earthquake was imminent after he had seen water drawn from a never-failing well.

(113) In fact the human soul does not divine naturally, unless it is so unrestrained and free that it has absolutely nothing to do with the body, as happens only for prophets and dreamers. On this basis those

two kinds of divination are sanctioned by Dicaearchus and, as I said, by our friend Cratippus. If for this reason, that they proceed from nature, they are admittedly the most important, they are not the only types. But if they believe that there is nothing in observation, they remove many of the things with which the scheme of life is bound up. But, seeing that they make a concession, and not a small one [prophecies with dreams], there are no grounds for us to contend forcefully with them, especially since there are some who approve of no form of divination whatsoever.)

(114) So, those whose souls, spurning their bodies, take wing and rush away, inflamed and excited by some passion, without doubt do see those things which they proclaim as they prophesy. Those souls which do not cling to the body are inflamed by many things, just as some are roused by a particular tone of voice or by Phrygian songs. Groves and woods move many souls, rivers or seas move many, whose raging minds see what will happen far in advance. To this kind of divination belong the following:

Alas! See! Some man has decided a famous case among three goddesses; as a result of that decision a Spartan woman will come, one of the Furies.

For in the same way many prophecies have been made by seers not only in words but also

in verse which Fauns and seers once used to sing.

(115) In the same way the seers Marcius and Publicius are said to have prophesied in verse; and the riddles of Apollo were expressed in the same way. I believe that there were certain exhalations from the earth, filled with which minds poured forth oracles.

This is the way with seers and not dissimilar, in fact, to that of dreams. For the same thing that happens to seers when they are awake happens to us as we dream. For in sleep the soul is active, free from the senses and every encumbrance of worry, while the body lies almost dead. Because the soul has lived from all eternity and has had relations with countless souls it sees everything that exists in nature provided that it moderates its eating and restrains its drinking so that the soul is in such a condition that it remains alert while the body sleeps. This is divination for one who dreams.

(116) At this point we encounter the important interpretation of dreams, which does not occur naturally but through art (likewise the interpretation of both oracles and prophecies); <all of these> have their interpreters as poets have commentators. For just as divine Nature would have created gold, silver, bronze, and iron in vain, if she had not also taught how to reach the veins of them; just as she would not have given the fruits of the earth or produce of trees to humankind usefully, if she had not handed down their cultivation and preservation; just as building material would have been useless, if we didn't possess the skill of construction, so with every benefit which the gods have given man some skill has been linked through which its usefulness could be harnessed. So for dreams, prophecies, and oracles, because many of them were obscure, many of them ambiguous, explanations of interpreters have been used.

(117) How prophets and dreamers see those things which do not exist anywhere at the time is a great problem. The questions we are asking would be solved more easily if the questions which should be asked first had been investigated. For this whole question is a part of the argument on the nature of the gods which you have set out clearly in your second book. If we hold to this, the thesis (part of which is the subject we are discussing) will stand firm: the gods exist, by their foresight the world is governed, and they are concerned with human affairs, not only in general but also in particular. If we maintain this, which to me seems unassailable, it surely follows that the gods give to men signs of what is to come.

(118) But it seems that one must determine *how* this is done. For it is not Stoic doctrine that the gods are concerned with every single fissure of livers, with every birdsong (for that is neither appropriate, nor worthy, nor in any way possible), but that the world was created from the beginning in such a way that predetermined signs would precede predetermined events, some in entrails, others in birds, others in lightning, others in portents, others in the stars, others in the visions of dreamers, and others in the utterances of those inspired. Those who understand these signs well are not often deceived; bad conjectures and bad interpretations prove wrong not because of the reality but because of the lack of skill of the interpreters. Once this has been set down and agreed [that there is a certain divine power which controls the lives of men], it is not hard to



imagine by what means those things happen which we clearly see do happen. For a sentient force which pervades the whole world can guide in the choice of a sacrificial victim and at the very moment when you intend to sacrifice, a change of entrails can take place so that something is either added or taken away. For in a brief instant Nature either adds or modifies or removes many things. (119) To prevent us doubting this there is a very important example which occurred briefly before the death of Caesar. When he was sacrificing on the day on which he sat for the first time on a golden throne and paraded in purple dress there was no heart in the vitals of the prime bull. So do you believe that any animal which has blood can exist without a heart? Caesar <was not> troubled by the strangeness of this, although Spurinna said that he should beware lest he lose his powers of thought and life, both of which proceed from the heart. On the next day there was no "head" to the liver. These prodigies were sent to him by the immortal gods with the result that he foresaw his death, not so that he prevented it. So when those parts without which that victim could not have lived are not found in the entrails, one must understand that those parts which are not found disappeared at the very moment of immolation.

(120) The divine spirit produces the same result with birds, so that *alites* fly at one moment here and at another there, disappear at one moment in one area and at another moment in another area, and *oscines* sing at one moment on the right and at another on the left. For if every animal moves its body forwards, sideways, or backwards as it wishes and bends, twists, stretches, or contracts its members in whatever direction it wishes, and does all this almost before thinking, how much easier is it for a god to whose power all things are subject! (121) And it is the same god who sends signs to us of the kind that history has handed down to us in very great number, such as we see recorded here: if an eclipse of the moon occurred a little before sunrise in the sign Leo, Darius and the Persians would be defeated militarily by Alexander and the Macedonians [in battle] and Darius would die; if a girl were born with two heads there would be popular revolt and seduction and adultery in the home; and if a woman dreamt that she gave birth to a lion, the country in which this had happened would be overcome by foreign nations. Of the same kind is the following example, which Herodotus has written: Croesus' son

spoke although he was a mute; following this portent his father's kingdom and house were utterly wiped out. Which history does not record that, while Servius Tullius was asleep, his head blazed? So just as the man who goes to sleep peacefully with his mind prepared both by fine thoughts and conditions appropriate to secure him serenity will have clear and reliable visions in his dreams, so the pure and undefiled soul of one who is awake is better prepared to interpret the truth of the stars, birds, all other signs and also of entrails.

(122) Surely this is what we have heard about Socrates and what is often said by him in the works of his disciples: that there is a certain kind of divinity which he calls his *daimonion*, which he always obeyed, as it never forced him on but often held him back. The same Socrates—for what better authority can we find?—when Xenophon was consulting him whether he should join Cyrus, after he had set out what he thought best, said “that is my advice, but it is that of a man; on matters which are obscure and uncertain I advise that the oracle of Apollo be consulted”. The Athenians have always consulted this officially on matters of great importance. (123) It is also written that, when he saw his friend Crito's eye bandaged, he asked what was wrong; when he replied that, as he was walking in the country, a small branch which had been tied back was released and struck him in the eye, Socrates said “That is because you didn't obey me when I called you back, when I was using the divine foreknowledge which I usually use.” Again the same Socrates, after the unsuccessful battle at Delium under the command of Laches, when he was running away with Laches himself, came to a place where three roads meet and refused to take the road which the rest had. When they asked him why he wouldn't take the same road he said that he had been warned by the god; whereas those who fled by the other road encountered the enemy cavalry. A large number of remarkable prophecies made by Socrates have been collected by Antipater. I shall not mention them, as they are known to you and do not need to be recalled by me. (124) However, there is a glorious and almost divine saying of that philosopher which he uttered after he had been condemned by sacrilegious verdicts, that he was dying with complete serenity, for neither as he left his house nor as he mounted the platform to plead his case had he been given any sign by the god of any impending danger, as he always had.

So I think that, although many things deceive those who evidently divine the future by means of art or conjecture, nonetheless divination exists; but human beings can make mistakes in this art as in every other. It may happen that some sign is given indefinitely but it is taken as certain, or some sign can remain unobserved, either the relevant sign or another sign contrary to it. But for me it will be proof enough for this proposition for which I am arguing to have found not many but even a quite small number of instances of things divinely sensed in advance or predicted. (125) Indeed I would not hesitate to say that, if any single thing has been sensed in advance and predicted in such a way that, when it came to pass, it occurred as it was predicted and if evidently nothing in it occurred by chance or fortuitously, divination exists for certain and that this should be admitted by everyone.

For this reason it seems to me that, as Posidonius has done, the whole force and rationale of divination should be traced first from god, about whom enough has been said, secondly from Fate and then from Nature. For reason compels us to admit that everything happens according to Fate. I call Fate what the Greeks call *heimarmene*, that is the order and series of causes, when cause linked to cause produces of itself an effect. That is an eternal truth which flows from all eternity. Because this is so, nothing has happened which was not going to happen and for the same reason nothing will happen the efficient causes of which nature does not contain. (126) From this we recognize that Fate is not what it is called superstitiously but what it is called scientifically, the eternal cause of things, why things that are passed have happened and why impending events occur and why what follows will be. So it comes about that on the one hand it can be known by observation what effect generally follows each cause, even if it doesn't always follow (for it is difficult to affirm that); on the other hand, it is probable that these same causes of future effects are perceived by those who see them in frenzy or in sleep.

(127) Moreover, since all things come to pass according to Fate (as will be demonstrated elsewhere), if a mortal could exist who could discern with his soul the connection of *every* cause, surely nothing would deceive him. For he who grasps the causes of future events necessarily grasps every future event. But since no one can do this other than god, what remains is for men to know what will happen in

advance by means of certain signs which will make clear what follows them. For those things which are yet to be do not suddenly come into being, but, like the uncoiling of a rope, the passing of time brings about nothing new but unfolds each event in sequence. Both those who have the gift of natural divination and those for whom the course of events is marked by observation realize this. Although the latter do not see the causes themselves, nonetheless they do see the signs and marks of the causes. Through using in relation to these marks memory, diligence, and the records of predecessors, that kind of divination which is called artificial, which concerns entrails, lightnings, portents, and heavenly signs is carried out. (128) It is not amazing that those things which exist nowhere are known in advance by diviners; all things “exist”, but they are distant in time. As in seeds there is present the vital force of those things which are produced from the seeds, so in causes are stored the future events which the soul perceives, either when in frenzy or set free in sleep, or which reason or conjecture sense in advance. Just as those who are acquainted with the rising, setting, and movements of the sun, moon, and other celestial bodies can predict far in advance at what time each of these will take place, so those who have studied in detail over a long time and marked the course of things and the connection between them and the outcomes, either always or, if that is difficult, generally, or, if even that is not granted, sometimes understand what is to happen. For these and other arguments of the same kind for the reality of divination are derived from Fate.

(129) From Nature comes another particular argument, which teaches us how great the power of the soul is when it is separated from the physical senses, which happens most of all either when people are sleeping or mentally inspired. Because, as the minds of the gods understand what each other is thinking without eyes, ears, and tongues (on the basis of this men, when they make a silent wish or vow, do not doubt that the gods hear them), so men’s souls, which when released by sleep are free of the body or stirred by inspiration and roused move freely of their own accord, see those things which they [souls] cannot see when they are mixed up with the body. (130) And, although it is perhaps difficult to transfer this natural explanation to the kind of divination which we say derives from a technique, nonetheless Posidonius has explored this question as

far as is possible. He holds that there are in Nature certain signs of future events. For we understand that the people of Ceos are accustomed each year to make a careful observation of the dog star and, as Heraclides of Pontus writes, make a conjecture whether the year will be healthy or pestilential. If the star rises dimmer or, as it were, wrapped in mist, the air is thick and heavy so that breathing it will be difficult and unhealthy; but if the star appears brilliant and very clear, this is a sign that the atmosphere is thin and pure and consequently healthy. (131) Democritus holds that the ancients were wise to establish the inspection of the entrails of sacrificial victims; that from their condition and colour are perceived signs at one moment of sickness, at another of health and sometimes even of the future fertility or sterility of the fields. If observation and custom have recognised that these techniques proceed from Nature, the passage of time was able to bring many things to be noted and recorded. So that natural philosopher introduced by Pacuvius in his *Chryses* seems to have understood very little of Nature:

for those who understand the speech of birds  
learn more from the livers of others than from their own;  
I think that they should hear rather than be obeyed.

But “why?” I beg you, when a few verses later you say clearly enough:

Whatever it is, it animates, forms, increases, nourishes and creates  
all things  
It buries and receives within itself all things and is the father of all;  
From it the same things are born afresh and to it also they return.

Why, then, since there is one abode for all things and it is common to all, and since the souls of men have always been and will be, why can they not understand what follows from each event and what signifies each event? This is what I have to say on divination’, said Quintus.

(132) ‘At this point I will affirm that I do not recognize the drawers of lots, nor those who divine for the sake of money, nor the necromancers whom your friend Appius used to consult:

In short I do not give a fig for Marsian augurs,  
Village *haruspices* or astrologers from the Circus,  
Nor Isiac prophets or interpreters of dreams.

They are not diviners either by science or technique. But

are superstitious seers and shameless prophets,  
 Either skill-less or mad or ruled by need;  
 They don't know the byway they themselves are on, but point out  
 the highway to others;  
 To the ones they promise riches, from them they ask a drachma;  
 From these riches let them deduct a drachma for themselves, but  
 hand over the rest.

This is the view of Ennius who, a few lines before, holds that gods exist but that "they do not care what the human race does". But I, who think that they do care and that they give many warnings and predictions, approve of divination without triviality, emptiness and trickery.

When Quintus had finished speaking, I said, '<You have come> admirably prepared indeed...'

## Commentary

1–7 In the prologue to book 1 Cic. sets out the the subject under discussion and the importance of reaching a correct assessment of a topic which concerned both individuals and the community. This falls into three parts: (i) divination is a phenomenon notable for its antiquity and ubiquity, attested in every age of human life and in all countries (1–2); (ii) in its various forms it influences every aspect of life. In the Roman state, for example, various types of divinatory procedure had recognized roles in the decision-making process: from the foundation of the city by Romulus augury was the distinctive Roman form of divination which preceded every civilian or military activity; the expertise of the *haruspices* was deemed essential for interpreting portents and averting evil; the prophecies of the Sibylline books and of other prophets were listened to; and even dreams could govern public policy (3–4). And (iii) divination was the object of philosophical enquiry from the Presocratics onwards, attracting a variety of views. Thus in Cicero's discussion there was to be a careful evaluation of the arguments to avoid either impiety through an oversceptical denial of divination or culpable credulity by an overeager acceptance of it (5–7).

In distinction to his other dialogues there is no dedication or addressee. This may be an indication that *De Divinatione* was not given its final polish before publication or of a change of plan. M. Junius Brutus had been the dedicatee of *De Natura Deorum* and of most of the works published during the dictatorship of Caesar (*Brut.*, *Parad. Sto.*, *Or.*, *Fin.*, and *Tusc.*), but his role in the assassination of Caesar made him a dangerous dedicatee in the unsettled

aftermath; in the works that were definitely published after Caesar's death inoffensive dedicatees such as Atticus and Marcus Junior are chosen.

There is no indication in these chapters as to the form the discussion will take, either as to the format of the argument or whether it is to be a dialogue. These are only revealed when Cic. sets the scene (8–9), at which point it becomes clear that he is a participant.

Because 'Marcus' is in fact a protagonist, rather than a minor figure, as in *De Natura Deorum*, the status of the prologue in the dialogue becomes an issue. It appears to be a neutral presentation, but it has been suggested that Marcus undermines the case for divination in various ways before it is presented. For example, Badalì (1976: 32) understands the use of *quidam* (a certain) in the expression 'a kind of divination' in the opening sentence of the work as attenuating and undercutting the validity and existence of divination. However, a generic sense is preferable, in that divination in which the future was foretold was not the universal manifestation of the phenomenon. Indeed, in each instance that Badalì alleges that Cic. uses ambiguous formulations or prejudicial terms, his interpretation seems forced, and the neutrality of the introduction should be maintained.

**1. An ancient belief** The antiquity of belief in divination and the ubiquity of its practice were key arguments for those defending divination (see below). Cic. uses this expression only of religious questions (cf. *Verr.* 2. 4. 106; *ND* 2. 63). *Opinio* (belief) is the Latin equivalent of *doxa*, which could be contrasted with *aletheia* (truth) or *episteme* (knowledge) often in the sense of what was assented to falsely (e.g. *Acad.* 1. 41; cf. *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7. 151–2), and so might indicate that, from the opening words, Cic. is loading his argument against divination (so Badalì 1976: 31–2). However, *opinio* represents what for a sceptic lacks proof, but can be accepted provisionally, and thus would be consistent with the Academic conclusion to book 2 (see introd., § 3).

**heroic times** Pease sees a reference to acts of divination in Homer and in tragedies based on the Trojan cycle, but Quintus also cites examples from the Theban cycle (1. 88). Any narrow



restriction should be rejected (Timpanaro). Cic. is showing that divination goes back to times which some of his contemporaries were uncertain should be considered as historical. Romulus should not be included among the heroic examples (*pace* Timpanaro), as Cic. appears to accept the historicity of Romulus' auspication (2. 70, 80).

**reinforced by the approbation both of the Roman people and of all peoples** This important line of argument, the *consensus omnium*, which goes back to the Presocratics, was pursued particularly by the Stoics, whence it appears throughout Quintus' case (1. 11–12, 84, 90–4). Cic. himself uses it (*Leg.* 2. 33) to justify the inclusion of augury in his ideal state, putting arguments for and against it in the mouth of Velleius and Cotta (*ND* 1. 44, 62, 3. 8). It is used particularly to support beliefs not empirically verifiable (re religious belief and practice, e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 4. 15–16; Plut. *Mor.* 574e; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 132), but is often confounded with argument from 'common conceptions'. See Schian 1973: esp. 157–63, and Obbink 1992: esp. 193–5, 211–31.

The division of exemplary material into Roman and other (cf. 1. 46, 55, 97) came to be drawn more sharply and enunciated as an organizational principle by Valerius Maximus (*praef.*, see Skidmore 1996: 89–91), but that it is also seen clearly in Cornelius Nepos' *De Viris Illustribus* is plausibly inferred for Varro's *Hebdomades* (Dyck 1996: 400–1); the practice of either or both of these contemporaries may have influenced Cic.

**a kind of** See above 1–7. Here Cic. is alluding to the difference between the traditional Roman use of divination in a non-prophetic way and the predominant Greek use.

**divination, which the Greeks call *mantike*** Cicero glosses the Roman term *divinatio* by the Greek *mantiké* also at *Leg.* 2. 33 and *ND* 1. 55. In formal Latin literature and notably Cic.'s philosophical works (e.g. *Tusc.* 1. 14, 22), only single words of Greek appear; for longer passages Cic. supplies his own translation (see G. B. Townend, *Hermes*, 88 (1960), 98–9). Cic.'s works provide the earliest extant appearance of the abstract noun *divinatio* (North 1990: 57; e.g.

*Clu.* 97), marking an important stage in the Romans' ability to analyse the broader phenomenon, as opposed to specific forms of divinatory activity.

**a presentiment and knowledge of future things** Cic. offers an initial definition of divination (cf. 1. 105) using key terms which will feature in the argument. By 'presentiment' (*praesensio*) he presents the essence of divination, that it permits advance awareness of what will happen; in the second term, *scientia* ('knowledge'), two ideas are present: first, that divination does not provide merely intuition, but information about the future to the rational faculties and secondly that this is not done arbitrarily, but by the employment of techniques. *Scientia*, then, translates the Greek *techne*, in the Stoic sense of 'a system of apprehensions unified by practice and directed to an end useful in life' (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2. 10; attributed to Zeno, Olymp. *In Gorg.* 53–4; translated by Cicero in a lost work, Diomed. *GL* 2. 421 K). This definition is the broadest advanced by Cic. in this dialogue (cf. 1. 9, 2. 13): it plays no part in the philosophical argument. Repici (1995: 182) argues that this cannot be a Stoic definition, which would emphasize the observational and explanatory (cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 132: 'the science which observes and interprets' (*episteme theoretike kai exegetike*)) or discerning (cf. Stob. 2. 114: *diagnostike*) nature of divination, but in this introductory context it is not prejudicial to any Stoic case. It is not, however, strictly appropriate to the divinatory practices of the Roman state religion, in which foreknowledge plays at best a minor role (cf. North 1990: 60–1).

**a noble and beneficial thing, if in fact it exists** Cic.'s laudatory adjectives may reflect Plato's language at *Phaedr.* 244c ('the noblest of arts', *tei kallistei technei*) and the protasis preserves the ostensible neutrality of the work, neither presuming nor denying the existence of *divinatio*. The usefulness of knowing the future is a key issue in the dialogue (e.g. 2. 22).

**by which human nature is able to come closest to the power of the gods** The gods see the future, and in natural divination the human soul can approximate to the gods (see on 1. 129). Cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 289: 'only divine divination, connecting us with the gods,

communicates to us truly the divine life, as it shares in the foreknowledge and thoughts of the gods and makes us truly divine’.

**we have done many other things better than the Greeks** While this patriotic attitude may be one manifestation of his general attitude (cf. *Rep.* 2. 30; *Tusc.* 1. 1; *ND* 1. 8; see too Pease), in this instance it is well grounded, as the Latin etymology encompasses all forms of the phenomenon of divination, whereas the Greek definition strictly relates only to natural divination (Timpanaro). However, Cic. does not spell out why the Latin etymology is superior (cf. *Tusc.* 3. 7, 10–11). Etymologizing was important in much early Stoic argument (see on 1. 93), but Cic.’s concern here is not primarily philosophical.

**our ancestors derived the term for this most excellent faculty from the gods** Cicero uses the archaic word for god, *divus* (D. Wardle, in T. Rajak and G. Clark (eds.), *Philosophy and Power* (Oxford, 2002), 181–91), rather than the contemporary *deus*, to demonstrate the etymology. Cic.’s attribution of the etymology to ‘our ancestors’ (*nostri*) rules out the abstract noun being his own coinage. As the verb *divino* appears in Plautus (*Mil.* 1257) and Terence (*Phorm.* 492; *Hec.* 696) with a divinatory meaning, an early creation of the noun is plausible. However, no etymology of *divinatio* earlier than Cic.’s exists (cf. Maltby 1991: 192–3).

**the Greeks, as Plato explains, from madness** Plato, *Phdr.* 244b–c: ‘the ancient inventors of names did not consider madness to be a disgrace or dishonour. For they would not have used the same word of the noblest of arts by which the future is discerned.’ The connection of divination (*mantike*) or diviner (*mantis*) with madness (*mania*) and Plato’s attribution of it to the ancients is not supported by the evidence of Homer, in whose works the *mantis* interpreted signs without manifestations of madness. Plato himself may have created the etymology of *mantis* from *mania* in support of his preference for the ecstatic mode of divination, the only form not banned from his ideal state. In fact, a link with *mainomai* (madness) rather than *menuo* (reveal) is plausible. See Roth 1988: 237–45; M. Casevitz, *RÉG* 105 (1992), 1–18.

**madness** Cic. uses *furor* in the sense of the divinatory frenzy sent by the gods in many passages in this dialogue (e.g. 1. 66, 70, 2. 110), although it does not bear this exclusive meaning in his philosophical works (cf. A. Taldone, *BStudLat* 23 (1993), 3–19).

**2. no people so civilized and educated or so savage and so barbarous** For a similar generalization on religious belief with the same range of peoples, cf. *Leg.* 1. 24. Here the point is to highlight the argument *e consensu omnium* (see on 1. 1). ‘Barbarous’ (cf. 1. 37, 47) means those who are neither Greek nor Roman; its linking with ‘savage’ demonstrates the pejorative aspect that usually attaches to it (cf. Dauge 1981: 119–31).

**signs of the future can be given and can be understood and announced in advance by certain individuals** The two main elements of the Stoic view are enunciated: divinatory signs exist *and* they can be interpreted so as to be useful (cf. 1. 82–3). ‘Certain individuals’ should not be taken negatively, as suggesting charlatans (so Badali 1976: 34), but as a reference to those who possessed either the technical knowledge to interpret the signs or the gift of prophecy or prophetic dreams.

**In the beginning... from the most ancient** Pease argues that *ultimis* (most ancient) should be understood spatially, that Cic. begins his list with the people the furthest from Rome, but Timpanaro rightly takes the expression temporally, as reinforcing ‘in the first place’ (*a principio*).

**Assyrians** The priority of the Assyrians as human practitioners of astrology (e.g. Jos. *AJ* 1. 168, Serv. *Ecl.* 6. 42) was disputed and given by some to the Egyptians (e.g. Diod. 1. 81. 6). Even if Cic. is inaccurate in writing Assyrians for Babylonians (Pease, Timpanaro, Schaublin) because the Chaldaean (see below) were not Assyrian, he is right to assert the priority of Mesopotamia in astronomy. The earliest text directly mentioning astronomical phenomena in the context of divination comes from Mari c.1765 BC (Heimpel 2003: letter 26), but the report that Gudea the ruler of Lagash from around 2122 to 2102 BC dreamt of the goddess Nisaba who was

studying a tablet of the stars to build a temple in accordance with them shows that the connection can be traced back much earlier (cf. Barton 1994: 11).

**sky unobscured and open on every side** Cf. Ps.-Plato *Epinomis* 987a: good summers and skies unobscured by cloud were enjoyed by both Syria and Egypt. This became a commonplace (cf. Theon 177–8) and was used by Posidonius (cf. 1. 93).

**observed the courses and movements of the stars** Although evidence for actual divination from celestial phenomena in Mesopotamia, as opposed to the simple collection of signs and their meanings, is scarce before the 7th cent. bc, the detailed compilation of omens, planetary movements, and predictions written down in Nineveh by the scribe of Enuma Anu Ellil shows that observations were made from at least the 17th cent. (CAH<sup>2</sup> 3/2. 279–80) and that celestial diviners now enjoyed equal importance with *haruspices* (Rochberg 2004: 66–92). The earliest extant monthly summary of observations of planetary phases and their movement past a Normal Star dates from 652 (Barton 1994: 12–14; cf. CAH<sup>2</sup> 3/2. 282–3). See also H. Hunger and D. Pingree, *Astral Sciences in Mesopotamia* (Leiden, 1999), 12–26.

**what they signified for each** The MSS reading *cuique* (for each) is defended by Timpanaro, although he recognizes that a compressed argument is involved in moving from the astronomical data accumulated to the astrological employment of it in individual horoscopes. Schaublin, however, accepts Hottinger's emendation to *quoque* (also), to avoid imputing to the Assyrians the precision that was the contribution of the Chaldaeans. Although extant Mesopotamian astrology is concerned with the country and the ruler rather than with individuals, interest in the individual should not be ruled out (Barton 1994: 13), and so *cuique* can stand. The earliest extant examples of the extension of astrology to provide personal 'horoscopes' date from 410 bc in Babylonia, but genethliological astrology, the predominant manifestation in the classical world, and one presupposing an Aristotelian universe, is a creation of the 2nd or 1st cent. bc (Pingree 1997: 21–6; Rochberg 1998).

**Within this people the Chaldaean, who were so called not from the name of their art but of their nation** The Chaldaeans were not Assyrians in origin but an offshoot of the Aramean peoples who occupied territory in southern Babylonia, were leaders in the Babylonian resistance to Assyrian rule in the 8th and 7th cents., and sometimes imposed their own ruler on the Babylonian throne (*CAH*<sup>2</sup> 3/2. 9–16, 26–38). If ‘within this people’ can have a geographical sense, i.e. that the Chaldaeans lived in the Assyrian Empire, it is not necessarily an error. From the mid-2nd cent. (e.g. *Cato Agr.* 5. 4) practitioners of astrology were called Chaldaeans irrespective of their nationality. Cic. here is clarifying that he is speaking of a specific ethnic group. For Badali (1976: 35), the use of ‘Chaldaeans’ is prejudicial, as Cic. always employs it in a negative sense (cf. *Tusc.* 1. 95), but his explanatory phrase ‘who were so called . . .’ minimizes any prejudice.

**Egyptians . . . acquired the same skill . . . through almost countless centuries** Aristotle is the earliest extant author to consider the Egyptians prominent in astrology (*Metaph.* 981<sup>b</sup>). While the most definite and uniquely Egyptian contribution to astrology, as known from the Hellenistic era onwards, was their calendar and a system of decans, it was only the arrival of the Persians that led to an Egyptian practice of astrology (Barton 1994: 19–21, 23–9). The Greeks and Romans believed that Egyptian records went back more than tens of thousands of years (*Jul. Afric. Chronogr.* fr. 1; *Cic. Rep.* 3. 14; *Diod.* 1. 81. 6, with 2. 31. 9).

**Cilicians . . . Pisidians . . . Pamphylians** These peoples from the rugged east of Asia Minor are examples of the savage and barbarous nations mentioned at the start of the chapter (cf. *Cic. Har. Resp.* 42).

**peoples over whom I myself have been governor** Cicero was governor of the Roman province of Cilicia, which incorporated Pisidia and Pamphylia, from July 51 to July 50. On his activities, see e.g. Stockton 1971: 227–45; Muñiz Coello 1998.

**the future is revealed by the flight and singing of birds** Cic. returns to their prominence in augury (1. 25, 92, 94, 105, 2. 80; cf. *Leg.* 2. 33).

**3. What colony indeed did Greece send...** An obvious rhetorical exaggeration, but one which is understandable in view of the many Greek colonies which claimed foundation as a result of oracles. Herodotus (5. 42. 2) makes a similar generalization, but it cannot be sustained (Londey 1990: 121–2). Indeed, consultations on colonies seem to have ceased in the early 4th cent.

As Pease notes, Cic.'s list of colonial destinations is not exhaustive, but representative of Greek colonization as a whole. It encompasses the two main waves, that of the Dark Ages to the shores of Asia Minor (see Thuc. 1. 12. 2–4; with S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford, 1991), ad loc.) and the later expansion beginning in the 8th cent. to the west. Although the extant collections of oracular responses from Delphi and Dodona contain foundation oracles given to colonies in the earlier movement, these are not historical, as the archaeological evidence suggests that neither Delphi (Morgan 1990: 126–34) nor Dodona (Parke 1967: 99–100) was functioning as a pan-Hellenic oracle before the 8th cent.; and those 8th cent. responses which might be historical were sought by cities from central Greece.

The three oracles are listed together without any distinction, but the pre-eminence of Apollo (and thus of Delphi) is clear from the surviving *testimonia* (e.g. Callim. *Hymn*. 2. 55–6; Men. *Rhet*. 17). For Pease the oracle of Ammon is added by Cic. 'to complete a rhetorical group of three', but this ignores the recognition accorded Zeus Ammon in 5th and 4th cent. sources (Plato, *Leg*. 738c; cf. Ar. *Av*. 716). Better, Apollo's and Zeus's oracles were linked in some Stoic writers on religion (Parke 1967: 129), perhaps influenced by Plato (cf. Miller 1997: 88–9). The only instances of city-foundation connected with Dodona are legendary—Aletes, the founder of Corinth, visited the oracle (Parke 1967: 129–31).

**Aeolia** In legend the sons and descendants of Orestes colonized Lesbos after the Trojan War, and thereafter founded the twelve Aeolic cities on the Asiatic mainland (Hdt. 1. 149) from the Troad as far south as Smyrna. See *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 2/2. 776–82. Consultation of Delphi by Penthilus and Cometes is found in the 4th cent. Attidographer Demon (*FGrH* 327 F 17).

**Ionian** In legend the colonization was begun by Androclus, son of the Athenian king Codrus, who founded Ephesus; the colonization

was a coordinated action by Athens where refugees from the rest of Greece had gathered (Hdt. 1. 142–8; Strabo 632–3; Paus. 7. 2. 1–4. 10). The colonizing movement had begun by the 10th cent., as seen from the finds of Protogeometric pottery on sites such as Miletus and probably extended wider than the later canonical twelve cities of the Panionic league (*CAH*<sup>2</sup> 2/2. 782–90). A tradition of a consultation of Delphi on refugees from the Dorian invasion survives in Vitruvius (4. 1. 4; cf. Schol. in *Aristid. Or.* 13. 112; Himer. *Or.* 10. 5, 28).

**Asia** Timpanaro questioned whether this is an ancient editorial interpolation to distinguish the colonies of the west from those in the Aegean), but it can function as a reference to the colonization further south on the Asiatic coast from Caria, including Iasus and Ceramus, as far as Phaselis in Lycia (*CAH*<sup>2</sup> 2/2. 790–6 and Hornblower 1982: 14). There is a legendary Delphic oracle to Neleus, son of Codrus, on driving out wicked Carians in order to settle Hellenes and Ionians (Schol. In *Aristid. Or.* 13. 110).

**Sicily** See the concise summary given by Thucydides (6. 2–5) of the foundations beginning from the 730s BC.

**Italy** For the settlements beginning with Pithecusae around 760 BC, see Ridgway 1992: 31–103.

**Delphi** Cic. uses the adjective Pythian, an epithet of Apollo, but its foremost association is with the priestess of Apollo at Delphi who declared his prophecies. For a more positive assessment of Delphic activity from the 8th cent. against those who emphasize retrospective propaganda, see Malkin 1987: 17–91.

**Dodona** The oracle of Zeus in Epirus appears in literature from Homer onwards and became a major pan-Hellenic oracle. Despite its prominence and the number of responses that have survived both on lead tablets and in literature, only one response is relevant here: the hereditary Sicilian diviners, the Galeotae (see on 1. 39), were commanded to sail west until an eagle snatched away their sacrifice (Steph. Byz. 197 [Mein]). See Parke 1967: 178–80.



**Ammon** The oracle of Zeus Ammon at the oasis of Siwa in the Libyan desert was known in the Greek world from at least the 7th cent. and it had an international reputation by the mid 6th cent. (cf. Hdt. 1. 46. 3). No oracle connecting it with mainstream Greek colonization has survived, and its consultation by any Greek states other than Sparta and Cyrene is highly implausible. However, Zeus Ammon had a role in the ideology of colonial foundation in North Africa (Malkin 1994: 158–67). Ps-Callisthenes (1. 30. 5–7) alleges that Alexander consulted Ammon on the foundation of Alexandria and received an oracle by incubation. See Parke 1967: 194–241 and K. P. Kuhlmann, *Das Ammoneion* (Mainz, 1988).

**war** Because of its unpredictability, warfare was a frequent topic for divination (Xen. *Eq. mag.* 9. 8–9) and the gods' will was tested at every stage of a campaign. There are many examples of questions put by states wishing to initiate hostilities, which is what Cic. particularly envisages here (e.g. Thuc. 1. 118, 2. 54; see Parker 1985: 307–9 and Pritchett 1979: iii. 305–18). Plutarch puts such questions at the head of his list of common questions put to Delphi (*Mor.* 386c). Dodona too was consulted (e.g. Paus. 8. 11. 12; Cic. *Div.* 1. 76). Such consultative sacrifices on the battlefield, however, disappeared in the time of Alexander (Parker 2000: 299–307).

**one form of divination** The multiplicity of practices is an element of Quintus' argument in favour of divination (see introd., § 3). This is not to be taken as suggesting the suffocating presence of divination (so Badali 1976: 37), but straightforwardly, as Cic. goes on to explain.

**how many has our own embraced?** Cic. lists the four main kinds of divination practised in Rome: augury, expiation (*procuratio*) by the *haruspices*, prophecies such as those in the Sibylline books, and dreams. The first three were regulated by official bodies, while in general dreams played no significant part in Roman religious life (see below 1. 4).

**Romulus, is held...to have founded the city after taking the auspices** Romulus is described as 'father' from Ennius onwards

(*Ann.* 108 Sk). Cic. does not wish to go back to the legendary past and introduce Aeneas, although he may be aware of the story (cf. Erskine 2001: 30–6). ‘Is held’ (*traditur*) may suggest a mild reserve by Cic. on the historicity of Romulus, which Quintus and Marcus accept (cf. 1. 30, 107, 2. 70), but in the philosophical works he is consistent in having Roman history begin with Romulus (cf. *Leg.* 2. 33; *Off.* 3. 41; *Parad.* 1. 11). By ‘auspices’ Cic. means the formal seeking of the gods’ approval before any undertaking, which was performed by the magistrate, not by a religious official. The word *auspex* derives simply from the watching of birds (*avis* and *specio*), as the ancient etymologies suggest (Maltby 1991: 69). For Romulus’ auspication, see on 1. 107–8.

**a very good augur** Here the emphasis changes to Romulus’ competence as an augur, which Marcus qualifies (2. 70), in so far as Romulus wrongly believed in the predictive power of augury. The etymology of *augur(ium)* is not straightforward: Cic. elsewhere (*Har. Resp.* 18; cf. *Ov. Fast.* 1. 609–12) suggests a connection with ‘increase’ and ‘success’ (*augeo*), but the grammarians (see Maltby 1991: 65–6) with ‘birds’ (*avis*). *Au* is from *avis* and *-gur* comes from an Indo-European root *\*geus* which corresponds with *gustare* in Latin in the sense of ‘test’ or ‘evaluate’ (G. Neumann, *WJA* 2 (1976), 212–29; accepted by Timpanaro, xxxvii–viii, citing *Soph. Ant.* 1005). Romulus’ competence as an augur was to be seen in the mysterious *Roma quadrata* (on which, see A. Grandazzi, *MÉFRA* 105 (1993), 493–545).

**the rest of the kings employed augurs** Cf. Cic. *Phil.* 3. 9. Individual kings, e.g. Numa (*Livy* 1. 20. 7), Tarquinius Priscus (*Div.* 1. 32), and Tarquinius Superbus (*Livy* 1. 55. 3–4).

**no public business, either at home or on military campaign, was undertaken without the auspices being taken** The change from monarchy to the Republic (traditionally 509) was a key moment in Roman history for those of Cic.’s period, heralding the beginning of freedom and the future prosperity of the state (cf. 1. 45). The restriction to ‘public’ business (cf. *Val. Max.* 2. 1. 1) is crucial: Cic. refers primarily to the impetrative auspices sought by the magistrate

before electoral or deliberative assemblies (cf. 1. 33) or on entering office or by the general before battle (cf. 1. 76) to determine whether the gods consented to the business going ahead.

**lore** Cic. means the written body of information, the result of years of empirical observation, which was at the disposal of those practitioners of haruspicy whose expertise was recognized by the Roman state (cf. Linderski 1986a: 2237–40).

### **seeking and consulting . . . interpreting and averting portents**

The first term describes the impetrative (explicit in Cic.'s *inpetrēdis*) role of haruspicy, seen in the examination of the entrails of sacrificial victims to determine whether the gods consented to a specific action or decision, frequently in a military context (cf. 1. 72). 'Consulting' (*consulēdis*) concerns the *sacrificium consultatorium*. A 'portent' (*monstrum*; see on 1. 93) was a sign, usually some disruption of the natural order, sent by the gods to show that they were displeased. If the Senate deemed a portent to be significant, the *haruspices* were formally requested to determine what the sign meant ('interpreting') and what action should be taken to avert the disaster threatened (*procurandis*).

**they took over this whole discipline from the Etruscans** Haruspicy was a form of divination known to the Romans through the Etruscans, hence its frequent description as the 'Etruscan discipline'. Within the state religion haruspicy was not practised by Romans, but by Etruscans (see on 1. 92). Cic. calls it a 'discipline' (*scientia*) because of the rational element in its procedures—conjectures were made from the accumulated information contained in the *haruspices'* books (Linderski 1986a: 2238–9). The possibility exists that the designation goes back to the Etruscans themselves (Capdeville 1997: 466 n. 32).

**so that there should be no kind of divination which might seem ignored by them** The Romans believed themselves to be, and represented themselves as, the most religious of peoples, as a consequence of which the gods rewarded them with their empire (see on 1. 21 **before all else worship the gods**). If the gods' goodwill

was to be maintained, the Romans could ignore no mechanism by which their will was revealed or interpreted.

**4. by raving and by dreaming** After listing the Romans' use of artificial divination, Cic. moves on to the category of 'natural divination', which he will treat at length later (1. 39–69). Badali argues (1976: 38–9) that Cic.'s terminology here is prejudicial rather than 'technical', but Cic. is concerned primarily to demonstrate the comprehensiveness of Rome's divinatory practices.

**ten interpreters...chosen from the citizen body** The Board of Ten for Ritual Action (*Decemviri sacris faciundis*), originally two men, after 367 ten, and after Sulla's reform fifteen. They were headed by two masters, one patrician and one plebeian, and in some way superintended those cults which were conducted under the Greek rite. They were the official guardians of the Sibylline books, which contained prophecies (cf. 1. 98) and remedies, which could guide the Roman response to religious and political crises. Traditionally they had been brought to King Tarquin by the Sibyl of Cumae and were kept in the temple of Jupiter Best and Greatest on the Capitol. At times of crisis, political turmoil, pestilence, or following unusual portents, the Board was consulted by the Senate and recommended a course of action, usually either to send an embassy to Delphi or to introduce a new cult or religious practice to Rome. As such they were one of the main vehicles for innovation and change in the state religion, legitimizing new importations, such as the *lectisternium* ritual, by providing guarantees based on foreign experience and authority and a link to antiquity. See Parke 1988: esp. 190–215; Orlin 1997: 6–115; Scheid 1998: 11–26; C. Février, *Latomus* 61 (2002), 821–41; Mazurek 2004: 151–68.

**often...an ear should be given to raving predictions of this kind** 'Often' is probably not an exaggeration, for, although *De Divinatione* offers only one other definite example of such prophecies entering the public sphere (see on 1. 89), in the 3rd cent. the Senate had to deal with prophecy as a powerful religious force (North 2000: 92–107). Prophecies were seized on throughout the 1st cent. and constitute a vital part of Roman religious life (Wiseman 1994:

esp. 58–67; Mazurek 2004: 158–63). ‘Prophet’ (*vates*) need not have a negative connotation (*pace* Badali 1976: 39), but the term marks out a kind of religious activity that was not regularly incorporated into the public religious system in Cicero’s day (cf. M. Hano, ‘*Haruspex et vates chez Tite-Live, III*’, in Guittard 1986: 111–14). ‘Soothsayers’ translates *harioli*, a term which usually has by the 1st cent. a pejorative sense, but describes a phenomenon popular in the 3rd and 2nd cents., as seen from the extant comedies of Plautus and Terence and from Naevius’ *Hariolus* (cf. Montero 1993: 115–20).

**Cornelius Culleolus in the Octavian War** Culleolus (*RE* iv. 1295) is otherwise unknown, but was probably a member of a senatorial family (Wiseman 1994: 59). In 87 conflict arose between the consul Cn. Octavius, from whom the expression ‘Octavian War’ (cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 14; *Phil.* 14. 23) derives, and L. Cornelius Cinna. The former was notoriously superstitious, but could not escape his fate (cf. Val. Max. 1. 6. 10).

**Nor...have the more significant dreams...been ignored by the highest council** Cic. can cite only two dreams of which the Senate took note (1. 55, 99) and Valerius Maximus (1. 7. 3) only one. The fragmentary Granius Licinianus (33. 12) appears to record a dream among a list of portents from 105, but with insufficient detail to permit certainty of its official recognition by the Senate. Even if there were more examples, the minor role of dreams in the traditional Roman system should not be exaggerated (cf. Harris 2003: 25–6).

**even within my own memory, L. Iulius, who was consul with P. Rutilius** L. Julius Caesar and P. Rutilius Lupus were the consuls of 90. Cic. served in the Marsic War (cf. 1. 99), which justifies the temporal expression. This incident probably belongs at the end of the year, on Caesar’s return from the campaign in which his victory at Acerrae had marked the turning point.

**Juno Sospita** After the defeat of the Latin league in 338 the rites of Juno Sispes, the chief goddess of Lanuvium, were shared with Rome (Livy 8. 14. 2), as the Lanuvians received Roman citizenship. Her epithet Sispes became corrupted into Sospita because of

a supposed connection with *sozein* and the idea of salvation (Festus 462 L), although it may have meant originally ‘mistress of the place’ (Pailler 1997: 524 n. 51), and thereby have had military connotations; her iconography regularly involves shield and spear (cf. *ND* 1. 82; Schultz 2006).

Within Rome she was worshipped in at least two locations, but only one is called a temple. This was vowed in 197 by C. Cornelius Cethegus and was dedicated in the Forum Holitorium in 194 (Orlin 1997: 63; *LTUR* iii. 128–9). However, it is possible that Cic. refers to the temple at Lanuvium (see Kragelund 2001: 64–8), which received an annual visit from the consuls (Cic. *Mur.* 90) and provided the greatest number of prodigies accepted as significant by the Senate from any location outside Rome (e.g. Livy 22. 1. 17, 40. 19. 2), and most relevant a portent heralding the Social War (see on 1. 99). Although Schultz and the majority of scholars prefer a Roman location for the restoration, in the context of needing to secure the loyalty of the Latins, a demonstration of Roman piety at Lanuvium might well have spoken more powerfully.

**Caecilia, the daughter of Baliaricus** Caecilia (*RE* iii. 1235) was the mother of the augur Ap. Claudius Pulcher (see 1. 29) as well as of Cic.’s great enemy Clodius. Q. Caecilius Metellus Baliaricus won a triumph in 121 and the honorific *cognomen* for military success in the Balearic islands (Livy *Per.* 60; Strabo 167). Caecilia’s membership of the Metelli, the most prominent plebeian family in the early 1st cent. (cf. Münzer 1999: 279–81; Wiseman 1974: 176–81), and their fame as protectors of Roman religion (cf. Val. Max. 1. 4. 5), is crucial to her dream’s acceptance and the Senate’s action. Although an earlier connection between the Caecilii Metelli and Juno Sospita cannot be proved, the appearance of the distinctive figure-of-eight shield on the tomb of another Caecilia Metella, the first cousin once removed of the dreamer, at least recalls the earlier service (Schultz 2006). Details of Caecilia’s dream in which the goddess was leaving her temple because of the squalor into which it had fallen, having become ritually impure and a sleeping place for dogs, appear in *Obsequens* (55), but he may have sensationalized the story (Schultz 2006). The context of the Social War, in which Rome’s old alliances with her Latin and Italian allies were under stress and

when proposals for the extension of Roman citizenship to the Latins were a key issue, renders a dream from the goddess whose worship by the Romans at Lanuvium exemplified the successful and beneficial extension of citizenship particularly significant. Caecilia's dream provides a justification for the policy enshrined in the *lex Iulia de civitate* of 90 by which citizenship was extended to the Latins (Kragelund 2001: 68–9).

**5. My own view** The emphatic expression of Cic.'s own view is taken by Badalì (1976: 40) to demonstrate clearly his belief in the non-existence of divination, but strictly his point concerns *why* the ancients believed. Moreover it is also what Quintus argues. As such it is a plausible explanation, and does not prejudge the issue of the existence of divination, unless Cic.'s limitation to 'the ancients' suggests that the contemporary reader should differ. While 'approved... of' (*probaverunt*) may be taken in the Academic sense of 'give assent to', in this general introductory context the usage of no particular school is probably favoured. On 'outcomes' see on 1. 11.

**arguments... have been collected** By this reference to a pre-existing collection Cic. makes it clear that he has not read all the authorities he lists firsthand, certainly not the Presocratics (cf. Timpanaro, lxxvii–viii). Because Zeno and the Stoics appear twice, Cic. may have combined material from two sources, a doxographical list of philosophical views in general on divination and a specifically Stoic compilation, probably that of Posidonius (cf. Schäublin 1985: 157–8, 163). Others emphasize the strongly pro-Academic conclusion of the doxography to suggest an Academic source (e.g. Glucker 1999: 42 n. 26). Nothing, however, precludes that Cic. has taken a list, basically Posidonius', and altered the conclusion to fit his own Academic preference. For Posidonius' role in the creation of doxography, see P. A. Van der Waerdt, *GRBS* 26 (1985), 381–9.

**the most ancient, Xenophanes of Colophon, while he admitted the existence of the gods... fundamentally rejected divination** Cf. Aetius *Plac.* 5. 1. 2. Although the list has no simple chronological order, Xenophanes is the most ancient. While certain knowledge about the gods was impossible (fr. 34. 3–4 DK), Xenophanes did

accept the existence of the divine, although he seems to have offered no proofs. He mentions a 'single greatest god' (fr. 23 DK) and often uses the singular *theos*, but cannot be considered a certain monotheist (Leshner 1992: 3–7, 78–119; Schäfer 1996: 164–74).

Even without the specific testimony of Cic. and Aetius, Xenophanes' rejection of divination can be deduced from his wider comments on the divine. Because the divine could not move (fr. 26 DK) and thus be in different places at different times, natural divination, by dreams or frenzy, is excluded; and as natural phenomena have natural explanations (fr. 32 DK), portents and prodigies would seem to have no divine origin. The key text, however, is 'not from the beginning did the gods reveal everything to mortals / but in the course of time, by inquiring, they discover the better' (fr. 18 DK), which has been interpreted as a rejection of divine communication via 'signals or cryptic signs' (the force of *hypedeixan*) and a preference for human enquiry, of which Xenophanes himself was a practitioner (Leshner 1992: 149–55). Even if we argue that the claim that the gods did not reveal *everything* does not preclude that they revealed something (cf. A. Tulin, *Hermes*, 121 (1993), esp. 133–7) and relate this to divination, it is difficult to see in what type of divination Xenophanes' *theos* could have participated.

**Epicurus in his babbling on the nature of the gods** The overwhelming majority of philosophical schools and philosophers, as Cicero goes on to show, could accommodate the phenomenon of divination in some form. Epicurus' rejection is explicit: 'since the science of divination does not exist, even if it does, what happens should not be considered in our power' (fr. 15 A; cf. C. Diano, *SIFC* 12 (1935), 237–9). His rejection was stated in the *Small Epitome* (Diod. Laert 10. 135), and probably also in *On the Gods*, although Cic. need not be referring specifically to that here or at *ND* 2. 162. Epicurus was 'the *only* dogmatic philosopher to have produced formal arguments against divination' (Obbink 1992: 212 n. 65). His rejection of divination depends on his conception of the gods as beings who do not concern themselves with human affairs, and who thus have no interest in communicating their will to men through signs (cf. Diogenes of Oenoanda frs. 23–4 and 52–4 Smith), and fundamentally on the irreconcilability of the mechanistic



explanation of causation provided in his atomic theory with the notion that the gods intervene to create portents in nature.

Cic.'s hostility to Epicurus' doctrines is consistent throughout the philosophical dialogues (cf. 1. 87). The particular note struck here of 'babbling' may be connected with Cotta's description of Epicurean theology as unintelligible (*ND* 1. 74–5). See D'Anna 1965.

**Socrates** Socrates' own beliefs come indirectly via Plato and Xenophon. It seems clear that he accepted natural divination (e.g. *Plat. Apol.* 20e–21a; *Phaedr.* 244a–c; *Leg.* 738b–d), but placed artificial divination such as extispicy (*Tim.* 72b) and augury (*Phaedr.* 244d) on a much lower level. He did not, however, reject artificial divination utterly, if the placing of it fifth in the hierarchy of useful lives (*Phaedr.* 248d–e) and its coupling with other skills (e.g. *Alc.* 107a–b; *Lach.* 195a–e; *Chrm.* 173b–c) are significant (Hankinson 1988: 127–8). Quintus uses Socrates as an example of one who credited prophetic dreams (1. 52), direct communication from the gods and oracles (1. 122–3).

**all the Socratics** While Xenophon accepted divination of all kinds (e.g. *An.* 6. 4. 12–24, 7. 8. 1–6), and Plato natural divination (oracles—*Resp.* 427b; *Leg.* 738b–d; dreams—see 1. 60–1), some Cynics rejected it (Diog. Laert. 6. 24; Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 5. 21. 6), and the Cyrenaics and Megarians were probably hostile (Pfeffer 1976: 6–42). In Cic. the term 'Socratics' is very broad (cf. Cic. *Orat.* 3. 61–2; further *testimonia* collected in Giannantoni 1983: i. 3–14).

**Zeno and those who followed him** The Stoics. Zeno is reported as upholding all forms of divination (Diog. Laert. 7. 149), but relevant fragments of his own work have not survived. Cic.'s generalization of Stoic views on divination (see 1. 6) is fundamentally correct. A central tenet of Stoicism was belief in gods who cared for the world; as an element of their providence they sent signs which men could interpret by divination (cf. 1. 81–2).

**the Old Academy** Plato and his followers who take their name from Plato's school. For example, Heraclides Ponticus (see on 1. 46) wrote a work *On Oracles* and Eudoxus denied that horoscopes could be cast

(*Div.* 2. 87), perpetuating their founder's preference for natural divination. Cic. specifies the 'Old Academy' to distinguish these followers of Plato from the adherents of the sceptical New Academy of Arcesilas and Carneades and the so-called 'Old Academy' invented by Antiochus of Ascalon in Cic.'s own day.

**the Peripatetics** Cf. Ael. *VH* 3. 11. Aristotle and his followers, who take their name from the walks (*peripatoi*) in the Lyceum. Aristotle accepted natural divination (cf. 1. 72): he includes oracles without hostile comment in his historical works (e.g. *Ath. Pol.* 19. 2), but did not devote a specific discussion to them and observed a general caution (e.g. *Pol.* 1335<sup>a</sup>18; *Rh.* 1398<sup>b</sup>32), as also on dreams ('it is not easy either to deny divination which takes place in sleep or to believe in it' (*Div. somn.* 462<sup>b</sup>12; cf. Aet. *Plac.* 416). Various approaches were taken by his successors: Theophrastus seems to have defended Pythia's veracity in one instance at least in his *On Piety* (W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Theophrastus of Eresus* (Leiden, 1992), ii, fr. 584A = Porph. *Abst.* 2. 15. 1–2); on the other hand, Origen (*C. Cels.* 7. 3, 8. 45) believed that arguments of Aristotle and his pupils could be used against oracles.

**Pythagoras ... conferred his considerable prestige on the practice** Pythagoras is credited with employing cleidomania, augury (Diog. Laert. 8. 20), and hydromancy (Varro, *Ant. Div.* 1 fr. 4 Cardauns). Amongst other 'miracles', he is reputed to have 'foretold' the strife that was to afflict Metapontum (Apoll. *Mir.* 6), but nothing proves this was done by divinatory technique, and a book of his alleged prophecies called *Tripod* was compiled in the 4th cent. by Andron of Ephesus (Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 10. 3. 4). The late biographies set his miraculous handling of an eagle in the context of a conversation on birds and divinatory signs (Porph. *Pyth.* 25; Iambl. *VP* 62). For the problems of asserting anything about Pythagoras and of untangling the traditions, see Philip 1966: esp. 3–23.

**Democritus in very many passages argued for the presentiment of things to come** Democritus of Abdera, the atomist philosopher of the 5th cent., is credited with 70 titles (Diog. Laert. 9. 46–9), which offers ample opportunity for the number of references to which

Cic. alludes. Only in late tradition did he practise astrology (e.g. Ael. *VH* 4. 20). He discussed dreams, explaining them as the result of streams of particles impacting on the soul (Plut. *Mor.* 735); according to Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 9. 19), he held that *eidola* 'indicate to men in advance what will happen', but this is most likely a very limited sense of precognition (see P. J. Bicknell, *REG* 82 (1969), 318–26). Cf. Arist. *Div. somn.* 464<sup>a</sup>5–6.

Although Democritus' atomistic theory made him similar to Epicurus, he does not usually attract the sarcastic treatment that Cic. deals out to Epicurus. Even Cotta's criticism of his inconsistent theology as 'notions more worthy of Democritus' city than of himself' (*ND* 1. 121) is in effect double-edged, suggesting that these views are not of his usual standard; Cic. may have respected the founder of atomism, despite disagreeing with him (cf. Silvestre 1990: 40–5).

**Dicaearchus the Peripatetic denied all other forms of divination except dreams and raving** Cf. Aet. *Plac.* 5. 1. 4. Dicaearchus of Messene, a pupil of Aristotle, wrote at the end of the 4th cent. on a range of subjects from geography to philosophy. Which work Cic. refers to here (cf. 2. 105, 'the big book of Dicaearchus') is unclear: the only certain title with which Cic. was familiar (*Att.* 13. 31. 2, 32. 2, 33. 2; cf. W. Görler, 'Cicero und "die Schule des Aristoteles"' in Fortenbaugh and Steinmetz 1989: 251) and which has surviving fragments on divination is *Descent into the Trophonian Cave* (see Wehrli 1967: 47–8). Scholars have posited Dicaearchan volumes *On the Soul* and *On Prophecy*, but most speculation concerns a possible work with the same or similar title as a lost treatise by Plutarch, *If Foreknowledge of What is to Happen is Useful*, in which Plutarch took issue with Dicaearchus. Although Dicaearchus held that the soul could not be separated from the body (Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 21), this need not be at odds with belief in some form of natural divination, if nature itself were divinely planned (cf. Arist. *Div. somn.* 463<sup>b</sup>11–20). For Dicaearchus the soul had a divine element (*Dox. Gr.* p. 639 Diels; Aetius, *Plac.* 5. 1. 4), but the emotional and irrational elements seem to have possessed the mantic function, if the arguments attributed to Aristotle's school by Plutarch (*Mor.* 432c) are Dicaearchus' (cf. Del Corno 1969: 161–3).

and The MSS read *Cratippusque* 'and Cratippus', but Schäublin (1985: 160) argues for heavy punctuation and the adoption of Davies's emendation *quoque* (also). The preceding period is long (and made far worse by Schäublin's further alterations, see below), but the conjunction of Dicaearchus and Cratippus by a simple *-que* should not be rejected, because they are linked together again later (1. 113, 2. 100).

**Cratippus, our friend whom I consider to be the equal of the finest Peripatetics** Although a pupil of the Academy, Cratippus became known as a Peripatetic (cf. 'in my judgement easily the best of all the Peripatetics I've heard' (*Tim.* 2), 'leading philosopher of this age' (*Off.* 1. 2, 3. 5)). Probably not the scholarch of the *Peripatos*, but master of a private school (H. B. Gottschalk, *ANRW* ii/36. 2 (Berlin, 1987), 1096–7), Cratippus of Pergamum was a contemporary of Cic., whom he met in Ephesus in 51 (*Tim.* 2); Cratippus had moved to Athens by the summer of 45 and taught Cic.'s son Marcus (*Fam.* 12. 16. 2). He received citizenship from Caesar at Cicero's request (Plut. *Cic.* 24. 7) and took the name M. Tullius Cratippus. The note of familiarity is maintained throughout Quintus' speech (1. 70, 113; cf. 2. 100) and is struck elsewhere by Cic. (e.g. *Off.* 3. 5; *Fam.* 16. 21. 3). He probably did not appear in Cic.'s *Timaieus* as a discussant (Linderski 1989: 110 = 1995: 49). Cratippus revived Platonic ideas and is a source of non-empirical tendencies in Platonic interpretation (Tarrant 2000b: 67–71).

**gave credence to these same forms, but rejected the other kinds of divination** Cic. is our only source for his views of divination (see on 1. 70–1).

**6. But, when the Stoics were defending almost all its forms** Schäublin (1985: 159) argues for this clause and its continuation to ... *fecisset* to be attached to the previous period, and for 'but' (*sed*) to be omitted in order to have *accessit* ('there followed Chrysippus') begin a new sentence. However, Cic. is now passing on to discuss the Stoic school by itself, in a form he may have taken from Posidonius (see above 1. 5 arguments ...). The section moves from a generalization to the views of individual Stoics arranged chronologically and culminates in

Posidonius. For an almost identical doxographic treatment of the Stoics on divination, see Diog. Laert. 7. 149.

The note of caution introduced by 'almost all' (cf. Aet. *Plac.* 5. 1. 1) may reflect the Stoic recognition that individual instances of divination could go wrong (cf. 1. 24–5), but should strictly indicate that at least one type of divination was rejected. Cic. lists elsewhere (*Acad.* 2. 107) the Stoic acceptance of extispicy, augury, oracles, dreams, and frenzied prophecies; and astrology (*Div.* 2. 88; see Long 1982: 166–78). Necromancy, which is hard to reconcile with Stoic doctrine on the existence of the soul after death, may be a form of divination they rejected. Alternatively, Cic.'s formulation recognizes the constant tension within Stoicism in regard to divination, particularly artificial divination (cf. C. Lévy 1997: 328). See Pfeffer 1976: 43–95.

**Zeno had, as it were, scattered various seeds in his commentaries** Although Zeno's *On Signs* (Diog. Laert. 7. 4) may have been a treatise on divination, the description of scattering seed and the plural 'commentaries' suggest strongly that there was no one treatment of divination by Zeno (Timpanaro). Pease considers that 'seeds' may be an allusion to the Greek *sperma*, a concept important in Stoic thought, but the metaphor, similarly qualified, appears elsewhere in Cic. in non-Stoic contexts (*Rep.* 1. 41; *Fin.* 5. 18; *Tusc.* 5. 69). The description of Zeno's works as 'commentaries' may suggest that they were written with no particular concern for literary appeal, a common feature of the genre.

**Cleanthes** Cleanthes of Assos followed Zeno as head of the Stoa from 263 to 232. Nothing specific on divination appears in the list of his works (Diog. Laert. 7. 174), but he used its existence to help account for human conceptions of the gods (cf. *ND* 2. 13, 3. 16) and he may have enlarged on Zeno's ideas in his *On the Gods*.

**then came** Schaublin (1985: 159) punctuates before this (cf. *Fin.* 1. 59; *Tusc.* 3. 2) and translates *accessit* by 'hinzu kam dann'. While his translation is justifiable, there is no need for the punctuation.

**Chrysippus** Chrysippus of Soli followed Cleanthes as head of the Stoa from 232 to 207. He was a prolific writer, producing over 705

works (Diog. Laert. 7. 180). Cic.'s praise (cf. *ND* 2. 16, 3. 25) should not be restricted narrowly to his work on logic (*pace* Timpanaro).

**divination in two volumes, as well as one on oracles and one on dreams** The 2-vol. work *On Divination* is attested by Diog. Laert. (7. 149) and Philodemus (*On the Gods* 7 = SVF 1183); the work *On Oracles* is attested by Photius (s.v. νεοττός), but that *On Dreams* not by title outside Cic. (cf. *Div.* 2. 134, 144; see Del Corno 1969: 52–7, 135–7). The individual volumes were full of illustrative examples, but their relationship to the 2-vol. work is unclear. Chrysippus may be the first Stoic to have raised the discussion of divination to ‘a more abstract, theoretical level’, viewing it as an empirical science (Bobzien 1998: 88), but no fragment enables us to explain precisely how he accounted for divinatory phenomena. Herophilus’ attempt to classify dreams systematically by their origin may have influenced Chrysippus, although we can prove his influence only in the case of Posidonius (see von Staden 1989: 306–10). Chrysippus’ concentration on the two types of natural divination suggests that he was the first Stoic to privilege them above artificial divination. See C. Lévy 1997: 333–5.

**Diogenes of Babylon followed him and wrote one volume** Diogenes of Babylon came from Seleucia, but is called ‘Babylonian’ from the country (Strabo 743), a toponym which Cic. applies to him only here, usually preferring ‘the Stoic’ (*Tusc.* 4. 5; *Acad.* 2. 137; *Sen.* 23; *Div.* 2. 90; but cf. *ND* 1. 41; *Off.* 3. 51). He was head of the Stoa from around 200 to 152; his immediate predecessor, Zeno of Tarsus, does not appear in this doxography because he wrote nothing on divination. Diogenes appears to have questioned the ability of astrologers to predict the destinies of individuals (cf. 2. 90), but he cannot have diverged far from Stoic orthodoxy.

**Antipater two** Antipater of Tarsus was head of the Stoa from 152 to 129. The title of his work(s) is not attested. If the singular *liber... plenus* (*Div.* 2. 144) is given its due weight, a title of *On Dreams* can be posited for one. The examples of Socrates’ prophecies via his *daimonion* (see on 1. 123) fit better with oracles and may suggest that the title of Antipater’s other volume was *On Oracles*. Perhaps the

two volumes together were entitled *On Divination* (Del Corno 1969: 156). Antipater appears to have exhibited none of the reservations of Diogenes. See Alesse 2000: 165–9.

**our friend Posidonius five** Posidonius of Apamea was the most influential Stoic of the 1st cent., lived on Rhodes where Cic. met him in 78/7 (Plut. *Cic.* 4. 5); Cic. could later speak of him as teacher (*Fat.* 5; *ND* 1. 6) and friend (cf. *Fin.* 1. 6; *ND* 1. 123, 2. 88; *Tusc.* 2. 61; *Div.* 2. 47). See Kidd 1988: 24–5. The 5-vol. work *On Divination* and perhaps *Physical Arguments*, which also discussed divination (Diog. Laert. 7. 149), are among Cic.'s main sources for *De Divinatione* (see introd., § 2). Posidonius offered an unconditional defence of divination (C. Lévy 1997: 327). For the fragments on divination, see Edelstein and Kidd 1972: 106–12, with commentary in Kidd 1988: 423–42 and Theiler 1982: 289–307.

**Panaetius, although the leader of their school** Panaetius of Rhodes was head of the Stoa from 129 to 109 (cf. 2. 97; *Acad.* 2. 107). He is the probable source for 2. 87–97, but not for anything in book 1. For his life and work, see van Straaten 1946 and Alesse 1994; for his fragments on divination, see M. van Straaten, *Panaetii Rhodii fragmenta* (Leiden, 1962), frs. 68–78, and F. Alesse, *Panezio di Rodi: testimonianze* (Naples, 1997), frs. 136–40.

**the teacher of Posidonius** Cf. *Off.* 3. 8; *Suda* s.v. *Ποσειδώνιος* (4. 179 Adler). On the standard chronology of Panaetius' life, his teaching of Posidonius predates 109. See Kidd 1988: 12–13.

**pupil of Antipater** Only Cic. records this relationship, but a connection with Antipater's predecessor Diogenes (*Suda* s.v. *Παναίτιος* (4. 20 Adler)) and thus his presence in Athens before 152 is plausible. His main philosophical apprenticeship, however, fell under Antipater before 129.

**deviated from the Stoics** Panaetius' thought marks a divergence from Stoic orthodoxy in many areas, as he took a line closer to Aristotle and Plato (Philod. *P. Herc.* 1018 col. LXI). For example, he rejected the doctrine of world conflagration. Although

a non-pejorative sense for 'deviated' has been suggested (Pease, Timpanaro), one of the meanings identified in *OLD* lacks a negative connotation. Blossius too seems to have been sceptical about some manifestations of artificial divination (cf. Plut. *TG* 17. 6; C. Lévy 1997: 321–2).

**he did not dare to deny...but said that he had his doubts** The obvious vehicle for these views was his *On Providence*, which Cic. requested Atticus to send him in May 45 (*Att.* 13. 8). Here and at *Acad.* 2. 107 (= van Straaten fr. 70: '[Panaetius] had his doubts about that which every Stoic except him thought was most certain, that the responses of *haruspices*, auspices, oracles, dreams, prophecies were true, and held himself back from assent') Cic. presents Panaetius as a sceptic, practising the *epoche* of the Academy, in relation to most forms of natural and artificial divination; elsewhere he appears as completely hostile to divination (Diog. Laert. 7. 149 = van Straaten fr. 73; Epiphanius *Fid.* 9. 45 Holl = van Straaten fr. 68). His rejection of astrology is clear from *Div.* 2. 87–97 (= van Straaten fr. 74). If the testimony of Diog. Laert. and Epiphanius is minimized as generalizations (e.g. van Straaten 1946: 79–81), the only problem relates to artificial divination other than astrology: fr. 70 suggests only doubts about augury, but *Div.* 1. 12 (= van Straaten fr. 72) would seem to imply rejection. Influenced by the attacks of Carneades on the Stoic doctrines of fate and providence, Panaetius rejected any sense of a powerful determinism operating from outside constraining man, and attributed to man an ability to affect external influences (cf. *Off.* 2. 117 = van Straaten fr. 117). Hence artificial divination would be impossible to defend, but Panaetius may not have wished to exclude totally the possibility of natural divination. At the least Panaetius accepted that earlier Stoic arguments were insufficient to prove the existence of divination, hence the cautious phrasing of Cic. here. See van Straaten 1946: 81–7 and Alesse 1994: 230–9.

**Will we not be permitted...?** A rhetorical question by which Cic. introduces the plan of the whole work, in which he presents his inquiry as one to be conducted along the lines of the sceptical New Academy of which he was an adherent, as becomes clear in 1. 7. Although on one level this conveys the difference between Panaetius



and Stoic orthodoxy, on another, especially when the context of Cic.'s rhetorical question and the extreme sarcasm of the following sentence are taken into account, it serves to put the Stoics in a bad light, as the opponents of free thought. As such it can serve as further evidence of the fundamental bias of *De Divinatione* (see introd., § 3).

**7. this virtue of the Academy** Under Arcesilas the Academy turned away from doctrinal assertions to a rigorous scepticism which characterized its approach for two hundred years, perhaps in an attempt to restore the spirit of Socratic enquiry (cf. 2. 150; *Fin.* 2. 2). See Groarke 1990: 98–123.

**a most eminent philosopher** Panaetius. Cic.'s adjectives of praise allocated throughout this section fall mainly on the opponents of divination. Cic. highlights the division even in Stoic ranks and thereby casts a shadow over their case.

**So, as I myself am enquiring what verdict is to be reached in regard to divination** At this point the doxographic prologue leads in to the setting of the dialogue proper. The ostensibly neutral Cic. gives way to Marcus. As a follower of the sceptical New Academy, Marcus presents himself as a latter-day Socrates pursuing an enquiry rather than promoting a dogmatic position (cf. 2. 150).

**Carneades** Carneades of Cyrene was the head of the New Academy till his death in 129; he left no books of his own, but his views were represented accurately by the prolific Clitomachus, whom Cic. read (2. 87; cf. *Acad.* 2. 78; for *testimonia* and fragments, see Mette 1985: 53–141). His views on divination (fr. 9 M) are reported only in *De Divinatione*: he questioned the extent of divination and whether it can be perceived by the senses (2. 9), wittily derided the oracle at Praeneste (2. 87), rejected augury (1. 12, 109), astrology (2. 97), and dreams (2. 150), and discussed the role of chance in divinatory phenomena (1. 23). It has been suggested that Carneades did not attack divination *per se*, but only Stoic arguments in its defence (Opsomer 1996: 170), but no hint of this emerges from the ancient *testimonia*. His particular targets were Chrysippus and Antipater (cf. Diog. Laert. 4. 62–3; Numenius fr. 27 Des Places).

**I am afraid to give my assent rashly to something untrue or to something insufficiently grounded** Cf. Cic. *Acad.* 1. 45: 'a man must always restrain his rashness and hold it back from every slip, as it would be glaring rashness to give assent either to a falsehood or to something not known for certain' and 2. 138: 'I am afraid that I may slip into forming opinions and adopt and approve something that I do not know.' In their polemic the Academics regularly accused Stoics of rashness, e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 1056f.

Marcus refers to the sceptical practice of *epoche*, the suspension of judgement (see P. Couissin, *RÉG* 42 (1929), 373–97). His formulation of the Academic position lets it appear that he could assent *if* the arguments presented were convincing, the position of the classical rather than dogmatic sceptic. Whether 'assent' (Cic.'s translation of *synkatathesis*; cf. *Acad.* 2. 37) here is meant in a strong sense of 'belief in', or a weak sense of 'approval falling short of belief', is unimportant. On the problem and meaning of 'assent' for the sceptic, see Frede 1987: 201–22.

**a careful comparison of argument against argument** Cf. *Rep.* 3. 8; *Acad.* 2. 7; *Off.* 2. 8; *Tusc.* 1. 8. This principle of arguing *in utramque partem* goes back to Aristotle (*Fin.* 5. 10) and was introduced into the Academy by Arcesilas (*Orat.* 3. 67); it is an important element of Cic.'s philosophical dialogues, although none of his extant works demonstrates the balance and scale of *De Divinatione* in this aspect. See Glucker 1978: 33–5 and Leonhardt 1999: 13–25.

**the three books which I wrote *On the Nature of the Gods*** In *De Natura Deorum*, which was published in 45, Cic. presents Epicurean and Stoic arguments, and subjects them to Academic criticism.

**haste in giving one's assent and erring is shameful in all things**

Marcus echoes his words from the proem of *De Natura Deorum* (1. 1), but the idea appears also in other dialogues (*Off.* 1. 18; *Acad.* 1. 45, 2. 66, 114). The idea of the shameful of being wrong goes back to Plato (*Tht.* 194c).

**especially in this topic . . . there is a danger . . . of the crime of impiety if we neglect them** Cf. Plato, *Minos* 318e; *Leg.* 888b. Despite his

personal Academic inclinations, Marcus is mindful of the wider dimension of the state here (cf. introd., § 3): the survival of Rome's prosperity and empire was believed to depend on her continued good relations with the gods (see on 1. 3 so that . . . ignored by them). The three terms, 'auspices', 'the divine', and 'religious observance', are those most relevant to the state religion and the Senate's role in its preservation.

**religious observance** The first appearance of the key term *religio*, which was derived variously by the ancients from *religere* with the sense of 'fear' (e.g. Serv. *Aen.* 8. 349), from *relegere* in the sense of 'repeat', referring to the scrupulousness characteristic of Roman religious practice (Cic. *ND* 2. 71), and from *religare* with the sense of 'binding' (e.g. Serv. [Auct] *Aen.* 12. 181). From a primary sense in which the notion of care or scruple was central, the term became more general meaning pious worship of the gods, either public or private, but particularly that connected with the ritual of the official state cults. See Sachot 1991: 364–72; Ronca 1992: 46–8, 52–3.

**old women's superstition** Marcus returns to the attack on superstition at the end of *De Divinatione* (2. 148–9). Superstition (*superstitio*) was the term applied to religious activities which lay outside the official state religion. Ancient etymologies derived it from 'fear of what stands above' (Serv. *Aen.* 12. 187) or from 'survival' (Cic. *ND* 2. 72), but Ronca (1992: 53–5) has argued for an archaic meaning of 'eyewitness' connected with the Indo-European meaning of 'knowing what is hidden from others' (cf. *epistēnai*). *Superstitio*, then, originally was the condition which resulted from possessing such divinatory power. During the 3rd cent. a pejorative sense came in, of erroneous or extreme religious activity caused by ignorance of philosophical truths about nature.

'Old women's' (*anilis*) is linked with superstition frequently by Cic. (*Div.* 2. 19, 36, 125, 141; *ND* 2. 70, 3. 92), drawing on the common belief (cf. Plato *Thet.* 176b) that old women were unduly credulous, with failing mental powers and garrulous. A popular etymology connecting the Greek *anous* (mindless) with the Latin *anus* (old woman) illustrates the idea (Festus 5 L).

**8–11a** These chapters set the physical scene for the dialogue, establish the question of divination in the context of physics and set forth the basic tenor of Quintus' case, which will occupy book 1. Cic often pays careful attention to the physical setting of his dialogues, e.g. the scene at Arpinum in *De Legibus* 1 (see Dyck 2004: 55–6.). Here Cicero's villa at Tusculum provides the general setting: its 'Lyceum' is an appropriate location for Quintus with his Peripatetic inclinations to mount his defence of divination, but also equally appropriate for a balanced, Aristotelian treatment of both sides of the question (cf. Leonhardt 1999: 13–25). Marcus' words which close this introductory section offer the first indication of the political setting of the dialogue.

The careful cross-reference to *De Natura Deorum* locates the discussion clearly and appropriately in the area of 'physics' and in its place in Cic.'s intended philosophical encyclopedia. For Quintus' essentially Stoic argument it is also necessary not to separate the issues of the nature of the gods and divination. Whether we read the wider conclusion of the *De Natura Deorum* as equally balanced (see introd., § 3 (ii)) or emphasize the support given by Marcus to the Stoic arguments of Lucilius Balbus, Cic.'s use of the words means that Quintus can legitimately present a traditional Stoic approach to divination, which he advertises in his statement of the classic Stoic reciprocity 'if there is divination, there are gods'.

**8. I have often discussed these questions on other occasions** A common literary gambit in the dialogues (cf. *ND* 1. 15; *Acad.* 2. 9; *Tusc.* 4. 7, 5. 11) to introduce the historical setting.

**recently** In the so-called 'Aristotelian' dialogues the participants are contemporaries of the author, rather than men of antiquity. For the dramatic date of *De Divinatione*, see introd., § 5.

**Quintus** Q. Tullius Cicero was Cic.'s younger brother who rose to the urban praetorship of 62 and was governor of Asia for three years, 61–59; with his military experience he assisted Cic. in Cilicia, took Pompey's side in the Civil War and lived in Italy from 47 till his death in the proscriptions of 43. Quintus wrote poetry. If Quintus had any philosophical inclinations they were probably towards the Peripatetics (cf. *Fin.* 5. 96; *Div.* 2. 100), yet Cic. uses him to argue what is

essentially a Stoic case in *De Divinatione*. The reason for Cic.'s choice of Quintus as his main interlocutor is unclear (see Pease, 17–18; Schofield 1986: 60: 'a tacit comment on the relative weakness of the Stoic case'). For his career see W. C. McDermott, *Historia* 20 (1971), 702–17; Shackleton Bailey 1980: 3–6; A. H. Mamoojee, *EMC* 13 (1994), 23–50.

**my Tusculan villa** Formerly the property of Sulla, it was bought by Cic. in 68 and rebuilt by him after Clodius had destroyed it. Cic. lived there continuously in 46 and for much of 45, while he wrote, amongst other works, *De Natura Deorum*. Its location has not been settled satisfactorily (e.g. M. Marchei, *Arch. Class.* 27 (1975), 18–25).

**we had reached the Lyceum (for that is what my upper gymnasium is called)** Only at 2. 8 do Marcus and Quintus sit down. As well as setting the scene (cf. *Orat.* 1. 28), this permits Cic. a mild witticism. In Athens the Lyceum was the base of Aristotle, where from their habit of walking around (*peripatein*) his followers acquired the name Peripatetics. Cic.'s Lyceum, a glorified pavilion, probably featured a peristyle courtyard with at least one room serving as a library (2. 8). The lower gymnasium was called the Academy, so that Cic. could have the best of Athenian philosophy. Cf. Linderski 1989: 105–6 = 1995: 44–5, and for the cultural milieu, T. K. Dix, *Athenaeum* 88 (2000), 448.

**I have just read through the third book of your *On the Nature of the Gods*** On one level this is self-advertisement (cf. *Tusc.* 5. 32; *Fat.* 4), but these references to *De Natura Deorum* also underline the close connection in the category of philosophy known as physics between doctrine on the gods and divination (cf. introd., § 3). Physics (*physika*) dealt with the nature of things, including the metaphysical, as opposed to ethics and logic.

**although it has shaken my opinion, has not utterly destroyed it** Although these words fit the character of Quintus as a polite gesture to his Academic brother, they also serve to undercut the case Quintus will present. He has acknowledged the power of the Academic arguments on a subject integrally linked with divination.

**Cotta argues in this way to destroy the Stoics' arguments rather than to destroy men's religion** A similar point is emphasized by Marcus (2. 41). C. Aurelius Cotta, consul of 75, behaves as an Academic philosopher in the tradition of Carneades, who repeatedly savaged the Stoic arguments of Chrysippus and Antipater (see on 1. 7). Cotta directs his attack onto four topics: (i) the existence of the gods, (ii) the divine nature, (iii) providential government (lost), and (iv) the gods' concern for men (cf. MacKendrick 1989: 178–80).

**That is indeed said by Cotta and repeatedly so** See *ND* 3. 1, 4–6, 9–10, 15, and in his conclusion, 'this is more or less what I have to say about the nature of the gods, not in order to disprove it, but so that you may understand how obscure and difficult to explain it is' (3. 93). Cf. *ND* 3. 44 for the same motive in Carneades.

**in order that he may not appear to reject what is generally held to be right** i.e. the practices and tenets of the state religion, which Cotta strongly defends and in which he affirms his belief at the start of his attack on Balbus (*ND* 3. 5; cf. *ND* 1. 61, 3. 14).

**9. religion has received a satisfactory defence by Lucilius in the second book** Cic.'s spokesmen for the Stoics was Q. Lucilius Balbus, whose speech followed the four headings listed above (1. 8 Cotta argues...).

**you yourself thought his argumentation was closer to the truth, as you write at the end of the third book** *ND* 3. 95: 'so we parted with Velleius thinking Cotta's discourse to be closer to the truth, while it seemed to me (Cicero) that that of Balbus approximated more to a semblance of the truth'. Although Cic. alters the expression, which in *De Natura Deorum* was formulated in Academic terms, to suit Quintus, it still amounts to assent by the sceptic. But, whether this should be understood in the strong sense of belief or rather as provisional assent (see 1. 7 **I am afraid...**) is not clear. As Marcus/Cic. can be shown to accept some key tenets of Stoicism, e.g. belief in some kind of argument from *consensus* (cf. *ND* 1. 2; *Tusc.* 1. 30), in argument from design (*Div.* 2. 148) and in a link between religion and knowledge of nature (*Div.* 2. 149), although he did not share the

Stoics' epistemological base, there was much in Balbus' speech to which Cic. could assent (see Tarán 1987: 1–22).

**you considered it more appropriate to inquire into it and discuss it separately** Balbus holds that the questions of divination and fate are distinct from that of the nature of the gods, albeit connected (*ND* 3. 19; cf. *Div.* 1. 127). Although Cic. intended to cover all three subjects within his encyclopedic treatment of Greek philosophy, he never intended to do so in one work. Indeed the general Stoic practice was to separate books on divination, taken either as a whole or individually on specific types of divination, from those on the gods or on determinism (see on 1. 5 and introd., § 3).

**divination, which is the prediction and presentiment of those things which are thought to occur by chance** For the Stoics the key definition of chance was 'a cause obscure to human understanding' (e.g. *Aet. Plac.* 1. 29. 7; *Alex. Aphrod. Fat.* 7), a definition that may have gone back to Democritus (*Arist. Ph.* 196<sup>b</sup>5; *Lact. Div. inst.* 1. 2). For his opening definition of divination, which is important for his case, Quintus may use the reformulation by Posidonius of Antipater's definition 'the prediction and presentiment of things that happen by chance' (Timpanaro, lxxv, xciii). This reformulation, necessitated by the attacks of Carneades, permitted the Stoics a way out of the ambiguity of their earlier position, while affirming the essential determinism of divinatory events in a provident cosmos. At 2. 13 Marcus slyly attributes to Quintus Antipater's original definition and at 2. 19 concludes that it is worthless. See Hankinson 1988: 155–7; Repici 1995: 179; Timpanaro 1994: 247.

**If you wish** Such polite phrases are common around the beginning of the first speaker's words (cf. *Acad.* 1. 14; *ND* 1. 17), here simply to get the Stoic exposition under way after establishing the basic definition on which the arguments will be based.

**power...nature** 'Power' prefigures the emphasis that Quintus will place on convincing divinatory outcomes (see on 1. 12), while 'nature' (*quale*) points to the variety of divinatory practices he will present.

**I hold that . . .** Quintus offers a preliminary, abbreviated formulation of the orthodox Stoic position, which he will set out more fully later (1. 82–3). The existence of divinatory practices could not be denied (as the prefatory chapters show), but whether they could give knowledge of the future was at issue.

**10. ‘Quintus,’ I said, ‘you are defending the Stoic citadel** In book 1 Marcus addresses Quintus seven times by the simple vocative form of his *praenomen*, but Quintus never uses Marcus’ name, a common feature of Cic.’s dialogues (Dickey 2002: 258). Because the line of argument is so familiar, Marcus can use this figurative expression (cf. *Fam.* 1. 9. 8). ‘Citadel’ refers only to the argument presented in the next lemma, although most of Quintus’ arguments do come from a Stoic view.

**if indeed those points of yours stand in reciprocal relationship, that “if there is divination, there are gods” and “if there are gods, there is divination”** For the Stoic pedigree of this reciprocity cf. Diogenianus (Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 4. 3): ‘Chrysippus gives this demonstration to us, proving each one via the other. For he wants to show that everything comes to be according to fate from divination, while that divination exists he is able to show by no other means than by assuming that everything comes about according to Fate.’

The earliest extant version of ‘if there is divination, there are gods’ used in connection with the truth of divinatory practices is found in Aristotle (fr. 10 R; cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 12), but is repeated often (e.g. Diog. Laert. 7. 149; Them. *in Anal. Post.* 2. 8). Marcus himself, when on holiday from the Academy, says ‘if there are gods there is divination’ (*Leg.* 2. 32; cf. Sext. *Emp. Math.* 9. 132; Iambl. *VP* 138), but in *De Divinatione* when wearing his sceptical hat (e.g. 2. 41) Marcus will ridicule it.

We do not know how the Stoics argued in detail, but it would be reasonable to presume that they did more than proceed from the fact of common belief in divination to the truth of that belief. As Quintus will make clear, the Stoic proofs depend on their notion of the gods as caring for mankind and wanting to give them guidance and also on the existence of fate. Neither of these can provide more than



necessary causes for the efficacy of divination (cf. *Div.* 2. 40–1). The circularity involved need not be vicious if the argument went ‘divination works; its working is accounted for by the postulate of determinism; and the postulate of determinism gains some empirical support from its working’ (Hankinson 1988: 139). The argument requires two things to work: (i) belief in a universe in which all events have a cause and are interlocked and (ii) that the gods are concerned for mankind. Both of these were key elements of the coherent Stoic system and ‘together entail at least the possibility (and perhaps the necessity) of divination’ (Hankinson 1988: 140–1).

**Neither of these is to be granted as easily as you think** Although ‘neither’ must include the propositions relating to the existence of the gods, Marcus does not deny this, but indeed concludes his attack on the reciprocity by saying that ‘divination is clearly destroyed, but the existence of the gods must be held on to’ (2. 41). Later (2. 106) Marcus comments that even this is not conceded by all, but that should not be read as indicating that he himself was one of the dissenters. The existence of the gods was not denied by any of the philosophical schools (cf. *Cic. ND* 3. 7). As Quintus’ reference to *De Natura Deorum* in 1. 9 shows, Marcus himself accepts the existence of the gods, even if the precise formulation of his view is appropriately cautious for the sceptical Academic. Marcus will, however, deny that they confer divinatory competence on human beings.

**the future can be announced naturally without the involvement of a god** The examples of everyday prognostication from nature which Quintus adduces (1. 13–15) are probably what Marcus has in mind here, although he and others (e.g. *Isid. Nat. Rer.* 38) do not accept the explanation favoured by Quintus and the Stoics.

**it may be that gods exist, but that no power of divination has been conferred by them on men** In short this is the Epicurean position. Quintus takes up this objection and the various ways it can be expressed at 1. 82–3.

**clear and obvious kinds of divination** Quintus here restates the first of the Stoic arguments, that, if divination exists, then the gods

exist, with crucial emphasis on the reality of divination as seen by the variety of its forms and (by inference) by the fact that nothing other than the existence of divination explains the successes of its practices.

**there are gods** As argued by Lucilius (*ND* 2. 4–44).

**they have concern for human affairs** As argued by Lucilius from the Stoic point of view (*ND* 2. 154–67). See on 1. 82.

**provided that you have the time...** Besides functioning as the means to introduce Cic.'s allusive comments on the political situation at the dramatic date of the dialogue, these words look back to the kind of scene-setting found in Plato, where the leisure of the characters to participate in the dialogue is often established (cf. Plat. *Theag.* 121a; *Grg.* 458c).

**11. at this time when there is nothing else that I can do with pleasure** Cf. *Rep.* 1. 14; *ND* 2. 3 for Cic.'s availability for philosophy. This is the most allusive of Cic.'s references to his almost total withdrawal from political life after his return to Italy in Oct. 48 until the death of Caesar. Cf. *Acad* 1. 11: 'freed from serving the state'; *Tusc.* 1. 1: 'since from my work of defending and from my senatorial functions I have been completely or largely freed'; and *ND* 1. 7: 'the condition of the state was such that it needed the advice and attention of just one'. Cic.'s rare public appearances, such as his *Pro Marcello* and *Pro Ligario* of 46, were not occasions of joy. For relevance to the time of composition, see introd., § 5.

**11b–12a** This section of the dialogue presents the fundamental *partitio* (logical division) of Quintus' argument. Four elements emerge: he will employ two kinds of argument: that from the antiquity (*locus de vetustate*), that from ubiquity (*locus de consensu omnium*); he will employ one key distinction, that between artificial and natural divination, and will investigate divinatory outcomes rather than attempt to explain their causes (*locus de ignorantia*). See introd., § 3 (vi).

**I myself have no new views...** On one level this is an aspect of verisimilitude, in that Quintus was neither a renowned philosopher nor a Stoic, so his presentation of their views would not be innovative. On another level it is highly appropriate to the arguments that he will present, based on consensus and antiquity (see on 1. 1 and 1. 2–4).

**two kinds of divination, the one involving a technique, the other involving nature** This division into two classifications of the many kinds of divination practised in the ancient world articulates the discussion by Quintus (see introd., § 3 (vi)): broadly speaking 1. 34–71 concern natural and 1. 72–9 artificial divination. The Latin terms employed here, *ars* (technique) and *natura* (nature), are equivalent to the Greek *technē* and *physis*; they do not mark a distinction between natural and supernatural divination, but rather the means by which the gods communicate their will to men—in the former *indirectly* by signs which require interpretation, in the latter *directly* (cf. Timpanaro, xxix–xxx). For modern glosses of ‘technical’ by inductive, rational, conjectural, exterior, and objective and of ‘natural’ by internal, subjective, and intuitive, see Bouché-Leclercq, i. 109.

The terminology of ‘technical’ (*to technikon*) and ‘non-technical’ (*to atechnon*) is certainly Stoic (cf. [Plut.] *Vita Homeri* 212), but attempts to take it back to Homer (*Od.* 20. 100–1), where Odysseus asks Zeus for a confirmation of a vision by an inspired saying and a portent, are not convincing. Homer’s *endothen* and *ektosthen* need not embody any distinction other than between oracles and portents, although Plutarch does attribute such a distinction to him (*Mor.* 593c). Herodotus (9. 94. 3) could speak of an ‘inborn divination’ (*emphytos mantike*) and of Melampus as learning his divinatory techniques from the Egyptians (2. 49. 2). Although the latter could be described as a *technē*, it is not clear that Herodotus distinguished the various types of divination in this way (cf. F. Heinimann, *MH* 18 (1961), 129). While Plato distinguished between divination by divine inspiration and other means (cf. *Phdr.* 244d), his extant dialogues reveal no trace of the technical/natural terminology (pace Kany-Turpin 2003b: 61–2).

A very different, contemporary classification of divination by the physical element to which it related was made by Varro (Serv. [Auct.]

*Aen.* 3. 359). Cic. would have been familiar with it, but for a discussion based on Greek philosophy, the classification found in that discipline was crucial. Cic. probably draws the terminology from Posidonius' *Natural Philosophy* (Kidd 1988: 108–9, 150).

**12. What nation or what state is there...** Again the argument from consensus, see on 1. 1. Cic. presents a definitive list of the types of divination to be dealt with, divided into the two categories he has mentioned.

**examine entrails** Quintus begins with the three separate elements of haruspicy, which he discusses separately throughout the work. The canonical order which probably derived from the books of the discipline is entrails, lightning, and prodigies. The *extis pecudum* (entrails of animals) of the MSS cannot stand. Mercer's emendation *extispicum* provides good sense and is supported by the similar expression at 2. 26. Cic.'s formulation is caused by the lack of a noun specific to the interpretation of *monstra* (cf. *fulgurator* at 2. 109).

For the science of extispicy, see Thulin 1906, and van der Meer 1987, with review by Linderski, *CP* 85 (1990), 67–71 = 1995: 595–9, 677–8.

**interpret** Interpretation is essential to all the technical kinds of divination, as the meaning of the signs sent by the gods has to be uncovered and passed on. An active role in forming an hypothesis and making a conjecture as to the sign's meaning is involved (cf. Linderski 1986a: 2227–8).

**prodigies** Abnormal phenomena in nature which, in Roman thought, portended divine displeasure. For the variety of Latin terms and the ancient etymologies, see on 1. 93. For modern literature, see most recently Rosenberger 1998.

**lightning** To cover both lightning flashes and strikes, Cic. uses the term *fulgur*, which is older than *fulmen* which he uses in augural contexts (C. O. Thulin, *ALL* 14 (1906), 376). In general see Thulin 1905.

**augurs** See on 1. 3.

**astrologers** See on 1. 2. Although the Latin term *astrologus* can be used neutrally in catalogues of types of diviners (e.g. Cic. *Fam.* 6. 6. 7), it regularly possesses a pejorative connotation (cf. Hübner 1987: 22–5).

**lots** Because of the harshness of a transition from three nouns indicating practitioners of divination to one indicating a kind of divination within the one clause dealing with types of artificial divination, Timpanaro considers an emendation of *sortium* to *sort<es ducent>ium* (or *legent>ium*), but the MSS reading is not impossible. A wide range of quasi-oracular practices is covered by ‘lots’ (*sortes*; e.g. the itinerant ‘quacks’ of 1. 132) but primarily the many oracles within Italy which functioned by various kinds of lot-drawing or the use of dice (cf. 2. 85–7). See J. Champeaux, *MÉFRA* 92 (1990), 281–302, and for Etruscan oracles by *lithobolia* and sortilege, A. Maggiani, *RdA* 18 (1994), 68–75.

**the kind which as a rule involve a technique** Quintus’ *fere* (‘as a rule’) may qualify ‘technique’ or more likely the verb (cf. Schäublin), but not so as to destroy the basic distinction.

**dreams or prophecies (these are the two classed as natural).**

Prophecies will include the Sibylline books and oracular prophecies such as those from Delphi.

**I consider that the outcomes of these practices should be investigated rather than their causes** ‘Outcomes’ (*eventa*) is equivalent to the Greek *ekbaseis*, the use of which in this context goes back to Zeno (Diog. Laert. 7. 149: ‘[the Stoics] say that divination in all its forms really exists; and they show it to be a *techne* on the basis of certain results (*ekbaseis*), as Zeno says...’), who was the first Stoic to present the empiricist arguments which reappear throughout Quintus’ speech (cf. 1. 16, 72, 84, 128). Posidonius’ second book on *Natural Philosophy* appears to have demonstrated that divination was an art (*techne*) through its outcomes (Diog. Laert. 7. 149; Kidd 1988: 108–9) and the same arguments are likely to have appeared in his *On Divination*, a more likely source for Cic. for this work.

**a kind of natural force which...announces the future** This is Quintus' deliberately vague explanation of the cause of the phenomenon of divination. The combination of 'force' (*vis*) and 'nature' (*natura*) suggests a connection with the explanation attempted by Posidonius which covered both categories of divination (see on 1. 129–30). Although the formulation may involve the combination of contradictory views held by different Stoics (cf. Schäublin), this is unproblematic at this stage of the discussion. Here Quintus does not want to become involved in a discussion of *how* the gods produce signs or impacts directly on the human conscience, but simply to affirm that both natural and artificial divination work.

**through signs observed over a long time** See on 1. 2. Here the reference is to artificial divination in which the meaning of specific signs was established empirically by observation over a long period; cf. 2. 146: 'observation over a long period...with the recording of events created the science [of divination]' (cf. 1. 25; ND 2. 166).

**through some impulse and divine inspiration** Cf. 1. 34, 38, 66. Natural divination through the direct, even physical, impinging of the gods on human beings, which Cic. describes by two nouns with the root meanings of 'goading' and 'breathing upon/into'.

**12b–16** Quintus begins his argument proper with a lengthy and poorly articulated application of the *locus de ignorantia*, i.e. divination works, but we do not know how. Using the basic tool of analogy he will compare artificial divination with other areas in which a connection between 'sign' and 'event' was recognized even if the nature and way in which the connection operated was not known. For example, certain kinds of animal behaviour indicate imminent bad weather; this is generally accepted, but such an application of meteorology is not a science or an art. In book 2 Marcus does not refute the validity of weather-signs, because Quintus himself does not present them as divination, but only as something similar (2. 14). Marcus would doubtless have followed the approach of Boethus and posited physical links between sign and event, as other Stoics demonstrated for phenomena such as the ebb and flow of tides (2. 33–4). Posidonius in particular was able to incorporate

meteorology within divination because of his belief that the world was divine and that the universe obeyed laws fixed since its beginning (cf. 1. 118). See in general Taub 2003 and on the arguments in *De Divinatione*, see Kany-Turpin 2003a.

**So let Carneades cease insisting as Panaetius used to do** Carneades (fr. 9 M; see on 1. 7) and Panaetius (see on 1. 6) rejected artificial divination. This passage, where Cic. draws either upon the reading of Clitomachus he had done for *De Natura Deorum* (3. 14–15) or on Posidonius, reveals the argumentation deployed against Chrysippus and Antipater, which Quintus will counter later (1. 118–19). Carneades' ridicule has two dimensions: first, that concern with the activities of insignificant birds was unbefitting of the gods' status, a charge taken up by other critics (cf. Sen. *NQ* 2. 32. 3–4; Apul. *Soc.* 7); and secondly, that it was incongruous that crows and ravens should fly in opposite directions to signify the same thing. Cf. Quintus' answer at 1. 120.

**crow** The hooded crow (*Corvus corone sardonius*), which nests throughout Italy, rather than the black crow (*Corvus corone*) which is found only in N. Italy (cf. André 1967: 61; Capponi 1979: 190–6). A crow croaking on the left was considered a sign of good fortune (e.g. Plaut. *Asin.* 260; Virg. *Ecl.* 9. 15; Phaedr. 3. 18. 12), although Pliny (*HN* 10. 30) calls it a bird 'of ill-omened garrulousness' and most omens associated with it are unfavourable.

**raven** *Corvus corax* (André 1967: 61; Capponi 1979: 196–202). Its importance in Roman divination is seen in the term *cornicularius* for one who observed omens from ravens (Schol. Prud. *Psychom.* 636). A raven croaking on the right was a sign of good fortune (Plaut. *Asin.* 260), on the left ill-omened (Plaut. *Aul.* 624). In general, the raven was a bird of ill omen (e.g. Val. Max. 1. 4. 2, 6).

**on the left...on the right** Cic. here is not thinking of the impetorative auspices sought by Roman magistrates within an augural *templum*, a situation where a complex matrix of human and divine perspectives determines the significance of signs to left and right (see Linderski 1986a: 2280–6; for diagram R. Beck, *Apeiron* 27 (1994), 101),

and where it was requested that the gods send specific bird(s) from a specified direction. Rather, the issue is oblativus auspices, where no sign has been requested, e.g. the raven that appeared on the left to Tiberius Gracchus before his death (Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 17. 3). In this context the favourable significance of right owes most to common superstition and is similar to Greek attitudes, although it is probably not influenced by them (Gornatowski 1936: 56–7). The uniqueness of the favourable significance of crow and woodpecker appearing on the left has no rational explanation, although Valeton (1891: 321 n. 1) tries to connect it with the augural matrix. See also Guillaumont 1985: 159–77.

**according to the outcomes of their signs** Cf. 1. 25, 72, 131. Schäublin (followed by Freyburger and Scheid) adopts the emendation of Koch, *significationum eventis* for the MSS reading *in significatione eventus*; Timpanaro resorts to the *obelus*, after canvassing ‘e significationis eventu’. The basic meaning, however, is clear—that there were records of signs and their outcomes which could be consulted.

**as long as memory records the facts and accounts are handed down** Quintus’ words are hyperbolic, but understandable in that the practice of artificial divination depended on repositories of information, such as the *libri fulgurales* of the *haruspices* or the astrological records of the Babylonians. This is the first moment at which Cic. confronts the question of historicity which is crucial to the empiricist argument of Quintus; in book 1 many kinds of accounts will be presented, with varying degrees of confidence, and in book 2 Marcus will question them all.

**13. One can be amazed...** The general analogy between divination and medicine, which was generally recognized as an art, is important to Stoic argument (Hankinson 1988: 141–2). Not until the analyses of modern science isolated the active ingredients of herbal drugs could there be what Quintus would call an explanation of their efficacy. Like such drugs, divination produces results, and so it should be used.



**herbs...and...roots** The same distinction between what grows above and below ground is drawn at *ND* 2. 161. The examples Quintus will use (1. 16) are of roots, but the works of Nicander, Dioscurides, and Pliny the Elder reveal that medicinal uses of leaves and flowers were just as common.

**things...similar to divination** Quintus signals another stage in his argument from analogy, the use of examples from meteorology. As the argument will reveal, the Stoics in particular had studied weather-signs, because in their view they were part of the workings of an ordered world, so that if one learnt to read the signs in nature, one could predict the weather.

The Stoic-influenced Aratus of Soli wrote a *Phaenomena*, a versification in hexameters of a treatise by the Alexandrian astronomer Eudoxus. The third part of this (733–1154) deals with weather-signs, and may derive ultimately from Theophrastus. The three poetic extracts quoted here by Quintus, which come from Cic.'s earlier translation (see below, your *Prognostica*), present signs given by (i) inanimate objects (1. 13) and (ii) animate, but non-human creatures (1. 14–15).

*De Divinatione* 1 is full of poetic quotations to support Quintus' argument. Where the original was Greek a Latin translation is provided (1. 14, 52, 65, 81). The use of poetry in philosophical argumentation was criticized severely by Carneades (Cic. *Tusc.* 3. 59) and aspects of Stoic practice were questioned by Cic. himself (*Tusc.* 2. 26–7). But the Stoics indulged greatly in it (cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 180). Although they did not consider that the pre-philosophical traditions of the Greeks, especially Homer, contained much truth, the myths related in poetry were essential materials for understanding the origin of many beliefs (see Long 1992: 41–66). The distribution of quotations and the different uses made of them in *De Divinatione* reflects the attitudes of the respective philosophical schools (Jocelyn 1973: 66–71). Marcus quotes mainly to support points already established, whereas Quintus uses it as important evidence for his case (cf. Krostenko 2000: 366–7). For verisimilitude Cic. has Quintus refer only to those of his own poems which were in the public domain or to well-known works of earlier poets (Jocelyn 1973: 81–2). In addition to the philosophical precedents for using poetry,

Cic.'s characterization of Quintus has some verisimilitude in that Quintus wrote an *Erigone* (Cic. *Q Fr.* 3. 1. 3) and verses on an astronomical subject (Courtney 1993: 179–81) which reflect the influence of his brother's *Phaenomena*. For a discussion of some of the philosophical ramifications of the use of poetry, see H.-G. Schmitz, *PHJ* 100 (1993), 182–5.

**a swollen sea . . .** The basic idea goes back at least to Theophrastus (*Sign.* 29, 31; cf. *Geopon.* 1. 11. 7). Cf. Aratus 909–12: 'Let a sign of wind be also a swelling sea and beaches roaring a long way off, sea-coasts reverberating in fair weather, and a mountain's summit-peak sounding' (tr. Kidd). Cic. takes six lines to render Aratus' four, a far greater expansion than normal (cf. Pease). Some of the expansion, e.g. 'reply to Neptune', is Cic.'s own invention, but other elements, e.g. 'suddenly', reveal his knowledge of the scholia (Atzert, 1908: 6). It is improbable that any of the adaptations are motivated by an attempt to make the verses more appropriate to Quintus' needs, e.g. the introduction of 'often' or 'gloom-inducing' (*tristificas*), because they were composed long before *De Divinatione*. The difference between Aristotelian and Stoic explanations is stark: for the former the impending storm would be the cause of the swelling sea, but for the latter, the sign is not the cause, hence the sea is only the physical matter on which the phenomena that cause the storm operate (Kany-Turpin 2003a: 368).

**your *Prognostica*** Cic. gave the title *Prognostica* to his translation of the third section of Aratus' *Phaenomena*, which had acquired the title *Diosemeiai* (signs). Although Aratus' poem was a unity, Cic. followed the commentators on Aratus (cf. J. Martin, *Histoire du texte d'Aratos* (Paris, 1956), 9–10) in creating separate works; four times he quotes the specific title *Prognostica* (*Att.* 2. 1. 11, 15. 16b; *Div.* 1. 13, 2. 47). Balbus describes Cic.'s 'Aratean poems' as written when Cic. was still a very young man (the diminutive *adulescentulus*—*ND* 2. 104), i.e. before 85. From a letter of June 60 (*Att.* 2. 1. 11) in which Cic. tells Atticus to await his *Prognostica* and from a line which Isidore quotes in a different form (see on 1. 14), Pease argues for a 2nd edn. (*CP* 12 (1917), 302–4). Stylistic criteria have also been adduced to confirm a difference between Cic.'s *Prognostica* and *Phaenomena*,

but these are subjective and hard to assess (cf. Soubiran 1972: 14–15). If the different readings of the indirect MS tradition (seen in Hyginus, Priscian, etc.) are significant, it may be that throughout his life Cic. tinkered with his poems and never produced a definitive 2nd edn. (Soubiran 1972: 14; B. Luiselli, *RCCM* 6 (1964), 156–63); the new copies of his *Prognostica* in 60 may simply reflect a renewed interest in his earlier poetry (cf. *RE* 7A. 1237). Again, with his new philosophical interests in the 40s, his early Stoic-influenced poem could be put to new uses (cf. *ND* 2. 104–15; see E. Gee, *CQ* 51 (2001), 527–36).

**Who can uncover the causes of these presentiments?** A rhetorical question, as the continuation shows. Apart from Aratus, none of the Greek scholars listed by Vitruvius for their knowledge of weather prediction (9. 6. 3) has a proven connection with weather prediction. The extant *De Signis* attributed to Theophrastus lists signs, but attempts no explanation. In what follows I have cited it as a source of material for Aratus, recognizing that its authorship and date are uncertain, but considering it a guide to what was available to Aratus (cf. Kidd 1997: 21–3).

**Boethus the Stoic** Boethus of Sidon, a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon, wrote a commentary on Aratus in at least 4 vols. Cf. Geminus of Rhodes (p. 61a): ‘Boethus...set out natural (*physikas*) explanations for both winds and storms coming after the aforementioned signs.’

**14. But who can give a plausible explanation of why the following things occur?** Even Epicurus accepted that animal behaviour could indicate future bad weather, but denied any causal connection between their activity and the weather and any divine agency in the creatures’ movements (Diog. Laert. 10. 115). The scholiasts to Aratus (913, cf. 946, 953, 954) provided natural explanations for the range of phenomena adduced by Quintus, attributing the signs to the animals’ ‘swiftness of perception’—man by being clothed cannot perceive the onset of colder air and his nasal senses are dull by comparison.

**Similarly...no small noises** Cf. Aratus 913–15: ‘Also when a heron in irregular flight comes in from the sea to dry land uttering

many a scream, it will be moving before a wind that is stirring over the sea' (tr. Kidd).

**white egret** Cic.'s *fulix* (cf. Avienus 1676) has been identified amongst others with the red-breasted merganser, which has a white underneath and fits Avienus' 'small' (André 1967: 77), the black coot (W. M. Lindsay, *CP* 13 (1918), 18), or the little egret, *Egretta garzetta garzetta* (Capponi 1979: 240–3). Certainty is impossible, as the Romans' vocabulary for sea-birds was 'very limited and ill-defined' and matches with Aratus' species were made *ad libitum* (cf. Mynors 1990: 79). Although the adjective 'white' (*cana*) can describe grey (André 1949: 65–6: 'blanchâtre'), it would be too light to describe a coot.

**also** In Cic. the quotation from Aratus continues without a break, but his next six lines translate Aratus 948–50. This should not be put down to a failure of memory (*pace* Traglia 1966: 31 n. 1) but to a deliberate quotation of what will be most relevant for the argument here.

**acredula...icy dews** Cic. expands into four lines Aratus 948: 'a solitary *ololygon* croaks its morning call'. The identity of Aratus' creature was uncertain, as the various suggestions of the scholiasts show: Turtle-Dove (*trygon*), water-bird (*orneon zoon enhydron*), or marsh-dwelling, longish, unarticulated creature (*zoon limnaion hypomekes adiarthroton*)! They also quote Aristotle (*Hist. an.* 536<sup>a</sup>11), who uses *ololygona* of the noise made by male frogs in summoning their females for intercourse. Aratus' source (cf. Theophr. *Sign.* 42) places the *ololygon* in a list of storm signs from domestic life, and earlier (15) has the green frog singing in a tree as a sign of rain. As the creature appears between frogs and the crow in a series of parallel clauses introduced identically by 'or', it is impossible to be certain with which Aratus more closely identifies it, although, with the testimony of Pliny (*HN* 11. 172), the tree-frog is preferable (cf. Kidd 1997: 501–2).

Although scholars have argued with ingenuity for identifications of Cic.'s *acredula* with some kind of insect cognate with *akris* or cicada (Thoresen, Pease), I take it to be a bird. This notion Cic. may

have got from Aratus' scholiasts, and he may underline it by his separation of the *acredula* from the lines definitely on frogs (S. Gamberale, *SIFC* 43 (1971), 247). Various identifications of the bird have been suggested, e.g. the great reed warbler, *Acrocephalus arundinaceus arundinaceus* (Capponi 1979: 31–3), the lark (Traglia 1966: 128), or the siskin, *Carduelis spinus* (E. Calderón, *QUCC* 67 (2001), 133–9). The latter is, however, improbable because the siskin's song does not have the repetitive aspect required by *vocibus instat* (Dunbar *per litt.*).

**the dark crow... takes the flood on its neck** These two lines translate Aratus 949–50: 'or perhaps a chattering crow along a projecting shoreline dips his head into an oncoming wave on the shore' (tr. Kidd). Aratus' *korone* is translated as *cornix* by Cic. and Avienus (1704), a choice which influenced Virgil's adaptation (*Georg.* 1. 388). Although *cornix* is generally to be taken a member of the crow family (see on 1. 12), André (1967: 61–2) argues that the *korone thalassia*, which Aratus seems to describe, should on the basis of Arrian (*Perip. M. Eux.* 32) be identified with the Manx Shearwater in its Mediterranean subspecies (*Puffinus puffinus yelkouan*), but as these are essentially aquatic birds, they are unlikely to be seen racing along a beach (Dunbar *per litt.*). Capponi (1979: 191) prefers the hooded crow (*Corvus cornix cornix*) which, although a land-based bird, is seen at sea and eats shellfish.

The distinctive behaviour of immersing the head does not appear in Theophrastus' description of the *korone*'s warning of storms (*Sign.* 16), but is frequent after Aratus (e.g. *Geopon.* 1. 3. 7; Avienus 1704–6; Plin. *HN* 18. 363; Lucan 5. 555–6). Crows frequently appear as weather forecasters (e.g. Nic. *Ther.* 406 and Euphorion in the scholium ad loc.; Lucr. 5. 1083–6; Hor. *Carm.* 3. 17. 11–13; Quint. *Inst.* 5. 9. 15).

**15. We see that these signs almost never deceive, but we do not see why this is so** Quintus' admission that weather signs are not infallible, necessary in order to forestall an obvious criticism by Marcus, is taken up at 2. 14 in a weaker form 'for the most part, not always'. For Quintus and the Stoics, however, only a pattern of success similar to that acceptable in medicine or another stochastic art is necessary to justify the existence of such signs.

**You also see . . . springs and ponds** Cic.'s three lines translate Aratus 946–7: 'or these very pitiful generations, a boon to water-snakes, the fathers of tadpoles croak from the water itself' (tr. Kidd). In order to break the monotonous series of alternatives in Aratus, Cic. introduces an apostrophe of the creatures (the identification of which as frogs is only clarified by Quintus' words after the quotation); he ignores Aratus' parenthetic 'boon to water-snakes' and completely recasts 'fathers of tadpoles' as 'daughters of fresh water'. The croaking of frogs as a sign of rain is found first in Theophrastus (*Sign.* 15), and thereafter is commonplace (e.g. Cic. *Att.* 15. 16A; Plin. *HN* 18. 361; Plut. *Mor.* 912c, 982e).

**utter your empty cries** 'Empty' is Cic.'s addition, and is inappropriate to Quintus' case, if the meaning is that the cries achieved nothing, i.e. that the storm could not be averted (Timpanaro), or were without significatory content. Rather, the nuance, if the philosophical subtlety can be attributed to the young poet, may be revealed by the question with which Quintus continues—frogs do not prophesy rationally or have any consciousness of reacting to divinely sent signs, but they can still be part of a divinatory system.

**who could imagine that mere frogs see that?** The diminutive *ranunculi* ('mere frogs') is dismissive, rather than indicative of the frogs' size (*pace OLD*). Quintus follows the Stoic line (cf. *ND* 2. 163) that divination proper is the preserve of man; the perception of weather-signs within the animal and natural world is only 'similar to divination' (1. 13).

**a kind of natural force . . . too dark for human comprehension** I have translated the text as emended by Vahlen, which restores sense, picks up the hendiadys 'natural force' (*vis et natura*) already used at 1. 12, and continues Quintus' argument. Schäublin obelizes 'but . . . force' and suspects 'for giving signs', but this leaves two short clauses with neither verb nor subject. Quintus faces up to the question of the relationship between the sign and the signifier in such animals with the kind of argument put forward by Posidonius that there is some sentient force which pervades the whole world and which produces signs in the signifiers (see on 1. 118) and that the

physical nature of some animals was so ordered by god that they could perceive atmospheric changes (cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 26). In this light the reference to nature is not at all ambiguous and does not import any notion of ‘natural divination’ (pace Kany-Turpin 2003a: 370). The antithesis with which Quintus concludes embodies the argument he has made repeatedly: the results of this quasi-divination are clear, but *how* it functions is obscure. The scholiast of Aratus provides the natural explanation of the frogs perceiving the water becoming colder and sweeter.

**soft-footed cattle... draw from the air moisture-bearing juice**

Aratus 954–5: ‘now also before the rain from heaven cattle, gazing up at the sky, sniff the air’ (tr. Kidd). Cf. schol. ad loc.: ‘all quadrupeds have sharper senses than man, and especially bovines because of the raising of the nostrils. So whenever it perceives some exhalations from the unwholesomeness of the air, it looks up as to the heavens and smells the thickness of the air before the storm comes, and shows from its smelling that there will be rain.’ This natural explanation offered by the scholiast is in effect incorporated into Cic.’s translation by ‘moisture-bearing’, but Quintus chooses to ignore it, because he does not want a physical explanation to weaken the analogy with divination. It was considered unusual for anything other than man to look up at the sky (cf. Plat. *Cra.* 399c, and many parallels collected by Pease at *ND* 2. 140), hence the behaviour of the cattle was to be noted. First in Theophrastus (*Sign.* 15), thereafter e.g. Ael. *NA* 7. 8; *CCAG* 8. 1. 137; *Geopon.* 1. 3. 10.

**Now indeed...** Cf. Aratus 1051–3: ‘The mastic buds three times, its growths of fruit are three in number, and each growth brings signs in succession for ploughing’ (tr. Kidd). The mastic tree (*Pistacia lentiscus*) is an evergreen found throughout the Mediterranean which produces a gum and oil. Its triple flowering appears first in Theophrastus (*Sign.* 55; cf. Plin. *HN* 18. 244). The *Geoponica* (11. 12. 2) exhibit some caution as to the phenomenon, for which there is no botanical foundation (cf. Kidd 1997: 544).

**the three times for ploughing** A practice alluded to from Homer (*Il.* 18. 542; *Od.* 5. 127) and Hesiod (*Op.* 462) onwards. See refs.

collected at West 1978: 274. In the fallow year farmers were recommended to plough in spring, midsummer, and autumn before sowing the following year's crop (Walcot 1970: 38–9).

**16. Nor do I ask why...its flowering** Cic. is correct to restrict this phenomenon to one tree. The similar behaviour of squill, a member of the lily family (Aratus 1060–3; Plin. *HN* 18. 133) is more easily explained, as there are spring and autumn flowering varieties. Pease highlights a possible inconsistency between the 'fruit' of Cic.'s translation and the 'flowering' of Quintus' comment, but it is insignificant.

**I am content with this...I have cited** The most emphatic statement by Quintus of his empirical argument, which gains added plausibility as he moves on to examples from ancient medicine, the legitimacy of which as an art was clear (1. 24, cf. 2. 13). For the centrality of this principle as set out in the *divisio* of 1. 12, see introd., § 3.

**the efficacy of the scammony root for purging** The *Convolvulus scammonia* L. (Levant scammony), which grows throughout the eastern Mediterranean, is described as having three-cornered leaves and a large root with many branches (Plin. *HN* 26. 59; Dioscur. 4. 70). A resin is extracted from its roots, the glycosidal elements of which act as a powerful, even dangerous, purgative. It appears in medical writings from the 5th cent. onwards (e.g. Hippocr. *Affect.* 2. 505; Arist. *Probl.* 864<sup>a</sup>4; Plut. *Mor.* 134d; Dioscur. 4. 170; Galen 4. 760 K) and was discussed by Avicenna, see J. McGinnis, *JHP* 41 (2003), 317–20.

**birthwort for countering snake bites** The genus *aristolochia* has at least ten species, of which the ancients distinguished three (Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 9. 20. 4; Dioscur. 3. 4. 1–4; Galen 14. 82 K) or four (Plin. *HN* 25. 95–6). The name comes from its primary usage as a mild analgesic useful in childbirth (W. C. Evans, *Trease and Evans' Pharmacognosy*<sup>14</sup> (London, 1996), 374). Of the species distinguished by the ancients the one called 'long' (*makra*) is expressly recommended for snake bites in the Greek sources (Dioscur. 3. 4. 4; *Eup.* 122–3; cf. Pliny



HN 25. 97) and the 'round' (*rotunda*) by Aemilius Macer (1402–3); general efficacy against snake bites, cf. Apul. *Virt. Herb.* 19. The most likely identification is *aristolochia longa*. Several modern ethnopharmacological studies attest a belief across continents in the efficacy of plants from the genus *aristolochia* against snake bites and evaluate the action of aristolochic acid in minimizing the effect of such bites, either by the stimulation of the immune system (P. J. Houghton and I. M. Osibogun, *Journal of Ethnopharmacology* 39 (1993), 21), or by decreasing the oedema (J. J. Moreno, *Immunopharmacology* 26 (1993), 1–9) and haemorrhagic effects (W. Martz, *Toxicon* 30 (1992), 1135–6) induced by snake venom.

**takes its name from its discoverer...from a dream** Cic. goes against the etymology from 'best for women on the birthing-bed' (Dioscur. 3. 4. 14; Plin. HN 25. 95; Isid. *Etym.* 17. 9. 52). He follows a tradition attributed to Aristotle that, while her temple at Ephesus was being constructed, Artemis revealed to a woman named Aristolochia the means of curing many people who had been bitten (Schol. Nicand. *Ther.* 509, cf. 937), but changes the gender of the discoverer to a man. This is a reasonable deduction from Cic.'s use of *inventor* (cf. ND 3. 59; *Orat.* 1. 13 for *inventrix*). The revelation of cures by dreams during incubation at healing shrines was common (e.g. Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 3; Plin. HN 29. 3); curative herbs were revealed through dreams (e.g. Diod. 17. 103. 7; Plin. HN 25. 17).

**I see...I do not know why they work** Editors from Marsus (including Pease and Schäublin) delete *posse* before *video* (I see), which would create an anacoluthon. *Posse* is retained by Timpanaro as a common usage in Cic.'s colloquial style and as providing an introduction for the second *possit* ('it is efficacious'), but the sentence runs more smoothly without it.

**I do not understand adequately the explanation for the signs of wind and rain** Cf. 1. 13–15. Quintus' 'adequately' probably concedes something to the kind of natural arguments found in the scholia to Aratus or in Boethus, but he maintains his basic position, as not everything had been explained away.

**I recognize, I know, and I vouch for the force and the result of them** Three verbs in asyndeton provide a climactic conclusion to Quintus' argument, which again stresses the indisputable outcome (*eventus*) which follows the signs.

**"the fissure" in entrails** The definition of 'entrails' (*exta*) from the verb to cut out (Festus 69 L) is probably false, but they are the organs taken out of the sacrificial animal for examination by an *haruspex*. For the Romans they were most frequently the liver, gall-bladder and heart.

What is meant by the technical haruspicial terms Cic. uses here? 'Fissure' (*fissum*) appears only in Cic. in connection with the liver (ND 3. 14; Div. 1. 118, 2. 28, 32, 34; cf. Fronto (p. 112 vdH<sup>2</sup>): 'just as in entrails generally the smallest and thinnest *difis<s>a* portend the greatest successes'). In Mesopotamian haruspicy there was great complexity of division and terminology, some of which resembles Etruscan, e.g. 'hostile' v. 'mine', cf. U. Jeyes, *Jaarbericht: Ex Oriente Lux* 32 (1991/2), esp. 35–41. Although J. Nougayrol (CRAI 1955: 511–12) writes of a remarkable correspondence between the Babylonian terminology and that found in Hesychius, it is not straightforward to relate minutely the very detailed terminology of Babylonian haruspicy with the little we know secondhand of Etruscan terminology from Latin and Greek texts (cf. Starr 1983: 2). Blecher (1905: 197) suggested that the *fissum* divided the liver into the 'friendly' and 'hostile' parts, but that is difficult to square with Marcus' information that *haruspices* had to distinguish whether a *fissum* portended good or bad (Div. 2. 28). Indeed Van der Meer's study of the Piacenza liver indicates that the friendly and hostile regions correspond with the east and west of the liver and therefore that the distinction bisects the natural division of the two lobes made by the *ligamentum coronarium* and the *teres* (1987: 147–52). A *fissum* is not a regular feature of the liver, but an abnormality which the *haruspex* should spot easily, something like an incision (cf. Guittard 1986: 56). For Thulin (1906: 41) *fissa* are the stripes on the surface of the liver which can appear in numbers. However, does *fissum*, a noun connected with *findo*, naturally mean 'stripe' or describe the action of a stripe? The root meaning is split or division, and Fronto's intensified form *difissa* should mean 'split apart', something more

noticeable. In Babylonian haruspicy there are frequent references to a phenomenon called *pitru*, which is translated as ‘fissure’ or ‘split’ or ‘indentation’, which can appear in numbers, on both left and right sides of the liver (the Babylonian equivalents of *pars hostilis* and *familiaris*) and which had to be at least half a finger length to be significant; mostly though it had negative significance (Koch-Westenholz 2000: 42, 61). These would seem to give a better indication of the meaning of *fissum* than Thulin’s stripes. For good colour photographs of sheep livers identifying the areas of significance, see Leiderer 1990: 157–88.

**“thread”** The natural meaning of *fibra* is ‘thread’ or ‘filament’. In Babylonian extispicy the term *qû* (filament) denotes a phenomenon which can assume various colours and occur in all parts of the liver and whose significance is negative (Koch-Westenholz 2000: 63); one explanation may be inflammation caused by the parasite *Fasciola gigantica* (cf. Leiderer 1990: 50). In the context of extispicy the Romans gave two distinct meanings to *fibra* when it was used as a technical term rather than as a general designation for entrails: (i) the extremities and (ii) veins and muscles (e.g. Serv. *Georg.* 1. 120). Thulin (1906: 42–4) preferred the first of these, using Celsus (4. 1), who speaks of the liver being divided into four *fibrae*, which Thulin equates with the Greek *lobos*, but Celsus’ testimony regarding the human liver should not be transferred to those of sheep (Guittard 1986: 55–6). If the Babylonian parallels and the natural meaning of *fibra* are relevant, the phenomenon is far more specific than one of the major divisions of the liver, a localized abnormality which could be of several colours.

**Life is indeed full of these things** Quintus’ standard answer receives further empirical reinforcement from the experience of everyday life. This reads better as a general statement than as a remark restricted to the use of haruspicy, i.e. that in every area of life there are things we do not understand, but we accept that they happen.

**[for almost everyone uses entrails]** These words were deleted by Hottinger as a gloss, but were retained by Pease to avoid a very abrupt

transition to what follows. However, if the previous sentence refers to life in general, the transition to the second major area of haruspicial activity, where the activity of the gods and the significance of lightning strikes was less arcane to a general audience, is not difficult.

**Do we not have many other instances, and this one among the first?** The interpretation and procuration of lightning portents was the second major area of haruspicial activity in Rome. The Roman annals were full of instances of lightning strikes, the historicity of which (as opposed to their significance) was not in doubt. Quintus, then, can use a more open, positive form of question which should not be criticized as Pease does, 'Cic. colloquially but somewhat awkwardly changes his question to a declarative sentence'. Although *in primis* can be translated as 'especially' or 'among the foremost' (cf. Schäublin and Timpanaro), the incident Cic. presents, probably from 278, was the first occasion on which the Senate formally called in *haruspices*, an innovation made possible by the conclusion of the final political settlement of Etruria (MacBain 1982: 47), and so a translation embodying this temporal aspect seems preferable.

**Summanus** The god, whose cult was reputedly introduced to Rome by Titus Tatius (Varr. *LL* 5. 74), was held to send lightning at night (Festus 66, 254 L; Plin. *HN* 2. 138; August. *De civ. D* 4. 23) or more precisely just before dawn (*CGL* 2. 348). The original meaning of his name and thus his function are disputed: one etymology derives his name from *sub* and *mane*, i.e. just before dawn, which links well with his identification as the morning star; another prefers *summum solis* the sun's highest point in the sky which fits well with the date of his festival, 20 June (Prosdocimi 1978: 199–207). From the combination of summer solstice, the particular form of the offering made to Summanus, and lightning it is clear that he was a cosmic deity, perhaps essentially separate from Jupiter, a version of the Indo-European god of the dark sky (cf. Champeaux 1988: 83–100), or even the Moon, *Soma* in Sanskrit (Magini 2001: 69–71). See also B. García Hernández, *Emerita* 60 (1992), 57–69.

**Jupiter Best and Greatest** The principal god of Rome, worshipped with Juno and Minerva on the Capitol, is here given his main cult

epithet *Optimus Maximus* ('Best and Greatest') which proclaims his supremacy (see Radke 1987: 233–53). In the nexus of myth, cult practice, and magisterial ceremonies Jupiter Best and Greatest's worship was inseparable from the growth and continuity of Roman imperialism (e.g. P. Borgeaud, *MH* 44 (1987), 86–100) and so any portent relating to it was significant. His temple was the largest in Republican Rome (*LTUR* ii. 144–8).

**at that time made of clay** This descriptive clause is attached by Timpanaro and Schaublin to Summanus, probably correctly, indicating the archaic nature of the statue and the remarkable nature of the event. A metal Summanus was in place in Cic.'s day, probably occupying the NW apex, while the bronze *quadriga* dedicated by the brothers Ogulnii (Livy 10. 23. 12) occupied the SE apex.

**struck from heaven...it was found in the spot which they had indicated** Cf. Livy *Per.* 14. In 278 the gods were warning Rome against the threat of Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, who was to provide the first threat to Rome's hegemony of the Italian peninsula: he came from the east, as did the lightning bolt. By their expertise in determining the direction of the lightning bolt the *haruspices* were able to discover the head of the statue, which had been blasted over 300 m into the Tiber. MacBain (1982: 47) rightly calls this incident a *coup de théâtre*, a conspicuous demonstration of the gods' support for the formal introduction of the *haruspices* to Rome and the greater integration of Etruria into the Roman state to strengthen Rome's position against the invader.

17–22 Although the quotation of Cic.'s poem forms part of the *locus de ignorantia*, as it continues directly from the rhetorical questions of 16, it also delays the development of the argument that occurs in 23–25a. It is clearly a Ciceronian insertion into a Greek philosophical argument, but while it adds nothing to the philosophical argument, it is a wholly appropriate element of a Stoic argument (see next note).

17. What better authority or witness could I use than you?

Quintus' argument is at one level an excellent blow *ad hominem*, in

that he can show Marcus in his own words describing a series of phenomena which he treats as divinely sent prodigies and which occurred only twenty years before the dramatic date of *De Divinatione*. While Marcus could be expected to attack the historicity of any other *exempla* Quintus would present, in the face of his own words Marcus would be forced to concede the first part of Quintus' argument, that prodigies and other divinatory phenomena do happen. In fact, when Marcus comes to deal with the quotation of his own words (2. 45–8), he does not deny the historicity of the incidents, only the interpretation given to them by Quintus and altogether fails to respond to Quintus' argument.

Even though Cic. could have preserved the *ad hominem* argument by presenting in some form the prose version of these prodigies (*Cat.* 3. 18), the use of the more dramatic and comprehensive poetic version fits well with traditional Stoic arguments. Chrysippus quoted so much from Euripides' *Medea* that a reader of Euripides' work quipped that he was reading Chrysippus' *Medea* (Diog. Laert. 7. 180). We may like to think that Quintus' praise (cf. *Leg.* 1. 1) is ironical, but the fact that the longest quotation of poetry in extant Latin (Courtney 1993: 162) is Cic.'s own suggests that the author's pride in his work, despite the poor reception it was given (e.g. *Cic. Pis.* 72), is not irrelevant to its appearance. For Krostenko (2000: 380–5), however, the matter is more substantial: in the context of the whole work the insertion of the poem into Quintus' case serves to distance Cic. from it and its claim of a relationship between the gods and an individual, which the example of the tyrannical Caesar had rendered unpalatable. This element of an untraditional, un-Roman, personal relationship is not, however, prominent in the sections of *Consulatus suus* quoted here—any communication from the gods comes to Cic. as the state's senior magistrate in the pursuit of his regular duties; the portents fulfil their traditional admonitory role, not the hellenizing role associated with Caesar.

**I have even learnt by heart...the verses which the Muse Urania speaks** Cf. the claim attributed to Balbus (*Cic. ND* 2. 104). The consensus of scholars places Urania's speech in the context of Dec. 63 after the Allobroges had broken the news of Catiline's conspiracy and has Cic. transported to Helicon in a dream where Urania advises him

to deal harshly with the conspirators, but this violates the epic convention in which the Muses speak only to the poet and not to heroes or politicians. Rather some later occasion during the poem's composition in 60 is preferable, when Cic. needed to know the significance of what had happened and whether the gods really did reveal the future through signs. See Jocelyn 1984: 44–6.

**in the second book of your *Consulship*** Cic. produced various literary records of his consulship and on 15 Mar. 60 advises Atticus to expect a poem (*Att.* 1. 19. 10). In Dec. 60 he quotes from the conclusion to book 3 by Calliope (*Att.* 2. 3. 4). The poem was published soon after. Its title was *Consulatus suus* (*His Consulship*) rather than *De Consulatu Suo* (cf. Non. 298, 300 L; Lact. *Inst.* 3. 17. 14), which supports the emendation of the MSS here from *consulatu* to *consulatu<s>* (Jocelyn 1984: 40), although Timpanaro argues for <De> *Consulatu* on the analogy of the reference to Catulus' work at *Brut.* 132. For a disentangling of *Consulatus suus* from the later *De temporibus suis*, see S. J. Harrison, *Hermes* 118 (1990), 455–63.

**First of all Jupiter... eternal ether** A description of Jupiter as conceived of in Stoic thought, not the god of mythology. The Stoics' greatest god was the ether, a subtle fiery substance, which pervaded the whole created order (e.g. Cic. *Acad.* 2. 126; *ND* 1. 37, 2. 28, 57–8, 3. 35; Diog. Laert. 7. 138). 'First' (*principio*) is probably an element of didactic style, rather than any chronological indication. Rather than an overelaborate incorporation of philosophical ideas into epic, Cic.'s verses recall the themes of Aratus' proem where the muses are invoked to explain the heavens, as Urania does here (Kubiak 1994: 58–9). Moreover, for Quintus' defence of divination this presentation of god pervading and governing the universe is wholly appropriate, a necessary condition for the production and interpretation of signs in divination.

**'stray' in the terminology and false nomenclature of the Greeks** Cic. (cf. *Tusc.* 1. 62; *ND* 2. 51, 119; *Rep.* 1. 22) attacks the Greek designation given to the planets. *Planetes* means wanderer, but the planets follow regular predictable courses. The error had been commented on since Plato (*Leg.* 821b) and was a commonplace (e.g. Plin. *HN* 2. 12).

**they all bear the mark of the divine mind** i.e. their behaviour is not random, but ordered by the divine mind which controls the universe. 'Mark' (*notata*), a poetic rendering of the Stoic notion of 'hallmark' (see on 1. 64). Quintus may omit a passage after this line in which the link was made between the divine mind and phenomena considered significant in divination (Jocelyn 1984: 51–2).

**18. during your consulship** In contemporary and later accounts 63 was rich in meteorological phenomena and portents; in his 3rd *In Catilinam* (18–21), delivered before the people on 3 Dec. 63, Cic. in effect gives a prose version of what he will describe here. The two phenomena which begin the poetic version, however, do not appear in any other version, suggesting that Cic. had a wide supply of material from which to choose appropriate material for the oratorical and poetic contexts (Köves-Zulauf 1997: 222–3). Jocelyn conjectures (1984: 49) that the original description also listed the planets in conjunction and perhaps gave the zodiacal sign in the ascendant.

**you too** As Jocelyn argues (1984: 52), this wording suggests that some other individual's sighting had been reported, although **too** (*quoque*) may equally emphasize Cic.'s personal role. This is one indication, among several, that the quotation here is not straightforward, unless Cic.'s syntax is extremely loose—Cic. may be omitting passages and creating syntactical problems in his abbreviated version. However, the suggestion of stronger dislocation by the importation of lines from other contexts (see on **torch of Phoebus**) is too extreme; by heavy punctuation some of the difficulties can be alleviated.

**swift motions of the heavenly bodies** These are probably shooting-stars or meteors (Courtney 1993: 164).

**the menacing conjunction of stars with glowing heat** If this refers to the conjunction of Mars and Jupiter in the vicinity of Aldebran which occurred around 11 May 64 (Haury 1984: 101–2), **around** (see below) has to be taken very loosely.

**sacrifices on the snowy peaks of the Alban Mount** Each year soon after assuming office the consuls performed a sacrifice at the



sanctuary of the Latin League dedicated to Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount (Monte Cavo, 950 m), some 21 km SE of Rome (see Alföldi 1964: 29–34). The date varied, being set each year by consular edict. Cic.'s mention of snow is not incompatible with a date in early May (see below **Latin Festival**). For **purifying sacrifices** (*lustrasti*), see on 1. 105. Offerings of milk at the *Feriae Latinae* (Dion. Hal. 4. 49. 3; Festus 212 L) were typically archaic (Plin. *HN* 14. 88).

**shimmering comets with their bright light** Pease identifies the phenomenon with the *aurora polaris* because of the plural, the appropriateness of 'shimmering' to its effects and its appearance in winter. The predominant associations of comets were negative (cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* e.g. 10–11, 29–31) in the eyes of both ordinary and educated (cf. Manil. 1. 892–3) people; in particular they were considered harbingers of political upheavals (e.g. Cic. *ND* 2. 14; Sen. *NQ* 7. 17. 3; Tac. *Ann.* 15. 47. 1). Positive associations were occasionally generated for political reasons (see E. Flintoff, *ACUSD* 28 (1992), 67–8).

**much confusion involving a nocturnal massacre** The description fits better with the shifting lights and colours of the *aurora* than with a dream (Soubiran 1972) or a prodigy of noise in sky like that of warfare (cf. Obseq. 14, 41, 43; Jocelyn 1984: 50). A *post eventum* link with the Catilinarian conspiracy is not unlikely.

**the Latin Festival fell around a time of foreboding... starry sky**

Any identification of the eclipse depends on the degree of dislocation in the Roman calendar. It has been argued that, because of failure to intercalate regularly, the civil year was as much as 105 days ahead of the solar year and thus that the lunar eclipse of the astronomical date 7 Nov. 64 occurred on the night 23/4 February 63 in the pre-Julian civil calendar (Radke 1990: 86–7). Although this would place the celebration of the Latin Festival closer to its regular position early in the year, a dislocation of around five days is more likely (Brind'Amour 1983: 59). Hence the better candidate for Cic.'s eclipse is the lunar eclipse of 3 May 63, which was twice the magnitude of the Nov. eclipse and was particularly spectacular when viewed from the environs of Rome because of the lowness of the moon in the sky.

**torch of Phoebus...** The three most common explanations of this phenomenon are (i) a partial eclipse of the sun, (ii) a comet, or (iii) a meteor (see Montanari Caldini 1988), although a detailed case has been made for zodiacal light, an elongated ellipse of light which extends along the zodiac on each side of the sun and is visible chiefly after sunset in late winter and early spring (Haury 1984: 97–103; cf. idem, *Ciceroniana* 5 (1984), 199–200). However, Haury's identification of the 'torch of Phoebus' with the 'torches' of *Cat.* 3. 18 is impossible, as they move in the diametrically opposite direction (cf. Timpanaro). A comet can probably be ruled out, as the closest examples occurred in July and Aug. 61. Against an identification with meteors is the association of Phoebus, i.e. this was a diurnal phenomenon (Jocelyn 1984: 40). Key to the identification is the meaning of *magnum ad columnen*: this can be rendered as 'a great column' (Soubiran) or as 'towards its zenith' (Courtney 1993: 165). The latter is preferable, as although there was a meteorological phenomenon known as a pillar (*kion*—Heracl. Pont. fr. 116 Wehrli; *columna*—Sen. *NQ* 7. 20. 2; *trabis*—Obseq. 61), Cic.'s use of *columnen* (cf. 1. 20) suggests a meaning of elevation. If we accept that 'torch of Phoebus' is a poetic description of the sun and *columnen* means elevation, then Cic. describes the partial eclipse of the sun which occurred on the astronomical date 18 May 63 (Köves-Zulauf 1997: 219–22). This identification with a memorable celestial phenomenon only a fortnight after the lunar eclipse would make unlikely the suggestion of Jocelyn (1984: 54) that these three lines are an insertion from somewhere else in the poem or from another of Cic.'s works.

For eclipses and superstition, cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1. 28. 1; Val. Max. 8. 11. 1, *ext.* 1.

**a citizen struck by an awesome thunderbolt** Dio has more than one such strike (37. 25. 2; cf. Plut. *Cic.* 14); Pliny (*HN* 2. 137) names the victim as M. Herennius from Pompeii (cf. Obseq. 61: Vargunteius), a member of a prominent local family. Lightning and thunder from a clear sky were considered ominous from Homer onwards (*Od.* 20. 113–14), but attracted very little scientific discussion (see Hine 1981: 272–3). They appear among portents recognized by the Romans (Obseq. 1, 24, 28, 47). The striking of a man

by lightning was regarded as an indication of further disasters (e.g. Livy 10. 31. 8, 22. 36. 8).

**when the earth trembled with its pregnant body** Earthquakes, cf. Dio 37. 25. 2; Cic. *Cat.* 3. 18; Plut. *Cic.* 14; Spoletum and some other places were levelled (Obseq. 61). ‘Pregnant’, either with conspiracy or with the subterranean winds which in the ancient view caused earthquakes (cf. Courtney 1993: 165). Earthquakes were generally considered ominous in antiquity (e.g. Plin. *HN* 2. 191–206; John Lyd. *Ost.* 107–10 W) and appear frequently among the prodigies formally expiated in the Roman state religion (Obseq. 7, 29, 35, 45, 46, 54, 59, 68, 71). See W. Capelle, *NJ* 21 (1908), 603–33; G. Traina, *ASNP* 15 (1985), 867–87.

**during the night various terrible forms were seen and warned of war and sedition** Cf. Dio 37. 25. 2: *eidola*; Plut. *Cic.* 14: *phasmata*. Although this appears to refer to ghosts rather than visions in dreams (Pease), the two phenomena should not be sharply separated—ghosts could be experienced through sleep, as well as cause dreams (Ogden 2001: 75–80, 219–30).

**seers** For the activity of inspired prophets in Rome see on 1. 4. None of these prophecies has survived, unless we are to link the ‘Sibylline’ prophecies adduced by the conspirator Lentulus to demonstrate that he would be the third Cornelius to rule Rome and that prophecy which declared that 63 would mark ‘the end of the city and the empire’ (Cic. *Cat.* 3. 9). These prophecies, however, may better relate to the next lemma.

### 19. Those things which after a long gap finally came to pass

Courtney (1993: 166) translates ‘the things that had been slipping for a long time and finally fell’ in reference to Roman morality. This completely obscures the connection Cic. is making with earlier historical events and prophecies, either the struggle between the supporters of Marius and Sulla in 87 which had been marked by similar prodigies, comets, and a man struck by lightning (Pease, *CP* 14 (1919), 175–7) or, better, the prophecies given after the Capitol

burnt down in 83, that in twenty years there would be a bloody civil war (Sall. *Cat.* 47. 2; cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 8).

**the Father of the gods himself** Jupiter is mentioned not because of the Stoic doctrines seen at the start of the extract, but because the phenomena described belonged to the sky. This was his special domain, as is shown by the etymology of his name in its original form *Di pater*.

**Now...** Cic. signals a change to the portents which appeared in 65 when L. Manlius Torquatus and L. Aurelius Cotta were consuls (cf. Obseq. 61). This unchronological arrangement is taken from Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19, although the order of portents is modified.

**the Lydian *haruspex* of Etruscan descent** There was a persistent belief that the Etruscans came from Lydia (e.g. Herod. 1. 94). See Briquel 1991: esp. 484; for summary of the archaeological evidence on indigenous development of Etruscan sites from late Bronze Age, see Moser 1996: 29–43, which linguistic considerations make probable (L. B. van der Meer, *BABesch* 79 (2004), 51–7). After the lightning strikes of 65 the Senate formally consulted the *haruspices* (Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19), who interpreted them as portending destruction, fire, the overthrow of law, civil war, and the end of Rome and her empire, and recommended specific actions in *procuratio* (see below).

The term *haruspex* is compared by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2. 22. 3) with the Greek *hieroskopos*, an etymology defended by E. Peruzzi (*PP* 24 (1969), 5–33) and O. Szemerényi (*Hermes* 103 (1975), 310). Dion. Hal., though, confuses *haruspices* with augurs in the precise context, which points not to a simple error, but to a desire to see all Roman institutions with Greek links or origins (cf. Vaahtera 2001: 75–7). The most plausible ancient etymology (Velius Longus, *GL* 7 p. 73; cf. Festus 89 L) is with an archaic term for sacrificial victim, *aruiga* (Ernout/Meillet 1959: 289–90; Walde-Hofmann 1938: 635–6).

**your year of office piled up and brought to fulfilment** Cic. may be a little disingenuous in appropriating the referents of these prodigies for his own year of office because he had alleged (e.g. *Cat.*

1. 15; *Mur.* 81) a plot by Catiline in 65 against Cotta and Torquatus. However, it glamorizes and glorifies Cic.'s consulship, the real purpose of the poem.

**struck his own hills and his own temples and hurled his fires at his Capitoline seat** Cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19: 'several objects on the Capitol were struck from heaven'. The Capitol was most closely associated with Jupiter. The plurals 'hills' and 'temples' are poetic, not a reference to the Capitol and the *arx* or some other hill or temple. Lightning strikes on temples were not infrequent (29 instances in Livy), due often to their elevated position and always to the metallic features such as statues on roofs. Cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* 102 W: 'if lightning strikes a temple, danger will fall upon the leading men of the state and on those in the royal court', a specific reference to the Catilinarian conspiracy by Nigidius Figulus in his collection of portents and manipulation of Etruscan lightning lore (Weinstock 1951: 140–1).

**Then fell the ancient and revered bronze image of Natta** Cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19: 'statues of men of old were cast down', a generalizing plural. The location of this statue, its age, and the precise identity of the honorand, beyond his membership of the *gens Pinaria* (*Div.* 2. 47) are all obscure (Sehlmeyer 1999: 129–31). Cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* 102 W: 'if lightning is directed against statues, it threatens various and continuous disasters for public business', again from Nigidius.

**laws long hallowed were liquefied** Cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19: 'bronze [tablets] of laws were liquefied', Dio 37. 9. 2: 'the letters on the columns on which the laws were inscribed became blurred and indistinct', Obseq. 61: 'bronze tables of laws with their letters liquefied'. Something more dramatic would be expected if these were the famous Twelve Tables; rather these are one or more of the many bronze tablets set up on the Capitol from the 5th cent. onwards which constituted a powerful symbolic display of the permanence of the laws and of their sacredness (C. A. Williamson, *CA* 6 (1987), 160–83).

**statues of gods** The plural appears also in Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19, but Cic. goes on here to speak only of the statue of Jupiter (see on 1. 20).

**20. Mars' wood-haunting nurse of the Roman nation...** Cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19; Dio 37. 9. 1; Obseq. 61. According to Livy (10. 23. 12), in 296 the Ogulnii brothers set up at the *figus Ruminalis* a bronze statue of the wolf with Romulus and Remus at her teats, or rather added the twins beneath the pre-existing statue of a wolf. The *figus Ruminalis* (*LTUR* ii. 249) was in the Lupercal beneath the SW slope of the Palatine. An ancient statue group stood there (Dion. Hal. 1. 79. 8) which is best identified with the Ogulnian group (cf. Wiseman 1995: 75–6). If, however, the location of the statue group struck in 65 was, as Cic. suggests ('here') the Capitol, it cannot be identified with the Ogulnian group and its history becomes obscure. Cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* 102 W: 'since in as much as the statues were regarded by the ancients as representations of some realities and as adornments to cities, damage to them involved a curse on [the city's] affairs'.

The wolf preserved in the Capitoline Museum is Etruscan from the late 6th or early 5th cent. Her distended teats and posture indicate that originally she was not represented as suckling cubs or Romulus and Remus; the twins were added at a later stage, perhaps during the Renaissance. Damage on the back legs of the statue has been thought consistent with the effects of lightning, but recent chemical analysis has revealed no trace of gilding; hence, unless Dio's attribution of this is incorrect, the Capitoline wolf was not struck by lightning. See Dulière 1979: esp. 28–64; Parisi Presicce 2000: 53–91; L. Rebaudo, *PP* 58 (2003), esp. 319–25.

**foreboding words from the Etruscan pages** After these lightning strikes had been reported and the Senate had judged them to be portents that pertained to the state, the *haruspices* were asked to interpret their meaning and to recommend propitiatory actions (*procuratio*) to restore the gods' goodwill (see Thulin 1905: 115–17; 1909: 79–81). In this case they will have consulted the *libri fulgurales* (lightning books), a repository of lore compiled over many centuries, but by 65 modified under the influence of both Greek philosophy and astrology (Weinstock 1951: 122–53).

**a huge disaster and evil...begun from noble ancestry was looming** The conspiracy of L. Sergius Catilina, a dissatisfied member of a patrician *gens* (cf. Sall. *Cat.* 5. 1). Although some have

preferred a wider reference to the whole patriciate (see Pease), Cic. would not have sought to alienate this influential section of the Roman elite; an emphasis on some of the conspirators' nobility is, however, evident in the *popularis* Sallust (e.g. *Cat.* 52. 24). Cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* 105 W: 'if lightning strikes a public spot, a shameless young man will lay hands on the kingdom, with the accompaniment of desperate and corrupt men', which appears to be a specific reference to Catiline by Nigidius.

All editors accept that the MSS have inverted two lines. With Courtney (1993: 168; cf. Timpanaro), I follow the emendation of Baehrens (*volvier*) for the varied offerings of the MSS (*vir AV*<sup>2</sup>; *viri H*; *vire B*<sup>1</sup>; *vitare B*<sup>2</sup>). For the necessary present infinitive, *instare*, the suggestion of Giomini (1979: 329–32) has been accepted by Schaublin. With Soubiran, however, I retain the *ingentem* of the MSS, rather than the emendation *in gentem* (*Ed. Rom.* 1471; cf. O. Plasberg, *RhM* 53 (1898), 95–7), which is an improbable description for the Roman people, and take the adjective *apo koinou*.

**in unvarying terms they announced the overthrow of the laws** A simple interpretation of the melting of the bronze tables recording laws (1. 19). Cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* 101 W: 'if it is directed against a political or public spot, it shows civil wars, insurrections and the overthrow of the constitution'.

**flames...a terrible slaughter and massacre** Cic. alleged that the conspirators planned to set fire to Rome on the night of 16 Dec. and then to murder the magistrates and senators (*Cat.* 3. 21, 4. 2; cf. Sall. *Cat.* 32. 2, 43). Jupiter's sending of fire and the *aurora* (see 1. 18 'shimmering comets') was to portend Catiline's arson and massacre respectively.

**determined by an unyielding fate unless** Cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 19: 'unless the immortal gods were placated by every means and by their own power virtually altered destiny itself'. These words illustrate a combination of Roman belief, in which prodigies simply announced that the gods were angry and that evil would follow unless propitiatory action were taken, with the Stoic concept of determinism.

a holy and well-proportioned statue of Jupiter...set up on a high column and looked to the bright east Cic. *Cat.* 3. 20: '[the *haruspices*] ordered a larger statue of Jupiter to be made, set up in a more elevated position and to be turned towards the east, the opposite direction to that of its predecessor' (cf. Dio 37. 9. 2). The statue was not relocated to the forum (*Div.* 2. 47; Dio 37. 34. 3; *contra* Obseq. 61). If 'elevation' (*columen*) refers to a column (explicitly so Obseq.), this is the only definite literary or epigraphic reference to a statue of a god on a column in Rome from the Republic or Early Empire (Welin 1953: 155–6). Resiting to a higher position was also prescribed for the statue of Horatius which stood in the Comitium (Aul. Gell. 4. 5. 1–4), probably at some stage early in the 3rd cent. (MacBain 1982: 54–5; cf. Frier 1979: 56–64, for a date 475–450). The orientation has been interpreted as a reference to Pompey's eastern activities (G. Ammon, *BBG* 53 (1917), 295–301; idem, *PhW* 38 (1918), 565) or symbolically of facing the city and institutions which the god was to defend (Soubiran) or the direction from which the enemy was expected (cf. Zon. 8. 1). However, the Etruscan conception of the east as propitious probably offers a better explanation, and requires no manipulation by Cic. (*pace* Guillaumont 1984: 27 n. 30).

the people and holy Senate... Cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 20: 'they said they hoped that, if that statue you now see could look upon the sunrise and the forum and Senate-house, the plans which had been hatched against the safety of the city and empire would be brought to the light, so that they could be seen by the Senate and people', and 3. 21; Dio 37. 34. 3–4. This is an accurate representation of the *haruspices*' explanation, rather than an *ex tempore* creation by Cic. as he addressed the people on 3 Dec. Formal responses from the *haruspices* provided a detailed exegesis of the prodigies on which they were reporting (see Cic. *Har. Resp.* 20–1, 40; Bloch 1963: 49–55). 'Holy Senate' became a frequent expression under the Principate (D. Kienast, *Chiron* 15 (1985), 253–82).

21. This statue...was finally set up in its exalted position...the Allobroges In response to the *haruspices*' prescription, the consuls of 65 let the contract for the relocation of the statue, but only on



3 Dec. 63 was it raised into place. Cic. *Cat.* 3. 21: 'Is it not, then, clear that it was brought about by the will of Jupiter Best and Greatest that, when early this morning on my order the conspirators and those who informed on them were led through the forum into the temple of Concord, at that very moment the statue was being set up? When it had been relocated and turned towards you and the Senate, both you and the Senate saw everything that had been devised against the safety of everyone revealed and illuminated', cf. Dio 37. 34. 3–4. A group of ambassadors from the Allobroges, a tribe of southern Gaul, in Rome to petition the Senate for redress against the depredations of tax-collectors, were recruited for the conspiracy, but turned informer, enabling incriminating material to be captured on the evening of 2 Dec. at the Milvian Bridge (Sall. *BC* 40–1). On the next day the Allobroges and the written evidence were brought by Cic. before the Senate and then he addressed the people (the *Third Catilinarian*), relating the whole tale and playing up the religious aspects, particularly the role of Jupiter, the 'coincidence' of the statue's erection, and the conclusive revelation of the conspiracy. For his command of theatre and possible involvement in the timing of the statue's re-erection, see Vasaly 1993: 81–7.

21. So... The final section of the quotation falls into two parts: first a carefully balanced ('rightly...rightly') celebration of the devotion to religion of Greek and Roman precursors of Cic., in both political and philosophical manifestations; secondly specific praise of Cic., who had exerted himself in 63 and whose relative relaxation in the context of 60 permitted him to give more attention to the Muses, i.e. to writing this poem (cf. Cic. *Att.* 1. 19. 10, 2. 3. 4).

**the ancients, whose writings you know** The contrast with *your* (see below) suggests that Greeks are meant, in particular great legislators such as Lycurgus, Solon, and Zaleucus (cf. Soubiran 1972; Courtney 1993: 169). The specific qualities of moderation and virtue would seem to exclude the Etruscans (*pace* Timpanaro), who, though religious, have no particular reputation for them, and Homer (*pace* Thoresen), because he did not rule a city. The expression *quorum monumenta tenetis* is capable of a range of meanings (cf. 'whose precepts you uphold', Timpanaro; 'of whom you preserve tangible

reminders', Soubiran 1972). But if 'the ancients' means early Greek legislators, the primary meaning of *monumenta* should be the written records they left behind or the historical traditions about them; only in a secondary sense, if at all, should it mean the notion of preserving their example.

**your compatriots** *Vestri* (literally 'your people') means the Romans.

**piety and faithfulness** Two of the main virtues on which the Romans prided themselves. They were considered responsible for their unique relationship with the gods on which depended the existence of their empire. The idea is seen most clearly in words attributed to Q. Marcius Philippus: 'for the gods support piety and good faith, qualities through which the Roman people has reached so great an eminence' (Livy 44. 1. 11). Piety (*pietas*), was primarily one's duty owed to the gods, seen in the maintenance and defence of traditional worship, although it was often extended to include duty to family and the state (see Wagenvoort 1980: 7–15; Weinstock 1971: 248–59). Although good faith (*fides*) applied primarily to relationships on the human level, the keeping of one's word was guaranteed by the gods and was inseparably linked to respect for the gods (Freyburger 1986): esp. 222–5).

**whose wisdom far surpasses all** Cf. Cic. *Har. Resp.* 19: 'in piety and religion and in this particular wisdom, that we see that all things are governed and controlled by divine power, we have surpassed all peoples and nations'. Roman wisdom was not philosophy, but a practical virtue displayed in politics and government (Cic. *Rep.* 1. 3). The first known celebration of the quality is in the funeral speech for L. Caecilius Metellus delivered in 221 bc (Plin. *HN* 7. 139) and the verse *elogium* of Lucius Cornelius Scipio Barbatus calls him *sapiens* (CIL i<sup>2</sup>. 7). See Klima 1971.

**before all else worship the gods** The earliest extant expression of the Romans' belief in their superior devotion to the gods appears in M. Valerius Messala's letter to Teos, in 193 (*IGRRP* 4. 1557), and in extant literature first in Polybius' discussion (6. 56. 6) of Rome's

distinctiveness. Cic. is familiar with the idea (e.g. *Har. Resp.* 19; *ND* 2. 8) and it is commonplace thereafter (e.g. *Val. Max.* 1. 1. 8; see R. Much, *ANRW* ii/16/1. 291–8).

**whose power is efficacious** In attributing to the gods effective power (*numen*), Cic. underlines their powerful influence on human life, in line with conventional piety and in contrast to the gods in Epicurean thought.

**Those who joyfully occupied their leisure** Cic. deliberately contrasts the philosopher's life of contemplation and study with that of the politician. The former enjoys and uses his *otium* constructively (see André 1966: esp. 281–2). Cic. singles out Plato and Aristotle by reference to the name of their respective schools (see on 1. 8).

**22. shady Academe** Plato's Academy, situated in a grove sacred to Academus, was famous for its trees (*Ar. Nub.* 1005; *Diog. Laert.* 3. 7), but many had been cut down shortly before Cic.'s visit to Athens in the early 70s by Sulla (*Plut. Sull.* 12. 3).

**dazzling Lyceum** Originally a gymnasium founded by Pericles. 'Dazzling' refers both to the oil which covered the gymnasts, and to the splendour of the physical building, in contrast with the Academy.

**poured out brilliant theories from their fertile genius** Rather than any specific works, e.g. of Plato's (*Leg.* 884a ff.) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1331<sup>b</sup>4), where worship of the gods was particularly upheld, this praise is general. For Pease, the verbal similarities with 1. 18 suggest that Cic. contrasts the clarity of philosophy with the arcane warnings of the seers, but such a note is inappropriate when he has just recorded the clear warnings and interpretations of the *haruspices*.

**Your country set you...** In 79, at the age of 27, Cic. undertook a trip to Athens, where he spent six months studying at the Old Academy under Antiochus (*Cic. Brut.* 315) and Philo (*Cic. Tusc.* 2. 9) and also listened to the Epicurean philosophers Phaedrus and Zeno (*Cic. Fin.* 1. 16); then he spent time on Rhodes studying rhetoric under Molo, but also heard Posidonius lecture (*Plut. Cic.* 4. 4). In 77

he returned to Rome in order to stand for the quaestorship of 76. This description of the sudden abandonment of philosophy is not historical, as the elections of 77 were the first for which Cic. was eligible to stand and his philosophical studies and travel had been planned as a mere interlude. For the elite Roman a political career, which gave access to military power and glory, was paramount. Cic. highlights a typical Roman contrast between a life of leisure, even one devoted to intellectual pursuits, and the hurly-burly of politics. I have tried to bring this out by representing the etymology behind the Latin *virtus*, the quality of a man. See in general W. Eisenhut, *Virtus Romana: ihre Stellung im römischen Wertsystem* (Munich, 1973).

**the time which is not taken up by your country you have devoted to these pursuits** The MSS reading *patriae vocatis* has to be emended, but what we understand Cic. to be saying will determine the solution. Two meanings are possible: (i) the view he expresses elsewhere (*Off.* 2. 4; cf. *Div.* 2. 7; *De or.* 1. 3), that, as he is engaged in politics, he can devote only his leisure time to philosophy; or (ii) that during an enforced period of relaxation he gives to philosophy what is, or which would be, available for politics (but his country doesn't want). The second is less likely, because in 60 Cic. was still active in Roman politics, as his letters to Atticus show (e.g. *Att.* 1. 17. 8–9), although it could be argued that his having the time to write *Consulatus Suus* was possible only through the failure of his political ambitions and his exclusion from real influence. In *De Legibus* (1. 9), Cic. clearly shows how politics takes priority, but that he busily devotes his spare time to writing.

*Vacat his* is the best correction of *vocatis* (cf. Ax, Giomini, Timpanaro, Courtney 1993: 170), although Madvig's *vacat id* is possible (cf. Pease, Soubiran 1972, Schäublin). If we read *quod patriae vacat* (what is available for the country), this cannot be translated as 'what the country leaves available' (pace Soubiran 1972, Timpanaro, Schäublin), but gives the very opposite sense. On the other hand, reading with Courtney (1993: 170) *quod patria vocat* (what calls you from the fatherland) presents philosophy and art in a way unparalleled in Cic. Best is to follow Davies, reading *quod patria vacat* 'what is not taken up by the country'.

**and to us** Urania speaks of herself and the other Muses.

**So, will you be able to...speak against my arguments on divination** Quintus' *ad hominem* argument against Marcus is restated, looking back to 1. 17. Quintus will return to the question of the apparent contradiction between Marcus' Academic attitude towards divination and the views he expresses elsewhere (cf. 1. 33, 72). Marcus quotes Quintus' words here (2. 46) in his unsatisfactory response to the *ad hominem* argument.

**you who have done...and have written** Quintus' words are carefully formulated, in that he brings into play not just Cic.'s literary production, but also his actions, in effect what he said to the people in the *Third Catilinarian* and any possible manipulation of the timing of the statue's relocation. Secondly he treats Cic.'s poem very seriously, saying it was written with 'the greatest of care'. While this can be a comment on purely poetic considerations such as vocabulary, style, and metre, it emphasizes that Cic.'s presentation of the portents was significant, and, within a Stoicizing philosophical framework, was not unintentional or careless. It requires, then, a considered response from Marcus (but does not get one at 2. 46–7).

**23. You ask, Carneades...I say that you yourself see them happen** For Carneades, see on 1. 7. This apostrophe of Carneades serves to refocus the argument on the last point made in the *divisio* (1. 12) after the lengthy distraction of the poetic quotation. Carneades countered the arguments of Chrysippus and Antipater, dismissing what they called 'divination' as 'chance' (cf. 2. 47–8), and denying that divination was an art (*techne*), as it had no area in which it could rightfully operate (cf. 2. 9, 14). Quintus's answer is directed towards the first of Carneades' points only and reiterates his basic argument that he cannot explain *how* (cf. 1. 12, 15, 16), but that empirically divination works, the *locus de ignorantia*.

**"By chance", you say** The first appearance of chance in the dialogue, employed repeatedly by Marcus in book 2 (27, 39, 47, 48, 52, 62, 66, 67, 75, 83, 121, 141).

**Can anything happen by chance which bears upon itself all the marks of truth?** Quintus introduces four examples involving questions of probability in various forms: (i) dice throws, (ii) paint splatterings, (iii) an animal writing, and (iv) a naturally occurring sculpture of artistic quality. It is not clear how scientifically Cic. (or his source) distinguished the kinds of probability involved, as the mathematical techniques of informal probability theory were not devised until the mid-17th cent. AD (O. Ore, *American Mathematical Monthly* 47 (1960), 409–19). Among Cic.'s examples (i) and (iii) need to be distinguished from (ii) and (iv) in two aspects: first, (ii) and (iv) are concerned with the probability of explanations for phenomena which have occurred, and in which subjective criteria are essential for assessing them; (i) and (iii) concern the theoretical probability of events which have not occurred. In (i) the theoretical probability is straightforwardly calculable, i.e. reducible to a mathematical equation, with one answer; for (iii) a definite answer would be possible if the number of words in the total Latin vocabulary, that is all sequences of characters with meaning, were knowable at any moment. Quintus must argue that chance is not responsible for the appearance of (ii) and (iv) and that (i) and (iii) *could* not happen by chance. But (ii) and (iv) are weak examples, as the conclusion to the chapter admits, 'for it is surely the case that chance never imitates reality perfectly'; and for (iv), in addition to the incalculability of how a rock might split or be formed, artistic aspects predominate which are not reducible to numbers.

Although Carneades' name is attached explicitly only to the last argument, it is probable that he used all of them. The third needs only a minor alteration to create a Latin example (cf. Pease on Cic. *ND* 2. 93).

**Mark** (*numerus*), literally 'number', is Cic.'s equivalent of *arithmos*, a commonplace among the Stoics in the sense of a perfect fit (Stob. 2. 93 W; cf. Cic. *Fin.* 3. 24). It may derive ultimately from Pythagorean number theory (cf. Dyck 1996: 514).

**Four dice cast produce by chance a 'Venus throw'** The word Cic. uses for 'dice' (*talus*) indicates that this was the astragal (or knuckle-bone), a four-sided, rectangular block-shaped die with rounded ends

(see F. Graf, 'Rolling the Dice for an Answer', in Johnstone and Struck 2005: 60). Suetonius (*Περὶ Παίδων*, p. 67 Taillardat) reveals that the two pairs of opposite sides bore the numbers 1 and 6, 3 and 4 respectively. The luckiest throw, in which each die fell with a different face upmost (Mart. 14. 14; Lucian, *Amor.* 16), was called 'Venus'. The mathematical probability of such a throw is not easily calculable because astragals were asymmetrical, the broader sides being given the values 1 and 6, but empirical studies suggest an actual probability of about 1/26 (Sambursky 1956: 45).

**surely you don't think it would be chance, if you threw 400 dice and got 100 'Venus throws'?** This kind of argument goes back at least as far as Aristotle (*Cael.* 292<sup>a</sup>29). The odds of this are something around  $1 \times 10^{100}$ . Despite the theoretical foundations in Stoic thought and the great opportunity for repeated observations of dice throwing which could have produced quantitative results, neither the Greeks nor Romans discovered a mathematical concept of probability (Sambursky 1956: 46–8). Although it has been suggested that there was some 'instinctive feeling about probability' (David 1962: 24), Cic. may here envisage one unique event rather than a class of similar events (J. van Brakel, *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* 16 (1976), 126).

**Paint sprayed at random on a canvas can form the outlines of a face** Quintus' argument is to some degree countered by examples known to the ancients in which a sponge thrown in frustration produced the effect of foaming sweat which the painter had been unable to produce by his art, and where they attribute it to chance: Nealces' horse (Plin. *HN* 35. 104; Plut. *Mor.* 99b), Protogenes' dog (Plin. *HN* 35. 103), and Apelles' horse (Dio Chrys. 63. 4–5; Sext. Emp. *Pyrr.* 1. 28). However, none of these parallels involves human representation, which may be considered of a different order to sweat.

**the beauty of the Venus of Cos** The 4th cent. painter Apelles began a painting of Aphrodite hoping to surpass his famous Aphrodite Anadyomene, but died before it could be completed. In Cic.'s writings this picture is a standard example of an artistic masterpiece

(*Orat.* 5; *ND* 1. 75; *Off.* 3. 10; *Fam.* 1. 9. 15), its choice perhaps influenced by Ciceronian autopsy on his return from Cilicia in 50 (suggested by Pease on *ND* 1. 75). Cic. is not thinking of the Aphrodite Anadyomene (see J.-M. Croisille, *Pline l'Ancien: Histoire Naturelle* livre XXXV (Paris, 1985), 203).

**If a sow should form the letter A on the ground with its snout...** The idea of the impossibility of random letters coming together to create literary works was a commonplace (cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 93; Plut. *Mor.* 399e). Pease wrongly lays the stress on the sow, as a proverbially stupid animal, rather than on the type of probability involved in the creation of a specific sequence of letters in a system where, unlike the throwing of dice, not all combinations are possible. By comparison with the 100 Venus throws, the degree of probability involved is infinitely small.

**Ennius' *Andromache*** Ennius' tragedy survives only in fragmentary quotations, mostly in Cic. (cf. Jocelyn 1967: 81–93). Repeated quotations and the exclamation 'o outstanding poet' (*Tusc.* 3. 44–5) demonstrate Cic.'s admiration for the work.

**when a stone was split open in the quarries of Chios the head of a young Pan appeared** Chios was famous for its marble (e.g. Theophr. *Lap.* 7), a variegated form (Plin. *HN* 36. 46). A similar story of a Silenus figure in the quarries of Paros (Plin. *HN* 36. 14), a work which may be identifiable with a relief group found at the entrance to a Parian quarry, has suggested an emendation of *Chiorum* to *Pariorum* (F. Osann, *RhM* 1 (1832), 417–22), but this is not necessary.

**I accept that there was some such resemblance** In this example there is no question of calculable probability, and the large element of artistic subjectivity necessary for the assessment of the occurrence renders it the weakest for the cases of both Carneades and Quintus. But each addressed it in a different way: for Carneades what matters is that by chance something can be produced which *approximates* to the truth, i.e. in this instance that some people could see a likeness of Pan, whereas the Stoics emphasized the difference between what was produced by chance and by art.



**Scopas** Scopas is an appropriate example of excellence in sculpture (cf. Mart. 4. 39. 3) for, although no definite Pan or Silenus can be attributed to him, his speciality seems to have been younger divinities. For the ancient *testimonia*, see A. F. Stewart 1977: 127–35.

**chance never imitates reality perfectly** Quintus' argument is speciously attractive, because in the two examples from art chance could not produce a representation of the quality expected from human art. When applied to divination the analogy must be that there are examples of divination in which the correlation between prediction and outcome is so close that chance is excluded. Perhaps examples from art are appropriate in another way, in that both the artist and god have intention.

**24. "But sometimes what has been predicted does not come to pass"** The objection to which Quintus devotes more attention begins here and forces him in effect to qualify the presentation of divination resulting from Cic.'s poem: there he demonstrated a perfect correspondence between prediction and outcome, but the wider reality of divinatory practice suggests that there are predictions which do not come true. Quintus concedes this again twice during his argument (1. 124, 128). For Carneades such failures demonstrate that divination is not an art or technique.

**What art, I ask you, does not experience this?** Quintus' argument is to proceed by analogy with other arts/techniques, which, in their ancient manifestations at least, were stochastic, notably medicine. Stoic definitions of an art (*techne*) go back to Zeno: 'a system of apprehensions unified by practice towards an end useful in life' (e.g. Lucian, *Par.* 4; cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2. 10, quoted at 1. 1 **presentiment**); and for the Stoics the interpretation of divinatory signs was such a *techne*. Although it can be argued that a 100 per cent success rate would, in fact, constitute 'prima facie grounds for doubting whether [such an art] has any real content to it' (Hankinson 1988: 146), the parallel with medicine is not unproblematical: no ancient philosopher questioned that medicine was a *techne* because it did not always yield the correct results, but objections to divination were more fundamental (C. Lévy 1997: 341–2). On a minimalist definition of

a *techne*, however, such as that in Plato's *Politicus* (284e) the practice of Roman augury, for example, could be considered a *techne* and there were appealing parallels between the practice of medicine and that of some types of artificial divination—a reliance on signs or symptoms and an understanding that neither of these was the cause (Kany-Turpin 2003b: 64–5).

**those arts which are based on conjecture and involve opinion** The first two elements of Cic.'s term 'conjecture' (*coniectura*) calque the Greek *symbolon*, but the Latin suffix *-ura* adds a highly appropriate notion of process (see E. Zellmer, *Die lateinischen Wörter auf -ura* (Frankfurt, 1976)). The Greek verb *symbollo* is used in the sense of 'conjecture' or 'interpret' as applied to divination from the 5th cent. (e.g. Eur. *IT* 55; Plato *Cra.* 384a; Arist. fr. 532 R). A root sense has been sought in the notion of physically casting lots (G. P. Shipp, *CR* 51 (1937), 11; e.g. Plaut. *Cas.* 342). In the more technical sense relevant here, it equates with the Greek term *stochasmos*. 'Conjecture' is the process within artificial divination (cf. 1. 34, 2. 26) whereby the diviner deals with a divinatory phenomenon for which there are no exact parallels recorded in the lore of his art (see Linderski 1986a: 2231–2; Allen 2001: 166–7). In such cases the diviner has to extrapolate from the closest parallels he has. 'Conjecture' in this sense, then, is not an uninformed guess, but the application of rationality to a body of data. As such it cannot guarantee the result; 'a stochastic *techne* is one whose theorems admit of exceptions or imperfections' (Hankinson 1988: 146 n. 92) and 'does not produce a distinct physical product, but instead aims at a goal clearly distinguishable from the practice of the art itself' (Sellars 2003: 70); it should, though, be successful 'for the most part' to qualify as a *techne* (cf. Alex. Aphrod. in *An. Pr.* 165). 'Opinion' (*opinabilis*) translates the Greek *doxastos* (cf. Cic. *Tim.* 3) or *oiesis* (cf. Plat. *Phdr.* 244c). 'Opinion' should not in this context be distinguished from conjecture as something inferior. Rather, Cic. duplicates the terms here and at the end of 1. 24 to underline that artificial divination is empirical and relies on a large, human element of interpretation.

**Is medicine not to be considered an art?** The context in which this same argument is also made (*ND* 2. 12, 3. 15) suggests that the

argument was made also by Posidonius. Although Hippocrates acknowledged that medicine and divination were closely related ([*Ep.* 15), he warned that the art of medicine was denied by the foolish because the opinions of its practitioners seemed to be as obscure and contradictory as those of diviners (*Acut.* 8). Galen clearly distanced medicine from divination (e.g. 8. 362, 18b. 246, 300 K) and held conjecture to be a vital technique of the doctor (e.g. 6. 360–1, 9. 277–8, 10. 206, 664–5, 806–7, 17b. 382 K), but denied that medicine was a stochastic art.

**the pilots of so many ships, did they not set sail from Troy.** Quintus' first example comes from the heroic age and as such is unhistorical, but that is not crucial to the argument, as Quintus could have presented any number of examples of storm and shipwreck. Rather Cic. puts literary considerations to the fore, presenting a renowned passage. Apart from speeches between 56 and 54, Cic.'s forensic oratory reveals little quotation of older Latin poets; however his philosophical and rhetorical works of those same years, beginning with *De Oratore*, are replete with quotations. See D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *ICS* 8 (1983), 239–49.

**happy at leaving...** The attribution of these verses to Pacuvius' *Teucer* is generally accepted (see D' Anna 1967: 155). Cic. quotes the first two lines indirectly, but their poetic form as trochaic *septenarii* can be restored simply. The next two lines, quoted directly, come from a famous passage which he employed previously (*De or.* 3. 157).

**Pacuvius** M. Pacuvius of Brundisium, nephew of Ennius, born c.220, wrote at least thirteen tragedies, eight of which have titles connected with the Trojan War. Cic. considered him the finest of Rome's tragedians (*Opt. Gen.* 24), perhaps because his works best fulfilled Aristotle's criteria for tragedy (A. Traglia, *Ciceroniana* 5 (1984), 55–67). See Manuwald 2003.

**the shipwreck of so many illustrious leaders and kings** The storm, described by Homer (*Od.* 3. 176–85), Virgil (*Aen.* 1. 39–45), and in goriest detail by Quintus of Smyrna (14. 422–628), occurred off

Euboea. Although many lost their lives, the only major casualty was Ajax, son of Oileus.

**the finest of generals recently lost his army and fled** ‘Science’ (*scientia*) is a simple variation for art (*ars*) rather than implying something more sophisticated (Timpanaro). This seems to be a reference to Pompey’s defeat at Pharsalus in 48, for which ‘recently’ is appropriate in the context of 45 or 44. Although Pompey appears by name in the next sentence in another category, he is the best candidate for the description ‘the finest of generals’ (*summus imperator*) here. Cic. accords him the accolade in *Pro Fonteio* (exc. Cusana 8), but also distributes it widely (e.g. *Verr.* 2. 4. 75; *Mur.* 20).

**is there no method or wisdom for governing a state** Quintus’ culminating example of an empirical science, that of government, is the least common in ‘professional lists’, although it has a good philosophical pedigree going back to Plato.

**Cn. Pompey has made many errors** Cn. Pompeius Magnus (Pompey), the great general and leader of the Optimates against Caesar. Cic.’s correspondence is full of criticism of Pompey’s political acumen (e.g. *Att.* 1. 13. 4, 2. 16. 2). Quintus may have in mind the abandonment of Italy to Caesar in 49 (cf. *Att.* 9. 10. 2; *Fam.* 7. 3. 2); if the notion of an intertextual reference to a Ciceronian work that was not published is plausible, then Quintus’ criticism of Pompey’s restoration of tribunician powers in 70 may be in view (*Leg.* 3. 22; see Dyck 2004: 503).

**Cato a few** M. Porcius Cato, the Stoic-influenced politician whose moral authority Cic. admired, but whose intransigence on points of principle Cic. criticized both publicly (e.g. *Mur.* 60) and privately (e.g. *Att.* 1. 17. 9, 2. 1. 8). After his heroic death for the Republic following his defeat at Thapsus in 46, Cic.’s references to him are marked by general admiration (e.g. *Off.* 1. 112; *Fin.* 3. 6), although his flaws are not totally concealed (*Off.* 3. 88). Cic.’s own *Cato* was crucial in the development of the legend of Cato, establishing him as the Roman model of the Stoic sage (*Div.* 2. 3; cf. Goar 1987: 13–15; in general, Fehrle 1983).

**even you yourself one or two?** For Pease ‘the climax contributes to the effect of an indirect boast hardly again equalled until Plin. *Ep.* 9. 23. 6’, but this misses the irony of the progression from ‘many’ through ‘a few’ to ‘one or two’. Through the character of Quintus Cic. can look back at his own career and offer in effect a more critical view than he could directly. Perhaps Cic. alludes to his frequent over-estimation of his own influence and of the power of words against the sword, to humiliations such as the ‘palinode’ he was forced to ‘sing’, retracting his criticisms of Caesar (*Att.* 4. 5. 1). In the context of a retirement from politics caused in some degree by Cic.’s own political errors, a brother’s gentle irony gains extra point.

**The response of *haruspices* and every kind of divination involving opinion is similar** i.e. all kinds of artificial divination. The prominence given to haruspicy here reflects the role it played in the events of 63 and its growing relative popularity in the 1st cent. (cf. 1. 28).

**it depends on conjecture, beyond which it cannot go** Quintus sets out clearly the limits of artificial divination: certainty is impossible because there is no simple connection between the sign and the signified, and the diviner can only extrapolate from similar examples.

**25. on most occasions directs us to the truth** Cf. Quintilian’s definition of *coniectura* (*Inst.* 3. 6. 30): ‘conjecture is so called from “throwing together”, that is from some directing of the rational faculties to the truth’. Quintus’ formulation is cautious, but requires that divination usually provides the correct answer (cf. 1. 118 **not often**).

**it stretches back over the whole of time** This anticipates Quintus’ description of the immortality of the soul (1. 115). Despite periodic destructions of matter, including human soul matter (see on 1. 111), the same divine mind controls the universe and operates in the same rational way in each dispensation. Despite this consistent rational principle, portents and auspices with no exact precedent could occur, and a role for conjecture exists.

**an art has been constituted through the repeated observation and recording of the same signs** Cf. Cic. *Div.* 1. 2, 2. 146; *ND* 2. 166;

Manil. 1. 61–2. These observations formed the basis of the books of the augurs and *haruspices* (and astrologers) to which they referred in order to interpret a specific sign.

25b–33 Now that Quintus has demonstrated to his own satisfaction that the second objection of Carneades has been disposed of and that divination is a genuine art, he proceeds to illustrate the efficacy of augury through a series of prominent examples. This is in effect a continuation of the *locus de ignorantia* with an emphasis on the outcomes of the various divinatory events. Quintus concludes this part of the argument with the form of divination that was most highly esteemed by the Romans and that played a prominent role in all their public decision-making processes; his examples are relevant to both the military and civilian spheres of Roman public life.

Quintus' examples implicitly support his arguments from ubiquity (*e consensu omnium*) and antiquity (*e vetustate*), as they encompass the non-Romans Deiotarus and Agamemnon and the full sweep of Roman history from Romulus to Crassus. It has been suggested, however, that they do not provide the strongest case (cf. Pease: 'due to the failure to distinguish between their moral and ideal worth (largely independent of their historicity) and their value as evidence for facts which is what is here demanded'). This criticism is overly harsh for the most part: the purpose of the very brief reference to Agamemnon (29) is primarily to permit Quintus a literary quotation, but the example itself is swamped by the contemporary examples of Deiotarus and Crassus which occupy the greatest space in the argument. For Quintus and the Roman reader, the examples of Claudius and Junius are 'guaranteed' by their place in the annalistic tradition. Moreover, Quintus' two examples from the regal period lay a particular emphasis on material evidence: the survival of Romulus' *lituus* down to the historical period and the indisputable existence of the *puteal* in the Forum marking Attus Navius' feat. Quintus' case pays particular attention to the question of historicity, but his criteria for credibility are not those of the 21st century.

There is, however, a tension between the examples Quintus amasses and the historical reality of Roman augury in the 1st cent., which is deliberately foregrounded in the argument: in

contemporary Roman augury the traditional augural techniques employed by various eastern peoples and the early Romans had been abandoned. For Cic.'s contemporaries the augural art was the means of receiving from the gods a simple yes or no answer to the question whether it was right to proceed with an action; the answer received was not an infallible guide to whether the action would have a positive outcome. This communication took place via a highly formalized dialogue between the auspiciant and his assistant, which used only set phrases and was designed to assure a favourable answer from the gods; the auspiciant alone determined the sign and the significance to be attached to it. It was in this respect not a conversation between a priest and the gods, but a dramatization of the relationship between the state and the gods as the Romans conceived it (Scheid 1987–9: 127–35). The founding myth of this view, according to which the gods were conceived as citizens, 'celestial colleagues of the terrestrial magistrates', to whom they usually subordinated themselves, may be seen in the the story of Numa's discussion with Jupiter on the Aventine (J. Scheid, *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 59 (1985), 41–53).

**how trustworthy are your auspices!** Again there is a deliberate element of *ad hominem* argument because Marcus was a member of the college of augurs. Cic. had aspired to membership from 59 (*Att.* 2. 5. 2) and took up the place of Crassus' son on the nomination of Pompey and Hortensius (*Cic. Phil.* 2. 4) in either 53 or 52 (cf. J. Linderski, *HSCP* 76 (1972), 190–200 = 1995: 240–50). Cic.'s enthusiasm for his new role may explain Appius' Claudius' dedication of his work on augury to Cic. (cf. Guillaumont 1984: 84–5).

**At the present these are neglected by Roman augurs (I say this with your permission)** Quintus' parenthesis is a literary device, encouraging the reader to connect other pessimistic statements in Cic.'s philosophical works about the practice of augury in his own day (1. 28, cf. *Leg.* 2. 33; *ND* 2. 9: 'because of negligence by the nobility augural lore is not kept up, the truth of auspices is despised, only the outward show is retained'). The practice of convening the *comitia curiata* in the persons of representative lictors *auspicioorum causa* caused similar comment a generation later (Dion. Hal. 2. 6. 2; cf.

Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2. 31; Vaahtera 2001: 120–2). Quintus' main point is that the ancestral practice of augury through observing the sky had been largely abandoned (cf. 1. 27, 28).

Cic.'s words should not be taken to indicate the bankruptcy of the state religion by the mid-1st cent. These and other comments, e.g. Varro on the loss of several divinities (*Ant. Div.* fr. 2a, 12 C), are overstated for literary effect, an element of the pervasive belief in moral decline from the 2nd cent. onwards. The 1st cent. produces ample evidence of interest in religion by the Roman elite (cf. Momigliano 1984: 199–211) and the notion of decline is very difficult to sustain for many aspects of Roman religious life in the Late Republic (cf. *BNP* i. 117–26). Membership of the augurate continued to be a much desired honour in the 1st cent. and augural symbolism was the most common of all priestly iconography on Roman coinage of the period (cf. H. Lowalski, *ACUSD* 31 (1995), 130–1). As Bendlin argues (2000: esp. 133–5), the disappearance of some religious practices and their substitution by others is an indication of a vibrant 'market' in Roman religion, not evidence of decline.

preserved by the Cilicians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, and Lycians To the three peoples associated with augury earlier (1. 2) is added the Lycians, for whom there is no other ancient testimony of their links with augury. For a survey of the divinatory practices of these regions, revealing few specific references to augury, see R. Lebrun, *Kernos* 3 (1990), 175–95. For Quintus' assertions that foreign practice often surpassed Roman, see Krostenko 2000: 361–4.

**26. Deiotarus...never undertook anything without first having taken the auspices** Deiotarus' assistance to Cic. during his governorship of Cilicia (Cic. *Deiot.* 39) and his protection of Cic.'s son and nephew (*Att.* 5. 17. 3, 18. 4, 20. 9) explain the generous description. Originally a tetrarch of the Tolistobogii, he was recognized as king of Galatia by the Senate in 59; he supported Pompey in the Civil War (see 1. 27) and was defended in a trial before Caesar by Cic. All of Cic.'s descriptions of Deiotarus present him as highly Romanized and a good friend of Rome and Cicero (Saddington 1993: 87–97). In his extreme devotion to augury, however, he goes far beyond the Roman norm. See Sullivan 1990: 51, 164–9.



warned by the flight of an eagle, he had returned from a journey Deiotarus will have taken the auspices before beginning his journey, and have proceeded with the gods' consent. Only while on the journey does he receive the warning which saved his life, a class of omens called *enhodia*. The eagle was the bird particularly associated with Jupiter and was thought to be especially ominous for rulers (*RE* i. 374–5), hence Deiotarus may have attached great significance to it.

**the room...collapsed the next night** Melampus is alleged to have escaped a similar fate (Schol. Hom. *Od.* 11. 287), but his divinatory talents enabled him to interpret the conversation of worms, something very different from the augural techniques employed by Deiotarus. A divine warning enabled Simonides to escape a similar fate (e.g. Cic. *De or.* 2. 353).

**27. as I used to hear from him in person** Cf. *Div.* 2. 76. Probably when Quintus accompanied Cic. to Cilicia in 51–50. The firsthand nature of this information is important in Quintus' establishment of the existence of divination.

**The following saying of his is most remarkable** Quintus presents an example which is not apparently conducive to his case, in that Deiotarus followed auspices which appeared favourable and yet incurred severe personal losses, and which Marcus will deride as 'ridiculous' (*Div.* 2. 78). In Roman terms, however, Deiotarus' auspices need not be problematic in that they constitute only the gods' indication whether an action can be undertaken on a particular day, not an 'opinion about the merits or demerits of the undertaking itself' (Linderski 1986*b*: 338 = 1995: 493).

**after Caesar had deprived him of his tetrarchy, his kingdom, and money** Despite Deiotarus' aid at the battle of Zela in 47, the tetrarchy of the Trocmi was given to Mithradates of Pergamum, and the kingdom of Armenia Minor went to Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia (*Div.* (2. 79; Dio 41. 63. 3; Magie 1950: 413–14). An indemnity was also levied (cf. Cic. *Deiot.* 35; *Phil.* 2. 94), probably separate from the general contributions required by Caesar (Dio 42. 6. 3). For the relevance of this passage in dating *De Divinatione*, see introd., § 6.

**he did not regret the auspices which were favourable as he set off to join Pompey** These auspices were, in Roman terms, impetrative. Deiotarus led a contingent of 600 cavalry to join Pompey's forces in Greece in 48, commanding them in the defeat at Pharsalus (Cic. *Deiot.* 13), after which he fled with Pompey.

**the authority of the Senate, the liberty of the Roman people, and the prestige of the empire** Deiotarus' defence of the auspices and of his own conduct invokes three of the shibboleths of Roman politics, each of which was dear to Cic. himself. Although 'authority of the Senate' could be understood in a technical sense of a senatorial decree that had been vetoed, it is better taken as a general reference to the primacy of the Senate in the Roman political system and to its prestige built up over 450 years of Republican government (cf. Hellegouarc'h 1963: 311–12). 'Liberty of the Roman people' is equivalent to the continuation of the Republic, i.e. the rejection of domination by one man (cf. Wirszubski 1950: esp. 5). 'Prestige of the empire' is the least frequent of the three expressions to judge by Cic.'s speeches (e.g. *Leg. Man.* 11, 14; *Leg. agr.* 2. 65; *Sest.* 1). The combination of all three expressions presents Deiotarus as a perfect Roman nobleman, with views that Cic. himself shared.

**on whose authority he had taken the course of duty and good faith** Cf. 2. 78: 'taking the course of good faith and friendship to the Roman people, he performed his duty'. As this gloss indicates, Deiotarus presents himself as the dutiful client king of the Roman people, rather than as loyal to the man who had extended his territories and secured him the title of king (cf. Magie 1950: 373–4). As such, he was fulfilling his legal obligations to the Senate which had confirmed his position in 59, giving him the title 'friend and ally of the Roman people'. 'Duty' (*officium*) was the concrete expression of friendship (Hellegouarc'h 1963: 152–5). For 'good faith', see on 1. 21.

**a good reputation was dearer to him than his belongings** 'Good reputation' (*gloria*), the reward for virtue, was another key concept for the Roman politician, and the subject of a philosophical work by Cic. written in mid-44. See Hellegouarc'h 1963: 369–83.

**real augury... “forced” auspices** Quintus applauds Deiotarus for his refusal to resort to the methods adopted by Roman magistrates, which (he will show) were in violation of ancestral augural practice. ‘Forced’ (*coactis*) is a negative description (cf. 2. 71–4) of one development relating to Roman impetrative auspices, which the magistrate had to seek before any popular assembly (excluding the *concilium plebis*), electoral or legislative, and the general (one endowed with *imperium*) was entitled to seek before any military engagement. A description of the procedure in the military context exists from Sabidius: ‘before the battleline is drawn up he in whom resided *imperium* and the right of auspices used to take the auspices seated in his magisterial chair in a tent; in the presence of the army, when the chickens had been freed from the cages and had been put in position around his chair, he would say “whoever of you sees *tripudia* piled up, let him announce a good augury, a *sinisterum solistimum*”. Then when silence has been secured he sits down and says . . .’ (Schol. Veron. *Aen.* 10. 241). For Quintus, the Romans perverted a legitimate form of oblativous auspices into impetrative auspices (cf. Valeton 1890: 213–14), in which the gods could express their will only by causing starved chickens to lose their appetite. The greater simplicity of the procedure, however, in which no aerial *templum* needed to be demarcated and the interpretation was given to only one action of the chickens, made it more convenient to use, especially in the military context. Although Scheid has suggested (orally) that the practice of taking auspices in the traditional way had ceased by the 1st cent., and that the *auguracula* constructed in Roman colonies from this period (e.g. at Bantia) were used for chickens to run around on and give signs by their movements, it is plausible to suggest that for such rites as the *augurium salutis* (see on 1. 105), inaugurations, and the major elections in Rome the traditional customs survived (Regell 1893: 7–8).

**it is necessary for some of the dough . . . to fall from the beak of the chicken** The augurs had originally considered it propitious when something fell to the ground of its own will, an oblativous auspice. In relation to birds, this would occur when one ate enthusiastically and pieces of its food fell to the ground, and perhaps it also made a noise. To ascertain the divine will quickly, especially in the military

context, and to produce this kind of behaviour the Romans kept in cages hens which they deliberately deprived of food, thus 'forcing' the auspice (Linderski 1985: 226–7 = 1995: 515–16). To further expedite this, the hens were fed lumps of dough (*offa*) which they could not eat without dropping pieces (Festus 285 L). See Valetton 1890: 211–15.

**28. You have in your writings** The second person plurals here, meaning 'you augurs' suggest that the writings referred to must be the augurs' books. If, however, Quintus is not presumed to have privileged knowledge, the augural decree had to be in the public domain. From the appearance of similar augural doctrine on *tripudia* in Festus (386 L) that is taken from App. Claudius' first book *De Augurali Disciplina*, which Cic. possessed since 51 (Cic. *Fam.* 3. 4. 2, 3. 11. 4), it is probable that Claudius quoted the decree of the augural college that lies beneath the contents of the next lemma. See Linderski 1985: 227 = 1995: 516.

**a *tripudium* results from <any> bird if anything falls from it to the ground** The MSS read 'aut tripudium fieri' which cannot stand. The emendation of *aut* (or) which is palaeographically easiest, *avi* (bird), and has also to be made in the Festus passage on the *tripudium sollistimum* (386 L), is secure, but does not complete the sense here satisfactorily. I add *omni* ('any') and reject Giomini's *pulte* (porridge), although that derives some support from another passage of Festus (284 L): 'Porridge is given to hens in auspices because from it it is necessary that something fall, to make the *tripudium*.' It seems clear that there is a very close parallel between Quintus' words here and Marcus' response at 2. 73, where an old decree of the augural college is quoted, 'any bird can make a *tripudium*', and that the *omnem avem* there picks up *omni avi* here. A parallel passage, which derives from Claudius (Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 1. 398), confirms the sense with *qualibet avi* (any bird at all).

At 2. 72 Cic. offers a derivation of *tripudium* from *terripudium* or in its earlier form *terripavium*, i.e. a striking of the ground (cf. Festus 498 L). See G. B. Pighi, *Rend. Accad. Bologn.* 3 (1949/50), 145–59.

Timpanaro questions whether the whole phrase is not an interpolation, on the grounds that it repeats the substance of the

previous sentence, albeit with extra details, and suggests omitting *in*, to produce ‘if any whole lump falls’. While *solidum* may mean the ground, its extant uses in this sense start with Ovid (*Fast.* 4. 821; cf. Livy 44. 5. 6) and the root meaning is ‘whole’ or ‘complete’ (Festus 385 L). Indeed, in the continuation of the Festus passage from Claudius a *tripudium* is also constituted by the fall of a ‘complete rock’ (*saxum solidum*).

**what I said is a forced *tripudium* you say is a *tripudium solistimum*** Quintus contrasts the traditional, technical terminology of the augural college. *Solistimum* is the technical term for the *tripudium* in which anything falls from what a bird is carrying (Festus 386 L) and as a superlative form connected with *sollus* means ‘the most complete’, i.e. the best kind of *tripudium* (cf. Cic. *Fam.* 6. 6. 7).

**by the negligence of the college** Cf. 1. 25. Here the blame is specifically attached to the college of augurs, the state body with the responsibility for maintaining the augural lore and formulating decrees on the application of augural law to public life (see Linderski 1986a: 2151–90). Individual augurs had ignored areas of augural practice, e.g. C. Marcellus rejected auspices from bees’ nests (*Div.* 2. 77), but the inappropriate acceptance of this development is attributed to the college as a whole.

**Cato the Wise** M. Porcius Cato, consul 195. Cic. frequently attaches the tag ‘the wise’ to Cato (cf. *Div. Caec.* 66; *Leg.* 2. 5; *Off.* 3. 16; *Amic.* 9; *Sen.* 5), but there is little indication that it should be taken as a title or formal *cognomen*. Rather some play with the popular etymology of the *cognomen* Cato as ‘clever’ may be suspected (Powell 1988: 107–8; cf. Badian 1988: 6–12). Fragments of Cato’s speeches *De Auguribus* (Festus 277 L) and *De aedilibus vitio creatis* (Aul. Gell. 13. 18. 1) indicate a keen interest in augural matters, but he was not a member of the college. The context of this criticism by Cato is unknown, but its tone is consistent with his general conservatism.

**many auguries and many auspices have been completely lost and abandoned** Cic. juxtaposes the two technical terms *auguria* and

*auspicia*. Often they can be used indiscriminately or non-technically, but here we should expect something more precise. If so, ‘auguries’ should refer to the rites conducted solely by augurs through which places, people and ceremonies were transferred to a ‘special permanently “inaugurated” state’ (Linderski 1986*b*: 338 = 1995: 493; cf. 1986*a*: esp. 2294–6); and ‘auspices’ to the procedure of seeking the gods’ will in relation to the timing of an action, an indication valid only for one day.

**In former times . . . even in private life** A vague phrase (cf. 1. 95, 122), and one from which even the minor qualification was removed by Valerius Maximus (2. 2. 1). Quintus’ need to justify the efficacy of augury and the auspices requires him to dismiss much contemporary practice and to concentrate on the exemplary practices of earlier generations. Here he underlines the declension which he illustrated in the previous chapter and highlighted by the contrast with Deiotarus: as well as reducing their reliance on the augurs in the public sphere the Romans also excluded them from private life. Although Nigidius Figulus’ lost work on private auguries (Aul. Gell. 7. 6. 10) demonstrates a contemporary interest, Quintus’ picture of the encroachment of haruspicy is true.

**“wedding auspices”, the real practice of which has been discontinued** The practice of employing diviners (*auspices*) to perform impetrative auspices on the morning of a marriage was succeeded by the use of friends of the family, to whom the same designation *auspex* was applied. These were not experts; either they were not required to observe the skies or they announced willy-nilly that they had observed signs giving approval to the marriage that day. Their use continued even into the Early Empire (cf. Val. Max. 2. 1. 1; Plin. HN 10. 21). See Treggiari 1991: 164.

**just as today . . . by means of entrails, so in the past it was by means of birds** Quintus cannot refer here to the proceedings of the Senate or the popular assemblies, where impetrative auspices were sought by the magistrates after the ancient fashion, but rather to the kind of *extispicia* which were performed before military engagements (see 1. 27 and 72) or by *haruspices* who attached themselves to prominent

individuals (e.g. 1. 119). The growth in haruspicy may be due to its greater apparent sophistication, which permitted more than a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer (cf. Valetton 1889: 447).

**Because of this, as we do not look for the propitious, we run into the dire and hindering** The causal link (*itaque*) is important. In the three examples with which Quintus illustrates this point, if the magistrates had employed the ancient method of examining the sky, Jupiter would have given a simple negative answer relevant for the day, but, because 'forced' auspices were used, the warning given was starker and 'most probably... pertained not only to the day, but also to the very substance of the action with which they were thought to be connected' (Linderski 1986a: 2203). The generals concerned thus threw away any chance of success in their engagements.

'Dire' signs are the most negative of the five categories the augurs recognized (Festus 317 L). In popular etymology at least, the term was connected with the anger of the gods (*dirae*  $\equiv$  *dei irae*; Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 4. 453; Festus 69 L; see Regell 1893: 19–20). 'Hindering' (*vitiosus*) is a wider category encompassing all negative signs. The basic meaning of the root *vitium* seems to be 'hindrance', although it came to be interpreted as 'error' or 'defect'; as a religious term it is found only in an augural context and is applied to mistakes in procedure or ritual (e.g. 1. 33) and disregard of the auspices (as in the following three examples). See D. Paschall, *TAPA* 67 (1938), 219–31.

**29. P. Claudius** P. Claudius Pulcher (*RE* iii. 2857–8), consul in 249. The brevity of the reference is explained by its almost canonical status and by the more detailed account in *De Natura Deorum* (2. 7). Although the story has been considered a creation of the anti-Claudian historical tradition replete with suspicious details such as the *cognomen* Pullius of the tribune who put Claudius on trial (Wiseman 1979: 90–1), it should be accepted as the best explanation for the trial which Claudius definitely underwent on his return (Linderski 1986a: 2176–7; cf. Hölkeskamp 1990: 437–48).

**son of Appius Caecus** Appius Claudius Caecus, censor in 312 (see Wiseman 1979: 85–9; Develin 1985: 215–24; L. Loreto, *A&R* 36 (1991), 181–203; *CAH*<sup>2</sup> vii/2. 395–8). The filiation is irrelevant for

the story, unless the use of the *cognomen* is to remind the reader of his family's impiety—his blindness was reputedly divine punishment for his interference with the cult of Hercules at the *Ara Maxima* (see e.g. Val. Max. 1. 1. 17).

**his colleague L. Junius** L. Junius Pullus (*RE* x. 1080–1), consul in 249. Cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 7. Linderski (1986a: 2176 n. 107) considers that Junius' disregard of the auspices is an unhistorical creation from his *cognomen*, which means 'chicken', but the *cognomen* may have been given after the defeat (cf. Pease).

**lost very large fleets** Claudius, surprised by the Carthaginians' readiness to join battle, was caught in a space too restricted for manoeuvring off Drepana in Sicily and was defeated, losing 93 ships and many men (Polyb. 1. 49. 4–51. 12). Junius' fleet was destroyed by a storm as he avoided an engagement with Carthalo: 103 warships and all the supply-ships were lost according to Diodorus (24. 1. 9; cf. Polyb. 1. 52. 6–7, most of 120 warships sailed with Junius, and were lost). See Lazenby 1996: 132–41.

**they went to sea against the auspices** Literally: 'sailed with a hindrance', cf. 1. 33, 2. 74; for *vitium*, see on 1. 28. Cic. *ND* 2. 7: 'when the chickens were freed from the cage but did not eat, [Claudius] ordered them to be thrown into the water, saying that, as they were unwilling to eat, they should drink'. The refusal of the starved chickens to leave the cage and eat the corn provides an indisputable sign, which Claudius rejects. In Florus (1. 18. 29) this rejection of the auspices occurs on campaign just before the battle, and this is the apparent basis for most versions, although Servius (*Aen.* 6. 198) places the rejection in Rome. The use of chickens best suits the military context. Confirmation of the use of chickens in augury leading to naval victory is suggested by the *aes signatum* minted during the First Punic War (cf. *RRC* 133).

**This befell Agamemnon in the same way** This reference to a mythical example (see on 1. 24 for the general context) is strictly unnecessary for the argument, but it enables Cic. to introduce another quotation from an archaic Latin tragedian.



**gave the order to set sail, to general approbation but against the bird** If the fragment comes from Pacuvius' *Teucer* (but see D'Anna 1967: 152), the unfavourable sacrifices and auspices relate to the return of the Greeks from Troy. If from some other context, even the Greeks' departure from Aulis could be relevant (cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 111–20).

**Why cite ancient examples?** Quintus' case intermixes ancient (cf. 1. 58) and recent examples (cf. 1. 17, 68) and the explicitly mythological (1. 40, 43, 63). Cic. is well aware of the question of historicity and his choice of examples is to some degree guided by a desire to present a typically Stoic argument bolstered with examples from literature from Homer onwards (cf. on 1. 13).

**29–30** The following example relating to the auspices forged by Ateius and the arguments made by Appius Claudius on the connection between the auspices and the disaster which befell Crassus involves questions of great subtlety and complexity. The first detailed discussion of the augural aspects was by Valeton (1890: 432–6, 440–3, 446–8); Linderski's magisterial treatment of augural law (1986a: esp. 2200–3), Schäublin's analysis of the arguments proposed by Quintus and Claudius (1986: esp. 177–81) and Konrad's discussion (2004b: 181–5) have advanced our understanding of the augural issues. Kany-Turpin has contributed specifically to the discussion of signification inherent in the episode (1999: 255–66; 2003: 72–3).

Three issues in particular are highlighted by this episode: first, the apparently strange position that, even when an auspice was recognized as having been made up, if that auspice was announced to be unfavourable and the action in respect of which it was announced was proceeded with, any unfavourable outcome of the action was considered to have a valid connection with the auspice and thus to be respected by both men and the gods (Linderski 1986a: 2214). For example Cic. himself, setting out the view of the augurs, could say of M. Antonius that 'you have falsified the auspices and have thereby involved the Roman people in a ritual pollution (*religio*)' (*Phil.* 2. 83); the gods too were bound by Ateius' report of unpropitious signs. The logic of this view, that an implication is valid even in the instance where it begins with what is false and ends with what is true, was

indeed accepted by Philo of Megara (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8. 113–14) and certain Stoics and can be considered as coherent (Kany-Turpin 1999: 260). In one sense the ‘reality’ of an auspicial sign was never problematic for the Romans, as in the regular impetrative auspices what the ausplicant ‘saw’ was what he had stipulated that he would see, irrespective of whether he did or not.

The second issue is whether a sign, even a falsified sign, is the cause of what it signifies. On a straightforward reading of the passage Quintus follows the standard augural position that the sign is not the cause, whereas Claudius holds the opposite view (see below **dire auspices**). Although Schäublin argues (1986: 177–81) that Cic. misrepresents Claudius’ view, in effect extrapolating it from the censorial *nota* that Claudius wrote against Ateius, the presentation of Claudius throughout *De Divinatione* and in other authors is of one who held extreme, ‘un-Roman’ views on divination, i.e. that its various techniques could indeed foretell the future (cf. 1. 105, 132; Val. Max. 1. 8. 10).

The third issue is that of responsibility for the disaster that befell the Romans. Quintus, following the logic of the Roman augurs, argues that Crassus was responsible by failing to take account of the dire auspices (see below **M. Crassus**... for his probable error), while Claudius, apparently emphasizing a moral argument, claims that Ateius was responsible through his invention and reporting of a dire auspice (Kany-Turpin 1999: 262–5).

**M. Crassus... neglected the announcement of dire auspices** By the *Lex Trebonia* M. Licinius Crassus secured Syria as his consular province and left Rome in mid-Nov. 55 to campaign against the Parthians. In 53 he was ensnared by the Parthians near Carrhae, losing more than 30,000 troops and his own life; his corpse suffered outrage at the Parthian court. See Ward 1977; Sherwin-White 1984: 279–90.

With the benefit of hindsight, Crassus’ whole expedition, from outset to tragic denouement, was presented as conducted against divine will: prodigies and omens dogged Crassus at every turn. Of this Cic. is concerned here with only one element, the attempted obstruction by the tribune C. Ateius Capito. Before leaving for his province, Crassus observed the traditional ceremonies of a *profectio*: he took the auspices at dawn and sacrificed, and made his vows on the

Capitol; and at no stage during these was any adverse indication received by himself or his augural assistant. The tribunes, who had unsuccessfully opposed the levies held by Crassus and had tried in vain to rescind the votes for the campaign (Dio 39. 39. 3), resorted to religious obstruction. According to Dio (39. 39. 6), their chosen manoeuvre was to announce directly to Crassus (so as to block the loophole exploited by Caesar in 59) that the most unpropitious signs, *dirae*, had been observed *while* Crassus was making his sacrifices on the Capitol (Valeton 1890: 447). It was impossible to follow the tactics of Bibulus in 59 and announce in advance that they were to watch the heavens, as lightning in a non-comitial context was a propitious sign; hence another form of *obnuntiatio* (announcement of an opposing sign) was required, in which the announcer was competent both to announce and interpret the sign. So Ateius reported that he had seen *dirae*.

*Dirae* are oblativ signs which had a particularly disastrous significance. Although *dirae* can mean ‘curses’, in this context the word must refer to augural signs (cf. Hübner 1970: 9–10). From Servius’ specification of the heavens as the realm of the *dirae* (*Aen.* 4. 609) we can suspect that they took the form of either unpropitious birds, thunder, or lightning. In fact, the general silence of the sources indicates that the specific identity of what was observed was not crucial in these cases (cf. Valeton 1890: 432–3).

As Dio makes clear with a present participle *poioumenou* (39. 39. 6: ‘as he was making the traditional vows for his campaign on Capitol’), Ateius claimed that he had seen the sign *while* Crassus was performing the customary prayers on the Capitol. Thus the *obnuntiatio* met the condition for an oblativ sign to be valid, namely that it was observed and reported while the action to which it was considered related was being performed (the so-called *vinculum temporis*). The sign then functioned not only as an unpropitious auspice (*auspiciu infustum*), but also as a premonition and may have been considered to put a permanent interdict against an undertaking (see Linderski 1986a: 2203). Such an oblativ sign, if accepted when it was reported, would have taken precedence over the imperative auspices secured through sacrifice or auspication (Valeton 1890: 430–2); if rejected by the magistrate, it was not binding on him. It was necessary, however,

for the magistrate to make a formal pronouncement of acceptance or rejection (cf. Plin. *HN* 28. 17; Serv. *Aen.* 12. 260).

From Plutarch's expression *paragenesthai kai sumpropempsai* (*Crass.* 16. 3) it has been suggested that Pompey, who in 52 certainly used an augural prerogative for his own political purposes (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 42), was present as augur at Crassus' auspication (Valeton 1890: 442) and that he disregarded or ruled invalid the announcement of *dirae* by Ateius (Linderski 1986a: 2213). In the former case he would have accepted that they were *dirae*, but ruled that they did not pertain to Crassus' expedition (Valeton 1890: 446), in the latter he will have denied that Ateius possessed the right to take the auspices (Valeton 1890: 434). For only the *obnuntiatio* of a colleague in the same magistracy could legally prevail against Crassus' auspices (and his consular colleague Pompey had given his support to Crassus in this key aspect); as tribune of the *plebs* Ateius had no *ius auspicandi* in relation to the actions of the consul and therefore his *obnuntiatio* was not legally binding (Valeton 1890: 423–4; Linderski 1986a: 2202 n. 199). However, such technicalities may be irrelevant given the power of the auspican to accept or reject an oblativ sign. If Pompey did not advise Crassus formally to reject the sign, or Crassus rejected such advice, then he left Rome with auspices that were at least dubious and possibly indicating an ineluctable disaster.

Thwarted in his *obnuntiatio*, Ateius called down curses upon Crassus as he left Rome (Plut. *Crass.* 16. 5–6; Dio 39. 9. 5–6). Cic. fails to mention the curses, not because he does not wish to slight someone who was supporting the Optimate line (*pace* Pease), nor because they are unhistorical (*pace* A. D. Simpson, *TAPA* 69 (1938), 532–41), but because they are irrelevant to the discussion of auspices (cf. J. Bayet, 'Les Malédictiones du tribun C. Ateius Capito', in *Hommages à G. Dumézil* (Brussels, 1960), 31–45 = 1971: 353–65).

**your colleague Appius, a good augur** Appius Claudius Pulcher (*RE* iii. 2849–53), consul of 54, had been Cic.'s predecessor in Cilicia and the cause of much irritation (*Fam.* 3. 6–10). Earlier he had supported his brother Clodius against Cicero and had been the only member of the Senate to vote against Cic.'s return from exile. He had been a member of the augural college from at least 63 (see on 1. 105) and was thus Cic.'s colleague from 53/2 until his death in 48.

He wins Cic.'s praise as an expert in augural law (*Brut.* 267). See Schuricht 1994.

**as censor stigmatized** Claudius was elected censor of 50 and acted with old-fashioned severity against personal luxury (cf. Cic. *Fam.* 8. 12. 2, 14. 4). Several of Caesar's partisans were expelled from the Senate, as well as Ateius from the other end of the political spectrum. The censors revised the citizenship rolls, and the membership of the equestrian order and Senate, taking into consideration both financial and moral criteria. If an individual deserved more than an oral reprimand, the criticism (*nota*; 'stigmatized') was entered on to the citizenship roll with an explanation. See Suolahti 1963: esp. 32–56, 483–9.

**C. Ateius, a good man and a distinguished citizen** C. Ateius Capito (*RE* ii. 1903–4) appears in Cic.'s correspondence as a trusted friend, despite his devotion to Caesar from 46 (*Fam.* 13. 29. 2; *Att.* 13. 33. 4, 16. 16 C and F). He was tribune of the *plebs* in 55, and thereafter held no public office.

**because—as Appius justified his action “he had falsified the auspices”** The expression 'falsify the auspices' (*auspicia ementiri*) appears once in Livy (21. 63. 5) of Flaminius and three times in Cic. (*Phil.* 2. 83, 88, 3. 9) of M. Antonius and probably comes from the *nota* of Claudius. Cic.'s use of the subjunctive *subscriberet* ('justified his action') indicates primarily that this is the view of Claudius. Given the conditions of the *vinculum temporis* (see above M. Crassus...), it is highly probable that there were witnesses on the Capitol who could refute Ateius' claim to have seen any negative sign (Konrad 2004*b*: 182). Cic. himself appears to harbour no doubts that the auspices were falsified.

**this may have been appropriate for him as censor** Quintus concedes that lying by Ateius fell legitimately within the competence of the censor to punish, presumably as immoral behaviour.

**the following was by no means appropriate to him as augur, that he wrote that “it was for that reason that the Roman people had**

suffered a very great disaster” Again, ‘it was...disaster’ is probably taken from the *nota* against Ateius (Schäublin 1986: 174). Quintus argues that Claudius’ grasp of augural theory is incorrect, that he was wrong to identify Ateius’ false auspices as the *cause* of Crassus’ defeat.

For if the calamity occurred for that reason, there is no blame attached to the one who announced it... False auspices did not *ipso facto* bring divine punishment on the Roman people (*contra* Schäublin 1986: 177–8), but, in the aftermath of a disaster, the assigning of responsibility was natural. Following the usual Roman interpretation, the one who reported an inauspicious oblativ sign was not responsible if a misfortune came to pass, but rather the one whose duty it was to heed the sign, usually a magistrate or general. One who falsified the auspices, however, was in a difficult position because his *obnuntiatio* brought ritual pollution (*religio*) on the Roman people, and, as appears from the case of L. Papirius Cursor, he might expect punishment (cf. Livy 10. 40. 11). Claudius’ position may have been that those who were not colleagues of the magistrate about to undertake an action were not permitted to announce a negative sign unless it had truly occurred and had been seen by them by chance, i.e. unless it was a *bona fide* oblativ sign, whereas Ateius had deliberately looked for and invented a negative sign (Valeton 1889: 419 ff.; 1890: 429, 442–3). Within a few months of writing these words, Cic. himself wishes evil on M. Antonius for having falsified the auspices (*Phil.* 2. 83).

(...the outcome proved that the announcement had been true...) These words are most likely Quintus’ explanation of Claudius’ argument (Valeton 1890: 441 n. 2), rather than an interpolation (cf. Schäublin 1986: 178–81). Pease argues that they cannot be from book 1 of Claudius’ *De Augurali Disciplina* which he had sent to Cic. before his censorship. However, nothing precludes that Claudius had reached his verdict on Ateius from his augural perspective before 50 and that the explanatory phrase, in which his augural status precedes his censorial, simply indicates that the censor is saying what the augur had already concluded.

**For dire auspices...are not the cause of anything happening, but announce what will happen unless measures are taken** This is a crucial statement of the traditional Roman position in the face of all divine communication; there is no inevitability about negative signs, so long as the warning given by the gods is heeded and appropriate action taken. The distinction between cause and sign is crucial to much of Quintus' argument and reappears frequently (34, 109, 127, 131). Valeton suggests (1890: 441–2) that Cic. misrepresents Claudius' argument, which may have run as follows: Ateius had in effect arrogated to himself the role of a magistrate and the gods had therefore granted his fictitious sign the effect of a real sign; but, because Ateius did not have the *ius auspicandi* in respect of Crassus' actions, he had deceived Crassus, who could not know that the *dirae* which had been announced related particularly to his action, since the augur in attendance, Pompey, did not dismiss or confirm the report; so the cause of the calamity lay not in the auspices, but in the mistake into which Crassus had fallen unknowingly and innocently, and into which Ateius had led him, with the result that he started a war against the auspices. Claudius thus holds the traditional view that the negative sign warned the magistrate not to proceed, and functioned as a qualified prediction of what would happen if the warning were ignored. 'The negative sign could be taken to function as a simple prohibition without any divinatory ingredient... The augural sign was not a disclosure of an inflexible verdict of fate, nor was its announcement by the augur a prediction of the future. It was only a warning. However, it is possible to argue that the warning given by the *auspicium infaustum* or *malum* was also a premonition, disregard of which would result in calamity. Thus the negative sign could be held to offer a glimpse of the future, to function as a qualified prediction, which was fulfilled only in case the warning was disregarded' (Linderski 1982: 30–1 = 1995: 476–7).

**30. So the announcement of Ateius...warned him what would happen if he did not take heed** Cic. spells out the specific application of the principle just enunciated.

**either...or** The first alternative relates to the *leges Aelia et Fufia* (the provisions of which were restated in the *lex Clodia* of 58), under

which it seems that tribunician (ab)use of *obnuntiatio* was limited (cf. Cic. *Pis.* 10; *Vat.* 18, 23)—Ateius' *obnuntiatio* was not legally binding. The second alternative is just a restatement of Quintus' (mis)understanding of Claudius' argument.

**that staff of yours** The staff (*lituus*) was curved at one end. The Romans took it over from the Etruscans, among whom it was a symbol of authority, principally in the secular sphere (Thuillier 1980: 389–92), as it also became among the Romans in the 1st cent. (Alföldi 1997: 129–30). Its special connection with the augurate is attested in literature (e.g. Aul. Gell. 5. 8. 2; Serv. *Aen.* 7. 187) and Roman coinage (*RRC*, nos. 242, 243, 264, etc.).

**Romulus delimited the regions with it when he founded the city** Quintus is alluding to Romulus' division of Rome after his successful auspication over the site of the city (A. Szabó, *RhM* 87 (1938), 161; Jocelyn 1971: 50). The basic action of delimitation is drawing a boundary line. From a fixed sitting position the augur marked out the significant area in front of him, 'delimiting his vision'; he then divided this area with a horizontal line and a second line perpendicular to this. See Valetton 1890: 256–63; Linderski 1986a: 2279, 2286–9.

[it is a curved rod . . .] This description of the *lituus* is unnecessary and should be deleted as a gloss. Examples of the *lituus* trumpet have been uncovered in Etruscan tombs (see Blanck and Proietti 1986: 25). The glossator is probably incorrect in that the musical instrument took its name from the augur's staff (Timpanaro).

**the hall of the Salii (which is on the Palatine)** The shrine has been located on the SW Palatine close to Augustus' palace, see A. Grandazzi, *REL* 70 (1993), 31–2. The Salii were two companies of twelve priests, whose origins predated the unification of Rome and who performed a dance in armour in Mar. and Oct. at the festivals which marked the opening and closure of the campaigning season. They were dedicated to Mars Gradivus, and in historic times their rites commemorated the passage of Romans from war to peace and vice versa.



**burnt down, was found undamaged** During the Gallic destruction of Rome in 390 (cf. Dion. Hal. 14. 2 2; Plut. *Rom.* 22. 1–2; *Cam.* 32. 4–5). The tradition goes back at least to the late 2nd cent. and is found in Livy's history of Praeneste (*II* 13. 2, 123, 429); Livy pointedly ignores its rediscovery, and Marcus calls it a fiction (2. 80).

**31. Ancient writers...division of the regions** The extant references to Attus Navius concentrate on two episodes, his contest with Tarquinius and the physical commemoration of his triumph by statue and *puteal*. Of the extant annalistic histories only Dionysius of Halicarnassus relates the incident from the vineyard (3. 70), but this demonstrates that the story was found in the historians of the generation before Livy. Cic. himself has the story in bare outline (*ND* 2. 9).

**Attus Navius with the staff** As the IE root *\*atta* is connected with fatherhood, it has been suggested that Attus is a title, meaning 'father' (G. Mancuso, *ASGP* 33 (1972), 165–335), perhaps even here *pater gentis*, but it is also intelligible as an ordinary *praenomen*, probably Sabine, from the same lexical base as Appius. Navius is generally interpreted as an Etruscan *nomen* (Schulze 1933: 197). If a link of the *nomen* could be made with the Greek word for temple *naos* or *nawos* (cf. A. Marinetti, *RPL* 5 (1982), 177), Attus Navius would become a perfect aetiological creation as a key figure in the history of Roman augury. However, the survival of an historical name cannot be excluded. On the augur, see Piccaluga 1969: 151–208; Beard 1989: 50–3; Bremmer 1993: 170–3.

**during the reign of Tarquinius Priscus** Although Attus' activity is sometimes placed in the reigns of Ancus Marcius (Liv. *Per.* 1) or Tullus Hostilius (Cic. *ND* 2. 9), the dominant chronological context in the annalistic tradition is the reign of Tarquinius Priscus (cf. Livy 1. 36; Dion. Hal. 3. 71); there is no need to have him floating through early Roman history (*pace* Piccaluga 1969: 161–4). The reign of Tarquinius Priscus, by tradition the fifth of Rome's kings (616–578), was one of transition, in which new constitutional and military reforms were necessary as the state grew (cf. Ogilvie 1965: 140–2, 145–8; Cornell 1995: 120–30).

**he is said to have vowed that...he would give to the god** The distancing implied by 'he is said' seems to apply only to the story of the *augurium stativum*, a procedure by which the selection of a place or thing was made (Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 3. 84, 10. 423; see Catalano 1960: 308–17), but is an indication of awareness by Cic. of different levels of historicity in his material. 'The god' may be the *Lar familiaris* (Piccaluga 1969: 157; cf. Dion. Hal. 3. 70. 2: *heroes*).

**stood...facing south and...divided the vineyard into four parts** Attus did not perform a regular auspication, in which the augur faced east, but an *augurium stativum*. This initial division may have involved no divine inspiration (cf. 'by the favour of a god': Dion. Hal. 3. 70. 3), but rather have employed the normal arrangement of a vineyard around two avenues aligned north/south and east/west (cf. Mynors 1990: 135).

**the birds had rejected three parts** Pease appears to see a contradiction between the versions in Cic. and Dion. Hal., but this is unnecessary: the rejection of regions in Cic. was achieved by the birds' appearing in the area they favoured, as Dionysius records. Valetton envisages a series of simple choices between left and right, with Attus turning towards the west for the second consultation, thus isolating one quarter (1889: 450). But if the birds had to settle over the object of the *augurium* (cf. Linderski 1986a: 2281 n. 536), there was no need for the augur to alter his orientation.

**when the fourth part, which was left, had been divided into regions** Attus seems to have repeated the procedure, thus creating an area one 1/16th of the original vineyard. The significance of 16 in Etruscan belief (e.g. *Div.* 2. 42; Plin. *HN* 2. 143) suggests Etruscan influence (cf. Catalano 1960: 310 n. 262). The story is not an aetiological explanation of the annual auspication of a vineyard performed by the *flamen Dialis* (Catalano 1960: 357–9).

**so we see it recorded** Quintus seeks to stress the record, fixing the responsibility for its reliability on his sources.

**When this had been made known...he won a great reputation and fame** Attus functions first as a private augur. Cic.'s version omits

Attus' education by Etruscan augurs (cf. Dion. Hal. 3. 70. 4–5) and his subsequent invitation by Rome's augurs to participate in their public consultations (*episkepseis*), although he was not a member of their college (Dion. Hal. 3. 70. 5). As it is clear that Attus was not a member of the Roman elite and yet became in many ways an archetypal Roman augur, the stories have to explain his rise to prominence and translation to Rome. Despite his Etruscan education, Attus functions afterwards as a Roman augur, not availing himself of any direct inspiration by the gods, but employing the traditional techniques in response to traditional questions. Dionysius' comment that Attus' commemorative statue was 'smaller than an average man' (3. 71. 5) does not mean that Attus was still a juvenile at the time of his contest with Tarquinius. Archaic statues were regularly smaller than lifesize (Plin. *HN* 34. 24) and the imperfect tense *referrent* can easily cover a period of several years (Sehlmeyer 1999: 83–6; Piccaluga 1969: 159–61).

**32. King Priscus summoned him to his presence** The other versions apparently diverge at this point. Because of danger from the Sabines Tarquinius was proposing to double the three centuries of a hundred *equites* established by Romulus with the names Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres. Romulus had instituted his three units after taking the auspices, but Tarquinius had not. Cf. Cic. *Rep.* 2. 36; Livy 1. 36. 3–5; Dion. Hal. 3. 71. 1; Florus 1. 1. 5. 2–4; Festus 168–70 L; [Aur. Vict.] *DVI* 6. 7; Jordanes, *Rom.* 1. 99; Zon. 7. 8. Attus' specific objection is to Tarquinius' intention either to give his own name and that of his friends to his three new centuries and thus to change a Romulan institution (Livy 1. 36. 3), or to change the names which had been given by Romulus to the existing centuries (Festus 168 L) *inaugurato* (cf. Livy 1. 43. 9). No change was possible to what Romulus had inaugurated without an exauguration. Attus consulted the gods and declared to Hostilius that they did not give the go-ahead to his proposed legislation. Livy's terminology is crucial, as *inaugurato* points to the overriding power of the augur in the area of legislation: the magistrate auspicated to determine whether the gods permitted action on the specific day, but the augur inquired about the legislation itself, whether it was good or bad, and his prohibition was permanent (Valeton 1891: 412; cf. Linderski 1986a: 2295–6).

Perhaps the early 3rd cent., when Rome had incorporated Etruria and began to consult her *haruspices* publicly, saw particular modifications to the Attus legend. In this episode several strands come together to explain the development if not the genesis of the story. While on one level we can stress the aetiological aspect—the story explains the monuments around the Comitium and the name of the *centuriae posteriores*—there are more thematic strands: Attus' strange name, both Sabine and Etruscan, embodies the amalgamation of indigenous and foreign elements which constituted Roman society and informed divinatory practices in general. While Attus could represent Roman opposition to an Etruscan king with particular links to haruspicy, and his story confirm the Romanness of the augural art (cf. Briquel 1986: 82), his education was Etruscan, which suggests at least one version in which simple anti-Etruscanism is excluded. In his confrontation with Tarquinius he defended the traditional role of Roman augurs as interpreters of the divine will and represents the ethos of the elite in rejecting the domination of powerful individuals (Linderski 1982: 33–4 = 1995: 479–80). That the miraculous aspects of his augural activity have no parallel in the role of historical augurs is a point well made by Beard (1989: 52), but her formulation of two contrasting ways in which insiders and outsiders to the Roman religious elite could read the myth is implausible.

**As a test of Navius' skill as an augur** Pease suggests that the test was preliminary to enrolling Attus in the augural college, but if so, Quintus has a version of the story which lacks the usual context (cf. Briquel 1986: 97 n. 73, who argues rightly that Piccaluga and Pease make an unsupportable clash between Cic. and Dionysius of Halicarnassus—Attus was clearly a confirmed, recognized augur by this stage).

**Priscus** This may well be a gloss. If Priscus were omitted here, Cic. gives the king's full nomenclature on his first appearance and thereafter refers to him as Tarquinius.

**Navius took the auspices and replied that it could** Perhaps Attus withdrew to the *auguraculum* on the *arx* (cf. Dion. Hal. 3. 71. 3). The technical expression 'performed an augury' (*augurium agere*; e.g.

Serv. *Aen.* 2. 703, 3. 89) indicates that Attus acted as an individual augur, seeking a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer from the gods which would be revealed by specified birds (Serv. *Aen.* 1. 398). Attus is ignorant of Tarquinius’ intended action, but that is irrelevant to the success of the augury. Attus does not have to read Tarquinius’ mind or to experience any direct inspiration from the gods because the normal exercise of his art provides the answer whether it is right to proceed.

**He ordered Attus to make the attempt** The feat was chosen by Tarquinius to be impossible, the reversal of normality—the stone which sharpened the razor was to be cut by it. Cic.’s use of indirect speech here obscures whether Attus or Tarquinius issues the order. The latter goes better with the next sentence where the king’s appearance in the ablative absolute (*rege...inspectante*) should exclude him from the action of cutting the stone (Timpanaro).

**the Comitium** The area in front of the Senate-house (*LTUR* i. 309–14 and figs. 181–2), where the Roman people had gathered for public assemblies. The site of a group of monuments associated with Attus: a statue (e.g. Livy 1. 36. 5), fig tree (Pliny *HN* 15. 77; Festus 168 L) and the *puteal* (see below). See now Carafa 1998: esp. 121–5.

**was cut in two by a razor** Cic.’s wording leaves it open as to who cut the stone—the passive formulation (*cotem...allatam*) suggests a third party while in other accounts it is Tarquinius (Dion. Hal. 3. 71. 4; August. *De civ. D.* 10. 16).

**Tarquin employed Attus Navius as augur** This does not prove that Attus was admitted into the augural college, which seems to be the belief of Livy (1. 36. 3; cf. Val. Max. 1. 4. 1), but rather that he was to hand as a learned adviser whenever Tarquinius took the auspices, and the people consulted him privately (Catalano 1960: 309 n. 255). Livy’s account (1. 36. 6) marks this as the beginning of augural supremacy in Rome.

**33. We understand** Cf. 1. 34, 92, 111, 122, 130, 2. 80, 98. A reference to the historical tradition to bolster the credibility of an example involving the miraculous.

**the puteal** From the ancient topographic references the *puteal* was in front of the *rostra*, where the praetor's tribunal was (Pseudacron *ad Hor. Sat.* 2. 6. 35), 'where the column of Maenius was, where debtors were pursued by their creditors' (Schol. Bob. *ad Cic. Sest.* 18), '[in front of] the Senate-house' (Conon *Narr.* 48), to its left (Livy 1. 36. 5), NW of the Comitium proper (Coarelli 1985: 28–34, and fig. 21). Puteals, i.e. circular curbed enclosures, are usually associated with the 'burial' of lightning bolts by *haruspices* (e.g. Schol. Juv. 6. 587). The splitting of the stone was treated *as if* it had been done by a lightning bolt, i.e. by Jupiter (cf. Thulin 1905–9: 103). Therefore the stone was buried as *sacer*, and also the razor because it was in effect the lightning bolt itself.

**Let's deny all this, let's burn the annals** Quintus' first line of defence is the plausibility of Rome's historical record. By 'annals' Quintus means in general the accounts of Roman history produced in literary form from the early 2nd cent., not just works with the title *annales*, but those which constituted the public history of Rome, to which Cic. made appeal in his public speeches (cf. Frier 1979: 221–2). Implicit also may be a reference to the *annales* of the Chief Pontiff (cf. Cic. *De or.* 2. 52), which contained notices of religious phenomena, e.g. when lightning struck individuals and public consultations of the *haruspices*.

**let's admit anything rather than that the gods are concerned with human affairs** Quintus' second line of defence is the Stoic argument outlined in the preface (1. 10), to which he will return later (1. 82), which connects the existence of the gods and divination with their concern for man. He in effect dismisses the views of Epicurus (cf. 1. 62, 109) and, as Timpanaro suggests, chides Marcus for slipping from New Academic scepticism into Epicureanism.

**written in your work** Quintus reminds Marcus of an incident used by his Stoic mouthpiece Lucilius Balbus in the work of which *De Divinatione* was a logical extension (*ND* 2. 10–11). Only if the episode were vouched for by Marcus himself in the previous work would Quintus' use of this be particularly effective *ad hominem*, although Marcus' endorsement of the Stoic case at the close of that work may give some grounds for Quintus' point.

**Tiberius Gracchus** Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (*RE* 2A. 1403–9), consul 177 and 163, had been an augur since 204 (Livy 29. 38. 7) and by 163 was probably the senior member of the college.

**does that not confirm the science of both augurs and *haruspices*?**

Although this section of the argument concerns augury, *haruspices* are mentioned because of their role in the events of 163 (see below).

**“taken possession of the tent irregularly”** ‘Irregularly’ (*vitio*; see on 1. 28) indicates a contravention of augural practice. As consul, Gracchus held the consular elections for 162 in Rome. Before the elections, which were held in the Campus Martius (Cic. *Q Fr.* 2. 2. 1), Gracchus had to take the auspices. For this an open enclosure, called a ‘tent’ (*tabernaculum*), made of skins (Festus 11 L) was erected in the gardens of Scipio. The technical expression *tabernaculum capere* refers to the whole ceremony of auspication, not just to the taking over or pitching of the enclosure. See Valeton 1890: 240–3.

**he had crossed the *pomerium* without first taking the auspices**

The *pomerium* (*LTUR* iv. 96–105) was the boundary of Rome, drawn by Romulus and first extended by Servius Tullius (Livy 1. 44. 3–5), which demarcated the augurally constituted city. The night before the elections Gracchus duly took the auspices, but before holding the elections he returned to the Senate-house to conduct some business. In making this journey he crossed the *pomerium* and thus cancelled the auspices he had taken. Because he took no new auspices after recrossing the *pomerium* to return to the Campus Martius, the elections were technically *inauspicato*—i.e. the gods’ will had not been ascertained whether they could be held that day. Plutarch (*Marc.* 5. 2; cf. Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 2. 178) understands the augural error to have been Gracchus’ use of the same *tabernaculum* when he returned to preside over the assembly, i.e. he did not forget to retake his auspices. Both versions involve valid augural problems, but it is not clear which of these Gracchus identified as his error.

Consular elections of the centuriate assembly had to be held outside the *pomerium*, usually in the Campus Martius, and required

their presiding officer (*rogator*) to be in possession of 'military auspices'. Crossing the *pomerium* involved a change from 'urban' to 'military auspices', which required a new auspication. It is not clear if the *amnis Petronia*, at which magistrates had to take auspices before holding popular elections or assemblies (Festus 296 L), is relevant here. See Valetton 1890: 244–5; Rüpke 1990: 32–3; B. Liou-Gille, *MH* 50 (1993), esp. 103–6.

**Gracchus... confirmed the authority of the auspices by confessing his own error** He wrote from his province of Sardinia to the college of augurs that from his reading of augural books he realized that he had erred (cf. Val. Max. 1. 1. 3; Gran. Licin. 28. 25). The college of augurs easily concluded that the electoral procedure had been administered incorrectly and conveyed their formal conclusion to the Senate, which passed a decree that the consuls should abdicate (Cic. *ND* 2. 11; Linderski 1986a: 2159–61).

**great authority was added to the discipline of the *haruspices***

After the elections had begun, the returning officer of the prerogative century died suddenly, but Gracchus continued with the elections. Then, considering the death ominous (cf. 1. 103), he consulted the Senate, which treated it as a prodigy. They called in the *haruspices* who interpreted the prodigy as a divine warning about the validity of the consular elections. In anger at this criticism of himself, Gracchus ridiculed the *haruspices* as foreigners and no experts in the rules of Roman auspices and had them dismissed.

**34–8** The organizational structure of these chapters before the extended discussion of dreams is not easy to determine. Their purpose should be to prepare the transition from examples from artificial divination to natural divination, but that is not achieved straightforwardly. The section begins (34a) by re-emphasizing the distinction between the two types of divination made in the *divisio* of 1. 11–12, and giving examples of the latter. A short digression on oracles and lot oracles (34b) seems misplaced, as Quintus has to return to oracles (37–8) before the discussion on dreams (39 ff.). In between is a passage in which Quintus approximates to the rhetorical style of Marcus in book 2, taking up potential objections by his



opponent and defending artificial divination, primarily haruspicy but also astrology. These are divinatory practices that have not so far been prominent in his argument (but cf. 1. 2) and so compound the impression of disorder. Included in this section are allusions to the arguments *e vetustate*, *e consensu omnium*, and *de ignorantia*, which reinforces the notion that the section is a restatement of the *divisio*, but these arguments do not articulate the material.

**34. one in which technique has a part** The minor change of formulation to ‘in which technique has a part’ (*particeps artis*) from ‘involving a technique’ (*artis est*: 1. 11, 12) is probably not significant, although it has been suggested that it is Posidonius’ formulation (Finger 1929: 380–1). Cf. 1. 24–5 for ‘conjecture’ and 1. 12 for ‘observation’.

**they involve no technique who foretell the future not by reason or conjecture** The heavy repetition of the formal language used in 1. 11–12 continues. ‘Reason’ relates to instances where a previously observed sign is reproduced exactly, ‘conjecture’ to instances where extrapolation was required (cf. Linderski 1986a: 2233).

**by a certain stirring of the mind or some free and unrestrained movement** Cf. the brief description in the preface, 1. 4. The behaviour of the soul in dreaming and in frenzied prophesying will be described in detail later (1. 63). In these types of divination there is direct impact on the human mind by the gods so that no interpretation or application of rational faculties is required to understand the message.

**like Bacis of Boeotia** The name may be a generic descriptive title derived from *bazo* (to speak), but the plurals found in Aristotle (*Probl.* 954<sup>a</sup>36) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 399a), where Bacides are linked with Sibyls as a paradigm of ecstatic prophecy (cf. Aristid. *Or.* 45. 12), can plausibly be interpreted as ‘people like Bacis’ (Dodds 1951: 88 n. 45). Bacis claimed to be possessed by nymphs (Paus. 4. 27. 4, 10. 12. 11). Prophecies are attributed to Bacis by e.g. Herodotus (8. 20. 1, 8. 77, 8. 96. 2, 9. 43) and Aristophanes (e.g. *Pax* 1070; *Av.* 962–3). Their prominence in the latter owes something to their

collection in book form from which he could quote them (cf. N. D. Smith, *CA* 8 (1989), 150–1). The Hellenistic scholar Philetas of Ephesus alleged that there were three prophets of this name, from Boeotia, Attica, and Messene (Schol. Ar. *Pax* 1071). See Parke 1988: 180–7; L. Prandi, *CISA* 19 (1993), 51–62; Dillery 2005: 179–81.

**Epimenides of Crete** A definite historical figure, best dated as a contemporary of Solon in the late 7th and early 6th cents. (cf. Rhodes 1981: 81–3), but one to whom many legendary details were attached. Although Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1418<sup>a</sup>22) denied his prophetic powers, he appears as a prophet (Apul. *Flor.* 15) and is alleged to have predicted the defeat of the Spartans at Orchomenus and the griefs the Athenians would suffer from possessing Munichia (Diog. Laert. 1. 114). See Svenbro 1993: 135–44.

**the Sibyl of Erythrae** First attested in Callisthenes (*FGrH* 124 F 14a) and Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 130 Wehrli) with the name Herophile, which appears in one of her oracles (Paus. 10. 12. 3) that featured in the 5th cent. debate between Marpeesus in the Troad and Erythrae in Ionia over her. Her prophetic activity was thought to predate the Trojan War (Apollodorus of Erythrae, *FGrH* 422 F 1), although Eusebius puts her *floruit* in 804 (*Chron.* 1. 201) and Solinus (2. 18) has her prophesy to the Lesbians the loss of their thalassocracy. See Parke 1988: 23–60.

**equalized lots** It seems probable that these lots offered simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers with equal probability. A similar expression is used of the process of ensuring that the lots used for the selection of a jury were identical (above all in weight) and bore the right names (Asc. 71 C; cf. 39 C); and for assemblies (*Tabula Hebana*). For lots from the oracles of Italy, see J. Champeaux, *MÉFRA* 102 (1990), 271–302.

**those which are poured forth under a divine impulse and inspiration** Cf. 1. 12. Quintus is thinking of the kinds of oracles which produced verse, and could not be the product of mathematical chance.

**those lots which we are told sprang from the earth** ‘We are told’ refers probably to the *monumenta Praenestinatorum* (2. 85), the local

history written by Q. Lutatius Catulus. This is a specific allusion to the famous oracle of Fortune at Praeneste, where Numerius Suffusius broke open a flint on divine instruction and 'the lots sprang forth carved in oak in ancient characters' (2. 85–6). However, given the very strong chthonic association of oracles in general (see Champeaux 1982: 106–7), wider reference is possible.

**Those who interpret all these things seem to approach very closely to the divine intention of those they interpret, just as philologists do for poets** The reading of the MSS *divinationem* was emended by Hottinger to *divinitatem*, but I have adopted the suggestion of Schäublin (1989: 42–5), *divinam rationem* (divine intention). It is clear that Cic. is drawing a comparison: diviners stand in the same relation to the gods as commentators do to poets. This emendation avoids the difficulty of having Cic. credit commentators with the same inspiration as the poets they aim to elucidate and recalls Cic.'s description of divination as that 'by which human nature is able to come very close to the power of the gods' (1. 1). As the comparison logically requires, the interpretation of the diviner is not passive, but employs his rational faculties, especially in the realm of conjecture (cf. Linderski 1986a: 2226–9). Perhaps Cic. takes this comparison from Panaetius who is recorded as calling the Alexandrian commentator Aristarchus 'a seer' (*mantis*) for his skill at divining the meaning of his poet (Ath. 634c–d; cf. Timpanaro 1994: 249).

**35. What is that cleverness which seeks to destroy by false charges facts established by antiquity?** Again a basically empirical point by Quintus—if it has worked for many years, accept the reality of the phenomenon.

**"I do not see their cause"** That these words belong to Quintus' opponent was recognized in Falconer's translation (cf. Wagenvoort 1952: 148). They should be treated as the objection of an imagined interlocutor rather than as an interjection by Marcus (cf. 1. 24, 38, 60, etc.).

**Perhaps it lies hidden, wrapped in the obscurity of nature** Cf. the frequent Sceptic phrase *physei adelon* (Philippson 1922: 101; e.g.

Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8. 145, 150). This idea, often with the added notion that nature herself has done the concealing, is often placed in the mouths of his characters by Cic. (cf. *Acad.* 1. 15; *Tim.* 1; *Fin.* 5. 51, 58).

**the whole of Etruria...every other state** Quintus lists the three elements of the haruspical discipline in no particular order and with no special significance in the language of disparagement. The highly rhetorical construction continues, with the three areas of haruspical activity followed by three physical portents each linked with 'often' (*saepe*) and with Rome and other states contrasted, both introduced by 'many' (*multa*). 'Crashes' (*fremitus*) appear frequently in descriptions of earth movements (e.g. 1. 18, 2. 60; *Har. Resp.* 20) and among portents officially recognized by the Senate (*Obseq.* 46, 48). 'Groanings' (*mugitus*) were considered a regular warning of earthquakes (Sen. *NQ* 6. 13. 4), as a portent (*Obseq.* 35). One category of earthquake took its name from groaning (Arist. *Mund.* 396<sup>a</sup>11: *muketiai seismoï*; Amm. Marc. 17. 7. 14: *mycematiae*, cf. Apul. *Mund.* 18). For a list of earthquakes, see A. Palumbo *et al.*, 'Catalogo', in E. Guidoboni (ed.), *I terremoti prima del Mille in Italia e nell'area mediterranea: Storia, archeologia, sismologia* (Bologna, 1989), 580–621.

**36. Should the recent parturition of a mule...predicted by haruspices as an incredible progeny of evils, be ridiculed?** According to Pliny (*HN* 8. 173) the annals were full of mules giving birth, but they were nonetheless treated as prodigies. Quintus refers specifically to a birth in 50 (*Obseq.* 65) or 49 (*App. BCiv.* 2. 144) which was interpreted as portending 'civil discord, the death of the nobility, overthrow of the laws and shameful human births' (cf. Col. 6. 27), i.e. the evils of the Civil War between Pompey and Caesar.

**a creature which is naturally sterile** The sterility of mules was discussed from Empedocles onwards (e.g. Arist. *Gen. An.* 747<sup>a</sup>34; Varr. *RR* 2. 8. 2). Although there were areas renowned for mules which did produce offspring (e.g. Varr. *RR* 2. 1. 27), such births were sufficiently rare in general to give rise to proverbial sayings (*Hdt.* 3. 151. 2; Suet. *Galb.* 4. 2).

**Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius** Publius is probably the tribune of 189 (*RE* 2A. 1400). Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (see on 1. 33) was censor in 169. His excellence as an augur was demonstrated by his actions in 163. In Cic.'s other philosophical works he is lauded for wisdom (*Fin.* 4. 65) and sense (*De or.* 1. 38).

**summon *haruspices* when two snakes had been caught in his house** Cf. Val. Max. 4. 6. 1; Pliny *HN* 7. 122; [Aur. Vict] *DVI* 57. 4; Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 1. 2–3. Gracchus' private consultation here contrasts with his public dismissal of the *haruspices* in 163. The logic of the story for Quintus is that Gracchus accepted the usefulness of *haruspices* after their vindication in 163. The two snakes are usually taken (e.g. Bayet 1971: esp. 374–7) to represent the *Genius* and the *Iuno*, the guardian spirits of Gracchus and Cornelia, but can also be identified with the *genius loci* (Serv. *Aen.* 5. 85; cf. G. K. Boyce, *AJA* 46 (1942), 13–22). Snakes in domestic art are common (e.g. *LIMC* iv. 426, no. 157, viii. 604, no. 39), and are portrayed most vividly in various *lararia* from Pompeii (cf. Kunkel 1974: pls. 29–31, 33–5), clearly as chthonic creatures operating below the human level (30–1, 33–5). In seeking to rationalize the story, Pease considers that these snakes were family pets (cf. Pliny *HN* 29. 72), but in that case their appearance in the house would hardly seem ominous, even if they were on the marriage bed. Rather, the portent lay in the appearance in the house of animals which did not belong here, portending death (cf. *Obseq.* 58). In dreams, however, the meaning was very different (cf. Niceph. *Onirocr.* 16: 'a snake seen on the bed—success').

**Gaius Gracchus informs us in the writings he has left** Marcus (2. 62) appears to describe a letter, 'C. Gracchus wrote to M. Pomponius', while Plutarch (*Ti. Gracch.* 8. 7) has 'in a book', but the two need not be identical (cf. Fleck 1993: 227). The work may have been an early Roman example of a biography (Santangelo 2005: 200), but Cic.'s purpose in specifying the source is to locate the story within the strong family tradition of the Gracchi by which they attempted to demonstrate their piety (Santangelo 2005: 211–13).

**the young daughter of Publius Africanus** Gracchus had married Cornelia (S. Barnard, *Latomus* 49 (1990), 384–92) after Scipio's death

in early 183; whether Scipio had consented even to the betrothal, which Plutarch dates after his death, is unclear (*Ti. Gracch.* 4. 3). Using the information of Pliny (*HN* 7. 57) on the fertile union of Gracchus and Cornelia which produced six girls and then six boys, and our knowledge of Gracchus' public career, the marriage is best dated in 181/180. Cornelia, then, could not have been born much after 195 and was in her forties when Gracchus died, which is not inconsistent with her description as *adulescens* (K. M. Moir, *CQ* 33 (1983), 136–45). He was born c.220, as Livy describes him as *admodum adulescens* in 204 (29. 38. 7). The purpose of the story is to present Gracchus as a 'pious statesman, who does not fear death and succeeds in being at the same time a devoted husband and a wise citizen' (Santangelo 2005: 210).

**a few days later he died** Gaius Gracchus was born in 154 or early 153. The elder Gracchus, then, cannot have died before 155/154. On the grounds that Tiberius Gracchus, born in 163, was considered old enough to take over his father's augurate upon the latter's death, a plausible date c.147 has also been suggested (Bernstein 1978: 57 n. 15).

**Let us ridicule *haruspices*...** Cf. 1. 33 **Let us deny...**

<**Let us condemn**> Rightly added in light of the recapitulation by Quintus below 'let us condemn, I say' (J. Vahlen, *RhM* 27 (1872), 186). On the grounds that the clausula produced is not metrical, L. Delaruelle (*RPh* 35 (1911), 240–1) argues that no *condemnemus* be added and that *contemnamus* should be attached to what follows. However, the emphasis given by 'I say' strongly suggests that Cic. is repeating a word he has used earlier.

**Babylon** For Babylonians. In the introduction Cic. spoke of Assyrians and Chaldaean (see on 1. 2), but no real contradiction exists.

**Mount Caucasus** Quintus probably means the Paropamisus range in modern Afghanistan (Thoresen), a location which better fits the origins of Callanus (Cic. *Tusc.* 2. 52; see on 1. 47).

those who cover 470,000 years in their works, as they themselves assert The tradition in Latin and Greek authors on the enormous antiquity of Babylonian astrological records goes back to Berossus, a Babylonian who wrote a *Babyloniaca* in Greek, which was mined for information on astrology from the Hellenistic period onwards. Most of the huge timespan concerned the antediluvian period. From the existing fragments a span of almost 468,000 years can be demonstrated. Berossus is credited with 490,000 by Pliny (*HN* 7. 193); the figures which appear in classical authors without attribution to Berossus vary greatly: e.g. 473,000, Diod. 2. 31. 9; 480,000, Jul. Afric. *Chron.* fr. 1; 432,000, Syncellus 30; 720,000, Epigenes, Plin. *HN* 7. 193; and 1,440,000, Simplicius, Arist. *Cael.* 475<sup>b</sup>. See S. M. Burstein, *The Babyloniaca of Berossus* (Malibu, 1978), 13.

37–8 Quintus' treatment of oracles is brief, and as such differs considerably from the treatment of the subject in his Greek philosophical sources: e.g. Chrysippus appears to have given equal weight to oracles and dreams (see on 1. 6). The reason for this is twofold: first, although there were many oracles in the Italian peninsula, some very close to Rome, the Roman state did not consult them, but even forbade its magistrates to employ them (cf. Val. Max. 1. 3. 3). The only oracle to receive official embassies from Rome was Delphi, and then generally as a course of action recommended by the Board of Ten for Ritual Action and approved by the Senate. Secondly, and more importantly, these oracles did not produce inspired prophecy in the 1st cent. In defending the existence of natural divination Quintus needs to use examples of oracular prophecy produced by indisputable direct action of the god upon his mouthpiece, rather than 'yes' or 'no' answers produced by lot or other such types of less striking oracle (for dice oracles, see F. Graf, 'Rolling the Dice for an Answer', in Johnston and Struck 2001: 51–97), the kind of material he will return to later (1. 65–9).

37. Alright, barbarians are foolish and deceivers...To speak of natural divination This is regarded by Pease as a transitional passage by Quintus in order to get his argument back on track after a digression from the discussion of natural divination advertised in 1. 34. However, if we see these chapters as restating and exemplifying

all four principles from the *divisio*, Quintus' approach is less chaotic—the arguments *e consensu omnium* and *e vetustate* are reinforced in these sections by his posing of rhetorical questions or, in effect, by setting up a claim by an imaginary opponent and refuting it, techniques for which Carneades was noted and which Cic. demonstrates eloquently in his speeches.

**who is unaware of the responses Pythian Apollo gave** The rhetorical formulation again suits the argument *e consensu omnium*. Pease suggests that Cic.'s source had excerpted his material from Herodotus, but this is overly restrictive. If the original collection goes back to Chrysippus (see below), 4th-cent. authors like Ephorus would also fall within his ambit (cf. the range of authors citing oracles, Fontenrose 1978: 240–416). Quintus' point is also better served by a reference to a wider period of Greek history. Quintus limits his case to the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, the most famous and prestigious pan-Hellenic oracle.

**Croesus** The last king of Lydia, ousted by the Persians in 547/546, famously consulted Delphi and other Greek oracles. Herodotus records the famous sequence by which Delphi established its reliability with Croesus and foretold his downfall (1. 47. 3, 53. 3, 55. 2, 85. 2, 91. 1–3). Xenophon has two further oracles (*Cyr.* 7. 2. 17–20), but these are more obscure. Cic.'s quotation of an oracle (*Div.* 2. 115) in a different form from Herodotus' may well suggest no specific use of Herodotus (cf. Fleck 1993: 46–7).

**Athenians** Many consultations are recorded in both literary and epigraphic sources, (e.g. Hdt. 5. 89. 2, 7. 140. 2–3, 141. 3–4; Paus. 1. 32. 5; Polyæn. 6. 53; *IG*<sup>3</sup> 78 and 137), but probably Cic. has in mind those given during the Persian Wars. See e.g. Giuliani 2001; Bowden 2005.

**Spartans** See on 1. 95. Herodotus' examples include that given to Lycurgus (1. 65. 3), another on the intended conquest of Arcadia (1. 66. 2), the location of the bones of Orestes (1. 67. 4), the legitimacy of Ariston (6. 66. 3; cf. 5. 63. 1, 7. 220. 4, 8. 114. 1). Further, cf. Paus. 7. 1. 8; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 193.



**Tegeans** Quintus may refer to the oracles given the Spartans which mention Apollo's gift of victory over the Tegeans (Hdt. 1. 66. 2, 67. 4), but consultations by the Tegeans are attested (Ps.-Alcid. *Od.* 4; Paus. 8. 53. 3).

**Argives** Herodotus (6. 19. 1–2, 77. 2, 7. 148. 3) records consultations during the Ionian revolt and the Persian Wars. Others are attested (Conon *FGrH* 26 F 1 xix; Plut. *Mor.* 340c, 396c; Hesychius *FGrH* 390 F 1 iii).

**Corinthians** The most famous series of Corinthian consultations concerns the tyranny of Cypselus (Hdt. 5. 92β. 2–3, 92δ. 2), but others are also attested (e.g. Paus. 2. 2. 7, 2. 3. 7; Plut. *Mor.* 773b).

**Chrysippus has collected innumerable oracles** For Chrysippus and his book *On Oracles*, see on 1. 6.

**I pass over these, as they are well known to you** This summary probably comes secondhand via Posidonius (cf. Jaeger 1910: 34 n. 4). Even though the low profile of oracles in Quintus' case is understandable, the exclusion of examples which had passed Chrysippus' test is not helpful to it.

**Delphi would never have been so frequented** Delphi was the most honoured of Greek oracles, as was seen in its treasuries and votive offerings (cf. Strabo 419; Just. *Epit.* 24. 6. 10). The most detailed ancient description is given by Pausanias (10. 8. 1–10), while the epigraphic record demonstrates the general truth of the description.

**38. "For a long time now that is not the case"** To be attributed to Quintus' imaginary objector (Wagenvoort 1952: 148). A general decline in oracles is remarked upon by Strabo (327, 813) and Marcus comments that Delphi had ceased to issue 'classic' verse prophecies long before his own time (2. 117). Livy may have made similar comments (cf. Oros. 6. 15. 11–12) and, despite a revival in Delphi's prestige under Trajan and Hadrian, so did Plutarch in his treatise *De Defectu Oraculorum* (*Mor.* 411d–f). A gradual and uneven decline in

all oracular activity set in with the emergence of the Hellenistic kingships (Parker 1985: 320–4).

**a lesser reputation because the truthfulness of its oracles is less striking** Consultation of Delphi continued, but on a much reduced scale, so that one Pythia sufficed (Plut. *Mor.* 414b). What Quintus stresses, however, is that the clearly divine, remarkable instances of prophecy seem to have disappeared. He ignores the notorious consultation by Appius Claudius in 48 and the prophecy of his death (e.g. Val. Max. 1. 8. 10), which would have strengthened his case, but that was exceptional.

It has been suggested that Cic.'s attitude towards Delphi was moulded by the response he himself received in the early 70s, when his eagerness to pursue a political career was not encouraged (Plut. *Cic.* 5. 1–2), but (i) the story of the consultation is suspect, (ii) the advice was not such as to deter Cic. (R. Flacelière, in *Études Delphiques* (Athens, 1977), 159–60), and (iii) Cic.'s description of a diminished Delphi is one admitted by believers and supporters of Delphi, such as Plutarch. For Quintus' argument, however, which relies in essence on the *consensus omnium*, all he requires is that Delphi was at one time generally believed to be exceptionally accurate in its predictions.

**It may be that the terrestrial force . . . has vanished over time** It is odd, and a probable indication of Cic.'s overall bias, that Quintus, who does not attempt to explain successful divination, is here represented as presenting a possible explanation for the disappearance of divination. His explanation is one which combines the popular understanding of the Pythia's prophecies as induced by vapours rising into the subterranean chamber in which she was believed to give her prophecies (e.g. Arist. *Mund.* 395<sup>b</sup>26–9; Diod. 16. 26. 2–4; Strabo 419; Pliny, *HN* 2. 208) with Stoic notions of terrestrial exhalations imperceptible to the senses (cf. 2. 44; Plut. *Mor.* 432d). The same explanation appears in Plutarch (*Mor.* 402b, cf. 437c), alongside others: e.g. (i) because of human wickedness the gods have withdrawn oracles (*Mor.* 413a, cf. Schol. Luc. 5. 133), (ii) a decline in population around oracular sites leading to the gods' withholding their favours (*Mor.* 414b–c), (iii) later Pythias went to the wrong location to receive inspiration (*Mor.* 402b), and (iv) the

cavern was not used after 278 (Schol. Luc. 5. 133). With regard to the last explanation, Pythia's consultations took place in the *adyton* at the west end of the temple. Emphasis has been placed on the absence of evidence for the kind of physical explanation preferred by the Stoics, e.g. no firsthand source describes gases or visible vapours, and the chasm appears first in Diodorus and the geological realities of limestone and schist were considered inconsistent with the production of vapours (see Parke and Wormell 1956: 9–20; Fontenrose 1978: 197–203). However, samples of water from the nearby Kerna spring and of the travertine reveal traces of methane, ethane, and ethylene (J. J. de Boer, J. R. Hale, and J. Chanton, *Geology* 29 (2001), 707–10; J. J. de Boer and J. R. Hale, 'The Geological Origins of the Oracle at Delphi, Greece', in B. McGuire *et al.*, *The Archaeology of Geological Catastrophes* (London, 2000), 399–412). In low quantities these gases excite the central nervous system and can produce the euphoria, thrashing of limbs and behaviour consistent with some ancient descriptions of Pythia. Iamblichus (*Myst.* 4. 1) argued that vapours caused only the physical effects, while Pythia's inspiration came from her possession by Apollo. Even in the 6th and 5th cents., if Herodotus' descriptions of the mantic sessions at Delphi are credible, there were no raving Pythias (cf. T. Compton, *RhM* 137 (1994), 217–23).

**certain rivers have disappeared . . . or have . . . turned aside to another course** These phenomena are well attested (e.g. in general Arist. *Meteor.* 351<sup>b</sup>2; Maeander, Strabo 580; Scamander, Plin. *HN* 5. 124) and were described from the Archaic period. The appearance of the comparison in Plutarch (*Mor.* 433f–434a) suggests an origin in a Greek philosophical source.

**Explain its occurrence as you wish . . . over many centuries the oracle was truthful** This conclusion brings together two of the four principles from the *divisio* explicitly, i.e. causes are unimportant and the argument *e vetustate*, and implicitly that *e consensu omnium*. The case here further relies on the accuracy of Greek historiography, which Quintus is prepared to defend (cf. 1. 37).

**39–65** Quintus' discussion of dreams is the most detailed of all the arguments in book 1 because dreams offered both the

strongest (or easiest) case for divination and that most appropriate to Quintus' known philosophical allegiances (cf. introd., § 3), as it was taken from natural divination. While the general perception of Quintus' argument is that it is disorganized (see introd., § 3), his treatment of dreams is least affected: it is not fragmented in the way that the discussion and *exempla* relating to artificial divination are; in chapters 39 to 59 he develops a largely coherent approach through a chosen corpus of dream *exempla* before dealing in chapters 60–4 with a traditional and major objection that 'many dreams are false'.

Quintus' emphasis on natural divination may, on the other hand, make the case for Marcus easier, as the two forms of natural divination played the smallest role in the state religion and enjoyed less recognition than augury and the threefold competence of the *Etrusca disciplina*. This choice, however, does permit the presentation of a selection of Roman poetry, which is in line with Stoic approaches and improves the pleasurable aspect (*delectatio*) of the work.

Quintus will argue that the existence of divination is proved empirically, by countless examples which can be located in precise contexts and which demonstrate that the future can be foretold with such a close correlation between prediction and outcome that excludes chance. His defence of dreams, then, is to be inescapably historical. Indeed, from the outset Quintus emphasizes that the *exempla* by which he will demonstrate the validity of divination by dreams must satisfy strict historical criteria (1. 39) and his comments on the provenance of his *exempla* are designed to underline their credibility. After a fitting introduction to his argument (1. 39), Quintus' case takes at best a detour and at worst suffers some Ciceronian sabotage, as the next three *exempla* are taken not from historians, but from drama and relate to what we might call the prehistorical past (1. 40–3a); and even the dream of Tarquin (1. 44–5), which for the Romans had an indisputable historic context, is presented in the words of a dramatist rather than a historian. A further detour, signalled as such, is the brief discussion of the human ability to prophesy when close to death (1. 47) before the argument returns to historical examples and then the dreams of philosophers (1. 52–3), who as men dedicated to the pursuit of truth should be reliable witnesses. Quintus concludes this part of his defence (1. 58–9) with a climactic category of prophetic dreams,

ones which should be open to no objections by Marcus as to their authenticity, since Quintus and Marcus were themselves the recipients of these dreams—a ‘pleasant and mildly titillating ad hominem tactic’ (Schofield 1986: 58), but actually of far greater significance given the criteria for credibility that Marcus will employ.

However, the effect of the empirical argument is somewhat undercut by the continuation (1. 60–5), which begins with the objection of an anonymous, imaginary interlocutor, ‘but many dreams are false’. Quintus’ response seems to place some stress on the interpretation of the dreams, and to lay blame on the human reception of dreams. As Stoic belief in divine providence cannot accept the possibility of the gods sending false dreams, false dreams have to be the fault of human beings. His second point is essentially that enunciated throughout the dialogue, that outcomes rather than explanations are crucial. Therefore, if some dreams can only, or even most plausibly, be regarded as veridical, the phenomenon of the divinatory dream exists. This, however, is overshadowed by the lengthy explanation, based on Plato, that many dreams are not veridical because the dreamer’s soul is not in a state where it can dream purely. The empirical argument slips away into a theoretical discussion of the nature of the soul and *how* it dreams, presenting three explanations formulated by Posidonius (1. 63–4). Quintus advertised a refined, empirical argument along traditional Stoic lines, one that would demonstrate an unparalleled concern for the historicity of the *exempla*. However, its basic empirical thrust is weakened by needless detours, by poor organization of *exempla*, and by the overshadowing of its climactic point by a progression to a theoretical discussion that is unnecessary for the empirical argument (as even Cratippus suggests in the conclusion to the discussion on natural divination).

**39. Let’s leave oracles and let’s come on to dreams** A simple transition between the two kinds of natural divination to be discussed.

**Chrysippus ... Antipater** See on 1. 6.

**searching out those dreams which ... demonstrate the intelligence of the interpreter** No direct quotation from Antiphon’s work

survives and Cic.'s comments (cf. 1. 116, 2. 144) provide the only information on its content and argument. Antiphon introduced into oneirocrisis a more sophisticated form of rationalistic analysis of the comparison between sign and signifier and relativistic criteria for examination of the dream images and the dreamer. Quintus clearly distinguishes the dreams Antiphon collected from examples of true natural divination, which require no interpretation, and rightly sees them as a form of artificial divination or even as a sophistic technique, cf. the view attributed to Antiphon the tragedian, that divination is 'guesswork by a thoughtful man' (*anthropou phronimou eikasmos*, Gnom. Vindob. 50. p. 14 W). See Del Corno 1969: 129–31.

**Antiphon** From the confusing testimonia, and differences in language and style, it is debatable whether Antiphon the sophist and writer on dreams should be identified with the logographer (Antiphon of Rhamnus), see Pendrick 2002: 1–26 (but for the counter-case, see M. Gagarin, *GRBS* 31 (1990), 27–44, and J. Wiesner, *WS* 107/8 (1994/5), 225–43). The *Suda* (s.v. 'Ἀντιφῶν Ἀθηναῖος δνειροκρίτης (1. 245 Adler)) gives the title as *On the Interpretation of Dreams* (*Peri kriseos oneiron*). It is referred to by Artemidorus (1. 14) and Seneca (*Contr.* 2. 1. 33).

**he ought to have used more weighty examples** Antiphon must have collected ordinary dreams rather than famous examples from history or literature, not relating them to individuals or historical events, perhaps anticipating the kind of material found in Artemidorus. Marcus criticizes Chrysippus also for this (cf. 2. 144), which suggests a different treatment from that which he gave oracles, for which he sets out the source and evidence (2. 56). However, when Quintus refers to 'Stoics' in connection with the famous dreams of Simonides and the two Arcadians (1. 56), he means Chrysippus and Antipater and shows that some context was given. 'Weightier' suggests primarily credible sources, and in what follows Quintus specifies his sources clearly and sometimes explicitly comments on their reliability (e.g. 1. 46, 48, 49).

**Philistus, a learned and careful man, a contemporary of the times** Philistus assisted Dionysius in his rise to power (Diod. 13. 91. 4),

served as garrison-commander in the northern expeditions (Plut. *Dion* 11. 4) and was clearly a friend of the tyrant (Cic. *Q Fr.* 2. 12, *De or.* 2. 57). However, in 386 he was exiled and returned to Syracuse only after Dionysius' death (Plut. *Dion* 11. 4; Paus. 1. 13. 9) to preserve the tyranny and then served Dionysius II until his death in 356. Philistus wrote a history of Sicily in six books and then four books on Dionysius (Diod. 13. 103. 3), concentrating on his rise to power and anti-Carthaginian activities down to 396. See L. J. Sanders, *Kokalos* 32 (1986), 5–17. Given the vicissitudes of his life under Dionysius, his attitude towards the tyrant is complex (cf. Sanders 1987: 43–71; M. Sordi in H. Verdin (ed.), *Purposes of History: Studies in Greek Historiography from the 4th to the 2nd Centuries B.C.* (Louvain, 1990), 159–71; eadem, *La dynasteia in occidente* (Padua, 1992), and G. Vanotti, *Hesperia*, 4 (1994), 75–82).

Quintus signals that he is taking his own medicine and begins the defence of dreams by using a historian who met the contemporary criteria for reliability (cf. Cic. *Brut.* 41–4) and with whose work Cic. had been familiar since the mid-50s. By using Philistus Quintus in effect echoes Cic.'s praise of his *On Dionysius* from a decade earlier (*Q Fr.* 2. 12. 4). Moreover, Philistus' testimony is not rejected by Marcus in book 2, which tends to confirm the positive verdict (cf. Fleck 1993: 65–6). However, others were less sanguine, cf. 'the character that he displays is that of a fawning tyrant-lover, mean and petty' (Dion Hal. *Pomp.* 5), a judgement softened by the acknowledgement that he displays some intelligence and according to Pausanias (1. 13. 9; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 855c) concealed the worst of Dionysius' crimes in order to win a recall from exile; perhaps he deliberately modelled his Dionysius on the perfect prince in Xenophon's *Hiero* (M. Sordi, *Athenaeum* 58 (1980), 12–13).

**Dionysius who was the tyrant of Syracuse** Dionysius, son of Hermocritus, was tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to his death in 367. He seems to have been of good birth, but not part of the old aristocracy (Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 58; cf. Isoc. *Phil.* 65). The name of Dionysius' mother is unknown, but the date of this example must be c.430. On Dionysius, see K. F. Stroheker, *Dionysius* (Wiesbaden, 1958), and Caven 1990.

**dreamt that she had given birth to a small satyr** The dreams of mothers pregnant with future memorable individuals abound in

classical and Christian literature (see F. Lanzoni, *Analecta Bollandiana* 45 (1927), esp. 243 ff.). The nature of the dream prefigures the character of the child.

**Galeotae** The Galeotae were an hereditary clan of seers, in legend from Telmessus, but associated with Hybla Geleatis (Steph. Byz. s.v. Ὑβλαι; Paus. 5. 23. 6–7), a town near Catania on the slopes of Etna in an area under indigenous Sicilian control. They remained loyal to Syracuse during the Athenian invasion and to Dionysius during the rebellion of 404/403. Dionysius thereafter used them to provide a divine sanction for his exercise of power, especially over the indigenous Sicilians. His political manipulation can be seen in this example and in the legend that their eponymous founder Galeotes, son of Apollo, king of the Hyperboreans, was sent to Sicily by Zeus after consulting his oracle at Dodona. This story was concocted c.388 to 385 to justify Dionysius' invasion of Epirus in order to restore Alcetes to the Molossian throne, and his alliance with the Gauls in Italy who were known by 4th-cent. Greeks as Hyperboreans (Heracl. Pont. fr. 102 Wehrli). See P. Catturini, *RIL* 121 (1987), 15–23.

The name Galeotae has suggested divination by the observation of gecko-lizards or by understanding their language, but the earliest reference to them in Archippus' *Fishes* is a joking allusion to them as dogfish (*galeoi*), a form seen also in Phanodemus (*FGrH* 325 F 20) and Rhinthon (fr. 17 K). See Parke 1967: 178–9.

**most famous in Greece enjoying long-lasting good fortune** As satyrs were pre-eminently liminal figures (e.g. F. Lissarrague, 'On the Wildness of Satyrs', in T. H. Carpenter and C. A. Faraone (eds.), *Masks of Dionysus* (Ithaca, NY, 1993), 207–20) associated with the god whose nature was the most fluid of all Greek divinities (e.g. A. Henrichs, 'Changing Dionysiac Identities', in B. F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders (eds.), *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition*, iii (Philadelphia, 1982), 137–60), the interpretation of the little satyr is not straightforward. Satyrs in art are frequently represented as creatures of sexual excess (see F. Lissarrague, 'The Sexual Life of Satyrs', in D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler, and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.), *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Greek World* (Princeton, 1990), 53–81), so in Timaeus' hostile version it probably prefigured



a tyrannical *libido*, as was the case in Hermippus' characterization of Pericles (cf. R. Vattuone, *Ricerche su Timeo: La pueritia di Agatocle* (Florence, 1983), 32–6). In Artemidorus (2. 37), the satyr portends disturbance, danger, and scandal. However, as Dionysius was a ruler who consciously demonstrated his devotion to Dionysus, we can expect that there was a positive interpretation of the dream of the figure of the god's most famous companion. In Philistus, the dream may have featured prominently at the beginning of the first book, portending Dionysius' great reign (Sanders 1987: 47–8), contributing a psychological explanation of Dionysius' character, ambitions, and name with its link to the god Dionysus, and demonstrating divine support for Dionysius' reign (cf. S. Lewis, 'The Tyrant's Myth', in C. Smith and J. Serrati (eds.), *Sicily from Aeneas to Augustus* (Edinburgh, 2000), 101–3).

Fortune seems to have featured prominently in Philistus' version of Dionysius' career (L. J. Sanders, *Kokalos* 36–7 (1990–1), 129), although not necessarily to decry the tyrant's own talents. While 'long-lasting good fortune' may refer primarily to Dionysius' long reign and natural death, the notion of military success, the foundation of Dionysius' position, is also relevant.

**40. legends related by our poets and those of the Greeks?** From a modern point of view Quintus' move to ancient drama as a source of credible examples is surprising, but for Cic. Ennius' *Annales*, in particular, are a source of great authority (cf. W. J. O'Neal, *CB* 64 (1988), 35–9). In Quintus' presentation, 'legends' (*fabulae*) form a specific category of material, taken from dramatic or epic poetry concerning episodes from the 'prehistoric' period (see on 1. 43).

Nonetheless, the story of the impregnation of a mortal woman by a god was of the kind that many found improbable, hence the generation of versions in which mortal men were responsible (e.g. Dion. Hal. 1. 77. 1; [Aur. Vict.] *Orig. gent. Rom.* 19. 5), or viewed with outright scepticism, as by Varro (August. *De civ. D.* 3. 4 = *Ant. Div.* fr. 20 C) and Cic. himself (*Rep.* 2. 4; cf. *ND* 2. 70) or veiled disbelief (Liv. 1. 4. 1–2). It is not a good example for Quintus to employ.

**in Ennius the Vestal recounts** This constitutes the first extended fragment of the *Annales* extant (1. 34–50 Sk). To serve Quintus'

purpose the dream must *foretell* what will happen to Ilia, i.e. her rape by Mars and her subsequent sufferings, but because of the lack of context it is not clear how Ennius handles the story. Skutsch (1985: 194) rightly dismisses the possibility that Ennius told the story after the dream as anticlimactic (cf. Jocelyn 1989–90: 42–3) or ‘explained the facts that lay behind the dream’, and Goldberg’s suggestion (1995: 101) that Ilia recounts what has happened to her ‘*as if it were a dream*’ is unconvincing. It seems probable that Ilia was raped while she slept and that she is pregnant as she reports her dream to her sister, a reconstruction which is supported by Cic.’s inclusion of this as the second of three examples of veridical dreams of pregnant women (cf. Krevans 1993: 265–6). Ennius achieves a Hellenistic remodelling of the Homeric tale of Tyro’s rape by Poseidon (*Od.* 11. 235–59), transforming a concealing sleep into a revelatory dream and narrating the episode from the woman’s perspective (C. Connors, *MD* 32 (1994), 102–8). Her dream, although not suppressing the sexual aspect, does not elaborate on it; in Artemidorus’ terminology it was an *oneiros theorematikos* (a dream which is to be interpreted as seen), a type that figures rarely in epic and drama because of limited dramatic potential compared with symbolic dreams (Jocelyn 1989–90: 41–5).

**the old woman** She is probably Ilia’s nurse and servant, although she is described as a Vestal by Quintus, and is to be distinguished from the character addressed as daughter of Eurydice (Skutsch 1985: 196).

**Daughter of Eurydice, whom our father loved** Eurydice was Aeneas’ first wife (Paus. 10. 26. 1). The use of *germana soror* and *soror* of the sister, whose name is usually given as Creusa (e.g. Dion. Hal. 3. 31. 4), suggests that Ilia was also Eurydice’s daughter (Jocelyn 1989–90: 22), although Timpanaro prefers that she is the offspring from another marriage (Serv. *Aen.* 6. 777), possibly to a daughter of the king of Alba Longa. For the motif of conversation with a confidante after a terrifying dream, see W.-H. Friedrich, *Philologus* 97 (1948), 288–91.

**a handsome man appeared to me and snatched me away** Ilia’s abduction by Mars, whose beauty (cf. Dion. Hal. 1. 77. 2) is

a typical divine attribute seen in many accounts of dreams and visions (e.g. Hdt. 7. 12. 1; Plut. *Sull.* 17. 2; Plin. *Ep.* 2. 27. 2; Tac. *Hist.* 4. 83; see Oakley 1998: 432–3), but may also carry a nuance of sexual attraction (Krevans 1993: 261). ‘Snatched away’ (*raptare*) may describe a violent rape, but the following lines recreate the nightmare aspect of dreams common in tragedy and through the depiction of Ilia’s distress may allude to her rape (Krevans 1993: 265). Ennius’ mention of river banks and willows sets the rape outside the house and is not incompatible with the traditional setting of the grove of Mars (e.g. *Orig. gent. Rom.* 20. 1; Dion. Hal. 1. 77. 1).

**41. my father seemed to address me** Ilia now hears the voice of the dead Aeneas. Jocelyn argues (1989–90: 45–6) that the scene envisages Aeneas as a Faunus or Aius Locutius, i.e. a voice with no attending visual manifestation, but ‘disappeared’ (*recessit*) suggests otherwise.

**you must first endure miseries, then your fortune will rise from the river** The fate of Ilia is reported variously (Dion. Hal. 1. 79. 1–2): death, imprisonment (cf. Plut. *Rom.* 3. 4) or, as Ennius goes on to describe, drowning in the Tiber or Anio at Antemnae (Porph. *ad Hor. Odes* 1. 2. 18; cf. Serv. *Aen.* 1. 273). The natural referent of ‘fortune’ (cf. Enn. *Ann.* 1. 56 Sk) is the survival of Romulus and Remus who were cast adrift on the Tiber.

**the blue expanses of heaven** The original augural significance of *templum* has yielded to the notion of ‘vault’ (cf. S. Timpanaro, *SCO* 46 (1996), esp. 31–9).

**42. Although these words are the creations of a poet, nonetheless they are not alien to the regular experience of dreams** Although Jocelyn (1989–90: 39) takes Quintus’ words to suggest that Ennius’ version of the dream had no literary predecessor, the comment is addressed rather to the question of historicity and genre and is essentially defensive: the example derives from a poet, by nature less reliable than a historian (cf. *Leg.* 1. 5).

Nonetheless, it has been presented plausibly, in that the type of experiences narrated by Ilia in her dream are commonplace (lost and alone: Hippocr. *Reg.* 4. 93; Cic. *Div.* 1. 59; Apul. *Met.* 4. 27; hearing

the voice of a parent: Artem. 2. 69), and so may draw implicit support from the argument *e consensu omnium*. The subtlety of Ennius' creation and his success in evoking the confused experience of the dreamer are clear (cf. Skutsch 1985: 194; Goldberg 1995: 96–101).

**The following too, I admit, is fiction** 'Fiction' (*commenticius*) is used often by Cic. of things his speakers consider fanciful or imaginary (e.g. *ND* 1. 18, 28, 2. 70; *Off.* 3. 39). This admission of the non-historical status of material from tragedy and drama is made more clearly by Quintus at 1. 68: 'from you yourself I have heard an example...not one made up but one which happened'. Despite Quintus' open admission, Marcus will still fix on it as a weakness of his argument (2. 27, 113).

**Hecuba dreamt...that she gave birth to a flaming torch** A quotation from the prologue to Ennius' tragedy *Alexander* which was based loosely on that of Euripides (see Jocelyn 1967: 204). The speaker is more likely to be Venus than Cassandra or Hecuba (Timpanaro 1996: 9–10). Hecuba's dream appears in many authors from the 5th cent. onwards (Pind. *Paean.* 8. 28–33; Eur. *Tro.* 920–2; Schol. Eur. *Andr.* 293; Schol. A Hom. *Il.* 3. 325; Hygin. *Fab.* 91; Apoll. *Bibl.* 3. 12. 5. 2; Dict. Cret. 3. 26). Ennius appears to translate verbatim Euripides' version of the dream (cf. *Tro.* 922), in which the torch is a symbol of the ultimate burning of Troy.

**King Priam himself...demanded an interpretation** The religious role of sacrificing, which some of the Greek versions attribute to Hecuba (e.g. Schol. Eur. *Andr.* 293), Ennius gives to Priam, perhaps to suit the Roman context. Priam treats the dream as a portent which requires expiation (*procuratio*), responding as a Roman would and using Roman religious terms: 'peace', which may reflect the Roman notion of *pax deorum* as well as Priam's subjective feelings (for Roman prayers with the formula 'grant peace', cf. Plaut. *Merc.* 678–80; Cic. *Rab. Perd.* 5; Livy 39. 10. 5, 42. 2. 3), 'interpretation', and 'conjecture' (see on 1. 24). See Jocelyn 1967: 221–2.

**begged Apollo to explain to him the fate portended by such an extraordinary dream** Priam appears to consult Apollo directly, rather than through an intermediary, probably from the temple in Troy rather than from an oracle in Asia Minor (Timpanaro 1996: 15–16). Insufficient context survives to confirm the suggestion that the term *sortes* (here translated as ‘fate’) may be a poetic description of consulting an oracle by the casting of lots (Jocelyn 1967: 222–3, 225).

**not to raise the son** Ennius’ *tollere*, which has frequently been interpreted as deriving from a Roman ritual in which the father picked up from the hearth the child he had decided to raise (e.g. Jocelyn 1967: 226–7), means no more than ‘bring up’ (B. D. Shaw, *Mnem.* 54 (2001), esp. 38–9).

**43. unhistorical dreams** ‘Unhistorical’ (*fabularum*) has a double meaning, first, ‘as found in drama or epic’ and secondly ‘imaginary, purely invented’. The former is probably the more important here, as Quintus points to a generic contrast, between *fabulae* and *annales*, i.e. between the kinds of dream regularly found in epic or drama and historical works. Cf. *Leg.* 1. 5: ‘there is one set of rules to be obeyed in history, another in poetry’.

**the dream of Aeneas** After Aeneas’ landing in Italy, the escape of his intended sacrificial victim and its dropping of a litter of thirty piglets led him to believe that the oracle he had received on the site of his future city had been fulfilled, but Fabius records that ‘as he slept he saw a vision which strictly forbade him to do so and advised him to found the city after thirty years, corresponding to the number of the piglets which had been born, and so he gave up his plan’ (Diod. 7. 5. 4–5 = Fabius Pictor fr. 5 Ch; cf. Dion. Hal. 1. 56. 5: ‘a great and wonderful vision in a dream in the likeness of one of his country’s gods’).

**the Greek histories of Fabius Pictor** Q. Fabius Pictor, son of Gaius (*SEG* xxvi. 1123). His traditional identification with the senator who had fought against the Gauls and Ligustini in the 230s and 220s (Polyb. 3. 9. 4; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 4) and was sent as ambassador to Delphi in 216 after the defeat at Cannae (Livy 22. 57. 5) can be

maintained. He was the first Roman writer of literary history (Dion. Hal. 7. 71. 1; Livy 2. 40. 1), but wrote in Greek at the end of the 3rd cent. or beginning of the 2nd cent., because the Roman historical tradition was unsatisfactory by comparison with what Greeks such as Timaeus were producing and perhaps also in order to present the Roman side of events to the Greeks against pro-Carthaginian authors like Philinus and Silenus. See Badian 1966: 2–6; Momigliano 1990: 88–92, 97–108; Dillery 2002: 1–23.

‘Histories’ (*annales*) is the general term for a work of literary history relating to Rome rather than a translation of the title of his Greek work. Here Cic. specifies *Greek* histories to distinguish them from the Latin tr. of Quintus’ work by one Numerius Fabius Pictor (Cic. *Brut.* 81; see E. Badian, *LCM* 1 (1976), 97–8). It is not clear that Fabius himself went on to produce a Latin version of his Greek annals (cf. F. Branchini, *Athenaeum* 39 (1961), 358–61). For the MSS reading *in numerum* the best correction is *nimirum in* (Dederich), as genre rather than chauvinism (implied by *nostri*) is central to Quintus’ argument here.

**which is certainly of the same kind** Cf. Diodorus’ use of *muthos* (7. 5. 4): ‘tells a story’ (*memuthologeke*). Cic. attributes no great weight to Fabius as a source for Roman history, never citing him as the ‘father of Roman history’. His appearance here, the explicit connection with the tendencies of poets and the pointed exclusion of the dream of Aeneas ‘from the dreams you took from histories’ (*Div.* 2. 136), underlines this negative verdict (see Fleck 1993: 98–102). That Fabius has to be cited as source for this story suggests that it was not well known to Cic.’s readers before the influence of the Iulii remoulded the traditions of Rome’s legendary past (Erskine 2001: 31), although Aeneas did feature even in Cato’s *Origines* (Serv. *Aen.* 1. 6).

**Let’s look at examples closer to our time . . . dream . . . of Tarquinius Superbus** Quintus draws a secondary distinction between the mythical and historical periods and the inherent credibility of their traditions, but leaves it open, by his question, what status he accords to events from the regal period. Quintus presents an episode with an indisputable and important historical context in Roman eyes, the

moment of transfer from regal to Republican government, although the version he gives is that of another poet. Marcus's failure to respond to this or to any of the poetic examples reveals his implicit view that they are unhistorical.

**Accius' *Brutus*** L. Accius was one of the most pre-eminent Roman dramatists, highly praised by Cic. (e.g. *Planc.* 59; *Sest.* 120), but rated below Pacuvius (see on 1. 24). His *Brutus* was a *fabula praetexta*, a serious play on a subject from Roman history (see H. I. Flower, *CQ* 45 (1995), 170–90), probably written and first produced for his patron D. Junius Brutus Callaecus, to celebrate either his triumph or the dedication of the temple of Mars built from his war booty (cf. Manuwald 2001: 222–4). M. Junius Brutus, the conspirator against Caesar, was urban praetor of 44 and sponsored a new production of an Accius play during the *Ludi Apollinares* in July 44. It seems that he expected to stage *Brutus* (Cic. *Att.* 16. 5. 1), but in fact only *Tereus* was presented (Cic. *Att.* 16. 2. 3), presumably because *Brutus* was considered too provocative in the aftermath of Caesar's assassination. These events postdate the writing, revision, and publication of *De Divinatione* (see introd., § 6), even if Cic. knew of the intention to stage *Brutus* in early June (cf. J. Boes, *RÉL* 59 (1981), 164–76) or, less likely, even before the assassination (cf. Guittard 1985: 47). It is highly unlikely, therefore, that this dream was deliberately inserted by Cic. to blacken Caesar as a tyrant. Nonetheless, Tarquin's dream sits oddly in the middle of a series of 'pregnancy dreams', but, even if it is considered a later insertion, the example of Phalaris in 1. 46 could not follow directly after 1. 43. The juxtaposition of two dreams dealing with evil tyrants in its way also has a point.

**44. I saw in a dream...** Accius combines Greek, Etruscan, and Roman elements, some possibly derived from near-eastern ruler symbolism of the sun and the ram (Fauth 1976: esp. 478–503). Dreams are a frequent feature in Greek literature from Homer onwards, but Accius owes specific debts to Euripides in the development of the two main themes of the dream, the death of the victim and the reversal of the sun's course, which are taken from the Atreus legend. The celestial portent probably appeared first in Accius'

*Atreus*, but in his *Brutus* the poet employed the familiar incident with its associations of tyranny and an end to usurped rule, transferring the motifs to a dream. We probably have a poetic appropriation of these motifs for the Tarquin legend from tragedy, rather than a poetic working of 'historical' elements of Roman history, but one which does employ the myth and symbolism of Etruscan-Roman kingship. Accius' play influenced the contemporary writers of Roman history, notably L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, rather than vice versa (cf. Forsythe 1994: 251–2). See Guittard 1985: 47–67 and Manuwald 2001: 226–32.

**a fleecy herd of outstanding beauty... sacrificed the more magnificent of the two** This ram signifies the elder brother of L. Junius Brutus, whom Tarquin killed as a potential threat to his power (Dion. Hal. 4. 68. 2; cf. Livy 1. 56. 7; Val. Max. 7. 2. 1). The symbolism of the sheep for Tarquin emerges from the separate traditions of oneirocrisis and Etruscan religion. In the former the symbolism is positive (cf. Artemidorus 2. 12: 'I have observed that sheep, whether they are white or black, are auspicious... sheep resemble men in that they follow a shepherd and live together in flocks and, because of their name, they are analogous to advancement and progress for the better. Therefore it is most auspicious, especially for men who wish to stand at the head of a crowd... to possess many sheep of their own and also to see and shepherd the flocks of others. Furthermore, a ram represents the master of the house, a magistrate or king'); in the latter, the sheep as a domestic animal was a source of favourable omens. Guittard (1985: 52–5) attempts to develop the Etruscan aspect by reference to a passage of Macrobius (*Sat.* 3. 7. 2: 'it is handed down in a book of the Etruscans that, if this animal [ram] is of an unusual colour, good fortune in all things is portended for the ruler. Moreover, there is the book of Tarquitius, translated from the *Ostentarium Tuscum*. There we find: if a sheep or ram is sprinkled with purple or golden colour, it increases the greatness of the ruler's family and line with the utmost good fortune, produces for him a family and offspring and makes it of greater good fortune'), but nothing in Accius' language indicates that the fleece was golden or purple. Tarquin merely sacrifices the best. Greater point is given to the appearance of a ram by the etymology of the Etruscan root \**tarχ* as ruler or prince (Fauth 1976: 487–9).



**its brother made for me with its horns...severely hurt, on my back** The second ram signifies L. Junius Brutus, the overthrower of Tarquin and first consul of the Roman Republic (see e.g. Cornell 1995: 215–16; Mastrocinque 1988). Accius does not rely on dream lore here, but the simple parallel between the mishap to Tarquin in the dream and his historical fate of exile; he will not be killed, but will live to see the new political order (cf. Diod. 22. 7. 1: 'Phintias the tyrant of Acragas saw a dream which revealed to him the end of his life: as he was hunting a wild boar, the boar rushed at him, struck his side with its tusks, ran him through and killed him').

**the flaming rayed orb of the sun melted away on a new path to the right** Parallels from the Atreus myth (see Schmitz 1993: 201–8) suggest that there was some change in the sun's direction (Eur. *Or.* 1001–6; *El.* 726–31, 739–42; *IT* 192–5, 816; cf. Mastrocinque 1983: 460–1). Whether Euripides describes, in the highly figured language of choral odes, a 180° change in the sun's direction—previously it set in the east and culminated in the north (cf. West 1987: 54)—or a displacement of the celestial pole which resulted in the stars (the zodiac) moving in the opposite direction to the sun (Willink 1986: 253–6), is unclear. However, neither of these may be necessary for an interpretation of Accius' dream, in which greater significance attaches to Etruscan or Roman ideas. The king's orientation, like that of the gods in Etruscan augury, was southwards: i.e. the sun rises on his left and sets on his right. There is no need to hold that Accius is importing Greek orientation and that the portent involves the sun setting in the east. If so, the absence of reversal of the sun's course as a portent recorded in Roman annals becomes irrelevant. Its significance in dreams, that 'every endeavour and hope will meet with opposition and everything on which they have set their hearts will go unfinished' (Artem. 2. 36), while appropriate to Tarquin, is incidental to Accius. Cf. Hippocrates (*Reg.* 4. 89): 'whenever a heavenly body appears to fall away from its orbit, if it is pure and bright and moves towards the east, it indicates health... but whenever a heavenly body seems to be dark and dull and to move towards the west... this indicates disease.'

**45. what interpretation of that dream was given by the diviners** For Guittard (1985: 56) the diviners are Roman not Etruscan

(cf. Dion. Hal. 4. 59. 3), but nothing in the passage suggests this. While it is possible that Accius highlights a conflict between Roman diviners and an Etruscan ruler, it is no less effective if Tarquin has his future revealed by Etruscan *haruspices*, whom his audience would expect to be the interpreters of prodigies. Accius carefully constructs the response so as to pick up the three elements of Lucius Junius Brutus' name, in reverse order, identifying him beyond doubt, but involving an element of suspense (Guittard 1985: 58).

**the things which men do...so important a matter** The diviner begins by carefully distinguishing Tarquin's dream from what Marcus calls 'natural' dreams (*Div.* 2. 128, 139), the obvious reflection of the dreamer's daily concerns. Although this is a commonplace found in literature and medical texts from Herodotus onwards (e.g. Hdt. 7. 16. β2; Ps.-Hippocr. *Insomn.* 88; Arist. *Insomn.* 3; Menand. 780 K; Ter. *Andr.* 971–2; Cic. *Rep.* 6. 10) and in Aristotle's rejection of divinatory dreams (*Insomn.* 461<sup>a</sup>18–23; *Div. somn.* 463<sup>a</sup>21–30; *Probl.* 957<sup>a</sup>21–5), it is crucial for the diviner to set aside the psychological or medical approaches and establish that this dream was sent by the gods.

**the one whom you consider as stupid as a sheep** 'Stupid' recalls the meaning of the *cognomen* 'Brutus', which Brutus acquired for his feigned stupidity (cf. Post. Alb. fr. 4 Ch; Cic. *Brut.* 53; Livy 1. 56. 7–8; Val. Max. 7. 2. 1).

**a man out of the ordinary** Accius indulges in typical word play here, as 'a man out of the ordinary' (*egregium*) is very appropriate for an animal 'from a flock' (*e grege*). The key idea underlying these words is that of Brutus as a man of action: his *nomen* 'Junius' is clearly connected with the root *\*iun*, with its sense of power (Schulze 1933: 470).

**that which was shown you with regard to the sun portends an immediate change in their affairs for the people** The *praenomen* Lucius is connected with *lux* (light), specifically with the rising sun (Festus 106 L)—hence the last element of Brutus' identity is revealed. In 'for the people' (*populo*) and 'affairs' (*rerum*) Accius introduces an

immediate allusion to the *res publica*, the name of the new political order (as also three lines later).

**a good omen for the people... the most favourable augury that the Roman commonwealth will be supreme** Accius uses archaic and precise religious language: *verrunco* (cf. Acc. 688 D; Livy 29. 27. 2) and 'augury' (*augurium*) of the status of the new order: it will enjoy the permanent support of the gods (cf. Linderski 1986: 338 = 1995: 493). For the king facing south his left (the east) was the favourable direction for bird and lightning signs; here, by extension, the sun is assimilated to these. *Res publica* (commonwealth) is used emphatically as a description of the new order.

**46. Now let us return to foreign examples** Quintus signals the end of his digression and returns to his plan of citing powerful examples (1. 39) and to the same material, i.e. pregnancy dreams.

**Heraclides Ponticus... a pupil and follower of Plato** Heraclides, from Heraclea Pontica, joined Plato's Academy in the 360s and narrowly failed to secure its headship in 339. In Cic. he is always cited as an adherent of Plato (cf. *Leg.* 3. 14; *ND* 1. 34; *Tusc.* 5. 8). Quintus emphasizes that Heraclides is 'a learned man' (*doctus vir*) in order to meet the criteria he has set for his examples (1. 39). As a follower of Plato, Heraclides accepted the reality of prophetic dreams as an example of natural divination (cf. Tert. *An.* 46. 6, 57. 10). Wehrli allocates this dream to *On Oracles* (fr. 132), O. Voss (*De Heraclidis Pontici vita et scriptis* (Diss. Rostock, 1896), 87) suggests his *Foreseeing* (*Prooptikon*; Diog. Laert. 5. 88), while Gottschalk tentatively considers *On the Soul*. See H. B. Gottschalk, *Heraclides of Pontus* (Oxford, 1980).

**the mother of Phalaris** Phalaris' birthplace, and thus the probable location for the dream may have been Astypalaea on Crete, although the sources for this are both late and dubious (Ps.-Phal. *Ep.* 4, p. 408 Hercher; Tzetz. *Chil.* 1. 643). If Phalaris held a magistracy before his tyranny (Arist. *Pol.* 1310<sup>b</sup>28) the chronological context of the dream is c.600. Philistus was tyrant of Acragas from c.570 to 554. See O. Murray, 'Falaride tra mito e storia', in L. Braccesi and E. de Miro

(eds.), *Agrigento e la Sicilia greca* (Rome, 1992), 47–60, and V. Hinz, *Nunc Phalaris doctum protulit ecce caput: Antike Phalaris Legende und Nachleben der Phalarisbriefe* (Munich, 2001), esp. 19–126.

**she saw in her dreams the statues of the gods which she herself had dedicated in the house** The full significance of the dream is difficult to uncover as we lack a detailed account of Phalaris' reign and downfall. Clearly the dream portends evil and disaster, and in its context the interpretation will have been striking. The emphasis on the mother's own responsibility and the location within the house may point to a catastrophe affecting the house and herself. For there is a story that Phalaris' mother and his friends were roasted in the infamous bull by the Agrigentans (Heracl. Lem. 69 Dilts). Alternatively the house may represent Acragas and Phalaris' reign of terror.

**Mercury seemed to pour blood from the bowl** The archetypal god of craftiness symbolizes Phalaris, whose deviousness was renowned (Polyaen. 5. 1. 1–4). Might the dream allude to the means by which Phalaris seized power—misusing his office as tax-collector, turning state servants against the male citizens at the Thesmophoria and ruling over the survivors (Polyaen. 5. 1. 1)? *Per se* the presence of a *patera* in the god's hand (see *LIMC* s.v. Hermes nos. 801–8) is banal, merely indicating divinity (P. Veyne, *Metis* 5 (1990), 19, 27–8), but the flow of blood from an implement which normally received milk or wine portends death (cf. 1. 98).

**The cruelty of her inhuman son** Cruelty was the distinguishing characteristic of this tyrant from the early 5th cent. (Pind. *Pyth.* 1. 95–6, 185–6) and also in Cic. (cf. *Verr.* 2. 4. 73, 2. 5. 145; *Pis.* 42; *Tusc.* 2. 7, 5. 26, 31; *Fin.* 5. 24, 28) who specially coins the term *Falarismos* (*Att.* 7. 12. 2). Criticism centres on the infamous hollow bronze bull in which his victims were roasted alive, the first allegedly its sculptor Perilaus (Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F 28c; Callimachus fr. 46 Pf.); his killings were indiscriminate (Polyaen. 5. 1. 2). 'Inhuman' may apply particularly to charges of cannibalism, which were levelled from Clearchus (fr. 61 Wehrli) onwards, although a more general meaning relating to the monstrosity of his conduct towards his own citizens is preferable. See G. Schepens, *Anc. Soc.* 9 (1978–9), 139–41.

**Dinon's *Persica*** Dinon of Colophon followed Ctesias in producing an account of Persian history and customs probably in the 340s. The extant fragments (*FGrH* 690) demonstrate that Dinon's work is full of fictions and romance for dramatic effect (cf. R. Drews, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History* (Washington, DC, 1973), 116–18; R. B. Stevenson, 'Lies and Invention in Deinon's *Persica*', in H. Sancisi-Weerdenberg and A. Kuhrt (eds.), *Achaemenid History II* (Leiden, 1987), 27–35; R. B. Stevenson, *Persica* (Edinburgh, 1997)).

Although Dinon would not seem the sort of source to strengthen Quintus' argument, his reputation in Rome in the 1st cent. was probably respectable: Nepos (*Con.* 5. 4) describes him as 'the historian in whom we have the greatest trust on Persian matters'.

**the interpretations which the Magi gave** The etymology of *magus* has been connected with power (J. Pokorny, *Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern, 1959), 695) or 'membership of the priestly tribe' (cf. M. Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism* (Leiden, 1975–82), i. 10–11, ii. 19–20), and became the old Persian term for a priest (*magu*). It is used of one of the six tribes of the Medes (*Hdt.* 1. 101), but principally of the priestly caste within the Zoroastrian religion. In Greek and Latin authors their religious function is central, e.g. as interpreters of dreams (*Hdt.* 1. 107, 108, 120). Although dreams were important in Zoroastrianism, it is not certain how accurately traditions in classical sources reflect the magi's activity in this area. See de Jong 1997: 387–403.

**Cyrus the First** Cyrus the founder of the Achaemenid dynasty, not the Cyrus whom Xenophon accompanied (1. 52). Born c.600, he was son of Cambyses the ruler of Persis under the Medes; by 558 he had succeeded his father. Whether the name Cyrus is Iranian, Elamite, or even Indian, it was explained to Greek sources, Ctesias and then Dinon, that Cyrus was connected with the sun (*Plut. Artax.* 1. 2; cf. *Hesych.* s.v. *Κῦρος*). This dream connects the important Persian religious symbol of the sun with the founder of their great imperialist dynasty. See *CHI* ii. 404–18; M. A. Dandamaev, *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* (Leiden, 1989), 10–13.

he grasped at it with his hands three times to no effect Cf. Achmet *Oneir.* 166: 'if someone approaches the disc of the sun or grabs hold of it, he will receive favour from the king, in proportion to the proximity...if the king [has this dream], he will make subordinate another king'. This favourable interpretation is to be contrasted with the generally negative associations of the sun in Artemidorus (2. 36) and may suggest that Dinon and Achmet were reflecting eastern and not Graeco-Roman views (cf. de Jong 1997: 301).

Although the sun (*hvar*) may represent the Persian concept of *khvarenah*, good fortune, a vaguer connection of the sun-god as the guarantor of Cyrus' kingship in the role of Ahuramazda is preferable (B. Jacobs, *MDOG* 19 (1987), esp. 227). The Achaemenids made use of a god-figure within a radiate sun, which is identifiable either with the chief god in their pantheon or with the *khvarenah* (de Jong 1997: 300).

[considered among the Persians a class of wise and learned men] Rightly excluded as a gloss by Hottinger and Baiter.

his triple grasping of the sun portended that Cyrus would reign for thirty years Probably no rational principle led to the interpretation of each grasping as a decade, rather the seers gave the safest answer to the new king—if they interpreted it as three years, they might soon be disproved whereas after 30 years the interpretation might be forgotten. The reign is given as 30 years by Justin (1. 8. 14) and Photius (*Bibl.* 72), as 29 years by Herodotus (1. 214), and as 31 by Sulpicius Severus (2. 9. 5). Cyrus' death is securely fixed to 530, so his accession to the throne of Persis occurred between 560 and 558.

47. Even among barbarian nations For Cic.'s use of 'barbarian', see on 1. 2 no people. Quintus in one respect goes off on another red-herring with this example of the soul able to prophesy when close to death (a topic he will return to at 1. 63), but the *consensus omnium* is a key part of his overall argument. The previous example of the Persian Cyrus has led him to this further 'barbarian' example. It featured widely in the Alexander historians and lovers of the exotic (e.g.

Diod. 17. 107; Strabo 715–18; Ath. 437a; Lucian *De mort. Peregr.* 25; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 2. 4–3. 6, 7. 18. 6; Ael. *VH* 2. 41; Plut. *Alex.* 65. 3, 69. 3–4).

**Callanus...as he was ascending his blazing pyre** According to Plut. (*Alex.* 65. 3) his real name was Sphines, Callanus being a rendering of the Indian form of greeting (*Kalyana*), but some moderns consider it the Greek version of a real Indian name (e.g. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich, 1926), ii, no. 396). He was a Brahman who met Alexander in spring 326 and then accompanied him on his campaigns. He was a controversial companion and adviser on Indian affairs, who was characterized with varying degrees of hostility. The manner of his death, by immolation, which was believed to be a special custom of the Brahmans (cf. Curt. Ruf. 8. 9. 32; Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 77; see R. Stoneman, *CQ* 44 (1994), 505–6), attracts great attention. The Greek sources differ: the eyewitness Chares (Athen. 437a) and Megasthenes have Callanus throw himself onto the burning pyre, while Arrian (*Anab.* 7. 3. 5) and Onesicrates (Luc. *De mort. Peregr.* 25) have him mount the pyre and lie (or stand) motionless while the pyre is lit until his death. It is not clear which of these versions Cic. follows. See Bosworth 1998: 180–203.

**I shall see you soon** Various versions of this scene survive. Strabo (717) says that all accounts concur on Alexander's presence, but only Cic. (cf. Val. Max. 1. 8 *ext.* 10) offers a face-to-face dialogue. In Arrian (7. 18. 6) Callanus 'refused to approach and greet Alexander, saying that he would meet him in Babylon and greet him there', cf. Plutarch *Alex.* 69. 3: 'he greeted the Macedonians who were present and encouraged them to spend the day on pleasure and drinking with the king, whom, he said, he would see shortly in Babylon'. Alexander, who even dressed like Hercules (e.g. Athen. 537f), was in his penetration of India emulating Hercules. That and the stories of his desire for consecration as a god, which were widespread, make Callanus' comparison appropriate (see Bosworth 1996: 98–119). Cic. takes this ultimately from some Alexander-historian, perhaps via Posidonius. Cic.'s references to Alexander after Caesar's dictatorship are either neutral, such as this, or negative (so J. R. Fears, *Philologus* 98 (1974), 121).

**Alexander died a few days later at Babylon** Callanus' death near the border of Persia and Pasargadae (Diod. 17. 107. 1; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 3. 1; Strabo 717) predated festivities at Susa in April 324 (see Hamilton 1969: 194). Alexander died in Babylon 10 June 323. Callanus' 'soon' acquired significance only after Alexander's death (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 18. 6) and 'a few days' later must cover at least fourteen months.

**I am digressing a little from dreams, to which I shall return soon** Quintus' words look back to the Callanus example as well as covering what follows (Timpanaro). The mention of Alexander's death suggests another barbarian prophecy connected with his birth, while the appearance of *magi* provides a thematic link back to the Cyrus dream. Cic. reuses material from *De Natura Deorum* (2. 69), with the addition of the prophecy by the *magi*. For Schäublin this material belongs properly at 1. 74–6, but the conscious acknowledgement of digression shows that Cic. has deliberately included it here.

**It is an accepted fact...the temple of Ephesian Diana burnt down** Cf. Plut. *Alex.* 3. 3: 'Alexander was born early in the month Hecatombaeon, which the Macedonians call Loos, on the sixth day of the month, on the day that the temple of Ephesian Artemis was burnt.' This equates to 20 or 21 July 356. Plutarch further connects the birth with the capture of Potidaea, Parmenion's victory over the Illyrians, and the victory of his horses at Olympia (*Alex.* 3. 4–5) for a most remarkable, multiple synchronicity. In reality this could only have been approximate, as the capture of Potidaea occurred in the spring, the Olympic Games and the Illyrian victory in the summer (cf. Hamilton 1969: 8–9). Aristobulus' view (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 28. 1) that Alexander was born in Oct. 356 is based on his acceptance of Alexander's official accession date in Oct. 336 instead of the real date in June does not affect this synchronicity, but *Pseudo-Callisthenes, Historia Alexandri Magni*, ed. W. Kroll (Berlin, 1958), 4, dates the conception of Alexander after Philip's return from Potidaea and the detailed astrological information attributed to Nectanebo appears to fix the birth in early Jan. 355, when there was an extraordinary conjunction of planets which fits Nectanebo's horoscope. While it may be possible to privilege the later date (cf. S. Ferrando,



*RIL* 50 (1998), 257–66), we know that the basic synchronism found in Plutarch was accepted by the mid-3rd cent. (Hegesias of Magnesia, *FGrH* 142 F 3) and appeared in Timaeus (Cic. *ND* 2. 69). Despite the latter's penchant for creating synchronicities his version may on this occasion be more plausible. See D. Asheri, *SCI* 11 (1991/2), esp. 82–5.

The arson of the temple of Artemis by one Herostratus in search of notoriety was ominous, even though its predecessor had also burnt down forty years earlier (cf. Arist. *Meteor.* 371<sup>a</sup>30–1; Strabo 641; Jos. *Ap.* 2. 131; Lucian, *De mort. Peregr.* 22; Macrobian *Sat.* 6. 7. 16).

**Magi proclaimed that a pest and plague to Asia had been born** Plutarch's location of the Magi in Ephesus (*Alex.* 3. 3) is dubious (Hamilton 1969: 8). Pease suggests that the Magi based their prediction on astrological observation, but if we accept that the prophecy is *post eventum* and from a Greek source, this is unnecessary (Timpanaro).

**48. Let's get back to dreams** Quintus signals the end of his digression.

**Coelius** L. Coelius Antipater, a contemporary of the Gracchi, was learned in literature, law, and rhetoric, the author of a 7-book monograph on the Second Punic War (Badian 1966: 15–17 and Herrmann 1979). His *History* was serious and well-researched, although he displayed a fondness for portents, the supernatural, and overdramatization. In June 45 Cic. asked Atticus to send the abridgement of his work by Brutus (*Att.* 13. 8), but, as Cic. was already sufficiently familiar with Coelius to comment on his style (*De or.* 2. 54; *Leg.* 1. 6) before he possessed the epitome, it suggests that he had read Coelius' full work and used the abridgement only as a sort of index (cf. Fleck 1993: 142). Here Cic. adapts a passage of Coelius, preserving examples of his archaic vocabulary (cf. La Penna 1975: 49–53).

**the gold pillar...in the shrine of Juno Lacinia** Juno's temple was built by the people of Croton 10 km SE of their city on the Lacinian promontory and functioned as the federal sanctuary

of the Italiot league. The gold pillar, attested also by Livy (24. 3. 6), was one of the many famous, rich offerings accumulated in the sanctuary (e.g. Strabo 261; Livy 24. 4. 3; App. *B Civ.* 5. 133). Because of its isolated position, which made it a tempting target for raiders (e.g. Plut. *Pomp.* 24. 3), the temple was vulnerable to theft. See G. Maddoli, *Crotone, Atti del XXIII Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia* (Taranto, 1984), 312–43, and R. Spadea, *Il tesoro di Hera* (Milan, 1996), 33–79.

Hannibal's dream is recorded nowhere else, but his connection with the shrine is secure and intelligible: the deliberately close association of Hannibal with Hercules (see on 1. 49), who was in one version of the legend at least founder of the temple (Serv. *Aen.* 3. 552), and accomplished the same journey from Spain to the foot of Italy, made it an appropriate setting for an interaction between him and the goddess. Hannibal left a bilingual inscription there in 205 setting out his achievements (Polyb. 3. 56. 4; Livy 28. 46. 12) before his departure from the Italian mainland. Although a dramatic date for Hannibal's dream of 216 after Cannae, when Croton came into Carthaginian hands, is possible, 205–3 is better (cf. Timpanaro), a time when Hannibal was in the area of Croton (e.g. Livy 28. 46. 16, 29. 36. 4, 9) and when it was no longer necessary for him to preserve the goodwill of the local communities. In political terms Hannibal may have wanted revenge on the members of the Italiot league and who were now deserting his side (cf. App. *Hann.* 241–2). If so, in its original setting this dream will have balanced the dream which authorized Hannibal's invasion of Italy (see on 1. 49) and may have exhibited a positive slant towards Hannibal—i.e. Juno, the protecting deity of Carthage, kept her general from an act of sacrilege. Coelius, however, probably played up the notion of a sacrilegious Hannibal (cf. Herrmann 1979: 178). See A. Campus, *PP* 58 (2003), 292–308.

**Juno . . . would see to it that he also lost the eye with which he saw well** Juno appears as the goddess whose shrine was to be violated, and perhaps as the protectress of Carthage, but certainly not as the enemy of Hannibal. Her warning and Hannibal's heeding of it (cf. Mithradates—App. *Mith.* 27) stand in contrast to the kind of story in which the deity avenged itself on the sacrilegious pillager

(Val. Max. 1. 1. 18–20). The idea of seeing, which features in both dreams, is central—in the one Hannibal looks back, disobeys the instruction of his divine guide (1. 49), and is punished by losing one eye; here he obeys the dream and retains his sight (Maass 1907: 25–8). Hannibal had lost the sight of his right eye in 217 in Etruria (Nepos *Hann.* 4. 3; cf. Polyb. 3. 79. 12; Livy 22. 2. 10–11).

**he had a small calf made and set on top of the column** Bulls and cows are connected with Juno (Hera) in myth and ritual (e.g. *RE* viii. 383–4), and specifically at Croton (F. Graf, *Megale Hellas: Nome e immagine, Atti del XXI Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia* (Taranto, 1982), 166–70).

**49. Likewise this is in the Greek history of Silenus...who has reported the actions of Hannibal with very great care** ‘This’ (*hoc*) looks forward, and when combined with ‘likewise’ (*item*) shows that both of the dreams appeared in Silenus and were transmitted to Cic. via Coelius. Silenus of Caleacte accompanied Hannibal on his expedition (Nepos, *Hann.* 13. 3). Silenus had a positive attitude towards Hannibal, but how he presented the dream, in what context he set it, and what interpretation he supplied is difficult to establish. Silenus reveals several characteristics of ‘tragic history’ (K. Meister, *Maia* 23 (1971), 1–9) and a pervasive theme of his existing fragments is the linking of Hannibal with Hercules (cf. D. Briquel, in *Actas del IV Congreso Internacional de estudios fenicios y Púnicos* (Cadiz, 2000), i. 123–9). For modern comprehensive discussions of this dream, see Cipriano 1984: 103–28 and Seibert 1993: 184–91.

**whom Coelius follows** Quintus’ parenthesis validates his use of Coelius as a source: the dream derives ultimately from a contemporary source close to Hannibal and is thus credible. This statement on Coelius’ sources does not entail that Coelius did not adapt and reform Silenus’ version comprehensively.

**Saguntum** In 219 Hannibal besieged this Spanish town, with which Rome claimed alliance and which should have been immune under the terms of a treaty between Rome and Carthage. Even if this attack

did not entail war with Rome, it came to have great significance as an example of Punic treachery. Livy (21. 22. 6) puts the dream in the context of Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro, the border between Carthaginian and Roman spheres of influence in Spain: Hannibal took the dream as confirmation of divine approval of his decision to invade Italy. The lack of geographical precision in Cic. has suggested use of the epitome of Coelius only, but Cic.'s knowledge of the original cannot be excluded. Although Polybius' reference to the dream connects it with the crossing of the Alps, its context in Silenus is not necessarily restricted to that moment, even if Hannibal used it to embolden his troops for the apparently difficult crossing. Cf. D'Arco 2002: 148–55.

**Jupiter ordered him to take the war into Italy** If we accept that the dream was publicized by Hannibal and is not a literary creation of the later historiographical tradition, in its original form the dream could have played a role in Hannibal's propaganda. Against a background of widespread, even general, belief in divinely given dreams, it could have provided a useful counter to Roman arguments based on international law and also have reassured Hannibal's troops before a lengthy march and indisputably difficult campaign (cf. Seibert 1993: 186–7). As with Alexander's dream at Tyre (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 18. 1), a divinely sent dream confirmed the commander's plans.

None of Coelius' Latin predecessors is known to have described this divine council; three lines of Ennius' *Annales* have been invoked (E. Norden, *Ennius und Vergilius* (Leipzig, 1915), 49–52, 116–17), but their context is insecure and Hannibal is the probable speaker (Skutsch 1985: 412–13, 429–30).

**a guide was given him...with his army** Silius Italicus (3. 168–9) identifies the guide as Mercury, perhaps Mercury Aletes, a protecting deity of Carthage (cf. E. Foulon, *RHR* 217 (2000), 669–88, and idem, 'Mercure Alètés apparent en songe à Hannibal', in P. de Fosse (ed.), *Hommages à C. Deroux*, iv (Brussels, 2003), 366–77), but the most likely identification is with Hercules (Seibert 1993: 187): Hannibal presented himself as emulating Hercules (Livy 21. 41. 7), who drove the cattle of Geryon from the western edge of the world, through Spain and Gaul, over the Alps into Italy (cf. R. C. Knapp, *Emerita* 54

(1986), esp. 118–19). If, however, the indeterminate language of Polybius (3. 47. 9: ‘a god or some hero’; 3. 48. 7: ‘they say that some hero appeared’), is significant in his criticism of those authors who believed that Hannibal could not cross the Alps without divine guidance, Silenus’ dream did not name the divinity. But Polybius’ deliberate vagueness is probably sarcastic.

**the guide ordered him not to look back . . . carried away by desire, he looked back** Seibert (1993: 187–8) argues that this prohibition and the continuation of the dream cannot derive either from Hannibal or Silenus, as it presents Hannibal negatively. However, it is not inconceivable that the guide’s ‘Do not look back’ functioned simply as a reinforcement of the command to advance, an element of the dream specifically tailored for Hannibal’s troops who were apprehensive. If the dream stopped at that point, it simply embodied a moral familiar from Greek literature and life (cf. Plato *Leg.* 854c). E. Meyer (*Kleine Schriften*, ii. (Berlin, 1924), 369), by contrast, argues that the original conclusion of the dream, which would have pointed up the disobedience of Hannibal and his punishment in failure, has been removed. Perhaps to speak of punishment, even in the most pro-Roman version that we find in Livy, is too strong. Rather Hannibal’s ‘disobedience’ ‘introduces a note that all will not be well’ (C. B. R. Pelling, *G&R* 44 (1997), 203). Many examples of such prohibitions from myth (e.g. Virg. *Georg.* 4. 488–91) and ritual (e.g. Virg. *Ecl.* 8. 102–3) are set out by Pease, who finds an explanation ultimately in fear of confronting evil or chthonic spirits. ‘Desire’ (*cupiditas*) may represent something like the typical Greek characteristic of curiosity or something more harsh, akin to *pleonexia*. This latter vice fits well with the excess–arrogance–disaster sequence prominent in tragedy and ‘tragic history’. If the dream mirrors Coelius’ wider presentation of Hannibal, he is Livy’s probable source for what has been called the ‘*Ἀντίβας ὑβριστής* motif’ (G. Mader, *Anc. Soc.* 24 (1993), 223). Another influence on Coelius, and perhaps on his predecessors, comes from the common interpretation of dreams: ‘if a man dreams that his head is turned round so that he can see the things behind him . . . it indicates impediments to any undertaking at all . . . To those abroad it foretells a late and unexpected return to their homeland’ (Artem. 1. 36; cf. Cipriano 1984: 123).

a vast horrendous beast wrapped around with snakes . . . the devastation of Italy Coelius' monster seems very different from Livy's huge serpent (21. 22. 8), and what he is describing is unclear, but its association with death is clear (cf. Artem. 2. 64). D'Arco (2002: 160–1) conjectures that Coelius' omission of the storm, which features in Livy and Cassius Dio (Zon. 8. 22), and his relocation of the dream remove the significance of both in the original version—the inclement weather of the Alps and the desolation of the pass—and require a reidentification of *vastitas* (devastation) with Hannibal's destruction of Italy. The Hannibalic War had real consequences for areas of the Italian peninsula, particularly affecting agriculture (see Cornell 1996: 97–117), but the symbolic shock of a powerful invader was even more important in determining the tradition.

not to worry about what was happening behind him and in his rear Pease's rationalizing explanation of the god's words, that Hannibal's 'course should be determined without any attempt to keep open a long and vulnerable line of communication', ignores the fact that in this context 'behind' means the future (Bettini 1991: 152–3), and that this symbolic meaning is far more to the point in the context of 219.

**50. In the history of Agathocles** Perhaps Agathocles of Cyzicus, a grammarian and historian of the late 3rd to early 2nd cent. who worked in Alexandria and was a pupil of the Stoic Zenodotus (see F. Montanari, *I frammenti dei grammatici Agathokles, Hellanikos, Ptolemaios Epithetes* (Berlin, 1988), 15–20). For an earlier date, making Agathocles a contemporary of Timaeus with an interest in events in the west, see G. Brizzi, *RSA* 16 (1986), 132–7. Jacoby (*FGrH* 472 F 7) considers this a fragment of this Agathocles although neither of his known works, *On Cyzicus* (*Peri Kyzikou*) and *Commentaries* (*Hypomnemata*) is a likely source (cf. Montanari, 33). An homonymous historian of Sicily has been conjectured (*RE* i. 759; cf. Pease), but remains only a name. The suggestion of Heeringa (1906: 16), that Cic. has misunderstood a phrase in his Greek source and created a history by Agathocles the tyrant of Syracuse is highly attractive. Cic. does not take this example directly from so obscure a source as Agathocles, but from Posidonius or some other Stoic source.

**Hamilcar** Hamilcar son of Gisgo was the Carthaginian commander in Sicily from 311 (*RE* vii. 2301–2). Diodorus (20. 29. 3, 30. 1–2) dates his capture to 309. From its context here and from Marcus' own corroboration (2. 136) a dream is meant, although in Diodorus an *haruspex* prophesies after examining the sacrificial entrails.

**When that day appeared...Hamilcar was carried off alive by them** Diodorus (20. 29. 4–11) describes the confusing military manoeuvres in some detail, but records no clash between the Carthaginian and their allies from the indigenous, non-Greek cities of Sicily, rather chaos caused by the camp-followers; then in nocturnal confusion through ignorance of the topography there was fighting among the Carthaginians.

**History is full of such examples and everyday life is crammed with them** The first half of this is unproblematic, as Quintus has presented and will continue to present famous examples of dreams from history. Schäublin suggests tentatively that the second half of the remark refers to 1. 56–9, but that material equally concerns major historical and literary figures, C. Gracchus and Cic. himself. Quintus' expression 'everyday life' (*vita communis*) is common in the philosophical dialogues (e.g. *Ac.* 1. 15; *Off.* 1. 7, 58, 2. 13; *Am.* 18, 21, 38) and means life as experienced by all people, both philosophers and ordinary folk. Unless we imagine some other meaning, such as the common experience of Quintus and Cicero, i.e. the examples of 1. 58 and 59, or consider the remark misplaced by Quintus, we must hold that the words reinforce, somewhat indirectly, the idea that prophetic dreams are not fictional or literary, or the preserve of the famous, but are a common, universally attested, and credible phenomenon.

**51. It is a fact that** An emphatic translation of *at vero* is justified by Quintus' stress on historicity and perhaps also by the contrast with everyday dreams.

**the famous Publius Decius...who was the first of the Decii to become consul** P. Decius Mus was consul in 340 (*RE* iv. 2279–86), the father of the homonymous consul of 295 and

probable ancestor of the consul of 279 (but see A. Cavallaro, *ASAA* 38 (1976), 271–8). By the filiation and specification of ‘first’ Quintus makes the identification secure and by ‘the famous’ (*ille*) suggests that the individual is well-known from annalistic history (see below). Indeed Decius’ *devotio* appears as an example of Roman piety and courage from Ennius onwards (see H. W. Litchfield, *HSCP* 25 (1914), 46–8). In Cic. the Decii illustrate courage, magnanimity, and the power of religion (e.g. *Sen.* 75; *Tusc.* 1. 89, 2. 59; *ND* 2. 10).

**military tribune in the consulship of M. Valerius and A. Cornelius** M. Valerius Corvus (*RE* 7A. 2413–18) and A. Cornelius Cossus Arvina (*RE* iv. 1294–5) were consuls in 343. The military tribunes were at this period six elected magistrates with functions restricted to the military sphere, who exercised a key command role in the legions (see Suolahti 1955: 35–57).

as it appears in the annals...in his dreams he had seen himself die Decius’ boldness and initiative at Saticula in Samnium in saving the consul Cossus and enabling him to win a great victory is described by Livy (7. 34. 1–36. 7). Cossus had led his forces into a valley where they were surrounded by the Samnites and retreat was impossible. Decius led an assault on high ground, participated in nocturnal reconnaissance missions, and extricated his commander. Livy does not criticize Decius’ rashness or mention the dream. Although the historicity of the First Samnite War has been questioned, it is not an invention of later annalists (Oakley 1998: 309–11). Similarly, although the Livian (and earlier) narratives of Decius’ actions may have been influenced by the comparable exploit of the tribune A. Atilius Caiatinus in 258, this episode is probably not a literary invention (Oakley 1998: 332–3). For Quintus the dream demonstrates that prophecy of an event that would take place three years later is possible; his reference to ‘annals’ serves to suggest that the date and the historicity of the dream is secured by reliable evidence.

three years later, when he was consul, he “devoted” himself In 341 Rome’s Latin allies revolted, aggrieved at being treated as



subjects. In the campaigns of 340, when Decius was consul, he and his colleague Manlius faced the Latin forces at Vesperis near Mount Vesuvius. In the Livian version Decius and Manlius both dreamt that in the next battle one side would lose a commander, the other their whole force; the general who sacrificed himself on behalf of his army would be on the winning side (Livy 8. 6. 8–10). In that battle, as the Roman left wing succumbed, Decius recited the formula of *devotio*, by which he besought various Olympian and chthonic deities to strike fear into the enemy and to take his and their lives, and rode into the enemy ranks. In fulfilling his *devotio* he was killed, but inspired his troops to victory (Livy 8. 9. 1–10. 8). *Devotio*, as practised by the Decii, has elements of an expiatory ritual (Livy 8. 9. 13, 10. 28. 13), of primitive magic (L. Deubner, *ARW* 8 (1905), 78–80), and of substitutionary sacrifice. See H. S. Versnel, *Mnem.* 29 (1976), 365–410; Guittard 1986: 49–55; Rüpke 1990: 156–61; Oakley 1998: 482–6.

**his son ardently desired to do the same** Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 67. 9. P. Decius Mus, consul 295, ‘devoted’ himself at Sentinum in the Third Samnite War against a powerful enemy force of Samnites and Gauls (Livy 10. 24). This *devotio* is a historical fact and may have been recorded on the Capitoline *Fasti*, whereas that of 340 is almost universally considered a fiction, although Oakley argues cogently for the possibility that it is historical (Oakley 1998: 477–80). See also C. Guittard, *CRAI* 1984, 581; idem, ‘Naissance et développement d’une légende: Les Decii’, in *Res sacrae: Hommages à H. Le Bonniec* (Brussels, 1988), 256–66.

**52. So let’s now come, if you wish, to the dreams of philosophers** Quintus moves on to another category of reliable material, tales of philosophers told by philosophers. All three dreams centre around the idea of a return home, for Socrates and Eudemus in the sense of death, for Xenophon in his historical return to Greece. Quintus’ presentation does not bring this to the fore, but it may well reveal an organizational motif in his source.

**Plato** Cf. *Crito* 43d–44b: ‘I am to die the day after the ship arrives...I think it will arrive tomorrow, not today. I make this

conjecture on the basis of a dream . . . a woman appeared to approach me, beautiful and fair, wearing a white garment, and to call me and say "Socrates, on the third day you will arrive in fertile Phthia" . . . the meaning seems clear, to me at least.' Quintus begins with a weighty *ad hominem* example in that Cic. considers Plato the finest of all philosophers (e.g. *Fin.* 5. 7; *Leg.* 1. 15; *Tusc.* 1. 22, 79), authoritative and persuasive (*Tusc.* 1. 79; *Acad.* 1. 17), and an excellent stylist (*De or.* 1. 47–9, 3. 15; *Orat.* 62). Cic. does not comment on Plato's historical reliability as a reporter of Socrates' thought and life, but in its author and subject matter this example matches the criteria set by Quintus at 1. 39 for weightier examples. For Plato and Cic. see T. B. DeGraff, *CP* 35 (1940), 143–53; Long 1995: 43–52; Sedley 1997: 118–21.

**Socrates . . . said . . . that he was to die in three days** Socrates appears in Cic.'s dialogues as the 'founder' (*princeps*) and father of philosophy (*ND* 1. 93, 2. 167; *Tusc.* 3. 8, 5. 10, 47; *De or.* 3. 60; *Fin.* 2. 1). His final days feature prominently (e.g. *Tusc.* 1. 71–3; *De or.* 1. 232) and are plausibly an episode utilized by the Stoics for various purposes (cf. Sedley 1993: 316–18). In 399 Socrates was awaiting execution after his conviction for corrupting the young and impiety. His sentence could not be carried out until the sacred ship carrying the state embassy returned from Delos (cf. Plat. *Phd.* 58a–c). Given these circumstances, it is only the specific prophecy of three days which differentiates this example from a non-prophetic dream caused by the day's concerns.

**a woman of rare beauty** The influence of Accius has been suggested (R. Degl' Innocenti Pierini, *Studi su Accio* (Florence, 1980), 15), but this is rather another example of divinities appearing extraordinary either in size or beauty (cf. 1. 40).

**quoted an Homeric line as follows: "the third good day will set you in Phthia"** Quintus represents the line as an extempore translation (Jocelyn 1973: 80) of Homer, *Il.* 9. 362–3, where Achilles says 'if the great shaker of the earth grants me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach fertile Phthia'. As Phthia was Achilles' home, Socrates interprets the dream as meaning that his soul will go home, i.e. return to the heavens, on its separation from the body in death.

Subordinate to this is a pun between *Phthien* (Phthia in the accusative) and *phthinein* (to die). Cic.'s translation reveals his knowledge of the wider context of the quotation in Plato (cf. A. Traina, *Vortit barbare* (Rome, 1974), 91–9).

**It is written that it happened just as it was said** Neither Plato nor Xenophon explicitly confirms this, but the appearance of the story in Plato of his hero guarantees what Quintus states here. The dream functions on several levels, first in telling Socrates exactly when he will die and what destiny awaits him, it confirms his decision not to resist death and encourages his belief in an afterlife, combining the psychology of the individual with metaphysical truths (Vegl  ris 1982: 60–1).

**Xenophon (what a man of quality, what a great man!)** Cf. the description at *Tusc.* 2. 62. Quintus' admiration for Xenophon as a philosopher is consistent with Cic.'s own attitude—he had read avidly the *Cyropaedia* (*Q Fr.* 1. 1. 23; *Fam.* 9. 25. 1) and in his youth had translated *Oeconomicus* (*Off.* 2. 87). His firsthand knowledge of Xenophon's historical works is less certain, so this section may derive from a Stoic collection of dreams (K. M  nscher, *Philologus*, suppl. 13 (1940), 75–82; but cf. Fleck 1993: 59–60). In general Xenophon's reputation and popularity sprang from his philosophical rather than his historical works.

**records his own dreams** Xenophon received two dreams at times of crisis: first, when the army's leadership had been assassinated and there was great uncertainty whether the Greeks would survive, Xenophon barely slept, but saw 'a thunder clap and then a bolt of lightning fall on his father's house, setting the whole thing ablaze' (*Anab.* 3. 1. 11); secondly, when his force was trapped between the seemingly uncrossable river Centrites and encircling Carduchians, he dreamt that 'he was bound in fetters, but that the fetters fell away of their own accord so that he was released and could move as freely as he pleased' (*Anab.* 4. 3. 8).

**during the campaign...Cyrus the Younger** 'During the campaign' (*in ea militia*) is taken as an awkward condensation

(Timpanaro) or paraphrase (Pease) of the probable title of the *Anabasis* in Latin, as *The Expedition of Cyrus*. This Cyrus was the younger son of Darius II of Persia, who led a revolt against his brother Artaxerxes in 401, in which Xenophon served as one of many Greek mercenaries. Cic. carefully distinguishes him (cf. *Sen.* 59) from Cyrus the Great (see 1. 46)

**Their remarkable outcomes are recorded** The first dream seemed to portend either escape from the midst of dangers or encirclement by the Persian king, but events proved that it was the former, as Xenophon initiated the choosing of new commanders and advocated the march which saved the Greeks from capture or defeat (*Anab.* 3. 1. 13–2. 39). In the second, some scouts discovered a safe crossing place and with minimal losses the Greeks crossed and escaped from the Carduchians (*Anab.* 4. 3. 11–12). Neither of these dreams or their outcomes seems as ‘remarkable’ as Quintus suggests—neither offers a clear, unmistakably divine, prophecy or seems to belong securely in the category of divine dreams, but rather to reveal the waking concerns of Xenophon. See R. C. T. Parker, ‘One Man’s Piety: The Religious Dimension of the *Anabasis*’, in R. Lane Fox (ed.), *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (New Haven, 2004), esp. 148–9 and H. Bowden, ‘Xenophon and the Scientific Study of Religion’, in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and his World* (Stuttgart, 2004), esp. 235–6.

**53. Shall we say that Xenophon is a liar or mad?** Marcus ignores Xenophon’s dreams (and all those from this section of Quintus’ argument) in his reply. Quintus’ question does not, of course, cover all sceptical responses to these dreams, only the two most damning.

**Does Aristotle, a man of unique and almost divine intellect, err** For Cic. Aristotle is second only to Plato (*Tusc.* 1. 22, cf. 1. 7). Cic. describes the intellectual excellence of several Greek philosophers and literary figures as ‘divine’ (see Leschhorn 1985: 387–8); Plato and Aristotle are praised most frequently, the former without qualification (*De or.* 2. 152). ‘Err’ is less damning than the lying or madness of Quintus’ last question. Quintus’ underlying assumption is

that Aristotle has carefully recorded what his friend and contemporary Eudemus said about his dream, and that he believed it was a real historical dream rather than a literary fiction after the fashion of Plato (cf. P. M. Huby, *Apeiron* 13 (1979), 53–4).

The following example comes from Aristotle's *Eudemus* (fr. 1 R), otherwise known as *Peri Psyches* (*On the Soul*). Although Cic.'s ostensible knowledge of Aristotle's 'exoteric' works is wide, it is difficult to be certain in specific cases that he has read them (see Barnes 1997: 46–50); in this case the role of a Stoic intermediary cannot be excluded.

If this is taken to show that Aristotle accepts the prediction of Eudemus' dream as divinely given (by contrast with the sceptical *De divinatione per somnia*), it is probably the belief of an immature Aristotle under the influence of Platonism who later abandoned metaphysical speculation for an empirical approach to dreams (Gallop 1996: 14). If, however, the dream is part of an introduction to his dialogue in which he sets out various opinions about dreams, the question of his belief is irrelevant. A passage in Aristotle's *Ethica Eudemia* (1248<sup>a</sup>30–<sup>b</sup>2) which has also been used to suggest that he did accept that some people enjoyed divine assistance in prediction may in fact properly concern success in deliberation or the ability to make fortunate choices (M. J. Woods, *Apeiron* 25 (1992), 184; see also on 1. 81). For Quintus' argument it is not so much the attitudes of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle to the dreams recorded in their works which is crucial, as the historical reality of the dreams and their nature as 'divine dreams'. It may well be that two Aristotles could be claimed, one by the Stoics in support of divination by dreams, and another whose arguments Marcus uses (e.g. Repici 1991: 169–71). See Kany-Turpin and Pellegrin 1989: 220; van der Eijk 1993: 225 n. 9.

**Eudemus of Cyprus . . . at Pherae, which was at that time a renowned city in Thessaly** 'Of Cyprus' distinguishes this Eudemus from the more prominent Eudemus of Rhodes, an astronomer and pupil of Aristotle. In Cic.'s day Pherae was an insignificant town in Thessaly, but in the first half of the 4th cent., under a series of powerful tyrants, Pherae was the leading city of Thessaly (*RE* Suppl. vii. 984–1025).

**held in domination by the cruel tyrant Alexander** Alexander reigned for eleven years from c.369 to 358 (Diod. 15. 61. 2). He secured power by murdering his uncle Polyphron; his notorious atrocities included violation of his oath to Theban ambassadors and massacring the inhabitants of Scotussa and Meliboea (e.g. Diod. 15. 75. 1). He is described as cruel (Ael. *VH* 14. 40; Plut. *Pelop.* 28. 5) and unjust (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 35). See H. D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century* (London, 1935), 126–59.

**there appeared to him a young man of striking appearance . . . after five years** For the beauty of divine apparitions, see on 1. 40 **a handsome man**. Quintus cites this example because it appears to be a clear divine dream—there were three elements of prophecy each of which came true, the last being the most dramatic, involving foreknowledge which stretched over five years. The combination of prophecies compounds the miraculous nature of the dream.

**the first came true immediately, in that Eudemus recovered** On its own not remarkable, and the kind of result which requires no prescience.

**the tyrant was killed by his wife's brothers** Cf. Cic. *Off.* 2. 25. The tale of revenge by Thebe on her husband and the assassination in their bed-chamber was elaborated from the mid-4th cent. onwards (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 34–7; Diod. 16. 14. 1; Plut. *Pelop.* 35. 3–7). Three brothers were involved, Lycophron, Tisiphonus, and Peitholaus. Alexander's death is best fixed between late autumn 358 and early 357 (M. Sordi, *La lega tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno* (Rome, 1958), 230–4).

**at the end of five years . . . he was killed in battle before Syracuse** In 354 Eudemus was killed in the conflict between Dion, whom he supported, and Dionysius II of Syracuse (Plut. *Dion* 22. 3) during the battle for control of Syracuse. The temporal clause underlines that Eudemus' knowledge of the dream did not influence his behaviour so as to bring it about—he expected to go to Cyprus. It is not clear whether the chronology works well: the prophecy was given in 358, shortly before Alexander's assassination, but Eudemus'

death occurs at most four and a bit years later, as Dion's death belongs to the summer of 354. Either Cic.'s *quinquennium* has to be understood inclusively of a period of four years, or Eudemus' death has to be separated from that of Dion and placed in the later campaign of Hipparinus against Syracuse in the second half of 353 (W. Spoerri, *MH* 23 (1966), 44–57).

**when the soul of Eudemus left his body, it had returned home** The idea of the soul's existence in the human body as an exile, or absence from its true home is implicit in Plato's *Phaedo*, but is found explicitly first in [Plato] *Ax.* 365b (cf. *M. Aur. Med.* 2. 17). This *post eventum* interpretation owes nothing to any technique of oneirocrisis (cf. *Artem.* 2. 49), but to the common philosophical idea prominent in Plato.

**54. a most learned man, the divine poet Sophocles** For Cic. Sophocles was the finest exponent of tragedy (*Orat.* 4), and the only Greek poet to be praised as 'divine' (see on 1. 53 **does Aristotle**). Again the example fulfils Quintus' criteria (1. 39), as it concerns an important figure. The story cannot be linked plausibly with Sophocles' office as *Hellenotamias* in 443/442, even if that Sophocles is the tragedian (cf. H. C. Avery, *Historia* 22 (1973), 512 n. 11). It may be an aetiological explanation of the unique cult-title of Hercules the Informer (C. Watzinger, *AM* 29 (1904), 241, 243) and in its basic outline be 'plausible enough', but like so many stories from the lives of Greek poets and philosophers it may have been created to explain the existence of a particular poem (cf. Lefkowitz 1981: 83–4).

**a heavy gold bowl had been stolen from the temple of Hercules** The earliest extant version of this story comes in the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymus of Rhodes (fr. 31 Wehrli): 'when this crown was stolen from the Acropolis, Hercules came to Sophocles in a dream and told him to go into the house on the right and search, and it was hidden there. Sophocles brought this information to the people and received a reward of a talent, as had been announced in advance. He used the talent to establish a shrine of Hercules Informer.' Where the details differ (e.g. bowl or crown; cf. also *Tert. An.* 46), it is more likely that Cic. has adapted the story inaccurately from a Greek source

(cf. H. Dettmer, *De Hercule Attico* (Diss. Bonn, 1869), 14) than that Hieronymus is wrong (*contra* L. Radermacher, *Sophokles* (Berlin, 1913), 3).

**He ignored the first and second time. When the same dream came more frequently** The dream was repeated at least three times (cf. 1. 55; Hdt. 7. 12–17; Aesch. *PV* 655). ‘Recurrent dreams, if they appear at small intervals and continually, should be considered as always having the same meaning. And because they are seen frequently, we should be more attentive to them and place greater faith in them’ (Artem. 4. 27).

**he went up to the Areopagus and revealed the matter** Hieronymus has a popular body, but there may be no contradiction. If the Areopagus exercised an oversight of religious law and dealt with this case of sacrilege (*pace* Wallace 1985: 106–12), the people could give Sophocles his reward. Alternatively Cic. has embroidered the story and introduced the Areopagus with a role familiar from his own day, treating it as the equivalent of the Roman Senate (cf. E. D. Rawson, *Athenaeum* 63 (1985), 64–6).

**that temple acquired the name of Hercules the Informer** Cf. the more restricted conclusion of Hieronymus, that Sophocles dedicated an altar or shrine to Hercules the Informer. Evidence of Hercules worship from the south slope of the Acropolis has been linked with this, but certainty is not possible (cf. Woodford 1971: 219–20). Perhaps Sophocles reinstituted an old cult, rather than established a new one.

**55. Why am I speaking of Greek examples? Somehow our own give me more pleasure** The next two Roman examples interrupt the flow of Greek examples, which continues in 1. 56. The immediate connection of the example of Sophocles with the following is the repetition of the dream until its recipient responded. The notion that Roman examples give greater pleasure (*delectatio*) than Greek can be contrasted with Valerius Maximus (1. 6 *ext.* 1): ‘so I will touch on foreign examples which, inserted in a Latin work, although they have less moral weight, nonetheless can bring some pleasing variety’;



foreign examples served primarily a literary purpose in the provision of less familiar and thus more interesting material, 'variety and pleasure' (2. 10 *ext.* 1), 'sweeter to discover' (5. 7 *ext.* 1); they obviated boredom (3. 8 *ext.* 1, 9. 5 *ext.* 1). Marcus echoes Quintus' preference (2. 8). While this may be a stance Cic. felt necessary to use before a Roman popular audience, to counter criticism for philhellenism, it also appears in his philosophical works (cf. 1. 1; *Tusc.* 1. 1).

**All historians, like the Fabii, the Gellii** These plurals are generalizing, rather than references to other Fabii (e.g. Numenius Fabius Pictor). The version of Q. Fabius Pictor (see on 1. 43) is transmitted via Dionysius of Halicarnassus (7. 71. 1). Cn. Gellius was a writer of *annales* in the late 2nd cent., although his publication date need not be raised to make him precede Coelius on the basis of Cic.'s text here (see below). Gellius wrote a lengthy work covering Roman history to 146 at least (see Badian 1966: 11–12; E. D. Rawson, *Latomus* 35 (1976), 710–17).

**but with the greatest accuracy Coelius** For L. Coelius Antipater, see on 1. 48. The MSS (except *V*<sup>2</sup>) preserve *proxume*, which is defended with some hesitation by Timpanaro as the *difficilior lectio* against an emendation of T. P. Wiseman (*CQ* 29 (1979), 143–4), *maxume* (above all), which is accepted by Schaublin. The respective chronology of Coelius' 7-book monograph and Gellius' multi-volume *annales* is not certain—Gellius may have begun before and finished after Coelius. As Coelius was not the most recent historian who will have recorded this episode, *proxume*, if it is to be understood in a chronological sense, would have to mean 'the most recent of those historians I use' (cf. Fleck 1993: 145–6). However, if *proxume* means 'with greatest accuracy' (cf. Liv. 25. 23. 12), *sed* (but) can retain its natural adversative sense (E. Peruzzi, *PP* 57 (2002), 226–7). Wiseman holds that Cic. read Valerius Antias, who wrote at least a generation after Coelius, but he is never cited by Cic. as a source and Cic.'s attitude towards him may be dismissive (cf. Fleck 1993: 209–24).

Although the basic story remains constant, some details and, most importantly, the chronological setting of the incident vary (cf. Livy 2. 36. 1–37. 1; Dion. Hal. 7. 68. 3–69. 2; Plut. *Cor.* 24. 1–25. 1; Macrob. *Sat.* 1. 11. 3–5; Min. Fel. *Oct.* 7. 3, 27. 4; Arnob.

*Nat.* 7. 39; *Lact. Inst.* 2. 7. 20; Augustine, *De civ. D* 4. 26, 8. 13). Coelius, Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch place the incident in the early 5th cent. (see below), Macrobius in 280/279. This latter version (followed also by Lactantius and Augustine) is probably that of Varro (T. Mommsen, *Römische Forschungen*, ii. (Berlin, 1879), 124; cf. *Div. Ant.* fr. 81 C), who is mentioned in connection with the etymology of *instauratio*. Macrobius may preserve the original version, which was transferred back to earlier history by Fabius Pictor and over time acquired many circumstantial details, a pattern which can be shown for many other stories (cf. Ogilvie 1965: 327; Bernstein 1998: 84–96, esp. 93–6). However, Coelius' is the simplest version and it cannot be proved that the Varronian alternative goes back earlier. A probable context for the story in Coelius, whose monograph on the Second Punic War is not an obvious home for an incident from early Roman history, is the *instauratio* of the *ludi plebei* in 216 after Cannae (cf. Herrmann 1979: 197), or that of the *ludi Apollinares* in 211 (see below), or an excursus motivated by rejection of Polybian scepticism (La Penna 1975: 55–6). In 216 Juno had been offended by improprieties in the procession, and the consul's failure to placate her led to Rome's defeat (see Val. Max. 1. 1. 16); these offer clear parallels.

**when the great votive games were being held for the first time** Cf. Augustine's 'Roman' and Valerius Maximus' 'plebeian' games. Coelius' description best fits the conflict of the Latin War which ended in 493 with the signing of the *foedus Cassianum*. The most detailed extant accounts in Dionysius and Livy, which derive from Fabius Pictor, date this episode to 491 (Livy) or 490 (Dionysius). The games in question had been vowed by Aulus Postumius before his victory at Lake Regillus in 496 (Dion. Hal. 6. 10. 1, 7. 71. 2).

**the games were interrupted** This interruption was caused by the Volscians, although probably not the visitation described by Livy (2. 37. 2), as the dream episode fits oddly into his narrative. For the suggestion that Coelius' version is modelled on the events of 211 when a report of Hannibal's arrival interrupted the votive *Ludi Apollinares* (Festus 436–8 L; Serv. *Aen.* 8. 110), see Bernstein 1998: 89, 184.

**repeats should be held** Cf. Livy 2. 36. 1: 'A repeat of votive games was being prepared.' The double *instauratio* appears only in Cic., from Coelius, and is probably an error (cf. Timpanaro). Although the repetition of a ceremony (*instauratio*) is best understood as a religious rather than political phenomenon (P. Cohee, *Hermes* 122 (1994), 451–68), to exclude all political motivation from individual *instaurationes* is implausible (cf. Bernstein 1998: 282). Varro's rejection of the etymology *apo tou staurou* (Macrobius *Sat.* 3. 11. 5) shows that this goes back to Fabius and the beginning of the Roman historiographical tradition; his wider rejection of the Fabian account indicates his belief that Fabius has retrojected developments of the 3rd cent. to the early 5th (cf. Bernstein 1998: 91–6).

**a slave wearing a yoke . . . was beaten with rods** Cf. Dion. Hal. 7. 69. 2: 'having stretched out both his arms and fixed them to a piece of wood which reached across his chest and shoulders as far as his wrists, they followed him, tearing his naked body with whips. The victim . . . not only uttered cries of ill-omen, but also made unseemly movements under the blows.' At the date of this incident the designation 'circus' is at best anachronistic (see T. P. Wiseman, *PBSR* 42 (1974), 2–26). Valerius Maximus (1. 7. 4) specifies the Circus Flaminius, but Varro's testimony that chariot races and ludic processions were never staged there (*LL* 5. 154) should be preferred (T. P. Wiseman, *PBSR* 44 (1976), 44–5). The probable venue becomes the Circus Maximus (cf. Bernstein 1998: 159).

**there appeared . . . the opener of the games had not pleased him** Livy, Dionysius, Valerius, and Macrobius identify Coelius' divinity as Jupiter, while Cic.'s vague expression may result from abbreviation by Cic. Coelius' 'opener of the games' (*praesul*; cf. Livy's *praesultator*) is a technical term to describe the dancers who performed in the regular circus procession (see J.-R. Jannot, *RÉL* 70 (1992), 56–68). Jupiter objected to the parody of dancing movements by the slave under the whip (see Dion. Hal. quoted above) and the defiling of a joyous occasion by these sufferings.

**a Roman peasant** Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Valerius Maximus name him as T. Latinius (Lactantius' Ti. Atinius is

a probable corruption of this); Macrobius' 'a certain Autronius Maximus' probably derives from a separate tradition followed by Varro. Ogilvie (1965: 327) considers T. Annius the more likely name for a prominent plebeian. However, the emphasis lies on his being at best a farmer uninvolved in political life. His anonymity in Coelius may be the result of abbreviation by Cic.

**... the dream was accepted by the Senate** Again Coelius' version is the barest, excluding the specific prescription of Jupiter. Livy and Dionysius specify a gap of a few days before the son's death, Valerius has an immediate decease. While the pagan sources show Jupiter's concern for the state in his giving of repeated warnings, the Christian sources emphasize the unfair display of power (e.g. Arnob. *Nat.* 7. 38; August. *De civ. D* 8. 13). Coelius' framing of the story reflects the pre-eminent role of the Senate within Roman state religion, although their cognizance of dreams is a rare phenomenon (cf. 1. 99). This form of divination was beyond effective control by the elite, and by such stories as this the average Roman might be dissuaded from claiming that a dream had a public significance.

**the games were repeated a second time** Cf. Livy 2. 37. 1: 'the Senate decreed that the games should be made as lavish as possible'; Dion. Hal. 7. 73. 5: '[the Senate] decreed that another procession be performed in honour of the god and other games to be exhibited at twice the cost of the former'. Only Coelius' version has a double *instauratio*, which Timpanaro suggests may be carelessness by Cic. or an erroneous duplication he found in one or more of his sources. Rather it is an authentic part of Coelius' account, but nonetheless unhistorical: although repeated, and even multiple, *instaurationes* are attested for the historical period, Coelius' dating of the games to the 5th cent. predates the introduction of *instauratio* (cf. Bernstein 1998: 92–3).

**56. Gaius Gracchus told many... when he was a candidate for the quaestorship** C. Sempronius Gracchus was the younger of the two radical tribunes whose conflict with the Senate led to their deaths (Stockton 1979). He held his quaestorship in 126, so the dramatic date for the dream is 127, before the elections for the quaestorship

(cf. Plut. *C. Gracch.* 1. 6). Gaius was setting out on the first step of the *cursus honorum*, although he had served as a land-commissioner distributing land in accordance with his brother's legislation. The MSS reading *petenti* should not be emended to *petere dubitanti* (Halm) in order to explain Tiberius' reference to delay (Pease) and to fit the interpretation of Gaius' behaviour attributed to Cic. by Plutarch, 'that he declined all offices and had chosen to live a quiet life'. Gaius' use of his brother and of the notion of fraternal *pietas* in his popular oratory is highly plausible and would have been rhetorically effective (cf. Bannon 1997: 127–31). Even if 'told many' is not a reference to a speech by Gaius in a *contio*, something more than a private conversation is required; indeed for Quintus' argument the widespread contemporary knowledge of the dream serves to confirm its historicity. In historical context the dream may represent a reprimand by Tiberius for Gaius' not standing for the tribunate (F. Zöchbauer, *Zu Cicero's Büchern De Divinatione* (Helm, 1877), 17), in order to pursue his radical policies, and would provide a context for Gaius' relating of the dream in 124, when he stood for election as tribune, now resolved on direct conflict with the Senate. However, it is equally possible that Gaius publicized the dream in 127 to justify and win support for his candidature for the quaestorship. Thus the delay Tiberius criticizes is in Gaius' beginning his public career, because Gaius did not stand for office at the earliest opportunity. He was nine years younger than Tiberius who was born in 163 (or early 162) (Plut. *C. Gracch.* 1. 2), and so became 28 during his quaestorship, while Tiberius had been quaestor at 25 or 26, close to the probable minimum age for the quaestorship (cf. A. E. Astin, *The Lex Annalis before Sulla* (Brussels, 1958), esp. 42–5).

**as it is written in the same Coelius' work** As with the previous example, it is not clear where Coelius narrated this in his account of the Second Punic War. One possibility is an excursus on the reliability of dreams, in the context of Hannibal's first dream (cf. Herrmann 1979: 197).

**he must perish sharing the same fate as he himself had** Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, Gaius' elder brother had perished in 133. On 'delay', see above. 'Sharing the same fate' would in general

terms refer to the violent end suffered by the two tribunes as a consequence of their radical opposition to the Senate; it could, however, apply specifically to the throwing of their corpses into the Tiber, a commonality that was noted (Vell. Pat. 2. 6. 7; cf. Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 20. 2; *C. Gracch.* 17. 5). In the method and scene of their respective deaths there are no close similarities: Tiberius was coshed with the leg of a bench on the Capitol (Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 19. 6), while Gaius was probably assisted in suicide by his slave in the grove of the Furies (Plut. *C. Gracch.* 17. 2).

**Coelius writes ... <Gracchus> had told many. What can be found better authenticated than this dream?** This example is weighty in Quintus' eyes, because Coelius is a credible authority, he was a firsthand witness of Gaius' tale, and it could be corroborated by many others, a point he makes twice in this *exemplum* by the repetition of 'many' (*multis*); moreover, the chronological setting is secured as 124 at the latest, as Gaius was tribune in 123 and 122. The pronoun *eum* (literally 'him', here rendered by 'Gracchus') has to be supplied, as it makes no sense for Cic. to relate that *Coelius* told the dream to many (Pease, Schäublin; *contra* Philipson 1922: 101–2).

**those two dreams which are very frequently recounted by the Stoics** After this Roman interlude Quintus returns to famous Greek dreams accepted by his Stoic philosophical sources. These go back to Chrysippus for one (see on 1. 57), but through Posidonius (cf. Schäublin).

**Simonides** Simonides of Ceos, probably born in the mid-6th cent., see Molyneux 1992. The biographical details elaborated in later poets are highly dubious (cf. Lefkowitz 1981: 49–56) and this story may be no more than a creation to explain an epigram attributed to Simonides (*Anth. Pal.* 7. 77): 'this man is the saviour of Simonides of Ceos, who though dead repaid a gift to the living'. Although its authenticity is doubted by modern scholars (D. L. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge, 1981), 299–301), for the Stoics and Quintus the epigram offers firsthand evidence.

The story appears in its fullest form in Libanius (*Narrat.* 13; cf. Schol. ad Aelium Aristiden, iii. 533), whose geographical details

suggest a date for the episode in the 480s when Simonides visited Sicily. The tale is a common folk-motif across many cultures, the grateful dead (see literature collected by E. Schürer, F. G. B. Millar, *et al.*, *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Christ*, iii (Edinburgh, 1986), 226), yet without a classical parallel.

**57. The second dream is very well-known and is handed down as follows** The *Suda* (s.v. *τιμωροῦντος* (4. 559 Adler)) shows that Chrysippus related this dream in an undramatic fashion. Cic., or an intermediate, has added details and created a more striking story; a process which Valerius Maximus was to take further (1. 7 *ext.* 10; see C. J. Carter, 'Valerius Maximus', in T. A. Dorey (ed.), *Empire and Aftermath: Silver Latin II* (London, 1975), 41–5).

**wagon** For the possibility that corpses and excrement were regularly removed in the same vehicles, see J. Bodel, *Graveyards and Groves: A Study of the Lex Lucerina* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 108 n. 161.

**What can be said to be more divinely inspired than this dream?** 'Divinely inspired' (*divinus*) introduces the role of the gods in divinatory dreams which Quintus will discuss later (1. 64)—the dreams are not caused by physiological or psychological disturbances (see 1. 60–3). Although the first dream might be explicable in terms of the general insecurity of hired accommodation and a concern for the friend, and could be disregarded because of the meal recently consumed, the second dream offered such information as could only come from the gods, and was proved to be correct. For speculation as to the paranormal transmission of information, see Dodds 1971: 203–4.

**58. Why search for more examples or those from antiquity?**

Quintus introduces his climactic category of prophetic dream, ones where Quintus and Marcus were themselves the recipients and so the authority of the source could not be questioned! The first of these dreams, however, need not strike us as remarkable, given the nature of the symbolism, the relationship between Quintus and Cic. and the former's knowledge of the political situation in Rome during

his governorship. Dodds (1971: 214) sees it as a 'standard modern type of "crisis dream"':

**I have often told you of a dream I had and I have often heard yours** Quintus' argument has a powerful *ad hominem* element, in that if Marcus did speak *often* about a dream which the outcome suggested strongly was divinely inspired and if he himself called it 'divinely inspired' (1. 60), then, he appears to be hypocritical if he argues against the reality of prophetic dreams. In fact Marcus' response (2. 136–7, 140) is far from gent.

**When I was proconsul of Asia** Quintus was allocated Asia in Mar. 61 (Cic. *Att.* 1. 15. 1), took up his post in the middle of that year, had his tenure prorogued for two further years, and was relieved only in 58 (Cic. *Att.* 2. 6. 2, 3. 9. 1). Quintus' description of his command as proconsular has been criticized and deleted by some editors as inaccurate. Quintus had not held the consulship, his highest office being the praetorship of 62, but he was governing a province which was usually the prerogative of an ex-consul. *Procos.* may be taken in its basic sense as 'in place of a consul', rather than in any technical sense relating to the *imperium* he exercised, although it may have been a prescription of the *lex Cornelia* of 81, that all provincial governors exercising their function *ex praetura* received the title proconsul (cf. A. J. Marshall, *ANRW* i/1. 903).

**in a dream** Quintus does not give a precise date for his dream, but it must precede the vote on Clodius' bill which guaranteed Cic.'s exile; on the day it was passed Cic. left Rome (*Sest.* 53), probably the third week of Mar. 58.

**I saw you riding on a horse towards the bank of a large river... and not reappear anywhere** Ancient dream theory deals adequately with various aspects of this dream, the interpretation of which, as Quintus says, 'is straightforward', and as such suggests that the dream is not prophetic, as Quintus requires it to be. First, 'that familiar friends have prevision especially about each other is due to their being specially concerned on each other's behalf' (Arist. *Div. somn.* 464<sup>a</sup> 27–9; tr. Gallop). In a Babylonian dream book sinking into



a river and emerging from it indicates wealth and worries (Holowchak 2002: 90 n. 27), whereas no extant Greek or Roman texts provide a close parallel to the historical situation (cf. Artem. 2. 27: 'It is bad luck to stand in a river, to be washed on all sides by waves, and to be unable to get out. For a man could not endure the misfortunes that would follow such a dream, even if he were very courageous'; Hippocr. *Insomn.* 93: 'crossing rivers indicate(s) ... disease or raving'). The horse also appears to have no relevant symbolism here (cf. Artem. 1. 56).

**I trembled in fear... and we embraced each other** Pease points to the similarity with the portent Philistus records of Dionysius I of Syracuse (1. 73), but there is no reason to believe that Quintus' dream owes anything to the former. Artem. 2. 2: 'greeting, embracing, and kissing one's friends is good' (cf. Astrampsych. *Onir.* p. 4); Artem. 4. 6: 'every man or woman, dead or alive, that one meets or sees in a dream, every friend, benefactor, and generally every person who does not cause or has not caused any injuries to the dreamer is auspicious'.

**experts in Asia predicted to me the events which came to pass**

Cicero's exile and return to his former status. Even before Quintus left Rome in 61, Cic.'s influence was much diminished and he had incurred Clodius' enmity by destroying his alibi in the Bona Dea scandal; by the beginning of 60 Cic. was concerned about his future and the threat from a Clodian tribunate (*Att.* 1. 8. 4, 2. 1. 4–5). The identity of Quintus' 'experts', the nature of their prediction, and when during Quintus' command they gave their interpretation is vague—did they specify exile or a merely a downturn of fortunes?

**59. I come now to your dream** The more powerful of the examples, both from its content and the fact that it is Marcus' own dream, makes a fitting climax to Quintus' parade of examples.

**our Sallustius** Sallustius (*RE* 1A. 1912–13) was a long-term friend of Cic. (e.g. *Att.* 1. 11. 1; *Q Fr.* 3. 4. 2–4), rather than some freedman (Shackleton Bailey 1965: 286). He accompanied Cic. into exile at least as far as Brundisium (*Cic. Fam.* 14. 4. 6) and was the first person

to hear Cic. relate his dream (see below). The mutual corroboration of Cic. and Sallustius give Quintus a secure example.

**During your flight, which was glorious for us but calamitous for the country** An antithesis which ostensibly owes more to rhetoric than to sense. It is not clear how Cic.'s flight itself, as opposed to his return (cf. Cic. *Parad.* 29), was 'glorious', but this is probably just an extreme exaggeration by Quintus, like Cic.'s frequent attempts to portray his flight as 'magnanimous self-sacrifice' (see Robinson 1994: 479). His choice of 'flight' (*fuga*) is not to achieve greater pathos (*pace* Timpanaro), although Cic.'s letters during the flight reveal him wallowing in misery and self-pity (e.g. *Att.* 3. 3–5, 3. 7. 2; *Fam.* 14. 4. 3). Rather, Cic. never uses the technical term *exilium* even in private correspondence and rebuts others who brand him as an exile (cf. *Dom.* 72), although it is not possible here to see any of the philosophical arguments he employs elsewhere to justify this (cf. E. Narducci, *AJP* 118 (1997), esp. 66–72; J.-M. Claassen, *Displaced Persons: The Literature of Exile from Cicero to Boethius* (London, 1999), 160, 261–2).

**a certain villa in the plain of Atina** An area in Lucania on the *via Popilia*. It may be possible to date Cic.'s stay here precisely. He had left Rome around 20 Mar. 58, wrote from Nares Lucanae (*Att.* 3. 2) on 27 Mar., if we accept Shackleton Bailey's emendation of the MSS *Id.* to *K(al.)*, and travelled that day to the plain of Atina, where he spent the night before going on to Sicca's farm at Vibo.

**spent most of the night awake and around daybreak you finally began to sleep deeply** On one level this is detail to create pathos, more importantly it provides key information for establishing whether the dream was prophetic. It was important to establish when a dream occurred, as those occurring around dawn or in the morning were considered most likely to be true (Philostr. *VA* 2. 37; Tert. *An.* 48. 1; and from the 1st cent.: Hor. *Sat.* 1. 10. 33; Ov. *Her.* 19. 195–6).

**although your journey was urgent...wandering sadly in desolate places** Cic. was racing to get to Brundisium and sail for Greece, as

penalties had been set for anyone who harboured him. To dream of such wanderings portended hard times (cf. Hippocr. *Insomn.* 16), here reflecting Cicero's fears for his future.

**C. Marius with laurelled *fascēs*** Marius, the great Roman general, seven times consul and winner of triumphs over Jugurtha and the Cimbri and Teutones was from Arpinum, Cic.'s home town, and was somehow related to Cic. (cf. *Brut.* 168; *Sest.* 50; *Att.* 12. 49. 2; Stockton 1971: 5). Marius is referred to with exceptional frequency by Cic. across his range of works, but the greatest fellow-feeling for Marius came in the years after his consulship, through the exile to 55, where the parallels with Marius' own eclipse and exile were closest (T. F. Carney, *WS* 73 (1960), 85–6). Despite Cic.'s readiness to use Marius, especially in popular orations, his personal attachment to and knowledge of Marius should not be exaggerated, nor his alienation from his political methods be minimized (cf. E. D. Rawson, *PCPS* 17 (1971), 76–9). Here 'laurelled *fascēs*' combine the emblem of magisterial power in Rome and the symbol of victory; they point above all to Marius' triumphs and may hint at the prospect of future office for Cic., just as Marius celebrated his seventh consulship after exile. Cf. 2. 140: 'at that time Marius was much on my mind, as I remembered how magnanimously, how bravely he had borne his own grave misfortune'.

**you had been driven out of your country by force** Cic. frequently represented his exile in these terms to play up the 'illegality' of Clodius' actions (Robinson 1994: 478–9).

**he took your right hand . . . handed you over to his senior lictor** In the terms of Greek *oneirocrisis*, because it is not certain that Marius could be called Cic.'s intimate friend, the symbolism of greeting (cf. 1. 58) was not unambiguously favourable: 'it is less auspicious to greet a person who is not one's intimate friend, but is known in some other capacity' (Artem. 2. 2). Here, however, in a specifically Roman context, the symbolism is unambiguously positive: Marius invites Cicero into the space and contact usually denied any citizen with the consul in public when attended by his 24 lictors (see Val. Max. 2. 2. 4). Lictors were the officials who bore the *fascēs* in front of the

magistrate, the 'senior lictor' (*lictor proximus*) had particular responsibility for preserving the sacral distance (cf. Mommsen 1887: 375–6; B. Gladigow, *ANRW* i/2. 297–8).

**his monument** The temple to Honour and Courage built from the spoils of the Cimbri and Teutones near Marius' house, probably around or beyond the area now occupied by the Arch of Titus (*LTUR* iii. 33–5; cf. v. 274). The deities are particularly appropriate for the triumph of the *novus homo* Marius by his own virtues, and thus by extension to his most famous successor Cic. The reference to the temple by the name of the dedicator rather than the deity (cf. Cic. *Sest.* 116; *Planc.* 78; Vit. 3. 2. 5; Val. Max. 2. 5. 6, 4. 4. 8) is typical of the Late Republic (Orlin 1997: 193–4).

**a swift and glorious return was in store for you** Nothing in the dream suggests the rapidity of Cic.'s restoration. This is probably Sallustius' own encouraging interpretation or the interpretation preferred by Cic. with the benefit of hindsight—in Oct. 46 the same combination of adjectives is employed by Cic. (*Fam.* 6. 6. 2), although it is not certain whether they represent the words of Cic. or Aulus Caecina. Important too are Cic.'s acceptance of the dream and his immediate recognition of its divine nature, although they are less critical to any objective assessment of the dream as prophetic than the topographical detail relating to the Marian monument.

**I was told swiftly... the magnificent senatorial decree about your return had been passed in that monument** Quintus' words seem to mock Sallustius—he picks up his 'swift' (*celer*), but applies it only to the rapidity with which news was passed to himself. A formal call was issued to all citizens who wished for the safety of the state to assemble in order to support the restoration of Cic. (e.g. *Pis.* 34; *Red. Sen.* 24–5) and the same edict commended him to foreign nations and Rome's provincial governors (*Sest.* 128). This was timed to coincide with popular games, most likely the *Floralia* rather than special celebrations organized to commemorate Marius' victory over the Cimbri (Schol. Bobb. 136 St. is in error; cf. Wissowa 1912: 150 n. 2), and the senatorial decree was passed in the temple of Courage and Honour (*Sest.* 116; *Planc.* 78), probably in May 57. Nothing in the

primary evidence specifies 1 May, but that is probable, the earliest moment during a month in which Lentulus, as senior consul, had the *fasces*. This is the only attested meeting of the Senate in this location and as such a remarkable coincidence with the dream. Although possible reasons for the choice of venue can be suggested, e.g. deliberately to point up the parallel between Marius and Cicero as *novi homines* or to allude to their kinship to boost support for Cic., we do not know why Lentulus chose the venue. In mid-July, at a further meeting in the temple of Jupiter Best and Greatest, the Senate formally voted for his return; popular ratification followed. See Bonnefond-Coudry 1989: 125–30.

### on the motion of an excellent and most illustrious consul

P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (*RE* iv. 1392–8), consul of 57 who had worked from the outset of his office for Cic.'s return. Posthumously Cic. celebrated him as 'author of my recall from banishment' (*auctor salutis*, *Brut.* 268; cf. *Pis.* 80). For contemporary and later praise, see e.g. *Pis.* 34: 'excellent consul'; *Red. Sen.* 5: 'unique and outstanding virtue'; *Sest.* 144: 'the god and father of my fortune and of my name' (cf. *Red. Sen.* 8). Cic. gives a full account of the theatre scene in *Pro Sestio*, delivered in 56 (117–23).

**you said that nothing could be more divinely inspired than that dream at Atina** For Quintus this is a powerful climax to his argument—Cic. himself admitted the prophetic, divinatory nature of his dream, confirmed by the passing of the senatorial decree in a venue that appears to have been used on this occasion only. At the time of the dream Cic. could not have known that Lentulus would be consul or would manipulate the proceedings so as to have the vote in a temple with particular associations with Cic. as a *novus homo* and fellow-townsmen of Marius.

**60. But many dreams are untrue!** This riposte of Quintus' imaginary interlocutor does not refer to the idea familiar from Homer onwards (e.g. *Il.* 2. 5–34) that the gods send deliberately misleading dreams, but rather to an empirical fact that not all dreams predict what will happen. This was recognized generally and even by dream interpreters (e.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 8. 95–6; Artem. 5 *prf.*). Further

objections, which lie behind this, are raised generally against divination by Marcus (2. 127–8).

**perhaps their meaning is obscure to us. But... what do we argue against those which are true?** Quintus' first response seems to place some stress on the interpretation of the dreams, and to lay blame on the human reception of dreams (cf. Plat. *Rep.* 617e). As Stoic thought, as opposed to poetic imagination, cannot accept the possibility of the gods sending false dreams (cf. Plat. *Rep.* 382e), false dreams have to be generated by human beings. His final argument is essentially that enunciated in 1. 24, but relying on the oft-repeated point that outcomes rather than reasons are crucial. If some dreams can only, or even best, be regarded as prophetic, the phenomenon of the prophetic dream exists.

**These would occur far more frequently...** An acknowledgement that the majority of dreams are not prophetic. Perhaps we are to infer from Plato's wider views on the paucity of those who have real concern for the soul, that the capacity to receive clear prophetic dreams is enjoyed by few (cf. 1. 111); for Quintus, however, the more important idea is the *potential* of all to receive.

**when burdened with food and wine, we see dreams which are confused and troubled** Via his quotation from Plato, Quintus will give examples of these unclear dreams, but his language may owe something to Aristotle: 'at other times the vision appears *disturbed* (*tetaragmenai*) and grotesque... as with those who are... *intoxicated* (*oinomenois*)' (*Insomn.* 461<sup>a</sup> 21–3; tr. Gallop), a passage he seems also to echo at 1. 81 (cf. A. Escobar, *CFC* 2 (1992), 244).

The effect on dreams of over-indulgence, explained in physiological terms, is discussed by Aristotle (*Insomn.* 461<sup>a</sup>13–30) and other writers later (e.g. Persius 2. 57; Max. Tyr. 16. 1). It could render dreams unreliable even as late as dawn (Artem. 1. 7), when the system was usually free of disturbance from the digestive system.

**See what Socrates says in Plato's *Republic*** Cic. offers here an extended translation of a passage from *Republic* 9 (571c–572a): 'whenever that part of the soul sleeps which is rational and gentle

and dominant, the beastly and wild part, full of food or drink, becomes rampant, forces sleep away and seeks to go and satisfy its pleasures. You know that there is nothing it will dare to do at such moments, since it has been freed and released from all shame and prudence. For example, as it supposes, it attempts to engage in intercourse with its mother and it does not shrink from intercourse with anyone at all, either man, god or beast, or from any act of murder; nor does it restrain itself from any food. In a word, it omits no act of madness or shamelessness. On the other hand, I suppose, when someone who is healthy and moderate goes to sleep having roused the logical element, having feasted on fine arguments and speculations, having spent time in communion with himself, while having given the emotional part neither excess nor short rations, so that it will sleep and create no disturbance for the best part, in its pleasure or pain, he leaves it alone, by itself and uncontaminated, to look and reach out for something and to perceive what it does not know, either of the past, present, or future. If likewise he has soothed the passionate part so as to sleep and has not raised his anger against anyone, but having quietened the two elements and roused the third in which thought is engendered, he takes his rest, you know that in such a condition he is most likely to apprehend the truth and that the visions of his dreams are least likely to appear unnatural.' In context Socrates is describing the man of despotic character, which he prefaces by these remarks on 'unlawful' appetites and desires, which though innate in all are controlled by reason. According to Plato, then, for most people their dreams mirror the desire of their souls and are a tool for psychological evaluation (Vegl  ris 1982: 56–60); only for the philosophical few do dreams offer the possibility of approaching the truth. This would not seem an obvious context from which to draw a key passage on divination, although Plato himself (*Rep.* 572b) gives a wider relevance to his discussion than to tyrants alone. But Cic. (or his source) has seen that this passage offers a useful summary of the roles and nature of the three parts of the soul in Platonic thought in relation to dreams. Other Platonic dialogues involving dreams, e.g. *Phaedo*, suggest that metaphysical realities cannot be perceived rationally, that dreams can be used by the gods, to reveal and not deceive (cf. *Rep.* 382e) about such things. See S. Rotondaro, *Il sogno in Platone: Fisiologia di una metafora* (Naples, 1998).

Much has been written on Cic. as a translator of Greek philosophical works, and especially of his relation to Plato, e.g. Poncelet 1957; T. Villapadierna, *Helmantica* 9 (1958), 425–53; A. Traglia, ‘Note su Cicerone traduttore di Platone e di Epicuro’, in G. Cavallo and P. Fedeli (eds.), *Studi filologici e storici in onore di Vittorio de Falco* (Naples, 1971), 305–40; Müller-Goldingen 1992: 173–87; Powell 1995: 273–300. In relation to this passage it is clear that, while offering elegant Latin, Cic. has altered the emphasis of Plato’s Greek. Poncelet (1957: esp. 253–7) puts much of this down to the deficiencies of Latin, particularly the absence of an active past participle. In this chapter Cic. does not emphasize as much as Plato does the responsibility of the human being for the inability of his soul to receive prophetic dreams, by describing its state rather than how it came about. However, rather than holding Cic. a deficient translator, it is probable that Cic. considers the attribution of responsibility adequately discharged by his introductory words; his version of Plato can, then, concentrate on the activity of the soul itself.

**that part of the soul which shares in thinking and reasoning**

Plato divided the soul into two parts, the rational (*to logistikon*) and the non-rational (*to alogon*), the second of which has two elements, the appetitive (*to epithumetikon*) and the emotive (*to thumikon*). See Plato *Tim.* 70a–e.

**So every vision which presents itself to such a man is without thought and reason... intercourse with his mother** These dreams are the product of the appetitive part of the soul. According to the interpretations recorded by Artemidorus and Achmet, dreams of actions which break social norms or laws do not necessarily portend evil and indeed constitute a notable section of oneirocritic material. The sheer length and complexity of Artemidorus’ treatment of dreams involving mother-intercourse (1. 79) suggest that such dreams were common (cf. Soph. *OT* 981–2; Hdt. 6. 107. 1; Paus. 4. 26. 3; Suet. *Iul.* 7).

**some other human being or god... beast** Dreams of sexual intercourse occupy three chapters of Artemidorus (1. 78–80): there are many varying significances for intercourse with human beings



depending on the age, status, and relationship to the dreamer of the subject (1. 78–9); intercourse with gods usually portends the death of the dreamer, although if the dreamer is healthy and in the dream derives pleasure from the intercourse, that signifies the receipt of help from one's superiors (1. 80); intercourse with beasts is straightforward: 'if a man dreams that he is having sexual intercourse with any animal whatsoever and that he himself is doing the mounting, he will derive benefits from a person or thing that corresponds to the animal...but if a man dreams that he has been mounted by the animal, he will suffer terrible acts of violence. Many men have died after this dream.' Achmet (133–4) offers a range of eastern interpretations both positive and negative for sexual relations with wild or other animals. Plato, however, is not discussing dreams with respect to their possible significance as Artemidorus does. See C. Grottanelli, 'On the Mantic Meaning of Incestuous Dreams', in D. Shulman and G. G. Stromsa (eds.), *Dream Cultures: Explorations in the Comparative History of Dreaming* (New York, 1999), 143–68.

### **killing someone and impiously staining himself with blood**

Artemidorus has a lengthy discussion of dreams of dying or being killed (2. 49–55), but says nothing on committing murder. The second part of this refers probably to dreams of cannibalism. Again Artemidorus has several varieties of this dream (1. 70).

**61. healthy and temperate habits and life** The general idea that diet and exercise could affect dreams and be employed medically is exploited by Hippocrates (*Reg.* 4). Cf. Philostr. *VA* 3. 42; Synes. *Insomn.* 19.

**with that part of his soul which involves thought and reason active** Although Cic.'s period has a clear and elegant structure with three ablative absolutes developed by three relative clauses, leading to a conclusion, this symmetry comes at the cost of the logical connections in the original. The ablative absolutes translate aorist active participles, and individually offer good translations, but the identity of the subject in the Greek is lost and with that the key idea that the will of the individual is responsible for discipline and the quality of dreams; Plato makes it clear that the dreamer must

stimulate this part of the soul (*kinesas*). This is compounded by the omission of Plato's 'having spent time in communion with himself'. See Poncelet 1957: 254–5.

**alert and satisfied with a banquet of good thoughts...neither enfeebled by abstinence nor sated with excess** Cic. retains Plato's dining metaphor, but 'thoughts' (*cogitationum*) minimizes the philosophical nature of 'arguments...speculations' (*logon...kai skepseon*). The need for balance is also seen in Ps.-Hippocrates (*Insomn.* 3): 'overcome neither by satiety or emptiness'.

**both of these usually dull the sharp edge of thought, either if nature is deprived of anything or there is abundance and excess** Cic. recasts the original with more freedom here, rendering Plato's purpose clause, 'so that it will sleep and create no disturbance for the best part, in its pleasure or pain' by this generalized parenthesis. Then there is a significant omission of '[the person who has eaten moderately and stimulated his soul] allows it by itself and uncontaminated to look and reach out for something and to perceive what it does not know, either of the past, present or future' (cf. Poncelet 1957: 255), words which would permit a good link with divination.

**calmed and quietened** The passives here, by contrast with the aorist active participles of the original, de-emphasize the responsibility of the individual to produce in himself the state necessary for truthful dreaming.

**when the two reckless parts of the soul...alive and alert for dreaming** Cic. here moves away from translation and in effect summarizes what Plato's argument requires. In his expansion of 'in such a condition' (*en toi toioutoi*), the addition of 'reckless' (*temerarius*) introduces an idea which is important to Cic. from his Academic perspective, i.e. that the good philosopher avoids hasty commitment (cf. Lévy 1992: 630 n. 6). Cic. has Varro say (*Acad.* 1. 42) that Zeno also opposed recklessness. This broader philosophical relevance militates against these words being a gloss, even though the end of the period runs more smoothly without them.

**peaceful and veridical** This is not a simple rendering of *tes aletheias...malista haptetai kai hekista paranomoi* and loses the deliberate lack of absoluteness in Plato's formulation (cf. Poncelet 1957: 257).

**I have reproduced Plato's exact words** Poncelet treats these words rigorously, and then criticizes Cic. for deliberate inaccuracies (1957: 253). To describe the translation as 'extremely free, being indeed hardly more than a paraphrase' (Pease), is in many respects unfair, as in substance it does represent Plato well (cf. Timpanaro).

**62. Shall we listen rather to Epicurus?** For Cic. Epicurus and Carneades are the chief opponents of divination (see on 1. 5, 7). In general Cic. distances himself from Epicurean doctrine, although he shares Epicurus' hostility to divination. Quintus employs this question to embarrass Marcus, by highlighting his apparent siding with philosophical approaches that he rejects. For Epicurus, dreams are purely a physical phenomenon, caused by the stream of images (*eidola*) emanating from bodies, which could not be perceived by the senses, but by the mind. 'Dreams do not have a divine nature or divinatory power, but occur as the result of the impact of images' (Epic. *Sent. Vat.* 24; cf. Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 9, VI. 6–8 Smith: 'the true nat[ure of dre]ams i[s by no means] that they are sent [by the gods] or are mon[itory]'). Although a materialist view of dreams is not inconsistent with belief in a divinatory function, in Epicurean thought the gods are unconcerned with human affairs and so play no role. See D. Clay, *AJP* 101 (1980), 342–65, and M. F. Smith, *Diogenes of Oenoanda: The Epicurean Inscription* (Naples, 1993), 450–1. Dreams were also seen as wish-fulfilments by Epicureans (cf. Quint. *Decl. Maj.* 10. 200; P. Kragelund, *CQ* 39 (1989), 440–3).

**Carneades...says now this and now that** Pease relates this to Carneades' sophistic delight in arguing both sides of a case (cf. Lact. *Inst.* 5. 14. 3–4). Although Carneades himself held no positive doctrine, but argued logically from the premisses of other schools, he could appear inconsistent. Quintus uses this to cast doubt on his argument.

**he thinks nothing that is ever elegant or fitting** The contrast with Carneades is very sharp, as Epicurus formulated his key beliefs in easily memorable and transmittable form for his followers. In general Cic. is as dismissive of Epicurus' literary talents (e.g. *ND* 1. 85, 123; *Fin.* 1. 6; *Brut.* 131; but cf. *Tusc.* 5. 26) as of his philosophical views.

**Will you, then, prefer him to Plato and Socrates... minor philosophers** For Cic.'s ranking of Plato, see on 1. 52. Cic. deliberately applies the pejorative adjective 'minor' (*minutus*) to philosophers with whom he disagrees (cf. *Sen.* 85; *Fin.* 1. 61). Prof. Dyck has suggested that *minutus* means something like 'oversubtle' or 'logic-chopping' (cf. *Leg.* 1. 36).

**Plato commands** Cic. takes a description in which Plato employs the singular and turns it into a general prescription. Only at this stage, rather than in his translation, and by introducing the notion of command, does Cic. effectively reproduce the idea in Plato that such preparation is essential for the soul to perceive prophetic dreams.

**Pythagoreans were forbidden to eat beans** The instruction to abstain from the broad bean (*vicia faba*) is included in the sayings of Pythagoras (e.g. Iambl. *VP* 109) and is a commonplace of the tradition on Pythagoras. It is in some cases ambiguous whether the prohibition extended even to touching the bean (Aul. Gell. 4. 2. 9; cf. Tert. *An.* 31), but the regular context for discussion is that of food (e.g. Aul. Gell. 4. 2. 2). A definitive explanation for the prohibition is impossible, but various approaches are possible: to understand a commonsense injunction in the face of what is now recognized as an hereditary enzyme deficiency that results in a severe reaction to broad beans, and is marked in southern Italy and Sicily, the cradle of early Pythagoreanism (e.g. R. S. Brumbaugh and J. Schwartz, *CW* 73 (1979–80), 421–2). Again, Pythagoreans may have believed that beans contained the souls of the dead (Plin. *HN* 18. 118; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 635e) and their prohibition can be seen in totemic terms (e.g. M. Detienne, *Dionysos Slain* (Baltimore, 1979), 60–1). Latterly, emphasizing a Pythagorean rejection of anti-oligarchic use of the lot,

see A. Herrmann, *To Think Like God* (Las Vegas, 2004), 59–60. In favour of an explanation combining ‘medical, dietetic, epidemiological, magico-religious, and historico-contextual evidence’, see J. Scarborough, *CW* 75 (1981–2), 355–8, and M. D. Grmek, *Diseases in the Ancient Greek World* (Baltimore, 1989), 210–44.

Quintus’ explanation (cf. Plin. *HN* 18. 118; Diog. Laert. 8. 23; Dioscor. 2. 105; *Geopon.* 2. 35. 3–4) is one of a variety of rationalizing explanations (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 12f; Aul. Gell. 4. 2. 4–5, 10; Clem. *Strom.* 3. 3). In addition to the unquestioned flatulence which broad beans produce, their high content of levadopa affects the nervous system and may produce insomnia and nightmares, conditions uncondusive to psychic activity.

**63. When the soul is separated by sleep from union with the body..., then it remembers the past, sees the present, and foresees the future** Quintus draws together strands which are moulded by Platonic thought, but have a wider reference too in that the essential elements (except the notion that the soul leaves the body during dreaming) were taken over by Aristotle and the Peripatetics. (i) A human being is a combination of body and soul; (ii) in sleep the soul is freed to some extent from its ‘slavery’ to the body (e.g. Ps.-Hippocr. *Insomn.* 1; Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 3); (iii) in death the soul is separated completely from the body (e.g. Plat. *Phd.* 64c; Nemesius 131–2: ‘the soul is in some way separated from the body in sleep...and it carries on activity by itself in dreams divining the future and consorting with intelligibles’). When the body is asleep, the soul is free to perceive prophetic dreams—e.g. Aristotle (Sext. *Emp. Math.* 9. 21 = Arist. fr. 12a W): ‘when the soul is isolated in sleep, it assumes its true nature and foresees and foretells the future’, and Ael. *VH* 3. 11: ‘the Peripatetics say that during the day the soul is wrapped up in the body and is a slave to it, and is unable to see the truth clearly; but at night it is freed from its obligation to the body and it becomes more prophetic, taking the form of a sphere in the area around the chest. From this come dreams’, and Anon. *Vit. Pyth.* in Photius cod. 249: ‘if the soul is separated from the body during life it becomes better than itself and in sleep in relation to dreams...it betters itself by far when separated from the body’.

The notion that the seer ranges over past, present, and future is a commonplace going back to Homer (*Il.* 1. 70), but may come to Cic. in this context ultimately from Peripatetic sources (cf. Theiler 1982: 294) since at 1. 65 Cic. uses the example of Hector's dying prophecy which was used by Aristotle in this context. Cic. may also have in mind the passage from Plato's *Republic* which he has just translated, in particular a phrase he omitted from his version, 'perceive what it does not know, either of the past, present or future'.

**the body of a sleeping man lies like that of a dead man** Sleep is compared to death from Homer onwards (e.g. *Od.* 13. 79–80; Plat. *Apol.* 40c–41b; Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 92), but the connection with psychic activity was exploited most by those with Platonic sympathies (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 8. 7. 21; Nemes. 131: '[the soul] leaves the body lying just like a corpse').

**even more so after death, when it has completely left the body** For death as the mutual separation of soul and the body see e.g. Plat. *Phd.* 64c. Because Plato does not speak of the detachment (*Lösung*) of the soul from the body, Schäublin suspects the particular influence of Aristotle (cf. Sex. Emp. *Math.* 9. 21), but because the body usually remains after death Plato's mutual 'separation' (*apallage*) must be conceived of as the soul leaving the body.

**So, as death approaches, it has greater power to divine** Plato, *Apol.* 39c: 'I am already in the state in which men are most likely to prophesy, that is when they are about to die' (cf. *Epin.* 985c). This phenomenon is commented on by Xenophon (*Apol.* 30) and Aristotle (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 22), who trace it back to Homer, where the dying Patroclus and Hector prophesy about the deaths of their killers. 'Around death, when the body becomes cleansed of all impurities or obtains a temperament suitable for this, through which the rational and thinking part is relaxed and freed from the present and roams among the irrational and imaginative realm of the future' (Plut. *Mor.* 432c). It became a commonplace, e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 8. 7. 21; Diod. 18. 1. 1; Photius (*Suda*, s.v. *ἀνθρῶπος* (1. 226 Adler)); Serv. *Aen.* 2. 775.

**For those in the grip of a serious and fatal disease . . . visions of the dead often appear to them** For inspired prophecy (*mania*) associated with

illness, cf. Plat. *Tim.* 71e; *Phaedr.* 244d; Aret. SA 24 H: 'they prognosticate to themselves, in the first place, their own departure from life; then they foretell what will afterwards take place to those present, who sometimes imagine that they are delirious; but these people wonder at the outcomes of what has been said. Others also talk to the dead, perhaps they are alone in perceiving them to be present, perhaps from their soul seeing beforehand, and announcing those with whom they are about to associate . . . when the disease has drained off and taken away the mist from their eyes, they perceive the things which are in the air, and with the naked soul become prophets.' 'Visions' (*imagines*) translates the Greek term *phantasmata* (cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 50, 10. 32), which Chrysippus uses specifically for dream visions. For the Epicureans there is the physical explanation for this phenomenon, that the dead leave behind atomic *simulacra* which impact upon the mind, without any divine involvement (cf. Lucr. 1. 132–5). The Stoics seem to have distinguished between images which are the product of the mind itself (*phantasia*), and thus of no prophetic significance, and those with a real existence demonstrating the true cognitive function of the soul (cf. Repici 1991: 175). The notion that *imagines* suggests a source other than Posidonius, one which denies the reality of dream manifestations (Finger 1929: 392–3), is unnecessary.

**Those who have not lived as they should have at that moment feel the greatest repentance for their sins** Cf. Stob. 4. 125 W: 'repentance affects all who are about to die, as they remember what they have done wrong'. Plato famously dilates on this subject (*Rep.* 330d–e), and may be Cic.'s direct source here. However, the synthesis of ideas in this chapter can with some plausibility be attributed to Posidonius (Theiler, Schäublin), although others restrict his influence to chapter 64 only (Kidd 1988: 429) on the grounds that the explanations of dreaming are inappropriate in the context and are, in fact, a crude insertion.

**64. Posidonius confirms also by that example which he adduces** As Schäublin suggests, 'also' is a clear indication that the previous material derives from Posidonius.

**a certain Rhodian . . .** The mention of a Rhodian may simply reveal the nationality of the man, but, as Posidonius lived and worked on

Rhodes, it may also operate as some guarantee of the reliability of the story.

there are three ways in which men dream under divine impulse Posidonius' argument plausibly draws on Herophilus' classification of the origin of dreams (cf. [Ps.]-Plut. *Mor.* 904f: 'some dreams are inspired by a god and arise by necessity, but others are natural and arise when the soul forms for itself an image of what is to its own advantage and what will happen subsequently; still others are mixed and arise without stimulus according to the impact of images whenever we see what we wish, as happens in the case of those who in their sleep make love to the women they love'; see on 1. 6 Chrysippus). It reappears in Philo, with slight changes to accommodate his monotheistic perspective (*Somn.* 2. 1: 'the third kind of dream occurs whenever the soul in sleep, setting itself in motion and agitating itself, becomes frenzied and inspired with the power of prognostication and foretells the future. The first kind is where god initiates the movement and, unseen, suggests things obscure to us but known to him, and the second kind is where the understanding moves in concert with the soul of the universe and is filled with divinely induced madness, which is permitted to foretell many things that will come to pass'). Posidonius no doubt accepted psychological explanations for ordinary or diagnostic dreams (cf. Kessels 1969: 400), but the most natural interpretation of 'under divine impulse' restricts the context here to divine, prophetic dreams (cf. Pfeffer 1976: 78–88; *pace* von Staden 1989: 308–9). 'Impulse' (*adpulsu*) illustrates the basic materialist conception of the Stoics, that there has to be external agency to explain such dreams (cf. Repici 1991: 176). Posidonius presents the three different divine impulses, in ascending order of importance of their mediator. Behind his classification lies the question, 'How do men acquire a certain knowledge of the future through dreams?' It seems that these are complementary explanations of different degrees of clarity and quality of prophecy, as is made explicit by Iamblichus, who is plausibly developing Posidonius' formulation (*Myst.* 3. 3: 'when at any rate the soul is united with the gods in such a detached activity, then it receives the *truest* fillings of its thoughts, from which it produces true divination'). Quintus' failure to refer again to this



classification explicitly and its isolation in the middle of *exempla* of prophecy by the dying has suggested that its inclusion is an afterthought (Holowchak 2002: 75), but in fact the ideas do recur in the later argumentative section (e.g. 1. 109–10).

**the soul foresees all by itself because of the relationship with the gods it possesses** The kinship (*cognatio, sungeneia*) of man and gods is a widespread philosophical and religious idea for the Greeks and Romans going back at least to Diogenes of Apollonia (e.g. Cic. *Leg.* 1. 24–5), but its centrality to Stoic thought, seen most clearly in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (4), 'for we are your offspring', is most relevant for Posidonius' use of it. Galen (*Plac.* p. 449 M) attributes to Posidonius the belief that the intellectual function of the soul, 'the *daimon* within oneself has a similar nature (*sungenei*) to the one which governs the whole universe', the providential world spirit, i.e. that it is essentially rational. 'Itself by itself' appear to be very similar to Aristotle's words (*Sex. Emp. Math.* 9. 21; quoted above), which is plausible given the wider context (Kidd 1988: 430), although there remain fundamental differences between Posidonius and Aristotle. There is no early Stoic text which states that the soul *by itself* can tell the future, hence this is probably an idea introduced by Posidonius to Stoicism (C. Lévy 1997: 335–6) and it is in contrast to the two following explanations.

**the air is full of immortal souls on which the marks of truth are clear, as though hallmarked** This is not a reference to fixed stars in the heavens, but to *daimones*, go-betweens between man and gods (e.g. Plat. *Symp.* 202e–203a; *Epin.* 984e), and *heroes*, surviving souls of the dead which inhabit the air (e.g. Philo, *Somn.* 1. 135, *Gig.* 8–9). They were a common element of Stoic belief (Diog. Laert. 7. 151), sometimes linked with divination (Stob. 2. 114 W; Chalc. in Plat. *Tim.* 260–1 W). Posidonius wrote a book on these (Macrob. *Sat.* 1. 23. 7). 'As though' (*tamquam*) shows that this is metaphorical imagery (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 564d–e), but the term 'marks' (*notae*), which is used in the sense of *semeia*, is appropriate for the idea that dreams can convey the truth in what the Stoics called a 'cataleptic presentation' (*kataleptike phantasia*; cf. *Sex. Emp. Math.* 7. 246; see M. Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1987), 151–76). It would

seem that Posidonius conceives of the immortal souls indicating the future because the future has already impacted on them in the form of kataleptic impressions. 'Hallmarked' (*insignitae*) is probably to be linked to 'marks' as a translation of *enapēsphragismenos* (cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7. 248; see Philippson 1922: 102). Philo accommodates this to monotheism by eliminating the intermediaries: 'our own mind moving out of itself together with the mind of the universe' (*Somn.* 1. 2).

**the gods themselves speak with people as they sleep** Cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 2. Clearly the highest, and rarest form of communication. Kidd (1988: 432) suggests that dreams received through dream oracles and incubation may be meant. However, a wider sense is likely to cover examples such as Sophocles' dream (1. 54). This is a view held by Chrysippus (2. 130), not a Posidonian innovation.

**as I just said...** Cic. signals the end of this short digression and return to the subject of 1. 63.

**65. Callanus, about whom I spoke earlier** See on 1. 47.

**Homer's Hector... prophesied the imminent death of Achilles** Cf. Homer, *Il.* 22. 355–60. This example, cited in this context, is attributed first to Aristotle in his *On Philosophy* (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 1. 21 = Arist. fr. 12 W), but probably comes to Cic. via Posidonius (cf. Theiler 1982: 293). Homeric examples appealed to Stoics for their authority (see on 1. 13 **things which**).

**Common usage would not have rashly hallowed the use of the word *praesagire*, if it did not correspond to some reality** Arguments from common usage (*consuetudo*), particularly for etymologies, were common in ancient philosophy and particularly for Stoics (cf. Cic. *Off.* 1. 23) who believed that the linguistic form of a word indicated its true meaning (cf. Origen *Cels.* 1. 24). Schäublin rightly argues that this particular example is not a translation by Cic. of a Greek original, although the possibility of some similar etymology in Greek with different examples cannot be excluded.

As I was leaving home, my soul presaged that I was leaving in vain Quintus quotes a line from Plautus (*Aul.* 178), although he substitutes a subjunctive (*exirem*) for the indicative of the original (*exibat*). This is probably a loose quotation from memory, involving an adaptation to the syntax of Cic.'s day (Timpanaro). 'Presaged' (*praesagibat*) is the word in question.

old women are called *sagae*, because they want to know much Festus 303 L: 'old women are called *sagae* because they know much'; 426 L: 'a woman skilled in sacred things is also called *saga*'; Porph. Hor. *Epist.* 2. 2. 208–9: 'he uses *sagas*... as though it were *satisagas* and those who do much'; Schol. Hor. *Carm.* 1. 27. 21: '*saga*... from "do enough" *satis agat*'; cf. Non. 23 L. Although the simple verb *sagire* is not attested, its existence is not to be doubted.

dogs are called *sagaces* Hunting dogs who sniff out the lairs of their prey by their sharp senses (Festus 303, 427 L; cf. Non. 23 L).

So the person who has knowledge (*sagit*)... Cf. Festus 250 L: '*praesagire* is to divine in advance (*praedivinare*), to be wise in advance (*praesipere*)'.

66–9 The section of Quintus' case concerned with the second branch of natural divination, inspired prophecy, which he will present very briefly (1. 66–9). This comparative brevity is explained to some degree by the relative absence of such prophets from Roman religious life (but see on 1. 4). Quintus has to present an essentially Greek phenomenon via the prophecies of Cassandra and the Rhodian oarsman, as the most famous Roman examples were easily refutable (see 2. 113), but the final example does have the merits of being contemporary and vouchsafed by credible witnesses, and as such fits with Quintus' empirical case.

66. therefore If we give 'therefore' its logical value, Quintus appears to force his case, as there is no clear connection between the kind of presaging involved either in the Plautus quotation or the popular use of his chosen term and the mantic frenzy in his first example.

**a power of presaging** Cic. uses the abstract noun derived from *praesagire*. The MSS read *praesagatio*, which is defended by Timpanaro as the *lectio difficilior* against the frequent correction to *praesagitio*, which is the form known to Festus (303 L). However, the first conjugation verb from which *praesagatio* would come is not attested before the 2nd cent. AD, whereafter it is the predominant form and would have been most familiar to scribes, leading to its appearance here in place of the earlier form.

**which is imposed from outside and is kept in by divine power**

Quintus stresses that prophecy is not a natural function of the soul, unlike dreaming, but requires the external influence of the gods. *Iniecta* ('imposed'), which Falconer and Timpanaro render by 'infused' (cf. Schäublin 'beigelegt'), requires, or at least suggests, something more forceful and in keeping with the description of Cassandra's behaviour. 'Kept in' (*inclusa*) again suggests that the prophet would naturally reject the divine manifestation and that it requires divine power to maintain it. Cassandra experiences an extreme manifestation, 'with some greater force' (*acrius*).

**the soul is drawn from the body and is stirred by divine impulse**

Again the language is powerfully metaphorical: the soul is envisaged as an animal dragged (*abstractus*), goaded (*instinctu*), and spurred (*concitatur*) into action. This description should be compared with that of the soul dreaming, where the root metaphor for separation from the body is non-violent (*sevocatus*). For a modern parallel of oracular possession see W. G. Arnott, *G&R* 36 (1989), 152–7.

Even if the interpretation of the Linear B syllables ke-sa-da-ra as meaning prophetess (J. L. García Ramón, *BCH* suppl. 25 (1992), 239–55) is problematic (cf. E. Suárez de la Torre, *Kernos* 7 (1994), 190 n. 40), in classical literature Cassandra is the example par excellence of the inspired prophet. Ennius' description of Cassandra shows that there are two distinct stages, psychological states, in her transmission of the prophecies: at first she is self-possessed and conveys her message rationally and then she is possessed by the god and sees visions. In the first extract that Cic. quotes here, although Cassandra indicates that divine possession is coming upon her, she is still in command of her language (Timpanaro 1996: 28–9); in the

second she is seeing a vision and in the third she becomes the direct mouthpiece for Apollo. Ennius signals the changes by metre from trochaic *septenarii* to iambic *octonarii* to dactylic *quaternarii*. Cf. A. Mazzoldi, *Cassandra la vergine e l'indovina: Identità di un personaggio da Omero all'Ellenismo* (Pisa, 2001), 179–283.

**But why...** Quintus presents three quotations from Ennius' *Alexander* (cf. 1. 42). Their respective contexts in the play are uncertain, but in the most likely reconstruction, which is based on the hypothesis of Euripides' *Alexander*, all three come from the recognition scene (Scodel 1980: 36).

**does she seem suddenly to use her flaming eyes to grasp with?**

These words are usually attributed to Hecuba, on the grounds of Cassandra's opening vocative, but the third person form (*visa est*) and *illa* do not fit easily with this, so Jocelyn (1967: 207) gives them to the coryphaeus. Most modern editions follow Lambinus' simple emendation to the second person *visa es* (Pease, Timpanaro 1996: 19–20, Schäublin), which permits Hecuba to speak them directly to Cassandra.

I retain the *rapere* of the MSS and take it with *oculis* (Jocelyn 1967: 210) rather than Lambinus' *rabere* (to be mad). Timpanaro's *paul<ul>o* is a simple and attractive solution to the metrical difficulty provided by the hiatus required in the *páulo* / *ante* in the MSS. *Virginali* of the MSS is understood as *virginalis* by all modern editors, with the final *s* failing to 'make position', as often in archaic poetry.

**Mother... I have been overcome by inspired prophecies; For Apollo, against my will, spurs me to frenzy** Cassandra addresses Hecuba, with heavy alliteration of *m* unreproducible in the translation. Jocelyn (1967: 212) suggests tentatively that 'Ennius thought of his Cassandra as a horse ridden by the power of clairvoyance', imagery which ties up splendidly with the introduction to the example, and with the frequent presentation of Cassandra (cf. S. Timpanaro, *SIFC* 21 (1946), 58–9). 'Inspired' renders *superstitiosus*, an adjective without negative connotations at this period and used by Ennius in its root sense of 'possessing divinatory powers' (cf. Ronca 1992: 48–9).

**I am ashamed...my father is ashamed of my actions** The first acknowledgement of shame may be an enigmatic way of Cassandra suggesting that her possession by Apollo has robbed her of her virginity and her right to associate with the other young girls who constitute the chorus. In legend Cassandra's prophetic talents were the gift of Apollo in return for promised sexual favours, but she cheated him and was punished by never being believed (Tzetzes ad Lycoph. *Alex.* 4). Priam is probably ashamed of Cassandra's raving that must have made her a doubtful prospect for marriage, but the immediate tension between them concerns her prophecies of doom.

**a sweet poem, expressive and suited to her character, but not relevant to the matter in hand** Cic.'s use of 'poem' instead of 'drama' has suggested that he is quoting from a text rather than remembering a stage performance (S. Goldberg, 'Cicero and the Work of Tragedy', in Manuwald 2000: 51–2). Quintus' criticism of his quotation as irrelevant seems rather harsh, as the core of it at least illustrates the notion of external influence well and (as above) the imagery fits well with Quintus' introduction. The adjectives 'sweet' (*tener*) and 'expressive' (*mollis*), contemporary terms of the neoteric aesthetic, are not relevant to the archaic verse of Ennius but to the vividness of the description of psychological disturbance. This, however, does not undermine Quintus' understanding of poetry, but simply shows him appreciating it in the contemporary language of literary criticism (*pace* Krostenko 2000: 369). Moreover, the psychological aspect is precisely to the point, as the introduction to these quotations shows.

**67. the torch comes** This passage also comes from the recognition scene of the plays by Euripides and Ennius (Scodel 1980: 35–6) at the point where Cassandra catches sight of Paris and points at him, describing him in language which deliberately recalls the dream of Hecuba (see on 1. 42).

**The god, enclosed within a human body, now speaks, not Cassandra** 'Enclosed' recalls the opening of 1. 66. This interpretation is required by Quintus' belief that prophecy is a result of external agency. It is not clear whether Cic. has omitted several verses

between his second quotation and this (Timpanaro 1996: 51). Cf. Plat. *Ion* 534d: 'god takes away the mind of these people... just like with divine seers, so that we who hear them may know that it is not they who utter these words of great value, when they are out of their wits, but that it is god himself who speaks and addresses us through them'.

**Already on the great sea** Cassandra's prophecy of the Greek fleet sailing to Troy to avenge the seizure of Helen must precede the prophecy by some time and thus justify Quintus' classification of it as a true prophecy.

**68. I seem to be presenting tragedies and stage-plays** For Quintus' consciousness of the questionable historical value of drama and myth, see on 1. 42.

**from you yourself I have heard an example of the same kind... which happened** As with the climax to the examples of dreams, Quintus employs an ostensibly powerful *ad hominem* argument, but one which also satisfies historical criteria for reliability—the incident was contemporary and was related to Marcus by one who heard the prophecy firsthand. Quintus can also establish that the prophecy was delivered before the defeat of the Republican forces and was not a *post eventum* creation (cf. Latte 1959: 140).

**C. Coponius...in command of the Rhodian fleet with praetorian imperium** Cf. Cic. *Cael.* 24: 'most civilized and learned, possessed of the most sober enthusiasms and the finest of skills' (with reference to this man and his brother Titus). Coponius had been one of the associates of Caelius Rufus. His praetorship of 49 is attested in literary (Cic. *Att.* 8. 12A. 4) and numismatic sources (*RCC* i. 462, no. 444); his command, with C. Marcellus, of the Rhodian section of Pompey's forces is mentioned by Caesar (*BC* 3. 5. 3, 26.2). Quintus accurately describes Coponius' position in 48 as pro-praetor.

**came to you at Dyrrhachium** After Caesar invaded Italy in January 49, Pompey ordered an evacuation to Dyrrhachium on the west coast of Greece. Cic. left on 7 June (*Fam.* 14. 7. 2). In June 48,

because of illness, Cic. remained in Dyrrhachium (e.g. Plut. *Cic.* 39. 1) while Pompey pursued Caesar to Thessaly after thwarting his attempts to encircle Dyrrhachium. By the end of July Pompey was approaching Thessaly and on 5 Aug. reached Pharsalus (see J. H. C. Leach, *Pompey the Great* (London, 1978), 192–200). The chronological indications in Quintus' story, 'a few days later' and 'in less than thirty days', help us fix the prophecy to a date after 9 July and probably closer to 9 Aug., if 'few' is to be taken at face value. Marcus' use of the imperfect tense at 2. 114: 'we were hearing that camps had been set up next to each other in Thessaly' reinforces this impression. In the immediate aftermath of Pompey's success at Dyrrhachium Republican morale was high and letters were sent to the provinces proclaiming Caesar's defeat (Caes. *B Civ.* 3. 79. 4). If the prophecy was delivered at that time, it is more remarkable than if at a later stage, when Pompey's absence, a shortage of news, and the imminence of a decisive battle might have fuelled fear in Dyrrhachium. Marcus minimizes the prophecy by playing up such factors (2. 114).

**a rower from a Rhodian quinquereme had prophesied a Greece bathed in blood in less than thirty days** Cf. Aul. Gell. 15. 18. The prophecy is attributed to a Greek of humble rank, far from home. Pompey's forces were defeated at Pharsalus on 9 Aug. 48 (e.g. *Fasti Ant. Min.*).

**the plundering of Dyrrhachium, and an embarkation onto ships in flight** After Pharsalus those who had not fled with Pompey returned to Dyrrhachium, but, as he considered it an indefensible position, M. Porcius Cato, the commander, evacuated his forces by sea to Corcyra some time in Sept. 48.

**the Rhodian fleet would receive a swift return and journey home** After the Republican navy had been split, the Rhodians may have headed east under the command of Cassius and surrendered to Caesar (App. *B Civ.* 2. 87, 137; Dio 42. 6. 2). For Latte (1959: 140), this is the heart of the so-called prophecy—the Rhodian rower wanted to return home and projected his wishes into a 'prophecy'.



**At the time you yourself were not unworried** In the only extant letter from the period Cic. shares the general optimism after some success at Dyrrhachium: 'it looks as if what remains won't be too difficult' (*Att.* 11. 4A). In later letters, with the benefit of hindsight, he is pessimistic about the Republican cause, but not about its military success (*Fam.* 7. 3. 2). Cf. *Fam.* 6. 6. 6: 'in that war no disaster occurred that I did not predict'.

**Marcus Varro and M. Cato...both learned men, were greatly alarmed** The former was alive to corroborate the story, and as a leading intellectual, was a good source for Quintus; M. Porcius Cato (Uticensis) had died in 46 (see on 1. 24). Both Cato and Varro easily earn their description as 'learned' (see Rawson 1985: *passim*), the latter was exceptional (cf. *Brut.* 205: '[Varro] a man outstanding in intellect and every kind of learning'). It is appealing to think that Cic. is being humorous in his description of these reactions to the prophecy: as a Stoic Cato should have accepted the general phenomenon of prophecy and remained calm in the face of his destiny. Varro had been a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon (e.g. Cic. *Att.* 13. 12. 3) and became a dogmatic Academic (Tarver 1997: 138–41). Despite Cic.'s dedication of his *Academica* to Varro and Varro's reciprocation with his *De Lingua Latina*, relations between them were not excellent during the period of Caesar's domination (cf. C. Kumaniecki, *Athenaeum* 40 (1962), 221–43). For a characterization of the trio as the 'Three Wise Men', see E. Fantham, *PLLS* 11 (2003), 96–117.

**A few days later Labienus arrived in flight from Pharsalus** T. Labienus (see R. Syme, *JRS* 28 (1938), 113–25 = *Roman Papers*, i. (Oxford, 1979), 62–75) commanded the cavalry on Pompey's left wing, the rout of which and the consequent encirclement of his wing were fatal to Pompey's strategy. A date around the middle of Aug. is likely, if Labienus did not travel light.

**the rest of the prophecy was soon fulfilled** According to Caesar (*B Civ.* 3. 99. 3), 15,000 Republicans were slain and more than 24,000 captured; Asinius Pollio (App. *B Civ.* 2. 82) recorded 6,000 dead. 'Soon' means within a month of the decision to concentrate resistance in Africa because the fleet was off Africa by the beginning of Nov.

**69. The grain plundered...told the truth** Quintus describes a hasty, panic-ridden abandonment, rather than a strategic withdrawal, with looting by the Republican troops. 'Deserted by the Rhodian fleet' probably refers to the encounter between the squadron under Cassius' command and Caesar in the Aegean (see above the Rhodian fleet...).

**70. I have set out divination by dream and frenzy, which, as I said, involve no technique** Quintus signals the end of this section of his argument and reminds the reader again of the basic division of divination, recalling the formula with which he began the section, 'involves no technique' (*arte careret*: 1. 34).

**our friend Cratippus** See on 1. 5.

**the human soul is to some degree derived and drawn from something outside itself** This belief is attributed by Cic. to the Pythagoreans (*Sen.* 78: 'Pythagoreans never doubted that we have souls drawn from the divine, universal mind', cf. *Tusc.* 5. 38: 'the human soul is taken from the divine mind'. Sext. *Emp. Math.* 9. 127: 'Pythagoras and Empedocles...declare...there is one spirit which pervades, like a soul, the whole universe and which makes us one with them'), but the later development of the idea by Theophrastus (*Simpl. In Phys.* 965: 'the mind is something better and more divine since it enters from outside and is completely perfect') is crucial here for its presentation by the Peripatetic Cratippus. Aristotle himself (e.g. *Gen. an.* 736<sup>b</sup>27) may have thought that the rational element of the human soul (*nous*) was the same as the divine *nous*, but the notion of being 'drawn from it' seems too physical. Cratippus, however, will have drawn on the more developed arguments and material universe of the Stoics, for whom the notion of a divine soul pervading all things was central. Chrysippus and Posidonius are attested with the very combination of ideas Quintus presents here (Diog. Laert. 7. 142–3: 'that the universe is a living thing, rational, animate, ensouled and intelligent is said by Chrysippus in his *On Providence* Book I...and by Posidonius...it is ensouled (*empsychon*), as is clear from our soul being a fragment from that source').

Cic. will echo this in 'drawn and poured off' (1. 110), in a passage which also comes from Cratippus.

**part of the human soul which is endowed with sensation, motion, and appetite** This description of the soul, which seems more Platonic than Aristotelian, illustrates the tendency of Cratippus to emphasize the Platonic residue in Aristotle's thought. The division of the soul into two parts is that between the rational and the irrational (cf. *Off.* 1. 101; *Tusc.* 2. 47), characterized by Plato as the noble and ignoble parts of the soul (e.g. *Rep.* 438d ff.; *Phdr.* 246a ff.). Cic. himself credits Plato with the bipartite division (*Tusc.* 4. 10), but he is well aware, not just from translating *Rep.* 571c–572b (1. 60–1), that Plato subdivided the irrational part into two (cf. *Rep.* 435b–436a). Cic. renders *to epithumetikon* by *adpetitus* (appetite), and *to thumikon* less succinctly by *sensus* and *motus* (sensation and motion).

**separated** 'Separated' (*seiugatam*) has the powerful image of 'un-yoked'.

**that part of the soul... is at its most active when it is furthest away from the body** Gucker (1999: 41–2) creates a clash between this and the similar phrasing at 1. 115 'the soul... remains alert while the body sleeps' by insisting that the separation of the soul here is physical. However, only a non-literal reading of this passage, referring to a soul's degree of immunity from the body, makes sense. Aristotle's talk about parts of the soul is much less committal than Plato's (cf. *An.* 433<sup>b</sup>1–3) and 'furthest from the body' is too spatial an expression for Aristotle, whose notion of the separation of the *nous* from the body is one of definition rather than physical distinction. Cratippus may envisage a scale on which ecstatic prophecy demonstrates the ultimate degree of immunity (Tarrant 2000a: 75–6).

**71. So...** Cratippus usually concludes his argument in this way Quintus' formulation of this has been taken to show that he is not quoting from a written work, but recalling the line of argument used by Cratippus in lectures or discussion (cf. Pease, 22 n. 100).

Either this would have been mediated by Quintus' nephew Marcus, who had been studying under Cratippus since mid-45, or more likely comes from personal contact with Cratippus during Cic.'s visit to Mytilene in 51 (*Tim.* 2). However, Cic. can use the same formulation where we know there were written works (*Fin.* 5. 81) and it means no more than 'this is the regular line of argument'. As Tertullian (*An.* 46. 10) includes Cratippus in a list of authors on dreams, there was a written work for Cic. to use (cf. P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, i. (Berlin, 1973), 247–8). The following presentation of Cratippus' views is reproduced with only small variations at 2. 107 and is then refuted by Marcus at 2. 108.

**although without eyes...possesses the sense of eyes which see things as they really are** While the argument depends on Cratippus' reading of Plato's *Meno*, which can be summarized as 'once a person is conscious of having recollected something, he is empowered with the faculty of recollection and can use it repeatedly' (cf. Tarrant 2000a: 70–1), the detail is more Aristotelian. This suggests that Cratippus applied to divination arguments in Aristotle's *De Anima*: (i) as the function of seeing presupposes the existence of eyes as physical organs of sight and of objects specifically appropriate to perception by that sense, so the function of divination presupposes either the existence of an 'organ' which can interpret instances of divination or the existence of specific divinatory objects; (ii) just as we accept that through the sense of sight that which is true *can* be seen, even if sometimes we are deceived, so through divination, even if sometimes it errs, it *is possible* to perceive the truth; (iii) there are many examples of divination which *it appears* could not have occurred by chance; (iv) therefore the existence of divination should be admitted (Repici 1995: 184–5).

At first sight, the parallel is appealing, in that the proposition that we do not deny the existence of sight because sometimes our eyes mislead us is undeniable; the extension of this, however, to something like divination is problematic, in that, while divinatory practices do exist, it is not possible to prove that anything lies behind them in the same way as it is possible for sight, without begging the existence of the phenomenon (cf. Repici 1995: 185–6).

someone who possesses the power of divination can sometimes make mistakes. This very cautious and modest position is no different from Posidonius' and that of the Stoics in general (cf. 1. 24).

if there is one instance of something being foretold in a way that it evidently could not have happened by chance. This conclusion of the Cratippian argument will appear later in Quintus' defence (1. 125). Although the formulation could appear very weak, if *videatur* is translated as 'seems' (cf. 1. 125: *apparet*), here a stronger translation is required: 'evidently' (cf. the Greek *phainetai on*). For Stoics from Chrysippus onwards, the obviousness (*enargeia*) that divinatory predictions came true featured in their formal arguments (cf. Bobzien 1998: 92–3), but Cratippus' argument is not formulated in a way that could satisfy the concerns of the sceptical academy. For the notion of 'exceptionless contingent generalizations' and their application to this argument, see Burnyeat 1982: 235–6.

There are innumerable examples of this kind and so the existence of divination must be admitted. Again the argument goes too far—as the Stoics had done, Quintus will show many examples which can be considered evidence of divination, but acceptance of them does not *prove* the reality of divination, only its plausibility. Moreover, the question of the frequency of successful predictions and whether they are statistically significant among the total number of divinatory predictions made is crucial (cf. 2. 121), but is ignored by Quintus (cf. Hankinson 1988: 146–7).

72–9a The Cratippian excursus has provided a powerful summation to natural divination, concluding with a ringing reaffirmation of the Stoic valuation of 'outcomes', indeed setting out more starkly that even *one* 'outcome' would suffice to prove the existence and validity of divination. Now Quintus will demonstrate for artificial divination 'outcomes' which meet the criteria for credence. His *exempla* are not organized in any discernible way, either by genre, chronology, or nationality, but they cover the whole period from Homer (1. 72) to the mid-1st cent. and thus serve the argument *e vetustate* and are taken from Greek, Roman, and Phrygian history and thus support the argument *e consensu omnium*. In most cases the

source of the *exemplum* is specified and they meet 1st-cent. criteria for contemporary or reliable sources. The first Roman *exemplum* has Marcus as a witness and the culminating *exemplum* concerning his friend Roscius also comes 'firsthand', and is corroborated by its commemoration in art and poetry.

**72. types of divination** In a passage that Linderski (1986a: 2237) rightly calls 'magisterial', Quintus separates with precision the two techniques employed within the various genres of artificial divination. 'Conjecture' (see on 1. 24) may in practice have been required infrequently if the records of the divinatory discipline were very full.

**recognized and recorded** See on 1. 12.

**interpreters** This must cover astrologers and interpreters of lot-oracles, both of which Quintus (1. 12) and Marcus (2. 109) include in their lists of types of artificial divination.

These types are considered invalid by the Peripatetics, but are defended by the Stoics Cf. the doxography of 1. 5–6.

**books of the Etruscans on haruspicy, lightning, and rituals show** Quintus observes the canonical order of the threefold division of the *disciplina Etrusca* (Guillaumont 1986: 125). If 'show' is taken at face value, these works were readily accessible and not secret compilations. In what form the Etruscan *haruspices* kept the records of their discipline in their own language is unclear, although the mummy of Zagreb now proves the existence of linen books in Etruscan on their rituals (see F. Rocalli, *Scrivere Etrusco* (Milan, 1985), 17–64) and tomb reliefs show rolled scrolls (Capdeville 1997: 458–64). By the Late Republic, however, some material was available in Latin. Lucretius' protest against 'Etruscan poems' (6. 381) suggests a strong interest in things Etruscan by his contemporaries. Indeed Tarquinius Priscus is credited with an *Ostentarium* (Macrob. *Sat.* 3. 7. 2); A. Caecina (see P. Hohti, 'Aulus Caecina: The Volaterran. Romanization of an Etruscan', in P. Bruun (ed.), *Studies in the Romanization of Etruria* (Rome, 1975), 409–33; Capdeville 1993:

13–25) and a Grapus (Granius?) wrote on lightning (cf. Rawson 1985: 303–6). There was no shortage of abstruse material on all aspects of Roman religion available for scholars and others, even if the official colleges did retain secret archives (cf. Linderski 1985: 207–34 = 1995: 496–523). Cic.'s own knowledge of the *disciplina Etrusca*, however, was superficial (e.g. D. Briquel, *ACUSD* 31 (1995), 28).

The third element 'rituals' is glossed by Festus (358 L): 'Ritual is the name given to the Etruscan books in which is written by what rites cities are founded, altars and temples hallowed, walls dedicated etc.' *Rituales* should not be emended to *tonitruales* (thunder) (*pace* C. Fries, *RhM* 55 (1900), 31–2): although there were probably *libri tonitruales* in the Etruscan world, if the title of Nigidius Figulus' *Tonitruale* is the translation it claims to be, thunder plays very little role in *De Divinatione*, and when it does it is in an augural context (cf. 2. 82). Nigidius' book was available for Quintus to allude to, as seen by Cic.'s clear paralleling of it in *Consulatus Suus* (Weinstock 1951: 140). The *libri rituales* here should relate to the interpretation of prodigies and their expiation, *libri ostentaria* (cf. Cens. *DN* 11. 6, 14. 6, 17. 5–6; see Capdeville 1997: 487–95).

**your books on augury** These are the resources available to Cic. as a member of the college of augurs, rather than any reference to Cic.'s own book on augury, *De Auguriis*. Probably augural decrees and the commentaries dealing with the *ius publicum* were available at least to the magistrates (Linderski 1986a: 2245 n. 387). If the augural books and commentaries were organized like the *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, each year recorded the names of the augurs, their activities, decisions, the text of prayers used, and description of rituals; if they were stored in the temple of Juno Moneta, they were effectively secret for practical reasons of value and fragility (Giovannini 1998: 110–17).

**unprepared conjectures in accordance with the situation** Quintus stresses the circumstances which differentiate a conjecture from regular augural interpretation. As Pease notes, *subito* must be understood as 'unprepared': the auspice or portent was without parallel and so has to be interpreted by analogy with known signs

thus taking account of the circumstances and necessitating the employment of rationality (cf. Linderski 1986a: 2239).

**in Homer Calchas predicts the number of years of the Trojan War from the number of sparrows** Cf. Hom. *Il.* 2. 301–32. As the Greeks were sacrificing at Aulis a snake emerged from the bottom of one of the altars and climbed into a tree where it ate eight sparrow chicks and their mother before being turned into stone. Calchas was immediately called on to explain this portent; the nine consumed birds each represented a year that would be spent at war before Troy would be captured in the tenth year. This portent received ample discussion in ancient works on divination: ‘concerning these lines Aristotle was at a loss. Why did Calchas, if what occurred was no portent, interpret it as a portent? Either because it was unusual for sparrows to be eaten by a snake or because there were eight. Concerning the turning into stone, which was great, he says nothing except that it points to the voyage home’ (Schol. B Hom. *Il.* 2. 305 = fr. 145 R). This example probably comes to Cic. via Posidonius (cf. 1. 87–8).

**Sulla’s *History*** During his brief retirement Sulla wrote a 22-vol. work of self-justification, a rapidly gathered selection of disparate material without a finishing, literary polish. Plutarch makes great use of them, citing them as *hypomnemata* (e.g. *Sull.* 37. 1), which is the usual term for commentaries. Only Cic. calls them *History*, either ironically or because there was no current term for autobiography or memoirs (R. G. Lewis, *Athenaeum* 79 (1991), 511 n. 11). See H. Behr, *Die Selbstdarstellung Sullas* (Frankfurt, 1993), 9–21.

**an occurrence which you witnessed** Cic. began his military service in 89, first under Sulla (Plut. *Cic.* 3. 1) until the latter went to stand for the consulship of 88 and then under Pompeius Strabo (Mitchell 1979: 8–9). Quintus returns to his technique in the dreams section of using *ad hominem* examples. If we exclude the legendary example of Calchas, Quintus begins and ends his *exempla* of artificial divinatory outcomes with contemporary cases.

**sacrificing in the territory of Nola in front of his headquarters**

Sulla was performing the regular sacrifice before action to ascertain



the gods' will (cf. Rüpke 1990: 148). In 90 Nola in Campania had fallen to the Samnite rebels and become a stronghold. Appian's date of 89 for Sulla's victory (*B Civ.* 1. 221; cf. Livy *Per.* 75) is preferable to the 88 of Plutarch (*Sull.* 9; cf. Val. Max. 1. 6. 4). See Salmon 1967: 364–7.

**a snake suddenly emerged from the bottom of the altar** Cf. Homer, *Il.* 2. 310; Obseq. 47; Val. Max. 1. 6. 8. The portent may be prefigurative, i.e. the snake symbolizes the sally Sulla was to make (Pease).

**Gaius Postumius the *haruspex*** Although the presence of *haruspices* with armies of the early Republic and during the Second Punic War is suggested by Livy (e.g. 8. 6. 12, 23. 36. 10, 25. 16. 3), and thus their presence was not remarkable, the relationship between Sulla and Postumius reflects the general's personal belief in divine guidance (cf. A. Keaveney, 'Sulla and the Gods', *SLLRH* 3 (1983), 51). Postumius, who appears in Sulla's retinue in 88 and 83, was from his name probably of Etruscan origin (cf. Schulze 1904: 215), a salaried official serving as Sulla's private *haruspex* rather than a prominent individual and member of the *Ordo LX haruspicum* (Rawson 1978: 141). Portents and their interpretation by Postumius featured large in Sulla's *commentarii* (cf. Plut. *Sull.* 6. 12, 9. 6; August. *De civ. D* 2. 24; Obseq. 56b).

**he captured the strongly fortified Samnite camp** Cf. Val. Max. 1. 6. 4; Livy (*Per.* 75) has two camps. Sulla claimed Samnite and rebel losses of 23,000 (App. *B Civ.* 1. 50), but Nola did not fall; he renewed the attack in 88 (Vell. Pat. 2. 18. 4).

**73. A conjecture...in the case of Dionysius** Cf. Plin. *HN* 8. 158: 'Philistus records that Dionysius left his horse stuck in mud, and, when it had dragged itself out, it followed its master's tracks with a swarm of bees clinging to its mane; and that because of that portent Dionysius seized the tyranny'; Ael. *VH* 12. 46: 'they say that Dionysius son of Hermocrates was crossing a river. A horse was carrying him. The horse slipped in the mud, but he jumped off, took hold of the bank and went away, leaving the horse as if it were

dead. But it followed him, neighed, and called him back. He grabbed its mane and was about to mount when a swarm of bees covered his hand. When Dionysius asked the Galeotae about this they told him that it was a sign of sole-rule.' Without warning Quintus begins a series of Greek *exempla*, this first taken from Philistus (*FGrH* 556 F 58) and therefore on the basis of the criteria spelt out earlier credible to Quintus; the conjecture was made, as Aelian shows, by the Galeotae (see on 1. 39).

**shortly before he began to reign** Dionysius was elected plenipotentary general (*strategos autokrator*) in 405, but his 'reign' might be held to have begun only in 403 after the revolt against him within Syracuse when he surrendered all claim to magisterial office and ruled as 'Leader' (*hegemon*; cf. Caven 1990: 82–3). In Diodorus (13. 96. 2) he 'openly proclaimed himself tyrant' after his return from Leontini in 405, but, while in terms of *Realpolitik* Diodorus is correct, it is not certain that Dionysius' apologist Philistus would have described his position as such.

**travelling through the territory of Leontini** In 405, as plenipotentary general Dionysius travelled to Leontini, where he had ordered all Syracusans of military age to muster, ostensibly for action against the Carthaginians but in reality to secure his own position away from the opposition of the upper-class citizens. The river is probably either the Terias or the Lissus.

**the horse was swallowed up in whirlpools and disappeared...**

The prodigy, as Philistus is likely to have presented it, related the vicissitudes of Dionysius' early career and foretold his rise to power: after participating in the attempted conspiracy of Hermocrates in 408 Dionysius had himself reported as one of the dead to escape punishment (Diod. 13. 75. 9), although he soon rose to become secretary (*grammateus*) to the generals (Caven 1990: 44). His supposed death is perhaps symbolized by the horse's disappearance, and the trip to Leontini as plenipotentary general by its re-emergence. In a less likely interpretation based on the lower chronology, the vicissitudes of Dionysius' horse would relate to his tenure of the generalship from 405 to 403, the powerful revolt against him in 403,

and then his subsequent glorious emergence as tyrant and most powerful commander in Sicily.

Although, in the famous example of Cyrus, the Persians used a horse's whinny to identify their next king (e.g. Hdt. 3. 84. 3; Just. *Epit.* 1. 10. 4–5), here the horse's noise conveys no meaning other than that it is alive.

**a swarm of bees had settled** A swarm portent was interpreted as a large number of obedient subjects (cf. Cic. *Har. Resp.* 25), but normally in the Roman context bee swarms are negative (D. MacInnes, 'Dirum ostentum: Bee Swarm Prodigies at Roman Military Camps', *SLLRH* 10 (2000), 56–69). Bees seen in dreams, however, were favourable for a commander (Artem. 2. 22). Achmet (282) has many different meanings for bees seen in dreams, but no example close to this. Here the swarm probably foreshadows the grant to Dionysius of a bodyguard of at least 600 by the army at Leontini and his employment of Dexippus' mercenaries (Diod. 13. 95. 5, 96. 1). After returning to Syracuse, he set up headquarters in the strategically crucial naval arsenal and controlled Syracuse by his mercenary forces (Diod. 13. 96. 2).

**74. warning was given to the Spartans shortly before the disaster at Leuctra** The Spartans demanded that the Thebans dissolve the Boeotian League and abide by their oaths, and sent an invasion force under King Cleombrotus. In Aug. 371 on the plain of Leuctra in south Boeotia the Spartan force was defeated, with the loss of some 400 Spartiates. See J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 46–66; idem, *SO* 55 (1980), 75–93.

**in the shrine of Hercules his weapons clanked** Pausanias (3. 15. 3) describes a *hieron* with an armed statue of Heracles, which fits the 'shrine' (*fanum*) of Cic., near the walls. Such prodigies appear in the Roman lists from the Late Republic (Aul. Gell. 4. 6. 2; Obseq. 44; Dio 44. 17. 2). Pease rationalizes the portents as the result of an earthquake producing simultaneous disturbances in Thebes and Sparta.

**the statue of Hercules was covered with sweat** The unusual appearance of some form of condensation was a frequent portent (cf. 1. 97 for parallels from Roman history).

**At the same time...**as Callisthenes says The miraculous synchronicity of events in cult sites of the same god far apart indicates divine responsibility. Although Cic. calls Callisthenes 'learned' (*Rab. Post.* 23), he regards his style as overly rhetorical (*De or.* 2. 58). Quintus himself enjoyed reading Callisthenes (*Cic. Q Fr.* 2. 12. 4). Closely connected with Aristotle and a contemporary observer, Callisthenes will have seemed a reliable authority for these events, which he narrated in his 10-vol. *Hellenika* (*FGrH* 124 F 22a). Cic. may take this example from Posidonius (*pace* Timpanaro), although he is familiar with Callisthenes and his appearance fits well with Quintus' tastes.

**the temple of Hercules** In myth Hercules lived in Thebes before his labours; he freed the city from the king of Orchomenus and was worshipped as a hero in a sanctuary outside the main gates of the city south of the Cadmea. Although only a hero, he was worshipped in a temple, with pediments and relief sculptures (and doors). His worship was especially connected with Thebes (e.g. Isoc. *Phil.* 32). See Schachter 1986: 14–30.

**the doors...suddenly opened of their own accord and the weapons that had been fixed to the walls were found on the ground** Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 7: 'it was reported to them from the city that all the temple doors were opening of their own accord and the priestesses were saying that the gods were revealing victory...and from the Heracleum they said that his weapons had disappeared, as if Heracles had set off for battle'. From Ephorus onwards these miracles were attributed to Epaminondas as devices to boost his soldiers' confidence before the battle (*Diod.* 15. 53. 4; *Polyaen.* 2. 3. 8); Xenophon and Callisthenes, however, were more credulous, and even Marcus (2. 67) goes no further than blaming chance. Although the miraculous opening of temple doors has a rich history in literary works, its acceptance as a prodigy in Roman historical accounts (e.g. *Obseq.* 13, 42, 52) may make it particularly attractive for Quintus. See O. Weinreich, 'Gebet und Wunder', in *Genethliakon: Wilhelm Schmidt zum 70 Geburtstag* (Tübingen, 1929), 169–464, esp. 259–62 = *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien* (Darmstadt, 1968), 9–298, esp. 96–9. For the Romans the fall of items in a temple assumed

religious significance as 'falling auspices' (*auspicia caduca*: Festus 56 L): the fall of the statue of Minerva that Cic. had dedicated presaged his death in 43 (Dio 45. 17. 3).

**At the same time at Lebadea, as a rite in honour of Trophonius**

Again the synchronicity is important to establish that the phenomena are divinely caused. In myth Trophonius was a master builder who, when pursued by his enemies, was swallowed up by the earth. He delivered oracles at night in an underground shrine (cf. Paus. 9. 39) to consultants who may have been fed hallucinatory drugs (R. J. Clark, *TAPA* 99 (1968), 63–75). His cult was popular in the 4th cent. (cf. Heraclides Ponticus fr. 155 Wehrli), as can be seen from the four different Trophonius prodigies recorded in connection with Leuctra (Tuplin 1987: 99–103). Remains of the oracle in the form of a subterranean chamber have been found on Mt. Propheetis Ilias, west of the temple of Zeus Basileus, but this was not the original location before the Theban League enhanced the site and moved the oracle closer to the temple of Zeus at the beginning of the 3rd cent. See Schachter 1994: 66–89; Bonnechère 2003.

**cocks in the neighbourhood began to crow** Although the birds may have been for sacrifice (cf. Bonnechère 2003: 58–9), cocks were considered birds with special divinatory roles, perhaps because their unique behaviour in looking up at the sky (Plin. *HN* 10. 47) was interpreted as looking to Jupiter. See Amiotti 1998: 119–32.

**Boeotian augurs said that victory belonged to the Thebans...** Cf. Plin. *HN* 10. 49: 'by crowing all night long they presaged to the Boeotians their famous victory against the Spartans, as the conjectural interpretation was made on the grounds that this bird when conquered does not crow'. For the belief that cocks crowed in connection with victory, cf. Plin. *HN* 10. 47, 11. 268; Ael. *NA* 4. 29.

**75. At the same time** Cic.'s different expression (*eadem tempestate*) is a solemn, archaic formula to emphasize the simultaneity and ubiquity of the divine warnings connected to Leuctra, which marked a crucial moment in the changes of power in 4th-cent. Greece. It is natural that many prodigies were associated with it (cf. Plut. *Ag.* 28. 4;

Mor. 397e-f). Quintus now reverts to Spartan prodigies that foretold the end of their hegemony.

**on the head of the statue...at Delphi there appeared suddenly a crown of wild, prickly grasses** Plut. *Mor.* 397f: 'the stone statue of Lysander himself sprouted a growth of wild shrub and grasses in such quantity that it concealed his face'. This marble statue, set up in the treasury of the Acanthians, featured Lysander with long hair and beard (Plut. *Lys.* 1. 1-2). See Bommelaer 1991: 160-1. The Lysander prodigies signify the end of Spartan hegemony by mishaps to the one who had done most to secure Spartan hegemony (cf. L. Prandi, *Callistene: Uno storico tra Aristotele e i re macedonici* (Milan, 1985), esp. 45-7).

As Pease notes, 'such growths were obviously due to the sprouting of seeds carried by the winds or birds...in the dust on the neglected tops of statues'. Plants growing in such unexpected places were treated as prodigies by the Romans (Plin. *HN* 17. 244; Suet. *Aug.* 92) and Greeks—Aristomenes was driven to suicide by the sight of grass, which normally grows only in deserted places, sprouting around his ancestral hearth (Plut. *Mor.* 168f).

**Lysander...the most famous of the Spartans** For Cic. 'a man of the utmost courage' (*Sen.* 59), 'the most clever and patient of the Spartans' (*Off.* 1. 109). Lysander was the Spartan commander whose strategy and diplomacy brought the Spartans victory in the Peloponnesian War. See Bommelaer 1981.

**stars of gold, which had been set up by the Spartans at Delphi** Plut. *Lys.* 18. 1: 'Out of the spoils, Lysander set up at Delphi bronze statues of himself and each of his admirals, as well as golden stars of the Dioscuri', cf. Plut. *Mor.* 397f: 'the stars which Lysander had dedicated from the spoils of his naval victory at Aegospotami'. Bommelaer argues that Plutarch refers to two separate monuments (1981: 10-11). The monument of the naval commanders is immediately on the left inside the SE entrance to the sanctuary; remains survive of the marble base of this major monument (c.18 × 4.5 m), which featured the crowning by Neptune of the Dioscuri and Lysander (Paus. 10. 9. 7-9; cf. Bommelaer 1981: 14-16). Although

this was a state monument, the prominence given to Lysander is remarkable (Jacquemin 1999: 191–2). The location and form of the ‘stars monument’, a private dedication by Lysander, are unknown, but perhaps that of the sanctuary of the Dioscuri can be surmised (see below). To commemorate a similar epiphany at Salamis the Aeginetans had dedicated a bronze mast with golden stars (Hdt. 8. 122), but Lysander’s dedication may have been more grandiose and devoted to his own glorification.

**after the famous naval victory of Lysander** Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2. 1. 21–32; Diod. 13. 105–6; Plut. *Lys.* 9. 5–13. 4. At Aegospotami in 405, while serving as vice-admiral (*epistoleus*), Lysander tricked the Athenians into complacency and captured most of their fleet. See Bommelaer 1981: 103–13 and P. Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika I–II.* 3. 10 (Warminster, 1989), 175–8.

**Castor and Pollux were said to have appeared with the Spartan fleet** Cf. Plut. *Lys.* 12. 1: ‘there were some who declared that the Dioscuri appeared as stars on each side of Lysander’s ship when he was sailing out of the harbour against the enemy, and shone out over the rudders’. Pease rationalizes this as a manifestation of St. Elmo’s Fire. Battlefield epiphanies are a common feature of ancient historiography (see Pritchett 1979: iii. 11–46, and H. S. Versnel, in D. van der Plas (ed.), *Effigies Dei* (Leiden, 1987), 42–55), and the Dioscuri feature prominently (Plut. *Mor.* 944d; Sagra, Diod. 8. 32; Messenia, Paus. 4. 16. 5; Regillus, Dion. Hal. 6. 13; see Lorenz 1992: 114–22), particularly in naval contexts (cf. N. F. Xypetnos, *Platon* 34–5 (1982–3), 23–48). They are associated above all with Sparta and received particular worship there (e.g. Wide 1903: 304–25; Parker 1989: 145). They were believed to accompany the Spartan kings on campaign, perhaps in the form of statues. Here the annexation of these gods by the non-royal Lysander may be an aspect of his struggle for power within a Spartan system which restrained him (cf. 1. 96).

**The insignia of those gods, the gold stars...fell just before the battle of Leuctra and could not be found** Stars are first associated with the Dioscuri from their role as Argonauts and are seen in the metopes of the Sicyonian monopteros at Delphi c.570 (H. A. Shapiro,

‘Cult Warfare: the Dioskouroi between Sparta and Athens’, in R. Hägg (ed.), *Ancient Greek Hero Cult* (Stockholm, 1999), 106 n. 36) and as early as 480 stars alone could symbolize the Dioscuri; the pair appear with stars on Attic vases from the last quarter of the 5th cent. (*LIMC* iii/1, s.v. *Dioscuri*, nos. 232–7). Despite the doubts of Lorenz (1992: 117) that the stars in Lysander’s dedication referred to the Dioscuri, on the grounds that stars are not an element of their iconography in Laconia, the Dioscuri and stars do appear in the Spartan colony of Tarentum in the mid-4th cent.

The sanctuary of the Dioscuri at Delphi may have been located between the treasuries of Potidaea and Spina/Agila (P. Faure, *AC* 54 (1985), 56–65; cf. the caution of Jacquemin 1999: 172). The stars were probably placed on the heads of the statues, as in the Hellenistic period (H. Pomtow, *AM* 31 (1906), 563). If the stars did disappear, perhaps later authors and even contemporaries such as Callisthenes did not know where the stars had been attached or what form the monument took. The symbolism is clear: the gods’ protection of Sparta had been withdrawn, they would provide no epiphany to combat the omens provided by Trophonius and Hercules.

**76. Spartans** *Spartiates* (cf. *Tusc.* 1. 102, 5. 77) designates strictly the ruling caste of the Spartans, as befits Spartan ambassadors to Dodona.

**consulted the oracle of Jupiter at Dodona on the question of victory...** This, the first known official enquiry by the Spartan state of Dodona (see on 1. 3), was perhaps necessitated by the non-operation of Delphi after a powerful earthquake in 373 had destroyed the shrine. But the Spartans were also keen to win the support of the Molossians who had recently come to prominence in NW Greece, a confederation of ten tribal groups under Alcetas (N. G. L. Hammond, *Epirus* (Oxford, 1967), 523–33) centred on Dodona and Euryomenae. Although Spartan intervention had saved the Molossians from occupation by the Illyrians in 385, they had joined the Second Athenian Alliance in 375. In 371, with a powerful Spartan army in Phocis, King Alcetas had to decide which side he would take in the forthcoming clash and might have been interested in the god’s response to the Spartans. See Parke 1967: 137–8.



In the literary accounts there were five ways by which the oracle was held to give responses, but historical consultations and contemporary references concern the use of the lot. Questions to Jupiter were inscribed on lead tablets and placed in an urn to be presented to the god, who would give a response also on a token (Parke 1967: 83–6).

**a monkey...upset the lots themselves...in every direction** For apes as pets in ancient Greece, see W. C. McDermott, *The Ape in Antiquity* (Baltimore, 1938), esp. 131–40, 149; for the term *deliciae* as pet, see Bradley 1998: 536–7. If Alcetas was present at the consultation, with his pet, there is no need for the suggestion that the monkey leapt from the trees of the sacred grove (H. Pomtow, *NJ* 127 (1883), 349). The monkey's behaviour (cf. Dio 50. 8. 1) prevented any message from Zeus being delivered, a convenient occurrence for Alcetas, as it absolved him of the need to choose sides.

**it is said that the priestess...said that the Spartans should think not about victory, but about safety** Although 'it is said' (*dicitur*) indicates some caution, the source for this is again the contemporary Callisthenes and the account is credible (Parke 1967: 83). The priestess interpreted the incident as an indication of great disaster, rather than a simple negative response (cf. Parker 1985: 308).

**77. Again...** Quintus moves to a Roman example of the same kind where prodigies announced a defeat. This example is taken from Coelius, although his name does not appear till 1. 78 (cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 8: 'Coelius writes that C. Flaminius paid no heed to religious obstacles and fell at Trasimene, inflicting a great disaster on the state'). Many elements of Coelius' account appear in Livy (22. 3. 11–13, cf. Plut. *Fab.* 3) and featured prominently in most annalistic accounts of Trasimene.

**C. Flaminius, consul for the second time** C. Flaminius, consul of 223 and 217, was a popular favourite, enemy of the nobility, but perhaps not the purveyor of a consistent, coherent anti-senatorial policy (R. Develin, *RhM* 122 (1979), 273–7). Because the senatorial class moulded the historical tradition on Flaminius, he appears

as a controversial figure and in an extremely negative light. See Amat-Seguin 1986: 79–109; M. Caltabiano, ‘Gaio Flaminio’, in A. Caldi and G. Susini (eds.), *Pro poplo Ariminense* (Faenza, 1995), 111–28, and F. Cenerini, ‘Gaio Flaminio’, *ibid.*, 129–43.

**ignore the signs of things to come and cause a great disaster to the state?** In original Roman thought prodigies did not foretell the future, but announced that Rome’s relationship with the gods was broken; as such they functioned as a warning of divine anger. Only growing Hellenization and the crisis of the Second Punic War led to ideas that prodigies foretold or prefigured what would happen. By sending a prodigy the gods interrupted the normal laws of nature to create an unforeseen phenomenon which required a formal response from man. According to Coelius, Flaminius ignored a wide range of divine warnings, a version which both vindicates the gods’ concern for Rome and underlines Flaminius’ guilt and responsibility. Such a presentation (cf. Livy 22. 9. 7) obviated the problem of condemning Flaminius’ politics in a partisan way and strengthened acceptance of the religious system.

**When he had purified the army** On this ceremony of purification (*lustratio*) see on 1. 102. Flaminius was prepared to observe religious rites, here the sacrifice of a *suovetaurilia*, to preserve the *pax deorum*, but not the kind that could be used against him by the elite (cf. Rosenstein 1990: 83). In manoeuvres which made strategic sense he left his base of Ariminum to counter Hannibal’s imminent arrival in Etruria and to prevent his ravaging unrestrained (Amat-Seguin 1986: 94–9).

**he and his horse suddenly fell for no reason in front of a statue of Jupiter Stator** This occurs at Arretium a day before the battle at Trasimene (Konrad 2004*b*: 179–80). Falling was ominous (cf. 1. 58), especially for a commander, but the most striking aspect of this is the location, which only Coelius specifies. Jupiter Stator was the god who ‘brings the rout to a halt’ (Livy 1. 12. 5) and his most famous temple stood in the Forum Romanum. The gods were warning Flaminius to halt (*stare*). Coelius’ account has none of the humour of Livy’s version (cf. L. G. H. Hall, *LCM* 15 (1990), 34–6), eliminates natural

causes (cf. Herrmann 1979: 115), and through the topographical detail highlights the disregard of Jupiter by Flaminius which is seen throughout his career.

**The experts' opinion of this sign...he considered as no obstruction** These unspecified experts are probably *haruspices* (Linderski 1986a: 2191 n. 167). Flaminius' action at this stage was not necessarily reckless, as such omens could be 'turned' (cf. Suet. *Iul.* 59) or considered as insignificant. In Roman thought a very large role was played by human free will, first in deciding whether to accept an omen as significant and secondly in averting it by rapid action (see Bloch 1964: 89–100). No problem need have arisen for Flaminius with any aspect of determinism, as that is a late introduction to Roman thought under the influence of Hellenistic philosophy. However, Cic. felt obliged to deal with the problem in *De Fato*.

**the hen-keeper said that this was not a day for joining battle** This second instance occurs on the morning of the battle of Trasimene. On *tripudium* and battlefield auspices, see on 1. 27–8. Coelius represents the augural aspects well: the hen-keeper reported to the auspiciant the birds' behaviour, answering the simple question whether Flaminius should join battle on that specific day. Konrad speculates (2004b: 178) whether the hen-keeper was conscious that Flaminius possessed no valid auspices and was attempting to dissuade him from battle.

**“Remarkable auspices indeed...”** Flaminius is presented as a rationalist, sceptical of the hallowed practices of Roman religion. It is not clear from Flaminius' question to the attendant, 'what course of action he would advise if the chickens would not eat even at a later stage', whether he was contemplating a second auspication later the same day, which violated religious practice. Rather he ridicules the whole procedure. To ignore this form of 'forced' impetrative auspice, which was almost guaranteed to produce a favourable response, was particularly dangerous (see 1. 28–9). Had Flaminius gone on to win, his behaviour would have been ignored, but in the narrative this is his second warning.

the standard-bearer of the first maniple could not move his standard from the ground Cf. Livy 22. 3. 12–13; Florus 1. 22. 14. As this ‘maniple’ (*hastati*) formed the front line of heavily armed troops in battle formation (L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army* (London, 1984), 38–9), a sign indicating that the senior maniple of the *hastati* should not move into battle formation was powerful and should have been heeded. Even after digging, the standards were removed only with difficulty (Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 11. 19: ‘this happened to Flaminius as well, who when he had ordered the standards to be raised and they could not be moved, and the ground in which they had been fixed was dug up, instructed them to be extracted by force’). The great Roman disasters of Trasimene, Arausio (Schol. Bern. *Georg.* 4. 108), and Carrhae (cf. Val. Max. 1. 6. 11; Dio 40. 18. 2) in particular and the revolt of Scribonianus in AD 42 (Suet. *Cl.* 13. 2) are linked by this oblativ sign (cf. Oros. 7. 6. 7), through which Jupiter demonstrates that the commander’s auspices are invalid. See Konrad 2004*b*: 169–203.

Flaminius...in his usual way ignored it Coelius’ account of Flaminius presented his other floutings of religious practice. For example, to avoid his political enemies preventing his exercise of the consulship by manipulation of the religious machinery, Flaminius entered his consulship on 15 Mar. 217 outside Rome. A consequence was that he did not take the traditional auspices or sacrifice to Jupiter on the Capitol or celebrate the Latin Festival on the Alban Mount; he had also set a date for his army to assemble without auspication and had omitted the usual sacrifices and vows on leaving Rome for his province (cf. Livy 21. 63. 9; see Rosenstein 1990: 59–60, 77–8; Konrad 2004*b*: 172–3).

Coelius’ account makes clear that the correct augural procedures were followed: the oblativ sign was reported to the magistrate or general, who then had the duty to accept or reject it by a formal pronouncement. Flaminius, however, simply ignored the sign, the meaning of which was clear because of the intimate connection between the reception of the negative response to his impetrative auspices and the command to uproot the standards, and thus behaved with extreme rashness. Jupiter was signalling as clearly as possible that Flaminius’ auspices were invalid (Konrad 2004*b*: 180–1).

As a result within three hours his army was destroyed and he himself was killed On the battle of Trasimene, see G. Susini, *Ricerche sulla battaglia del Trasimeno* (Cortona, 1960). Livy (22. 6. 1) also records that the fighting took around three hours. Roman losses were severe: 15,000 slain, 10,000 put to flight (Livy 22. 7. 2; Polyb. 3. 84. 7, 11–15), and 6,000 captured (cf. App. *Hann.* 41: 20,000 slain, 10,000 fled). In Livy (22. 6. 4) an Insubrian named Ducarius transfixes Flaminius with a lance, while Polybius credits several Celts (3. 84. 6). There are conflicting traditions on the fate of Flaminius' corpse: either it was found and handed over to the Romans for honourable burial (Polyaen. 6. 38. 1) or Hannibal could not find it (Livy 22. 7. 5; Plut. *Fab.* 3. 3).

78. Coelius has added...at the very time that this disastrous battle was taking place... Cf. Livy 22. 5. 8: 'their minds were so engrossed in the battle that none of those fighting felt the earthquake which laid low large parts of many cities in Italy'. Pliny *HN* 2. 200: 'the most numerous series of shocks was during the Punic War, when reports reached Rome of fifty-seven in a single year; it was the year when during an action at Lake Trasimene neither the Carthaginians nor the Romans noticed a violent earthquake' (cf. Plut. *Fab.* 3. 2; Zon. 8. 25). All the prodigies and auspices concerning Flaminius come from Coelius (Herrmann 1979: 116). The stress on synchronicity may owe something to the influence of Timaeus (cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 69). Although earthquakes could be interpreted as portents of divine displeasure, they cannot have fulfilled the same function as the warnings ignored by Flaminius, hence Quintus merely tacks this section onto his main account. At most the quakes demonstrated to the Romans that the *pax deorum* had been ruptured.

among the Ligurians... The geographical detail, unique to Coelius' version, indicates a major earthquake across northern Italy; Zonaras has the quake extend to Etruria (8. 25).

in many places landslides occurred Cf. Livy 22. 5. 8: 'caused great landslides to mountains'; Plut. *Fab.* 3. 2: 'parts of crags were broken off'; Zon. 8. 25: 'many of the mountains... collapsed'.

rivers flowed in the opposite direction, and the sea flowed into their channels Cf. Livy 22. 5. 8: 'turned fast-flowing rivers from their course, brought the sea into rivers'; Zon. 8. 25: 'rivers cut off from their ancient outflows, turned to new'. This clear reversal of the normal order was a particular indication of divine anger.

**Midas the famous Phrygian...would be very rich** Cf. Aelian *VH* 12. 45 and Val. Max. 1. 6 *ext.* 2. Midas was once divided between a mythical character and the 8th-cent. ruler of Phrygia, traditional dates 738–696, but now the legendary aspects are increasingly interpreted in terms of Phrygian religious and cultural customs (see L. E. Roller, *CA* 2 (1983), 299–312; eadem, *CA* 3 (1984), 256–71; A. Thiel, *Midas* (Heidelberg, 2000)). Wealth is a key element in the Midas tradition from the earliest Greek reference (Tyrt. fr. 12), so that his name became synonymous with wealth (e.g. Ar. *Plut.* 286–7) and he was credited with a golden touch (e.g. Ov. *Met.* 11. 85–145). For animal-nursed infants in Greek and Roman legend, see E. S. McCartney, *Papers of the Michigan Academy* 4 (1925), 15–42.

**Again, while the tiny Plato was asleep in his cradle, bees settled on his lips** This is the earliest testimony to this story which appears in greatest detail in Neoplatonist biographies (e.g. Olympiodorus *In Alc.* 2. 24–9: 'his parents took the infant Plato and set him down on Mt. Hymettus, as they wanted to sacrifice there on his behalf to Pan, the nymphs and Apollo Nomios; while he was there, bees approached and filled his mouth with honey, in order that it might become true of him, that words sweeter than honey flowed from his mouth'; cf. Anon. Proleg. 2. 16–22 and Ael. *VH* 10. 21, 12. 45). The key variant is whether the bees merely settle on Plato's lips (e.g. Cic., Plin. *HN* 11. 55) or make honey there (e.g. Val. Max. 1. 6 *ext.* 3; Ael. *VH* 12. 45). 'Again' (*at*) is ostensibly adversative, pointing to the contrast between the different gifts predicted for Midas and Plato (cf. Timpanaro). Although Cic. may have encountered the anecdote during his studies at the Academy, the most plausible source of this story is a biography of Plato, mediated to Cic. via Posidonius. See Riginos 1976: 17–21.

**the interpretation was given that he would possess a unique sweetness of speech** Val. Max. 1. 6 *ext.* 3: 'hearing of this, the

interpreters of prodigies said that a singularly persuasive eloquence would flow from his mouth' (cf. Plin. *HN* 11. 55). As bees were considered to be the souls of the dead and as a symbol of the Muses (e.g. Varr. *RR* 3. 16. 7; Procl. *In R* 2) and were connected with the inspiration of poets from Homer onwards (e.g. Paus. 9. 23. 2), the interpretation given here is not remarkable, but Plato is the only philosopher in the many parallels cited by Pease. For the link between honey and eloquence, an idea which goes back at least as far as Homer (*Il.* 1. 249), see W. Robert-Tornow, *De apium mellisque apud veteres significatione* (Berlin, 1893), esp. 105–14. In Aelian and the Neoplatonist versions the story is slanted so as to give Plato an Apollonian nature, a notable feature of many of the stories about Plato which reflects Plato's own reverence for Apollo (cf. *Phd.* 60e) and explains the transference of poetic symbols to Plato (Riginos 1976: esp. 31–2).

**79. was Roscius...lying or was it the whole of Lanuvium on his behalf?** Q. Roscius Gallus, the tragic and comic actor, for whom Cic. spoke in a property suit of uncertain date. For his provenance from Lanuvium, cf. *ND* 1. 79. Despite the ambiguous social position occupied by actors in Roman society, Roscius seems to have enjoyed great popularity (Jones 2001: 129–45). See C. Garton, *Personal Aspects of Roman Theatre* (New York, 1972), 209–13.

**Solonium [a flat area in the territory of Lanuvium]** Festus (296 L) places the *ager Solonius* 12 miles from Rome on the *via Ostia*, which is impossible to reconcile with any location near Lanuvium (cf. C. Pisani Sartorio and S. Quilici Gigli, *BCAR* 89 (1984), 10–13). Given that Cic. had a Lanuvian villa (*Att.* 2. 3. 3), possibly inherited from Roscius, he would not have erred on its location. Unless there was another *ager Solonius*, otherwise unknown, or a slip for Lavinium (Gordon 1938: 23 n. 15), it is best to jettison these words as a gloss.

**his nurse...observed him asleep, wrapped in the coils of a snake** This is familiar from mythology, e.g. Erichthonius (Eurip. *Ion* 21–6), Helenus and Cassandra (Schol. A Hom. *Il.* 7. 44), and Roman history, e.g. Scipio Africanus ([Sext. Aur.] *DVI* 49. 1),

Nero (Dio 61. 2. 4). The portent was one of future greatness. The lexicographers Hesychius and Pollux (s.v. ὄφεις) show that bracelets with snake emblems were commonplace, which may reflect either some belief in the protection of snakes or have been aimed to ward them off. As snakes played an important role in the worship of Juno Sospita at Lanuvium (see Gordon 1938: 37–41; Pailler 1997: 521–2), confirmed by the contemporary coins of L. Roscius Fabatus (RCC, no. 412), there may be specific local symbolism relating to the goddess' protection or blessing on Roscius.

**Roscius' father referred it to the *haruspices* who replied that the boy would achieve unequalled fame and glory** A private consultation, cf. 1. 36. The prophecy came true in that Roscius was considered the best of his profession and his name was used to denote excellence in all kinds of art (Cic. *De or.* 1. 130); 'Roscius is on stage' was used proverbially of the best orator (Cic. *Brut.* 290).

**Pasiteles has engraved this scene in silver** The MSS read Praxiteles, but Winckelmann's correction to Pasiteles must be accepted. Praxiteles, the 4th-cent. BC sculptor is the more famous, but his appearance here is a chronological absurdity. Pasiteles was a Greek from South Italy, who received Roman citizenship in 89, a scholar-artist, praised by Varro (Plin. *HN* 35. 156). See Stewart 1990: 230, 306–7.

**our friend Archias has described it in verse** A. Licinius Archias was a native of Syrian Antioch, born c.120, who achieved fame as a writer of epigrams and had a special talent for ex tempore composition (Cic. *Arch.* 18). He first came to Rome in 102 and Cic. defended him in 62 when his Roman citizenship was impugned. Quintus, it seems (Schol. Bob.), was president of the court which heard the case.

**79b–84** On my interpretation of the structure of book 1 (see introd., § 3 (vi)), these chapters form the beginning of a key section of Quintus' argument in which two ideas are brought together: (i) the gods do not normally communicate through direct



epiphanies, but through divination (either natural or artificial); and (ii) the existence of the gods and of divination are mutually dependent. The latter argument (82–4) is clearly climactic, bringing to the fore the typically Stoic formulation advertised at the start of the argument (1. 9–10). More problematic, however, is the earlier material (1. 79b–81) which appears to concern types of natural divination through prophecy and frenzy and so may fit oddly with the previous section on artificial divination. Schaublin e.g. suggests that the section here is an ‘alien element’ (*Fremdkörper*), probably misplaced by Cic. (a sign of a work lacking final polish?). However, Quintus’ dismissal of epiphanies as a primary means of the gods’ communicating with men and his emphasizing of the reality of the divine power which pervades the whole world and can affect directly the human soul are useful preliminaries to the logical argument.

**Till the immortal gods converse with us when we’re in the Forum, in the street, or at home?** While Roman and Greek historiography is full of divine epiphanies and the appearance of the Dioscuri in the Forum in 168 (*ND* 2. 6; see Wardle 1998: 245–8) would seem to be a good response to the rhetorical question, the argument here has moved into a philosophical debate on the possibility of divine epiphanies (cf. Finger 1929: 388–94). Plato (*Leg.* 909e–910) dismissed epiphanies as a particular delusion of women, whereas Neoplatonist authors argued for the reality of divine epiphanies (e.g. Iambl. *Myst.* 2. 10, 3. 2; Proclus, *In R* 1. 39–40). Among the Stoics there appears to have been some ambiguity, in so far as Balbus argues (*ND* 2. 166) that direct appearances of the gods belonged to the distant past, but Posidonius held that the gods themselves do speak with dreamers (see on 1. 64). Cic. himself publicly denied epiphanies (*Har. Resp.* 62), a view which Quintus is made to follow here. In the lives of individual Greeks and Romans as much as in their history, divine epiphanies were claimed as an enduring reality: e.g. the claim of an anonymous author (*P. Ox.* 1381), the inscriptional evidence from 3rd-cent. AD Didyma that divine epiphanies were common for a time (*IDid.* 496), and from Rome the report that Pan appeared to Hyginus in broad daylight (*IGUR*, no. 184). See Lane Fox 1986: 102–50.

**they spread their influence far and wide, enclosing it in caverns in the earth or fixing it in human nature** This appears to have some connection with Stoic notions of *pneuma*, the active divine principle which pervades the whole world (e.g. Alex. Aphr. *Mixt.* 216. 14–17; Sen. *NQ* 6. 2–4).

**a power from the earth used to inspire the Pythia at Delphi** The imperfect tense reflects the earlier acknowledgement that Delphi was not currently a notable prophetic centre (1. 38).

**a natural power the Sibyl** Quintus clearly gives no role to vapours in Sibylline inspiration, although oracular consultations in Italy took place in subterranean chambers (e.g. at Cumae).

**one type is deadly, like that at Ampsanctus among the Hirpini** Pliny *HN* 2. 208: ‘similarly among the Hirpini, at Ampsanctus at the temple of Mephitis, those who enter the place die’; Vib. Seq. 153: ‘Ampsanctus in Lucania, the exhalation of which kills birds’. This remains the most powerful gas-spring in Italy; its gases, carbon dioxide with sulphuric acid, are poisonous at close range. For detailed bibliography, see *BTCGI* 3 (1984), 242–9.

Quintus attempts to counter an objection from his imaginary interlocutor that he is linking very different phenomena without justification, but the variety of effects experienced from terrestrial vapours had already been set out by Aristotle (*Mund.* 395<sup>b</sup>26–30): ‘many vent-holes for wind open in many parts of the world; some of them cause those who approach to become frenzied, others cause them to waste away, others inspire them to utter oracles as at Delphi and Lebadea, others utterly destroy them, as the one in Phrygia’.

**Plutonia, which we have seen** Plutonium was a generic term for Mephitic sanctuaries. These were common in the Maeander valley (cf. Ogden 2001: 23–4), but Cic. has in mind a striking example near Hierapolis (cf. Strabo 629–30: ‘Hierapolis, where are the hot-springs and the Plutonium . . . below a small brow of the mountainous country lying above it, is an opening big enough to admit a man, but of considerable depth. It is surrounded by a four-sided rail, c.30 metres in circumference; it is full of a vapour so thick and misty that the

ground can scarcely be seen. To those who approach the rail the air is harmless, since the outside is not contaminated by that vapour in windless conditions, as it remains within the enclosure. Death immediately afflicts any living thing which goes inside...’ The castrated priests of Cybele were, however, immune (cf. Dio 68. 27. 3; Amm. Marc. 23. 6. 18). Cic. travelled up the Maeander valley past Hierapolis on his journey to Cilicia in 51 (cf. *Att.* 5. 20. 1; *Fam.* 3. 5. 1) and could have detoured to visit the site. Even though Quintus did not accompany him on this part of the journey, in his three years as governor of Asia (see on 1. 58) he had the opportunity to visit.

**some parts are harmful, others health-giving, some produce men of sharp intellect, others fools** Such ideas of geographical or environmental determinism, which are echoed elsewhere in Cic. (*ND* 2. 17, 42; *Fat.* 7), probably go back to the Presocratic philosophers, as they are well developed in the Hippocratic treatise *De aera, aquis, locis* (e.g. 24). Herodotus in reaction demonstrates the limitations of arbitrary distinctions upon which the theory rests (see R. Thomas, *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion* (Cambridge, 2000), 86–114). Plato (*Leg.* 747d–e) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1327<sup>b</sup>23) also present this idea, but the Stoics Panaetius (*Procl. In Ti.* 50b) and Posidonius are the immediate links for Cic. Strabo (102–3) has an extended criticism of Posidonius’ attribution of national or continental characteristics to providence, which Galen corroborates (*Hippoc. Plac.* 5. 22, pp. 320–1 De Lacy): ‘Posidonius plausibly attaches to this discussion the observations of the physiognomist: in different localities men’s characters exhibit no small differences in cowardice and daring, in love of pleasure and of toil, the supposition being that the affective movements of the soul in every case follow the physical state, which is altered in no small degree by the mixture (of elements) in the environment.’

**80. a certain image or depth of voice or by singing** Quintus will give an example of the first in the next chapter (1. 81) and juxtaposes the second and third in his description of souls freed from the body (1. 114). Iamblichus (*Myst.* 3. 9) describes a similar trance state brought about by cymbals and tambourines, but distinguishes it

from true divination; his explanation rests on the soul's ability to respond to the divine harmony which pervades the universe.

**the same thing happens often through worry or fear** As Marcus also accepts (2. 114).

**just like her who: "with her mind changed as though mad or moved by the rites of Bacchus, was calling for her Teucer among the hills"** Quintus introduces a quotation probably from Pacuvius' *Teucer* (Varro, *LL* 7. 87; Pacuvius *Teucer* fr. 20 D'Anna.), in which Hesione, Teucer's mother, is in great distress at her husband's exiling of her son for not returning from Troy with his brother Ajax. Festus (107 L) connects 'mad' (*lymphata*) with the form of possession which the Greeks call nympholepsy (see W. R. Connor, *CA* 7 (1988), 155–89). The effects of Bacchic inspiration and prophecy have clear visual similarities (cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 298–301: 'this god is a seer, for Bacchic ecstasy and frenzy contain a large element of divination. For when the god enters a human body in power, he enables the possessed person to foretell the future'), but there is a need to distinguish true inspiration in possession from that where the soul takes the initiative (Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 7). Following Schaublin, I punctuate after *commota* 'moved', to create a balanced pair of alternatives. 'Hills' brings to the fore the common link of Dionysiac orgies with mountainous regions (e.g. Hdt. 7. 111. 2).

**This exaltation shows that a divine power exists in the soul** Cf. 1. 118, 2. 29, 35, 117, 124.

**Democritus says that no poet can be great without frenzy** This view is attributed to Democritus (and Plato) by several authorities, e.g. Dio Chrysostom 53. 1: 'Democritus speaks about Homer as follows: "Homer, having been allocated a divine nature, built a beautiful arrangement of lines of all kinds" suggesting that without a divine and superhuman nature it is impossible to produce lines of such beauty and expertise' and Clement *Strom.* 6. 168: 'Democritus [speaks] in a similar way [to Plato]: "whatever a poet writes with enthusiasm and holy spirit is very beautiful"' (cf. Hor. *Ep.* 2. 3. 295–7). Cic.'s other reference (*De or.* 2. 194) in the persona of the

anti-intellectual Antonius cannot be pressed to suggest that Cic. has no firsthand knowledge of the saying. It is likely that Democritus was 'Platonized' by the Stoics (see J. Mansfeld, *Mnem.* 57 (2004), 288). See also I. Dellis, 'Democritus' Views about Poetical Inspiration', in L. G. Benakis (ed.), *Proceedings of the First International Congress on Democritus* (Xanthi, 1984), 469–83.

**Plato says the same** e.g. *Ion* 534b: 'the poet is not able to produce poetry until he becomes inspired and out of his mind' (cf. *Apol.* 22b–c; *Phdr.* 245a; *Leg.* 682a, 719c), a famous phrase quoted often (Procl. in *R* 1. 184; Stob. 2. 36 W). In Cic. too there is a wider formulation: 'no one has ever been a great man without some divine inspiration' (*ND* 2. 167); for poetry (Cic. *Arch.* 18), for poetry and eloquence (Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 64). Similar language is used to describe the inspiration of diviners and poets from the Greek archaic period (Guillaumont 1984: 14).

**let him call it frenzy...in Plato's *Phaedrus*** Quintus refers back to the passage with which Cic. began the dialogue (*Phdr.* 245a). Holding that 'him' refers to Plato, Timpanaro excludes 'Plato's' as a gloss.

**your oratory in lawsuits** Quintus makes the distinction between the style of speaking (*oratio*) and delivery (*actio*), which includes gestures, bodily movement, facial expression, and modulation of the voice, found elsewhere in Cic. (*Orat.* 54; *Brut.* 239). See A. T. Corbeill, *Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome* (Princeton, 2004), esp. 114–16.

**to turn to less weighty examples** To be a theatrical performer meant the loss of civic status (*infamia*) for a Roman citizen in the Late Republic (e.g. Leppin 1992: 71–4), hence Cic.'s use of 'less weighty' (*levis*) to describe the art and its practitioners (cf. *De or.* 1. 18, 129) and his other apologies (cf. *Sest.* 119).

**your friend Aesop...some force seemed to have robbed him of his mind's understanding** Clodius Aesopus (see Leppin 1992: 195–6) was a famous tragic actor. Only in private correspondence

(Q Fr. 1. 2. 14) does Cic. refer to him elsewhere as friend (*familiaris*), despite his support for Cic.'s return from exile (Sest. 120–3). Aesop was renowned for the emotional nature of his performances (Cic. *Tusc.* 4. 55; Plut. *Cic.* 5. 5). 'Expression' suggests that sometimes Aesop acted without a mask, although this was not the norm (D. Wiles, *The Masks of Menander: Sign and Meaning in Greek and Roman Performance* (Cambridge, 1991), 129–49).

**81. apparitions present themselves which have no reality** In denying reality to these apparitions (*formae*), for which the Greek is *phasmata* (Paus. 10. 23. 2), Cic. appears to be drawing again on a Stoic source other than Posidonius (cf. Finger 1929: 371). The caution is seen further in the distancing formulae 'it is said' and 'they say' which articulate the next example.

**Brennus and his Gallic forces** In 279 over 40,000 Gauls marched into Greece; after the Greeks abandoned a defensive position at Thermopylae Brennus marched straight against Delphi which had c.4,000 defenders, who were encouraged by the epiphany of a handsome young man and two armed virgins. The Gauls did minor physical damage to the temple complex (if any), but during the following night first huge rocks fell on them and then they were frozen and blinded by the snow; next day they resisted an Aetolian attack but in the night Pan created terror, the Phocians attacked, and the Gauls retreated (Nachtergaele 1975; Rankin 1987: 87–98). Brennus was a titular name, meaning king (A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz* (Leipzig, 1896), i. 520–4; Rankin 1987: 101–5).

**they say that at that time Pythia spoke from the oracle: "I shall see to the matter, I and the white virgins"** Of the extant versions only Quintus' 'they say' exhibits caution, cf. Diod. 22. 9. 5: 'Pythia gave a response to the Delphians that the god commanded them to leave in their place in the sanctuary the offerings and everything which pertained to adoration of the gods because the god and with him the white maidens would protect everything'; Just. *Epit.* 24. 7. 6: 'the oracle forbade the country people to take away from their farms the wine and corn'; Paus. 10. 22. 12: 'the god did not wish them to be afraid, but announced that he himself would defend his own

belongings'; *Suda* s.v. ἐμοὶ μελήσει (Adler 2. 264). The use of iambics (Tzetzes, *Hist.* 11. 386–7; Ael. Aristid. 26. 75) is reserved by Delphi for hostile and contemptuous responses (Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 144; cf. H. W. Parke, *Hermathena* 65 (1945), 58–66). The same response was given by Apollo in 371/370 against Jason of Pherae (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 30; cf. Aelian fr. 55 b D-F). The virgins are identified as Minerva and Diana by the ancients (Diod. 22. 9. 5; Just. *Epit.* 24. 8. 5); their epithet 'white' (*leukai*) has its regular application in connection with deities which come to the aid of mortals (G. Radke, *Philologus* 92 (1937), 387–402), and *korai* has its sense of virgin.

**the army of the Gauls was overwhelmed with snow** A contemporary decree from Cos, Apr.–July 278 (*SIG* 398, ll. 1–14), illustrates the official Delphic version: 'the barbarians mounted a campaign against the Greeks and the shrine at Delphi; it is reported that after they had attacked the shrine they met with punishment at the hands of the god and those who had come to the assistance of the shrine in the barbarian attack, and that the temple has been saved and decorated with the arms of those who had marched against it, and the majority of the rest of the attackers perished in conflicts with the Greeks... and the people [of Cos] give thanks to the god for his appearance (*epiphaneias*) in the midst of the danger to his temple and for the salvation of the Greeks'; cf. a fragmentary hymn to Apollo from the sanctuary of the Athenians dated c.150: 'the foreign Ares, when he did not revere your oracle and ravaged your wealthy (?) seat, perished in a soaking snow-storm' (*Fouilles de Delphes*, iii/2, no. 138, ll. 4–6). Justin (*Epit.* 24. 8. 6–8) offers a rationalizing explanation of a rockfall and snow storm.

**Aristotle thought that those who rave because of illness and are called "melancholics" have in their souls some divine, prescient power** The condition of *melancholia* which etymologically at least relates to black bile (e.g. Cael. Aurel. *Mal. Chron.* 1. 6. 180) and in ancient medical definitions involved the patient in emotional instability, fear, and sadness (e.g. Hippocr. *Aph.* 6. 27; Galen 19. 416 K). It was considered the beginning of madness by Aretaeus and thereafter in the medical tradition was linked with *mania*, although it was also distinguished carefully from it. In *Tusculanae*

*Disputationes* (3. 11) Cic. equates *melancholia* with the Latin term *furor* and illustrates it by the profound emotion felt by tragic heroes like Ajax, which seems more like severe anger rather than divine possession (cf. Cael. Aurel. 1. 6. 180). There are three Aristotelian passages upon which Cic. may have drawn in *De Divinatione*: while *Problemata* 954<sup>a</sup>34 ff. mentions melancholics and their susceptibility to frenzy and enthusiasm, there is no mention of any divine power at work in them; *Ethica Eudemia* 1248<sup>a</sup>39–40 stresses that god is the starting point of the soul's movement within melancholics, and *De divinatione per somnia* 463<sup>b</sup>12–21: 'Nature is daemonic, but not divine. Here is proof: quite ordinary people have powers of prevision and direct dream-vision, as if it were not god who sends dreams, but as if those whose nature is garrulous, as it were, or atrabilious see visions of all kinds. For it is because they experience many movements of every kind that they just happen to encounter sights resembling real events, being fortunate in those, like certain people who play at odds and evens' (tr. Gallop). Aristotle's terminology 'daemonic nature' (*physis daimonia*) excludes divine intervention and relegates such dreams to the fortuitous (Gallop 1996: 44–6). For melancholics who dream with particular frequency and clarity, their dreams are not god-sent but are 'an interaction between a divine movement and a particular human state of receptivity: melancholic people "use" (*chresthai*) a general and universal divine movement to which they are more susceptible than other people because of their physiological constitution' (van der Eijk 1993: 226). Aristotle's views on divination through dreams probably do not change between *Ethica Eudemia* and *De divinatione per somnia*: in no work does he argue for divine inspiration, but rather for psycho-physiological explanations of some people's greater facility to foresee through dreams (cf. M. A. Holowchak, *Ancient Philosophy* 16 (1996), 420–2). Although Aristotle does not say explicitly that there is something divine in the souls of melancholics, Quintus' vague formulation 'divine prescient power' is a reasonable paraphrase of Aristotle's view in *De divinatione per somnia*, which suggests that this is his primary source (cf. Repici 1991: 184 n. 23), although he had a good knowledge of *Problemata*. See Pigeaud 1981: 122–33, 259–63; P. J. van der Eijk, *Mnem.* 43 (1990), esp. 36–46; Repici 1991: 189–90.



I have my doubts whether this should be attributed to those suffering from disordered stomachs or delirium. This is not a contradiction or a modification of Aristotle's view, but rather a restatement of the earlier denial of prophetic significance to dreams brought about by overindulgence in food and wine (1. 60); *melancholia* is something different from indigestion or delirium, both of which had physical causes. Cic. employs two medical terms taken from Greek which indicate a sound knowledge of the medical terminology. The *cardiaca passio* is defined by Celsus (3. 19) as a stomach disorder and is contrasted with *phrenitis*, although the key question in treating the disease was to discover whether the heart or the mouth of the stomach was at issue (Galen 5. 274–5 K). Whereas *melancholia* could lead to delirium without fever, *phrenitis* means delirium *with fever* (Galen 16. 491 K), and was understood as a disease primarily of the body (*Anon. Lond.* 1. 15). See Pigeaud 1981: 71–82, 263–4.

82. That divination really exists is established by the following Stoic reasoning. This chapter sets out an excellent example of the form of Stoic argumentation employing the hypothetical syllogism, of which Chrysippus recognized five varieties. Sandbach (1975: 97–8; cf. Repici 1995: 187) sets out the logical structure of the argument: 'if (a) gods exist and (b) they do not foretell the future, either (c) they do not love us, or (d) they do not know what will happen, or (e) they do not think that it would profit us to know or (f) they do not think that it would accord with their dignity to tell us, or (g) they are unable to tell us. But it is not true that they do not love us. Therefore it is not true that the gods exist and do not foretell the future. [This] can be set out schematically as follows:

If  $a + b$ , either  $c$  or  $d$  or  $e$  or  $f$  or  $g$ . But not  $c$  or  $d$  or  $e$  or  $f$  or  $g$ .  $\therefore$   
Not both  $a$  and  $b$ . But  $a$ .  $\therefore$  Not  $b$ .'

However, this is a very bad example of 'useless argumentation', in that the premisses of the argument cannot be demonstrated and cannot be accepted by an opponent (cf. 2. 103–6; Repici 1995: 187–9). The form of argument was refuted by Carneades, and Stoics after Antipater abandoned it. Although the argument is old, and Cicero

attributes it to Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater (1. 84), he probably draws on Posidonius' presentation of it, even though later Stoics and Posidonius pursued a very different line of argument (see on 1. 125 ff.). Marcus (2. 101–6) quotes this passage almost verbatim before proceeding to an ironical demolition of the argument.

**If there are gods** Cf. *Div.* 2. 41; *Leg.* 2. 32. The existence of the gods was central to all Stoic doctrine; in fragmentary form we have the arguments of Zeno (Sext. *Emp. Math.* 9. 133), Cleanthes (Sext. *Emp. Math.* 9. 88–91), and Chrysippus (Cic. *ND* 2. 16, 3. 25; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 9. 78). See M. Dragona Monarchou, *The Stoic Arguments for the Existence and Providence of the Gods* (Athens, 1976).

**and they do not declare to men in advance what will happen** A proposition rejected by the Stoics, who held the reality of divination (see on 1. 6).

**they do not love men . . . unable to give signs of these things** These five alternatives (*c* to *g* above) will be dealt with below under the objections that the Stoics themselves made.

**they are friends and benefactors of the human race** Cf. Cic. *Leg.* 2. 32: 'they look to the advantage of the human race'; *ND* 2. 162: 'by the prudence of the gods human interests are looked to'. In what is at best a paraphrase of Chrysippus, Clement (*Strom.* 1. 17) speaks of beneficence (*to agathopoiein*) in connection with the divine power. Beneficence was seen widely as a characteristic of the gods, e.g. Aristotle said 'in what man can be equal to god . . . in benefaction' (*Gnom. Vat.*, no. 53), a saying which was widely imitated and adapted (see L. Sternbach, *Gnomologium Vaticanum* (Berlin, 1963), 25–6). Epicurus, however, denied beneficence (Diog. Laert. 10. 139; cf. Philod. *Piet.* 1147–55).

**nor are they ignorant of what has been decided and predestined by themselves** In traditional Greek religion the gods were thought to know more than mortals, but not to be omniscient (Burkert 1985: 183) and even Chrysippus argued that 'god cannot know everything because he cannot make the (logically) impossible possible' (Philod.

*Dis.* 3 col. 7 p. 25 = *SVF* ii. 1183). On the other hand, as early as Homer (*Od.* 4. 379) there was a parallel belief in the omniscience of gods which finds a particular home in philosophy from Socrates onwards (e.g. *Xen. Mem.* 1. 1. 19: 'many people think that the gods know some things and not others... Socrates considered that the gods know everything'; *Alex. Aphrod. Fat.* 30: 'it is outrageous to say that they are ignorant of anything that will come to pass'; see Pease on *ND* 3. 90). On the Stoic conception of fate, see below 1. 125.

**nor is it of no advantage to us to know what will come to pass** Cf. Balbus' defence of divination: 'many dangers are averted' (*Cic. ND* 2. 163). On the notion of precaution, cf. 1. 30. For Stoics, knowledge of the future enabled man to participate in his fate, but not to change it (cf. *Epict.* 2. 10. 5 and 1. 17. 20; see C. Lévy 1997: 338–9), to settle his soul and await in peace and steadfast tranquillity what was to come (cf. *Ptol. Tetr.* 1. 3. 5; *Heliod. Aeth.* 2. 6–7; see M. Vegetti, *Elenchos* 15 (1994), 219–28).

**nor do they consider it inappropriate to their majesty** Implied here is a contrast with the Epicurean belief in gods who were unconcerned with humanity and lived in their own state of *ataraxia*. Jupiter was called 'Best' 'that is the most beneficent' (*Cic. ND* 2. 64). For the idea of the gods' concern for small things, see on 1. 118 for it is.

**nor are they incapable of foreknowing the future** The issue here should be *foretelling*, but this is no MS corruption; as at 2. 102 (and 2. 105), where Marcus repeats the Stoic argument in his refutation, the same *praenoscere* appears. As it stands, the argument merely repeats *d*.

**83. So it is not true that there are gods and that they do not give signs of the future** The penultimate part of the syllogism. The proposition denied here is pre-eminently that of Epicurus.

**there are gods and therefore they give signs** For Epicurus the first part of this was a given, as can be seen in his writings (*Men.* 123) and those of his followers (cf. *Philod. Piet.* 627–8, 650–3, 1890–2). Marcus is concerned to stress that the rejection of divination does

not mean a denial of the gods' existence (2. 41), a point established in *De Natura Deorum*.

**if they give signs...therefore there is divination** Subsidiary to the logical framework of the main argument, here Quintus presents very succinctly the absurdity of presenting signs without a way to interpret them, i.e. divination. For the link between divination and the existence of the gods as 'the Stoic citadel' and Marcus' ridicule, see on 1. 10.

**84. Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater employ the same argumentation** Cic. may take this directly from Posidonius, whose five books on divination will have reviewed the arguments of his predecessors before setting out his own. Kidd, in his conservative identification of Posidonian fragments, does not attribute these chapters to Posidonius, but it is highly probable that much of the material from here to 1. 96 comes from Posidonius (cf. Theiler F 374; Schäublin).

**84–108** After the section presenting the formal Stoic argument on the interrelation of divination and the gods, Quintus with a highly rhetorical accumulation of elements in 1. 84 essentially restates both what Cic. had outlined at the start of the dialogue (1. 2) and more importantly the points of the *divisio* (1. 12) in his own argument. Schäublin makes much of Quintus' description at 1. 109 of the preceding chapters as a digression ('But to return to the point from which my discourse broke off'), thus relegating 1. 84–108 to the status of an excursus. However, within the rhetorical structure of book 1 these chapters articulate (and represent) very clearly the two arguments *e vetustate* (1. 87–9) and *e consensus omnium* (1. 90–108). This section of the argument is clearly structured: the *exempla* to demonstrate the argument *e consensu omnium* proceed climactically from barbarian (90–4) through Greek (95–6) to Roman examples, which themselves culminate in the augural act by which Rome herself was founded. See introd., § 3 (vi).

**reason, outcomes, peoples, nations...our own ancestors as well**  
In turn these refer to (i) the syllogistic argument of chapters 81–3;

(ii) the outcomes (*eventa*) of divinatory practice in the examples Quintus has used and will employ; (iii) developed cultures, even down to the city level (e.g. *Verr.* 2. 2. 77; *Balb.* 42); (iv) ethnic entities not necessarily smaller than the previous category (e.g. Cilicians, Pisidians, and Pamphylians; cf. 1. 2), but less civilized; and (v) the Roman examples (cf. H. Roloff, *Maiores bei Cicero* (Göttingen, 1938), 124).

**it has always been believed to be so** The argument *e vetustate*. Although Hottinger (followed by Schaublin) transposes this phrase to the end of the period to avoid the syntactical difficulty it introduces and because one expects *denique* (finally) to be in the final member, Giomini and Timpanaro rightly retain it at this point.

**the greatest philosophers, poets, the wisest of men—those who have set up constitutions and those who have founded cities**

Although examples of the first two categories have been quoted in the earlier exemplary sections (Socrates, 52, Plato and Aristotle, 53, Homer, 72, Ennius, 66–7, Pacuvius, 80, Accius, 44–5; and even Marcus himself, 17–22), this list looks forward to the contents of the next section: philosophers (86–7), poets (Homer, 87), statesmen (Mopsus, Amphilochus, 88, Lycurgus, 96, and especially Romulus, 107–8).

**Do we wait until beasts speak** For a similar expression of impatience introducing the argumentative section, cf. 1. 79. Speaking beasts were a familiar kind of prodigy in Roman annals (Plin. *HN* 8. 183; e.g. Livy 3. 10. 6, 24. 10. 10), and in literature from Homer onwards (*Il.* 19. 404–17), but rather than such a prodigy Quintus means ‘are we to wait until beasts also express the same opinion?’ Cf. Cic. *Fin.* 2. 18.

**Are we not satisfied with the shared belief of mankind?** Explicitly the appeal to the argument *e consensu omnium*, an argument favoured by the Stoics (see on 1. 1).

**85. no other argument... the cause of each type of divination**

It will be almost a refrain in Quintus’ argument that he cannot say

how any example of divination occurred, merely that it did (1. 86, 109; cf. 1. 12). Marcus will ridicule this (e.g. 2. 27: 'this is not the way of a philosopher... he must demonstrate by proof and arguments why and how it is so, not by outcomes'; cf. 2. 46, 80). Quintus' 'difficult' clearly does not rule out the possibility of explanation, but not until 1. 109 does he attempt to offer an explanation.

**what explanation** Quintus provides examples from three types of artificial divination, where the sign is given externally and requires interpretation according to the rules of the specific discipline. The sequence of rhetorical questions is a foretaste of the approach adopted by Marcus in book 2, following the example of Carneades (Schofield 1986: 53–4).

**why a split lung...stops an undertaking and postpones it to another day** The *haruspex* was concerned principally with the liver. The only evidence from classical sources that the lungs played a secondary role is this passage, Lucan (1. 622; see Thulin 1906: 23, 45), Sen. *Oed.* 367–8, and a late patristic poem (*PL* 5. 262b). Two technical phrases attested for augury seem here to have been applied to haruspicy: 'stop' (*dirimere*; cf. Amm. Marc. 14. 10. 9, 21. 13. 8; Serv. *Ecl.* 8. 29); 'postpone to another day' (*proferre diem*), although well attested in legal contexts of postponements (see *TLL* x. 1687. 30 ff.), may allude here to the augural formula *alio die* (e.g. Cic. *Leg.* 2. 31; Timpanaro). In the detailed rites of Babylonian extispicy, much attention was paid to the lungs (cf. Starr 1983: 38–41).

**a raven on the right and a crow on the left provide a good omen** See on 1. 12. 'Good omen' (*ratum*) is another technical term from the legal and religious sphere (cf. 2. 80).

**the conjunction of Jupiter or Venus with the moon at the birth of a child** Astrological commonplaces included the attribution of benign characters to Venus and Jupiter, as can be seen from references in Latin poets (Lucan 1. 660–2 and schol. ad loc). More arcane, though, will have been the detailed lore of prognostication. In particular, the moon is related to 'the essence of the human body' (Firm. *Math.* 4. 1. 1) and 'the ruler of the chart and the giver of life

are found from the position of the moon' (Firm. *Math.* 4. 1. 8). Although the detailed prognostications of Firmicus Maternus (e.g. *Math.* 4. 3) show that a variety of fortunes await those born with the moon in conjunction with either Jupiter or Venus, the basic characteristic of these planets as 'benefics' is in accordance with ancient belief (Barton 1994: 96; cf. the simplified prognostications versified by Manetho, *Apotelesm.* 2. 446–58). In detail, see A. Bouché-Leclercq, *L'Astrologie grecque* (Paris, 1896), 404–57.

**the conjunction of Mars or Saturn** See Firm. *Math.* 4. 2 and 4. 4 for the generally negative prognostication from these conjunctions.

**Why does god warn us when we are asleep and ignore us when we are awake?** An objection formulated as early as the 4th cent. (Arist. *Div. somn.* 464<sup>a</sup>20–2; cf. Marcus' complaint, 'I ask why, if god gives us those visions in order to take precautions, he does not give them when we are awake rather than when we are asleep?', 2. 126). A Stoic could argue that the divine epiphanies and the signs given through artificial divination are waking communications, but the objection relates to the most common form of natural divination.

**Cassandra in her frenzy can foresee the future, but wise Priam cannot do the same?** The same contrast between madness (*furor*) and wisdom (*sapientia*) was made in Hecuba's words to Cassandra (1. 66), who prophesied the arrival of the Greek fleet. Marcus makes the same objection (2. 110). The objection has some force, in that such natural divination takes place precisely when human reason is most subdued or overcome by powerful emotional experiences.

**86. Why does each of these things happen, you ask?** Cf. 1. 109 and 2. 46: 'when I asked you the reasons for each example of divination, you said at great length that, since you were looking at facts, you were not examining the reason and the cause'.

**the question is wholly legitimate, but not what we are dealing with now** Quintus concedes that causation is a proper concern for a philosopher (cf. Marcus' criticism, 2. 46) and somewhat disingenuously suggests that he will at some stage discuss it. When he

introduces Posidonius' arguments, he presents fate as the cause (1. 126), but not in any detailed response to Marcus.

**We are asking *whether* it happens or not** This is the heart of Quintus' argumentative strategy, to establish the fact of divination by presenting irrefutable examples of it (cf. 1. 125).

**magnet** The word 'magnet' derives from Magnesia (Plin. *HN* 36. 127–8). The phenomenon of attraction was discussed from Thales (Arist. *An.* 405<sup>a</sup>19) onwards; Cic. would at least have been familiar with Lucretius' discussion (6. 986–1089). On ancient references to magnets and a discussion of the various theories adumbrated, see A. Radl, *Der Magnetstein in der Antike: Quellen und Zusammenhänge* (Wiesbaden, 1988).

**divination, which we see for ourselves and hear and read about and have inherited from our fathers** Marcus does not mention the magnet argument in book 2, as it is difficult for him to refute. Quintus' point is persuasive on a popular and empirical level, and relies again on the argument *e consensu omnium*. Cic. elsewhere speaks highly of preserving what has been handed down from earlier generations (e.g. *Div.* 2. 148; *Har. Resp.* 18–19).

**before philosophy a recent invention emerged** Quintus is well aware that philosophy has a history of over 500 years, but he can describe it as 'recent' by contrast with the older science of divination and the far greater period of human existence (cf. *Jos. Ap.* 1. 7; Justin Mart. *Cohort. Gr.* 12; Cic. also notes that medicine is a recent invention, *ND* 2. 126).

**after philosophy advanced, no philosopher of any authority thought otherwise** Cf. the summary at 1. 5–6 where Cic. singles out Xenophanes and Epicurus as the exceptions. The former, who was outside of the schools that dominated philosophical discourse in Cic.'s day, Cic. regards as peripheral, discussing his philosophical views rarely (*ND* 1. 28; *Ac.* 2. 118; *De or.* 3. 20) and here, by including him among the 'ancients' he in effect relegates him to the unsophisticated stage of philosophy. Cic. belittles Epicurus



(cf. 1. 5, 62), denying him the *auctoritas* he accords Plato (*Tusc.* 1. 49).

**87. I have mentioned Pythagoras, Democritus, and Socrates...** In making Quintus refer to the earlier survey of philosophical views as his own, Cic. clearly slips up, as it was not part of Quintus' argument, but of the introduction (1. 5). The mistake is usually attributed to haste in composition and lack of final revision, and is one of several in the philosophical works (cf. *Acad.* 1. 46; *Fin.* 5. 21, 49; for *De Officiis*, see Dyck 1996: 10, and *De Legibus*, see Dyck 2004: 11).

**What could be more shameful than this, that Epicurus believes that no disinterested virtue exists?** Describing the intellectual sins of their opponents as shameful is part of the rhetoric of the sceptical Academy (Dyck 2003: 58) inherited from Plato (cf. *Tht.* 194c; *Minos* 318e), and is used by Cic. against Epicurus at *ND* 1. 70 and *Fin.* 1. 19. No fragment of Epicurus' own work with this view has survived, but the view is frequently attributed to him (e.g. Diog. Laert. 10. 138; Alex. Aphrod. *in Top.* 12; Sen. *Beat. Vit.* 6. 3). Epicurus held that virtue was the means to the end of a happy life not the goal (Diog. Oen. 26. 3. 3–8). What this gratuitous attack on Epicurus adds to Quintus' argument is far from clear, other than putting Epicurus beyond the pale.

**Is there anyone whom antiquity...does not impress?** With this rhetorical question Quintus introduces a section (1. 87–9) which presents examples of divination from antiquity (going back to Homer), the argument *e vetustate*. His second concern is that the evidence should be trustworthy, taken from authors of the highest repute. Quintus here in effect reproduces the distinction underlying the proem in which earlier views of divination are distinguished from the later 'scientific' approach of the philosophers; and he builds on and expands the points made in the proem (Schäublin 1985: 162). Most of the examples (except Amphilochous and Tiresias) appear also at *Leg.* 2. 33, where a simpler form of the argument *e consensu omnium* was attempted (cf. Dyck 2004: 348–9).

**Homer writes that Calchas was by far the best of augurs** An abbreviated paraphrase of *Il.* 1. 68–72: 'Calchas the son of Thestor,

by far the best of seers, who knew the present, future and past and guided the Achaean fleet to Ilium through divination, which Phoebus Apollo had bestowed on him'. Quintus, ironically and polemically, follows Homer in locating Calchas' excellence in divination, not human knowledge of geography. In later sources his skills extended to haruspicy and astrology (Quint. Smyrn. 9. 330–2, 12. 4–6). In post-Homeric legend he dies in despair at being beaten by the divinatory skills of Mopsus (e.g. Strabo 642). See di Sacco Franco 2000: 36–8.

**88. Amphilochus and Mopsus were Argive kings, but also augurs, and founded Greek cities on the sea coasts of Cilicia**

Amphilochus, a descendant of Melampus (Hom. *Od.* 15. 248), accompanied Calchas in his wanderings after the fall of Troy (e.g. Quint. Smyrn. 14. 366–9); Mopsus appears first (Hes. *Melamp.* fr. 278 MW) as the one who defeated Calchas in a mantic contest, which, in most versions, took place at Colophon and led to the founding of the oracle of Apollo at Claros, 12 km distant, by Mopsus. According to Callinus (Strabo 668), he and Amphilochus led peoples who settled in Cilicia, Syria, and as far as Phoenicia (cf. Hdt. 3. 91. 1). Communities in Pamphylia (e.g. Perge) and in Cilicia claimed to be founded by him and some, such as Mopsuestia and Mopsucrene, bore his name, but he is associated primarily with Mallus (Strabo 675), where he and Amphilochus were killed in a duel. A Hittite inscription discovered at Karatepe in NE Cilicia dated c.700, in which the local king refers to himself as a descendant of the house of Mopsus, may suggest a Cilician tradition independent of mainstream Greek mythology, but not necessarily that Mopsus was a historical person (*pace* R. D. Barnett, *JHS* 73 (1953), 142). When the Greeks enjoyed greater contacts with Cilicia, they may have used the local traditions to ease their acceptance by the natives or themselves have been influenced strongly by Cilician traditions (W. Burkert, 'Oriental Myth and Literature in the *Iliad*', in R. Hägg (ed.), *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century BC* (Stockholm, 1983), 117). Bremmer (*OCD*<sup>3</sup> 995) suggests that Mopsus may be a family name for seers. See Parke 1985: 112–24; T. S. Scheer, *Mythische Vorväter zur Bedeutung griechischer Heroenmythen im Selbstverständnis kleinasiatischer Städte* (Munich, 1993), 153–271. For Timpanaro, 'Argive'

means 'Greek', but cities in Cilicia and Pamphylia in the Hellenistic period were forging links with Argos on the basis of such mythology (see Scheer, 220–2), so the more specific meaning is defensible.

### **Amphiaraus and Tiresias, not men of humble or obscure status**

Both played prominent roles in the myths of the Theban cycle, which justifies Quintus' comment on their status: Amphiaraus was an Argonaut and participated in the hunt for the Calydonian boar and in the campaign of the Seven against Thebes (e.g. Pind. *Nem.* 9. 13–25); Tiresias was seer to both Oedipus and Creon. In the Homeric genealogy Amphiaraus was the father of Amphilocheus (*Od.* 15. 248), was himself descended from Melampus, and thus was part of a family with close mythical links to Apollo. Tiresias of Thebes, grandfather of Mopsus, was blinded either by Hera (Hes. *Melamp.* fr. 275 MW) or Athena (Pherecydes *FGrH* 3 F 92) and was given the gifts of prophecy and long life in recompense by Zeus. Quintus celebrates him primarily as an augur (cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 24–6; Soph. *Ant.* 998–1004; Eur. *Phoen.* 834–40), but his expertise was believed to extend to astrology (Ps.-Luc. *Astrol.* 11), extispicy (Stat. *Theb.* 10. 667), and the interpretation of portents (Eur. *Bacch.* 248–9). See L. Brisson, *Le Mythe de Tirésias: Essai d'analyse structurale* (Leiden, 1976) and G. Ugolini, *Untersuchungen zur Figur des Sehers Teiresias* (Tübingen, 1995).

**nor like those of whom Ennius writes "they invent false prophecies for the sake of personal profit"** Quintus will conclude his argument with an attack on low-class, money-driven diviners, whose actions brought divination into disrepute, by quoting a passage of Ennius which expresses very similar thoughts to these (1. 132). On that basis it has often been allocated to Ennius' *Telamon* (cf. Jocelyn 1967: 346). Here Amphiaraus and Tiresias are distanced from these humble practitioners, to support the validity of their well-known divinatory feats.

**Homer writes that he alone has knowledge, the rest wander around like shadows** Quintus renders Homer's '[Persephone granted] him alone to be conscious. The others flit like shadows' (*Od.* 10. 495) into indirect speech.

**Amphiaraus . . . is honoured as a god and . . . oracles are sought from the place in which he was buried** His oracle, which was probably situated at Cnopia (Strabo 404) south of the citadel near St. Nicholas, on the site where Amphiaraus was swallowed up by the ground through Zeus' thunderbolt, was prominent in the 6th cent. (Hdt. 1. 46. 2) and was open only to non-Thebans (Hdt. 8. 134. 2). However, after the Persian Wars, as a result of rival claims to be the site of Amphiaraus' death (e.g. Paus. 9. 19. 4; Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 6. 18c), the main centre of his cult became a site 6 km from Oropus, on the border between Boeotia and Attica, where healing through incubation rather than oracular prophecies became the most prominent feature (but cf. Val. Max. 8. 15 *ext.* 3; Philostr. *VA* 2. 37). See Schachter 1981: 19–26 and T. K. Hubbard, *HSCP* 94 (1992), 101–7. For a description of the sanctuary, see P. W. Wallace, *Strabo's Description of Boiotia* (Heidelberg, 1979), 43–5, and P. Roesch, 'L'Amphiaraion d'Oropos', in G. Roux (ed.), *Temples et sanctuaires* (Paris, 1984), 174–84.

Given his human birth, Amphiaraus should be a 'hero', but the myth of his *anhodos* indicates that his status was problematic (cf. E. Kearns, 'Between God and Man: Status and Function of the Heroes and their Sanctuaries', in Bingen and Schachter 1992: 71). Cic. himself had been a member of the advisory board of the Senate which in 73 ruled in a dispute between the Oropians and Roman tax-collectors in favour of the Oropians and granted tax-exemption for the cult of Amphiaraus (cf. Cic. *ND* 3. 49). In the senatorial decree (see Sher, *RGEDA*, no. 70) Amphiaraus is described as god (*theos*).

**89. Priam, the king of Asia** This grandiloquent description of Priam's kingdom appears elsewhere only in poetry (e.g. Virg. *Aen.* 2. 557; Sen. *Agam.* 203), but Cic. sometimes creates titles to lend a person greater weight in the eyes of Roman readers (e.g. *Off.* 2. 60). For Quintus the mention of another continent is foremost.

**Helenus and . . . Cassandra who were diviners, the one by auguries and the other by mental agitation and divine stimulation** These twins were identified, probably by the Stoics, as typical examples of artificial and natural divination respectively. Helenus is described by

Homer as 'far the best of augurs' (*Il.* 6. 76; see Di Sacco Franco 2000: 43–4) and enjoyed various adventures in the post-Homeric epics, e.g. advising Neoptolemus (Paus. 1. 11. 1); by Virgil his expertise expanded to astrology and inspired prophecy (*Aen.* 3. 360). Cassandra's prophetic role is post-Homeric. Both received their mantic gifts from Apollo by incubation in his temple (Tzetzes ad Lycophr. *Arg.* 5).

**certain brothers Marcii, born of a noble family, were prophets of this kind in the time of our ancestors** Cf. Livy 25. 12. 2: 'a new obstacle arose from the Marcian verses. This Marcius had been a famous prophet, and when in the previous year by senatorial decree there had been an investigation into such books, they had come into the hands of M. Aemilius the urban praetor who was dealing with the matter. He had immediately handed them over to the new praetor Sulla. There were two of these prophecies by Marcius, the first of which had gained authority because the events predicted had already come to pass, which brought credence to the second one, whose time of fulfilment had not yet arrived...' Cic. probably read the version in Coelius Antipater, a favourite source for the Second Punic War (see on 1. 48). Cic. is inconsistent in referring to two Marcii (also 2. 113; cf. Serv. *Aen.* 6. 70, 72; Symm. *Ep.* 4. 34. 3) and one (1. 115); most authorities have one (e.g. Plin. *HN* 7. 119; Macrobian *Sat.* 1. 17. 25; Festus 162 L). The Marcii belonged to the plebeian family and merit the description 'noble' from their consular ancestry. Wiseman has conjectured (1994: 59, 62–3) that one of the prophetic brothers was the Marcius admitted to the college of augurs in 300, at a period when prophecy was not uncommon in Rome. Although the family claimed Marsyas, who introduced augury to Italy, as an ancestor (*RRC* no. 363), to jump from a plausible link with augury to conjure up an inspired prophet is perhaps too fanciful. Sceptics consider the verses as contemporary forgeries, perhaps even by the praetor Sulla, who was one of the Board of Ten (e.g. Bernstein 1998: 178–9), but the existence of such prophetic texts in the 3rd cent. is not to be doubted (cf. North 2000: 92–107).

**Polyidus of Corinth prophesied many things to others and death for his son** Polyidus, literally 'one who sees/knows many things', has links with Corinth (Homer *Il.* 13. 663) and Megara (Paus. 1. 43. 5).

He prophesied the death of his son Euchenor (Homer *Il.* 13. 663–72), aided Bellerophon (Pind. *Ol.* 13. 79–82) and restored to life Glaucus, son of Minos (Apollod. 3. 3. 1–2); he performed augury through owls (Ael. *Hist. an.* 5. 2).

**they considered wisdom and divination to be equal marks of kingship** Quintus' generalization should extend to kingship in both early Greece and Rome, in which the prerogatives of the monarch extended across political, judicial, and religious spheres.

**our state, in which the kings were augurs** Romulus was pre-eminently the Roman king who practised augury (see 1. 30), and although augural activity is not emphasized for the other kings (cf. Valeton 1891: 410 n. 5: Cicero's statement is not to be pressed), they were part of the augural college and the inauguration of temples gave opportunities for the regal exercise of the augural function (e.g. Numa, Livy 1. 20. 7). See P. M. Martin, *L'Idée de royauté à Rome: De la Rome royale au consensus républicain* (Clermont Ferrand, 1982), 85–96.

**later, private citizens...governed the state by the authority of their religious beliefs** 'Later' indicates after the expulsion of the kings. Public priests, the members of the priestly colleges were considered as 'private citizens', even though their acts were public (Linderski 1986a: 2195 n. 176). Cf. *Leg.* 2. 31: 'the highest and most important authority in the state is that of the augurs'. Quintus' justifiable exaggeration flatters Marcus' pride in the office.

**90. The same principle...is not ignored even among barbarian nations** Cic. refers to the powerful influence of augurs on decision-making rather than the combination of regal and augural powers. The particular influence of Posidonius, who wrote a detailed ethnographic account of the Celts in book 23 of his *History* (see Kidd 1988, fr. 67–9, with commentary), has been suspected for this whole section of Quintus' argument and specifically here (cf. J. J. Tierney, *PRIA* 60 (1960), 224).

**the Druids** If 'Druid' is comprised of an intensive prefix and a root *wid* (know), then the meaning is 'wise man', which would fit

well with the equation with philosopher made in Greek authors (e.g. Strabo 197). For the many classical references to Druids, see N. K. Chadwick, *The Druids* (Cardiff, 1966) and Rankin 1987: 259–94: they were a learned group among the Celts, aristocratic in composition, and functioned as intermediaries between gods and men.

**I myself have known Diviciacus, the Aeduan, your guest and admirer** Quintus served with Julius Caesar in Gaul between 54 and 51, but his acquaintance with Diviciacus probably dates from the winter of 62–61 when the latter visited Rome to seek aid against the Sequani (Caes. *BG* 6. 12. 5; see M. Rambaud, 'Diviciacos chez Cicéron', in R. Chevallier (ed.), *AIÓN: Le Temps chez les Romains* (Paris, 1976), 87–92). Brother of Dumnorix, chief of the Aedui, Diviciacus is prominent in Caesar as very pro-Roman (e.g. *BG* 1. 19. 2). See B. Kremer, *Das Bild der Kelten bis in augusteische Zeit* (Stuttgart, 1994), 226–34.

**He claimed that the science of nature, what the Greeks call *physiologia*, was known to him** Quintus does not vouch for Diviciacus' claims, as he had not seen Diviciacus perform as an augur. Normally Cic.'s glosses are to explain a Greek term in Latin (cf. *ND* 1. 20), here the reverse. *Physiologia* meant primarily natural philosophy, but also included theology and divination. Posidonius and his successors attributed to the Druids a wide range of philosophical and intellectual interests (e.g. Caesar *B Gall.* 6. 14. 6; Strabo 197; Pomp. Mela *Chor.* 3. 2).

**he used to foretell...sometimes by augury and sometimes by interpretation** In the main Greek descriptions of Celtic religion, Druids and seers are different categories, but the evidence is insufficient for us to distinguish the relationship clearly (*RE* v. 1730). In Caesar and Cic. there are only Druids. Classical sources attest the Celtic use of augury (Just. *Epit.* 24. 4. 3; Arist. *Misc. Ausc.* 86; Diod. 5. 31. 3; Ps-Plut. *Fluv.* 6. 4) which has a similar prominence in Celtic sources (F. Le Roux and C.-J. Guyonarc'h, *Les Druides* (Rennes, 1986), 128–32). The distinction between 'augury' and 'interpretation' (*coniectura*) is the same as in the Roman practice (Linderski 1986a: 2237 n. 355).

**augury and divination are practised by the Magi** The 'Magi' (see on 1. 46) are associated primarily with the interpretation of dreams and astrology, but divination by fire (Agathias *Hist.* 2. 25) or rod and stick (Dinon apud Schol. Nicand. *Ther.* 613) is also attested. Although a general excellence in divination is attributed to them (e.g. Diog. Laert. 1. 7), no source mentions specific knowledge of augury (de Jong 1997: esp. 397–9). On divination in Zoroastrianism see J. Duchesne-Guillemin, 'La Divination dans l'Iran ancien', in A. Caquot and M. Leibovici (eds.), *Rites et pratiques religieuses: La Divination*, i (Paris, 1968), 141–55.

**gather in a sacred place for discussion...as you were once accustomed to do on the Nones** 'Sacred place' (*fanum*) is appropriate to the Magi, who had no roofed temples; in the Roman context a consecrated piece of ground sufficed for the augurs, even the garden of a member of the augural college (Cic. *Am.* 7). These are 'not official meetings convened to pass a decree or give a *responsum* to a magistrate but rather informal seminars and colloquia, discussions concerning theoretical tenets of the *disciplina auguralis*' (Linderski 1985: 212–13 = 1995: 501–2). During these discussions the dynamic process of explanation and interpretation created that which became binding lore in the augurs' *commentarii* (Linderski 1975: 286–8 = 1995: 586–8). Although the past tense and the use of *quondam* (once) probably 'indicate that by Cicero's time this custom had fallen into oblivion' (ibid.), it need mean no more than, for instance, that since the disruptions of the Civil War such regular monthly meetings had ceased. In *De Amicitia* (7–8), with its dramatic date in the 2nd cent. bc, Cic. presents the same custom, and augural banqueting was still a live custom in 46–5 (*Fam.* 7. 26. 2), seemingly unaffected by Caesar's dictatorship (cf. J. Rüpke, 'Collegia sacerdotum', in U. Egelhaaf-Gausser and A. Schäfer, *Religiöse Vereine in der römischen Antike* (Tübingen, 2002), 48).

**91. No one could be king of the Persians who had not first learnt the art and lore of the Magi** The Greeks were fascinated by the education of Persian monarchs and frequently included in it religious instruction in Zoroastrianism (Ps.-Plato *Alc.* 121e; Nic. Damasc. *FGrH* 90 F 67; Philo *Spec. Leg.* 3. 100). This Greek tradition may



reflect the custom of the *herbedestan*, the Zoroastrian priestly school (de Jong 1997: 448–51). As the priesthood in Zoroastrianism was hereditary, the *Magi* provide a good introduction for the following examples from Greece and Babylonia of hereditary divination.

**Telmessus, in which city the art of the *haruspices* is pre-eminent** Quintus adds ‘in Caria’ to specify the Telmessus which is 9 km west of Halicarnassus, modern Gürice (G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *ABSA* 50 (1955), 153–5); the location fits Quintus’ description of rich fields (1. 94; see D. Harvey, *Kernos* 4 (1991), 245–58). For Pease, the use of ‘city’ (*urbs*), shows that Cic. had never visited the small community during his governorship. Quintus’ *haruspices* are Herodotus’ *exegetai*, interpreters/expounders (1. 78. 2), the most famous of whom was Aristander, who interpreted portents for Alexander the Great (e.g. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 2; see W. S. Greenwalt, *Anc. W* 5 (1982), 17–25; F. L. Gattinoni, *CISA* 19 (1993), 123–38 A. Nice, *A Class.* 48 (2005), 87–102). Two comments by Arrian (*Anab.* 2. 3. 3–4) suggest that the mantic talent extended to all Telmessians who were believed to be descended from the eponymous seer Telmessus (cf. E. L. Hicks, *JHS* 14 (1894), 377). Telmessian expertise in augury can be inferred from an allusion in a fragment of an Aristophanic comedy (Athen. 308f) and from Posidippus (34. 2 AB); Christian writers add oneiromancy to the Telemessians’ expertise (e.g. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 74. 3; Tert. *An.* 46. 3).

**the Iamidae and the Clutidae...famed for their excellence in haruspicy** The oracle of Zeus at Olympia is poorly attested (e.g. Pindar *Ol.* 6. 5; Strabo 353), because it became overshadowed by the games. Although hereditary priesthoods were common in Greece, even in connection with oracles (e.g. Tac. *Ann.* 2. 54. 3; *Hist.* 2. 3. 1), the situation at Olympia was unique. It may reflect the unification at one site of two geographical groups, the Iamidae from Triphylia and the Clutidae from Arcadia, as is suggested by the different tribal affiliations of the two families. See Parke 1967: 173–8.

Famous Iamidae, the descendants of Iamus, include Tisamenus, who performed extispicy before the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9. 33. 1–3), Eumantis, Theocles, and Manticles (Paus. 4. 16. 1, 21. 2). Pindar’s ode celebrating Hagesias, winner of the mule race between

476 and 468, as 'guardian of the prophetic altar of Zeus at Pisa and co-founder of famous Syracuse' (*Ol.* 6. 6) was interpreted by the ancient scholiasts as implying that one or more of the Iamidae participated in the founding of Syracuse in 733, although modern views prefer some role by Hagesias in the 'refounding' of Syracuse by Gelon or even just a celebration of his link with the seers (Malkin 1987: 93–7; N. Luraghi, *Klio* 79 (1997), 69–86). Epigraphic records of the seers from 30 BC to AD 265 (with gaps) demonstrate the continuing prestige attached to these families of seers. In addition to haruspicy, skill is alleged in empyromancy (Philostr. *VA* 5. 25; Schol. Pind *Ol.* 6. 7) and cledonism.

**In Syria the Chaldaeans excel in their knowledge of the stars** Cic. uses 'Syria' loosely for the area comprising Syria and Babylonia (cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 101; *Fin.* 2. 106); for Herodotus (7. 63) Assyria is the barbarian term for Syria. Chaldaean divination (see 1. 2) was held to be hereditary (Diod. 2. 29. 4).

**92. Etruria has the greatest knowledge of things struck by lightning** Cf. 1. 35; Sen. *NQ* 2. 32: 'the Etruscans possess the greatest knowledge in dealing with lightning'; Diod. 5. 40. 2: 'they have worked out divination by lightning in more detail than any other people'; Dion. Hal. 9. 6. 4: '[the Etruscans] seers... are reputed to have studied with greater accuracy than anywhere else signs which appear in the sky'.

**in the time of our forebears... at a time when our empire was thriving** This vague formulation has suggested various dates: between 396 and 310 (Luterbacher 1904: 10 n. 7); the 2nd cent. (Thulin, *RE* vii. 2437; Capdeville 1993: 3); between the Second Punic War and 133 (Timpanaro); and possibly c.139 (M. Dickie, *Magic and Magicians in the Greco-Roman World* (London, 2001), 155–6). Best, however, is a context shortly after the initial reception of the *haruspices* in Rome, which plausibly belongs in 278 (MacBain 1982: 43 ff.). 'At a time when our empire was thriving' is not an implied criticism of Caesar (cf. Giomini 1971: 21 n. 22) but highlights the Senate's concern for Rome's religion in good as well as bad times.

decreed that of the sons of the leading citizens groups of ten should be handed over to the individual Etruscan peoples to be instructed in the discipline Cf. Val. Max. 1. 1. 1: 'the sons of ten leading citizens were entrusted to the individual peoples of Etruria in order to learn the lore of the sacred rites'. With Ax and Giomini I accept Davies's emendation of the MSS's *sex* (six) to *X* (ten) (cf. W. Thor-mayer, *De Valerio Maximo et Cicerone quaestiones criticae* (Göttingen, 1902), 80), although Pease and Timpanaro prefer Christ's *X ex* which would require a translation: 'decreed that ten sons of the leading citizens of each of the Etruscan peoples should be handed over'. Schaublin accepts Madvig's *deni principum filii ex singulis...* 'ten sons of the leading citizens from the individual Etruscan peoples', which is certainly very convincing on palaeographical grounds. The numeral in Val. Max.'s manuscripts is not disputed and we should certainly eliminate the MSS's 'six'. Neither number fits well into an official order of sixty *haruspices* (Rawson 1978: 148 n. 150), but, as Pease suggests, if the Senate's main concern was to provide a pool of candidates, having 120 or 150 boys in training would have ensured a supply for any order of *haruspices*. The confederation of Etruscan cities originally had twelve members (cf. Dion. Hal. 6. 75; Livy 4. 23. 5, 5. 33. 9) and later fifteen or more.

The key question, however, is the nationality of the 'leading citizens' (*principes*). A straightforward reading of Valerius Maximus, his epitomators, and of the MS text of Cic. suggests that Roman sons were sent to Etruria (so Costanzi 1924: 341–9, and W. V. Harris, *Rome in Etruria and Umbria* (Oxford, 1971), 9 n. 7). But with the emendations of Davies and Madvig (see above) the sons become Etruscan (as held by Thulin, *RE* vii. 2441 and Pease). Given the closeness with which Valerius follows Cic. here, should he be taken as an accurate guide to Cic.'s text in relation to the numeral ten, which is a minor detail, but be convicted of misunderstanding on the larger matter? It is more likely that the misunderstanding as to the nationality of the trainees is by the interpreters of Val. Max., beginning with Nepotianus.

Although Roman augurs may have practised haruspicy in the earliest times (cf. Valetton 1889: 447), for the historical period, from which most of our evidence comes, *haruspices* were Etruscan (e.g. Cic. *Fam.* 6. 6. 3), and Cic. himself in his conservative prescription on

Roman religion (*Leg.* 2. 21) writes: ‘prodigies and portents should be delegated to Etruscan *haruspices*, and leading citizens from Etruria should learn the discipline’. The role of these *principes*, from the mythical Tages, founder of the discipline, is attested in a variety of sources (*Tac. Ann.* 11. 15. 1; *Cens. DN* 4. 13; *Comm. Bern. Luc.* 1. 636) and is to be deduced from the upper class views found in the Etruscan *libri* (e.g. *Cic. Har. Resp.* 53; see Rawson 1978: 139–40). It has been suggested that Etruria could not supply the number of *haruspices* needed for all the colonies and municipalities of the Roman empire (Costanzi 1924: 345), but this is not relevant for the 3rd cent., and the later municipal *haruspices* were arguably different from the elite practitioners called upon by the Senate (cf. Haack 2002: 130–3). If we accept that elite *haruspices* were Etruscans, for the period for which we have good literary and epigraphical information the only way to salvage the view that Roman youths were sent to Etruria in the 3rd cent. is to posit that the senatorial decree was later rescinded (so Costanzi 1924: 347).

**an art of such great importance should not . . . become an object of commerce** Although the Senate had not historically made great use of *haruspices*, it was important to flatter the newly conquered Etruscan elite who exercised a strict control over religious knowledge within their system (Briquel 1997: 446–9) and ease their acceptance of Roman rule; on a mid-2nd-cent. dating, the *haruspices* had a track record and the Senate considered it crucial, in a period of growing religious conservatism, to ensure that *haruspices* retained their aristocratic bias. The turmoil of the Etruscan wars and the uncertainty of any future role for *haruspices* under Roman domination may explain a shortage of candidates in the mid-3rd cent. It was important for the Senate to exercise some control over this form of religion, as over all others. If Romans were not to be practitioners, the best solution was for the Etruscan elite to manage the system and ensure that *haruspices* did not become agents of radical politicians. For Quintus’ opposition to low-class, mercenary *haruspices*, cf. 1. 132.

**Phrygians, Pisidians, Cilicians** Apart from this passage and *Juv.* 6. 585, only Christian writers emphasize the priority and prominence of the Phrygians in auspicy (e.g. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 1. 74; *Isid. Etym.*

8. 9. 32). Of the Pisidians and Cilicians Quintus repeats what Cic. has stated at 1. 2. Cilician respect for auspicy may go back to the foundations of Mopsus and Amphilochous (1. 88).

**the Arab nation** Cf. Philostr. VA 1. 20 and among Christian writers e.g. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 74. A fragment of book 24 of Appian's histories (fr. 19 V-R) describes the Arabs as a 'divinatory nation' (*ethnos mantikon*) and relates his personal experience of an Arab interpreting the call of a crow (cf. Porph. *Abst.* 3. 4). Appian locates his experience in Arabia Petraea, but Quintus' expression covers all the nomadic peoples south of Judaea.

**as we know was also regularly done in Umbria** Literary texts do not confirm this, but the Iguvine Tablets refer frequently to augury: table 6 has detailed instructions for auspication (see J. W. Poultney, *The Bronze Tables of Iguvium* (Baltimore, 1959), esp. 228 ff.).

**93. it seems to me...practised** Although the large overlap between Quintus' argument in these sections and the overview given by Cic. in the introduction (as well as needless repetition between 92 and 94) may suggest a failure to undertake a thoroughgoing revision of the dialogue, Quintus does introduce a new element here, the link between different environments and forms of divination, which probably reveals use of Posidonius.

**Egyptians and Babylonians** See on 1. 2. Cic. substitutes 'Babylonians' for Assyrians, but no greater precision is intended.

**Etruscans sacrifice victims more carefully and more frequently ...entrails** Cf. Livy 5. 1. 6: 'a nation devoted beyond all others to religious rites because it excelled in the observation of them'. The connection between the Etruscans and sacrifice is seen in various ancient etymologies linking *Tusci* with the Greek verb for sacrifice *thuo* (e.g. Serv. *Aen.* 2. 781; Isid. *Etym.* 14. 4. 22), or with the examination of sacrifices *thuoskopia* (John Lyd. *Mens.* 1. 37; cf. Dion. Hal. 1. 30. 3).

**many lightning strikes occur among them due to the thickness of the atmosphere** Physical explanations for lightning go back to

Presocratic thought and are applied to Italy in various ways. Seneca (*NQ* 2. 30. 3–4) is closest to Cic.'s explanation, while Pliny (*HN* 2. 136; John Lyd. *Ost.* 96 W) attributes lightning to the greater variability of the atmosphere in Italy.

**many unusual things arise from the air** In addition to those things described in 1. 97, e.g. rain of iron (Plin. *HN* 2. 147), chalk (Obseq. 48), blood (Livy 39. 46. 5), and milk (Obseq. 39).

**earth** In addition to earthquakes and peculiar sounds (1. 35, 97), rivers flowing with blood (1. 98), unusual patterns of plant growth (cf. 1. 75) are attested, e.g. SHA *Alex. Sev.* 13. 7; Plin. *HN* 17. 244.

**the conception and generation of men and beasts** In addition to fertile hybrids (1. 36), hermaphrodites (1. 98), two-headed babies (1. 121), all kinds of unusual births could be considered portentous: multiple births (e.g. Obseq. 14; Livy 35. 21. 3; Plin. *HN* 7. 33; SHA *Ant. Pius* 9. 3); Siamese twins (Obseq. 12, 14, 25, 51); women with children of different species (Obseq. 57; Plin. *HN* 7. 34; App. *B Civ.* 1. 83); animals born with limb deformities (Livy 30. 2. 11, 31. 12. 7, 32. 1. 11, 9. 3, 29. 2, 40. 2. 4, 45. 4, 42. 20. 5); animals born of a different species from the mother (Livy 23. 31. 15; Ael. *VH* 1. 29; Jos. *BJ* 6. 5. 3); human–animal mixtures (Livy 27. 11. 5, 31. 12. 7, 32. 9. 3).

**Their efficacy, as you yourself are accustomed to say, is demonstrated by the terms wisely applied to them by our ancestors**

Quintus refers back specifically to Lucilius' words at *ND* 2. 7: 'what else do predictions and presentiments of things to come make clear other than that they are shown, demonstrated, portended, and predicted to man? As a consequence they are called *ostenta*, *monstra*, portents, and prodigies'. He considers the etymology of the various terms for the phenomena handled by *haruspices* as significant of their function, which reflects the principle of Stoic etymologizing that the connection between a thing and the name assigned to it was natural, dependable, and explicable (cf. J. J. O' Hara, *True Names: Vergil and the Alexandrian Tradition of Etymological Wordplay* (Ann Arbor, 1996), 19–21, and C. Fresina, *La Langue de l'être* (Münster, 1991),

111–36). ‘Our’ suggests an element of suppressed patriotism in that, whereas all the key Latin terms for portents were etymologically significant, this was not the case for Greek (e.g. *teras*).

**Because they demonstrate, portend, show, and predict...** The definitions-cum-etymologies of Varro are preserved most securely by Serv. [Auct.] (*Aen.* 3. 366): ‘*ostentum* because it shows (*ostendit*) something to man; *portentum* because it portends (*portendit*) something that is going to happen; *prodigium* because it directs forward (*porro dirigit*); *miraculum* because it is something remarkable (*mirum*); *monstrum* because it warns (*monet*)’. Other such collections of explanation for this group of terms appear in Festus (122 L), Nonius Marcellus (701–2 L), Fronto (*GL* 7. 250), and Augustine (*De civ.* D 21. 8). Most specific are definitions attributed to Suetonius (Reifferscheid p. 284): ‘an *ostentum* shows itself to us without possessing a solid body and affects both our eyes and ears, like darkness or a light at night; a *prodigium* is seen and possesses a solid body, like comets, a star or torch in the sky; a *monstrum* is contrary to nature <or exceeds the nature> we are familiar with, like a snake with feet or a bird with four wings’. Although Bouché-Leclercq (1882: 77–8) has argued that *portenta* and *ostenta* are used of inanimate objects, *monstra* of biological, and *prodigia* of human acts or movements, in practice they are virtually synonymous, see C. Thulin, ‘*Synonyma quaedam latina*’, in *Commentationes in honorem Iohannis Paulson* (Gothenburg, 1905), 197–213.

- (i) *ostendo* (demonstrate) and *ostentum* (miraculous apparition) are clearly connected and have an indisputable literal meaning of ‘hold/set before (the eyes)’, i.e. that which shows or demonstrates.
- (ii) *portendo* (portend)/*portentum* (portent) have the same *tend* root as the above. *Por-* is explained as a contraction of *porro* (Serv. Auct. *Aen.* 7. 256) or for *prae-* (August. *De civ.* D 21. 8), hence a literal meaning of ‘reach forward’, i.e. that which demonstrates in advance.
- (iii) *monstro* (show)/*monstrum*. Most ancient etymologies concur with Cic. in linking with *monstro* (to show), but Varro linked with *moneo* (to warn). See C. Moussy, *RÉL* 55 (1977), 345–62.

- (iv) *praedico* (predict)/*prodigium* (prodigy). Here and at ND 2. 7 Cic. understands the root verb as *dicere* (to speak). He is followed by Festus (254 L), against Varro's *porro dirigere*. Modern scholars connect with *agere* (Ernout-Meillet 1959; cf. Non. Marc. 694 L) or *aiere* (Walde-Hofmann 1938: 368).

**94. Arabs, Phrygians, and Cilicians...as they cross the plains in winter and mountains in summer** See on 1. 92. Transhumance is a feature of the herdsman's life. For Quintus' argument, it is the unobstructed views that plains (cf. 1. 93) and mountains afford that are important.

The same explanation goes for Pisidia and for our Umbria See on 1. 92. Pisidia has both high mountains and extensive plains and the central Anatolian plateau is an area where transhumance occurred (S. Mitchell, *Anatolia* (Oxford, 1993), i. 71, 145). Umbria was a major sheep-rearing area in Italy where the low quality of much of the vegetation required changes in pasture (J. M. Frayn, *Sheep-Rearing and the Wool Trade in Italy during the Roman Period* (Liverpool, 1984), 18–20).

**Caria and particularly the Telmessians, of whom I have spoken above** See on 1. 91. Cf. Nep. Ages. 3. 1: 'during those times [Caria] was considered to be by far the richest'.

**95. in all the best states auspices and all the other kinds of divination have wielded the greatest influence** Quintus develops the argument *e consensu omnium* in a form designed to avoid the criticism that divination convinces only the simple-minded: among 'the best', i.e. the civilized and successful, states he concentrates on Sparta, whose constitution alongside that of Rome attracted the greatest praise for stability, and on Rome and within them on the individuals (e.g. Lycurgus) and bodies which controlled the state (e.g. the Roman Senate). See Rawson 1969: 99 ff.

**a king or a people that has not employed divine prophecy** For examples of regal use of divination, cf. 1. 3, 26–7, 32, 37, 88–9, 91. Of those peoples already mentioned in Quintus' argument (excluding



individual city-states in Greece and the peoples of Italy): Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Cilicians, Pisidians, Pamphylians (1. 2–3), Persians (1. 46), Carthaginians (1. 49), Celts (1. 90), Carians (1. 91), Arabs and Phrygians (1. 92).

**Romans, who do nothing in war without examining entrails and nothing in the civilian sphere without taking auspices** Cf. 1. 3: ‘no public business, civilian or military, was undertaken without the auspices being taken’. Quintus’ introduction of haruspicy in the military context reflects the practice of his day (cf. Wissowa 1912: 548). The main MSS read *dum habent auspicia externa* and pose two questions: how to punctuate and whether to emend. Most editors have sought a contrast between war and peace, and between haruspicy and augury, which is not provided by the MSS text, as nothing contrasts with war. This lack is solved by reading *domi* (B) (in civilian matters) for *dum* (as at 1. 3), but then *habent auspicia* becomes problematic: Giomini excises *auspicia* and retains *habent*, which has to be understood in the sense of *suscipiunt* (undertake), but there are no convincing parallels (Timpanaro). Preferable is either to excise *habent auspicia* (Timpanaro), as a marginal comment created to fill out the meaning of *neque solum...magis*, or to accept Pease’s suggestion <*domi*>, *dum habent auspicia* (cf. 2. 76). Schaublin excises *dum habent auspicia*, which leaves auspicy unchallenged in its traditional supremacy in all aspects of Roman life (cf. 1. 3), but does not reflect the reality of Roman practice. Heavy punctuation before *externa* is essential.

**the Athenians...employ certain divinatory priests whom they call *manteis*** Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 54. 6) confirms the existence of seers (*manteis*) with a public role: ‘who are to make sacrifice ordered by the seers and if good omens are required they see to it with the seers’. A role at the deme level is plausible (cf. Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 75). *Manteis* had a role in Athens’s imperial colonizing ventures in the 5th cent., but the kind of references to Hierocles and Lampon make it difficult to determine whether they were independent diviners or fulfilled an official role (cf. Dillery 2005: 193–7). A seer Telenicus, listed among the Erechtheid dead of 460/459 (*IG* i<sup>3</sup>. 1147), presumably served with other *manteis* in the Athenian forces (cf. Dillery

2005: 200–4), but whether Cic. is referring to such a common military function rather than seers influencing the assembly is unclear.

**the Spartans have given their kings an augur as assessor** These assessors were called ‘Pythians’ and were fed at public expense (Hdt. 6. 57. 2; Xen. *Resp. Lac.* 15. 5). Two were attached to each king and their attendance on the king was so close that they were described as tent-comrades (*suskenoi*). They served as envoys to Delphi, but, although they were appointed by the kings, oracular consultations were not taken unilaterally (see Parker 1989: 154–5).

**they wanted an augur to be present with their elders** An ordinary seer (*mantis*; cf. Xen. *Resp. Lac.* 13. 7) rather than an *ephor* is meant (Richer 1998: 139 n. 30). No other source attests this for the Spartan *gerousia*, but nothing precludes it. On the importance of the *gerousia*, see G. E. M. De Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), 137–8.

**On important matters too they used always to consult the oracle at Delphi** Cf. Nep. *Lys.* 3. 1: ‘the Spartans were accustomed to refer everything to oracles’; Paus. 3. 4. 4: ‘the Spartans referred to the oracle at Delphi, as they were accustomed to on everything else’. ‘Spartans loved oracles, more perhaps than did the citizens of any other Greek state, and granted them an unusual importance in political debate’ (Parker 1989: 154). Of the 342 oracular responses which Fontenrose classes as historical or quasi-historical, 42 are to or for Spartans (1978: 244–354).

**Ammon** Cf. 1. 3. Paus. 3. 18. 3: ‘from the beginning the Spartans are known to have used the oracle in Libya more than any other Greeks’. Although there is excellent evidence to suggest a strong link between Sparta, the Dorian colonies of North Africa, and the oracle of Ammon at Siwa in both myth and history (Malkin 1994: esp. 158–68), instances of consultation or oracular response are few. In a Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Socrates relates an undated clash between Athens and Sparta, to resolve which the Athenians sent to Ammon and received the response: ‘I would rather have the reverent reserve of

the Spartans than all the sacrifices of the Greeks' (*Alc.* 149b). Although not about a response to the Spartans, the story presumes excellent relations between them and Ammon. In 403/402 Lysander visited Siwa to bribe the oracle to support his constitutional reforms (see below), but was rebuffed (*Diod.* 14. 13. 4; see I. Malkin, *CQ* 40 (1990), 541–5). From this same episode, as recorded by Ephorus (*FGrH* 70 F 206 = *Plut. Lys.* 25. 3) the priests of Ammon knew of an earlier oracle that the Spartans would settle in Libya. This may be an oracle given to, or used by, Dorieus in the late 6th cent., but its source is unclear. The vague *chresmou tinos... palaion* (some ancient oracle) when used by Ephorus does not suggest Delphi and may seem to rule out Ammon, in that the priests were not appropriating it for Ammon (so Malkin 1994: 194–7), but, since in the late 5th cent. Siwa would have had nothing to gain from greater Spartan interference in Libya, perhaps the later failure to appropriate the oracle is intelligible—what had been desirable 100 years previously was not in 403/402.

**Dodona** Literary accounts of Spartans consulting Dodona begin with Lysander, who is alleged to have attempted bribery (Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 206 = *Plut. Lys.* 20; *Diod.* 14. 3. 4; *Nep. Lys.* 3. 1). Spartan expeditions to Acarnania in 389 may have led to increased official contacts with the oracle, seen in the story of an abortive consultation in 371 (*Plut. Mor.* 191b); c.367 the oracle prophesied a 'tearless war' for the Spartans (*Diod.* 15. 72. 3)—the last surviving account of an official Spartan enquiry. None of the published lead strips on which enquiries were addressed to the oracle can be attributed to the Spartans.

**96. Lycurgus...confirmed his own laws with the authority of Apollo at Delphi** Quintus' formulation here is less sceptical than Cotta's (*ND* 3. 91): although it allows a rationalist interpretation, Cic. probably accepts the genuine involvement of Delphi. There is a strong tradition of Delphi's involvement in the creation of the mixed constitution which was attributed generally to Lycurgus (e.g. *Xen. Lac.* 8. 5; *Polyb.* 6. 48. 2, 10. 2. 11; *Val. Max.* 1. 2 *ext.* 3); the ephorate, though, Cic. attributes to King Theompompus (*Rep.* 2. 58; see Dyck 2004: 487). In the most extreme version Lycurgus received laws from

Apollo as Minos had from Zeus (Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 149 = Strabo 366). This association with Delphi may have been played upon by Spartan conservatives opposed to the reforms proposed by Lysander (see below) in order to make the existing constitution inviolable, but Herodotus records it as a view held by non-Spartans much earlier in the 5th cent. (1. 65. 5). Again, the 'great rhetra', an archaic document central to any constitutional discussion, was considered to be an oracle or at least to be dressed in the guise of an oracle. See D. Ogden, *JHS* 114 (1994), 85–102.

**When Lysander wanted to change these, he was prevented by the same authority** Lysander allegedly made the Spartans swear an oath that they would not tamper with his laws (Plut. *Lyc.* 29. 1–3). Aristotle (*Pol.* 1301<sup>b</sup>19–21) notes an alleged attempt of Lysander to abolish the kingship, but this goes beyond the usual story of his wanting a kingship open to his own candidature, of the liberal use of bribery and the oracles' rejection of him (e.g. Diod. 14. 13. 2–4; Plut. *Lys.* 24. 2–26. 4). In 403/402 the architect of Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War, in search of a secure, prestigious position for himself in Spartan life, and at a moment when neither Spartan king had a legitimate son of an age to succeed, began to promote the idea that the kingship should be open to all descendants of Hercules (Plut. *Lys.* 24. 4). If the role given to the boy Silenus is historical, then a plan of some years' gestation is to be suspected. See P. Cartledge, *Agesilaos* (London, 1987), 94–6; C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, NY, 1979), 92–6; U. Bernini, *SIFC* 3 (1985), 211–36.

**Those who governed the Spartans... performed incubation in the shrine of Pasiphae** Although the etymology of Pasiphae from *pasi phainein* (to appear to all) quoted by Plutarch (*Agis* 9. 2) and the vague 'they consult the oracle' of Pausanias (*manteuontai*: 3. 26. 1) suggest that all could consult the oracle, the literary (Plut. *Cleom.* 7. 3) and epigraphic evidence (*IG* v/1. 1317) mentions only ephors. The kings' use of Delphi and the ephors' of Pasiphae reflects the need for independent and potentially competing divine supports, but it is not impossible that the kings could also receive dreams pertaining to the state (Richer 1998: 208–12). *Excubare* (incubation) strictly means 'sleeping outside (the city)', but the widespread practice of receiving

divine guidance through a dream while sleeping on the ground in a sacred complex after performing various rites is usually called 'incubation'. The usual purpose of incubation was to seek healing, not political guidance. On incubation see L. Deubner, *De Incubatione* (Leipzig, 1900) and Graf 1992: 186–93.

Cic. locates this shrine close to Sparta, but Pausanias (3. 26. 1) and Plutarch (*Agis* 9. 2) locate it on the road from Oetylus to Thalamae and at Thalamae respectively, far from Sparta. Either Cic. is mistaken (Richer 1998: 206) or, less plausibly, there was a daughter shrine close to Sparta to which he refers (Wide 1893: 247).

**oracles received in dreams** Quintus' 'oracles' transmits a technical term from ancient dream analysis for a specific kind of dream usually received via incubation: 'it is an oracle when in dreams a parent or some other venerable and influential individual or a priest or a god openly announces what will or will not happen, what is to be done or avoided' (Macrobian *Somn. Scip.* 1. 3. 8; cf. Niceph. Greg. 608b; Artem. 1. 2: *chrematismos*). See Kessels 1969: 394–6.

**97. I now return to Roman examples** Cf. 1. 55. 'Roman' translates *nostra* (cf. *ND* 2. 8; *Tusc.* 5. 105; *Off.* 3. 99). Quintus will present a list of twenty examples of portents from Roman history in 97 and 98, which have been traced back to a haruspical apology found in Sisenna's history (MacBain 1982: 21–3). From parallels in *Obsequens*, half of the prodigies can plausibly be dated to 117 and 91, but the principle of organization behind the material is unclear.

**the Senate ordered the Board of Ten to consult the books** The Senate had ultimate responsibility for all matters pertaining to the state religion (Beard 1990: esp. 31–4). Quintus uses the anachronistic term 'Board of Ten' (by his day Fifteen) primarily because the majority of known consultations occurred between 367 and the late 80s (53 consultations between 509 and 87 are known from literary sources, 48 of which date from the period of the Board of Ten (Orlin 1997: 203–7)), but also because since Sulla's reforms the Board had been manipulated for political purposes—to thwart Pompey's ambitions in Egypt in 56 (Dio 39. 15. 1–16. 2) and to justify Caesar's

kingship in 44 (e.g. *Div.* 2. 112)—and therefore such controversial consultations would not have helped his case.

**how often has it heeded the replies of the *haruspices*** The literary references to all public consultation of *haruspices* are tabulated by MacBain (1982: 82–106). For the Republican period it is clear that in the 1st cent. BC there was a very large increase in haruspicial activity compared with that of the Board of Ten/Fifteen.

**For example, when two suns...are seen** Pease argues that these celestial signs were taken over from Cleanthes via Posidonius in whose work they functioned as proofs of the gods' existence (cf. *ND* 2. 14), but far more plausible is a Roman historiographical source because the examples are located in Italy or the West. The phenomenon of 'parhelion' was discussed from Presocratic philosophers onwards: Empedocles (*Stob.* 1. 25. 12 W); Anaxagoras (*Plut. Mor.* 894f); Aristotle (*Met.* 372<sup>a</sup>10–18). In Roman historiographical sources for the Republic double suns are recorded in 206 at Alba (*Livy* 28. 11. 3), 204 at Rome (*Livy* 29. 14. 3), 163 at Formiae (*Obseq.* 14), and 129 in Rome (*Cic. ND* 2. 14; *Rep.* 1. 31); triple suns in Rome in 174 (*Livy* 41. 21. 2), Gaul in 122 (*Obseq.* 32), Picenum in 104 (*Obseq.* 43), in 44 (*Obseq.* 68), and 42 (*Obseq.* 70). Cf. Seneca *NQ* 1. 11. 2: 'historians call them "suns" and record that they have appeared in twos and threes'.

**three moons** The comparable phenomenon known as 'paraselene'. In 223 at Ariminum (*Plut. Marc.* 4. 1), in Gaul in 122 (*Obseq.* 32; *Plin. HN* 2. 99), and in 39 (John Lyd. *Ost.* 4 W).

**torches** Again *Cic.* uses a Latin rendering of a Greek technical term (cf. *Arist. Met.* 341<sup>b</sup>1–5 *daloî*; *Mund.* 395<sup>b</sup>10–12 *lampades*). *Pliny* (*HN* 2. 96) says that 'torches' (*faces*) produce long tails, and thus probably describe meteorites. Recorded examples in 44 (*Obseq.* 68), 17 (*Obseq.* 71).

**sun...at night** 166 at Casinum (*Obseq.* 12), 163 at Capua and Pisaurum (*Obseq.* 14), 134 at Amiternum (*Obseq.* 27), 113, and many other occasions (*Plin. HN* 2. 100). Probably some form of aurora polaris (Pease).

**sounds...in the sky** E.g. in 163 on Cephallenia a trumpet (Obseq. 14), during the Cimbric invasions (Plin. *HN* 2. 148; John Lyd. *Ost.* 13 W), in 91 (Orosius 5. 18. 3: 'with a very loud noise in the sky'), in 88 (Plut. *Sull.* 7. 3), in 83 between Capua and Vulturnus the sound of standards (Obseq. 57), in the Latin territory in 56 (Cic. *Har. Resp.* 20), at Antioch in Syria and Ptolemais in 48 (Caes. *B Civ.* 3. 105. 3; Obseq. 65a; cf. Dio 41. 61. 3).

**the sky appeared to come apart** Pease explained the phenomenon by the sun shining through clouds, or lightning against a dark cloudy background, but something more striking, and thus terrifyingly significant seems appropriate—an auroral phenomenon: 'homogeneous or rayed auroral arcs located not too far from the horizon may be seen arched across the sky. The lower border is sharp but the upper portion less defined. Because of the brilliance of the lower border the sky between it and the horizon appears very dark, like the mouth of a chasm or trench from which fire flames forth' (P. J. Bicknell, *Latomus* 31 (1972), 525). The phenomenon was called 'chasm' by the Greeks (Arist. *Met.* 342<sup>a</sup>34 ff.; John Lyd. *Ost.* 34 W), terminology also found in Latin authors (Sen. *NQ* 1. 14. 1; Plin. *HN* 2. 97).

Examples from 217, 93, and 91 were recorded by Livy (22. 1. 11; Obseq. 52, 54). Although Servius, in the text as it stands, alleges that this was a significant sign in the augural books (*Aen.* 9. 20), *auguralibus* should be emended to *fulguralibus* (P. Regell, 'Auguralia', in *Commentationes Philologiae in Honorem Augusti Reifferscheidii* (Vratislava, 1866), 64–6).

**balls** Cf. 91: 'around sunrise a ball of fire shone from the north with a huge sound in the sky' (Obseq. 54; Oros. 5. 18. 3). Fiery spheres are a rare auroral phenomenon linked with the above (as seen in the connective *atque*). See P. Bicknell, 'Globus ignis', in J. Bingen *et al.* (eds.), *Le Monde grec: Hommages à Claire Préaux* (Brussels, 1975), 286–7.

**a landslide...violent earthquakes** The syntax indicates that the two phenomena in distinct locations are linked by Cic. and the introductory 'again' (*etiam*) suggests that a different historical

context is envisaged from the previous examples: the subsidence was caused by the earthquake, the epicentre of which was further south. The traditional context has been found in 113 (Obseq. 38: 'the earth gaped wide among the Lucanians and at Privernum'), although that requires a confusion by Obsequens of Apulia and Lucania and there was no imminent war or civil strife to be warned against in that year. Latterly the insurrections and civil war of 87, and the consultation of the Sibylline books recorded by Granius Licinianus (35. 1–2), have been suggested as a more appropriate context (F. Santangelo, *Anc. Soc.* 35 (2005), 167–73). This would fit well with the hypothesis that Sisenna's history is the source of Cic.'s examples here, as the work culminated in the struggles of the 80s.

**huge wars and most ruinous revolts were announced to the Roman people** If MacBain (1982: 22) is correct in tying Quintus' examples to 117 and 91, the rhetorical plurals 'wars' and 'revolts' will refer to the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones, and the Social War respectively.

**in all these cases the responses of the *haruspices* coincided with the Sibylline verses** This is the only evidence for a double consultation of *haruspices* and the Board of Ten for these prodigies in 117 and 91, but it is plausible. A consequence of the apparent failure of responses recommended by the Board of Ten in the early years of the Second Punic War was the greater prominence of the *haruspices* (cf. Mazurek 2004: 149–54), but the eclipse of the Board was only temporary and partial in that a careful interweaving of decemviral and haruspical expertises can be traced from 207 (MacBain 1982: 58–71). For example, the birth of hermaphrodites was certainly dealt with by both. Although the *haruspices* were not subordinated to the Board of Ten, prophetic material produced by *haruspices* appears to have been added to the collections supervised by the Board (North 2000: 95–8), which would improve the likelihood of agreements.

**98. Apollo sweated at Cumae** In 91 'on the citadel at Cumae the statue of Apollo sweated' (Obseq. 54). This statue of Apollo was a regular source of portents of Roman victories in the East, usually through weeping (169, Livy 43. 13. 4; in 146 or 130?, August. *De civ.*



D 3. 11). Sweating is a different phenomenon from weeping, and had a more sombre significance (cf. Posidippus 30. 1–2 AB: ‘if a statue sweats, what great trouble it means for a man and what a great blizzard of spears it brings’; John Lyd. *Ost.* 16 W: ‘whenever statues appear to sweat *or* cry... it threatens civil disturbances’; *AP* 9. 534, 14. 92; *Plut. Alex.* 14. 5). Here the Social War, which was strictly a revolt rather than an external war, was portended. For belief in the magic properties of statues, see Faraone 1992.

The physical explanation for the phenomenon was known to be condensation from the 4th cent. (*Arist. Plant.* 822<sup>a</sup>31; *Theophr. Hist. Plant.* 5. 9. 8), but religious significance was attached to it, e.g. in 216 (*Livy* 22. 36. 7), 206 (*Livy* 28. 11. 4), 54 (*Dio* 40. 17. 1), and 49 (*App. B Civ.* 2. 36).

**Victory at Capua** Capua may be significant for its prominence as a centre of the Samnites who were Rome’s most stubborn foes in the Social War. Victory, if not taken over from the Samnites, was first worshipped publicly by the Romans during the Samnite Wars (cf. Salmon 1967: 152–3). Even if this specific link is denied, unusual manifestations connected with Victory were particularly significant in war-conscious Rome, e.g. in 295 (*Zon.* 8. 1), in 88 (*Plut. Sull.* 11. 1), and in 42 (*App. B Civ.* 2. 135).

### **when men-women were born, was it not a portent of disaster?**

Quintus uses the earlier term *androgynus* (‘man-woman’), which by the late 1st cent. AD had changed to *hermaphroditus* (*Plin. HN* 7. 34; cf. 7. 15). *Livy*, *Obsequens*, and *Phlegon of Tralles* record sixteen instances of the birth of hermaphrodites being treated as a portent between 209 and 92. In eleven cases the *haruspices* committed such children to water in an open trunk or box, to bring about their drowning, and the Board of Ten led various purificatory rites in Rome. Not all sixteen instances can be connected with a following disaster, but that is not a problem in that a duly performed *procuratio* would avert or delay disaster. Several do, however, tie in with disasters: that of 207 with Hasdrubal’s invasion, 133 with the revolt of Aristonicus, 125 with the Latin revolt, 104 with Cimbric invasions, and that of 92/91 with the Social War (*Obseq.* 53; *Diod.* 32. 12. 2, ‘around the beginning of the Marsic war’). Such portents and their

expiation served to articulate public anxiety at such times of stress through memorable rites of exclusion and elimination. See MacBain 1982: 127–35; R. Garland, *The Eye of the Beholder* (London, 1995), 67–72; L. Brisson, *Sexual Ambivalence: Androgyny and Hermaphroditism in Graeco-Roman Antiquity* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 25–32.

**the river Atratus ran with blood** The location of this river, mentioned only by Cic. (cf. 2. 58), is unknown. Atratus, clearly to be linked with the adjective ‘black’ (*ater*; see André 1949: 57–9), is probably a proper noun. Physical explanations for this phenomenon were provided from the 4th cent. (Arist. *Met.* 356<sup>a</sup>13–14; cf. Cic. *Div.* 2. 58), but it appeared frequently as a portent in Republican annals, e.g. in 167 at Calatia (Obseq. 11), 166 on the Quirinal (Obseq. 12), 147 at Caere (Obseq. 20), 137 in the forum (Obseq. 24), 136 at Puteoli (Obseq. 25), 96 at Faesuli (Obseq. 49), 94 (Obseq. 51), 93 at Carseoli (Obseq. 52), and 92 at Volaterrae (Obseq. 53)

**it frequently rained stones** The many examples in Livy justify ‘frequently’ (1. 31. 2, 7. 28. 7, 21. 62. 5–6, 22. 36. 7, 23. 31. 15, 25. 7. 7, 26. 23. 5, 27. 37. 5, 28. 27. 16, 30. 38. 8–9, 34. 45. 8, 35. 9. 4, 36. 37. 3, 38. 36. 4, 39. 22. 3, 42. 20. 6). In 152 at Aricia (Obseq. 18), in 102 in Etruria (Obseq. 44), in 94 among the Vestini (Obseq. 51), in 91 among the Vestini (Obseq. 54). Orosius (5. 18. 5) specifies seven consecutive days of stone-rain over a very wide area in 91. Physical explanation for this phenomenon included wind (Plin. *HN* 2. 104) and meteorite showers (e.g. John Lyd. *Ost.* 14 W). The temporal expressions in this sentence are carefully arranged in descending order of frequency for rhetorical effect (I. Haug, *WJA* 2 (1947), 112 n. 3).

**sometimes blood** Livy 39. 56. 6, 40. 19. 2, 43. 13. 6. In 183 (Obseq. 4), 181 (Obseq. 6), 104 at Luna (Obseq. 43), and in 102 around the Anio (Obseq. 44). Alexandrian scholars discussed whether the blood of those killed in wars was drawn to the clouds by convection to fall as rain (Schol. Hom. *Il.* 11. 53–4), but more prosaic explanations include desert or volcanic dust (e.g. Pease).

**now and then earth** Cf. Livy 10. 31. 8, 34. 45. 7, 35. 21. 4, 45. 16. 5; e.g. in 167 at Anagnia (Obseq. 11), 166 in Campania (Obseq. 12), 163 (Obseq. 14), and in 133 at Ardea (Obseq. 27a).

**once even milk** Livy 27. 11. 5. At Gabii in 163 (Obseq. 14), at Rome in 130 (Obseq. 28), at Veii in 125 (Obseq. 30), at Rome in 124 (Obseq. 31) and 118 (Obseq. 35), at Praeneste in 117 (Obseq. 36), in 111 for three days (Obseq. 39), in 108 (Obseq. 40), in 106 near Perugia and at Rome (Obseq. 41), in 104 in Lucania and in the Forum (Obseq. 43), in 95 at Caere (Obseq. 50), in 92 at Rome (Obseq. 53). Quintus' description of this as rare is hard to explain given its frequency in the annalistic records. Physical explanation has been sought in the ash of forest fires (Pease).

**on the Capitol the Centaur was struck by lightning** No other reference to this statue exists. The mythic significance and the artistic representation of centaurs is so varied that any attempt to connect this statue with a Roman politician or specific building is impossible. Centaurs appear on Republican coinage only twice: anonymous coins of 217–215 on which Hercules fights a centaur and on a coin of M. Aurelius Cotta of 139 where Hercules' chariot is drawn by centaurs (*RRC*, nos. 39, 229). No religious site connected with Hercules on the Capitoline is known.

**on the Aventine gates and men** The Aventine features in portents (e.g. Livy 35. 9. 4), but no date can be given this incident. Individuals struck by lightning were considered as portents (e.g. Obseq. 1, 28, 37, 41, 56a, 56b, 61); the striking of the city's gates or walls was more significant, as they were considered sacred (*sanctus*: e.g. Gaius *Inst.* 2. 8; Just. *Inst.* 2. 1. 10) and the security of the city was symbolically threatened (cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* 47 W). If the context for this is 91, we should look for some connection with the Social War. The Aventine was something of a liminal space with special associations with Rome's allies, the site of the federal sanctuary with the Latins. Perhaps the lightning strikes symbolized the breaking of the treaty between Rome and her allies.

**at Tusculum the temple of Castor and Pollux** Tusculum, the first Latin city to receive Roman citizenship, was an infrequent location for portents (Obseq. 1), but when the cult of the Dioscuri was concerned it was significant. The Dioscuri were the protecting deities of Tusculum (cf. Festus 410 L) and their cult was long celebrated by families such as the Fonteii who came from Tusculum (cf. Cic. *Font.* 41; see J. Välimaa, in E. M. Steinby (ed.), *Lacus Iuturnae* (Rome, 1990), 116–19). The Dioscuri were introduced to Rome from there by a quasi-*evocatio* before the battle of Lake Regillus in 496 (F. Castagnoli, *Studi Romani* 31 (1983), 3–12). Perhaps the portent was interpreted as an end of Latin loyalty or of the Dioscuri's protection.

**at Rome the temple of Piety** Cf. Obseq. 54: 'the temple of Piety in the Circus Flaminius was struck by lightning and closed', in 91. This temple was vowed by M'. Acilius Glabrio in 191 (Orlin 1997: 146–7) and was built at the extreme east of the Circus Flaminius (*LTUR* iv. 86). Its destruction by Caesar in 44 may give added point to its appearance in Quintus' list, but the primary reference is to the allies' breaking of their duty to Rome in starting the Social War.

**in all these cases...** In repeating the point made at the end of 1. 97, Quintus in effect counters a common objection by critics of divination, that its various techniques and expertises were all separate.

**99. Following a dream of Caecilia...during the recent Marsic War** See on 1. 4. Cic. uses the contemporary name for the Social War, between 91 and 89. 'Recent' is used loosely of something within the lifetime and memory of Quintus, cf. 1. 4: 'even within my own memory'.

**Sisenna...impertinently argues...that no credence should be given to dreams** Fr. 10 B. Before his death in 67 L. Cornelius Sisenna, probably of Etruscan descent, wrote a history of the Allied and Social Wars (see Rawson 1979: 327–46). Cic. praises it as the best available, even though it had shortcomings, notably its imitation of the Greek 'tragic-historian' Clitarchus (*Brut.* 228; *Leg.* 1. 7; cf. Fleck 1993: 154–61). It is impossible to reconstruct Sisenna's attitude to the supernatural from Cic.'s selective account here. Sisenna has no

miraculous disappearance for Aeneas (fr. 3 B), and a character in an uncertain context raises the question whether the gods are interested in mankind (fr. 126 B). Against this apparent scepticism must be set the inclusion and acceptance (if Cic. is correct) of portents. Sisenna's rejection of dreams is explained best as polemic against Coelius Antipater's credulous acceptance of them (La Penna 1975: 49), rather than against Sulla (*pace* G. Calboli, *Studi Urbinati* 49 (1975), 157–9). The persuasive Epicurean has been identified with C. Velleius (Rawson 1979: 341), although there seems no reason to suppose that Quintus has a specific individual in mind (Dyck, *per Litt.*).

**He does not, however, argue against portents** Fr. 6 B. In this respect the Epicurean influence seems to have failed, but we do not know whether Sisenna included portents in his narrative of 91 out of a senatorial traditionalism (Barabino 1967: 85), or real belief 'in the Etruscan lore of his forebears, or simply as a historiographical *topos*' (Rawson 1979: 341). Fr. 12 B appears to refer to the portentous rain of stones and pottery fragments recorded in Orosius (5. 18. 5; cf. Obseq. 54), but it is difficult to use this to argue that portents occurred throughout Sisenna's work.

**at the beginning of the Marsic War statues of the gods sweated**

The clash with 2. 54, 59: 'before the Marsic War' is not significant; with Obsequens, it is enough to date the prodigies to 91 (cf. P. Frassinetti, *Athenaeum* 50 (1972), 86). Cic. abbreviates Sisenna's account of the portents from Cumae and Capua (see on 1. 98).

**blood flowed** This probably refers to a portent at Arretium, 'as bread was being broken during banquets, blood flowed from the middle of the loaves as if from bodily wounds' (Orosius 5. 18. 4; Obseq. 55) rather than to the river Atratus running red (1. 98).

**the sky came apart** See on 1. 97.

**voices were heard from unseen sources** Cf. 1. 101.

**at Lanuvium the shields were eaten through by mice** Pliny *HN* 8. 221: 'the eating of the silver shields at Lanuvium portended the

Marsic War'. These were probably the shields in the temple of Juno Sospita where the cult-statue featured a small shield (*scutulum*, Cic. *ND* 1. 82; *CIL* 14. 100\*). This portent suggested that the protective power of Juno over the Latin League was threatened or warned against the weakening of the relationship between Rome and the Latins which Rome's worship at Lanuvium celebrated (see on 1. 4). The activity of mice in sacred areas was regarded as significant by *haruspices* (cf. Ael. *VH* 1. 11; Auson. 25. 13. 2 Green) and their eating of sacred items appears in the annalistic record (Livy 27. 23. 2; Plut. *Sull.* 7. 3; Obseq. 20). Such rodent activity was reputed to have destroyed Cretan (Schol. Clem. *Protr.* 30) and Assyrian forces (Hdt. 2. 141. 5).

**100. we find in the annals** From a Roman annalistic historian rather than the pontifical annals (Frier 1979: 300–5).

**the war with Veii** The war with Veii occupied much space in early Roman history, as can be seen from the accounts in Livy (5. 1. 1–23. 12), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (12. 10–15), and Plutarch (*Cam.* 2. 3–6. 4; see T. Hantos, *ACUSD* 33 (1997), 127–48). The final phase of the conflict, from which this episode comes, lasted ten years, 406–396 on Livy's dates (see Ogilvie 1965: 629). Livy places these events in 398 (5. 14. 5). Cic.'s is the earliest extant version of this episode in the war, but which of the earlier annalists he draws on here is impossible to determine. The most striking aspect of Cic.'s version is its narrow concentration on the haruspical aspects of the story, and omission of the Roman embassy to Delphi, the role of the Board of Ten, and the Senate's initial rejection of the *haruspex*'s interpretation. This need not imply a unique, pro-haruspical source, nor that the Delphic consultation is a late accretion to the story, given the material evidence at Delphi for a consultation in connection with Veii (see Parke and Wormell 1956: 273). Nonetheless, the story involves many problems and has attracted much attention, e.g. J. Hubaux, *Rome et Vêies: Recherches sur la chronologie légendaire du moyen âge romain* (Paris, 1958), 121–53; D'Arco 1997: 93–148.

**when the Alban Lake rose beyond its usual level** Dion. Hal. 12. 10. 1: 'about the time of the rising dogstar, the season when lakes

mostly fail . . . a certain lake no less than 120 stades from Rome in the so-called Alban mountains . . . at a time when neither rain nor snowstorms had occurred nor any other cause perceptible to man received such an increase to its waters that it inundated a large part of the region around the mountain, destroyed many farmhouses and finally carved out the gap between the mountains and poured a mighty river down over the plains lying below'; cf. Plut. *Cam.* 3. 1–3; Livy 5. 15. 2; Zonaras 7. 20. The Alban Lake, 24 km SE of Rome, exists in a volcanic crater fed by no springs or rivers. The description by Dionysius and Plutarch seems incredible, requiring a rise of c.100 m to reach the brim of the crater. The only other prodigious rising of the Alban Lake submerged the palace of the legendary Amulius/Allodius (Diod. 7. 5. 11; Dion. Hal. 1. 71; Zon. 7. 1). From the coincidence of Dionysius' dating of the prodigy to the dog days, the regular necessity of irrigation tasks enjoined on farmers for this period (e.g. Pall. 9. 8–12) and the first appearance of Neptune in Roman state cults in 399, G. Dumézil (*Fêtes romaines d'été et d'automne* (Paris, 1975), 25–31) conjectured that this is the myth of the *Neptunalia*, a festival celebrated on 23 July. However, almost nothing is known of the festival's celebration and no link survives in any source for its connection with the Alban Lake.

**a certain noble Veientine came over to us** In the other versions he was captured (cf. Livy 5. 15. 4–12; Val. Max. 1. 6. 3; Dion. Hal. 12. 11. 1–4; Plut. *Cam.* 4. 1–3). The historicity of the *haruspex* has been questioned on the grounds that his role is a literary creation modelled on that of Proteus in *Odyssey* 4 or Helenus (cf. Apollod. *Epit.* 5. 9), in order to link together the historical but otherwise unconnected events of the fall of Veii and the building of the *emissarium* (e.g. D'Arco 1997: 139–41). Nothing in the existing form of the story supports the suggestion of M. Ruch (*RÉL* 44 (1966), 331–50) that the Veientine *haruspex* is a manifestation of the god Neptune, ancestor of the Veientes (Serv. *Aen.* 8. 285) and that he was able to produce the miraculous behaviour of the element under his control.

**the decrees of fate which the Veientes possessed in written form** Dionysius and Plutarch make no mention of written Etruscan lore and Livy's *haruspex* unusually prophesies by direct divine inspiration

(5. 15. 10), which may be an isolated survival of the broader powers such figures once claimed. 'Decrees of fate' (*libri fatales*; also called *rituales*, Cens. DN 11. 6, 14. 6) contained not just ritual regulations, but also prophecies on individuals and communities. See Thulin 1905: 8–10.

**Veii could not be captured ... it would be disastrous for the Roman people** Cf. Dion. Hal. 12. 11. 2: 'it is fated for this city to be captured only when the lake beside the Alban Mount, lacking its natural springs, shall no longer mingle its waters with the sea'. Livy 5. 15. 11–12: 'when the Alban water overflows, then if Rome duly leads it off, victory will be given over the Veientes; before that happens the gods will not desert the walls of the Veientes'. Livy omits this negative aspect of the prophecy (cf. Ogilvie 1965: 661–2), but his whole version is heavily contaminated by Roman thought and his version of the prophecy is modelled on a Delphic response (Guittard 1989: 1243–4).

The fundamental problem is to explain how the Alban Lake could be connected with events in Veii, when geographically they are many kilometres apart. If read with fundamentalist literalness, in terms of geography and hydrology, the story is nonsensical; its appearance, however, in all the sources who discuss the episode (whatever differences in emphasis they have) guarantees that to its original audience it was not laughable. One approach, complex in its ramifications, is based on linguistics: the Veientine seer used an Etruscan word *alpanu*, an equivalent of the Greek deity Nemesis, in a formula such as *alpanum solvendum* ('Retribution must be satisfied'); either there was some cross-cultural misunderstanding or even more devious linguistic manipulation involving the Greek *lachos* (fate) and the Latin *lacus* (lake) to create a connection between the Alban Lake and Veii (J. Gag , *M FRA* 66 (1954), 47–54). If, however, the real meaning of *alpanu* is 'gift' or 'willing' and the figure identified on Etruscan mirrors by Gag  corresponds to *Concordia* (e.g. A. d'Aversa, *Dizionario della lingua etrusca* (Brescia, 1994), 2), this approach offers nothing. Another, more promising approach is to posit a different kind of connection between Veii and the Alban Lake. On the basis of a fragment of Naevius, in which a king of Veii thanks Amulius of Alba Longa (Festus 334 L), it has been suggested that



there was a link in cult between the sanctuary of the Alban Mount and Veii (A. Pasqualini, *Alba Longa: Mito, storia, archeologia* (Rome, 1996), 247). However, it is possible to draw from Livy's narrative a plausible, political interpretation of the story with an internal and an external dimension: the portent was closely linked with patrician–plebeian struggles within Rome (cf. Livy 5. 17. 5) and in particular with an alliance between the leaders of the plebeians and the Latins against the patricians, who were advancing their own hegemony of the state by the war against Veii; the cult-site of the *lucus Ferentinae*, which was the seat of the Latin League, was threatened by the rise in water level, which was naturally interpreted as a divine sign relating to the Latin League. Thus the portent and the oracle relate to a reaffirmation of the Treaty of Spurius Cassius in which the partnership of Rome and the Latins was reinstated. The restoration of the *emissarium* thus parallels the reaffirmation of the treaty (Coarelli 1991: 37–8).

**that wonderful irrigation of the Alban Lake was made by our ancestors** Quintus' 'irrigation' (*deductio*) is another technical term, literally a 'leading off' (cf. Serv. *Georg.* 1. 270; Varro *RR* 1. 36. 1; Pliny *HN* 3. 119) and refers to the whole construction of tunnel, ditches, and channels by which the water was used to irrigate the area beneath the Alban Mount. The most remarkable element, and most visible today, is the tunnel over 1400 m long dug from the surface of the lake through the volcanic rock to empty into a tributary of the Tiber (see Castellani and Dragoni 1991: 45–52). Although an early 4th-cent. date for this, synchronous with the Veientine War, has been suggested (e.g. G. Baffoni, *SE* 27 (1959), 303–10) the tunnel was constructed in the late 6th cent. to protect the site of the Latin League. It had fallen into disrepair by the 4th cent., causing the rise in level of the lake (Coarelli 1991: 36–7). For the general canalization in the area of the Alban Mount, see S. Judson and A. Kahane, *PBSR* 31 (1963), 74–99.

**when the Veientes...had not dared to tell everything to the Senate** Only Dion. Hal. has a parallel version of this (12. 13. 1–3): 'the most prominent of their number and the one among them who enjoyed the greatest reputation for skill in divination...said...after

robbing the Veientes of their country you shall before long lose your own.' Perhaps we can deduce from this that in the version on which Cic. depends the original *haruspex* was not fully honest, a frequent feature of the presentation of Etruscan seers (cf. the attempted treachery of Olenus: Plin. *HN* 28. 15). This version has a more precise prophecy which accurately predicts the fall of Rome in 390.

**101. Fauns are said to have been heard often in battles** Cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 6: 'the voices of Fauns have often been heard'. The plural and frequent confusion of genders suggest that the nature of the oracular Fauns was not strictly determined (cf. Cic. *ND* 3. 15: 'I've no idea what a Faunus is'). Ancient etymologies derive Faunus from *fari* ('to speak'; e.g. Varro *LL* 7. 36; Serv. *Aen.* 8. 314) or *apo tes phones* ('from the voice'; Serv. *Aen.* 7. 81) or from *favere* ('to favour'; Serv. *Georg.* 1. 10). Faunus is linked with woods (Varro *LL* 7. 36; Serv. *Aen.* 10. 551) and has attributes of the Greek Pan. His divinatory exploits, although frequently alluded to (Enn. *Ann.* 207 Sk.; Plutarch *Mor.* 268; Nemes. 2. 73), are attested in historical times only in connection with the battle of the Arsian Wood in 509 (Livy 2. 7. 2; Dion. Hal. 5. 16. 2). See P. F. Dorsey, *The Cult of Silvanus* (Leiden, 1992), 33–42.

Although Finger (1929: 391) sees in the distancing formula 'are said' a trace of a dualist source, for his Roman *exempla* Cic. is probably not using a Greek philosophical source. Rather, the distancing formula reflects the caution of historians (cf. Livy 2. 7. 2: *adiciunt*; Plut. *Publ.* 9. 4: *legousi*).

**voices issuing from unseen sources which foretold the truth** Anna-listic sources record examples in 377 (Livy 6. 33. 5), 168 (Plut. *Aem.* 24–5), 137 (Obseq. 24; Val. Max. 1. 6. 7), and in 43 (Obseq. 69). These voices regularly come from woods or groves (cf. Virg. *Georg.* 1. 476; Dion. Hal. 1. 56. 3; Livy 1. 31. 3) which for the Romans were places of powerful divine presence. Such oracular communications were, however, hard for the Romans to fit into the pattern of divine communication within the state religion, where in general the gods do not speak, and are consequently rare. See Briquel 1993: 78–90.

**not long before the city was captured a voice was heard** In 391. Livy 5. 32. 6: 'M. Caedicius, a plebeian, reported to the tribunes that

he had heard in the silence of night... a voice louder than that of a human being which ordered the magistrates to be told that the Gauls were coming'; cf. Plut. *Cam.* 14. 5: 'Come on, Marcus Caedicius, tell the magistrates at dawn to await the Gauls shortly.'

**the grove of Vesta, which extends from the foot of the Palatine along the New Road** Cf. Livy 5. 32. 6: 'on the New Road where the shrine is now above the temple of Vesta'; Aul. Gell. 16. 17. 2 = Varro *Ant.* fr. 103\* C: 'an altar is set up for him on the Lower New Road'. This grove was separate from the temple of Vesta, on the opposite side of the *via nova* (New Road) to the right of the steps from the Porta Romanula (*LTUR* v. 129–30). The location of his altar just outside the ancient gate of the Palatine citadel accords well with his role in protecting walls and gates which is alluded to in Cic.'s version. For groves as places created by and dwelt in by a divinity amid fully inhabited areas, see Scheid 1993: 13–20.

**expiation was made after that dreadful disaster** After the retreat of the Gauls in 390, amongst other restorations, the Senate formally expiated its earlier error (Livy 5. 50. 5; Plut. *Cam.* 30. 3).

**Opposite that place an altar (which we see fenced off) was consecrated to Aius Loquens** By Cic.'s day the grove had been encroached upon (*LTUR* i. 140) and only the altar remained. Livy's *templum* (5. 50. 5) means a consecrated area, and is misunderstood by Plutarch, who creates a temple (Plut. *Cam.* 30. 3). The more common form of the deity's name is Aius Locutius (cf. Livy 5. 150. 5; Arn. *Inst.* 1. 28; Varro *Ant.* fr. 108 C). Both parts of the name are linked by Marcus (2. 69) with verbs of speaking, while Aius indicates speech with particular authority (cf. E. Benveniste, *Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européenne*, ii. (Paris, 1969), 262–3). Although the deity who usually spoke from woods was Faunus or Silvanus, the location of this grove within the *pomerium* fits ill with a wild god, hence a unique identity was created for this deity (Briquel 1993: 89). Giving a fixed identity to an unpredictable form of divination resulted in the deity's future silence (Briquel 1993: 82).

it has been written by many...the temple of Juno on the citadel The earthquake was treated as a portent and was expiated by a typical sacrifice to Tellus (Earth; cf. Ov. *Fast.* 1. 671–2; *CIL* 6. 32323; Arnob. *Nat.* 7. 22; Festus 274 L). Although this expiation probably came by a prescription of the *haruspices*, the same is also found in the Sibylline books (cf. Zos. 2. 6). The temple which Cic. knew was dedicated in 344 (see *LTUR* iii. 123–5), but Livy's notice of this (7. 28. 4) does not suggest that the cult-title is new and thus that this is the historical context of the incident. A pre-existing cult of Juno on the *arx* (citadel) has been deduced from the legend of M. Manlius Capitolinus (Plut. *Cam.* 27. 2); archaic remains of cappellaccio and terracotta antefixes dated to the 6th cent. have been identified as the earlier temple of Juno, and Servius [Auctus] (*Aen.* 4. 45: 'in the books of the augurs Juno is said to preside over the auspices') has been used to make the *auguraculum* an extension of her temple. However, the context of Servius' comment is marriage auspices, and the remains may equally be those of a palace (cf. Solinus 1. 21; Plut. *Rom.* 20. 5). See Ziolkowski 1992: 72–5; idem, *CP* 88 (1993), 207–19.

after which that Juno was called Moneta The epithet is linked by Cic. with *monere* in the sense of 'warn' (cf. 2. 69: 'we were warned'; Isid. *Etym.* 16. 18. 8), but the original sense was probably that of Remembrancer or Recorder (Liv. Andron. *apud* Prisc. *Inst.* 6. 198 K; see Radke 1965: 221–3; H. Zehnacker, *RÉL* 81 (2003), 12–15), in that Juno was custodian of the *libri lintei* (the linen books). A derivation from *mons* (mountain), in reference to the high places where Juno was worshipped, is less likely (pace J. Haudry, *Juno Moneta: Aux sources de la monnaie* (Milan, 2002), 11–12).

So do we despise these signs given by the gods and sanctioned by our ancestors? For Quintus' argument the historicity of these examples, as confirmed by their unanimous acceptance in the historical tradition, is crucial.

102. Pythagoreans regularly observed what was said not only by gods but also by human beings Cf. Diog. Laert. 8. 20: '[Pythagoras] employed divination both through cleidomania and through

birds'; Iambl. VP 149: 'he paid attention to voices, divination, and oracles, all spontaneous occurrences'. This brief sentence, looking back to Greek practice amid what is purely Roman material, serves to make the transition from divine voices to the broader category of omens. Although these are two unrelated forms of *cladonism* (Pease), the connection Quintus makes is not forced. In general the Romans appear to have attributed greater significance to accidental utterances than the Greeks, although examples of this branch of divination appear in both cultures (cf. Bouché-Leclercq 1879: 155–60 and 1882: 135–44). Although the Romans seem to have considered it as a branch of augury Quintus here links it more with natural divination.

**what they call omens** 'They' is probably indeterminate, i.e. 'people'. The etymology of *omen* is uncertain: Varro (*LL* 6. 76, 7. 97; cf. Festus 195 L and Donat. in Ter. *An.* 200) connected it with speaking, with *os* (mouth). Modern philologists have preferred *increase* (*augsmen*; cf. Ernout-Meillet 1959), thought (*ovismen*; cf. Walde-Hofmann 1938), the Hittite *ha*—the expression of truth (E. Benveniste, *Hittite et indo-européen* (Paris, 1962), 10–11), and even the membranes that contain the intestines (*omentum*; Bettini 1991: 273 n. 57). For *\*hgs-men* see M. Meir-Brugger, *Glotta* 70 (1992), 248–9.

**Our ancestors...prefaced all undertakings with "May this prove good, well-omened, successful, and fortunate"** A shorter version, *quod bonum, faustum felix*, was such a common formula that it is abbreviated to *QBFF* (*CIL* 3. 7437, 8. 9796), but Cic. gives the longer formula, including *fortunatum*. This appears to have been the weightiest form of words, as is seen from its use in the ceremonies of the Arval Brethren (*CIL* 6. 32367, 32379). In general use the elements of the formula were interchanged flexibly: in personal prayers (e.g. Plaut. *Trin.* 41; *Cas.* 381), at a public assembly for appointing a king (Livy 1. 17. 10), by a magistrate presiding over an assembly (Livy 39. 15. 1), in consular motions (Suet. *Cal.* 15. 3), and in the imperial period in the Arvals' proclamation of a sacrifice (*CIL* 6. 2065, 2068, 2074) and the prayer of cooptation (*CIL* 6. 32388).

for all religious business which is conducted publicly the command is given "Guard your tongues" *Favete linguis*: Serv. *Aen.* 5. 71: 'during sacrifices silence is necessary, in that the herald says as the magistrate sacrifices, "*favete linguis, favete vocibus*", that is, "receive good omens" or "be silent"' (cf. Non. Marc. 693 L); Festus 78 L: '*faventia* signifies good omen. For heralds cried and ordered the people at sacrifices, "*favere*". For *favere* is to speak what is good; poets of old used *favere* instead of *silere* (to be silent)'; Sen. *Vit. Beat.* 26. 7: '*favere linguis*: this word does not, as most people think, derive from favour, but it commands silence so that a sacrifice can be duly performed with no ill-omened voice interfering'. The instruction was to avoid the utterance of ill-omened sounds that might be heard by the presiding magistrate or priest and cause the abandonment or repetition of a religious act.

**in the proclamation of festivals** 'Imperative festivals are those which a consul or praetor declares by virtue of the exercise of his magisterial power' (Macrob. *Sat.* 1. 6. 16), irregular festivals in an emergency or to celebrate a victory. Pease suggests that the proclamation of any festival is meant here, but, if Quintus is thinking in particular of the festivals ordered as the expiation of a prodigy (e.g. Livy 35. 40. 7), special proclamation (*imperandis*) may be the appropriate technical term.

**abstain from lawsuits and insults** Mirrored in the archaizing rules for Cic.'s state (*Leg.* 2. 19) and in his commentary (*Leg.* 2. 29), cf. Livy 5. 13. 7, 38. 51. 8. On days marked as *feriae* (festival) in the Roman calendar, legal business was suspended (except under the provision of certain laws), as the *legis actio* required the physical laying on of hands—acts of violence required expiation. See A. K. Michels, *The Calendar of the Roman Republic* (Princeton, 1967), 69–73.

**in the purification of a colony** Quintus rightly brings together, presented in ascending order of importance, three different types of *lustratio* ('ritual cleansing') involving three of the most important constitutive rites in Roman society where a group was gathered together as an 'army'. The heart of the ceremony of purification

(*lustratio*) was a procession led by priest or magistrate with one or more sacrificial animals around what was to be purified; the animals were sacrificed to Mars and the meat burnt or buried. The ceremony drew a line between the inside and the chaotic dangerous world outside, creating as it were a magic circle and defining the area and peoples to be protected. See Versnel 1975: 101–3.

Although the ritual of drawing a furrow around the settlement was important in the foundation of a colony (cf. Varro, *LL* 5. 143), and was probably recognized as the foundation ceremony once the new colonists had arrived at the site, the actual *lustratio* must be distinguished from this. According to Mommsen, the *lustratio* concluded the first *lustrum* which itself followed the physical settlement of the colonists on the land, but it may be preferable to conceive of the ritual constitution of the colonists taking place where they were gathered before going off to found the settlement *sub vexillo*. See Eckstein 1981: 85–97.

**by the man who was founding it** This phrase is rejected by Pease and Schaublin as an inaccurate gloss, in that when a colony was founded (*deduco*) more than one official was responsible, but is rightly retained by Timpanaro who emphasizes the use of the lot or prior agreement before one representative performed the rite (cf. Mommsen 1887: 36). On the understanding of *lustratio* given above, Cic. uses *deduco* in its technical sense of ‘leading the colonists out to found the colony’ in the ceremonial march *sub vexillo* (Eckstein 1981: 97 n. 30).

**when a commander purifies an army** Cf. 1. 77. Usually before a battle or when a new force was assembled or a new commander arrived; in addition to the cathartic and apotropaic aspects mentioned above, this ceremony had a linking, constituting function (Versnel 1975: 101–2; Rüpke 1990: 144–6) and one which bound the troops to their commander (Baudy 1998: 219–21). *Lustratio* originally meant ‘illuminate’ but in the ritual context came to mean ‘purify’, and was linked by antiquarians with going or carrying around fire (Non. Marc. 399, 528 L; Serv. *Aen.* 4. 5; cf. H. Petersmann, *WJA* 9 (1983), 209–30).

**a censor** Under the Republic every four or five years the censors reviewed the citizen list and concluded the process with a ceremony

of *lustratio*. What moment in the process, which could take the whole year, is meant here is unclear, although the closing ceremony, when the censor walked around the assembled people with the sacrificial victims, is usually assumed (Suolahti 1963: 31; R. M. Ogilvie, *JRS* 51 (1961), 31–40). See Baudy 1998: 223–61.

**men with names of good omen are chosen to lead the victims**

Cf. Plin. *HN* 28. 22: ‘why at public purifications do we choose names of good omen for those who lead the victims?’ An epigraphically attested example (*CIL* 5. 808) features Exuperatus and Valerius Valens. In dreams too names of good omen generally had a positive significance (Artem. 3. 38).

**Consuls do the same in the levy, so that the first soldier has a name of good omen** Cf. Fest. 108 L: ‘in the levy or census the first names called are Valerius, Salvius, Statorius’. Under the Empire, ‘Augustus’ became appropriate (cf. *Amm. Marc.* 21. 10. 1).

**103. these practices were observed by you scrupulously as consul and commander** In 63 as consul Cic. may have had to perform a lustration of the city after the many portents relating to Catiline, although *Obsequens* does not record any. Certainly as governor of Cilicia, where he was engaged in military action, he purified his army as soon as he arrived in camp in Dec. 51 (Cic. *Att.* 5. 20. 2).

**Our ancestors claimed the prerogative century to be an omen of an election which conformed to the laws** After the reform of the Centuriate Assembly between 241 and 219 (L. J. Grieve, *Historia* 34 (1985), 309), one century was chosen by lot from the first class representing the *iuniores* of one tribe to announce its vote first. Sometimes magistrates acted as if there was nothing sacrosanct about the vote of the prerogative century (cf. N. Rosenstein, *AJP* 116 (1995), 58–62), but Cic. himself in his public speeches consistently represents the vote of this century as an important sign of how the election would proceed (cf. *Mur.* 38: ‘there is so much *religio* in these elections, that to this day the prerogative omen has always been fulfilled’; *Planc.* 49), presumably implying that the gods would bring from the lot the century which would vote as they



wished. In the private context of a philosophical dialogue Marcus holds that this belief was no more than a superstition, rather than some sign belonging to the state religion (*Div.* 2. 83). However, the choice of voting unit itself could be taken as an omen, as in 310 (Livy 9. 38. 15). If the gods did not choose a century or *curia* with an ill-omened name, it was a sign of the auspicial propriety of the election. See Stewart 1998: 41–6.

**I shall now set out well-known examples of omens** This story appears first here (cf. Plut. *Aem.* 10. 3; *Mor.* 197f–198a; Val. Max. 1. 5. 3), but probably goes back to an earlier annalist. The death of the puppy is an oblativ sign which takes its reference from the context, the immediate aftermath of the allotment to Paullus of the command against Perses. By formally accepting the omen Paullus makes it a specific indication of divine approval (Stewart 1998: 46–8; Lateiner 2005: 45–9).

**L. Paullus...when it had fallen to him by lot to wage war against King Perses** L. Aemilius Paullus (*RE* i. 576–80), cos II in 168. Plutarch (*Aem.* 10. 3; cf. Just. *Epit.* 33. 1. 6) records that no lots were cast because Paullus had been elected consul specifically to fight Perseus, whereas Livy (44. 17. 7) explicitly records use of the lot in a detailed passage on the arrangements for the war. Although the Augustan *elogium* (*CIL* 12. 194) appears to support Plutarch, glorification of Paullus is probable and Livy's version should stand (W. Bingham, *SLLRH* 4 (1986), 184–209). There is no need to surmise manipulated sortition (*pace* S. C. R. Swain, *Historia* 38 (1989), 319 n. 21).

Perseus (*RE* xix. 996–1021) had been king of Macedonia from 181. Rome declared war on him in 171, but there were no results until two experienced military commanders were elected for 168 to conclude the war. See E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984), 408–19.

**he kissed his little daughter Tertia, who was quite small at the time** Tertia was Paullus' third daughter and may have married the son of Cato the Censor sometime between 168 and 161 (cf. Plut. *Cat. Maj.* 20. 12; *RE* i. 592–3). Cic.'s use of two diminutives

(*filiola, tristicula*) suggests that Tertia was below marriageable age in 168, but their main purpose is to highlight that Tertia was a child and, as such, was uninfluenced and an honest mediator of the gods' message (e.g. S. I. Johnston, *Arethusa* 34 (2001), 106–8, on children as mediums). There is no human manipulation here to create an oblique sign (see Stewart 1998: 47).

**“What’s the matter, Tertia?”** In the private context of the family the father addresses the daughter by her feminine nickname rather than the gentilician, which would be the normal form of address (Dickey 2002: 75). The use of the vocative *mi* here is similarly a mark of intimacy, particularly prominent in Cic.’s works of addresses between parents and children (Dickey 2002: 221).

**“My daughter, I accept the omen”** Paullus was an augur (*CIL* 11. 1829) and will have been particularly alert for the opportune turning of a chance utterance, which was the predominant sense of *omen* for the Romans (see the examples collected by Val. Max. 1. 5). A very large role was played by human free will, first in deciding whether to accept an omen as significant and secondly in averting it by rapid action (see Bloch 1964: 89–100). Here the formal acceptance of the omen ‘gave it an almost irrevocable force’ (Lateiner 2005: 47)

**A puppy of that name had died** Greek names were frequently given to pet dogs, e.g. Muia and Lydia (J. M. C. Toynbee, *Animals in Roman Life and Art* (London, 1973), 108–22). Here ‘Persa’ is an archaic or popular assimilation of Perseus or Perses to a first declension form, found often for slaves and others of humble status, and so here for a pet, albeit Perses/Persa could also be the name of a breed of dog (*OLD*, s.v. *Perses*<sup>1</sup> 2). For pet-owning as typical of the children of the Roman elite, see Bradley 1998: 525–38.

**104. I have heard L. Flaccus, the *Flamen* of Mars** The personal testimony here is important to Quintus’ argument, as the second-hand account from a reliable source has weight in establishing that the events happened. Flaccus is probably to be identified with L. Valerius Flaccus, consul in 100 and whom Cic. mentions held

a priesthood (*Rab. Perd.* 27); he was Master of the Horse between 82 and 79, and died before 63. See Szemler 1972: 170.

The flamine of Mars was second in the hierarchy of *flamines*, the priests assigned to the worship of a specific deity (Vanggaard 1988) and was held by those of high social standing.

**Caecilia, the wife of Metellus . . . daughter of her sister** Cic.'s genitive *Metelli* (of Metellus) permits Caecilia to be his wife or daughter; Valerius Maximus (1. 5. 4) interprets Cic. as meaning wife (followed by Timpanaro and Schäublin). If Caecilia was his 'daughter', Caecilia's sister had a different father—thus Metellus would not be marrying his own granddaughter. If Caecilia was Metellus' wife, the girl was his niece, and an endogamic marriage within the Caecilii emerges (see the putative stemma of Bettini 1991: 90), which is plausible given the marriage strategies of these elite families (cf. Y. Thomas, *RHDFE* 58 (1980), 354). Metellus and Caecilia may have been children of Calvus and Macedonius respectively, or vice versa (cf. Münzer 1999: 279–81).

**a certain shrine** A 'shrine' (*sacellum*) was a small open area, usually in front of a public temple (see Fridh 1990: esp. 185–7). Cic.'s vague 'a certain' (*quodam*) is unlikely to refer to the *cubiculum Fortunae* (pace Gagé 1963: 227). Silence was observed in order to hear any significant sound (Valeton 1889: 444), even in domestic auspication (cf. Festus 464 L). Timpanaro rightly asks whether a temporal expression such as *concupia nocte* has fallen out of Cic.'s text, as Valerius Maximus includes the detail.

**as used to be the practice of the ancients** Although watching for birds was in general superseded by sacrifice (cf. Val. Max. 2. 2. 1) and friends took on the role of professional augurs (Treggiari 1991: 164), copious literary evidence for wedding auspices survives, even from the Early Empire (e.g. Tac. *Ann.* 11. 27. 1) when the same term (*auspex*) continued to be used. Here, though, an earlier stage may well be meant, the taking of omens 'for the opportunity or prospect of marriage, rather than for a wedding that is about to occur' (Bettini 1991: 88). Whether from this one passage it can be argued that it was the special prerogative of the maternal aunt to take these omens and

that the conservative Caecilii Metelli preserved the ancient custom (Gagé 1963: 225–30) is less certain.

**“Yes, my girl, I give you my place”** Caecilia was sitting as an augur did when taking auspices. With hindsight her words were seen to have a meaning other than she intended. The omen consists in the double sense of ‘place’ (*sedes*): on the one level Caecilia’s seat, on another her position as Metellus’ wife.

**The omen occurred in the fulfilment—for she died soon after**

Giving up a seat was a bad omen (cf. Front. *Strat.* 1. 12. 7). Someone other than the ruler sitting on the throne could portend the ruler’s imminent death (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 24. 2–3; Diod. 17. 116. 2–4), or more positively function as an omen of that person’s unexpected rise to power (e.g. Dio 74. 3. 3; SHA *Max.* 30. 6–7; *Aurel.* 5. 4; Amm. Marc. 25. 10. 11). In all cases the significance of the action becomes apparent only later.

**I understand full well...** Quintus’ conclusion to this section on omens is no more than another variation of the Stoic argument that, if there are gods, there is divination (see on 1. 10). Marcus wastes no effort on responding to these omens, dismissing them in a few lines (2. 83).

**105. you, I say, must defend auspices** Cf. on 1. 25 *your auspices*. Quintus returns to an *ad hominem* argument based first (1. 105) on Marcus’ membership of the augural college and secondly (1. 106) on his belief in augury as demonstrated in his poetry. Cic. nowhere else mentions this notable incident from his consulship, presumably because the failure of the *augurium* might reflect poorly on him (cf. Vaahtera 2001: 135).

**To you as consul the augur Appius Claudius reported...augury of safety was doubtful** The official communication via Appius Claudius (see on 1. 29) probably came from the whole college of augurs to Cic. as senior magistrate of the state, who, under the archaic designation of *praetor maximus*, would have read the *precatio maxima* (the greatest prayer; Linderski 1986a: 2180 n. 117)

enquiring if the gods consented to the celebration of the *augurium salutis*, otherwise known as ‘the greatest augury by which the safety of the Roman people is sought’ (*CIL* 6. 36841: *augurium maximum quo salus p. R. petitur*). The clearest explanation of this custom appears in Dio (37. 24. 1–2): ‘a kind of augury which involves an inquiry whether the god entrusts them with asking for prosperity for the people, as if it were not holy even to ask for it before agreement had been given. It was performed each year on a day when no army was going out to war or was preparing itself against anyone or was fighting.’ If the extant attestations reflect the pattern, this was a very irregular ceremony: before 63 the only definite celebration occurred in 160, although one in 235 can be assumed (see J. Liegle, *Hermes* 77 (1942), esp. 261–97). After the death of Mithradates and the capture of Jerusalem in 63 it could be claimed that Rome was at peace and therefore the basic qualification for the *augurium salutis* had been met: ‘it was in some way possible for the divination to be performed, but it was not clear (*ou... katharon egeneto*) since some birds flew up from an unlucky quarter (*exhedroi*) and therefore the divination was repeated’ (Dio 37. 25. 1). Dio’s immediate continuation, ‘and other unlucky signs happened to them’, may suggest that the gods’ refusal of permission to celebrate the *augurium* constituted a prodigy or that apparent permission secured during the repetition was negated by the appearance of unmistakable prodigies (cf. Catalano 1960: 342–4). ‘Doubtful’ is probably a technical term for a category of augural signs (Valeton 1891: 418; Catalano 1960: 335–46).

**there would be a civil war, tragic and troublesome** In normal augural procedure the second successful performance of the ceremony (*litatio*) would have meant an affirmative answer from the gods, but Appius’ fundamentalist interpretation insisted on taking seriously the unpropitious birds and adding a prophetic aspect alien to Roman practice, treating the negative sign as a portent (cf. Valeton 1891: 418: ‘tamquam prodigium Ciceroni esse nuntiatum ab augure’).

**A few months later... crushed by you** The Catilinarian conspiracy, although brewing for some time, became known only in late Oct. 63; the passing of the *senatus consultum ultimum* recognized a state of

crisis on 21 Oct. and swift action followed to crush potential rebellion in Italy. The *augurium salutis* seems to have been celebrated in autumn (Rüpke 1990: 143), which is hard to square with ‘a few months later’. Perhaps Cic. requested an early celebration on hearing of the end of Pompey’s campaigns, or this temporal expression is to be understood loosely or as emphasizing the degree of the gods’ foreknowledge. ‘Still fewer days’ is a palpable exaggeration, if Quintus refers primarily to the ambushing of the conspirators on the night of 2–3 Dec.

**I give my strong endorsement to this augur...** Quintus, as a Stoic rather than as an augural practitioner in the traditional Roman way, defends a prophetic rather than declarative function for augury.

**Your colleagues used to ridicule him** This does not refer to the augurs of 63, but what Cic. heard said against Appius between 53/52 and 48 when he was a member of the augural college. In *De Legibus* (2. 32) Cic. names one of Appius’ antagonists: ‘in your college there is a huge disagreement between Marcellus and Appius, both fine augurs, as the former holds that those auspices of yours were created for the benefit of the state, the latter thinks that your discipline can, as it were, tell the future’.

**Pisidian** See on 1. 2, 92 for the link between Pisidia and augury.

**Soranian** The adjective refers to Sora, a Volscian town 96 km ESE of Rome near the territory of the Marsi, who were famous for their excellence in augury (cf. 1. 131).

**in their “wisdom” they said that the religious observances were made up to suit the opinion of the ignorant** Cf. *ND* 1. 117: ‘those who said that the whole notion of immortal gods was made up by wise men for the sake of the state so that religion might bring to obedience those whom reason could not’. In our passage there is a question of punctuation: should ‘they said’ (*aiebant*) be marked off by commas and ‘in their wisdom’ (*sapienter*) modify ‘made up’ (*fictas*) to become the augurs’ comment on the wisdom of religious

fictions, as in the passage from *ND* (Pease, Schäublin)? Without this punctuation *sapienter* can have the heavily ironic sense I have given it (cf. Timpanaro n. 251) and contribute to the strong form of the argument which Quintus makes—not only was the creation of religious fiction unwise, *but* for Rome there was no such fiction. The opponents of Appius stood in the tradition going back at least to the 5th cent. which held that wise rulers could deceive the people in order to make the people amenable to education (e.g. Plat. *Rep.* 414b) or to discourage wrong-doing (Critias, e.g. Sext. Emp. *Phys.* 1. 54). Numa was seen as the Roman prototype (cf. Val. Max. 1. 2. 1; Serv. *Aen.* 7. 763) who inspired several imitators (see Wardle 1998: 137–8).

**neither the shepherds of whom Romulus was king nor Romulus himself were so ingenious as to fake religious practices to deceive the masses** Cf. 1. 107. Timpanaro suspects that this line of attack may derive from Posidonius, but nothing proves that Posidonius used Roman *exempla* in his works on divination. Chrysippus seems to have opposed the doctrine of ‘pious fraud’ (Plut. *Mor.* 1040a–b), but even if some Stoics did hold to it Posidonius may have limited the wise men’s innovation to the invention of anthropomorphic gods (Dyck 2003: 157). Quintus’ point has some force, as Marcus himself refers (*Rep.* 2. 12) to the primitive Senate of Romulus, and the annalists portray Romulus and his people as shepherds (Livy 1. 6. 3; Dion. Hal. 1. 79. 11).

**neglect eloquence...** Cf. a similar criticism of Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus (Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 51).

**106. What could be more divine than the auspical sign which is in your Marius? To use you above all as an authority** As at 1. 17–22 and 59, Quintus formulates an *ad hominem* argument which is built explicitly on Marcus’ own words, but perhaps has a specific intertextual reference to *De Legibus* (1. 4): ATTICUS: In *Marius* many things are questioned, whether they are made up or true; and by some people truth is required from you, because you are dealing with recent memory and a man from Arpinum. MARCUS: By heaven, I have no desire to be thought a liar, but some of those people you

mention, my dear Titus, act foolishly in demanding the truth in such a predicament as from a witness and not as from a poet. QUINTUS: I understand, brother, that you think that one set of laws should be observed in history and another in poetry.' At one level Quintus' *ad hominem* argument is powerful—Cic. cannot deny the authorship of his poem—but Cic. knowingly undercuts it for his reader because of the widely suspect reliability of his *Marius* as a historically accurate account. Although *De Legibus* was not in the public domain in 44 and Cic.'s plans for it were uncertain, and there could be no specific intertextual reference for his readers to spot, the passage quoted above suggests that *Marius* was viewed with some suspicion. Dyck emphasizes (*per litt.*) that the dialogue is fictional, that there are no other contemporary references to criticism of the poem and that Atticus' remarks are phrased by Cic. in such a way as to direct Cic.'s riposte away from Atticus himself (cf. Dyck 2004: 65). Krostenko (2000: 338) argues that Cic.'s use of *Marius* in *De Divinatione* is 'a negative exemplum of how to construct a religious fiction', put in Quintus' mouth as a way of dissociating Cic. himself from the kind of special relationship between the gods and an individual which the experience of Caesar's dictatorship had done much to sour for Cic. However, this misses the point, as the undercutting of Quintus' argument is more fundamental.

When Cic. composed *Marius* is uncertain (cf. Dyck 2004: 57–8). The most likely date is the last months of 57, immediately after Cicero's return from exile, during which he admits he thought often of *Marius* (*Div.* 2. 140); his public speeches of these months are full of references to *Marius* (e.g. *Red. pop.* 20; *Sest.* 50). See Courtney 1993: 178.

The auspical sign is 'divine' in that it was clearly sent by Jupiter (as the first lines of the quotation and the thunder underline); *Marius*' return to Rome, which it presaged, proved its validity.

**Suddenly...** Cic.'s description is based on Homer *Il.* 12. 200–7: 'a bird came upon them as they were ready to cross, a high-flying eagle, skirting the people to the left and carrying in its talons a bloody, monstrous snake which was still alive and struggling; nor had it yet given up the fight: for it bent backwards and struck the one who held it on the breast beside the neck. Hurt by the pain the eagle hurled it



away to the ground, cast it down in the midst of them and flew off with a cry on the wind.' Within *Marius*, this extract concerns a sign received by Marius while in exile in 88 in North Africa or while fleeing Sulla's forces earlier in the same year. Because the sign does not appear in Plutarch's *Marius* it has been considered an imaginary episode (*RE Suppl.* 6. 1364; Soubiran 1972: 261).

**the winged minister of Jupiter who thunders on high** Cf. 2. 73; *Tusc.* 2. 24. Cic. stresses the augural validity of the sign: Jupiter controlled Roman auspices, and birds were his chosen messengers. Many details in the passage can be interpreted allegorically: the eagle is Marius; the snake bite is the non-fatal blow of exile at the hands of the Sullans (Courtney 1993: 175); the snake may be Sulla, with 'multi-coloured neck' referring cruelly to his prominent red facial disfigurement (Plut. *Sull.* 2. 1). But some aspects are ambiguous: does the escape of the snake into the ocean symbolize Sulla, who sailed off to the east to confront Mithradates, or Sullans who suffered death notoriously during Marius' seventh consulship (Courtney 1993: 176)? In fact, an allegorical interpretation is not necessary for the strictly augural element of this episode.

**swoops down from a tree trunk** Not the oak tree at Arpinum under which the dialogue of *De Legibus* was set (1. 1–2), where Marius had received an omen in his infancy (Plut. *Mar.* 36. 5–6), and which he did not visit in 88/87 (Soubiran 1972: 261).

**turned from the sunset to shining sunrise... wings of good-omen** The eagle flew from west to east, which from the perspective of Jupiter in the north was from right to left, a propitious sign. Rather than a symbolic image of Marius being promised new glory like the rising sun (Soubiran 1972), or a symbolism of a change of luck (Timpanaro), Cic. presents accurately the augural matrix. His augural knowledge is underlined by the use of *praepes* (of good omen), a term of impeccable augural ancestry, although its precise meaning in its technical sense was disputed (Aul. Gell. 7. 6. 3; Serv. [Auct]. *Aen.* 3. 246, 361, 6. 15; Festus 224 L). *Praepetes* flew in the higher part of the augur's field of vision and were prominent (Valeton 1890: 246–8).

**augur of the divine will, Marius saw it** Marius was a member of the augural college from 97 (cf. *II* 13. 3, no. 17, 83). Although a bare statement by Valerius Maximus (1. 5. 5: 'generally very skilful at interpreting religious occurrences') may refer to Marius' skill at manipulating popular religious sentiment rather than to particular augural expertise (cf. Plut. *Mar.* 36. 4–5, 40. 6), Cic. here provides a specific augural example (if it is historical), which he underlines by more augural language: *notavit* (recognized) is the technical term for noting a significant sign; and *fausta* (of good omen); cf. Arnob. *Nat.* 1. 65.

**Thus Jupiter himself confirmed the clear omen of the eagle**

Thunder on the left was auspicious (cf. Ov. *Fast.* 4. 833; Plin. *HN* 2. 142; Serv. *Aen.* 2. 54; Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 2. 693). The confirmation of an auspical sign by a clap of thunder underlines for Marius the certainty of his return. According to Servius (*Aen.* 2. 691) it was a Roman custom to seek confirmation by a second sign, but unless we confirm this from the parallel use of *haruspices* and the Board of Ten (e.g. 1. 97) and a line of Ennius (*Ann.* 146 Sk), for which the context and interpretation is not secure, historical instances do not exist. *Contra* Pease this is not a *fulgur attestatum* (Sen. *NQ* 2. 49. 2) in that it does not confirm another lightning portent (cf. Thulin 1905: 79). The combination of eagle and lightning was an omen of victory in war for the Argead kings (Posidippus 31. 1–2 AB).

107. The famous augurate of Romulus...accepted by the trustworthy and passed down to posterity *Auguratus* is 'augurate' (cf. *TLL* i. 1368–9) rather than 'augury' and implies nothing about the subsequent 'college' of augurs which some accounts attribute to Romulus *after* the foundation of Rome (e.g. Cic. *Rep.* 2. 16). According to Jocelyn (1971: 45) the contrast between *pastoralis* and *urbanus* is pointed because the Aventine lay outside the *pomerium*, and thus beyond the limit where the magistrates could rightly take auspices, but this is forced in that (i) the *pomerium* has not yet been defined and (ii) Quintus is restating the points made in 1. 105, where such an anachronistic piece of augural nicety is irrelevant. Quintus' addition to his earlier point is solely to use the general acceptance of this auspication by Roman posterity to guarantee its historicity. As such,

it functions as the climactic example of divination in this section of his argument—the most exalted statesman of the most powerful civilized nation used augury.

**the augur Romulus, as it appears in Ennius** The quotation comes from book 1 of Ennius' *Annales* (72–91 Sk). Vahlen (1894: 1144) argues that *Romulus augur* is part of the quotation, although it is awkwardly separated from it by the parenthetical *ut apud Ennium est* and *cum fratre item augure*. I distinguish these words from the poetic quotation.

**Taking care with great care . . . devoted themselves to both auspices and augury** The repetition and duplication is in imitation of solemn legal or ritual language (e.g. Haffter 1934: 33 n. 7), but the terminology is chosen with care for its appropriateness to the augural context. *Operam dare auspicio* is a set phrase (cf. Festus 276 L; Cic. *Leg.* 2. 20; Livy 34. 14. 1). Ennius' coupling of *auspicium* and *augurium* creates a solemn effect (cf. Livy 5. 52. 2: 'we have a city founded by auspication and inauguration'), but we should also expect some augural precision in the terms despite the poetic context. Wissowa (*RE* ii. 2580–1) sought the distinction in the twins' exercise of both a magisterial and an augural function, to which respectively the two augural terms were most appropriate. This finds favour with Timpanaro (xxxviii n. 27), but is rejected as artificial by Skutsch (1985: 224 n. 40). Perhaps the key here is the different results of *auspicium* and *augurium*: by the former the gods gave their consent to proceed with the object of the consultation on that day, by the latter a permanent approval of the project itself was secured. Both results were essential and appropriate for the city which was to rule the world.

**On the Murcus Remus took his seat for the auspication and watched alone for a bird of good omen** The MSS read *in monte auspicio se devovet atque secundam* (on the hill Remus by his auspicy vowed himself to the gods below and of good omen). This is problematic in two respects: first there is no specific location given for Remus' auspication and secondly the line is unmetrical. Skutsch remedies the first problem by emending to *in Murco*. The Murcus

(*LTUR* iii. 269–70) was the older name for the Aventine according to Festus (135 L); the cult of Murcia at the SE end of the *spina* in the Circus Maximus and references to the rock above the temple and grove of the Bona Dea locate Remus' station with far greater precision (Wiseman 1995: 113, 137). As for the metrical problems, two main solutions have been suggested: (i) to excise *secundam* (of good omen) as redundant for metre (H. Jordan, *Quaestiones Ennianae* (Königsberg, 1885), 8) or for meaning 'since *ex hypothesi* both twins were looking for favourable birds' (Wiseman 1995: 171); or (ii) to emend *se devovet* (devoted his attention to or vowed himself to the gods below) to *sedet* (took his seat) on the grounds that the former meaning of *se devovere* is unparalleled, whereas *sedet* produces recognizable augural terminology (e.g. Serv. *Aen.* 9. 4, 6. 197; Festus 470–2, 474 L; so Skutsch 1985: 224–5). While the second interpretation of *se devovit* has been defended (Jocelyn 1971: 60–3; Wiseman 1995: 171), a line of Terence (*Eunuch.* 780: *solus Sannio servat domi* [Sannio keeps watch at home alone]) which is close to the Ennian line and a *scholium* on it (*SERVAT pro sedet et servat...nam non servat nisi qui prius in eodem loco sederit*, 'he cannot watch unless he has first sat in the same place') which displays Donatus' knowledge of augural terminology and procedure, supports Skutsch's emendation (J. Linderski, *Mnem.* 42 (1989), 90–3 = 1995: 527–30). 'Watched for' (*servat*) is again augural terminology (Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 6. 198: '*servare...* is used in the terminology of augurs both of the heaven and of the sky').

**fair Romulus sought on the high Aventine** The adjective 'fair' (*pulcer*; cf. 38 Sk), so often used of gods (cf. 1. 40), suggests the favoured status of Romulus. Apart from a passage in Servius (*Aen.* 3. 46: 'Romulus, having received the augury, threw a spear from the Aventine to the Palatine...'), which may reflect the view of Varro (cf. Arnob. *Nat.* 4. 3), the later tradition is that Romulus observed from the Palatine (e.g. Livy 1. 6. 4; Dion. Hal. 1. 86. 2; Ov. *Fast.* 4. 815–18; Aul. Gell. 13. 14. 5). This relocation of Romulus is a result of the Murcian having lost its separate identity during the 2nd cent.

**watched for the tribe of those who fly on high** 'Watched' (*servat*) repeats the augural terminology from the lines on Remus. Although

Skutsch (1985: 226) is right to argue that ‘the tribe of those who fly on high’ (*genus altivolantium*) is a poetical rather than augural expression, ‘a calque on *hypsipetes*’, given the wider use of augural language of this passage, this may be a poetic equivalent of an augural term specifying those birds seen by the augur in the celestial *templum* (cf. 106 ‘wings of good omen’ and 108).

**They fought whether to call the city Rome or Remora** The city would be named after its founder. Cf. Festus 327 L: ‘Romulus called Rome after his own name, and Rome not Romula so that by the richer significance of the word there would be an omen of greater prosperity for his country’; 345 L: ‘the place on the top of the Aventine, where Remus had taken the auspices for the foundation of the city, is called Remoria’. The names of the brothers embody a basic polarity: Romulus is connected with vigour, strength, and speed (e.g. Plut. *Rom.* 1. 1; cf. Erskine 1995: 368–83), while Remus connotes slowness and delay (*OGR* 21. 4–5; cf. Festus 345 L: ‘in augury birds are called *remores* which compel someone who is about to do something to delay’).

**108. They waited just as... from the painted mouths of which the chariots soon rush** An image taken from chariot-racing, where the presiding magistrate gave the starting signal by dropping a white cloth from his balcony (J. H. Humphrey, *Roman Circuses: Arenas for Chariot Racing* (London, 1986), 153–4). The starting gates (*carceres*) of the Circus Maximus were built in 329, remained wooden till the Early Empire (*ibid.*, 133), and could easily have been painted (cf. L. Valmaggia, *RF* 22 (1898), 116).

**the people, their faces showing their apprehension for the future...** The people belong in the background story. Gratwick (*CR* 37 (1987), 164) prefers the Renaissance conjecture *ora tenebat* (kept silent) on the grounds that fear is an inappropriate emotion. However, the supporters of one of the protagonists had their homes at stake.

**Meanwhile the blazing sun retreated to the darkness of night** Jocelyn (1971: 70–2) suggests that *sol albus* is the morning star

(cf. Enn. *Ann.* 571–2), Skutsch (1985: 231) sunset of the day before the contest, as the twins took their augural positions in the early hours of the morning (Festus 470 L, 474 L, ‘after the middle of the night’; Aul. Gell. 3. 2. 10), and now Albis (2001: 25–32) returns to the idea of Merula that the moon is meant.

**Then a bright light revealed itself struck by rays** ‘Light’ (*lux*) here is something other than the sun itself (see below), in fact the light seen before the sun appears above the horizon. This is the earliest moment for significant auspices (cf. Vahlen 1894: 1154 n. 2).

**on high, flew by far the most beautiful bird, of good omen, on the left** Three augural terms are juxtaposed: (i) ‘of good omen’ (*praepes*), see on 1. 106, (ii) ‘on the left’ (*laeva*), see on 1. 12, and (iii) ‘most beautiful’ (*pulcherrima*). *Longe* (‘by far’) modifies *pulcherrima* (pace M. Haupt, *Opuscula*, ii. (Leipzig, 1875), 455) and thus underlines the excellence of this auspice. For Skutsch (1985: 234), Ennius describes the sign given to Romulus, with ‘bird’ (*avis*) as a collective singular which is common in augural formulae (e.g. Varro *LL* 6. 82), but from the structure of the passage Remus has a better claim (cf. Timpanaro; Wiseman 1995: 172 n. 40). In most versions Remus saw six birds (e.g. Dion. Hal. 1. 86. 3; Livy 1. 7. 1; Ov. *Fast.* 4. 817).

**at the very moment the golden sun arose, thrice four sacred bodies of birds fell from heaven** Ennius demonstrates that this occurs after Remus has seen his bird. Cf. Wiseman 1995: 7: ‘the careful precision with which he identified the exact moments when the one bird and the twelve birds appeared’. Romulus claimed to have seen twelve vultures (e.g. Dion. Hal. 1. 86. 4), a bird connected with Vel, the Etruscan god of fire (J. Heurgon, *RÉL* 14 (1936), 109–18). Although, according to Plutarch (*Rom.* 9. 6–7; *Mor.* 286a) and Festus (214 L) it had an augural significance, their reports are probably influenced by Augustus’ reporting of the same augury in 43 (Suet. *Aug.* 95).

**positioned themselves in fair stations of good omen** Two of the augural terms are repeated from above, ‘fair’ (*pulcer*) and ‘of good

omen' (*praepes*). For Skutsch this means that the birds *settled* in auspicious places (cf. Aul. Gell. 7. 6. 3, 8; Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 6. 15), foreshadowing the settlement of Romulus and his followers, but nothing more than direction is necessary.

**From this Romulus saw that he had been given preference** 'Understood' (*conspicit*) in the augural sense of bringing together and interpreting what he had seen. Ennius' text is corrupt: the majority of MSS (*AVHB*) read *propriam*, others *prioram* (*B*<sup>2</sup>) or *priora* (*F*; followed by Giomini; Jocelyn 1971: 73; Wiseman 1995: 172 n. 41) and Müller has conjectured *proprium* ('as his own'; followed by Skutsch, Schäublin). I tentatively read *priora*, understanding this of priority in rank (cf. Val. Max. 1. 4. *prf.*: *potiora*) and possibly as a Graecism (*ta prota*). Developed augural theory dealt with the situation where a second sign opposed a first (see on 1. 124), but the number of birds is not crucial. Although Servius appears to support Romulus' belief (*Aen.* 12. 183: 'in auguries the first yields to the later'), his comment is probably incomplete (cf. Regell 1893: 21 n. 54): a second sign only overrides the first when it is more powerful, as appears to be the teaching with respect to *peremptalia fulgura* (cf. Festus 284 L).

**109–31** In this final major section of the dialogue the main problem facing Quintus is whether a rational explanation (or explanations) can be offered for all types of divination, both natural and artificial. The abruptness of the transition to these arguments, which begin with natural divination, is exacerbated by the concentration of the intervening chapters on artificial divination. The remaining discussion falls into two parts (110–17, 118–24) dealing respectively with natural and artificial divination, which evince substantial differences of approach (cf. Schäublin). The second section is heavily influenced by Posidonius, who is its likely source, but the source for the first section is less certain. I follow the view of Tarrant (2000a: 63–74) that Cratippus lies behind it (see introd., § 4), but Cic. has greatly abbreviated the argumentation, it would appear, and has produced transitions within the argument which are far from smooth. On this view, the two sources offer incompatible explanations of the respective forms of divination, which Cic. could

hardly succeed in marrying harmoniously and which, given his own position, he had no interest in attempting to do. What appears as inconsistency within Quintus' argument, particularly in relation to the status of artificial divination, may be due less to excessive haste in composition by Cic. than to a deliberate intention to represent the difficulties of Quintus in Peripatetic mode in reconciling his support of Cratippus (or someone with similar views) with the traditional Stoic doctrine upholding both artificial and natural divination (cf. Timpanaro).

**109. But to return to the point from which my discourse broke off** Probably Quintus means back to 1. 85 '... each type of divination' (Timpanaro), the last point at which Greek philosophical input was important. Schäublin demonstrates (1985: 164 n. 32a) how well Quintus' argument develops from the earlier section, in which he argued for the fact of divination, to this where he offers the *how* (*ratio*) (cf. the emphasis at 1. 118).

**If I cannot explain why anything happens... would that be a weak answer to Epicurus and Carneades?** Cf. 1. 12, 35, 84 for Quintus' empirical argument. In the previous section on natural divination Quintus again paired Epicurus and Carneades (1. 62), the chief opponents of all forms of divination.

**if the explanation for artificial foreknowledge is straightforward, but that of divine foreknowledge is somewhat more obscure**

While the argument at this introductory part of the section must, notionally at least, encompass both types of divination, the contrast between 'artificial' and 'divine' (again at 1. 111; cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 289–90), rather than artificial and 'natural', suggests the superiority of the latter, which would be the Platonic and Peripatetic position (and may strengthen the case for Cratippian influence on the argument). Quintus' characterization of the respective explanations (*ratio*) for artificial and natural divination appears problematic, in that natural divination, with its long-established connection with soul theory, does offer a relatively simple explanation *how*, whereas Posidonius' arguments relating to artificial divination do not get to grips with the *how*. So he promises what he does not deliver,



an explanation of artificial divination (cf. Schäublin and Timpanaro) and later appears to make the reverse point, that the argument from nature made for natural divination is hard to transfer to artificial divination and therefore that the latter is more difficult to explain. However, although one might suspect a polarity error in the text here, there is no fundamental contradiction (see on 1. 130). If, however, by 'explanation' Quintus means (or we expect) something linking cause and effect, we are to be disappointed in respect of artificial divination, whereas if 'explanation' is used in the limited sense of 'logical procedure followed', there is little problem, but also little contribution to the argument. In the next sentence, the most obvious referent of the 'straightforward explanation', it is simply the process of observation and recording which gives the *how* of artificial divination, something removed from Posidonius' arguments.

**entrails... stars... an extraordinary science** Quintus omits augury from this list of techniques of artificial divination, but made this exact point at 1. 25. The tendency of the argument in Quintus' source is to reduce artificial divination to a science, divorced from true divination in which the gods are directly involved, and is fully compatible with Cratippus. In Stoic thought stochastic techniques, among which they classified divination, were different from sciences (Repici 1996: 50–1) because of the imperfect results they produced.

**This can exist even without the intervention and inspiration of the gods...** From Cratippus' point of view this is a logical step: artificial divination is no more than the application of human rationality and is not divination at all; the decisions of a doctor or good politician are comparable. In previous discussions of this passage the simple word 'can' (*potest*) has aroused dispute. In one view it has minimal connection with the philosophical arguments relating to artificial divination, but simply makes a commonsense point about the rational recording of signs and outcomes (cf. the contents of 1. 112–13). In other views 'can' makes a crucial change to the philosophical argument and has consequences for the identification of Cic.'s source. If *can* in this statement, as it does at 1. 118 ('a sentient force which pervades the whole world can guide in the choice of a sacrificial victim, and at the very moment when you intend to

sacrifice, a change of entrails can take place'), relates to artificial divination, it creates an apparent agreement by 'relativizing' positions which may have been incompatible (cf. Finger 1929: 372–8). It is, however, more likely that Cic. has here severely truncated his source, omitting the entire category of real artificial divination, as *etiam* (even) shows (Pfeffer 1976: 90). Finger posited Antiochus of Ascalon as Cic.'s source, but he does not feature in the doxography on divination, which Cic. has adapted from its Stoic source to include Cratippus, and it would be odd if his views on divination, for which we have no evidence (see Fladerer 1996), were utilized by Cic. without any indication.

**110. should be ascribed to the nature of the gods...as the most learned philosophers agree** At 1. 117 Quintus will refer to the discussion in *De Natura Deorum*. The 'learned philosophers' are probably Pythagoras and Plato, rather than Hellenistic philosophers (Tarrant 2000a: 67).

**drawn and gathered** Of these two metaphors describing the relationship of human souls to the divine, the first 'drawn' (*haurire*) appears at 1. 70 in a view expressly attributed to Cratippus. Although Finger quibbles (1929: 373) that the view apparently expressed here, that the whole soul without differentiation is divine, contradicts Cratippus' view that only the rational part of the soul is touched by the divine, this is still the general introduction to the more detailed exposition of the 'how' of divination and a brief formulation is not problematic. 'Gathered' translates *delibare*, which originally meant 'pour' or 'draw off'. A more natural image is of 'plucking' (e.g. Cic. *Sest.* 119), seen in *carpere* and its compounds and equivalent to the *apospasma* found in Greek *testimonia* to this doctrine (cf. Powell 1988: 254). Cf. Cic. *Sen.* 78 (quoted at 1. 70); *ND* 1. 27: '[Pythagoras] held that the mind is throughout the whole universe... from which our souls are plucked (*carperentur*)'; *Tusc.* 5. 38: 'the human soul is plucked (*decerptus*) from the divine mind' (cf. *Leg.* 1. 24; *Rep.* 6. 16, 24; *Tim.* 4). From its Pythagorean origin (cf. Diog. Laert. 8. 28: 'the soul is a fragment (*apospasma*) of ether... and that from which it is broken off (*apespastai*) is immortal'), it was taken up by Stoics (e.g. Diog. Laert. 7. 143: 'the universe is a living creature...and it is

ensouled, as is clear from our soul being a fragment (*apospasmatos*) from that source', which Kidd attributes to Posidonius (Fr. 99a)).

Since the universe is filled...with eternal intelligence and the divine mind, human souls are necessarily influenced by their relationship with divine souls For the pervasive divine mind, cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 127: 'there exists one spirit which extends through the whole universe like a soul'. For Finger (1929: 386), this formulation rules out Posidonius as a source, as the separation of body and soul involved is far sharper than that required in Posidonius' system in which the all-pervading godhead influences directly the human being, but Theiler rightly argues that *commoveri* and *cognatio* are Posidonian terms. 'Relationship' (*cognatione*) is a correction of the *cognitione* (knowledge) of the MSS, preferable to the alternative *contagione* (contamination), because of its appearance in the Posidonian passage 1. 64 and at 2. 33, and because the usual negative connotation of *contagio* (cf. 1. 63) is not appropriate here. 'Divine souls' include the *daimones* of 1. 64. At 1. 115 the fundamental kinship of all soul material is again made plain.

our souls are subject to the necessities of life and...are hindered from association with the divine Cf. the description at 1. 62–3. 'Restraints', literally 'chains' (*vincula*), evokes the idea found in Plato's *Phaedo* (62b; cf. *Cra.* 400c; *Phdr.* 250c), and attributed by him to 'the wise' (*hoi sophoi*, *Gorg.* 492d), of the body as a prison or tomb. It is found in Cic.'s dialogues (*Rep.* 6. 14; *Sen.* 81; *Tusc.* 1. 75) and later (e.g. Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 3: 'we are freed...from certain chains laid upon us'). Even if it is Platonic in origin and thereby important to Cratippus, Cic.'s probable source here, the expression is perfectly compatible with Stoic thought (cf. *Sen. Cons. Pol.* 9. 3; *Cons. Helv.* 11. 7).

111. Rare is that class of men This paragraph was judged non-Posidonian by Reinhardt (1926: 265 ff.), but, on the basis that its definition of philosophy echoes that of *Tusc.* 5. 7, which probably was taken from Posidonius, Finger (1929: 386) argues that it is Posidonian. On my assumption that Cratippus is the basic source for 1. 109–16, this introduces an important parenthetical passage

(1. 111–12) in which Cratippus distinguishes from true divination the predictions made by those who through concentrated thought can make prognostications, or scientific forecasts (cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 10. 3: ‘divination by human reasoning’ of earthquake production). True divination is by divine inspiration alone. This distinction may plausibly owe much to Cratippus’ reading of Plato’s *Meno* (99b–e; see Tarrant 2000b: 71).

**possessed by an all-consuming concern and enthusiasm for the contemplation of things divine** The description of these philosophers deliberately parallels the recipients of divine inspiration (Repici 1996: 51), but their asceticism does not lead to divine inspiration. Plato, according to Diog. Laert. (3. 63), defined philosophy as ‘desire for divine wisdom’. In Greek sources philosophy is often defined as ‘knowledge of things divine and human’ (Aet. *Plac.* 1. proem. 2; Philo *Congr.* 79; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 9. 13), whence it is found in Cic. (*Tusc.* 4. 57, 5. 7; *Off.* 1. 153, 2. 5) and Seneca (*Ep.* 89. 5).

**The auguries of these do not derive from divine inspiration but from human reason** A non-technical use of ‘augury’. This distinction is said to go back to the seven sages: ‘Chilon used to say that prescience of the future was a skill a man could acquire by *rationality* (*logismoi*)’ (Diog. Laert. 1. 68).

**floods and the conflagration of heaven and earth which is to come sometime** The plural of ‘floods’ and ‘sometime’ may suggest that Quintus does not refer here to any doctrine of a cosmic flood (cf. Sen. *NQ* 3. 27. 1–15), although Plato and Aristotle had envisaged alternate destructions by fire and water (*Tim.* 22c; Cens. *DN* 18. 11), a view which late sources attribute also to the Stoics (Comm. Bern. Luc. 7. 813; Orig. *C. Cels.* 4. 64). Both objects of the prediction are part of the doctrine of the ‘burning up’ (*ekpyrosis*) of the universe which was characteristic of the early Stoics. Two fragments of Heraclitus (DK 30, 90) can suggest that he originated the doctrine (C. H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge, 1979), 133–4), but the first definite attribution is indirectly from the 4th cent. AD via Simplicius (*in. Cael.* 1. 10), who points to the Stoics as later holders

of the view. Early Stoics such as Cleanthes (e.g. *SVF* i. 106–9) believed in a periodic conflagration, while the later Stoics Boethus and Panaetius preferred an indestructible universe (Philo *Aet. Mundi* 15; Cic. *ND* 2. 118). Posidonius, on the basis of his conception of *pneuma*, returned to the older position (fr. 13, 97, 99b K), which remained the standard Stoic position (Glucker 1999: 33). Cic. could be taking this either from Posidonius or Cratippus.

Perhaps ‘sometime’ (*aliquando*) suggests a certain scepticism on the calculations, which (as for Aristotle’s greatest year) were based on the conjunction of sun, moon, and five planets (Arist. *Protr.* fr. 19).

**Solon** Solon, as mediator and archon, brought stability to strife-torn Attica in the early 6th cent., while Pisistratus became tyrant, intermittently from 566 and uninterruptedly from 546 till his death. Solon opposed the grant of a bodyguard to Pisistratus (Diog. Laert. 1. 49; Plut. *Sol.* 30. 2; Ael. *VH* 8. 16). Diod. (9. 20. 2, 19. 1. 4) with some caution (*legetai*) quotes verses of Solon which Athenians later treated ‘as a kind of oracle’: ‘from cloud comes the force of snow and hail, thunder from a flash of lightning, from powerful men a city’s destruction, and through ignorance the masses fall enslaved to a tyrant. If they raise a man too high, it is not easy to restrain him afterwards; it is now that one should consider everything’ (fr. 9 W). The analogy which Solon makes between the natural phenomena and human tyranny illustrates well the rational kind of prediction to which Quintus refers.

It is impossible to date this piece of Solon’s verse within his long career—the opposition to tyranny could easily come from the early 6th cent., before Pisistratus was significant. See E. A. Anhalt, *Solon the Singer: Politics and Poetics* (Lanham, 1993).

We can call these men prudent, that is, they take forethought, but we can in no way call them “divine” Quintus plays with an etymology used by Cic. in his extant (*Rep.* 6. 1; *Leg.* 1. 60) and lost (*Hortensius*, Non. Marc. 60 L = fr. 96 G) philosophical works which derives *prudentia* from *providentia*.

**Thales of Miletus...bloom** The earliest version of this story occurs in Aristotle (*Pol.* 1259<sup>a</sup>6–17; cf. Diog. Laert. 1. 26): ‘for

example Thales the Milesian and his idea for making money, which involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on account of his wisdom. When he was reproached for his poverty on the grounds that philosophy was of no use, they say that he knew by his knowledge of the stars while it was still winter that there would be a great harvest of olives; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many were searching at the same time and all of a sudden, he let them out at whatever rate he pleased; he made a quantity of money and demonstrated that it is easy for philosophers to be rich if they want to, but that that is not what they are concerned about.' This is a floating anecdote elsewhere attributed to Democritus (Plin. *HN* 18. 273; E. Pfeiffer, *Studien zur antiken Stern glauben* (Leipzig, 1916), 96). Cic. appears to have Thales buy up the olives rather than the presses, which is an economic nonsense: one would be expected to corner the market in anticipation of a shortage, not a glut.

Included as one of the Seven Sages, Thales was one of the leading citizens of Miletus in the early 6th cent. In Herodotus he is a political adviser and in Plutarch a businessman (*Sol.* 2. 1), although that may be an inference from this story in Aristotle (J. P. Herschbell, *Hermes* 114 (1986), 179). Although it has been suggested that he was not as much a philosopher as a politician and shrewd businessman (D. W. Roller, *LCM* 3 (1978), 249–53), his efforts in the area of natural philosophy and above all his prediction of the eclipse were important in establishing his status as one of the seven sages (O'Grady 2002: 268–76).

**112. by virtue of some knowledge** Aristotle's 'knowledge of the stars' (*ek tes astrologias*) probably means in modern terms astronomy (cf. Plato *Tht.* 174a). M.-L. Freyburger-Galland, 'Thalès, astrologue ou astronome?', in B. Bakhouché (ed.), *Les Astres* (Montpellier, 1996), 263–79.

**he is said to have been the first to predict the solar eclipse which took place in the reign of Astyages** Hdt. 1. 74. 2: 'when the battle [between Alyattes and Cyaxares] had been joined, day suddenly became night. Thales of Miletus announced to the Ionians that this

change of day would take place, having set out beforehand the favourable period/limit, the year in which the change did occur' (cf. Diog. Laert. 1. 23; Clem. *Strom.* 1. 65; Euseb. *Chron.* 2. 101 H, now ruled out as a prediction by W. Lapini, *ZPE* 126 (1999), 115–16). Thales' priority in explaining eclipses was accepted by Eudoxus in his history of astronomy (Dercyllides in Theon of Smyrna p. 198 Hiller; Clem. *Strom.* 1. 65) and thence passed into the common tradition (e.g. Plin. *HN* 2. 53). Since 1853 the *communis opinio* has identified Thales' eclipse with the solar eclipse of 28 May 585, on the grounds that (i) it was the only *total* eclipse visible in Asia Minor during the normal campaigning season, and (ii) the date is given by Pliny (*HN* 2. 53), as established by Apollodorus. There is good evidence that the Babylonians were able to predict solar eclipses with some accuracy (J. Steele, *JHA* 28 (1997), 133–9), but whether Thales had access to their wisdom is unclear. Ingenious explanations have been formulated as to how Thales might have discovered (or learnt of) the Saros or Exeligmos Cycles with the aid of putative astronomic records in a city which did not record its eponymous magistrates till 525 (e.g. W. Hartner, *Centauros* 14 (1969), 60–71; D. Panchenko, *JHA* 25 (1994), 274–87), but such knowledge of these cycles as was obtainable in the 6th cent., from any source, could not have enabled a prediction to have been made that specified that an eclipse would be visible in Asia Minor (O'Grady 2002: 129–33). Mesopotamian records did establish that solar eclipses could only happen at or very near to a new moon (attested also from Thales, *P Oxy.* 3710) and that they follow at calculable intervals, but in the 6th cent. they were not able to forecast solar eclipses. O'Grady suggests (2002: 140–2) that Thales was able to predict the date of the eclipse on the basis of Mesopotamian evidence that a lunar eclipse preceded by  $23\frac{1}{2}$  lunar months a solar eclipse visible in the same location. Even if the forecast is historical, the magnitude of the eclipse, and the terrifying effect it had on the combatants, was not predictable. A radical response to the *communis opinio* is to hold that the phenomenon described by Herodotus was a total lunar eclipse (T. T. Worthen, *Electronic Antiquity* 3 (1995–7), unpaginated). That could have been predicted, but no such eclipse occurred in 585 (Worthen). Suitable eclipses which affected Asia Minor took place on 3 Sept. 609 and 4 July 587. It is preferable to remain with the traditional identification of a total solar eclipse.

Problems in synchronizing the reigns of Cyaxares (Hdt.; Eudemus) or his successor Astyages (Euseb. *Chron.* 101 H; Solinus 15. 16; *P Oxy.* 2506 fr. 98) with that of Alyattes and with a total eclipse which was visible over Asia Minor and would have produced the effects essential to Herodotus' story, are insurmountable (A. A. Mosshammer, *TAPA* 111 (1981), 145–55; *pace* D. W. Roller, *LCM* 8 (1983), 58–9).

Doctors, pilots, and also farmers all sense many things in advance, but I call none of them “divination” At 1. 24 Quintus links doctors and pilots as practitioners of imperfect sciences, but who are nonetheless to be regarded as mastering a discipline, and compares their disciplines with divination. Finger (1929: 387) posits an inconsistency between 111 and 112: the philosophers and statesmen who employ rational prediction in the former are few in number, but the practitioners of 112 are numerous—an indication of careless pasting together from three sources. However, the source criticism of Finger is forced; the passage proceeds in the deliberate semi-coherent fashion which Cic. deliberately attributes to Quintus' argument. Philosophers and true diviners are different from practitioners of any kind of *techne* (cf. 1. 24 ‘what art’).

the Spartans were warned by the natural philosopher Anaximander...because an earthquake was imminent Anaximander of Miletus, traditional dates 611–547, attributed seismic activity to the entry of air into clefts in the ground opened either by excessive heat or rain (Amm. Marc. 17. 7. 12; cf. Arist. *Meteor.* 2. 7), a theory perhaps developed in Sparta, which was renowned for its earthquakes (Strabo 367c). Anaximander's stay in Sparta (cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 1) is historical and may be dated c.550 from a Spartan cup representing the world as conceived by Anaximander (M. Conche, *Anaximandre: Fragments et témoignages* (Paris, 1991), 38–41), but the means by which he predicted the earthquake is obscure. From ‘under arms’ P. Ducat (in B. Helly and A. Pollino (eds.), *Tremblements de terre: Histoire et archéologie* (Valbonne, 1984), 76) infers the earthquake of 464, which triggered a Helot revolt, and traces the account (cf. Plin. *HN* 2. 191; Plut. *Cim.* 16) to Ephorus. However, this is very difficult to square (i) with the dates for Anaximander, and (ii) the logical requirement of Cic.'s story of a small gap between the



prophecy and fulfilment. Better to link the earthquake with one from the mid-6th cent. before the rebuilding of major temples in stone c.550 (cf. P. Cartledge, *LCM* 1 (1976), 26). For particular Spartan worship of Poseidon and sensitivity to earthquakes, see J. Mylonopoulos, 'Poseidon, der Erderschütterer: Religiöse Interpretationen von Erd- und Seebeben', in E. Olshausen and H. Sonnabend (eds.), *Naturkatastrophen in der antiken Welt* (Stuttgart, 1998), 85–8.

**the extremities of Mount Taygetus were torn away like a ship's stern** Strabo 367c: 'some record that some of the peaks of Taygetus were shorn off' (cf. Plut. *Cim.* 16. 4). The geological evidence shows that there have been major slides, but the centre of Sparta, 4 km from Mount Taygetus, could not have been flattened by a rockfall, as Pliny (*HN* 2. 191) rhetorically says, embellishing from Cic.'s account.

**Pherecydes, the renowned teacher of Pythagoras** Pherecydes from Syrus is linked with four separate stories of predictions and a spurious scientific invention. He was considered the first writer of Greek prose, a work probably entitled *Peri tes physeos ton theon* (On the nature of the gods) (Schibli 1990: 1–6) or *Theologia/Theogonia* (D. L. Toye, *Mnem.* 50 (1997), 530–60). His relationship with Pythagoras is attested widely, although a firsthand master–pupil relationship is questionable (Schibli 1990: 11–13).

**he said an earthquake was imminent after he had seen water drawn from a never-failing well** Cf. Diog. Laert. 1. 116: 'having drunk water from a well, he foretold that on the third day there would be an earthquake, and there was'; Apollonius Paradoxographus *Hist. Mir.* 5: 'once on the island of Syrus he was thirsty and asked for a little water from someone he knew; after drinking he predicted that there would be an earthquake on the third day. When this came to pass he won a great reputation'; *Paradox. Vat.* 30: 'Pherecydes of Syrus, having drunk from a certain well, became very mantic and predicted some earthquakes and other things'; Max. Tyr. *Dial.* 13. 5: 'Pherecydes also predicted an earthquake to the Samians'. Andron charged Theopompus with stealing this miracle from Pythagoras (cf. Iambl. *VP* 136) and attributing it to

Pherecydes (Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 10. 3. 6–9). On the fluidity of location and identity of the prophet, cf. Amm. Marc. 22. 16. 22.

Although the water level in wells can be changed by earthquakes, as was recognized from antiquity (e.g. Arist. *Plant.* 822<sup>b</sup>34–7; Paus. 7. 24. 8), the anecdotes suggest that it was from drinking rather than drawing the water that Pherecydes made his prediction, therefore most likely the colour or taste of the water was affected (cf. Pliny *HN* 2. 197: ‘in wells the water becomes more stirred up and with a somewhat foul smell’).

**rather than a natural philosopher** Although Cic. (or his source) include Pherecydes among the Presocratic philosophers, in Aristotle he appears as one of the *memigmenoi* ‘who give a mixed account, in that they do not say everything in myth’ (*Metaph.* 1091<sup>b</sup>8–9), a fair judgement from the extant fragments of Pherecydes’ work (Schibli 1990: 92, 134).

**113. the human soul does not divine naturally... as happens only for prophets and dreamers** By this heavily emphasized link and recapitulation Quintus signals the end of the parenthetical discussion of non-divinatory prediction (1. 111–12) and the return to the explanation of natural divination, of which he recognizes only two types, as is signalled by the use of *aut... aut*.

On this basis those two kinds of divination are sanctioned by Dicaearchus and, as I said, by our friend Cratippus. Schäublin seems overstrict in positing an error by Cic. (cf. 1. 87), in that Dicaearchus has been mentioned only in the introduction (1. 5) and not in Quintus’ argument. Rather, Quintus’ words show that he is well aware that he has mentioned only Cratippus (1. 70). It is difficult to divine here that Quintus has diverged from his main source here (so Schäublin), but the next two sentences are in effect another parenthesis in the argument which continues at 1. 114.

**If for this reason... they are admittedly the most important, they are not the only types** Quintus needs to disagree with Cratippus and Dicaearchus in order to include both natural and artificial divination, but out of personal friendship for Cratippus and because

of a shared Peripatetic perspective (cf. 2. 100) he concedes the superiority of natural divination. This, however, is not explicit in the continuation of the argument (but see below on 125 ff.).

**they remove many of the things with which the scheme of life is bound up** Although Quintus may be speaking as a Roman here, saying that to be deprived of the services of augurs and *haruspices* would remove the rules by which public life was run, the meaning of ‘the scheme of life’ (*vitae ratio*) should be more closely related to the argument. If the meaning of the last clause (cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2. 132) is ‘everyday life’ (Falconer), it may refer to the practices of doctors and farmers, etc. Quintus would then be rejecting a total denial of the value of the stochastic *technai*.

**But, seeing that they make a concession, and not a small one...**

Quintus continues with the soft glove approach to Cratippus, even though his position is opposed to the main line of argument which will be resumed in the next sentence.

[**prophecies with dreams**] To be excluded as a gloss, with all editors since Davies.

**there are some who approve of no form of divination whatsoever**

E.g. Epicurus and Xenophanes (see on 1. 5).

**114. So** The argument picks up from the end of 1. 110; cf. the similar chain of thought in Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 3. There is clear inter-mixing of the philosophical original with Quintus’ Roman colouring (e.g. the poetic quotations of 114 and the Roman examples at the beginning of 115).

**those whose souls... take wing and rush away, inflamed and excited by some passion** The first category of natural divination to be treated is ecstatic prophecy. The activity of the soul is described in vivid language, suggestive of the phenomenon of shamanism in which the spirit of the shaman is liberated from the body and ‘sets off on a mantic journey or “psychic excursion”’ (Dodds 1951: 88 n. 43). Plato himself may have been fascinated by the phenomenon in

relation to the translocation of the soul and have used in his most influential description of inspiration in the *Phaedrus* language influenced by shamanism (cf. L. Shenfield, *Pegasus* 41 (1998), 15–24). Cratippus and others emphasize the physical aspect of separation, which was not part of Plato's picture of the soul (cf. 1. 114 'cling to the body' and 1. 129 'mixed up with the body').

The image of flying goes back to Homer (*Il.* 22. 362) and was taken up by Pythagoras (Max. Tyr. 10. 2) and most importantly by Plato (e.g. *Phdr.* 246c; *Phd.* 70a; in Cic. cf. *Rep.* 6. 14, 29). Aristeas and others were reputed to have souls which fled far from their bodies to other countries and encountered people (Plut. *Mor.* 592c; Iambl. *VP* 136; Apoll. Paradox. *Hist. Mir.* 3), but something different is required for the prophet who 'sees' what is not yet. 'Inflamed... passion', although ostensibly metaphorical, reflects the Stoic conception of the nature of the ether, in which the souls moved, as fiery (e.g. Cic. *ND* 1. 37). 'Excited', cf. 1. 66.

**without doubt do see those things which they proclaim as they prophesy** This emphatic statement has been interpreted as philosophical polemic, presenting the view of Posidonius for whom the gods did reveal themselves directly through dreams and prophecies, in contrast to the Dualists for whom only *imagines* were seen (Finger 1929: 387–94): *cernunt* (see) seems factive.

**some are roused by a particular tone of voice or by Phrygian songs** For the first cf. 1. 80. Aristotle *Pol.* 1342<sup>b</sup>1: 'of the modes the Phrygian has the same potential as the *aulos* among instruments: both of them are exciting and emotional. This is evident in practice, for all bacchic celebration and that sort of dancing...go most appropriately with melodies in the Phrygian mode' (cf. Sen. *Ep.* 108. 7). The Phrygian mode, suitable for moods ranging from cheerful to frenzied, was considered as inspired (Lucian *Harmon.* 1; Apul. *Flor.* 4) and arousing (Plat. *Symp.* 215c; Arist. *Pol.* 1340<sup>a</sup>9), although sometimes it produced negative effects (Cic. *De consiliis suis* fr. 3). See West 1992: 180–1.

**Groves and woods move many souls, rivers or seas move many**  
Groves and woods were commonly thought to increase one's sense of

the divine (cf. Sen. *Ep.* 41. 3), probably because they were the haunt of divinity (see on 1. 101). Something wider than the locations associated with Dionysiac enthusiasm is meant, as the inclusion of seas and rivers shows.

**Alas! See!...** The third quotation in the dialogue from Ennius' *Alexander* (cf. 1. 42, 66; Jocelyn 1967: fr. 17. 47–9). Cassandra's prophecy of the judgement of Paris in favour of Aphrodite, as a result of which Paris lured Helen to Troy and brought about its destruction. Jocelyn conjectures that Ennius introduced 'a vision of the night of Troy's fall with Helen waving, like a Fury from a tragedy, a torch to signal the Greek attackers' (1967: 219), but a far more general allusion to the vengeance that was to come may equally be involved. Clearly the Ennius quotation was not in Cic.'s philosophic source, but Cic. builds on the earlier presentation of Cassandra as the typical ecstatic prophet.

**in the same way many prophecies have been made by seers not only in words** Although the place of inspired prophecy in Roman religion has been minimized, there is now an increasing acceptance of its prominence in the 3rd cent., and not just in the highly charged years of the Second Punic War (North 2000: 92–107). Examples of *prose* prophecies have not survived, but that is what Quintus clearly means by 'words' (*verbis*), even if the clarifying supplement *solutis* (Thorsen) is not accepted.

**"in verse which Fauns and seers once used to sing"** A quotation from the proem to book 7 of Ennius' *Annales* (207 Sk.) which in context explains Ennius' refusal to narrate the First Punic War at length because of its lengthy treatment by others, notably Naevius, in Saturnian verse. Varro (*LL* 7. 36) comments on this line: 'it has been handed down that [Fauns], in the so-called Saturnian verse, were accustomed in well-wooded spots to speak (*fari*) events which were to come, from which speaking they were called Fauns (*fauni*). Seers (*vates*)—the old writers used to give this name to poets from plaiting (*viere*) verses' (cf. Festus 432 L; Auct. *Orig.* 4. 4–5). Cf. 1. 101 for Fauns.

**115. the seers Marcius and Publicius are said to have prophesied in verse** For Marcius, see on 1. 89. Publicius is mentioned only by

Cic. here and at 2. 113 with a pejorative 'whoever he was' (*nescio cui*). Grammarians quote individual words from the seer Marcius (Festus 162, 185 L; Isid. *Orig.* 6. 8. 12) which are compatible with Saturnian metre, but not with hexameters, while the *carmina Marciana* quoted by Livy (25. 12. 5–6, 9–10) and Macrobius (*Sat.* 1. 17. 28) appear to have been composed in prose with the cadences of hexameters, although this may be the creation of the annalists (cf. Klotz, *RE* xiv. 1541–2). For tentative support of the authorship of Livius Andronicus (made first by L. Herrmann, 'Carmina Marciana', in *Hommages à G. Dumézil* (Brussels, 1960), 117–23), and for the existence of verses composed in a mixture of Saturnians and dactylic cadences, see Guittard 1985a: 39–47.

**the riddles of Apollo were expressed in the same way** The historical evidence of the Delphic oracle is complex: while the literary sources such as Herodotus present responses in verse, the majority of oracles preserved on stone down to the mid-4th cent. are in prose. In the archaic period Delphi may have been unique in giving some responses of Pythia in verse, and may have inspired the form of the earliest Sibylline prophecies in the 6th cent. Between 100 BC and AD 100 during the period of Delphi's decline verse oracles are almost non-existent (Parke and Wormell 1956: 33–4). Didyma's responses from the archaic period were in prose, but after its refoundation in 334 the Milesians copied Delphi's practices and for the rest of its history Didyma produced hexameter responses (H. W. Parke, *Hermathena* 130–1 (1981), 99–112). The younger foundation Claros also produced verse oracles, but in a variety of metres, perhaps to distinguish itself from Didyma.

Rather than 'unofficial distributions' of such oracles (Pease), or the collection made by Chrysippus (Thoresen), or examples quoted in Greek literature, e.g. Herodotus, or even Posidonius, such a general comment on oracular texts could come from a general knowledge of Greek historiography.

A riddling nature is crucial to many oracles (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2. 54. 4: 'through ambiguities, as is the custom for oracles'), a feature frequently derided by Christian writers. Though many Delphic responses were simple, others were deliberately riddling (cf. the ironical line of Heraclitus: 'the lord of the oracle in Delphi does not

say or conceal, but indicates (*semainei*)' and the epithet *loxias* (ambiguous/slanting) which Apollo earned. See Parke and Wormell 1956: ii, pp. xxiii–xxviii; Maurizio 2001: 38–46.

**there were certain exhalations from the earth, filled with which minds poured forth oracles** Cf. 1. 38. The past tense reflects Quintus' previously expressed view that prophecy had ceased at Delphi (1. 38) and that responses were no longer given in verse. Quintus' support for the notion of a vapour accords with Stoic thought, which assimilated it to the *pneuma*. But Cratippus may also have taken this line, as Aristotle (*Mund.* 395<sup>b</sup>26–9) advanced a similar explanation.

**the same thing that happens to seers . . . almost dead** The following description draws closely on that already given in the discussion of dreams (esp. 1. 60–3), which underlines the essential similarity of the phenomena.

**Because the soul has lived from all eternity and has had relations with countless souls it sees everything that exists in nature** The fundamental question here is whether these words owe more to Platonic or Stoic doctrine. According to the Stoics, 'the soul is born and destroyed' (*he psyche gennete kai phtharte*, Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 15. 20), which appears to be at odds with this passage. If Posidonius believed in a periodic *ekpyrosis*, as seems probable (see on 1. 111), he cannot in any straightforward way have held that the individual human soul had 'lived from all eternity' (cf. Glucker 1999: 39–41). Rather, he held that 'soul *in its entirety* is immortal and that the totality of soul had access to the totality of information contained in its memory' (Tarrant 2000a: 70). That, however is very hard to link with Quintus' idea of this soul exhibiting control over its physical appetites, which far better fits the individual human soul. If Posidonius is the source, we must hold that he interpreted the kinship of individual souls with the cosmic soul in such a way that each individual soul for a period insubstantiates the cosmic soul in respect of knowledge, a view for which no other evidence exists.

The idea of the individual immortal soul fits best with Platonic doctrine. The formulation here has to be explained either as

a Ciceronian adaptation (e.g. E. Wellmann in E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, iii (Leipzig, 1923), 603 n. 1), introducing a more Platonic or Pythagorean element, or as the product of some source who has linked two passages in Plato (*Meno* 81c–d; *Rep.* 614d–615a) for the respective ideas of immortality and communication of souls when they are between bodies with Plato's teaching on dreams (see 1. 60–1). This individual is identified as some 'proto-Platonius' by Gucker (1999: 30–43) and plausibly as Cratippus by Tarrant (2000a: 64–76; 2000b: 67–71), who was a careful reader of Plato's *Meno* (see on 1. 70–1).

provided that ... it remains alert while the body sleeps Cf. 1. 61

**116. At this point we encounter** Quintus faces up to an apparent contradiction in his argument which has drawn a sharp distinction between natural and artificial divination, stressing the direct communication of the soul with the divine in the former. If this is so, the objection goes, why do all forms of natural divination also require human interpretation (in many respects no differently from artificial divination)? Does that not discredit this form of divination? Even Plato, despite his rejection of artificial divination, admitted that dreams required interpreters, although he refused to call them diviners (*Tim.* 72b: 'it is also customary to appoint the tribe of prophets to pass judgment on inspired divinations. Some people call them "diviners", those who are wholly ignorant that they are not diviners but interpreters of the enigmatic voice and apparition'), but Quintus' answer is somewhat Stoicizing, as he resorts to providence. This suggests that his use of Cratippus has come to an end and that he is now relying on arguments from Posidonius.

**the important interpretation of dreams, which does not occur naturally but through art** Cf. 1. 39: 'dreams which when explained according to the interpretation of Antiphon demonstrate the intelligence of the interpreter'. Quintus is well aware of the widespread profession of dream interpretation based on the empirical recording of dream outcomes collated over many years (cf. *Artem.* 1. *prf.*: 'I have patiently listened to old dreams and their consequences').



Quintus' own examples of divinely inspired dreams included cases where interpreters were necessary (1. 39—the Galeotae; 1. 45—Tarquin's diviners; 1. 46—Magi). It may be that Chrysippus accepted the use of Antiphon's exegetical methods to explain obscure dreams or oracles (C. Lévy 1997: 335). Although the excision of *Antiphontis* has been rejected as arbitrary, Cic. is not here speaking about a particular form of dream interpretation (Pendrick 2002: 424).

**(likewise the interpretation of both oracles and prophecies)**

Delphic prophecies were notorious for requiring interpretation; professional interpreters (*exegetai*) performed this function for states (e.g. *IG* 3. 241)

**<all of these> have their interpreters as poets have commentators** Cf. 1. 34: 'Those who interpret all these things... just as grammarians do for poets'. The line here is excluded by Pease and Schaublin as a gloss, but is retained by Timpanaro as a defensible repetition in a section where repetition is rife and because the use of *explanator* (interpreter) is thoroughly Ciceronian (cf. *Rep.* 3. 33; *Div.* 2. 131).

**just as divine Nature would have created gold, silver, bronze, and iron in vain** Quintus' argument rests on the Stoic notion of providence (cf. 1. 82–3)—if the gods have created something good for man, they also give the means or skill by which to enjoy the benefit.

**with every benefit which the gods have given man some skill has been linked** In the general Stoic view arts were a gift of the gods (Tert. *An.* 46: 'the Stoics hold that god, in his great providence over the instruction of man, imparted to us, among all the other kinds of assistance provided by the divinatory sciences and arts, dreams'; cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 132). Where Cic. appears to reject the divine institution of the arts (*Off.* 2. 14), he is arguing against crude, popular notions of anthropomorphic interventions and may follow Panaetius (cf. Dyck 1996: 382). It is not clear, however, that there is a fundamental difference between Panaetius and earlier Stoics on this point.

**117. How prophets and dreamers see those things which do not even exist anywhere at the time is a great problem** The Stoics

appear to have thought of the future as already existing (cf. Stob. 1. 105 W), like another country into which we are advancing and which the gods (and perhaps the sage) could see. At 2. 120 Marcus will allude to the theory of Democritus that the soul was struck by *eidola* (*imagines*), an idea taken up by Cratippus, but not accepted by Posidonius, for whom the soul of the practitioner of natural divination was in direct contact with other souls (see on 1. 127–8).

**The questions we are asking would be solved more easily** Quintus clearly means that the existence of divination is linked integrally with the nature and existence of the gods, a point made by Cic. in the introduction (1. 9) and repeatedly throughout Quintus' argument (e.g. 1. 10, 82).

**If we hold to this, the thesis (part of which is the subject we are discussing) will stand firm** Again the very repetitive linking of the two subjects is justifiable from Quintus' perspective as the foundation of his argument. There are four heads of Stoic argument in *De Natura Deorum* 2: the gods exist (4–44), their nature (45–72), the world is governed by them (73–153), and lastly they are concerned with human affairs (154–67). Only the second is omitted here.

**not only in general but also in particular** Cf. *ND* 2. 164: 'the immortal gods are accustomed to display concern and forethought not only for the whole human race, but also for individuals'. The extent of the gods' concern for detail was disputed (cf. Epict. 1. 12. 2–3) even among Stoics (see below, 1. 118), but Platonic doctrine provides a background for this view (cf. Plat. *Leg.* 900c; Procl. *In Ti.* 287b). There is a clear contradiction with the last stages of Balbus' argument (cf. *ND* 2. 167, quoted 1. 118 'for it is not'), but it can be resolved, as Posidonius probably did (Timpanaro). Here, however, there is no contradiction with the more detailed exposition of how the gods' concern was realized in the next section.

**If we maintain this...it surely follows that the gods give to men signs of what is to come** Another repetition, with personal asseveration, of the Stoic 'citadel' (cf. 1. 10). Cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 149: 'Stoics say that divination exists in all its forms, if it is true that

providence exists... This is stated by Zeno, by Chrysippus in Book II of *On Divination*, and by Athenodorus and Posidonius in Book II of *Natural Philosophy*.<sup>7</sup> Although the argument makes links to Cic.'s works, the kind of argument is suggestive more of Posidonius, whose input is crucial for the defence and explanation of artificial divination.

**118. But it seems that one must determine *how* this is done** Cf. 1. 109 and Quintus' intention to explain *how* divination works.

**For it is not Stoic doctrine that the gods are concerned...** The idea that the gods were not concerned with minutiae goes back to the 5th cent. at least (Eurip. fr. 974: 'for God handles the great, but the small he gives up and leaves to Fate'); Chrysippus contemplated it as a possible explanation of why bad things happen to good people (Plut. *Mor.* 1051c); for Galen (19. 241 K) it was a Stoic view and Cic. places it in the mouth of Balbus (*ND* 2. 167: 'the gods care for large matters, they ignore the small'; cf. *ND* 3. 86, 90, 93). There was, however, no simple application of the idea in Stoic thought on providence and divination. Chrysippus and Antipater (cf. *Div.* 2. 35) held that there was a specific divine intervention to produce each divinatory sign which was to be interpreted, a view which Carneades ridiculed and Panaetius later discarded (1. 12). Posidonius, however, argued that signs and events were connected in a global system of causality which the gods had organized. So, although the gods in person did not directly produce e.g. crows on the left for auspications, the providential system did, thus justifying at one remove the belief that the gods were concerned with detail, while removing from them the image so easily ridiculed of their distraction with minutiae (cf. Timpanaro; Schäublin 1985: 164–5).

**that is neither appropriate, nor worthy, nor in any way possible**

Cf. 1. 82: 'nor do they consider it inappropriate to their majesty (for nothing is more glorious than kindness)'. Again there is no contradiction between these passages, because of the doctrine of divine providential organization of the universe.

**predetermined signs would precede predetermined events, some in entrails...** 'Predetermined' translates *certus*, here emphasizing

that the signs have been fixed precisely and are sure. Posidonius's world seems not to require ongoing divine involvement, as for each form of divination, both natural and artificial, appropriate signs had been created. The inclusion of artificial divination shows that the argument here is not Cratippan.

**bad conjectures and bad interpretations prove wrong not because of the reality but because of the lack of skill of the interpreters** The question of fallibility as an objection to the status of divination as a *techne* has been addressed earlier (1. 24), but the denial of the gods' responsibility for failure goes back to Plato (cf. *Rep.* 382e, 617e). Quintus does not need to claim that any diviner is infallible, but in the context of a carefully constructed providential system he needs to explain why the failures which cast doubt on divination occur. If the fault cannot be divine, it must be human and therefore relate not to the sign, but to the rational interpretation of it, primarily of course oblique signs without strict parallel in the records (cf. Linderski 1986a: 2239). Quintus' assertion is an example of the way in which individual failures not only did not destroy faith in the divinatory art, but strengthened the credibility of the discipline as a complex body of knowledge to be mastered better (cf. T. Barton, *Power and Knowledge* (Ann Arbor, 1994), 82–6, 92–4).

**[that there is a certain divine power which controls the lives of men]** Schäublin (1985: 165–6) deletes this as an inappropriate gloss, on the grounds that the variation of the key formula here from that in 1. 120 is unsupportable and that syntactically it is left hanging in the air.

**it is not hard to imagine by what means those things happen** This is Quintus' promised answer to *how* artificial divination works, the 'easy explanation' of 1. 109.

**a sentient force which pervades the whole world can guide in the choice of a sacrificial victim** Cf. 2. 35: 'a certain sentient force does guide in the choice of a sacrificial victim'. Posidonius certainly believed in a divine, sentient force (cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 138: 'Stoics say that the universe is governed according to intelligence and

providence, as Chrysippus says in Book V of *On Providence* and Posidonius in Book III of *On Gods*, since intelligence pervades every part of it (like soul in us).<sup>7</sup> Logically the divine force should provide guidance in every instance, so what is the force of 'can' in Quintus' formulation? For Finger (1929: 373–4) Cic. adds 'can' to relativize a stark statement in his original and thus creates a clash with expressly Posidonian teaching at 1. 125. Pease, however, considers the absence of 'can' at 2. 35 more significant, namely that Cic., or his putative source Clitomachus, was intensifying a pragmatic Posidonian position in order to ridicule it, while Timpanaro considers the difference unimportant. If we understand the force of 'can' to be 'has the power to', i.e. as a logical, analytical 'can' springing from the concept of the all-pervasive force, rather than 'may (or may not)', then there need be no fundamental tampering with Posidonius' position. Quintus is, in fact, emphasizing the effective power of the sentient force in achieving the material changes he describes in the next example.

**a change of entrails can take place so that something is either added or taken away** Cf. Plin. *HN* 28. 11: 'suddenly heads or hearts are added to entrails or are doubled as the victim stands'. In particular, alterations to the caudate lobe of the liver are meant: its duplication or enlargement portended success (Thulin 1906: 24–6; cf. Livy 27. 26. 23; Obseq. 69; Pliny *HN* 11. 190, 28. 11; Suet. *Aug.* 95; Pliny *Ep.* 2. 20. 13). While defending the existence of the sentient spirit, Seneca questioned the idea of instant substitution (*NQ* 2. 32. 4: 'such things are carried out by divine agency even if the wings of birds are not guided by God nor the entrails of animals shaped under the very axe'), which was open to ridicule (cf. 2. 35–6; Arnob. *Nat.* 4. 12). In some respects it seems inconsistent with the idea of predetermined signs preceding predetermined events, indeed, a sort of last-minute desperation by the divine. While it was relatively easy for a Stoic to argue that providence could cause one sacrificial animal to have a particular shape or size of liver, the extreme case of the complete removal of an organ vital to life was more problematic: it could not be argued that the animal had lived without a heart, therefore the idea of a sudden removal at the moment of sacrifice was necessary.

**in a brief instant Nature either adds or modifies or removes many things** Stob. 1. 177 W: 'there are four kinds of destruction and generation that occur from what is to what is...dismemberment, transmutation, fusion and breaking up of a whole, called dissolution'. Forms of change were defined by Posidonius in his discussion of the destructability of the universe. According to Shorey (*CP* 17 (1922), 173) Cic. 'need have looked no further than Lucretius ii. 769-70', but the change required in entrails is of a different order. In later Neoplatonic thought 'the *daimon* which presides there, the air and movement of the air and the revolution of what surrounds the entrails change them variously, in whatever way it pleases the gods' (Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 16).

**119. To prevent us doubting this there is a very important example** As a contemporary incident from Rome, this cannot derive from Posidonius. There is no need for a 'source' for this, although Julius Aquila has been suggested (G. Schmeisser, *Die etruskische Disciplin vom Bundesgenossenkriege bis zum Untergang des Heidentums* (Leignitz, 1881), 25 n. 117); Cicero knew Spurinna, as is shown by his witty description of a 'consultation' (*Fam.* 9. 24. 2; Guillaumont 1984: 101), and probably got the story firsthand. From Cic. it appears in Livy (cf. *Obseq.* 67) and thereafter more widely (Pliny *HN* 11. 186; Suet. *Iul.* 77; Plut. *Caes.* 63).

**on the day on which he sat for the first time on a golden throne and paraded in purple dress** Caesar was granted the use of triumphal dress for all occasions in 45, but 'purple' here was the regal dress granted in 44 (Dio 44. 16. 1), not the dictator's regular *toga praetexta*; the 'chair', a magistrate's *sella curulis* in gold (T. Schäfer, *Imperii Insignia: Sella curulis und fasces* (Mainz, 1989), 114-15), similarly was voted in 44 (Dio 44. 11. 2) and was used in the Senate-house and on the Rostra (see Weinstock 1971: 271-3). Although Cic. carefully specifies that this was the first appearance of the regal garb, that by itself has not made identification of the occasion simple. Various suggestions include Caesar's return from the *Feriae Latinae* on 26 Jan. 44, when the prescribed sacrifice was a bull (Dion. Hal. 4. 49. 3) or the Lupercalia on 15 Feb., if another of Cic.'s descriptions, 'clad in a purple toga, on a gold throne, crowned'

(*Phil.* 2. 85), describes the same occasion (cf. Weinstock 1971: 331, 344–5; Rawson 1978: 143). Most appealing, however, is the Senate meeting of 13 or 14 Feb., which best brings into play the prophecy of Spurinna that Caesar should be on his guard for 30 days (Val. Max. 8. 11. 2). See A. Alföldi, *Caesar in 44 v. Chr.* (Bonn, 1985), 163–4, and Zecchini 2001: 72–3.

Underlying Cic.'s words is the view later expressed (e.g. Suet. *Iul.* 76. 1; Dio 44. 3. 1–3) that the acceptance of inflated honours due to royalty or gods led to the warnings sent by the gods through these sacrificial prodigies, to dissuade Caesar from a course which would lead to the conspiracy against him. This sacrifice was probably part of the double rite of extispicy and auspication which preceded every Senate meeting (Vaahtera 2001: 86–9).

**there was no heart in the vitals of the prime bull** Despite the outward health of the sacrificial animal, it lacked the organ most vital for life. 'They used to say that the auspices were deadly (*pestifera*) when there was not heart in the entrails or head on the liver' (Festus 286 L). The same prodigy had occurred in Caesar's dictatorship in 46 (Polyaen. 8. 23. 33; App. *B Civ.* 2. 488), is attested on other occasions (Plin. *HN* 28. 11; HA *Pert.* 11. 2–3), and could even be considered a frequent occurrence (Iambl. *Myst.* 3. 16). 'Prime' (*opimus*) is a technical term used for animals for public sacrifices (Varro, *LL* 2. 1. 20; Festus 202 L). Different words are used here and in book 2 (2. 36–7) for the sacrificial animal, *bos* and *taurus* respectively. If the latter is used strictly, a prime breeding animal is meant (G. Capdeville, '*Taurus et bos mas*', in P. Gros (ed.), *L'Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine: Mélanges offerts à Jacques Heurgon* (Paris, 1976), 115–23).

**do you believe that any animal which has blood can exist without a heart?** Since Aristotle the connection between blood, the heart, and life was generally accepted: 'so the heart exists in all creatures with blood... no sanguinaceous creature is without a heart. For the primary source of blood must be in them all' (*Part. An.* 665<sup>b</sup>9–10, 666<sup>a</sup>22–4). However, the ability of tortoises (Arist. *Iuv.* 468<sup>b</sup>15), goats, and crocodiles (Chalcid. *In Tim.* 214) and regular sacrificial animals (Galen 18B. 238 K) to live once their hearts had been torn out was part of folklore. See e.g. von Staden 1989: esp. 169–72.

**Caesar <was not> troubled by the strangeness of this** Given Caesar's notorious attitude towards haruspicy a negative has disappeared from the extant MSS. I read <*non est*> *novitate*, preserving the clausula *-ate percussus* (cf. Timpanaro). Caesar is consistently represented as dismissive of *haruspices* in particular, and especially from the beginning of the Civil War to his assassination: Caesar ignored the chief *haruspex* (probably Spurinna) before his African campaign (*Div.* 2. 52) and joked away the absence of a heart in 46/45 with the words 'what's surprising if an irrational animal has no heart?' (Polyaen. 8. 23. 33; cf. App. *B Civ.* 2. 488). Caesar's attitude is usually ascribed to his rationalism or general impiety (cf. Suet. *Iul.* 59), but the leading *haruspices* and the Etruscan elite, particularly from south Etruria were probably in favour of his opponents and in response Caesar may have adopted a traditionalist distrust of non-Roman religion (cf. Zecchini 2001: 65–76; and L. Aigner-Foresti, 'Gli Etruschi e la politica di Cesare', in G. Urso (ed.), *L'ultimo Cesare* (Rome, 2000), 11–33).

**Spurinna** Cf. Val. Max. 8. 11. 2. Of Etruscan ancestry (Schulze 1904: 94–5), and known to Cic. (*Fam.* 9. 24. 2). He may be connected with an aristocratic family from Tarquinii, have been chief *haruspex* at least from 46 (cf. 2. 53), and may have been elevated into the Senate by Caesar (cf. Cic. *Fam.* 6. 18. 1), despite his earlier opposition. See Rawson 1978: 143–5 and Zecchini 2001: 68–9.

**he should beware lest he lose his powers of thought and his life, both of which proceeded from the heart** Cf. 'the sensory faculty, the motor faculty and the nutritive faculty are all lodged [in the heart] ... the heart and the liver are essential constituents of every animal' (Arist. *Part. an.* 647<sup>a</sup>24, 670<sup>a</sup>23).

**there was no 'head' to the liver** The liver's largest natural protuberance, the *processus caudatus* (see Leiderer 1991: 182–5), received special attention from *haruspices* (cf. *Div.* 2. 32). In Babylonian haruspicy it was called the 'finger' (*ubānu*) and abnormalities to it generally portended evil (Koch-Westenholz 2000: 69–70). On the Piacenza liver the *processus caudatus* is in the area which in Van den Meer's plausible analysis are 'the most dire regions' (1987: 147–52).



In Latin this lobe was called the 'head' (*caput*; Thulin 1906: 30–7), a term which lends itself to portents of great significance. The absence of a 'head' appears frequently as a portent (Livy 27. 26. 13, 30. 2. 13, 41. 14. 7, 15. 3; Obseq. 17, 35, 47, 52, 55; Pliny *HN* 11. 189, 28. 11; *SHA Pert.* 14. 3), and was considered as an *auspiciu pestiferum*, one that portended death or exile (Festus 286 L).

**These prodigies were sent to him by the immortal gods with the result that he foresaw his death, not so that he prevented it**

If the second 'so that' (*ut*) introduces a final clause, as all commentators and translators argue, these words present a problem in that Quintus is made to contradict his earlier argument, 'signs... announce what will happen *unless* measures are taken' (1. 29) and 'nor is it of no advantage to us to know what will come to pass (for we will be the more careful if we know)' (1. 82); the earlier argument excludes the absolute determinism required by this sentiment. If we take this line, then Cic. has imported a piece of Stoic determinism into a Roman context, something that Quintus' argument has carefully avoided (e.g. 1. 29: 'signs... announce what will happen unless measures are taken'). However, in the context of a consistent argument by Quintus it is possible to understand *ut* as consecutive, and thus the words become an almost wistful reflection on Caesar's death, or at worst a criticism of Caesar for not heeding the divine warning, by one whose career had profited from Caesar's friendship. They are not a rabid anti-Caesarian comment (Timpanaro) indicating that the gods wanted Caesar's death, or the inappropriate intrusion of Cic.'s own opposition to divination (Pease), anticipating the argument Marcus will deploy at 2. 20–5. Pease cites several apposite parallels for Greek determinist views (cf. Ach. Tat. 1. 3. 2: 'god likes often to tell men the future at night; not in order for them to take steps to avoid suffering (for it is not possible to beat fate), but so that they may bear their suffering more lightly', Helioid. *Aeth.* 2. 24; Amm. Marc. 23. 5. 5), but none that fits the Roman context.

**So...one must understand that those parts...disappeared at the very moment of immolation** A conclusion bringing the reader back to the Posidonian argument at the end of 1. 118.

**120. The divine spirit produces the same result with birds** Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1. 3: 'those who practise divination and employ birds... hold that the birds... do not realize the assistance they are giving to the diviners, but that the gods send signs through them'; Orig. *C. Cels.* 4. 88: 'some say that certain demons or divinatory gods give to animals their movements, to birds their different flights and cries and to all other animals this or that kind of movements'; and, drawing on Cic., Amm. Marc. 21. 1. 9: 'auguries and auspices are not effected and understood by the whim of birds who do not know the future... but god directs the flight of birds, so that a sounding beak or a flight by on the wing, in a disturbed or smooth passage, foretells future events'.

***alites* fly...in another area** 'Appius Claudius says that *alites*... make an auspice... by their wings or flight, e.g. buzzards, the gypaeus barbatus aureus (*sanqualis*), eagles, baby sea eagles (*inmusulus*), vultures' (Festus 214 L; cf. Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 1. 394, 3. 246, 3. 361). For the identification of the Latin terms, see Capponi 1979. Pliny (*HN* 10. 6–28) describes the various types of eagle, vulture, hawks, cuckoo, and kite, citing Umbricius Melior and Masurius Sabinus, but from haruspical rather than augural sources (cf. F. Capponi, *Le fonti del X libro della Naturalis Historia di Plinio* (Genoa, 1985), 281–3).

***oscines* sing at one moment on the right and at another on the left** 'Appius Claudius says that *oscines* are birds which make an auspice by singing from their mouths, e.g. crow, raven, owl' (Festus 214 L; cf. Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 3. 361); *oscines* also included two kinds of woodpecker and tit. Varro seeks an etymology of the term from *os* + *cano* (mouth + sing) (*LL* 6. 76; cf. Festus 214 L).

**how much easier is it for a god to whose power all things are subject!** The comparison relies on the Stoic conception of the universe as a living organism pervaded by the divine spirit, a view attributed to Posidonius (Diog. Laert. 7. 142). He may also, on the model of his theorizing about meteorology, have developed a theory in relation to divination which could account for two separate sequences of events relating to the sign and the outcomes (cf. Kany-Turpin 2003: esp. 70–1), but that would not square with

the Roman practice of augury. Divine omnipotence is problematic if a real role is to be attributed to the 'free will' of human beings (in particular) and birds. However, the fundamental conflict between the considerable amount of 'free will' seen in Roman religious practice and the determinism of the Stoics is not faced by Quintus here.

**121. signs . . . of the kind that history has handed down to us in very great number** The combination of Greek and Roman examples suggests that Cic. at the very least expands his source's list of historical instances where signs were given and clear interpretations were borne out by the sequel, but the inclusion of examples of both artificial and natural divination fits Posidonius' inclusivity.

**if an eclipse of the moon occurred a little before sunrise in the sign Leo** Cf. John Lyd. *Ost.* 9 W: 'When an eclipse occurs in Leo it signifies some defeat to kings.' The form of such a prediction is borne out by an example from Hellenistic Egypt (CCAG 7. 131) and one from Babylon, which is very important in illustrating that the practices of Hellenistic astrology did come from Babylon (BM 36746; see F. Rochberg-Halton, *JNES* 43 (1984), 115–40): 'if the moon is eclipsed in Leo and finishes the watch . . . the King of Akkad will experience hardship'. The symbolism of this prediction is clear: eclipses of the moon were considered particularly significant of disaster for the Persians (Curt. Ruf. 4. 10. 6), the Lion easily symbolized the king (John Lyd. *Ost.* 9 W: 'if an eclipse occurs in the royal trine, that is Aries, Leo and Sagittarius, some such mishap is bound to befall someone connected with the royal court'), and the chronological indication looked to the imminent rising of the new ruler Alexander (Boll 1910: 169).

**Darius and the Persians would be militarily defeated by Alexander and the Macedonians [in battle] and Darius would die** The MSS present a duplication (*armis, proelio*) which appears to add nothing; editors delete either *armis* ('militarily')—Giomini—or *proelio* ('in battle')—Pease, Timpanaro, Schäublin.

Attempts to link this with the battle of Gaugamela which occurred eleven days after a lunar eclipse (Plut. *Alex.* 31. 8; see Hamilton 1969: 81 for various suggested dates) are problematic because the dating is

only a reconstruction (see A. T. Grafton and N. M. Swerdlow, *JWIC* 51 (1988), 19) and crucially because the Gaugamela eclipse, securely fixed to 20 Sept. 331 (A. J. Sachs and H. Hunger, *Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia* (Vienna, 1988), 176–9), was at its peak in the late evening. No other eclipse occurred during the reign of Darius III (336–1), but it is reasonable to identify Cic.'s eclipse with that of 13 Feb. 338 (although it does not fit 'a little before sunrise'), as the sun was then in Aquarius, diametrically opposite the moon in Leo (Boll 1910: 168–9). If this date is accepted, then a gap obtrudes between Darius' defeat in 331 and his death in 330.

**if a girl were born with two heads, there would be popular revolt and seduction and adultery in the home** Minor deformities could be ignored as insignificant, but births with multiple heads were considered a prodigy (Festus 147 L; cf. A. Allély, *RÉA* 105 (2005), esp. 139–41). Examples are recorded for 174 (Livy 41. 21. 12) and AD 64 (Tac. *Ann.* 15. 47. 1), AD 112 (Phlegon of Tralles *FGrH* 257 F 36 xxv), between AD 138 and 160 (SHA *Ant. Pius* 9. 3), and in AD 359 (Amm. Marc. 19. 12. 19–20). The only parallel of a two-headed girl comes from 94 (Obseq. 51), but a connection with the Gracchi and the making of the Roman state 'double-headed' (Flor. 2. 5. 3) has been suspected to support an earlier date (e.g. Timpanaro). The interpretation reveals the Etruscan distinction between public and private significance (Thulin 1909: 116 n. 1).

**if a woman dreamt that she gave birth to a lion** Pericles' mother Agariste had this dream (Hdt. 6. 131. 2; Plut. *Per.* 3. 3). The potential ambiguity of her dream has been emphasized, in that the lion could symbolize great courage or regal qualities or something wild and destructive (e.g. C. W. Fornara, *Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford, 1971), 53–4). A predominantly positive interpretation would seem probable in the original context (cf. Aristoph. *Thesm.* 514; see G. W. Dyson, *CQ* 23 (1929), 186–94; F. D. Harvey, *Historia* 15 (1966), 255; Artem 2. 12). The negative interpretation arises from the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, for which Pericles retrospectively was considered responsible.

**Herodotus** The only citation of Herodotus as a source in *De Divinatione*. Although Cic. may have read Herodotus at some time, this citation probably comes from his source (L. Laurand, *Musée Belge* 15 (1911), 7 n. 3; cf. Fleck 1993: 48–9, 52–3). Cic.'s version is fundamentally consistent with that of Herodotus (A. S. Pease, *CP* 15 (1920), 201–2). In *De Legibus* (1. 5) Marcus comments on the 'innumerable stories' (*fabulae*) that appear in Herodotus, while still describing him as 'the father of history'.

**Croesus' son spoke although he was a mute** Hdt. 1. 85: 'he had a son . . . in all other respects fine, but dumb . . . Croesus had sent to Delphi to inquire from the oracle about him. Pythia answered him "Scion of Lydia, king over many, Croesus, you great fool, do not wish to hear the voice of your son speaking in your house, though you have prayed much for it. For you it is far better for that to be far distant: for he will speak for the first time on a day of poverty." At the taking of the wall a certain Persian, not knowing who Croesus was, came at him intending to kill him . . . the dumb son, when he saw the Persian attacking, in his fear and grief broke into speech and said "Man, do not kill Croesus".' Cf. Nic. Dam. *FGrH* 90 F 68; Val. Max. 5. 4 *ext.* 6; Plin. *HN* 11. 270; Aul. Gell. 5. 9. Pliny's version is garbled, perhaps misunderstanding Cic.'s *infans*, so that the prodigy becomes that of a six-month-old child speaking, whereas Cic. and the other authors envisage a much older child. Cf. W. Pötscher, *Zeitschrift für klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie* 20 (1974), 367–8 and T. A. Sebeok and E. Brady, *QUCC* 30 (1979), 7–20.

**following this portent his father's kingdom and house were utterly wiped out** Lydia fell to the Persians in 547/546. This prodigy is clearly different from one in Roman religion as it does not precede the forewarned disaster—in the Herodotean account Sardis had already been captured when the son spoke, as required by the Delphic oracle on which his story rests.

**Which history does not record that, while Servius Tullius was asleep, his head blazed?** Cf. John. Lyd. *Ost.* 5 W: 'let not even that tale of historians be beyond your telling, that often signs have occurred on the heads of men . . . to them all (Ascanius, Servius

Tullius and Constantine) kingly power was announced, not a peaceful and trouble-free power, but one full of countless evils for them themselves and for those to come after them... Tullius so filled the city with wars that he was unable to enjoy the peace established by Numa'. The extant traces of Roman annalists suggest a widespread tradition: Valerius Antias had one version (Plut. *Mor.* 323c; cf. Plin. *HN* 2. 241) and Livy another (1. 39. 1–2; cf. Dion. Hal. 4. 2. 4). See R. Thomsen, *King Servius Tullius* (Copenhagen, 1980), 59–64.

A flame projecting from the head like the hat (*apex*) worn by *flamines* (cf. Serv. *Aen.* 2. 683) rather than the radiate crown, which was a Hellenistic feature, seems envisaged. The royal fire (Ogilvie 1965: 157–8; T. Köves-Zulauf, *Reden und Schweigen* (Munich, 1972), 248–50) was a mark of charismatic leadership, often taken as a manifestation of the tutelary spirit of the individual (*genius*). The appearance of a similar phenomenon around Octavian in 44 (e.g. Vell. Pat. 2. 59. 6) required manipulation, but demonstrates widespread belief in the prodigy. See J. Martínez Pinna, 'Poder y predeterminación en la Roma arcaica', in Smadja 1999: 205–21.

**just...so** Although the first element is another reference back to 1. 61–3, the correlatives (*ut, sic*) indicate an important attempt to draw a parallel between natural and artificial divination, which we can attribute to Posidonius (see on 1. 118). Quintus, though, does not elsewhere include restrictions on the mental state of the practitioner of artificial divination and it would seem to be a far weaker argument, as the purity necessary for natural divination does not seem relevant to his activity. If Quintus had emphasized calmness or any other attribute conducive to the exercise of rational thought, the parallel would be more powerful.

**122. this is...what is often said by him in the works of his disciples** Quintus links the possession of a pure and undefiled soul with Socrates' divinatory skills, but Socrates' *daimonion* cannot be equated with artificial divination. Cic. is aware that Socrates himself left no writings and that our views of his philosophy depend mainly on Plato and Xenophon (cf. *Off.* 1. 90). This passage has been considered a translation of Plato (e.g. Müller Goldingen 1992: 176 n. 15) or of Xenophon (M. Puelma, *MH* 37 (1980), 148 n. 22), but if

so it is at least at one remove, via Posidonius, who himself probably plundered Antipater (see on 1. 123).

a certain kind of divinity which he calls his *daimonion* Cf. Plat. *Apol.* 31c–d: ‘you have often and in many places heard me mention that something divine and *daimonion* comes to me... this has been mine since childhood, some voice which when it comes always prevents me from doing what I am going to do and never urges me’; *Phdr.* 242c: ‘it always restrains me from what I am about to do’ (cf. *Euthphr.* 272e; *Tht.* 151a; Xen. *Apol.* 4; *Symp.* 8. 5), Ps.-Plat. *Theag.* 128d: ‘it is a voice which, when it comes, always points out to me something to dissuade me from what I am about to do, but never urges me on’. Cic. faithfully reproduces the negative aspect of this voice, which Xenophon (*Mem.* 1. 1. 4, 4. 3. 12) and the author of *Theages* (129e; see B. Centrone, ‘Il “daimonion” di Socrate nello pseudoplatonico “Teage”’, in G. Giannantoni and M. Narcy (eds.), *Lezioni socratiche* (Naples, 1997), 329–48) sometimes minimize, and limits its guidance to Socrates alone. Although later antiquity interpreted the *daimonion* as ‘an indwelling personal *daimon*, a sort of guardian spirit or spirit guide’ (Dodds 1971: 221; cf. e.g. Apul. *De deo Soc.* 17 ff.; Procl. *In Alc.* 78–83c; Olympiod. *In Alc.* 21–3c), the vaguer language used by Socrates himself and Plato suggests a deliberate attempt to avoid the term *daimon*, as Socrates’ guide was unique, but all men had a *daimon* (cf. *Rep.* 496c–d; see M. A. Joyal, ‘The Divine Sign Did Not Oppose me’, in M. A. Joyal (ed.), *Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1997), esp. 57–8, and idem, ‘Tradition and Innovation in the Transformation of Socrates’ Divine Sign’, in L. Ayres (ed.), *The Passionate Intellect* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995), 39–56, for the detailed development of the idea and more ancient testimonies).

Socrates—for what better authority can we look for? Cf. 1. 17; *Off.* 3. 100. For Quintus’ repeated stress on authority and reliability, see on 1. 39. Xenophon’s membership of Socrates’ inner circle and indirectly, therefore, the historicity of his conversation, are disputed nowadays (e.g. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* vol. iii (Oxford, 1945), 156–8), but no ancient scepticism is found (e.g. Diog. Laert. 2. 48). Epicureans by contrast attacked Socrates’ credentials as a philosopher (K. Kleve,

‘*Scurra Atticus: The Epicurean View of Socrates*’, in *ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ: Studi sull’ epicurismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante* (Naples, 1983), 227–53).

when Xenophon was consulting him whether he should join Cyrus Xen. *Anab.* 3. 1. 5: ‘Xenophon conferred with Socrates the Athenian about the journey; and Socrates... advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and consult the god with regard to this journey’, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1. 6–8. In 401 Xenophon was debating whether to join the mercenary force being recruited to fight for Cyrus, satrap of Lydia (S. Ruzicka, *CJ* 80 (1985), 209) against his brother Artaxerxes, king of Persia. Cic.’s source here diverges from the extant Xenophontic accounts in presenting a Socrates who gave rational advice (‘that is my advice, but it is that of a man’), but who clearly subordinated it to oracular advice; his *daimonion* could not provide a positive encouragement to Xenophon. Cf. Parker 1985: 302–3.

**The Athenians have always consulted this officially on matters of great importance** No consultations from the Peisistratid period are known or likely, but Cleisthenes secured Delphic approval for the names of the new tribes in the democracy (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 21. 6). ‘It is hard to prove that the Athenians consulted an oracle on any important issue of public policy after the Persian wars’ (Parker 1985: 320), but nonetheless consultations were made on a wide range of religious and administrative questions: e.g. repatriation of Theseus (Plut. *Thes.* 36. 1–4), restoration of the Delians in 421 (Thuc. 5. 32. 1), entitlement to public maintenance (*IG* i<sup>2</sup>. 77), the order of sacred acts (*IG* i<sup>2</sup>. 80), during a food shortage (?) (*IG* i<sup>2</sup>. 76, 78), the letting of lands near Eleusis (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 204), the priesthood of Asclepius (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 4969), the welfare of the state (Dem. 21. 52), procuration of a celestial portent (Dem. 43. 66), whether to improve the finery of Demeter and Persephone’s statues (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup>. 333), on sending the Pythiad procession (*SIG* 698a), etc. See Bowden 2005.

**123. It is also written...** Cic. takes this story, which is extant in no Greek source, directly from Posidonius. Crito was a close friend of Socrates (e.g. Plat. *Apol.* 33d) and participant in the dialogues. For



collected *testimonia* see G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, vol. ii (Naples, 1990), 635–6.

**the divine foreknowledge which I usually use** Although his *daimonion* does benefit others, its primary concern was Socrates' safety, if that is meant by 'foreknowledge' (*praesagatio*) here.

**after the unsuccessful battle at Delium under the command of Laches** In 424 the Athenians attacked Boeotia, but the failure of their allies to foment internal revolts as planned led to an Athenian withdrawal from Delium (Thuc. 4. 90. 4), a sanctuary of Apollo in Boeotia, to a position on the plateau of Paliokhani, just inside Attica, where the battle was fought (W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, vol. ii (Berkeley, Calif., 1969), 24–36). The Boeotian forces routed the Athenian hoplites (Thuc. 4. 96–97. 1). Laches, son of Melanopus, was an Athenian general from 427 at least (Thuc. 3. 86. 1) and commanded the Athenian left wing at Delium. See Patzer 1999: esp. 10–26.

**running away with Laches himself** 'When Socrates with Alcibiades and Laches reached the coast at Registes and returned home...he often called out the name of friends and members of his company who had died...because when they were fleeing from the battle they had not listened to the *daimonion* of Socrates and had used a different route from the one he was leading them down' (Plut. *Mor.* 581d–e; cf. *Epistologr. Gr.* 610–11). Socrates' marshalling of a band of hoplites, who fought together and resisted the Theban cavalry attacks (cf. Plut. *Alc.* 7. 3), effectively secured their escape (V. D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (New York, 1989), 180–1). Although Herodicus (Athen. 215c–f) denied Socrates' role at Delium on the grounds that no historian records it, its basic historicity is secure (P. von der Mühl, *MH* 23 (1966), 234–6).

**came to a place where three roads meet...encountered the enemy cavalry** Fixed by Patzer (1999: 21) as the road SW via Phyle, which fits the more detailed topographical information in the Pseudo-Socratic Letter. The *daimonion*, here called 'god'

(cf. Plat. *Apol.* 40a; Xen. *Mem.* 4. 8. 6), again restrained Socrates from taking the alternative routes.

A large number of remarkable prophecies made by Socrates have been collected by Antipater Quintus' language suggests that Antipater's collection (see 1. 6) went beyond what was recorded in the works of Plato, Xenophon, and the other extant Socratics. Probably Cic. has not taken the quoted examples from Antipater directly but from Posidonius. This particular story is generally attributed to Antisthenes, but the emphasis on the *daimonion* better suits another early Socratic (cf. Alesse 2000: 165–9).

#### 124. a glorious and almost divine saying of that philosopher

'Divine' is a regular adjective of praise in Cic. of individuals (see Leschhorn 1985: 387–97) and eloquence (e.g. *Am.* 32), generally with the untheological meaning of 'inspired'. Nothing more theological is meant here, as the qualifying 'almost' (*paene*) shows.

**sacrilegious verdicts** The plural probably reflects the threefold indictment against Socrates (Diog. Laert. 2. 40, taken from the official records), although the votes of the numerous jurors may be meant. After the guilty verdict and the voting of the death sentence Socrates is reported as addressing the jury (Plat. *Apol.* 38c–42a). Cic. makes a close translation of one passage from this speech, 'neither as I left the house at dawn did the signal of god oppose me, nor when I appeared before you here in court, nor at any point in the speech I was to give' (40a), and an interpretative paraphrase of another, 'this was clear to me, that it was better for me to die and be released from troubles. For this reason the signal in no way dissuaded me and I am not at all angry with those who voted against me or prosecuted me' (41d).

**although many things deceive those who evidently divine the future by means of art or conjecture** Cf. 1. 118. 'Art' and 'conjecture' relate to amassed lore and to logical extrapolations respectively, techniques which concern primarily artificial divination, unless natural divination is included because its signs often need interpretation (cf. 1. 116). Problematic is the meaning of *videantur*: if it is to

be translated as 'seem' or even 'are thought', it is very weak for an argument which fully includes artificial divination; if, as at 1. 71 it means 'evidently' or 'are deemed to', the problem disappears. Either formulation could be Posidonius', but in the first sense it would seem that, while including artificial divination, he valued natural divination more highly.

**some sign is given indefinitely but it is taken as specific** Pease refers to ambiguous oracles (2. 115–16), but it would equally apply to an augural sign. Two contrasts seem central to this, first between 'indefinite' (*dubie*) and 'specific' (*certus*; cf. 2. 104) and secondly between the giving (*datum*) and the reception (*acceptum*). The latter element is the easier to interpret: by conjecture or interpretation the diviner attributes to the sign a specific meaning (which happens to be wrong). More troublesome is 'given indefinitely' (*dubie datum*), which comes close to saying that the gods can give a sign which does not have a fixed meaning, and one which cannot be interpreted correctly, an argument which no Stoic could accept. From augural terminology found in one episode of 4th-cent. history (*dubial/incerta auspicia*: Livy 8. 30. 1, 32. 4, 34. 4), it may be possible to extrapolate a category of signs meaning something like 'wait', i.e. a set meaning, and thus excuse the gods from ambiguity if the human interpreter fails to act appropriately. But the way in which auspices received by Papirius, before his campaign against the Samnites, were judged *incerta* is wholly obscure (cf. J. Linderski, 'Roman Religion in Livy', in W. Schuller (ed.), *Livius: Aspekte seines Werkes* (Konstanz, 1993), 62 = 1995: 617: 'the point is that the auspices were ambiguous—not adverse. It was risky and foolhardy to engage the enemy, but the result was open'; Konrad 2004*b*: 202–3).

**some sign can remain unobserved, either the relevant sign or another sign contrary to it** The first alternative is straightforward—through incompetence of the diviner a sign sent by the gods is overlooked. The second is more complex, although part of divinatory theory from the 4th cent.: 'it is not remarkable that many dreams have no fulfilment... for if another movement occurs more powerful than that from which, while still future, the sign comes, the event does not happen. Many things, although well-planned by those

who ought to bring them about, are by other more powerful principles brought to nothing' (Arist. *Div. somn.* 463<sup>b</sup>22–8). From augury we have specific evidence of different grades of sign (Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 3. 374): 'lesser auguries yield to greater and have no force, although they occurred first' (Serv. *Ecl.* 9. 13), e.g. the eagle as Jupiter's special bird overrode all other bird signs, and a thunder clap or lightning bolt was the most powerful (Serv. [Auct.] *Aen.* 2. 693; Dion. Hal. 2. 5. 5); again, a second sign, even of the same grade as the first, should override it (Serv. *Aen.* 2. 691: 'it is not sufficient to have seen one augury unless it is confirmed by one similar. For if the second is different, the first is undone'—an exaggeration, see Regell 1893: 21). Lastly, within the Roman magistracies the status of the observer could be decisive (cf. Aul. Gell. 13. 15. 4). For similar manoeuvring over lightning portents, cf. Festus 263 L. From his Etruscan sources Seneca held that lightning was the most weighty sign (*NQ* 2. 34. 2: 'if the intervention of lightning negates the revelations of the entrails or of augury, the entrails have been improperly examined, the augury improperly observed'; cf. Hine 1981: 364–5).

**125. if any single thing...this should be admitted by everyone**

Quintus largely repeats what he has earlier attributed to Cratippus (1. 71), with a necessary extension to artificial divination. I have suggested that the argument from 1. 116 onwards draws mainly on Posidonius, so here Cic., as the empirical part of the discussion ends, has either found something analogous in Posidonius or has adapted the Cratippian argument to this context.

**For this reason it seems to me that, as Posidonius has done** 'Indeed it becomes necessary to establish an all-embracing natural law, if the case is not to rest on one or a few instances from observation' (Kidd 1988: 426). It is highly probable that Posidonius' extended treatment of divination incorporated a wider discussion of his predecessors' views, that he returned to the inclusive position of the earlier Stoics, and that Cic. straightforwardly takes all the material in paragraphs 1. 125–30 from Posidonius (A. A. Long, *CR* 26 (1976), 75).

**the whole force and rationale of divination should be traced first from god...and then from Nature** Cf. Aet. *Plac.* 1. 28. 5:

‘Posidonius said that fate is third from Zeus; for first there is Zeus, second Nature, and third Fate’, a muddled derivation. As Quintus’ arguments have hitherto been drawn from the existence, nature and providence of the gods (e.g. 1. 82–3), the last two elements of this threefold division articulate the rest of the argument: fate (1. 125–8) and nature (1. 129–32). The three terms do not form a hierarchy of powers, which would have made Posidonius a forerunner of the Neoplatonists, but reflect orthodox Stoic teaching in which nature, fate, and god (Zeus) are identical, but are manifested in different ways (Dragona Monarchou 1976: 287: ‘these terms had the same reference, though they were not synonymous, because of the Stoic distinction between sense and reference’). Quintus lists the three in the correct logical order of the argument: providence/god has the logical priority, then fate, through whose chain of causes the semiotic system necessary for divination exists, and thirdly nature, the arena in which all exist together (cf. Reydam-Schils 1997: 472–3). They do not refer to three types of divination respectively: fate-artificial, god-natural, nature-divination through direct contact with the divinity, as Quintus affirms that the causes of individual kinds of divination cannot be known (1. 85, 109).

Although the singular ‘god’ used throughout this section is connected by Dragona Monarchou (1976: 298) with Socrates’ *daimonion*, the use of the singular (or Zeus) for the controlling power of the universe is soundly Stoic (e.g. Diog. Laert. 7. 135; Alex. Aphrod. *Fat.* 31) and is seen in Posidonius’ own language (John Lyd. *Mens.* 4. 48; Kidd 1988: 427).

**For reason compels us to admit that everything happens according to fate** ‘That everything happens by fate is stated by Chrysippus in *On Fate*, and by Posidonius in Book II of his *On Fate*, and by Zeno and by Boethus in his Book I of *On Fate*’ (Diog. Laert. 7. 149). This is orthodox Stoic doctrine (cf. Cic. *Fat.* 33; *ND* 3. 14).

**I call fate what the Greeks call *heimarmene*, that is the order and series of causes, when cause linked to cause produces of itself an effect** Quintus adheres to the Stoic definition which employs an etymology from *heirmos* (series, sequence): ‘Chrysippus says that destiny is the organization of a design perfectly achieved; Fate is

strung together (*heimarmenen eiromenen*) by the will of God or some other cause', Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 6. 8. 8; 'fate is a chain of causation for those things that exist', Diog. Laert. 7. 149; 'Stoics [describe fate as] a sequence of causes, that is an inescapable arrangement and interconnection', Aet. *Plac.* 1. 28. 4; 'fate is an inescapable sequence of causes', Nemes. 37; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 19. 6; *Ben.* 4. 7. 2; Aul. Gell. 7. 2. 3. Others preferred a connection with *eiromai* (say) (Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 15. 15. 6). The probable etymology is from *meiromai* (allot). See J. B. Gould, *JHI* 35 (1974), 17–32.

**an eternal truth which flows from all eternity** Cic. *ND* 1. 55: 'whatever happens has flowed from eternal truth and an unbroken sequence of causes'; cf. 3. 14. For the chain of causes stretching back to eternity, cf. Cic. *Top.* 59; *Tusc.* 5. 70; *Fat.* 20, 38; the metaphor of 'flowing' emphasizes the smooth continuity between past, present, and future, rather than motion (Pease).

**Because this is so, nothing has happened which was not going to happen...** Cf. Cic. *Fat.* 17 and 33. The existence of an unbroken series of causes eliminates any role for chance (central to Carneades' assault on divination) and any direct divine interference (e.g. a god suspending the laws of nature to save a favourite); the universe, then, fully infused by the divine mind, exhibits the purely logical sequence of cause and effect essential to any attempt to understand its workings or create a predictive system, particularly the kind required in artificial divination.

**126. Fate is not what it is called superstitiously but what it is called scientifically** For the same contrast cf. *ND* 2. 63, 3. 92. Cic. contrasts popular personified notions of fate such as the *Moirai* or *Parcae*, images of old women spinning threads (e.g. Hes. *Theog.* 903–6) with the impersonal, rational, process of the Stoic universe. See Greene 1944.

**the eternal cause of things, why things that are passed have happened and why impending events occur and why what follows will be** An accurate representation of a Stoic definition, cf. Chrysippus: 'fate is...the rationale in accordance with which past

events have happened, present events are happening, and future events will happen' (Stob. 1. 79 W).

**So it comes about that on the one hand it can be known by observation** Again the logic of the system is crucial to enabling prediction to be made in artificial divination. Timpanaro notes correctly that this period is carefully balanced by *et* and *-que* (perhaps translating *men* and *de*), emphasizing the inclusivity of the theory for both artificial and natural divination. For 'observation' cf. 1. 2, 25, 34, 72, 109.

**what effect generally follows each cause, even if it doesn't always follow** The formulation carefully acknowledges that not all attempts at divination succeed (cf. 1. 71, 124–5, 128), but at this point Quintus does not need to explain how diviners fail (the main ways have been outlined in 1. 124). As Pease notes, failures were not attributed by Stoics to a breakdown of the system of cause and effect, but 'to the interposition of other disregarded or unnoticed causes'. When an unforeseen consequence followed an apparent cause, which some would attribute to irrational chance (*tyche*), the Stoic response (taking up Aristotelian terminology, *Phys.* 196<sup>b5</sup> ff.) was to define chance as a rational 'cause obscure to human reasoning' (e.g. Alex. Aphrod. *Fat.* 8: "obscure to human reasoning" are the causes of those things which are believed to come to be in accordance with certain reactions, the cause through which they come to be being unknown... they are believed to act as they do in accordance with some definite cause').

**it is probable that these same causes of future effects are perceived by those who see them in frenzy or in sleep** If there is a distinction between 'can' (*possit*) and 'probable' (*veri simile*), this again suggests the superiority of natural divination (cf. 1. 124 'seem'). In that dreams and prophecies could provide a far more detailed prediction of exactly what would come to pass, often with what amounts to a narrative, whereas the various forms of artificial divination (even the most complex manifestations of astrology) provide relatively simple predictions of, say, disaster or defeat or straightforward permissions or refusals, the former category is clearly superior. In

a dream or prophecy often the course of future events was seen, the judgement of Paris led to the arrival of Helen and the destruction of Troy (1. 114), something impossible in the signs of artificial divination.

Here Quintus seems to imply that the soul has direct access to the causes themselves (*videant, cernit*), perhaps not always, but at least sometimes; whereas at 1. 118 Quintus states that from the foundation of the world predetermined *signs* precede predetermined events in both natural and artificial divination. Schäublin (1985: 166–7) understands Posidonius to argue that in natural divination *sometimes* (not always and not all) the causes themselves could be seen and that these fulfilled the role of signs in the divinatory act.

**127. all things come to pass according to Fate as will be demonstrated elsewhere** Cf. 1. 125. In the extant part of *De Fato*, however, there is no defence of divination. The passive is consistent with a Cic. who had not yet decided what format the work would take: he could have considered a dialogue in which someone (even Quintus) presented Stoic arguments for divination. These words are not a gloss, nor a cross-reference taken carelessly from Posidonius (*contra* Thoresen), nor a slip in which Cic. forgets he is speaking as Quintus (cf. the slip at 1. 87), but the vaguest form of reference possible to an intended project (cf. 2. 19) and ultimately evidence of a change of plan by Cic., unless the lost sections of *On Fate* redeemed the promise.

**if a mortal could exist who could discern with his soul the connection of every cause** ‘Connection’ (*conligatio*) is the equivalent of the Greek *episyndesis* (e.g. Alex. Aphrod. *Fat.* 25) which is a stronger term than sequence (*heirmos*) in that it emphasizes the bond between causes (and their effects). ‘Grasp’ translates *tenere*, which seems to require a stronger translation than ‘know’ (cf. Timpanaro); something like ‘control’ or ‘dictate’ is meant here, which suggests the power to mould the future, impossible in a fully deterministic system except for the divine mind, and that only in so far as it was part of the material universe. As Dodds argues (1971: 212), because the ancients believed that the universe was finite and relatively small, the ‘nexus of present conditions on which the future



was thought to depend was for them finite and therefore theoretically knowable in its totality, at least by a god'. In rejecting this third and putatively highest plane of divination, which Carneades had easily ridiculed, Posidonius appears to differ from Chrysippus (cf. C. Lévy 1997: 336–8).

**men . . . know what will happen in advance by means of certain signs which will make clear what follows them** If the divinatory 'super-sage' does not exist, the only means of divination is through the semiotic system which Posidonius argues is integral to the universe. 'Make clear' (*declaro*) is the equivalent of the Greek *semainein*, a technical term found often in discussions of divination (e.g. Stob. 2. 171 W). In the Posidonian system, as opposed to Roman belief in which signs do not cause events (1. 29), the event inevitably follows the sign. For, as nothing comes into existence outside of the causal sequence, there are no surprises or chance occurrences to confuse the diviner.

**like the uncoiling of a rope, the passing of time brings about nothing new but unfolds each event in sequence** Stoic doctrine of fate is marked by a Greek metaphor using the verb *eirein* 'to string together' (e.g. Diog. Laert. 7. 149) or the cognate noun *heirmos*, 'series, sequence' (e.g. Aet. Plac. 1. 28. 4; see above 1. 125 'I call fate . . .'). The primary idea within this, the essential continuity of processes, is misrepresented by critics of the Stoics who substitute the notion of a 'chain of causes' (e.g. Alex. Aphrod. *Fat.* 23; cf. Aul. Gell. 7. 2. 1). Rather than 'chain' the Stoics' *heirmos* is better rendered by 'rope'. See R. J. Hankinson, 'Cicero's Rope', in K. A. Algra *et al.* (eds.), *Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy* (Leiden, 1996), 185–205.

If the Stoics held a view of circular or closed time the image of the rope is particularly appropriate (cf. A. A. Long, *SJP Supplement* 23 (1985), 29). Even without this 'unfolds' (*repliko*), the technical term for unrolling a papyrus roll in reading, and 'each event in sequence' (*primum quidque*) underline the central idea of sequence (cf. Cic. *ND* 3. 7). See R. P. de Ravinel, *RÉL* 38 (1960), 113–14.

**Both those . . . and those** A carefully balanced sentence which unequivocally puts artificial and natural divination on the same

footing in their understanding, first of possible events and secondly, by logical extension, of signs.

**Although the latter do not see the causes themselves, nonetheless they do see the signs and marks of the causes** Schaublin (1985: 166 n. 166) argues plausibly that *qui* refers only to the practitioners of artificial divination ('die letzteren').

**that kind of divination...which concerns entrails, lightnings, portents, and heavenly signs** The last element of this list of the types of artificial divination, 'heavenly signs' (*signa caelestia*), is unusual. Timpanaro suggests that either astrology or meteorological signs are meant. Certainly Posidonius had an interest in both (cf. August. *De civ. D* 5. 2; Boethius *Diis* 77; Cic. *Div.* 2. 47), but we would expect above all a reference to augury, which has featured prominently in Quintus' argument. Perhaps this broader expression is to encompass all types of artificial divination outside the province of the *disciplina Etrusca* that involved looking at the sky. Strictly we should not need to be reintroduced to the term artificial (cf. 1. 72, 116), but such repetition is frequent in Quintus' argument; it is not necessarily a sign of hasty composition, but perhaps of a desire to reinforce key terms.

**128. those things which exist nowhere are known in advance by diviners; for all things "exist", but they are distant in time** In Stoic thought time is an infinite continuum, in which past and future do not exist now (Kidd 1988: 398), created by the divine mind (cf. Arist. *Phys.* 223<sup>a</sup>21–9). The diviner is a lesser version of god, who for Stoics and Neoplatonists saw everything as in the present (cf. Sen. *NQ* 2. 36: 'for divinity everything is in the present'; Nemesius 353: 'to god even the future is as the present'; Procl. *In R.* 329: 'the gods see that which is not yet present as if it were present'; Clem. *Strom.* 7. 35. 7: 'god knows the future as if it were already in existence').

**seeds** The use of the seed analogy is deeply rooted in Stoic thought from Zeno onwards (Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 15. 20. 1; Diog. Laert. 7. 148), but the closest parallel is Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 196: 'if seed exists, they say, cause also exists, since seed is the cause of the things which grow and are generated from it'.

**which the soul perceives, either when in frenzy or set free in sleep, or which reason or conjecture sense in advance** The first two alternatives relate to natural divination by prophecy (cf. 1. 38, 66) and dreams (cf. 1. 113) respectively. For natural divination Quintus can use 'perceive', as the vision or dream presents the future event. The third and fourth alternatives relate to the two techniques of the artificial diviner, see on 1. 34, 124. As the artificial diviner does not see the future event, but only the sign which announces it, Quintus uses 'sense in advance' (*praesentit*), which may indicate a less clear revelation (see on 1. 126).

**Just as ... at what time each of these will take place** Quintus means astronomers (cf. 1. 2). Babylonian astronomers had created arithmetical methods for predicting lunar and planetary phenomena (see on 1. 112); using very different theoretical ideas Hellenistic scholars addressed the same questions, but drew on the Babylonian learning. See O. Neugebauer, *A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy* vol. i (Berlin, 1975), 2–5, and A. Aaboe, *The Place of Astronomy in the Ancient World* (London, 1974), 21–42.

**so those ... either always or ... generally, or ... sometimes understand what is to happen** Quintus returns in a slightly different form to the notion that practitioners of divination do not achieve 100% success (cf. 1. 124), but appears to concede more—that success occurs in a minority of cases ('sometimes', *non numquam*); even so, this is not fatal to his argument, so long as there is one indisputable case of divination (cf. 1. 125), the position of Cratippus (1. 71).

**these and other arguments of the same kind ... are derived from Fate** Rounding off the second section of the argument which is derived basically from Posidonius (cf. 1. 125).

**129. From Nature comes another particular argument** The third element of the argumentation derived from Posidonius relates best to natural divination. Throughout this example by 'nature' Cic. means 'natural structure, the natural *hexis* or properties or make-up of a thing or things (i.e. *physis*)' (Kidd 1988: 435), here specifically the nature of the soul.

the power of the soul is when it is separated from the physical senses Cf. 1. 63, esp. 'active and alive' and 1. 70; 'is at its most active when it is furthest away from the body'.

the minds of the gods understand what each other is thinking without eyes, ears, and tongues In contrast to the Epicureans, the Stoics rejected an anthropomorphic conception of the gods (Diog. Laert. 7. 147), which pictured them with sense organs (Procl. *In Cra.* 37: '[the gods] live together through thoughts and know one another by thoughts and not by the senses', cf. Clem. *Strom.* 7. 7). Theiler compares the voiceless transmission of thoughts by *daimones* described by Plutarch (*Mor.* 588c).

a silent wish or vow The regular practice was to pray aloud (see P. W. van den Horst, *Numen* 41 (1994), 1–25; H. S. Versnel, 'Religious Mentality in Ancient Prayer', in idem, *Faith, Hope and Worship* (Leiden, 1981), 25–8; G. Freyburger, *RÉL* 79 (2001), 26–36). Silence or whispering under the breath became associated with prayers for evil (cf. Mart. 1. 39. 5–6), and is specifically commanded in some malicious magic, but is also seen in the context of love (Tib. 4. 5. 17–18; Aristaenetus 16). 'Even' (*etiam*) does confirm that silent prayers were made, but also suggests that they were not the norm.

stirred by inspiration ... see those things which they [souls] cannot see when they are mixed up with the body Cf. 1. 4. I follow Timpanaro in removing the second *animi* and in adopting Rath's emendation of *liberi* (free) to *libere* (freely), to reduce the redundancy, which is remarkable even given Cic.'s occasional prolixity.

130. although it is perhaps difficult to transfer this natural explanation to the kind of divination which we say derives from a technique Pease holds that this is incompatible with 1. 109, 'so what if the explanation for artificial foreknowledge is straightforward', but if the demonstrative pronoun 'this' (*hanc*), which is further intensified by *quidem* (cf. Kidd 1988: 434), refers to arguments from Nature there is no contradiction: Posidonius has rational explanations for the two types of divination, but they are fundamentally

different—arguments ‘from God’ work for artificial divination, arguments from Nature (of the soul) for natural divination.

**nonetheless Posidonius has explored this question as far as is possible** Kidd (1999: 166) translates *rimatur* (explored) as ‘rubbed up’, which, although it reflects that this is ‘a strong figure’ (Pease; cf. Festus 345 L: ‘*rimari* is to search for vigorously, as if even in the cracks’), seems to me too negative for this context, in which Posidonius’ argumentation is crucial to Quintus’ case. Even so, there may be an element of consistency in Quintus’ characterization, as he later rejects artificial divination (2. 100). The primary reference must be to Posidonius’ five books *On Divination*, rather than to his far larger *Meteorologica*. Heraclides Ponticus could easily be cited in both. Sextus Empiricus (*Phys.* 1. 79: ‘similarly, in accordance with certain risings and settings of the stars, changes in the surrounding atmosphere and every kind of variation in the air occur, sometimes for the better, sometimes involving pestilence’) connects these examples with Posidonius’ theory of cosmic sympathy.

**there are in Nature certain signs of future events** These signs come from the nature of things, ‘produced in the natural continuum of cause and effect’ (Kidd 1988: 435). Pease (following J. F. Dobson, *CQ* 12 (1918), 187) holds that the sign treated below is an example of ‘physical phenomena from which we can predict the weather’ and not any true divinatory prognostication, but the sign seems to be a phenomenon with a far greater prognostic scope than, say, the storm signs of 1. 14, in that the character of a whole year seems to be at issue.

**we understand that the people of Ceos are accustomed each year to make a careful observation of the dog star** The introductory formula, along with the explicit attribution which follows, show that this is a well-founded tradition which can be traced back to the mid-4th cent. The rising of the brightest fixed star visible with the naked eye, Sirius, was considered significant among Greeks from at least the 8th cent. (cf. Hom. *Il.* 22. 25–31), as it coincided with the period of greatest heat and often severe fevers which were popularly attributed to the star’s presence in the sky with the sun all day (cf.

Hippocr. *Aer.* 11; Schol. Hom. *Il.* 20. 31; Hyg. *Poet. astr.* 2. 4). For the Cycladic islanders the heat and consequences for crops were particularly severe (cf. Schol. Ap. Rhod 2. 498: 'when the Dog Star was blazing and drought and famine afflicted the Cyclades Islands for a long time . . . they propitiated the Dog Star and it was a custom for the Ceans to await the rising of the Dog Star each year in full armour and to sacrifice to it. As a consequence the Etesian winds cooled down the earth in summer and the Greeks were freed from famine.' Cf. Diod. 4. 82. 2).

**as Heraclides of Pontus writes** See on 1. 46. Fr. 141 Wehrli.

**conjecture whether the year will be healthy or pestilential** Cf. Hippocr. *Aer* 2: 'knowing the changes of the seasons and the rising and the setting of the stars, with the circumstances of each of the phenomena, he will know beforehand the nature of the year to come'. As the heliacal rising of Sirius, datable c.19 July for Hesiod (*Op.* 498) occurred too late in the year to relate to the main crops, it concerned the general healthfulness of the climate (cf. Manil. 1. 403–4), whether fever would break out (or continue), factors which depended to a large degree on whether the Etesian winds would blow. These were believed to begin around the rising of Sirius (Arist. *Meteor.* 361<sup>b</sup>35).

**If the star rises dimmer . . . breathing . . . will be difficult** In general the rising of the Dog Star was a bad time for disease (Hippocr. *Aer* 11).

**131. Democritus holds that the ancients were wise to establish the inspection of the entrails of sacrificial victims** For Democritus' acceptance of divination, see 1. 5. Although direct citation by Cic. is not impossible (cf. Timpanaro, lxxvii–iii) and it is not clear at what point Cic. leaves Posidonius (Schäublin), the final sentence before the quotation from Pacuvius (see below if . . .) formally ends the Posidonian argument, so this should be part of it. Democritus may have considered artificial divination to be simple scientific conjecture, with no relation to the theory of images by which he could explain natural divination (cf. 2. 120; Bouché-Leclercq 1879: 41):

the condition of the liver related directly to the quality of the food on which the sacrificial victim had been fed (cf. 2. 30).

**from their condition and colour are perceived signs** Marcus will emphasize the simple connection between food and health (2. 30). In Vitruvius the ancestors rationally determined the siting of cities by inspecting the health of their animals' livers (1. 4. 9–10). Condition and colour appear to form no part of Roman haruspical practice (Thulin 1906: 24 n. 1), but are attested in Greek (Aesch. *PV* 493–5); in Babylonian haruspicy colour terms appear in the vocabulary (Koch-Westenholz 2000: 62, 162).

**If observation and custom have recognized that these techniques proceed from Nature** A closing formula to the section begun at 1. 129.

**natural philosopher introduced by Pacuvius in his *Chryses* seems to have understood very little of Nature** For Pacuvius, see on 1. 24. Nonius Marcellus (e.g. 370 L) supports the MSS reading *Chryses* here (see D'Anna 1967: ad loc.). *Chryses* was one of Pacuvius' last plays, performed in 129 or shortly before (cf. Cic. *Am.* 24). Chryses, the son of Agamemnon, learnt late of his father's identity and joined with Orestes, his half-brother, in killing Thoas, king of Tauris, who had attempted to kill Orestes (Hyg. *Fab.* 120–1). These lines may be part of an attack by Thoas on Orestes' belief in divination (W. Zillinger, *Cicero und die altrömischen Dichtung* (Würzburg, 1911), 126–7), addressed to Chryses who has to decide between heeding the portents and giving in to Thoas's demands for the surrender of Orestes (cf. Slater 2000: 319), but the barbarian Thoas is not a natural identification for a natural philosopher (cf. E. Fantham, 'Pacuvius: Melodrama, Reversals and Recognitions', in D. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), *Myth and Culture in Republican Rome* (Exeter, 2003), 116). If the two extracts here were put into the mouth of the same character, as Cic.'s expression suggests, then the speaker offers both a critique of divination of the kind found elsewhere in Greek and Roman drama (e.g. Soph. *Oed.* 387–9; Eur. *IT* 570–1; Plaut. *Amph.* 1132–4; *Poen.* 463) and also a Stoic-influenced defence of a pantheistic, immanent deity. This combination might deliberately reflect the theories of Panaetius, which were familiar to the Scipionic

circle in which Pacuvius moved (C. Mandolfo, *Orpheus* 22 (1975), 43–4). On this circle, see J. E. G. Zetzel, *HSCP* 76 (1972), 173–80.

**for those who understand the speech of birds...** Fr. 20 (D'Anna); three iambic *senarii*, although the beginning of the first line is missing. The words evince scepticism on augury and haruspicy, the latter achieved by a witty contrast which depends on the archaic view of the liver as the seat of human intelligence. Similar attacks are found in Ennius' *Telamon* (see on 1. 132), Accius' *Astyanax* (fr. 4 R), and a line of Pacuvius (fr. 11 *Inc. Fab.* D'Anna).

**I think that they should hear rather than be obeyed** The word play of Pacuvius is impossible to reproduce (*magis audiendum quam auscultandum censeo*), but is typical of him. The contrast between *audire* and *auscultare* is found also in Caecilius Statius (*Symbolos* 196) and Cato (fr. 111 Malcovati).

**But "why?", I beg you** Quintus' question appears to be addressed rhetorically to the speaker of the previous words (cf. Cic. *Brut.* 76). Hence the barbarian Thoas is made to argue for a world system with no room for divination in language derived from Greek natural philosophy (Slater 2000: 319).

**Whatever it is...** Fr. 23 D'Anna. The sentiment of these three trochaic *septenarii* is usually compared with lines from Euripides' *Chrysippus* (fr. 839 K) addressing Earth as the 'mother of all', but the debt is probably not specific, as Euripidean adaptations of the contemporary philosophical notions of Anaxagoras in particular are found in many plays (e.g. fr. 936 K: 'do you see the boundless ether on high and encompassing the earth in his watery arms? Count the former Zeus, consider him god'; tr. Cic. at *ND* 2. 65). 'Anaxagoras said that the air contains the seeds of all things and these when carried down by rain produce plants' (Theophr. *Hist. Plant.* 3. 1. 4). Here, too, 'father of all' refers to the ether, rather than the earth (cf. Cic. *ND* 2. 91). Anaxagoras' ideas were taken over and adapted by the Stoics.

**it animates... and to it also they return** Cf. Lucr. 5. 318–23, and Vitr. 8 *praef.* 1, where Euripides is explicitly the pupil of Anaxagoras.



For the Stoics ether, the fiery upper atmosphere, was the intelligent divine principle which observed the eternal process of birth and death without itself being affected and knew what was to come (Ps. Hippocr. *Carn.* 2. 1: 'That which we call the hot is in my opinion immortal, knows, sees and hears all things, and knows both the present and the future... this is what the ancients, I think, called the ether'; Diog. Laert. 7. 139: 'the universe... has the ether as its governing principle'; cf. 1. 17) and by which prophecy was made possible. The background of this quotation in Stoic thought is highly relevant to Quintus' argument.

**since there is one abode for all things and it is common to all** ND 2. 154: 'the world [is] as it were a shared home of gods and men, a city for both'; *Leg.* 1. 23: 'this world is to be considered as one state shared by gods and men' (cf. *Rep.* 1. 19; *Leg.* 2. 26; *Fin.* 3. 64; *Parad.* 18). In this context Cic. omits the idea of state or citizenship from this idea, which goes back to the late 5th cent. (cf. Plato *Gorg.* 507e) and was taken up by Stoics (e.g. Chrysippus, Stob. 1. 184 W; Sen. *Ben.* 7. 1. 7) and became commonplace (e.g. Epict. 2. 5. 26; Max. Tyr. 13. 6; Lact. *Inst.* 2. 5. 37). For divination to work it is essential that the gods not separate themselves from the world and that they communicate with men. Here Quintus emphasizes that there is one system for gods and men.

**since the souls of men have always been and will be** Apparently another Cratippan formulation, as the immortality of the individual soul is Platonic rather than orthodox Stoic belief (Timpanaro). The continuity of the totality of soul matter (see on 1. 115) means that there is no impediment springing from the limited existence of individual souls, i.e. a change of signifying system in a new phase of earth's existence after a periodic *ekpyrosis*, to the soul's interpretation of signs offered by the universe.

**This is what I have to say on divination', said Quintus** The end of his philosophically based defence of divination.

**132. 'At this point I will affirm** Quintus continues, as we gather from the final words of the book. The tone is solemn, a rejection of all unreal or superstitious divination (Timpanaro).

**I do not recognize . . .** While several lines of division were made by defenders or practitioners of divination to distinguish genuine divination from fraud, Quintus' division probably has three aspects to it: first, and explicitly, he rejects all divination practised for personal gain; secondly, he rejects amateur diviners, those who practised artificial divination, but did not have the proper training (perhaps identical with social class); and thirdly, in the Roman context, he eliminates all practices that were not part of the state religion: the consultation of oracles other than Delphi, necromancy, inspired prophecy, and dream interpretation (cf. *Leg.* 2. 20). There is no major inconsistency with his approbation of such practices in non-Roman cultures (*pace* Nice 2001: 166).

**the drawers of lots** Divination by lots is dealt with scantily in book 1 (1. 12, 76), but is attacked at length by Marcus (2. 85–7). Quintus targets the common hucksters consulted by the lower classes (e.g. *Hor. Sat.* 1. 9. 30; *Juv.* 6. 583–4), not the functionaries at prominent oracles such as that of Fortuna Primigenia at Praeneste (e.g. *CIL* 14. 2989). See Nice 2001: 159–60.

**those who divine for the sake of money** Cf. 1. 4 ('soothsayers') for the pejorative term *hariolor*; 'for the sake of money', a choice of words influenced by the earlier quote from Ennius (see 1. 88). Divination for personal gain was first suppressed in 139, if Nepotianus' sentiments (*Val. Max.* 1. 3. 1) go back to Livy and to the official justification for the expulsion. There were later clampdowns with the same alleged motive, e.g. by Agrippa in 33 (*Dio* 49. 43. 5).

**the necromancers whom your friend Appius used to consult**

Consultation of the spirits of the dead in the historical period was confined to several major complexes where, because of gases escaping to the surface, there was thought to be a direct connection between the underworld and the surface (e.g. Thesprotia, and places with the name Plutonia, cf. 1. 79). In Italy Lake Avernus had the necessary associations (cf. *Cic. Tusc.* 1. 37), but there is no literary evidence of necromantic cult there from the historical period (cf. *Diod.* 4. 22. 2; *Strabo* 244; *Ogden* 2001: 63–71).

Appius' (see on 1. 28) notorious necromantic practices (cf. *Tusc.* 1. 37: 'the Nekuimanteia practised by my friend Appius') were shared with Vatinius (Cic. *Vat.* 14), and probably with Nigidius Figulus. He earned public scorn for his belief in necromancy (Ogden 2001: 149–50). A pantomime by Laberius with the title *Nekuimantia* suggests the possibilities for ridicule.

**I do not give a fig for Marsian augurs** A highly colloquial dismissal: *nauci* (fig) in this sense is attested in Plautus and earlier writers (cf. Festus 166 L), but later only in the grammarians Aelius Stilo (*Gramm.* 19. 1) and Ateius Praetextatus (*Gramm.* Fr. 3). For Nice (2001: 156) Cic. himself writes *nauci* 'to continue the archaic tone of this and the preceding chapter'. Older editors (e.g. Davies) took this phrase and the following as part of the quotation from Ennius, but metrical difficulties requiring emendation and above all the great improbability of Isis worship being common enough to be ridiculed in the early 2nd cent. suggest that these words at best paraphrase Telamo's speech (cf. M. S. Salem, *JRS* 28 (1938), 56) or 'contain(s) reminiscences' (Pease); to deny any connection with Ennius (Nice 2001: 153–4) is excessive.

A mythological connection was made between 'Marsian augurs' (cf. 1. 105) and the Phrygian Marsyas (cf. Serv. *Aen.* 3. 359), who gave them his name and their augural expertise, whereas another tradition has the Marsians inherit their powers from Medea (Solinus 2. 28) or Circe (Plin. *NH* 7. 15). The Marsian hill folk (see Letta 1972) were perceived as 'other', tarred with the brush of witchcraft and magic, and their practices, which lay outside the control of the state religion, may have been seen as a threat to Roman religion (E. Dench, *From Barbarians to New Men* (Oxford, 1995), 159–67).

**Village *haruspices*** The adjective makes clear that these are lowly functionaries, not members of the Etruscan elite trained to serve the Roman state or even municipal *haruspices* (cf. Haack 2002: 111–33). In Rome they gathered in humble locations such as the Velabrum (Plaut. *Curc.* 483) and market places (Jer. *Ep.* 127. 9).

**astrologers from the Circus** Again lowly practitioners for whom the circus was a favourite haunt (Juv. 6. 582–3; Schol. ad loc: 'if the

superstitious woman is poor she searches in the circus for ones to consult. For practitioners of the art used formerly to tout for business there'; Hor. *Sat.* 1. 6. 113–14: 'I wandered through the deceitful circus...I stand beside the fortune-tellers (*divinis*)'; Ps.-Acron ad loc: "'deceitful circus"...because of Samardacus who used to solicit around the turning posts. For there both astrologers <and> amateurs had once solicited.' Because of the belief that the physical features of the circus were conceived as a miniature universe, it was not an unsuitable place for would-be interpreters to seek business (cf. Bakhouché 2002: 138–9).

Isiac 'prophets' 'Prophets' (*coniectores*) is not a positive term in this context. Although it has an indisputable etymological link with *coniectura*, which Quintus acknowledges as an essential element of the expert's practice in artificial divination (see on 1. 24), here the term probably means 'those who make guesses (without foundation)'. Its use of Isiac functionaries comes from the interpretation of dreams received during incubation practised in the cult of Isis (Quint. *Inst.* 3. 6. 30; Festus 52 L: '*coniectores*—an interpreter of dreams'; cf. 2. 123, 129, 134, 144; cf. inscriptions of *oneirokritai* (interpreters of dreams) connected with the cult of Isis (F. Dunand, *La Culte d'Isis dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée* (Leiden, 1973), iii. 313; and dedications to Isis *kath' horama*—P. Roussel, *Les Cultes égyptiens à Délos du III<sup>e</sup> au I<sup>er</sup> siècle av. J. C.* (Paris, 1915–16), 119, no. 66, 149, no. 123, 198, no. 201, 201, no. 210).

Worship of Isis reached Campania in the 2nd cent. through the region's strong economic ties with Egypt and Delos, and by the early 1st cent. there was a cult on the Capitoline hill in Rome (*CIL* 6. 2247, datable 90–60; cf. Apul. *Met.* 11. 30). Given that worship of Isis had probably not reached Rome by Ennius' death, these words are Cicero's, reflecting a view of his own time: from the early 50s to 48 the Senate had tried repeatedly to remove the unauthorized cult-sites from Rome, as a threat to the *pax deorum*. See Takács 1995: 27–70.

**interpreters of dreams** Cf. 2. 127 for popular consultation of such interpreters, who, as in Athens, could be accused of misleading interpretations (cf. Hyp 4. 15–16; Aeschin. 3. 77). Artemidorus

(*Proem.* 12), by contrast, collected the works of such popular market interpreters, although they were considered quacks.

**They are not diviners either by science or technique** The heart of Quintus' disapproval is that the interpretations of all these diviners were not based on the results of observations over many years, the basis for artificial divination.

**But** This begins a new sentence (Nice 2001: 159) and is definitely non-Ennian, even if the following phrase can be attributed to him.

**superstitious seers and shameless prophets** Jocelyn (1967: 398) denies these words (*superstitiosi vates impudentesque harioli*) to Ennius on the grounds that when the first three lines are taken together 'the rude and undigested pile of adjectives and adjectival clauses ... looks like the work of a hasty quoter rather than that of a competent dramatist'. F. Caviglia (ASNP 39 (1970), 478 ff.) and Timpanaro attribute the words to Ennius, which is not impossible. More difficult, but crucial to the attribution of these words, is to establish the precise connotations of *superstitiosus* and *hariolus* in the early 2nd cent. and in the mid-1st cent. Certainly, in Ennius' *Alexander* (see on 1. 66) *superstitiosi hariolationes* has no pejorative sense. *Superstitiosus* changed from a neutral sense of 'having knowledge (as a witness)' to a negative 'credulous' or 'superstitious' in the modern sense (Ronca 1992: esp. 48–9; cf. Sachot 1991: 372–8). In Plautus, the *hariolus* is a generally discreditable and even dangerous figure (N. W. Slater, 'The Market in Sooth: Supernatural Discourse in Plautus', in E. Stärk and G. Vogt-Spira (eds.), *Dramatische Wäldchen: Festschrift für Eckard Lefèvre zum 65 Geburtstag* (Hildesheim, 2000), 345–61) and is sometimes synonymous with 'speaking nonsense' or being mad (e.g. Ter. *Phorm.* 492; Montero 1993: esp. 115–19), but there is a degree of ambiguity about the term. The adjective qualifying *harioli*, *impudentes*, is negative which has suggested that the combination of *superstitiosi vates* with *impudentes harioli* may encompass all forms of divination, respectable and charlatan, 'scrupulous seers and impudent prophets' (A. Grilli, '*Superstitiosi vates*', in C. Stella and A. Valvo (eds.), *Studi in onore di Albino Garzetti* (Brescia, 1996), 227–30). In

the broader context of the Ennian lines both elements should be negative, and certainly that is the meaning intended by Quintus.

**skill-less** *Inertes*, literally and in its original sense (cf. Cic. *Fin.* 2. 115) ‘without art/skill’.

**or mad or ruled by need** i.e. their frenzy was not due to divine inspiration, but to madness, or was put on in order to fool clients. Cf. Accius’ *Astyanax* (265 D): ‘I give no credence to augurs who enrich the ears of others with words, to enrich their own homes with gold.’ These are similar to the *egertai* of whom Plato disapproved (*Rep.* 364b3; *Leg.* 909b).

**They don’t know the byway they themselves are on, but point out the highway to others** A wonderfully alliterative line which spits contempt and which may be proverbial (A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwortlichen Redensarten* (Leipzig, 1890), 370). Nothing in this or the previous line supports the notion of Pease that they are inappropriate to Quintus’ wider argument in that they deny the Stoic theory of inspiration. Even if in their original context the lines expressed a complete rejection of divination, as was appropriate to the dramatic situation in which Telamo speaks (probably rejecting advice from a specific diviner), they can be read as condemning only those seers who possessed neither genuine inspiration nor a command of technical divination.

**To the ones they promise riches, from them they ask a drachma** Although allegations of the venality of diviners are found in Attic tragedy (e.g. Soph. *OT* 388–9; Eur. *Bacch.* 255–7) there is no parallel for the particular point here. Hence Ennius may be addressing the Roman context of his own day (Jocelyn 1967: 398). The ironic contrast in the line is between the size of the riches prophesied and the meagreness of the reward sought (cf. Plaut. *Merc.* 777; *Pseud.* 808). Even lower prices could be quoted (cf. Juv. 6. 546–7; Max. Tyr. *Dial.* 13. 3).

**Ennius...holds that gods exist but that they “do not care what the human race does”** Marcus quotes the lines verbatim at 2. 104:

'I have always said and will say that the race of heavenly gods does exist, but I hold that they do not care what the human race does.' Ennius' Epicurean attitude here, echoing the first of Epicurus' *kuriai doxai*, is more likely his own importation than original in any form to the 5th or 4th-cent. *Telamon* which he is adapting.

**but...emptiness and trickery** Quintus restates the Stoic position on beneficent gods with which he began his defence (1. 10; cf. 1. 82). Divination approved by Quintus includes those forms carried out by skilled practitioners (of the highest social class) and incorporated within Rome's official religion.

<You have come> **admirably prepared indeed** The original ending is missing, but probably amounted to no more than the completion of this compliment to Quintus on his defence of the Stoic position and the formal taking of a walk (cf. 2. 8) before beginning the second part of the dialogue. The compliment seems almost formulaic for these dialogues (cf. *Leg.* 1. 63; *Rep.* 1. 34; *ND* 3. 2).

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