INCONSISTENCIES IN GREEK AND ROMAN RELIGION I

TER UNUS

ISIS, DIONYSOS, HERMES
THREE STUDIES IN HENOTHEISM

BY

H.S. VERSNEL



E.J. BRILL

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EDITED BY H.S. VERSNEL
IN CO-OPERATION WITH F.T. VAN STRATEN

VOLUME 6

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FOR ASTRID
the first instalment

Hebt goeden moedt, vreest geen tyrannen,
Hoe machtig dat sy zijn of sterck,
Ick salse doch als kaff uyt-wannen,
En doens' vergaen met al haer werck.

Tot u sal ick met vreugd in-treden,
Soo ghy lanckmoedelijck verwacht,
En tot mijn dienst bereyd u leden,
My lievende uyt aller kracht.

Dirk Rafaelsz. Camphuyzen

CONTENTS

PREFACE

This is the first part of what was originally planned as a single volume on a variety of inconsistencies in (the study of) ancient religion and society. As the manuscript grew and more and more additional themes announced themselves, it seemed preferable to impose a thematic and material division: the earlier chapters focussed on themes related to henotheism, the later ones on questions concerning myth and ritual. The disadvantage that each volume provides only one thread of a tangle of inconsistencies will, I hope, be counterbalanced by the advantage that readers interested in only one of the two major issues are not forced to buy (or carry) all that lumber.

My thanks go to the few friends and colleagues whom I had the nerve to bother with a request for criticism or who, while perusing parts of the work for reasons of personal interest, contributed various suggestions for improvement. On individual points or sections these contributions are credited in the relevant notes. Special thanks are due to Frits Naerebout, who literally deconstructed the first draft of the introduction and who, I fear, even after the numerous corrections and reconsiderations prompted by his acute and stimulating criticism, will still not like all its bold statements. He was also the one who convinced me that 'ambiguities' was too limited a concept to cover the entire range of issues broached in these two volumes. Thanks are also due to the inventor of the personal computer and to Herman Roozenbeek for his expert and good-humoured assistance when, time and again, I managed to misinterpret the inventor's intentions.

If *reading* books like the present does not make for an exhilarating experience, please imagine what it must mean to *write* one, especially if the writing requires the use of a language that is not one's own. It is like wading through mud, and I hated every moment of the disproportionate amount of time wasted on my peregrinations through the jungle of English idiom (curses on the good old grammar school). If the result is not entirely incomprehensible, this is chiefly due to the efforts of Peter Mason, who conscientiously checked and improved the English (meanwhile suggesting a number of corrections and additions as regards contents as well). The remaining mistakes are solely due to the author's indomitable tendency to go on (and on) inserting pieces of text even in the final stages of the printing process (and beyond). I am also indebted to the Faculty of

Arts of the University of Leiden for having granted a subsidy to cover part of the editing expenses.

Two visits to the Fondation Hardt—that classicist's haven where a week's work equals a month's work at home (even after deducting the time and efforts consumed by blessed Suzanne's more imaginative outings)—greatly fostered progress. Finally, I would like to join previous contributors to "Studies in Greek and Roman Religion" in expressing my gratitude to the editors for accepting this work in their series.

ABBREVIATIONS

Books and articles for which I use the name-date system are given in the bibliography. Other books (mainly works of reference) which I cite simply by (name and) abbreviated title are given here. For the abbreviations of periodical titles I have followed the conventions of *L'Année philologique* (I hope). Corpora of inscriptions are referred to as (e.g.) *I.Priene*; these works are either listed in J. J. E. Hondius, *Saxa Loquuntur* (Leiden 1939) and, currently, in *SEG* or form part of the series *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien*. (For a full list of the epigraphical corpora covering Asia Minor see: St. Mitchell, *CR* 37 [1987] 81-2). The exceptions are listed below.

Abh.	*Abhandlungen*
Adonis	*Adonis. Relazioni del colloquio in Roma 1981* (Rome 1984)
AE	*L'année épigraphique* (1888-)
AL	*Anthologia Latina*
ANET	J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton 1955², 3d ed. with supp. 1969)
ANRW	*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (ed. H. Temporini & W. Haase, Berlin 1972 -)
AP	*Anthologia Palatina*
ARV	J. D. Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vase Painters* (Oxford 1963²)
ARW	*Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*
L'association dionysiaque	*L'association dionysiaque dans les sociétés anciennes* (Paris-Rome 1986).
BE	*Bulletin épigraphique* (by J. & L. Robert, annually in *REG* until 1984, continued by a team of epigraphists, 1987- , cited by year and paragraph number)
BGU	*Griechische Urkunden aus den königlichen Museen zu Berlin* I-IV (1895-1912)
CAF	*Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (ed. Th. Kock, Leipzig 1880-88)
CH	*Corpus Hermeticum*

Chrestomathie	U. Wilcken & L. Mitteis, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig-Berlin 1912)
CIG	*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* I-IV (ed. A. Boeckh, Berlin 1828-77)
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (1863-)
CMRDM	E. N. Lane, *Corpus Monumentorum Religionis Dei Menis* I-IV (Leiden 1971-8)
EG	G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidibus conlecta* (Berlin 1848-59)
FAC	*Fragmenta Atticorum Comicorum* (ed. A. Meineke, Berlin 1839-57)
FGrHist	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin-Leiden 1923-58)
GB	J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* I-XIII (London 1911-36^3)
GGR	M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I-II (Munich 1967^3-1961^2)
GR	W. Burkert, *Greek Religion. Archaic and Classical* (Oxford 1985)
HWDA	H. Bächtold-Stäubli, *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens* (Berlin 1927-42)
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae* I-XIV (1873-)
IGPhilae	A. & É. Bernand, *Les inscriptions grecques [et latines] de Philae* (Paris 1969)
IGR	*Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes* I-IV (ed. R. Gagnat *et alii*, Paris 1911-27)
IGUR	*Inscriptiones Graecae Urbis Romae* I-III (ed. L. Moretti, Rome 1968-79).
ILS	*Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* I-III (ed. H. Dessau, Berlin 1892-1916).
Inscriptions métriques	É. Bernand, *Les inscriptions métriques de l'Égypte gréco-romaine* (Paris 1969)
ISE	*Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche* I-II (ed. L. Moretti, Florence 1967-75)
LEW	A. Walde & J. B. Hofmann, *Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1938-54^3)
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zürich 1981-)
LSAM	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris 1955)

LSCG	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris 1969)
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford 1940^2)
LSS	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques. Supplément* (Paris 1962)
MAMA	*Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua* I-VIII (London 1928-62).
OF	O. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin 1922)
OGIS	*Orientis Graecae Inscriptiones Selectae* I-II (ed. W. Dittenberger, Leipzig 1903-5)
OMS	L. Robert, *Opera Minora Selecta* I-IV (Amsterdam 1969), V (1989)
Perennitas	*Perennitas. Studi in onore di A. Brelich* (Rome 1980)
PGM	*Papyri Graecae Magicae. Die griechischen Zauberpapyri* I-II (edd. K. Preisendanz *et alii*, Stuttgart 1973-4^2)
PLM	*Poetae Latini Minores* (ed. A. Baehrens & F. Vollmer, Leipzig 1881-1930)
P.Michigan	*Michigan Papyri* (Ann Arbor 1931-)
P.Oxy	*The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (London 1898-)
PSI	*Papyri Societa Italiana* (1912-)
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* (ed. Th. Klauser *et alii*, Stuttgart 1950-)
RE	*Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaften* (ed. G. Wisowa, E. Kroll *et alii*, Stuttgart-Munich 1893-)
RML	*Ausführliches Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* (ed. W. H. Roscher *et alii*, Leipzig 1884-1937)
Sb	*Sitzungsberichte*
SB	F. Preisigke & F. Bilabel, *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Aegypten* (Berlin 1926)
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (ed. J. J. E. Hondius *et alii* 1923-71, continued by H. W. Pleket *et alii*, Amsterdam 1976-)
SIRIS	L. Vidman, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Religionis Isiacae et Sarapiacae* (Berlin 1969)
Syll.^{3}	*Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* I-IV (ed. W. Dittenberger *et alii*, Leipzig 1915-24^3).
TAM	*Tituli Asiae Minoris* (Vienna 1901-)

TGF	*Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (ed. A. Nauck, Leipzig 1889²; the fragments in the new edition by B. Snell, S. Radt *et alii* [Göttingen 1971-85] are indicated by the editors' names)
Tod	M. N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* I (Oxford 1946²), II (1948)
TWNT	*Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (ed. R. Kittel *et alii*, Stuttgart 1933-79)
UPZ	U. Wilcken, *Urkunden der Ptolemäerzeit* I-II (Berlin 1929-57)

INTRODUCTION

L'abîme est dans le nombre des idées.

P. Veyne

This book has an object and a subject. Its object is to elucidate basic inconsistencies and ambiguities in ancient history in general and in ancient religious mentality in particular, and to demonstrate their relevance for understanding history. This undertaking will have a sequel in the second volume on myth and ritual. The subject of the present volume is ancient henotheism: the tendency to direct one's affectionate devotion to one particular god, without, however, denying the existence of other gods or refusing them occasional or even regular cultic attention. Though a systematic collection and discussion of the complete material is a serious desideratum, this is not the aim of the present book. Rather, it focuses on a selection of central questions, starting from the conviction that an elucidation of tensions and paradoxes inherent in henotheism may constitute a stimulating introduction to one of the most important religious phenomena of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods. Accordingly, this preamble is divided into two sections. The first discusses the notion of inconsistency as a much neglected or even rejected, though important aspect of history. Since it is intended as an introduction to the two volumes and, I hope, some future studies as well, it has taken the lion's share.

The second part briefly introduces the notion of henotheism in general and the issues raised in this book in particular. In this respect the book must speak for itself. Readers with a special interest in henotheism but who lack a particular affinity with questions of inconsistency or ambiguity may start on p.35.

1. Inconsistency

In 1969 M. L. J. Abercrombie published a report of a course of experiments carried out with a group of medical students that was designed to show them the high degree of selectivity that we use in the simplest observations. The effects of the experiments were overwhelming. Ingrained assumptions and complacencies about the concept of 'normality' suddenly crumbled. Having discovered the arbitrariness of human perception, the confused guinea pigs found themselves faced with an entangling world of

ambiguity, a frightening abode. They reacted in alarm. "But you can't have all the world a jelly", one protested. "It is as though my world has been cracked open", said another. And these were by no means the most hostile reactions[1]. Obviously, Primo Levi was right when he stated: "the young above all demand clarity, a sharp cut; their experience of the world being meagre, they do not like ambiguity"[2]. And this is only a part of the truth. Mary Douglas, who refers to these experiments, adduces their inferences as another testimony to more general symptoms of aversion to ambiguities, anomalies and inconsistencies, in her case especially in non-Western cultures[3]. In her classic *Purity and Danger,* she argues that the primary function of classificatory systems is to provide stability, identity and confidence. Accordingly, a strongly conservative bias is built in these systems of labels, which directly influences our perception. For, as cognitive psychology teaches us and everybody ought to know by now, our impressions are schematically determined[4]. The mind needs procedures and rules in order to organize the stimuli which are forever bombarding the sense organs. These schemata not only enable people to make sense of the physical world, but they also provide the rules for directing actions and thoughts in the social world. Thus, in general, schemata "tell the perceiver what to look for"[5]. According to a well-known metaphor, the human mind is not a reflecting mirror, but a lamp that illuminates—and often overexposes—some facets, while leaving others in the dark[6]. In seeking to find what they look for, people are guided by schemata which ensure that they notice and receive information which confirms their original assumptions[7]. The determining agents in the construction of these schemata are culture and society. This is what social psychology teaches us and what Douglas consistently exploits. In her words (p. 49): "In perceiving we are building, taking some cues and rejecting others. The most acceptable cues are those which fit most easily into the pattern

[1] M. L. J. Abercrombie, *The Anatomy of Judgment; Concerning the Processes of Perception, Communication and Reasoning* (London 1960, Harmondsworth 1969[2], from which I quote p. 158).

[2] Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (Harmondsworth 1988) 23.

[3] Douglas 1970 [1st ed. 1966], esp. 49-53.

[4] See for instance: S. E. Taylor and J. Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in: D. Hamilton (ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior* (Hillsdale NJ 1981).

[5] Taylor and Crocker, *ibid.*, 90.

[6] A variant is a metaphor introduced by Popper: the mind is not a bucket in which sensory information ends up, but a self-activating searchlight.

[7] J. S. Bruner, On Perceptual Readiness, *Psychological Review* 64 (1957) 123-51; A. G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, *American Psychologist* 35 (1980) 603-18; M. Snyder, On the Self-perpetuating Nature of Stereotypes, in: D. Hamilton (ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behaviour* (Hillsdale N.J. 1981).

that is being built up. Ambiguous ones tend to be treated as if they harmonized with the rest of the pattern. Discordant ones tend to be rejected. If they are accepted the structure of assumptions has to be modified".

If, then, our perceptions are largely dictated by what we expect to be in agreement with the paradigms of our socio-cultural environment, anomalies and ambiguities, being violations of established categories, are at least experienced as irritating disturbances, and at worst they are terrifying infringements of the basic rules of culture and nature. Any given system of classification is bound to give rise to anomalies, and any given culture must confront events which seem to defy its assumptions. Reactions differ: one can ignore the anomalies—not just *pretend* but even actually *manage* not to perceive them. In that case the deviant signals are not allowed to pass through our cultural filter. Alternatively, if people cannot avoid noticing them, they can reject and condemn them. But it is also possible—and often inevitable—to negotiate adjustments. No classificatory system can ignore or deny obvious contradictions *ad infinitum* without impunity. Various mechanisms can then be utilised in the process of revision. Douglas mentions five provisions for dealing with ambiguous events: 1) Reducing or denying the ambiguity by a deliberate choice of either one of two contradictory options. For example, monstrous birth, since it defies the boundaries between humans and animals, is rendered harmless by defining the infant as an animal baby and treating it accordingly[8]. 2) Physical control of the anomaly: anomalous events are eliminated, for instance by killing or destroying the agent. 3) Exploiting the anomalous as a negative demonstration of how normal codes are supposed to be. A good example is the abomination of crawling things in *Leviticus*. 4) Tabooing the anomalous, by defining it as dangerous and untouchable. Attributing danger helps to enforce conformity[9].

The central thesis of Douglas' book is that ritual purity is one of the most powerful instruments in the defence of the boundaries of classification. The anomaly is experienced as dirt and filth, which must be eliminated or rendered harmless in one of the ways described. However, the fifth of her provisions, provides an alternative, more positive strategy. By ritually or, more generally, demonstratively playing out the anomalous, it is exploited to construct a unifying pattern in which good and bad, living and dead, are incorporated as opposite, but undenied and to some extent

[8] "A twin is not a person, he is a bird", say the Nuer: E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Customs and Beliefs Relating to Twins among the Nilotic Nuer, *Uganda Journal* 3 (1936) 230-8, as quoted by J. Z. Smith 1978, 280, who gives the overwhelming literature on the discussion.

[9] It is not clear where the precise difference lies between her approaches 3 and 4.

condoned elements of social and natural existence[10]. In sum, it appears that (non-Western) adults no less than (medical) adolescents display similarly unequivocal symptoms of uneasiness or aversion when confronted with anomalies or ambiguities. Nor is this all.

The reader will have noticed that in the above summary terms such as anomaly, ambiguity, inconsistency freely alternate as if they were synonyms. Douglas (p. 50) apologizes for this apparent confusion: "Strictly they are not synonymous: an anomaly is an element which does not fit in a given set or series; ambiguity is a character of statements capable of two interpretations. But reflection on examples shows that there is very little advantage in distinguishing between these two terms in their practical application. Treacle is neither liquid nor solid; it could be said to give an ambiguous sense-impression. We can also say that treacle is anomalous in the classification of liquids and solids, being neither one nor the other set." This, however, is hardly convincing as a general rule. If one accepts that all ambiguities can be ranged among the wider category of the anomalous, the reverse is certainly not true. For this reason I have selected the most comprehensive term available for general use in this book: 'inconsistency'. It embraces such (equally vague, but sometimes more restricted) notions as incompatibility, discrepancy, incongruity, lack of harmony, anomaly and ambiguity. As various different aspects crop up in the present book, the terminology may be adapted to each specific case under discussion.

The notion of inconsistency, this time under the label of 'dissonance', has enjoyed a particularly brilliant career in the study of cognitive psychology since the sixties. A few years before the publication of the studies by Abercrombie and Douglas a fundamental book had appeared: *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*[11] by L. Festinger. The book demonstrated that aversion to dissonance is a *universal* phenomenon. Though only mentioned in passing by Douglas, it is a revealing and deservedly influential study, since Festinger provides an extensive and illuminating discussion of the complete range of socio-psychological reactions to infringements of man's natural need for consistency in attitude, conviction and conduct[12].

[10] One of its manifestations has been brilliantly exploited by V. W. Turner in his discussions of the rites of liminality. This issue will be discussed in *Inconsistencies* II.

[11] (New York 1957 = 1962).

[12] I am aware of the fact that theories of 'balance' (F. Heider, Attitudes and Cognitive Organization, *Journal of Psychology* 21 [1946] 107-12), 'symmetry' (T. M. Newcomb, An Approach to the Study of Communication Acts, *Psychological Review* 60 [1953] 393-404; 'congruence' (Ch. Osgood, G. J. Suci, P. H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* [Urbana 1957]) and 'cognitive dissonance' have not remained without criticism. No theory ever does, certainly not a very successful one in the field of social psychology. One of the fundamental objections is that these theories start from an axiomatic (conditioned by Western cultural assumptions) view of man as compulsively striving after order and consistency. For one (characteristic) form of criticism I refer to Billig *et alii* 1988 (see below n.29 and my reaction). It is impossible to enter into this discussion here. I can only say that such reactions as "perhaps human beings *like* inconsistency or ambiguity" or "maybe dissonance is good for us" should be underpinned with better arguments than by references to jokes, riddles, ritual or literary ambiguity and the like. For here is precisely where dissonance is exploited and played out in order to make it explicit, tangible and controllable. This can be done because *these* are the very sections of communication where ambiguity's potential threats can be reduced, just as most of us prefer reading or seeing a thriller to being in one. On the other hand, reactions to cognitive dissonance have been and still are experimentally investigated with such decisive results that here, indeed, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. See for a survey of the ample applications of Festinger's theory: J. W. Brehm, A. H. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York 1962); A. Levy, *Psychologie sociale* (Paris 1965); W. J. McGuire, The Current Status of Cognitive Consistency Theories, in: M. Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in Attitude Theories and Measurement* (New York 1969) 401-21; R. Aronson, *The Social Animal* (New York 1972), and above all: R. A. Wicklund and J. W. Brehm, *Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance* (Hillsdale NJ 1976). Cf. also the literature on prejudice mentioned below.

Whenever an inconsistency is experienced, the resulting 'psychological discomfort' tends to effect a pressure to reduce or remove it. The power of this pressure is directly proportionate to the 'magnitude' of the dissonance. Minor dissonances may be experienced as bearable and can be accepted. Major inconsistencies, however, are so annoying that various strategies are launched to get rid of them. Most of them boil down to negotiating an adjustment of one of the contrasting elements[13].

As a rule, dissonance between *personal conduct* and *personal conviction* can be solved by adjusting either one of the components. The inconsistency that lies in the addiction to smoking and the consciousness of its dangers can be removed or reduced by either giving up the habit or reading a bunch of reports which expose previous negative verdicts as indecisive or at least premature. Of course, an appeal to far more alarming death rates in traffic or industrial casualties may come in handy too. The latter strategies amount to a selective recharge of one's cognitive supply. Another alternative, however, is to refuse systematically to take notice of any scientific information at all, and simply to close one's eyes to one of the two conflicting realities. This is perhaps the most common type of reaction,

[13] For a better understanding I here quote the short summary of the theory by Wicklund and Brehm *ibid.* 1976, 10: "Cognitive dissonance is a motivational state brought about when a person has cognitive elements that imply the opposite of each other. As a tension state, it may be said to persist until cognitive work lowers the relative number or importance of relevant cognitions discrepant with the elements that are most resistant to change. The cognitive work can consist of adding consonant cognitions, increasing the importance of consonant cognitions, subtracting dissonant cognitions and decreasing the importance of dissonant cognitions. The resistance-to-change concept is the hallmark of the theory, for without it the unique predictions of the theory would be impossible; it provides an organizing point for determining the magnitude of dissonance and how dissonance will most likely be reduced."

although, in the case of smoking, recent rules for advertisers assiduously attempt to suppress it[14].

But when it comes to dissonance between *personal attitude or conviction* and *general social codes*, realistic choices are rigorously reduced. Having no opportunity to effect any serious revision in public cultural values, deviant individuals see their options restricted to two alternatives: either revising their personal set of assumptions or behaviour—which means adaptation to the majority—, or withdrawing from the stronghold of 'common sense' as radically as possible and accompanied by as many sympathizers as possible. The appeal to 'social support' appears to be a recurring trait in the solution of dissonance.

These reactions to cognitive dissonance have been explored to advantage in the study of religious behaviour. For instance, they have shed new light on what are often incomprehensible reactions to failing prophecies from the viewpoint of the outsider[15]. When people are committed to a belief and a course of action, it appears that clear evidence to the contrary may simply result in deepened conviction and in increased proselytizing. This astonishing—because 'illogical'—pattern is brought about by a number of factors detailed in Festinger's book. There is a socially oriented reaction which consists of two, often supplementary, strategies: the dissonance is reduced by either 'exclusivity of grouping', i.e. by isolating the faithful from the dissenting and critical majority ('closing the ranks'), or by persuading more and more people that the system of belief is correct. Here quantity effects quality: social support proves that the group is right. Next to this there is a cognitively oriented reaction: the inconsistency is explained away by developing new hermeneutic systems. The best known instance can be found in the various divergent solutions to explain the so-called 'Parousieverzögerung' in the New Testament[16].

[14] Of course, it is also possible to retain the two conflicting cognitions and to accept conduct's negative consequences as the *price* of its advantages. This strategy is possible in dissonances between conviction and conduct, but as a rule cannot be applied in dissonances between personal and general assumptions, as we shall now see.

[15] For instance: L. Festinger, H. W. Riecken, and S. Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis 1956 = New York 1971); J. A. Hardyck and M. Braden, Prophecy fails again: A Report of a Failure to Replicate, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 65 (1962) 136-41; R. P. Carroll, *When Prophecy Failed: Reactions and Responses to Failure in the Old Testament Prophetic Tradition* (London 1979); T. Sanada, After Prophecy Fails, *Japon. Journ. Relig. Studies* 6 (1979) 217-37.

[16] See for instance: D. Flusser, Salvation Present and Future, *Numen* 16 (1969) 139-55; U. Wernik, Frustrated Beliefs and Early Christianity. A Psychological Enquiry into the Gospels of the New Testament, *Numen* 27 (1970) 96-130. The latter author provides a very interesting discussion of the various strategies that were invoked to solve or reduce the cognitive dissonance created by the death of Jesus: denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence, following R. T. Abelson, Models of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas, in: M. Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in Attitude Theories and Measurement* (New York 1969) 349-56.

Two types of reaction to cognitive dissonance deserve particular attention. In the first place, like Douglas, Festinger also mentions a 'positive' type of response. It is possible to acknowledge the incongruity and still retain the two dissonant elements by granting them a place in the cultural universe. By way of example he cites a study by Spiro.[17] The latter describes an Indian tribe from North-West America, who on the one hand believe that man is essentially good, but, on the other, cannot help noticing that, for some unfathomable reason, their children pass through a stage of extreme aggressiveness, hostility and destructiveness. The resulting dissonance might have been solved in several ways: by adjusting their view of human nature, for example, or by redefining their concept of goodness. However, they preferred a different solution. A third, additional, cognitive element was introduced, which safeguarded the two incongruous realities and nevertheless reconciled the dissonance: malicious ghosts can take possession of human beings and force them into doing 'bad' things.

The second interesting type of reaction—one of whose expressions we have already met—can be sought at the other end of the scale of mechanisms, since it is the diametrical opposite of the first one. This type, too, proliferates especially where two cognitive themes threaten to collide, and it amounts to completely ignoring one of the conflicting elements *or the contradiction itself*. Here, I feel, Festinger leaves us somewhat in the lurch. Though he does not ignore this variant, his focus is on different strategies. All the same, it is one of the most popular refuges, since in daily life people's proneness to having their views falsified is both considerably smaller and far more complicated than Popper would appreciate. Here again cognitive psychologists have done miracles in disclosing the well-nigh unlimited capabilities *and* eagerness of human beings to ward off contradictions *inter alia* by closing their eyes to data that are at variance with their assumptions[18]. A very common variant in situations when two 'realities' threaten to collide is the mechanism of winking at either side, just allowing a place on the retina to one reality at a time. This enables the subject to

[17] M. Spiro, Ghosts: An Anthropological Inquiry into Learning and Perception, *Journ. of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 48 (1953) 376-82.

[18] See the studies mentioned above n.12. Naturally, these tendencies can be documented most abundantly where needs for stereotyping are strongest. B. L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping Blacks, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 34 (1976) 590-8, for instance, demonstrates that those people who accept the stereotype that Blacks are aggressive are forever coming up with evidence to support their *idée fixe* and seem unable to notice any information which might disturb their belief. On the various mechanisms involved see: T. A. van Dijk, *Communicating Racism. Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk* (London 1987). Generally on similar mechanisms: D. J. Bem, An Experimental Analysis of Self-Persuasion, *Journ. of Experimental Social Psychology* 1 (1965) 199-218.

keep the two apart and thus to prevent collisions without abandoning one or the other. More often than not, reflective adaptations in the hermeneutic system are only a last refuge following a long period of peaceful slumber in the arms of paradox[19].

There is no need to say that it is again religion that offers the most striking instances. The faithful rarely take the initiative of reflecting on incongruities in the major religious assumptions on which they have been raised. When it appears that the *daps* offered to Iupiter Dapalis has *not* been consumed by the god—and this must have been the rule—no Roman farmer took this as an incentive to stop offering this modest meal. Snakes in general, and *elaphe longissima* in particular, do not like cakes. That is why they do not eat them. But this did not prevent the Athenian priests from regaling the guardian snake of the Acropolis with this fare. It was only when Themistocles found it expedient that the time had come to make people aware of the fact that the sacred animal had refused his meal and to draw appropriate conclusions. Everybody could see that the lightning of Zeus did strike his own or other deities' temples from time to time, which it was not supposed to do, and hardly ever hit criminals, which is what it should have done. But we have to wait for a Diagoras of Melos to reflect on the dissonance, to make it explicit *and* to take the consequences. In my quaint little country there was a religious explosion recently when a professor of theology publicly confessed that he no longer believed in the bodily resurrection of Christ[20]. All of a sudden a profusion of hermeneutic auxiliaries were activated in order to bridge the gap between natural law and New Testament expressions of belief. How unfathomable are the ways of our theological colleagues in their attempts to reconcile exegesis, hermeneutics, theology and natural law! Strategies for reconciling the dissonance between scholarly discourse and religious preaching could easily fill an interesting volume on cognitive dissonance. In the meantime, however, a schism is imminent, not unlike that of 1924, when another theological pronouncement divided the Dutch population in two camps: those who believe that snakes talk (at least under *very* favourable conditions) and those who do not. And *nothing* would have happened if the professors had kept their mouths shut or had done their job properly by giving a beautiful sermon on the message of Resurrection or Genesis 3. Of course, the dissonance would still have been there, but safely hidden somewhere in the shady quarters just below the level of critical consciousness.

[19] Then the dissonances are "situated just below the normal level of critical consciousness in men [.....] so that they could in principle have been aware of it but as a rule took it for granted", thus J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (New York 1971) 32.

[20] However, he appears to have been inspired by a British predecessor: David Jenkins.

Indeed, there is a fascination in exploring people's capability of *not* feeling embarrassed by obvious inconsistencies, such as when assumptions conflict with experience. "Do they still eat babies in New York or have they now learned to become more civilized like us?", the anthropologist Gary Gossen was asked by 'his tribe', the Chamulas in Southern Mexico[21]. Transport the ill-informed to New York and confront them with reality. Will they see their error? Most probably not, at least not if they are as reluctant to change their views as were the European *conquistadores* who, imbued with cannibalistic representations of 'the other', arrived in this part of the world five centuries ago and saw *their* worst Thyestian expectations confirmed by all kinds of evidence except the only really cogent one: actual practice of man-eating[22]. When it comes to the crunch, cannibals and other anti-cultural fauna like the Amazons generally prefer retirement to more remote regions of *terra incognita* rather than abandoning our imagination altogether[23].

The human *femur* is a strongly curved bone, Galen taught in the second century AD, basing his thesis on the observation of animal thighs. In the early sixteenth century the famous Paris anatomist Sylvius refused to be convinced of the contrary. When his pupil Vesalius finally dissected a human thigh and demonstrated *ad oculos* that the *femur* was dead straight, Sylvius sought refuge in the assumption that the tight trousers which were

[21] G. H. Gossen, *Chamulas in the World of the Sun: Time and Space in a Maya Oral Tradition* (Cambridge Mass. 1974) 29. I owe this reference to Gordon 1987, 71, who has some splendid remarks on the correlation between cultural and spatial distance and its alienating effects.

[22] See: P. Mason, Seduction from Afar. Europe's Inner Indians, *Anthropos* 82 (1987) 581-601. Cf. also various contributions to Chr. F. Feest (ed.), *Indians and Europe. An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays* (Aachen 1987), on various representations of 'otherness'. Although in a letter of 1493 to Luis de Santangel, Columbus wrote that *he had not found monstrous men in the islands*, contrary to what many believed, he made an exception of the islands of the Caribs, inhabited by savages who lived on human flesh. Moreover, in the same letter he mentions a region "where the people with tails are born". Various other monstrous races are there, too: men with one eye or with dog heads: P. Mason, Classical Ethnography and Its Influence on the European Perception of the Peoples of the New World (forthcoming). Besides being moulded in the image of cannibals, Indians were also portrayed in accordance with the European iconography of the witch: B. Bucher, *Icon and Conquest. A Structural Analysis of the Illustrations of de Bry's Great Voyages* (Chicago 1981 [= *La sauvage aux seins pendants*, Paris 1977]), as discussed by P. Mason, The Ethnography of the Old World Mind: Indians and Europe, *Anthropos* 84 (1989) 549-54.

[23] After all, the very first word in the long title of the prototypical 'ethnology' of American cannibals: *Warhaftige Historia und beschreibung eyner Landtschafft der wilden nacketen grimmigen Menschfresser Leuthen in der newenwelt America gelegen* (Marpurg uff Fastnacht! [my exclamation mark H.S.V.; see for its meaning: *Inconsistencies* II] 1557), means 'true', 'authentic'. No doubt about it!

the fashion in his day must have gradually straightened the human bones[24]. Later, however, Vesalius himself easily outstripped his master in seeing the non-existent or constructing an *anatomia imaginabilis*. "Praise the Lord", he wrote in the first edition of his *Fabrica* of 1543, when, contrary to all expectation—*i.e.* contrary to what Galen had taught—no visible apertures between the right and the left ventricles of the heart appeared to exist: "None of these small grooves (at least as far as I can see) penetrates from the right to the left ventricle so that we are compelled to admire the genius of the Master Builder of all things, by which the blood can penetrate from the right ventricle to the left one, *through gaps invisible to the eye*" (my italics H. S. V.)[25]. Indeed, as E. Meyerson, speaking of mathematical problems, once said: "nolenti non fit demonstratio". Other professors, Otto Heurnius and Adriaen van Valkenburg, did not even shrink from *making* the apertures where they ought to have been according to Galen[26]. Apparently, where there is a will there is a way (an expression which can also be reversed, as we shall see). This applies to other sections of anatomy as well: in bygone days anthropologists were convinced that the Trobrianders really had no idea about the biological role of the husband in the process of procreation. More recently, however, Leach and Spiro have clearly demonstrated that this is not a question of

[24] ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιόν! The story is only known to me through J. Boeke, Andreas Vesalius als hervormer der ontleedkunde, *Ned. Tijdschr. v. Geneeskunde* 59 (1915) 31-45, esp. 38. Despite all their efforts, Dr. F. G. Schlesinger and Dr. H. F. J. Horstmanshoff (to whom I owe this information) have not been able to confirm it from authentic sources. However, they have showered me with other instances of 'seeing the invisible' or 'resistance to change' in medical history, for which I would like to express my gratitude. Cf. the following note.

[25] A. Vesalius, *Fabrica* (1543) 589: *adeo sane ut rerum Opificis industriam mirari cogamur, qua per meatus visum fugientes ex dextro ventriculo in sinistrum sanguis refundat.* Translation: G. A. Lindeboom, *Andreas Vesalius and his opus magnum. A Biographical Sketch and an Introduction to the Fabrica* (Nieuwendijk 1975) 13. In *Andreas Vesalius, 1514-1564. Een schets van zijn leven en werken* (Haarlem 1964) 144, Lindeboom comments: "Vesalius is only beginning to see and at some, even important and clear, points, he did not see, simply because the image fell on the blind spot of his scientific mind's eye". The problem, of course, was that the new discovery was not consonant with Vesalius' ideas on the movements of the blood. Interestingly, he returns to the issue in the second edition of the *Fabrica* (1555). Now he writes: "I have not found any gaps in the septum between the two ventricles. Yet, these little channels have been described by anatomists who have decided that the blood flows from the right to the left ventricle. Personally, I have my strongest doubts as to the function of the heart in this respect". And he continues to criticise Galen's assumptions cautiously, though without drawing definite conclusions. *Honoris causa* I would like to point out that my compatriot J. H. van den Berg was the one who long ago opened my eyes to the 'metabletica' of historical perception (in a series of studies which were sometimes very fanciful and justly criticized). See for example his: *Metabletica, of leer der veranderingen* (Nijkerk 1956); *Het menselijk lichaam. Een metabletisch onderzoek* (Nijkerk 1959), in which he also refers to Vesalius (40 ff.).

[26] E. C. van Leersum, *Ned. Tijdschr. v. Geneeskunde* 59 (1915) 4-16, esp. 9.

not knowing, but one of not letting the incongruous truth spoil the rigorously matrilineal codes of Trobriand society[27].

It is vital to my argument to stress the universality of this particular type of response to dissonance, which is by no means restricted to the areas of religion or scholarship. Who does not recognize everyday experiences such as the following? A very nice person whom I have long known was deeply convinced that, no matter which sector of scholarly, artistic or generally cultural activity one takes, coloured people are always inferior to whites. The same person also happened to be a great admirer of the music of Duke Ellington and Louis Armstrong, whose performances he vainly attempted to imitate. For years he managed to keep the dissonance from his retina by a virtuoso winking process, i.e. by keeping the two conflicting convictions radically apart. It was only after I had plucked up the courage to point out the inconsistency that other, hermeneutic, auxiliaries were called in: exceptions prove the rule; perhaps *some* faculties of cultural life are equally distributed among the various races, etc.[28] And speaking of inconsistency: who does not recognize the dissonance concealed in being fond of a person and nonetheless heartily disliking one or more of his ideas and convictions? Revealing strategies for meeting these *everyday* dissonances are disclosed in a recent study: *Ideological Dilemmas*, which discusses dissonances that become manifest in intrinsically ambivalent situations of teaching-learning; expertise-equality; prejudice-tolerance; gender-individuality. For example, having illustrated how the language of prejudice and that of the avoidance of prejudice continually conflict, it

[27] E. R. Leach, Virgin Birth, *Proc. Royal Anthr. Instit.* 1966 (1967) 39-50; M. E. Spiro, Virgin Birth, Parthenogenesis, and Physiological Paternity, *Man* N.S. 3 (1968) 242-61. Long before, B. Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages* (New York 1929) 565-72, had discovered dramatic inconsistencies between social practice and cultural ideas and norms, especially in the realm of sexuality. Although his Trobriand informants contended that incest between brother and sister, being the supreme abomination, could not and did not exist, it appeared to occur in real life. Realizing that the informants had described their society as 'it ought to be' rather than as it really was, Malinowski concluded that the recognition of the importance of such contradictions is central to the appreciation of cultural complexity. Cf. also: F. G. Bailey, *Stratagems and Spoils* (New York 1969) 125 ff.

[28] 'Refencing' (accepting one or two exceptions to the general rule at your own [right] side of the fence) is one of these strategies. Here is another quoted from G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, Mass. 1954):
Mr.X: The trouble with Jews is that they only take care of their group.
Mr.Y: But the record of the Community Chest shows that they give more generously than non-Jews.
Mr.X: That shows that they are always trying to buy favor and intrude in Christian affairs. They think of nothing but money; that's why there are so many Jewish bankers.
Mr.Y: But a recent study shows that the percentage of Jews in banking is proportionally much smaller than the percentage of non-Jews.
Mr.X: That's just it. They don't go in for respectable business. They would rather run night-clubs.
Cf. also above n.18.

shows how, "with the aid of conjunctions such as 'but' or 'still' these opposing themes can coexist grammatically and dilemmatically within the same sentence". It also reveals how in one and the same person 'the sociologist' may employ a discourse of sympathy and 'the psychologist' a discourse of blame[29].

These common strategies of everyday life may be rather innocent, but it is no luxury to realise once in a while that identical mechanisms function in national or international political behaviour as well. In the last few decades, a wide interest in this issue has resulted in a profusion of revealing and perplexing studies[30]. We shall have to return to this when confronted with the 'language of politics'. For the moment I wish to emphasize one crucial inference to be drawn from this literature: perhaps the most dangerous error in assessing dissonance in political word and practice is to reduce it by the use of the label 'propaganda' or 'slogan'. The danger lies precisely in the fact that this is not the case, at least not necessarily or exclusively. At a level quite removed from that of deliberate propaganda, 'the image of the enemy' can be a product of perception in the minds of the passive participants no less than in those of the active participants in policy. This perception generally resists corrections in the light of experiences from 'real reality' and if confronted with inconsistency, it will resort to strategies of exactly the same kind as the ones recorded above. The result, then, may be that Kennedy's famous "I am a Berliner" assumes a sheer mythical polysemy, evoking meanings far beyond the one that the speaker may have intended, assuming that he intended anything at all. We shall encounter some instructive illustrations of the ambiguities that language may contribute to the complex of political discourse.

Let us summarise. Culture and society are categorical constructs. As a corollary, they cannot but provoke numerous and disquieting inconsistencies, anomalies, ambiguities and paradoxes—in short, all those complications which threaten to make the world a jelly. In his *The Rebirth of Anthropological Theory*[31], the anthropologist S. R. Barrett even defines contradiction as "the basis of social life". It appears that feelings of discomfort induced by dissonant disturbances of the cultural universe constitute a universal phenomenon and we have briefly sketched some prevailing strategies of escape. These strategies appear to be equally popular among such widely divergent categories as adolescents, adults—both Western and non-Western—, scholars, theologians, politicians and *idiotai*. Consequently, historians may be well advised to be on their guard for at least two pitfalls on their way towards interpretation: inconsistencies and reactions to inconsistencies in the sources *and* in the minds of the historians themselves. Since social life is essentially contradictory, and since, on the other hand, consistency is the desperately—but often unsuccessfully—aspired principle of social behaviour[32], Barrett rightly warns us that "the one-perspective man or woman, the anthropologist incapable of or unwilling to entertain alternative models of mankind, is an intellectual infant" (preface XIII). Historians, let us hope, are no less human than anthropologists, and are equally liable to fall victim to the fallacies of the human mind.

Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story: there is another category of inconsistencies that we come across in daily life which are no less discomforting. While those discussed so far concern the schemes and paradigms dictated by culture and society—the ways in which society *is thought*—, the ambiguities to be discussed now concern the prevalent form in which culture and society *are communicated*: language[33]. And once more we find ourselves in serious trouble.

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[29] M. Billig *et alii*, *Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking* (London etc. 1988). Though this is a lucid and illuminating study, it betrays a strange bias. The authors belong to the 'Loughborough Discourse and Rhetoric Group' and profess a firm belief in 'the thinking society'. Since society is full of contrary themes, people are faced with difficult decisions. "In fact, the existence of the contrary themes ensures that there is a need for thought" (3). However, it is no less true, as I have argued above, that a range of different, 'quiet' strategies is applied *before* themes present themselves so emphatically as contradictory that people are induced "to discuss and puzzle over their everyday life". The emphasis on *dilemmatic* discourse unjustifiably tends to ignore, indeed deny, the existence of what I would call 'pre-rhetoric' dilemmatic strategies. Accordingly, the authors' criticism of Festinger and related psychologists is obnoxiously one-sided and, to my mind, completely misses the mark. There is a more differentiated collection of interpretations in: Ch. Antaki (ed.), *Analysing Everyday Explanation* (London etc. 1988).

[30] For instance: K. N. Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Ann Arbor 1956); D. J. Finley (ed.), *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton 1970); *idem*, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton 1976); A. Ostermann and H. Nicklas, *Vorurteile und Feindbilder* (Munich 1976).

[31] (Toronto-London 1984). The quotation is the title of the second section of the book. Its three chapters, 'Contradictions in everyday life', 'Neutralizing mechanisms' and 'The illusion of simplicity', can be viewed as a manifesto and make for fascinating reading. For another attempt to give contradiction a central role in a general theory of social practice see: A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory* (Berkeley 1979) 131-64.

[32] C. J. Mower White, *Consistency in Cognitive Social Behaviour* (London 1982), argues that consistency, comparability, similarity and congruity are the principles by which social behaviour can best be explained.

[33] Of course, it is impossible to go into the debate on the relationship of language and thought here. Language is probably not only a form in which society is communicated but also an instrument with which it is thought. There is a good, concise survey of recent scholarly discussion in S. Glucksberg, Language and Thought, in: R. J. Sternberg and E. E. Smith (eds.), *The Psychology of Human Thought* (Cambridge 1988) 214-41, who concludes: "It may turn out that Watson was right after all—thought is speech—but it is the speech of the mind, not of the tongue, that matters." If I have separated the two categories rather drastically, this is for systematic reasons and because language adds a number of ambiguities proper to its specific nature. Skinner's ideas, as presented in the text, constitute an example of the amalgamation of language and thought, which, nonetheless, I found it expedient to subsume under the linguistic phenomena.

In the field of language—written or spoken—contradictions and inconsistencies appear to give rise to equally uniform feelings of repugnance. In a wide range of studies on semantics, political theory and the history of ideas, the phenomenon has been pointed out emphatically and in detail[34]. Readers, including professional readers such as scholars, says Quentin Skinner[35], suffer from 'the strain towards congruence', which is continually nourished by their belief in 'the myth of coherence'. The assumption that as a rule authors command stable, well-considered and consistent doctrines elicits obstinate attempts to ''gain coherent views of an author's system''. Consequently, ''any apparent barriers (...) constituted by any apparent contradictions which the given writer's work does seem to contain, cannot be real barriers, because they cannot really be contradictions''[36]. If, then, a text, a philosophical system or a historical report reveals an internal contradiction or an inconsistency somewhere, then an almost scholastic conviction that the antinomy must be 'solved', at whatever cost, seems to be the inevitable result. In contrast to this, Skinner pictures the process of thinking as an ''intolerable wrestle with words and their meanings''. Thus ''our attempts to synthesize our views may in consequence reveal conceptual disorder at least as much as coherent doctrines''.

Indeed, the reader's attitude seems generally to be determined by two equally irrational assumptions, namely 1) that the human mind is capable of and prepared to constantly produce consistent thought-sequences; and 2) that language is the perfect means of communication for expressing these thoughts adequately and unambiguously to others. As for the latter assumption, even the briefest glance at the linguistic literature[37] teaches

[34] A very good introduction to a range of relevant problems in the field of meaning, language and history is: T. F. Carney, *Content Analysis: A Technique for Systematic Inference from Communication* (London 1972). For the issue under discussion see ch. 4: 'Content Analysis and the 'New Look' in Psychology: Selective Perception and Models', where a link is made with the psychological discoveries discussed above. Generally, studies in 'content analysis' turn out to be very useful to what I am arguing here. See also: H. D. Lasswell *et alii*, *Language of Politics. Studies in Quantitative Semantics* (New York 1949). On more recent developments: Kl. Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology* (London 1980); K. E. Rosengren, *Advances in Content Analysis* (London 1981). Not every classicist was immediately convinced of its relevance. See the chilly discussion between H. Bloch and T. F. Carney in *JHS* 88 (1968) 136-8.

[35] Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, *H&T* 8 (1969) 3-53. For a fundamental discussion see: J. G. A. Pocock, The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Enquiry, in: P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics and Society* 2nd series (Oxford 1962) 182-202.

[36] Here, Skinner refers to W. Harrison, Texts in Political Theory, *Political Studies* 3 (1955) 28-44.

[37] J. G. Kooij, *Ambiguity in Natural Language* (Amsterdam-London 1971), esp. ch. 5: 'Ambiguity in the Lexikon: some Observations on Polysemy'; J. Lyons, *Semantics* I, II (Cambridge 1977); G. Leech, *Semantics* (Harmondsworth 1977); B. Th. Tervoort *et alii*, *Psycholinguistiek* (Utrecht 1975 = 1972); R. F. Terwilliger, *Meaning and Mind* (Oxford 1968).

us that human language is an extremely precarious means of communication. ''Their fight, our fight'', cheered a Red radical Dutch chief inspector during a protest march against the judicial treatment of members of the German *Rote Armee Fraktion* more than a decade ago. Alarmed patriots detected a call for armed terrorism, the natural meaning implicit in 'their fight'. However, 'our fight', so the chief inspector replied, could not possibly contain this meaning since he himself was a pacifist and opposed to any use of firearms. So 'fight' was not 'fight', after all, a surprising lesson which did not prevent him from taking advantage of the opportunity to retire early soon after. Here, non-linguists discovered 'live' what any introduction in polysemy could have taught them[38], namely, that one term can unite quite incompatible, sometimes even radically opposite implications, references and meanings, depending on the user, the situation and the associations they bear[39].

Revealing illustrations abound, particularly in the (ab)use made by political language of terms such as 'democracy', as documented by a wealth of studies on political vocabulary[40]. Perhaps the most maltreated term in this area of ambiguities is 'freedom'[41], with its dark opposite 'tyranny' as

[38] Of course, other lessons could be drawn from recent history. The first line of the German national anthem ''Deutschland, Deutschland über alles'' contains a relational polysemy similar to 'fight' in our example. It can be taken in an imperialistic sense (as many Germans and all their enemies understood it during the last World War) or as an expression of personal devotion: ''Germany is the one and only for me'', in the terms of the present book: *una et sola Germania*. See W. Dieckmann, *o.c.* (below n.46) 157.

[39] A splendid example from the world of children: around 1950 one of the questions in the entrance examination for Dutch secondary schools ran: ''what is a hero?'' Some 40% of the young candidates answered 'a coward, a weakling'. I well remember from my own youth that this was the primary—to many even the only—meaning of that word, which had its origin in the derisive use of the word for the enemies on the next street. I also happen to *know* why the 'real' meaning was not completely eradicated from my mind at the time: the existence of a series of much desired stamps featuring the portraits of naval heroes.

[40] For instance: I. de Sola Pool *et alii*, *Symbols of Democracy* (Stanford 1952); T. D. Weldon, *The Vocabulary of Politics* (Harmondsworth 1953, Baltimore 1960) chs. 1 and 2; H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven 1963[5]) 103 ff.; N. H. Hinton, *Political Semantics: A Case Study* (Hanover 1941). ''In politics and poker, ambiguity has its uses, and even its justifications'', and ''Words such as democracy, capitalism, nationalism, ... should never be employed without an *ad hoc* definition'': H. D. Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York-London 1970) 265.

[41] '''Freedom' is no less complex a concept than 'servitude' or 'bondage'; it is a concept which had no meaning and no existence for most of human history; it had to be invented finally, and that invention was possible only under very special conditions'': M. I. Finley, Between Slavery and Freedom, *CSSH* 6 (1963/4) 233 ff., esp. 236 f. = *idem*, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (New York 1981) 116 ff. In this connection J. von Ungern-Sternberg, in his review of Raaflaub 1985, *MH* 44 (1987) 294, writes: ''Das Gegenwärtige ist für uns leicht das Selbstverständliche. Das gilt insbesondere auch für die von uns verwendenten Begriffe. Selbst Historikern fällt es schwer sich das Gewordenseins ihrer Vorstellungen stets bewusst zu bleiben.''

second best, as Grimal demonstrated for Greco-Roman antiquity in a recent book[42], and as I shall argue in a more specific sense in the first chapter of this book. But 'meaning' is not so unambiguous either. After all, Ogden and Richards listed 23 meanings of 'meaning' in 1923[43]. ''Hence comes the great trouble we have in understanding each other, and the fact that we even lie to each other without wishing to: it is because we all use the same words without giving them the same meaning'', Durkheim already sighed in 1912[44]—and he was not even a linguist.

Besides the disquieting fact that one word can unite two or more widely divergent meanings, there is the no less discomforting experience that one and the same thing, event or person, can be denoted by two diametrically contrasting terms. Of course, this phenomenon is of a radically different, essentially extra-linguistic nature. It is just a matter of two different perspectives being worded accordingly: ''Every red-blooded radical knows that American libertarianism is really totalitarianism, and that American democracy is really tyranny, and that American freedom is really a species of slavery...'', says D. H. Fischer in a book which should be compulsory reading for every history undergraduate[45]. Newsreels have long accustomed us not to marvel at the fact that the terrorist shot today by the current regime is the freedom fighter buried tomorrow by his comrades. Whatever the precise nature of this specific type of dissonance, specialists in political language are right in warning us of the common error of assuming that phenomena and things that bear different names must be different[46].

[42] P. Grimal, *Les erreurs de la liberté* (Paris 1989). I saw this essay only after the completion of the present book. The main issues discussed in my first chapter—both as to period and theme—are of a different nature from the ones discussed by Grimal. More systematic, far better documented and with an equally open eye to the polysemy of the term 'freedom' is Raaflaub 1985. Although it focuses on the pre-hellenistic period, I have constantly consulted this study without always mentioning it.

[43] C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (London 1923, 1946[8]).

[44] E. Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris 1912). I quote from the English translation: *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London 1976[2]) 436. Here is how a linguist phrases the problem: ''Words (....) do not have 'meanings' in the sort of way that children have parents. They have *uses*, identifiable in particular places and periods'' (Carney *o.c.* [above n.34] 86).

[45] *O.c.* (above n.40), in the chapter on fallacies of semantical distortion, p. 266.

[46] W. Dieckmann, *Information oder Überredung. Zum Wortgebrauch der politischen Werbung in Deutschland seit der Französischen Revolution* (Marburg 1964) 166, lists a series of misconceptions in approaching political language, one of which is: ''Vorstellungen und Dinge, die verschiedene Namen haben, sind verschieden.'' He also warns against the general assumption that terms such as 'democracy', 'freedom' etc., should necessarily indicate the existence of a real 'thing' or 'idea', or, worse, 'an absolute idea' behind the façade of the vocabulary ('the illusion of the real essence': Weldon). Generally on these issues: *idem*, *Politische Sprache. Politische Kommunikation* (Heidelberg 1981). See also: F. L. Ford, *Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism* (Cambridge 1987), who provides an anthology of dissonant statements about political violence. Cf. the massive evidence collected in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* 5 bd (1972-84).

Small wonder that ambiguities proliferate, as is especially demonstrated in the linguistic study of polysemy, the multiple significance of words and phrases and of the mechanisms employed in everyday speech to restrict this multiplicity of meaning[47]. ''We are happy to be white'' is a statement which would cause a painful silence in many a social environment until it appears that it has been uttered by a number of teeth in a television commercial. This trite instance of ambiguity[48] helps to clarify that meaning is determined by context—both the situational-social and the textual one—. It is this context which makes it possible for the language user to filter out from the various possible meanings of polyvalent words or expressions all except the 'desired' ones[49]. On the other hand, there is some truth in the clearly exaggerated phrase: ''if a statement is considered in a fully open context (...), a man might mean by it anything that a man might mean by it''[50].

Consequently, 'close the context' is the motto[51], especially in historical research. In France, in particular, scholars have demanded the recognition of linguistic semantics for historical studies for decennia. Despite the influential and fertile applications of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre[52], it

[47] A. M. Zwicky and J. M. Sadock, Ambiguity Tests and how to fail them, in: M. J. Kimball (ed.), *Syntax and Semantics* 4 (New York-London 1975) 1-36; M. Garrett, Does Ambiguity complicate the Perception of Sentences? in: G. B. Flores d'Arcais and W. J. M. Levelt (eds.), *Advances in Psycholinguistics* (Amsterdam 1977).

[48] However, its implications are far from trivial: in the context of teeth, 'white' is the indication of a colour. Used as a distinctive marker of people, it suddenly acquires the referential value implied in what E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India*, said of the India he wrote about: '''white' has no more to do with colour than 'God save the King' has to do with god, and it is the height of impropriety to consider what it does connote''. See on this and related problems: R. Fowler, *Homo Religiosus: Sociological Problems in the Study of Religion* (London 1974) 10 ff.

[49] Kooij, 141. On the stimulus-filter-response theory: Terwilliger, 163 ff. On 'reference' and ambiguity: Lyons I, 177 ff., in the works mentioned above n.37. Cf. Carney, *o.c.* (above n.34) 105-7.

[50] J. Dunn, The Identity of the History of Ideas, *Philosophy* 43 (1968) 85-104, esp. 98. In his reaction, Ch. D. Tarlton, Historicity, Meaning and Revisionism in the Study of Political Thought, *H&T* 12 (1973) 307-28, rejects the contextual approach and ably but destructively prefigures the deconstructivism of the 80s.

[51] Fischer *o.c.* (above n.40) 263 ff.; J. G. A. Pocock, *o.c.* (above n.19) 3-41; Skinner, *o.c.* (above n.35) and *idem*, The Limits of Historical Explanation, *Philosophy* 41 (1966) 199-215; Dunn *o.c.* (above n.50), all of whom take 'meaning' as a basically 'relational' concept.

[52] M. Bloch, *La société féodale* (Paris 1939) is imbued with the idea that meaning is determined by historical context and change; L. Febvre, *Combats pour l'histoire* (Paris 1953) 219, demands co-operation with the linguistic semanticists, who ''en nous restituant l'histoire de mots particulièrement lourds de sens, écrivent du même coup des chapîtres précis d'histoire des idées''. Later on, more sophisticated approaches were formulated by

was only twenty years ago that A. Dupront, an advocate of the 'sémantique historique', still found it necessary to accuse historians in general of 'brutal, superficial, first-impression interpretations'[53]. Historians, 'morbid rationalists' that they are, too often tend to purge their material of 'the irrational, the disturbing, the extraordinary, the sublime, the marginal'[54]. Here we have a variant of Skinner's attack on 'the myth of coherence', and Dupront, too, demands that, in order to determine the value of a term or expression, especially if that term is politically loaded, it should be analysed in its relations to a double context: the text-immanent and the socio-cultural one[55].

However, linguistic complications are not restricted to the problems of polysemy. Another difficulty—rarely recognized by non-linguists—is that a great number of enunciations are not even intended to impart precise information. ''Truly informative linguistic usage is very rare'' says Tervoort[56], and there is a host of apparently 'normal' words or utterances, which, after a laborious treatment on the rack of scholarly analysis may feign to yield up a concrete and exact meaning, but which are likely to have possessed only the vaguest of senses in the minds of their original users. The most obvious category of this type: exclamations or acclamations, preeminently belongs to the field of 'social' or 'expressive' communication, not to the 'descriptive' one[57]. They do not normally carry a

Carney *o.c.* (above n.34) and especially in the interesting work of R. Robin, *Histoire et linguistique* (Paris 1973), esp. ch. 5 ff. Her attack on the dangers of the thematic approach in historical research is both baleful and provocative: ''C'est que la méthode thématique (...) traverse la structure linguistique du texte, sa matérialité propre qui est fait de mots choisis et combinés. De ce fait, sont négligés la structure syntaxique du texte, la lexique spécifique, le réseau sémantique qui se noue entre vocables. Sont éludés, de la même façon, le niveau propre du discours, sa structure, sa stratégie argumentielle, sa rhétorique, les mécanismes d'enonciation par lesquels le sujet parlant intervient dans le discours. Bref, les textes ne sont utilisés que pour leur contenu, avec ce postulat initial et implicite que le continu est univoque, que la simple lecture en rend compte dans sa plénitude''. Here we have in beautiful French one of those scientific prescripts which, in themselves, are legitimate enough but which cannot be fully responded to without giving the death blow to major sections of the historical craft. Compare the modish claims in religious science that *any* comparison of different religions or even of different stages of one religion should be suspended, since every (stage of) culture is a unique and incomparable unity. Sometimes substantially correct claims can have far more disastrous consequences than incorrect procedures. Significantly, elsewhere Robin points out the dangers that threaten a purely text-bound approach, referring to Foucault for productive alternatives.

[53] A. Dupront, Sémantique historique et histoire, *Cahiers de lexicologie* (1969) 15-25.

[54] ''l'irrationel, le panique, l'extraordinaire, le sublime, le marginal'': *idem*, L'histoire après Freud, *Revue de l'enseignement supérieur de l'histoire aujourd'hui*, 44/5 (1969) 48.

[55] In fact, he demands three modes of semantic compilation: 1) the vocabulary of the author; 2) the relationship of this vocabulary to that of the contemporaneous social environment; 3) the place of this vocabulary in the total verbal corpus of the vernacular.

[56] *O.c.* (above n.37) 122.

[57] Lyons *o.c.* (above n.37) 50 ff., who unites the social and expressive functions under the label 'interpersonal language', referring to the same functions that were labelled 'phatic communion' by B. Malinowski, The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages, Supplement I to: Ogden and Richards *o.c.* (above n.43).

precise and well-defined meaning. Another category is formed by terms such as 'freedom' or 'democracy', or the word 'fight' discussed above. They belong to those expressions of which it can be said that ''inherent in their meaning there is a certain vagueness of referential applicability''[58]. They unite informative and emotional meanings and especially where these two overlap the result can be confusing. According to Leech, to say: ''Liechtenstein's form of government is a democracy'' does not necessarily mean more than that the speaker is a supporter of Liechtenstein's form of government. Often belonging to 'the language of militancy' and sometimes exploited as substitutes for bodily aggression, they pre-eminently lend themselves for 'associative engineering'[59]. The acclamation εἷς, which will cheer up many a page of the present book, for instance, typically belongs to this area of social and expressive communication. Consequently, any attempt to detect a single *precise* or *general* meaning in this enigmatic three letter word will be in vain[60]. And, as we shall see in the third chapter, it is particularly this 'referential vagueness of applicability', as opposed to its apparently precise meaning—''one''—which renders the term unbearably ambiguous and, consequently, a ready butt of satirical wit.

One of the purposes of this impressionistic, unsystematic and highly inexpert hotch-potch was to sow the seed of discomfort and uneasiness. The historians appear to end up with an intricate set of complications. First, they find themselves confronted with a web of often interconnected socio-cultural and socio-linguistic inconsistencies which, each in its own manner, block the way to the clarity and transparency so fervently aspired and so ardently admired in scholarly research. Secondly, and worse, they must constantly beware of a motley variety of strategies to cope with inconsistency on two levels: the level of the historical sources (author/text), and that of the interpreters (the readers), at which they and their (even less sophisticated) colleagues operate. Even if historians show awareness of similar flaws in the written sources—but we shall see that this is exceptional—this by no means self-evidently entails a comparable insight

[58] Kooij *o.c.* (above n.37) 119; W. Wolski, *Schlechtbestimmtheit und Vagheit, Tendenzen und Perspektiven: methodologische Untersuchungen zur Semantik* (Tübingen 1980).

[59] Leech *o.c.* (above n.37) 56 f. and 66.

[60] This can even apply to circumstantial sets of 'information', as M. Beard, Writing and Ritual: A Study of Diversity and Expansion in the Arval Acta, *PBSR* 53 (1985) 114-62, revealingly demonstrates for some later texts in the *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, whose content-oriented cultic reference appears to have been almost completely replaced by the symbolic function of ritual demonstration.

into the flaws of their own perception. And human perception is continuously waylaid by the allied forces of cultural schemes and resistance to cognitive dissonance.

It is common knowledge that selectivity of perception often provokes widely diverging descriptions or assessments of the same events, developments or phenomena in daily life. Any collection of eye-witness testimonies after a traffic accident will bear out this banal truth. In the fields of artistic production, literary criticism or, generally, scholarly interpretation, individual selectivity is additionally influenced and in fact determined by authoritative collective paradigms. Here cultural schemes and linguistic ambiguities will often combine to interfere with objective observation and interpretation[61]. These pitfalls have been detected and analysed recently in many sectors of intellectual life. In connection with the role of stereotypes in pictorial art, for instance, E. H. Gombrich coined the phrase: "Where there is a way, there is a will"[62], and E. R. Curtius, Th. Kuhn and H. R. Jauss could have said just the same in connection with the role of *topoi* in literature, paradigms in the sciences and expectations in literary reception respectively[63]. Anthropologists are beginning to discover that the contradiction apparent in two diametrically different descriptions of one and the same culture should not *inevitably* be solved by discarding either one of them, as the notorious 'Samoa debate' shows[64].

[61] For a very interesting discussion of the interdependence of cultural experience and perception see: M. Cole and S. Scribner, *Culture and Thought: A Psychological Introduction* (New York etc. 1974) 61-97, ch. 4: Culture and Perception. There one finds many examples of the following type: a pygmy from the forest, who knows what cows are but who has never had the opportunity to see one from a great distance, is suddenly confronted with cows grazing some miles away; he decides that he must be looking at ants.

[62] E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation* (Princeton 1960[1]; 1969[3]) 26-8.

[63] As P. H. Schrijvers, De mens als toeschouwer. Een cultuurhistorische verkenning in de Latijnse literatuur, *Lampas* 13 (1980) 261-76, esp. 263, remarks. I also found the reference to Gombrich in this article.

[64] M. Mead, *Coming of Age at Samoa* (New York 1928) has been frontally attacked by D. Freeman, *Margareth Mead and Samoa. The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth* (Cambridge Mass. 1983). However, B. Shore, *Sala'ilua. A Samoan mystery* (New York 1982), and: Paradox Regained: Freeman's Margareth Mead and Samoa, *Amer. Anthr.* 85 (1983) 935-44, forcefully argues that the differences should not be seen as mutually exclusive discrepancies. I quote two of his statements since they perfectly express my own conviction: "Like a person, the social world is understood to possess many 'sides' and 'parts' and is to be understood in terms of its contexts. The whole is thus not reducible to any simple monad, for such a simplification of structure is a kind of death. Life is a process of elaboration; understanding life means both creating and grasping that complexity" (1982, 170). "What is wrong, in the end, with the kind of absolute, formal refutation that is the hallmark of Popperian science (...) is that it pretends that the 'facts' of human existence operate like some bloodless, mindless machine according to the strictest principles of Aristotelian noncontradiction." (1983, 943). P. Kloos, *Door het oog van de antropoloog. Botsende visies bij heronderzoek* (Muiderberg 1988), gives several examples of conflicting descriptions and interpretations which, in the end, prove to have their roots in the anthropologists' own cultural concepts and theoretical orientations. See also below p.184 on opposing assessments of the Hopi and Zuni religions. In fact, the urgency of re-study often seems to originate in a change of dominant social concepts: R. J. de Jongh, Tepoztlan en Staphorst. Een vergelijking van herstudies, *Sociologische Gids* 27 (1980) 520-47.

Uses and meanings of words and expressions are determined by social environment and are inculcated right from early childhood, as Bernstein in particular has demonstrated[65]. Bourdieu has devoted much of his work to tracing the deep and lasting marks of these and other mechanisms of cultural segregation. Scholars, no less than other language users, are governed by the assumptions, prejudices and biases of their cultural environment, and this is one reason why it may require considerable effort to convince them that the 'Oedipus complex', quite a casual *term* in their own culture, is perhaps less universal *as a concept* than Freud would have us believe[66]. If this is so, what then will be left of the 'universal' meanings of terms such as 'freedom', 'democracy', 'love', 'honour', 'adolescence'?

"I am a red parrot", says a South American Bororo; "I am the bride of Christ", says a Roman Catholic nun. Each of them will have serious problems in grasping the meaning of the other's statement. Nor are they alone in their bewilderment. The Bororo confession has generated a notorious and apparently endless discussion on the precise meaning of the identification with a parrot, *inter alia* featuring the argument that a Bororo cannot possibly *be* a parrot since "he does not try to *mate* with other parakeets". For anyone interested in the infinite niceties of argumentation, the brilliant discussion by J. Z. Smith[67] should be required reading.

[65] For instance : B. Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control* (London 1971) on the socializing functions of 'restrictive language'. Extremely interesting experiments on children's preference for one type of classification over another and its causes: J. S. Bruner, R. Olver, and P. Greenfield, *Studies in Cognitive Growth* (New York 1966): "school is teaching European habits of perceptual analysis." The interconnectedness of linguistic and social theories of schemes and perceptions is apparent in M. Douglas, *Natural Symbols. Explorations in Cosmology* (London 1970), which is a eulogy on Bernstein's work. Cf. also M. Douglas, *Implicit Meanings. Essays in Anthropology* (London 1975) 173-90.

[66] M. E. Spiro, *Oedipus in the Trobriands* (Chicago 1983). The crucial section "Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?" (pp. 144-80) also in: B. Kilborne & L. L. Langness (edd.), M. E. Spiro, *Culture and Human Nature* (Chicago-London 1987) 72-108. Even Greece, the cradle of Oedipus' hidden desires, must now renounce its claims: J.-P. Vernant, *Oedipe sans complexe*, in: Vernant et Vidal-Naquet 1972, 77-98. Interesting are the diametrically opposed views of P. L. Rudnytsky, *Freud and Oedipus* (Columbia U.P. 1987), an addict, and R. Eisner, *The Road to Daulis: Psychoanalysis, Psychology, and Classical Mythology* (Syracuse NY 1987), a sceptic, though a confused one. All this is not to say that the Oedipus legend as a literary theme is not spread far and wide: L. Edmunds, *Oedipus: The Ancient Legend and its Later Analogues* (Baltimore and London 1985).

[67] J. Z. Smith 1978, ch. 12 'I am a parrot (red)', with the 'mating parakeets' quoted on p. 267. Cf. *ibid.* 296-9, and the exemplary treatment of alternating denotations of one person: the *magus*, the miracle doer as *theios aner*, and the Son of God (190-207). On the implications of the 'Bride of Christ' confession *vel similia* ("I am saved by the blood of the Lamb") see: R. Fowler *o.c.* (above n.48).

Again it is especially in the study of religion that scholarly prejudice with respect to the limits of the imaginable tends to erect forbidding barriers on our way to understanding. "The situation of historians of religions often fails to permit an alien world of meaning to retain its integrity be cause the scholar's ultimate values are threatened", says J. S. Helfer[68]. And he mentions Otto, Van der Leeuw and Eliade among those scholars "whose conclusions are too clearly functions of what they assume to be limits of understanding; ultimacy situates scholarship and determines it." And there is little reason for assuming that minor scholars suffer from minor prejudices.

In the field of historical study, "researchers' expectations (or paradigms that influence them) may turn history into mythology of ideas", warns Q. Skinner in the work mentioned above. I have tried to show that here specific dangers loom up, dangers which, if recognised at all, generally tend to be repressed or suppressed. However, it may be objected, is it really so bad? Are historians—and let us restrict ourselves to ancient history—blind to ambiguities in their sources; do they indeed without exception rigorously impose their clear-cut rationalistic standards on the material and thus create ever new 'myths of coherence', as Dupront argued twenty years ago? Of course things are not as bad as that and it may be appropriate to interject a modest *Ehrenrettung* by quoting a random selection of perceptive observations recorded from the works of some of my favourites. M.I Finley[69] once wrote "It is another fallacy to which intellectuals are prone that a society cannot long survive if it contains contradictions and ambiguities in fundamental institutions". He illustrated this by a reference to a slave's sentence for theft in 1861, to which the judge from Alabama added the words: "Because they are rational *human beings*, they are capable of committing crimes; and, in reference to acts which are crimes, are regarded as *persons*. Because they are *slaves* they are incapable of performing civil acts; and in reference to all such they are *things*, not persons." Whereupon Finley commented "I leave it to those more qualified to uncover the logic in the proposition that my slave is a thing while he is filling my purse with the profits from their labour, a person when he steals my purse". F. Cumont[70] noted: "Besides, in paganism a dogma does not necessarily exclude its opposite dogma (....). The two sometimes persist side by side in one mind as different possibilities

[68] J. S. Helfer (ed.), *On Method in the History of Religions*, *H&T* Beiheft 8 (1968), 1-7.
[69] M. I. Finley, A Peculiar Constitution? *TLS* July 2 (1976) 821. Elsewhere, too, he displays revealing insights into the shifts in historical judgment, for instance in his *Democracy, Ancient and Modern* (London 1973) 10 ff., and we shall meet him again in the context of ambiguity.
[70] *Afterlife in Roman Paganism* (New Haven 1923) 2.

each of which is authorized by a respectable tradition". A.D. Nock[71] observed that "the history of religion is a history of feeling rather than of reason; so it is that people are but little troubled by inconsistencies between their beliefs and their instincts. It is not surprising that these inconsistencies are particularly marked in their attitudes to death", while K. Meuli[72] explains the simultaneous existence of different representations of death and the dead as follows: "Die Eigenart unseres Denkens macht es uns unmöglich, die Vorstellung unseres eigenen Nichtseins ernsthaft zu vollziehen". And R. MacMullen[73], after pondering the question: "What, for example, could Theodosius II possibly have in mind when he termed himself a *numen*?", concludes: "Generally in history, unlike the exact sciences, the better practice tolerates contradictions, simply by assigning them to different groups and individuals."

So we have here a mild antidepressant. However, unless I am very mistaken, these recognitions of historical inconsistency are rare exceptions in the study of 'normal' history[74]. Significantly, they are casual remarks: interjections rather than statements of principle. Among the five scholars just mentioned MacMullen is the only one who expands more consistently—and delightfully—on problems concerning inconsistency. Especially his recent works[75] on early Christianity are full of refreshing observations, for example on implicit polytheistic trends in a doctrinal monotheism.

However, there is one ancient historian who really is an exception and hence deserves special mention here: P. Veyne. He has fundamentally reflected on basic historical problems of ambiguity and inconsistency in

[71] A. D. Nock, *AJP* 55 (1934) 183. Cf. *idem*, 1972 I, 43 n.81, on the assumed differences between *Pax Augusta* and *Pax Augusti*: "In any case we must allow for much vagueness of thought on these matters; perhaps many who used these epithets had no clear-cut views of their precise meaning." Cf. also, *ibidem*, 549: "We must not look for consistency in men's religious actions, any more than in their secular conduct: norms of belief and facts of practice, words and deeds do not fit: nor do men mean all that they say, in reverence or irreverence, least of all men as nimble of wit and tongue as were many of the Greeks. Religion is not all or nothing, certainly not among them."
[72] Meuli 1975 I, 311 f.
[73] R. MacMullen, The Meaning of A.D. 312: The Difficulty of Converting the Empire, in: *The 17th International Byzantine Congress. Major Papers* (New York 1987) 5.
[74] After I had finished this introduction my colleague F. G. Naerebout drew my attention to D. Cohen, Law, Society and Homosexuality in Classical Athens, *P&P* 117 (1987) 3-21. Here we perceive a firm 'drive towards incoherence', for instance in his conclusion: "The widely differing attitudes and conflicting norms and practices which have been discussed above represent the disagreements, contradictions and anxieties which make up the patterned chaos of a complex culture. They should not be rationalized away. To make them over into a neatly coherent and internally consistent system would only serve to diminish our understanding of the 'many-hued' nature of Athenian homosexuality." I could not agree more.
[75] MacMullen 1983; 1984.

his more theoretical works[76], whose subtle intricacies, admittedly, make stiff demands on the lesser gifted. Also, and more important to me, he has paid much attention to the working of ambiguity in 'normal' history[77].

Let me single out one characteristic passage in a note of *Les Grecs ont ils cru à leurs mythes?*[78], where the plurality of coexisting modes of belief is called: ''un fait trop banal pour qu'il soit utile d'insister''. To Veyne it is equally trivial that people believe in two different truths simultaneously (''qu'on croit à la fois des vérités différentes sur le même objet''). And he provides revealing instances, for instance the observation that in one stage of their development children know (believe) at the same time that the presents are brought by Santa Claus and that they are given by their own parents. His conclusion from a long series of similar illustrations: ''Multiples sont donc les manières de croire ou, pour mieux dire, les régimes de vérité d'un même objet'', is the perfect summary of what I have tried to argue in this introduction and will try to exemplify especially in the first chapter of this book. It would make an ideal motto, too. However, as a motto for the present section I have selected an intrinsically ambiguous quotation from *Comment on écrit l'histoire*. In an open context, and even in the context of this introduction, ''a man might mean by it anything that a man might mean by it'', depending *inter alia* on one's assessment of the term 'abîme'. But whoever bothers to peruse Veyne's book will find another most compelling confirmation of what has been argued above: it is the context which determines the meaning, and in *this* context it appears to be radically and unexpectedly different from any meaning the isolated expression may have provoked. Here, then, a variant of the statement just quoted applies[79]: ''A word means whatever a writer did mean it to mean'', a statement, however, that will arouse the most vehement protests from another category of readers, as we shall see below.

The present book investigates various instances of inconsistency in 'normal' history, and more particularly in the history of religion, its sources and its students. We have seen that even major dissonances in religion, culture, and society, like the cultural assumptions and paradigms they defy, are commonly ''situated just below the normal level of critical consciousness in men of the author's era so that they could in

[76] Above all in: *Comment on écrit l'histoire* (Paris 1971), abbreviated and expanded with *Foucault révolutionne l'histoire* (Paris 1978); *L'inventaire des différences* (Paris 1976).

[77] For instance in Veyne 1976 and 1986, which will be amply exploited in the present book.

[78] (Paris 1983), 144 f. There is an English translation: *Did the Greeks believe in their Myths?* (Chicago 1988).

[79] E. A. Judge, *The Social Pattern of the Christian Groups in the First Century* (London 1960) 9.

principle have been aware of it but as a rule took it for granted''[80]. We have focused our attention on these situations of—often subconscious—dissonance and the strategies launched to control the inherent tensions. We shall see them in action in the first chapter. However, the phrase just quoted implicitly reminds us that there were other types of reaction as well: to make explicit, demonstrate, magnify, ritualize the anomalous. Sometimes it is society itself that plays out conflicts of inconsistency, for instance in rites of reversal and related theatrical inversions of social life. Various types of these collective procedures will be discussed in the second volume. However, individuals too may be tempted to point to the anomalous, whether they are fools or revolutionaries, prophets or dropouts, or, more commonly and far more subversively: authors, visual artists, philosophers.

Two literary genres in particular seem to have the natural mission of questioning, problematising and challenging society, of transgressing boundaries, tearing away the covers that hide inconsistency, and thus disclosing tensions and dissonances in religious, cultural and social life. These are tragedy and comedy, or more generally comical writing. To the historian of mentalities they have a twofold interest: they may reveal implicit contradictions of their times that would otherwise have gone unnoticed; and they show us one individual's struggle with the task of questioning, exploring, analysing, and finally communicating these questions to contemporaries, a great challenge to both. Answers or solutions are seldom offered: there *are* no answers, fortunately, because answers would mean the end of the art. The second chapter of this book discusses a tragic, the third a comic evocation of an incisive socio-religious ambiguity. Their treatment of inconsistency is a good deal more conventional than that of the first chapter, since in contradistinction to historical studies, literary criticism has long embraced ambiguity as one of its most productive devices[81]. However, to use a literary work as a historical source these days is to invite serious difficulties. Historians cannot allow themselves to ignore the current dispute on the central issue of the meaning of texts completely. I shall return to this in the following brief summary of what this book is about—and what it is not about.

[80] Pocock as quoted above n.19.

[81] *Honoris causa*: W. Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (London 1930[1]), which opened my eyes long ago. Just to illustrate the interest in different literary and linguistic aspects of ambiguity in classical philology I mention: W. B. Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1939); E. Heitsch, *Die Entdeckung der Homonymie* (*Abh. Mainz* 1972) 501-87, with the review by D. Fehling, *Gnomon* 1975, 703 ff.; H. Dörrie, Zum Problem der Ambivalenz in der antiken Literatur, *AuA* 16 (1970) 85-92; R. B. Edlow, *Galen on Language and Ambiguity. A Translation of Galen's De Captionibus (On Fallacies)* (Leiden 1977).

1) Many historians of my generation have been raised, as I was myself, on the conviction that we can—and must—explain historical events, motives, changes and developments in an unequivocal, consistent and preferably monolithic manner. You have only to look properly, take your time and collect *all* the facts available, and something must come forth. "Nachruhmen darf ich dem Werk, dass es so gut wie keine Hypothesen enthält, sondern Tatsachen zusammenstellt", was the proud boast made by von Harnack in the foreword to the fourth edition of his epochal *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums*. Although such an undiluted positivistic position is unlikely to be adopted by any historian of our time, the mottos added to the chapters of the present book suggest that at least some historians would feel more at ease with it than others. Doubtless the search for clear solutions to historical questions is the basic task of historical research. Questions of τίς, τί, ποῦ, πῶς, πότε, διατί[82] will always constitute the bulk of our books and periodicals, and that is as it should be. Nor would it be wise to propagate the fashionable slogan that 'meaning can only be found in the uncertainty of meaning', as I shall argue below. However, as soon as interpretation comes in—and this is *very* soon—strange things begin to happen. The first thistles will soon make their appearance only a few steps beyond the safe boundaries of the historian's settlement[83]—the stronghold defended by the allied forces of description, collection and classification. Suddenly, questions tend to resist the plain rules of the positivistic game and to discourage monolithic answers. A thorny tangle of inconsistency and ambiguity unfolds. Ecologists warn against rash and inconsiderate reclaiming and cultivating for fear of erosion and irretrievable loss of unsuspected natural resources. Likewise, it may be worthwhile to retain the anomalous, the marginal and the inconsistent, at any rate just long enough to assess their possible value. The result of elimination—for instance by too readily sacrificing one of the conflicting components of a dissonant complex in a historical source—may turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory.

Expressions of ambiguity and inconsistency find a particularly fertile soil in periods of political, cultural or religious transition. One of these was the early Hellenistic period. The first chapter will deal with one of the most crucial ambiguities of this period: that of cities and individuals who are at the same time free and subject. This bewildering dissonance has strikingly concordant expressions in the areas of politics and religion. In this chapter in particular I shall set out to find solutions to vexed questions by referring to the strategies for controlling ambiguity and inconsistency

[82] Hermogenes, *Rhet. Gr.* (Walz) IV p.354.

[83] Or "le jardin de l'heureux sommeil", as P. Veyne *L'inventaire des différences* (Paris 1976) 38, calls this historians' reservation.

mentioned earlier. This is also the context in which linguistic ambiguities play a dominant part. One of the unwritten rules of communication is that one cannot give two completely contradictory meanings to one word *in one text* and still expect to be understood. If and when violations of this and other rules of communication nevertheless do occur, the cause must generally not be sought in casual decisions of individual users of language but in sudden spasmodic changes in culture and society[84]. I shall argue that the coexistence of two diametrically opposed meanings of the term 'tyrant' in a single text is both a result and a signal of incisive changes in political, social and religious realities and mentalities. We shall also observe the fanatic attempts made by modern historians to deny, eliminate or at least smooth away the stark dissonances proper to this period.

It is not difficult to find other significant and meaningful complexes of inconsistency in ancient history and its interpretations. We might take, for instance, the archaic Greek struggle with theodicy—arbitrariness of fate versus divine will—and its range of different solutions, sometimes coexisting without reconciliation in a single piece of literature (for instance in Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*), or the bewildering divergence in the assessments of polytheistic systems in the views of J.-P. Vernant and W. Burkert[85]. Here one perceives profound differences[86], whose solution should probably not be sought in the radical discarding of either of the two. Or again, consider the dissonance in the representations of divine rulership, which, even after the excellent work of Price 1984, keep raising basic questions of a psychological nature, as few critics have failed to remark[87]. Here too theories of cognitive dissonance might be helpful, not

[84] Tervoort *o.c.* (above n.37) 98.

[85] J.-P. Vernant, *Religion grecque. Religions antiques* (Paris 1976) 15: "Considérons le polythéisme grec. La notion de dieu n'y fait pas référence à une personne singulière, ni même à un agent individualisé, deux catégories qui ne sont pas encore nettement dégagées. Un dieu est une puissance qui traduit une forme d'action, un type de pouvoir. Dans le cadre d'un panthéon, chacun de ces puissances se définit, non en elle-même, comme sujet isolé, mais par sa position relative dans l'ensemble des pouvoirs, par le système des rapports qui l'opposent et l'unissent aux autres puissances composant l'univers divin. La loi de cette société de l'au-delà, c'est la délimitation stricte des pouvoirs, leur équilibre hiérarchisé, ce qui exclut les catégories de la toute-puissance, de l'omniscience, du pouvoir infini". Burkert 1985, 119: "But a polytheistic world is nevertheless potentially chaotic, and not only for the outsider. The distinctive personality of a god is constituted and mediated by at least four different factors: the established local cult (...), the divine name (...), the myths told about the named being, and the iconography (....). All the same, this complex is easily dissolved, and this makes it impossible to write the history of any single god."

[86] Again it is P. Veyne, especially in his 1983 study, who discloses and analyses various forms of ambiguity concerning polytheistic representations.

[87] See especially: W. Liebeschuetz, *JRS* 75 (1985) 262-4; R. Mellor, *AJPh* 107 (1986) 296-8; R. M. Grant, *CPh* 82 (1987) 174-6.

least by the re-orientation of the questions they involve[88]. Or, finally, think of the problems Christians faced in adjusting pagan ideas and expressions to their new faith, and the sometimes unthinkable—but historical—manner in which they coped with them.

Patet mundus—I hope to devote other studies to these and related problems, to which the above considerations may serve as a preliminary introduction. The first chapter of this book is intended to provide an illustration of what *can* be done with this specific type of historical questions. As I could not think of a more appropriate, provocative or polysemic motto nor of a better guide in ambiguity than Jonathan Z. Smith, it bears a motto taken from his work.

2) However, it will be objected, what is so new in this? What about the 'école de Paris', of the 'Vernantiens', the 'Mousquetaires', as the big three—J.-P. Vernant, P. Vidal-Naquet, and M. Detienne—were called in a recent interview[89]? Here is a passage from this interview: "Les Vernantiens s'attachaient à relever les bizarreries, les paradoxes, les disfonctionnements, les aberrations, les ombres du tableau. Ils fouillaient la Grèce du chaos, de l'épouvante, de la guerre civile, de la tyrannie. Ces hommes autres, qui travaillaient sur l'altérité, parvenaient à troubler l'identité de la Grèce". Is not this the perfect response to the passionate claims phrased by Dupront in practically identical terms in 1969? Yes, it is. The members of the 'école de Paris', professedly structuralists without uncritical acceptance of the most extreme Lévi-Straussian extravagances, who introduced semiotic exercises long before this approach became all the rage, and who kept in touch with historical development and change in a way worthy of their own characterisation as 'psychologie historique', embrace ambiguity as one of the fundamental concepts of historical interpretation. There is practically no recent publication which does not feature the term or the notion[90]. Accordingly, the god Dionysos[91] has undergone a metamorphosis from which he emerged as a new deity: the god of ambiguity. For this reason, and because I have greatly benefitted from Vernant's Dionysiac and other studies, the second chapter of this book,

[88] I have made a preliminary attempt in: Geef de keizer wat des keizers is en Gode wat Gods is: een essay over een utopisch conflict, *Lampas* 21 (1988) 233-56.

[89] M. Alphant, *La libération* 13 april (1989) 15 ff.

[90] There is a useful survey of the work of the Paris school (and of a few other French scholars) in: P. Ellinger, Vingt ans de recherches sur les mythes dans la domaine de l'antiquité grecque, *REA* 86 (1984) 7-29. For the ambiguity in language see especially: M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris 1967, 1973[2]) ch. IV, L'ambiguïté de la parole (pp. 51-80).

[91] However, this versatile and ubiquitous god is performing remarkable epiphanies on the other side of the Atlantic too, and not solely in a structuralist environment, as we shall see in the second chapter.

on the central paradox in Euripides' *Bacchae*, bears a motto taken from a work by him, both εἷς καὶ πρῶτος and *unus pro omnibus*.

Yet it is precisely this chapter which also exemplarily shows the differences in focus and approach. A first, considerably shorter version appeared in Dutch in 1976, before any of the Paris studies on Dionysos had seen the light. I am happy to recognize the essential concordance in our general assessments of the pattern of ambiguities in Dionysiac religion. However, whereas Vernant and Detienne question the tragedy for its relevance to the nature of Dionysos and Bacchic religion, my aims are both more historically oriented and less ambitious. I wish to investigate the play's implicit (and sometimes explicit) references to veiled tensions of contemporary society. There is an essential difference between the quest for a structural ambiguity as a reflection of underlying, general and enduring characteristics of Greek culture, and the search for a topical dissonance as the expression of historical tensions. Moreover, and more importantly, one need not be an expert to recognize that the inconsistencies discussed in the above introduction are of a radically different type from most of the neat structuralist oppositions preferably exploited by the Paris school[92]. A lack of propensity towards abstraction, an inclination to eclecticism, a belief in the benefits of cross-cultural comparison and in the auxiliaries of the social and anthropological sciences (which will be more manifest in the second volume), added to fits of desolation when losing contact with solid antiquarian fact-finding, are some other features which distinguish the present writer from the structuralist approach. All the same, these differences by no means affect my admiration for or my indebtedness to the innovatory way of thinking history of the Paris school. Comparable results and concordances in interpretation may sometimes be attained by scholars starting from different points of departure and approaching along different paths. In fact, our paths will cross or coincide more than once. There are other, very different approaches to Greek and

[92] Although it is not so bad as Barrett *o.c.* (above n.31) 150, writes on the opposition between his own 'anthropological' picture and that of Lévi-Strauss: "That picture will not resemble the neat and tidy systems of opposition characteristic of Lévi-Straussian structuralism. Instead the emphasis will be on a world of 'cluttered contradictions', themselves at times messy, loosely integrated, ambiguously located, and devoid of ultimate rational design. If this view makes the philosophical hair of French rationalism stand on end and drives logicians zany, the only solace to be offered is that it moves us closer to the actual character of life itself." Cf. C. Geertz, *Works and Lives. The Anthropologist as Author* (Stanford 1988) 143, who speaks of the "Lévi-Straussian rage for order." *Pace* Henry Miller ("the insane have a terrific obsession for logic and order, as have the French"), the present author would adopt a confession made by P. Worsley, in: E. Leach, *The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism* (London etc. 1967,1976[2]) 141: "I have no desire to be cast in the role of a simple-minded {English} empiricist breaking a lance for God, Harry, and the Cult of the Fact against the dragon of Gallic systematics."

Roman religion and society besides the structuralist one. A more anthropologically oriented one will form the dominant framework of the second volume. For this reason I prefer to postpone the introduction to this specific approach and its most important representatives in the field of the history of ancient religion until then.

All this may come as a meagre comfort to at least one category of readers, if they have managed to persevere so far—those no-nonsense historians who deeply distrust everything that savours of fashionable theories, especially if they come from Paris[93]. There are no funny structuralist or otherwise sophisticated ambiguities in this book, but only simple, no-nonsense, down to earth, daily life inconsistencies which are the universal corollaries of cultural schemes and paradigms such as the ones that manifest themselves exemplarily in the works of no-nonsense historians.

3) When I tried out a very condensed version of the first chapter at Oxford in 1983, Dr. Chr. Sourvinou-Inwood told me that I should read Derrida in order to find out how right I was. After getting her to repeat the name, I went back to Holland, undertook some inquiries and started to read, but not for long, because I found myself up against the founding father of deconstructivism for the first time of my life and it was a frightening experience. For here we detect another abyss, the gap between the immediate and often rather primitive use of the (literary) text for historical interpretation, and the ones defended by very divergent hermeneutic schools which plead for—or at least entail—the relegation of author and intended reader and deny the text any historical meaning, since meaning,

[93] Recently, J. Linderski began his review of a very down to earth, if not earthy, book, *Faith, Hope and Worship. Aspects of Religious Mentality in the Ancient World*, as follows: "Faith, hope, and worship sounds sentimental enough, and the code words 'aspects' and 'mentality' arouse the worst suspicions in the skeptic who dreads a torrent of semi-profound banalities in the fashion of the Parisian gurus. The book is at times diffuse, but the alarm is premature". Then there follows a balanced and honest review. I find this ominous. The fact that the mere *title* of a book, in which, for that matter, the Paris trio is hardly if at all mentioned—and this is nothing to be proud of—, can provoke such frantic reactions, is a distressing sign of the present state of ancient historical research. An abyss appears to divide 'normal', middle of the road, no-nonsense historical *techne* from the 'funny', speculative history commonly associated with the more esoteric *thiasoi* proper to the Latin race. However, the other party keeps its end up, too. In a recent volume *Interpretations of Greek Mythology* (London-Sydney 1987), J. N. Bremmer has collected a bouquet of current research in Greek religion and mythology. Burkert, Buxton, Graf, Pellizer, Versnel, Calame, Parker, Sourvinou-Inwood, Henrichs and the editor himself do their utmost to be as recent as possible. It does come as a surprise, then, to read in a review by D. Sider, *CW* 82 (1988) 127: "the methodologies employed may generally be characterized as old-fashioned". And "the historical and philological arguments [are] of a sort that would have been familiar and pleasing to Frazer". The cause of this verdict is the fact that structuralist contributions do not dominate the scene this time. I find all this deeply regrettable.

they claim, originates through the active interpretation performed by any individual reader. The text offers an infinite play of meaning which varies with every 'lecture individuelle'. This time the reckless historian who sets out to discover the (or one of the possible) 'original' meaning(s) of a tragedy, as I shall try to do in the second section, or to analyse the intention of a piece of comic writing, as I propose to do in the third, *must* take sides, even if the expertise (and the space) are lacking for cogent argumentation. The 'infinite openness of the text', of course, may have its attractions, certainly for the literary critic[94]. Nor can the author of a book on inconsistencies deny a certain degree of relevance to 'the uncertain openness of language'. However, it is easy to see that if applied consistently and especially if applied monolithically, this hermeneutical approach can only flourish on the ashes of historical research[95]. After all the study of history, and especially the history of mentality, cannot live by bread alone: next to inscriptions and historiographical sources (insidiously literary, too, of course), literary texts are essential sources of information, and the historian ought to be very reluctant in sacrificing them on the altar of literary criticism.

[94] Not only for the literary critic, though. Postmodernism has spread its wings and is already visiting other sections of social and cultural life as well. M. Featherstone (ed.), *Postmodernism. A Theory, Culture and Society Special Issue* (London 1988), investigates the consequences of the 'postmodern condition', being "a world of ever-multiplying signifying processes, a hypertrophy of images, a dissolution of established categories and identities, and an ever-increasing scepticism towards claims of truth", in the fields of sociology, religion, aestheticism etc.

[95] In her review of Goldhill 1984 in *AC* 57 (1988) 333, M. Mund-Dopchie aptly quotes G. Mounin, *Les problèmes théoriques de la traduction* 7, on comparable problems posed to the translator by advanced linguistics : "Si l'on accepte les thèses courantes sur la structure des lexiques, des morphologies et des syntaxes, on aboutit à professer que la traduction devrait être impossible. Mais les traducteurs existent, ils produisent, on se sert utilement de leurs productions." Cf. my remarks on the practical impossibility of rigorously applying overdemanding principles in historical research above n.52. Another reviewer, M. R. Kitzinger, *AJPh* 107 (1986) 117, rightly complains that "we lose 'Aeschylus' to 'Derrida'." In an article 'Bafflement in Greek Tragedy', to appear in *Metis* 3 (1989), R. Buxton (to whom I am indebted for having communicated his manuscript to me) argues that in reality the methodological difference between the radicals and the traditionalists would seem to be by no means clear-cut: "the awareness that a text may simultaneously have more than one meaning is fundamental to the highly respectable notion of tragic irony". He provides a splendid example in his article. R. Koselleck and H.-G. Gadamer, *Hermeneutik und Historik. Abh. Heidelberg* (1987) 1-36, discuss some relevant problems. Generally on modern approaches to classical literature: S. Kresic (ed.), *Contemporary Literary Hermeneutics and Interpretation of Classical Texts* (Ottawa 1981); A. Benjamin, *Post-Structuralist Classics* (Warwick Studies in Philosophy and Literature 1988). I have not seen A. Cameron (ed.), *History as Text* (London 1989). Unfortunately, my colleague Naerebout just informs me that everybody seems to be one 'post' behind. He discovered that Hayden White, the 'spiritus rector' of the prestigious graduate History of Consciousness Program at the University of California, Santa Cruz, regards the "old paradigms of French deconstruction" as superseded and has moved on to Italian and German "post-post-structuralism" (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 27 [1 feb. 1989] N3f.).

Fortunately, this reservation appears to be gratifyingly concordant with the all but unanimous reactions to the first serious, dogmatic and merciless application of the deconstructivist wave to Greek literature: S. Goldhill's *Language, Sexuality, Narrative: The Oresteia* (Cambridge 1984), including, so it seems, his own. For his second book, *Reading Tragedy* (Cambridge 1986), turns out to be a balanced, relatively conventional and very useful book, with all sorts of references to contemporary audiences, expectations, social and cultural conventions, ideological motifs, etc. His statement: ''tragedy explores the problems inherent in the civic ideology'' (p.77)[96], may serve as a welcome excuse for the far less sophisticated approach to the literary sources that will be followed in this book. With reference to parts of the theory of reception as inaugurated by J. R. Jauss in his inaugural address: *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft* (Konstanzer Universitätsreden 1969²)[97], I principally regard the literary performance as an act of communication, a dialogue with the reader, which involves the task of analysing—if and as far as possible—the author's intention, the ways in which the author tries to guide the reading of the work, and above all the expectations of the audience. ''Tout tableau a deux auteurs, l'artiste et son siècle''[98]. This also implies that different audiences—in different times and different cultural situations—will attach different 'meanings' to a literary work according to their expectations, which are a function of their political, cultural and social schemes. In this perspective, both the philological and the historical interpretation depend on a broad reconstruction of the expectations and experience of the audience. It is this dialectical communication between author and audience which I set out to discover in the second and third chapters.

However, once having escaped Scylla, Charybdis has already come into view: the fundamental dilemma known under the label of ''the anthropological doubt''. On the one hand, it can be maintained that: ''La Grèce et Rome se présentent à nous avec un caractère absolument inimitable. Rien dans les temps modernes ne leur ressemble. Rien dans l'avenir ne pourra leur ressembler''[99]. Or: ''Rien n'est plus loin de nous que cette antique civilisation; elle est exotique, que dis je, elle est abolie''[100]. These statements almost inevitably lead to anthropological doubt: is it at all possible to understand or even to describe a foreign or ancient culture when

[96] Cf. his interesting—very 'Parisian'—article: The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology, *JHS* 107 (1987) 58-76.

[97] Especially his concept of 'Erwartungshorizont', pp. 173ff. Cf. R. C. Holub, *Reception Theory* (London-New York 1984); W. Barner, Neuphilologische Rezeptionsforschung und die Möglichkeiten der klassischen Philologie, *Poetica* 9 (1977) 499-521.

[98] P. Veyne *o.c.* (above n.83) 32.

[99] N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique* (Paris 1923 = 1864) 4.

[100] P. Veyne *o.c.* (above n.83) 13.

we have no other tools besides our own concepts and terminology?[101] Seen in this light, Cl. Geertz[102] is being *very* moderate when he states: ''Once one abandons uniformitarianism (.....) relativism is a genuine danger; but it can be warded off only by facing directly and fully the diversities of human culture (...) and embracing them within the body of one's concept of man, not by gliding past them with vague tautologies and forceless banalities''.

On the other hand, we have the alternative position as phrased, for instance, by Marguérite Yourcenar: ''L'homme moderne est bien moins différent qu'il ne le croit de l'homme du XIXe siècle, de l'homme du XVe siècle, de l'homme du Ier siècle avant Jésus-Christ, ou même de l'homme de l'âge de pierre. Nos besoins et nos instincts sont les mêmes''[103]. A banality no doubt, but is it without any force? At least it does take into account the absolute minimum precondition for historical and anthropological research, *viz.* ''that the most distant cultures, both in space and time, show behaviour that is, to a certain point, meaningful, and understand-

[101] The problem has become topical again in the light of a remarkable recent book *Tragic Ambiguity. Anthropology, Philosophy and Sophocles' Antigone* (Leiden 1987), in which Th. C. W. Oudemans and A. P. M. H. Lardinois argue for an unbridgeable gap between the modern Western 'separative cosmology', which has no room for ambiguities, and the ancient Greek 'interconnected cosmology'. These cosmologies, so the authors contend, are so essentially different that we shall never be able to really experience—let alone (re-) create—the Greek notion of the tragic. Tragedy is a corollary of ambiguity, and ambiguity is a corollary of the 'interconnected cosmology'. Although I am convinced by many of their fertile interpretations, I have serious doubts about some of their central theses. It is impossible here to go into this in any detail (I refer to Goldhill's review in *CR* 38 [1988] 396-7, which, though in my view too negative, strikes some very important critical notes). As to the issues broached in the present book the observation suffices that—on the level of daily life experience—mechanisms for coping with ambiguities seem to be universal phenomena, common to both 'separative and interconnected cosmologies'. Moroever, the authors draw a rather sharp dividing line between the purely 'interconnected cosmology' in the period from the archaic period to Attic tragedy, up to and including Sophocles, on the one hand, and the influence of the Sophists, Euripides and the fourth century philosophers, who have spoilt its integrity, on the other. Since all the issues that I discuss belong to the latter period, I feel more confidence in emphasising the common and universal strategies for coping with ambiguities. Repressing inconsistencies or making them explicit—by discussing, mediating, negotiating, demonstrating, ritualising—are both variants that flourished in Greek no less than in modern culture, as I hope to show.

[102] C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York 1973) 41. I owe this quotation to Oudemans and Lardinois 1987, 4-10, who provide an excellent discussion of the problem. For fundamental views on the background and the implications of the 'anthropological doubt' see: R. Horton & R. Finnegan, *Modes of Thought. Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies* (London 1973); B. R. Wilson, *Rationality* (Oxford 1970, 1974²); H. G. Kippenberg, Einleitung: Zur Kontroverse über das Verstehen fremden Denkens, in: H. G. Kippenberg & B. Luchesi (edd.), *Die Sozialwissenschaftliche Kontroverse über das Verstehen fremden Denkens* (Frankfurt 1978) 9-51.

[103] In an interview: P. de Rosbo, *Entretiens radiophoniques avec Marguérite Yourcenar* (Paris) 57.

able as human''[104]. I honestly confess that I do not see a workable alternative to the equally banal consequence as phrased by Dilthey: ''Interpretation would be impossible if expressions of life were completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them. It lies, therefore, between these two extremes''[105].

Of course, in the end there is only one last and desperate—though again very banal—chance of passing safely between Scylla and Charybdis: the unvarnished attempt to convince with the aid of honest means. The fact that they will never convince everybody, nor convince anybody completely, is both the doom and the stimulus of the historians. All the same, I hope that nobody will contest the view that 'honest means' should involve adducing evidence—and lots of evidence—at the very least. ''Wir müssen den Leser mit der Fülle des Materials zerschlagen'' (Meuli 1975, 1147) is the German variant of the English request for ''facts, facts, facts'' (A.D. Nock)[106]. This is one reason for the rather generous supply of footnotes in this book[107]. It is also the reason for placing the third and most positivistic chapter under the patronage of Louis Robert, as exemplary as he is without parallel.

I. Sevcenko[108] once drew the following distinction between two types of historians: ''the vivid historian or butterfly and the technical historian or caterpillar. The former believes that complete history is neither possible nor desirable. Selection is necessary, and proper selection distinguishes good historians from bad ones. Facts are unimportant in themselves but are used to find underlying principles. The latter puts a premium on the discovery of new facts, letting interpretation take care of itself''. Everybody, of course, recognizes the variant of the distinction between model-builders and positivists, deductionists and inductionists, conceptualists and narrativists[109], or as we have just seen, 'gurus' and real historians. I regret the intransigence implied by this antithesis and would rather wish that caterpillars become butterflies while carefully retaining their caterpillar qualities. However, *can* one person be a caterpillar

[104] As Oudemans and Lardinois 1987, 7, gladly concede.

[105] W. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Stuttgart 1958) 7: 255, as quoted by J. Z. Smith 1982, 135 n.2, and brilliantly exploited there and in his other works.

[106] Let us take it as Fortune's blessing that the eventual ineffectiveness of the accumulation of facts will come to light only in the second volume. This is not just because ''facts do not exist'' (Aron), nor because it appears only too often to be utterly impossible to draw firm lines dividing facts and fiction: J. Clifford, in: J. Clifford & G. E. Marcus (edd.), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley 1986) 1-26.

[107] Though never enough: S. Nimis, Fussnoten: das Fundament der Wissenschaft, *Arethusa* 17 (1984) 105-34.

[108] I. Sevcenko, Two Varieties of Historical Writing, *H&T* 8 (1969) 332-45.

[109] Although these days one cannot even trust one's narrativists any more, as is shown by the case of the rather butterfly-like caterpillar Carlo Ginzburg.

and a butterfly simultaneously? Here at last we discover what anthropologists are for, as one of them says: ''the Bororo may say 'we are red parrots' with the same right as the caterpillar says 'I am a butterfly'''[110]. So there is still hope.

2. Henotheism

The term 'henotheism' is a modern formation construed on the acclamation εἷς ὁ θεός, ''one is (the) god''[111]. This cheer can be found endlessly repeated in inscriptions, papyri, engraved in rings and amulets—preeminently, though by no means exclusively in the context of Sarapis—and in literary texts. Nor is it absent from Christian literature. As we shall have ample occasion to observe, the acclamation does not (necessarily) entail monotheistic notions (''there is no other god *except* this god''), although this connotation may creep in from time to time. It denotes a personal devotion to one god (''there is no other god *like* this god'') without involving rejection or neglect of other gods. For this reason Nock 1933 did not employ the term 'conversion' for this type of devotion, but coined the more hospitable term 'adhesion' instead.

The term 'henotheism' has never enjoyed an overwhelming degree of popularity. It can be found occasionally in publications from the twenties and thirties—especially under the influence of the famous collection by Peterson 1926—in the works of authors such as Weinreich and Nock. Generally, it seems to be more frequent in theological than in classical studies. Significantly, I have not been able to trace one book which carries the term in its title[112]. Of course, terms, especially if they are modern formations, are of minor importance, but in this particular case the importance of its denotations and connotations can hardly be overrated. They disclose a shift in religious attitudes of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods which, although *not* strictly monotheistic and not necessarily a *praeparatio* to the adoption of monotheism, are among the most striking of all antiquity. To be sure, the Mediterranean population did not *en masse* convert or adhere to henotheistic types of devotion, no more than it converted to the

[110] K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens* (Berlin 1894) 512. Admittedly, there are complications: ''at least, *though he assumes the characteristic form only after he is dead* (my italics H. S. V.) in this life he is to that animal what the caterpillar is to the butterfly'' (E. Durkheim—M. Mauss, *Primitive Classification* [1901-2, Chicago 1963] 6f.

[111] According to F. Stolz, *Grundzüge der Religionswissenschaft* (Göttingen 1988) 83, the term 'henotheismus' or 'kathenotheismus' was invented by Max Müller in order to indicate the momentaneous and selective adoration of one god as a result of a mystic experience. I owe this reference to Dr. J. N. Bremmer.

[112] The term does not occur in R. M. Grant, *Gods and the One God* (Philadelphia 1986), a popularizing but solid book. If I am right, the concept of 'henotheism' is not even discussed there.

'Oriental religions', as MacMullen in particular has rightly stressed in his recent works. On the contrary, henotheism seems to have remained a somewhat sectarian phenomenon of an essentially competitive nature. However, this did not prevent many of its features from permeating established types of religion as well. As such it is certainly one of the most characteristic hallmarks of what Veyne 1986 calls "le second paganisme" of the second and third centuries AD[113]. Various features, however, can be perceived long before this period.

In principle there are two ways to substantiate such a thesis. One is to write a systematic study of the development of 'henotheism', a new synthesis of the issues broached long ago by Peterson 1926 on the one hand, and Nock 1933 on the other, while systematically plundering the treasure houses of O. Weinreich, L. Robert, R. MacMullen and others. On the other hand, the person who—either by nature or by the annual influx of some two hundred undergraduates who wish to be informed about the niceties of the relationship between Caesar and Cleopatra—is prevented from undertaking this ambitious task, has another option: that of selecting a number of characteristic issues, concentrating on what seem to be symptomatic problems, rather than striving for completeness. That is what I have chosen to do in this book, which is organized as a triptych.

The first chapter[114] presents a first introduction to the most important phenomena proper to henotheistic forms of adoration. It analyses the tragic implications of the henotheistic option: the 'one' god gives salvation and liberates humanity from the bonds of worldly or cosmic despots, but the price is the highest imaginable: total surrender to the liberator *alias* the new despot. This distressing facet of *la condition humaine* appears to occur simultaneously and with remarkable congruence in the worlds of politics and of religion in the Hellenistic period. The second chapter[115] focuses on what I hope to demonstrate as the first henotheistic experiment in Greek history and literature: the *Bacchae* of Euripides, in which the dramatist stages the insoluble paradox between the totalitarian demands

[113] This implies that I cannot accept the most excessive of the conclusions which Lane Fox 1986 draws from his rich and impressive description of the religious culture of Greek Asia Minor in the first centuries AD. Though fully open to the continuity in the city cults so convincingly demonstrated in his admirable book, I feel that his ample material on 'seeing' and 'hearing' the gods—supplemented with the thousands of (votive) inscriptions of the *iussu* type from different parts of the Roman Empire—points to a major change in religious experience. This by no means implies that we should re-embrace Dodds' notion of 'the Age of Anxiety', rightly contested by Lane Fox.

[114] Its contents were the subject of my inaugural address *De tyrannie verdrijven?* (1978), which was privately published in a limited edition.

[115] This is a much elaborated and considerably extended version of an article which appeared in Dutch as: Pentheus en Dionysos. Religieuze achtergronden en perspectieven, *Lampas* 9 (1976) 8-41.

of one tyrannical god and the no less totalitarian claims of society. Reflecting certain tensions in contemporary Athens, it exposes both the convert and the recalcitrant as being guilty of the very same crime: *asebeia*. I shall also argue that Euripides' Dionysos is the first Greek god to be portrayed with the full set of paraphernalia of the great gods of Hellenistic henotheism. The third chapter[116] takes us to the early imperial period and illuminates the impossible consequences, indeed the absurdity, of henotheistic praise if applied—as it sometimes was—to a human being, in this case a gladiator.

Apart from the issue of henotheism, the three studies are connected by the conviction that religion is essentially an expression of culture and that it mirrors the social mentality of its times, albeit in a way that is never very plain or direct, and often extremely complex and veiled. For instance, one can hardly avoid the impression that the concurrence of the growth of henotheism on the one hand, and the development of hierarchical lines in the social setting of the *polis* and of monarchical forms of rulership in the political setting of the Hellenistic empires on the other, are more than sheer chronological coincidences. However, even the most superficial hint in this direction requires a double substantiation by evidence from the politico-social and the religious sectors. This is the second reason for adding circumstantial evidence in the footnotes.

The Musée d'Orsay in Paris exhibits a painted wood relief by G. Lacombe (1893-4) called 'Isis'. It is one of the most gruesome sculptures I have ever seen. The naked, very witchlike goddess is portrayed as *Isis lactans*. Two streams pour forth from her breasts. But they are streams of blood, not of milk. This is a shocking way of expressing the central ambiguity of henotheism. But there are more deferential expressions too. One of them can be found in the two stanzas which serve as a motto to this book. They have been taken from the 'May-liedt' by the Dutch poet Dirk Rafaelsz. Camphuyzen (1586-1627). They conceal the very same ambiguity, this time, however, expressed by a believer, not by a sceptic[117]. Here is a prosaic translation of these lines in which Jesus Christ addresses his bride, the church in persecution:

[116] This is the only chapter of which an earlier, again considerably different and more modest, version has appeared in English: A Parody on Hymns in Martial V, 24 and Some Trinitarian Problems, *Mnemosyne* 27 (1974) 365-405.

[117] The Netherlands seem to have a certain preference for the ambivalence expressed here. Two of our foremost modern writers phrase it as follows (*NRC* 13.12.1985): "Freedom: the truth, of course, is that one steps from one slavery into the other. The only happiness to be found in this world is happiness in slavery. Happiness in freedom does not exist. Freedom does not exist either" (W. F. Hermans); "Man needs freedom in order to make the trip from the domicile of the former master to that of the next. Freedom is only a means to get into new subjection". (G. van het Reve).

Be of good courage, fear no tyrants,
However powerful or strong,
For like chaff I'll winnow them
Destroy their persons and their works.

But I shall come to you with joy
If you will reverently await Me
and readily accept My service
and love Me with all your force.

ISIS, UNA QUAE ES OMNIA

TYRANTS AGAINST TYRANNY: ISIS AS A PARADIGM OF HELLENISTIC RULERSHIP

The historian's task is to complicate, not to clarify.

J. Z. Smith

1. I AM ISIS

The triumphal march of the goddess Isis through the Mediterranean world began in the early stages of the Hellenistic period[1]. The expansion

[1] The literature now definitely overflows the banks, not always equally fertilizing the fields. See the invaluable survey by J. Leclant et G. Clerc, *Inventaire bibliographique des Isiaca. Répertoire analytique des travaux relatifs à la diffusion des cultes isiaques 1940-1969* I-III (Leiden 1972-1985) for authors' names beginning with A-Q. More recent titles in B. Metzger, A Classified Bibliography of the Graeco-Roman Mystery Religions 1924-73, with a supplement 1974-77, *ANRW* II,17,3 (1984) 1259-423, esp. 1329-48; 1409-13. There are several good short surveys and discussions. I single out: F. Dunand, Cultes égyptiens hors d'Égypte. Essai d'analyse des conditions de leur diffusion, in: *Religions, pouvoirs, rapports sociaux. Ann. Litt. Univ. Besançon. Centre rech. hist. anc.* 32 (1980) 69-148; L. Vidman, Isis und Sarapis, in: M. J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Die orientalischen Religionen im Römerreich* (Leiden 1981) 121-56; M. Malaise, La diffusion des cultes égyptiens dans les provinces européennes de l'empire romain, *ANRW* II,17,3 (1984) 1615-91; Turcan 1989, 77-127. Some of the most important monographs are: G. Vandebeek, *De interpretatio graeca van de Isisfiguur* (Leuven 1946); P. F. Tschudin, *Isis in Rom. Die Wirkung der ptolemäischen Kulte auf Rom bis zur frühen Kaiserzeit* (Diss. Basel 1963); L. Vidman, *Isis und Sarapis bei den Griechen und Römern. Epigrafische Untersuchungen zur Verbreitung und zu den Trägern des ägyptischen Kultes* (Berlin 1970); R. E. Witt, *Isis in the Graeco-Roman World* (London 1971); F. Solmsen, *Isis among the Greeks and Romans* (Harvard UP 1980). On the diffusion of the cult see: M. Malaise, *Les conditions de pénétration et de diffusion des cultes égyptiens en Italie* (Leiden 1972); E. Dunand, *Le culte d'Isis dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée* I-III (Leiden 1973). Especially in Greece: S. Dow, The Egyptian Cults in Athens, *HThR* 30 (1937) 183-232. R. R. Simms, Isis in Classical Athens, *CJ* 84 (1989) 216-21. On the date of her introduction in Athens see below p. 102 n.22. A significant testimony of the impact of the goddess in Greece may be seen in the fact that Eleusinian priests bore theophoric names with the element Isis: D. Placido, Isis, la oligarquía ateniense y las tradiçiones áticas, *MHA* 5 (1981) 249-52. Under the Flavians and Antonines the Sarapis propaganda had a firm *pied à terre* at the emperor's court: L. Cracco Ruggini, L'imperatore, il Serapeo e i filosofi, *CISA* 7 (1981) 183-212. For Egypt itself see: Zaki Aly, The Popularity of the Sarapis Cult as Depicted in Letters with Proskynema-Formulae, *EPap* 9 (1971) 165-219, esp. 205-18. On the social strata of the adepts: F. Bömer, Isis und Sarapis in der Welt der Sklaven. Eine Nachlese, *Gymnasium* 96 (1989) 97-109. "Der Kult war nie ein ausgesprochener Kult der Sklaven" (p.103).

of her cult, due to a great variety of factors, was considerably enhanced by the missionary zeal of her priests, who, moreover, tended to carry on the Egyptian tradition of hereditary succession. Add to this the nature of a goddess who counted procreation and childbirth among her major concerns, and we begin to descry at least one of the causes of her overwhelming success[2]. Nor did the goddess keep aloof when it came to more practical issues: she often interfered personally when one of her priests or devotees conceived the idea of founding a sanctuary or temple. Then the goddess might send a dream or even write a letter containing her instructions and the human addressee would relate his dream or 'discover' the instructions after awaking and carry out the divine orders[3]. Thus many sanctuaries were—or were said to have been—founded, not infrequently after fierce conflicts with the local authorities or population[4].

[2] A combination of 'mission' and heredity in the Sarapis aretalogy of Delos: Engelmann 1975, esp. 11 ff. (the text also in Totti 1985 no. 11). On heredity: Vidman 1970, index s.v. 'Priester, erbliche'. Isis' concern with procreation etc. is illustrated by numerous votive texts. Cf. her epithet *Lochia*: J. M. R. Cormack, *BSA* 41 (1940-3) [1946] 105f. = *SEG* 12, 316; cf. *BE* 1946/7, 136 and *SIRIS* 107. Further E. Dunand, Une *interpretatio romana* d'Isis: Isis déesse des naissances, *REL* 40 (1962) 83-6; V. Tran Tam Tinh et Y. Labrecque, *Isis lactans* (Leiden 1973); S. K. Heyob, *The Cult of Isis among Women in the Graeco-Roman World* (Leiden 1975). *Euteknia* was considered to be a token of divine benevolence, of which priests in particular boasted: Cumont 1937, 119 and 184. On the relationship of man and woman in the Isis aretalogies: Veligiani-Terri 1986, who rightly denies Isis the nature of a women's goddess.

[3] The most instructive instances belong to the Sarapis cult, but also in this respect Isis and Sarapis are closely related. On the famous miracle of Sarapis at Thessalonike (*IG* X,2,1, no. 255, Totti 1985 no. 14 [1st c. AD]) see: R. Merkelbach, Zwei Texte aus dem Sarapeium zu Thessalonike, *ZPE* 10 (1973) 49-54: "Den nötigen Brief wird ihm ein Sarapispriester geschrieben haben." (54) Although not always necessary, in this case I think this is correct. See for similar cases: Merkelbach, *o.c.* and W. Speyer, *Bücherfunde in der Glaubenswertung in der Antike* (Göttingen 1970) 17 with n.4, and 32-9. Cf. F. Sokolowski, Propagation of the Cult of Sarapis and Isis in Greece, *GRBS* 15 (1974) 441-8. As is evident from Apuleius *Metam.* 11,6 and 11,22, the appearance of one and the same dream to two persons, *in casu* the candidate for initiation and the priest, has the function of indubitably asserting the divine order. In this way Reitzenstein 1927, 208, explains why the *katochoi* of Memphis used to write down their dreams: if the same dream had occurred to the priest, the command was considered to be divine. Note that also in a different sphere orders to organise a *taurobolium* alternated between *iussu Matris deum* (*ILS* 4132) and *ex vaticinatione archigalli* (*ILS* 4185): Veyne 1986, 270 n.57. The divine orders often had to be repeated several, most frequently three, times. On the consequences of not immediately—or not at all—complying with divine commands: Festugière 1954, 79 f. and below p.201 ff.

[4] Generally: Nock 1933, 49 ff.; Delos, see above n.2; Magnesia: *I.Magnesia* 99 = *Syll.*[3] 554 = *SIRIS* 294; at Ephesos: *I.Ephesos* IV, 1246; Syria: *IGLSyr* 1261; Histria: D. M. Pippidi, *StudClas* 6 (1964) 108-18. Libanius 11, 114, still maintained that Isis had come to Antiochia after a dream instruction to Seleucus II. See: F. W. Norris, Isis, Sarapis and Demeter in Antioch of Syria, *HThR* 75 (1982) 189-207, esp. 190 ff. On resistance esp. in Rome see: H. R. Möhring, The Persecution of the Jews and the Adherents of the Isis Cult at Rome AD 19, *NT* 3 (1959) 293-304.

We can follow the course of the expansion reasonably well by means of inscriptions, papyri and artefacts from the scanty relics of the 3rd century BC onwards, especially as the priests and worshippers frankly propagandized[5] the goddess by listing her glorious acts in liturgical panegyrics and publishing these 'hymns' on stone[6]. Besides these aretalogies there were other means to extol the majesty of the goddess, for instance by relating a specific miracle which had brought salvation from sickness, peril or death, or even by collecting these stories in miracle books[7]. It is the more stereotyped epigraphic aretalogies, however, that will receive our special attention.

The remarkable resemblance of the five specimens which have come down to us strongly suggests a common origin. Half a century of fierce scholarly debate has not yielded a consensus on the original nature of the supposed prototype, whose cradle, according to legend, stood in Memphis. For reasons that will soon become apparent this discussion cannot be neglected totally. I shall therefore give a severely condensed survey of

[5] P. M. Frazer, Two Studies on the Cult of Sarapis in the Hellenistic World, *Opusc. Athen.* 3 (1960) 1-54, has contested a political interpretation of this Isis mission. Cf. also Solmsen 1980, 45. Differently: Dunand 1973 I, 27-108; J. Gwyn Griffiths, Xenophon of Ephesus on Isis and Alexandria, in: *Hommages M. J. Vermaseren* I (1978) 409-37. I only know D. Dietrich, *Der hellenistische Isiskult und die sogenannte Isismission als kosmopolitische Religion* (Diss. Leipzig 1966) from a summary in *Das Altertum* 14 (1968) 201-11. An interesting consequence of this imperialism appears for instance in the manuscript tradition of the 'Life of Aesopus' (Totti 1985, no. 18). Originally it referred to a miracle cure by Artemis. This deity, however, was elbowed out by Isis, who herself had to give in to the Christian Philoxenia later. *Sic transit...*

[6] Apart from the literary and papyrological evidence we have five epigraphical 'hymns', 'aretalogies' or 'praises' (on the name see: Grandjean 1975, 1 ff.; Henrichs 1978a), some of which are badly damaged: 1) Maronea (about 100 BC), Grandjean 1975, and see for some corrections: R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 23 (1976) 234 f.; Totti 1985 no. 19; 2) Andros (the only metrical composition, late 1st c. BC), Peek 1930; Totti 1985 no. 2; 3) Kyme (1/2nd c. AD), A. Salac, Inscriptions de Kymé d'Eolide, *BCH* 51 (1927) 378-83; Roussel 1929, 137-68; *IG* XII Suppl. p.98-9; *I.Kyme* 41; Totti 1985 no. 1; 4) Thessalonike (1/2nd c. AD), *IG* X 2, 254; 5) Ios (2/3rd c. AD), *Syll.*[3] 1267; *IG* XII Suppl. p.98. See for surveys of related literary and epigraphical texts: *GGR* II, 626 n.5; Grandjean 1975, 8 ff.; J. Leclant, Aegyptiaca et milieux isiaques. Recherches sur la diffusion du matériel et des idées égyptiennes, *ANRW* II,17,3 (1984) 1692-709. Add *PMG* V, 98-159, which has been identified as an Osiris liturgy, closely related to the Isis hymns: Merkelbach 1967. On the Isis hymn in *PSI* VII, 844 (identified by E. Heitsch, *MH* 17 [1960] 185-88) see: A. Barigazzi, L'inno a Iside des *PSI* VII, 844, *ZPE* 18 (1975) 1-10. The correspondences of these aretalogies with the famous prayers in Apul. *Metam.* 11,2, 5/6 and 25, have been discussed by J. Berreth, *Studien zum Isisbuch in Apuleius' Metamorphosen* (Diss. Tübingen 1931), 11-37; W. Wittmann, *Das Isisbuch des Apuleius. Untersuchungen zur Geistesgeschichte des zweiten Jahrhunderts* (Diss. Berlin 1938) 9 ff., 22 ff., 130 ff. Gwyn Griffiths 1975 *ad loc.*

[7] The two types could be combined, as for example in the hymn of Maronea. On the different origins of the two types see: Henrichs 1978a, 206. On *epiphaneiai* see the references in Versnel 1986. Many *aretai* are reproduced by Longo 1969. They are discussed by Nock 1933, 84 ff., MacMullen 1981, 10 ff., Versnel 1981a, 54-62, with special attention to the aspect of *marturia*.

the various opinions[8]. In 1943 R. Harder argued for an all but exclusively Egyptian origin of the hymn through an analysis of the formulae, which he traced back to Egyptian models. In 1949 the two major experts on Hellenistic religion, A. D. Nock and A. J. Festugière, forcefully attacked this view and contended that the original text must have been written in Greek since it contained numerous basically Greek concepts. Their views were adopted and elaborated by the Egyptologist D. Müller in a monograph that appeared in 1961. Müller undertook a line by line search for Egyptian *Vorlagen*, which, however, served mainly to illustrate that they are *not* exactly comparable to the Greek texts. Müller's chief aim was to demonstrate the metamorphosis of the Egyptian goddess through her migration to the Greek world. Not impressed by these arguments, J. Bergman in his book *Ich bin Isis* of 1968 strongly defended an Egyptian origin of the ideology which pervades the hymn, showing that all its constituents can be documented in an Egyptian context.

Paradoxically and significantly, when the only hope of finding a definitive way out of this impasse was in the discovery of a new text, this proved to be vain when another aretalogy was actually found at Maronea in 1969. The new aretalogy is different from the others and highly interesting. It presents the first *explicit* identification of Greek Demeter and Egyptian Isis, but at the same time opens with some lines that definitely have an Egyptian flavour. Its editor, Y. Grandjean, did not find sufficient arguments to contest J. Bergman "le fond égyptien des arétalogies d'Isis." Others, however, like Solmsen and particularly Henrichs, defend the Greek case with ever increasing zeal, finding fresh ammunition in Maronea. In an article published in 1984 but based on a paper of 1979, Henrichs argues that the "Isis of 'Praises' (i.e. of the aretalogies) is thoroughly Prodicean in that her status as a deity is predicated upon her role as a cultural heroine and former queen of Egypt" (156). The improvement on previous theories is that the various features which connect Isis with the nature of Greek Demeter as a founder of culture and which had long been recognized as such are now traced back to the Sophist theory of the gods as deified rulers and founders of culture, a picture that Euhemeros adopted and elaborated.

Brilliant and provocative as it may be, the new theory still does not

[8] The following titles will be discussed: R. Harder, *Karpokrates von Chalkis und die memphitische Isispropaganda, Abh. Berlin* (1943) [1944]; A. D. Nock, *Gnomon* 21 (1949) 221-8 = Nock 1972 II, 703-11; A. J. Festugière, A propos des arétalogies d'Isis, *HThR* 42 (1949) 209-34 = *idem* 1972, 138-63; D. Müller, *Aegypten und die griechischen Isis-Aretalogien, Abh. Leipzig* 53.1 (1961); J. Bergman, *Ich bin Isis. Studien zum memphitischen Hintergrund der griechischen Isisaretalogien* (Uppsala 1968); A. Henrichs, The Sophists and Hellenistic Religion: Prodicus as the Spiritual Father of the Isis Aretalogies, *HSPh* 88 (1984) 139-58.

dispose of many non-Greek elements that are obvious to any reader and denied by none. Not only are they unequivocally present in such proclamations as: "I invented the letters together with Hermes (= Thot)" (K 3c), or "I am the wife and sister of Osiris" (K 6), but also in "I divided earth from heaven"(K 12), an act of creation no Greek god could boast[9]. Stylistically, a series of *Ego*-proclamations in which a god proclaims his *dunameis* is un-Greek[10]. The same can be said of the typically 'oriental' expression of omnipotence composed of two polar qualities such as "I soothe the sea and make it wave" (K 43) and "I make the navigable unnavigable whenever it pleases me" (K 50)[11], nor is it easy to find a *parallellismus membrorum* like the one cited below (p.44) in Greek literature, though both tropes are not completely lacking[12]. So one cannot but

[9] I do not recognize anything really comparable in Hesiod *Th.* 126 ff.; 173ff., to which Solmsen 1980, 133 n.48, refers. The new fragments of an Orphic theogony in the Derveni Papyrus (*ZPE* 47 [1982] and cf. West 1983, 68-115), do explain the castration of Ouranos by Kronos as the separation of heaven and earth. But there cannot be any doubt as to the strong Near-Eastern influences here, since the same text adds that Zeus swallowed the genitals of Ouranos and became pregnant, which is clearly borrowed from the Kumarbi myth. See most recently: W. Burkert, Oriental and Greek Mythology: The Meeting of Parallels, in: Bremmer 1987, 10-40, esp. 22.

[10] I find it very difficult to follow Nock 1972 II, 706 ff., in his view that similar *anaphoric* sequences have no exact parallels in Egyptian texts, and consequently must be Greek. First, he is not able to give a single authentic Greek instance. Secondly, already in 1912, in the first edition of his *Agnostos Theos*, Norden 1923, 177 ff., had identified the formula as "ein soteriologischer Redetypus" characteristic of Old Testament style and having its origin in Near Eastern cultures. And he did provide clear Egyptian parallels on p. 219. The Egyptian expression 'I am' even developed into the 'magical name' *Anoch* and variations, used very commonly in Greek magical papyri from Egypt. See the discussions by A. A. Barb, in: *Hommages à W. Deonna* (Bruxelles 1957) 73-6; A. Jacoby, *ARW* 28 (1930) 269-85, esp. 271 ff.; S. Sauneron, Le monde du magicien égyptien, in: *Le monde du sorcier*. Sources orientales 7 (Paris 1966) 36-9. The Greek expression *ego eimi*, too, is ubiquitous in *PGM*: M. Smith 1978, 125 f. See in general on this type of liturgical enunciations: R. Reitzenstein, Zwei hellenistische Hymnen, *ARW* 8 (1905) 167 ff.; E. Schweizer, *Ego eimi* (*FRLANT* 38, 19652); H. Zimmermann, Das Absolute *Ego eimi* als die N.T. Offenbarungsformel, *BZ* N.F. 4 (1960) 54-69; 266-76 (who traces the OT origins); H. Conzelmann, *Grundriss der Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Munich 1967) 381; G. W. MacRae, The Ego-Proclamation in Gnostic Sources, in: E. Bammel (ed.) *The Trial of Jesus. Cambridge Studies in Honour of C. F. D. Moule* (London 1970) 122-34; R. P. Merendino, *Der Erste und der Letzte* (Suppl. *Vetus Testam.* 31, Leiden 1981) *passim*. See also: J. Z. Smith, Native Cults in the Hellenistic Period, *History of Religions* 1 (1971) 243 n.12, for bibliographical data. He follows Müller 1961 in assuming an Egyptian origin of the formula. On Egyptian reminiscences see also: Weinreich below n.13.

[11] There are even stronger enunciations of this type in *P. Oxy* 1380 (Totti 1985 no. 20), ll. 195/6: αὐ[ξ]ήσε[ως] καὶ φθορᾶς (....) κυρία, and above all ll. 175-7: καὶ φθορὰν οἷς θέλις δίδοις, τοῖς δὲ καθεφθαρμένοις αὔξησιν δίδ[οις]. Fowden 1986, 49, deems it likely that part of the invocation is a translation from an Egyptian text. No need to say that this type of expression is particularly characteristic of the OT, for instance in Deut. 32:39, "I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal."

[12] Compare for instance the formulas in Hesiod *Erga* 5-8 and Archiloch. fr 130 W. Cf. also Aesopus' answer to Chilon (Diog. Laert. 1, 3, 69) about Zeus' omnipotence:

conclude that the aretalogies of Isis are a genuinely Hellenistic creation—very comparable to the creation of Sarapis himself—in which Greek elements dominate without, however, blotting out the Egyptian-oriental contribution[13].

In the most complete aretalogy, the one from Kyme[14], of which I quoted some lines, Isis speaks. A breathless series of some fifty *Ego* proclamations articulate the goddess as the one who has created (divided) heaven and earth, who has defined the laws of nature and who (sometimes arbitrarily) manipulates the physical elements. She has invented agriculture, social order and civilization by introducing language, justice, religion, moral codes and love. After a preliminary formula of omnipotence in ll. 46/7: "What pleases me, that shall be finished; for me everything makes way", the hymn ends with the unsurpassed and unsurpassable climax (ll. 55/6):

Ἐγὼ τὸ ἱμαρμένον νικῶ
Ἐμοῦ τὸ εἱμαρμένον ἀκούει

τὰ μὲν ὑψηλὰ ταπεινῶν τὰ δὲ ταπεινὰ ὑψῶν. I emphasize the term 'formula', for, of course, the idea itself is not uncommon. Cf. for instance Sappho's prayer to Aphrodite ll. 19-24, where the goddess promises to exercise her *dynamis* to bring about a reversal of present circumstances. On this representation in Greek literature see: H. Saake, *Zur Kunst Sapphos. Motiv-analytische und kompositionstechnische Interpretationen* (Munich etc. 1971) 39-78, esp. 68 ff. Aphrodite/Eros is generally pictured as an invincible and irresistible power: H. Parry, The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite: Erotic *Ananke*, *Phoenix* 40 (1986) 253-64. For this reason she is one of the few gods who could be called 'tyrant' as we shall see below. Polar actions of the type: to render the mighty humble and the weak strong, occur predominantly in characterizations of Fate, Tuche, Moira, Eros etc. and the *kuklos* idea connected with them. See: J. Krause, *Allote Allos. Untersuchungen zum Motive des Schicksalswechsels in der griechischen Dichtung bis Euripides* (Munich 1976); Versnel 1977 and 1981b, *passim*. In general on the meaning of such polarities: M. Eliade, *The Two and the One* (New York 1965) 78-124. An instance of *parallellismus membrorum* can be found in Hdt. 1, 47: "I understand the speech of the dumb and hear the voiceless", but it is quite exceptional and, as far as I know, restricted to Apollo in his oracular faculty.

[13] This is the opinion of *inter alios* Vidman 1970, 26 n.77 and Leclant *o.c.* (above n.1), 1694, to which also Gwyn Griffiths and Malaise adhere in the works mentioned above. Cf. for Malaise also his article cited below n.17, p. 94. This view is supported by an undeniable similarity with Egyptian hymns for Isis, found at Philae and published by L. V. Zabkar, Six Hymns to Isis in the Sanctuary of her Temple at Philae and their Theological Significance, *JEA* 69 (1983) 115-37, of the period of Ptolemy II Philadelphos. Fowden 1986, 45-52, too, has an open eye for the Egyptian contribution, which is also strongly supported by J. D. Ray, *The Archive of Hor* (London 1976). On the geographical epithets characteristic of other hymns in praise of Isis, O. Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 21, in a review of B. A. Van Groningen, *De Papyro Oxyrhynchita 1380* (Diss. Groningen 1921), writes: "Ich frage hier schon: gibt es im Griechischen irgendwo einen Hymnus, der über Hunderte von Zeilen weg geographisch geordnete Epitheta reiht?" And he also refers to the specific anaphora. *Ibidem*, 377, he traces back the Andros hymn to Egyptian models.

[14] Apart from the editions mentioned above n.6, the text of this aretalogy can be found in Peek 1930, Harder 1943, Grandjean 1975, *IG* XII Suppl. pp. 98/9, Totti 1985 no. 1. A translation in: F. C. Grant, *Hellenistic Religions* (Indianapolis 1980 = 1953) 131-3.

"I overcome Fate, Fate harkens to me."

Before discussing the implications of this enunciation we should pay some attention to the nature of the lauded *aretai*. Although the motive for the publication may very well consist of an actual miracle cure—so for example in the hymn of Maronea—the aretalogies themselves do not explicitly mention these individual miraculous achievements. This may seem all the more remarkable since undoubtedly Isis' acts of salvation and healing (like the same qualities of other gods) formed an unflagging incentive to religious zeal, as numerous votive inscriptions testify. Indeed, "the spreading of the so-called Oriental mystery religions occurred primarily in the form of votive religion"[15]. To the majority of believers Isis was no doubt first and foremost the goddess who saved people in childbirth, from illnesses or perils, particularly the perils of the sea, where Isis as *Pelagia*[16] wielded the sceptre as well. In short, she was the *soteira*[17] *par excellence* even to the degree of becoming the device of salvation. Artemidorus *Oneir.* 2,39, explains:

[15] Burkert 1987, 15, with due emphasis on seafaring, illness and childbirth.

[16] Ph. Bruneau, Isis Pélagia à Délos, *BCH* 85 (1961) 435-66; 87 (1963) 301-8; *idem*, Existe-t-il des statues d'Isis Pélagia? *BCH* 98 (1974) 331-81. Turcan 1989 calls her 'Notre-Dame-des-flots'. A recent interesting find: E. R. Williams, Isis Pelagia and a Roman Marble Matrix from the Athenian Agora, *Hesperia* 54 (1985) 109-19. Cf. J. Leclant, Isis, déesse universelle et divinité locale dans le monde gréco-romaine, in: *Iconographie classique et identités régionales* (*BCH Suppl.* 14 [1986]) 341-52. Iuvenalis 12, 26-8: *et quam votiva testantur fana tabella plurima; pictores quis nescit ab Iside pasci*, with the scholion: *quam naufragio liberati ponunt; antiquitus enim solebant qui naufragio liberati essent, pro voto pingere tabellas et in templo Isidis ponere.* This tradition can be followed into late antiquity: J. Polzer, A Late Antique Goddess of the Sea, *JbAC* 29 (1986) 71-108.

[17] *Pansoteira*: *IG Philae* 2, 134; *soteira*: *ibid.* 1, 5; 6; 59; *P.Oxy* 1380, 20, 55, 76, 293; *SIRIS* 179, 247, cf. 289, 411; P. Roussel, *Les cultes égyptiens à Délos* (Paris 1916) 49, 194; cf. *ibid.* 72, a dedication from Delos to Sarapis, Isis, Anubis and Apollo: σωθεὶς ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων; É. Bernand, *Inscriptions métriques*, 165; *Hymn of Isidorus* I, 26 and Vanderlip 1972, *ad loc.* Cf. Ronchi V, 1977, 1044-6. In the Dream of Nectanebus (*UPZ* I, 81 col II, l.19 [2nd c. BC]), she even saves the gods: ζώζουσα θεοὺς πάντες (*sic*). Elsewhere she saves the universe: Kaibel *EG* 985,4 (from Philae = É. Bernand, *Les inscriptions grecques de Philae* II [Paris 1969] 159). Note that in Greek hymns to 'classical' gods a pretentious expression such as σωτὴρ τῆς οἰκουμένης is isolated, late and as far as I know restricted to Asklepios and Apollo in the Epidaurian Hymn (*IG* IV 1 ed. min. 133 and 135). Cf. O. Weinreich *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 299 f. "In any case the use of Soter and Soteira for Sarapis and Isis refers to deliverance from perils by sea and by disease, and the deities are *saviours of all good men*" (Nock 1933, 56). Cf. in general: C. J. Bleeker, Isis as a Saviour Goddess, in: *The Saviour God. Comparative Studies in the Conception of Salvation Presented to E. O. James* (Manchester 1963) 1-16; Engelmann 1975, 28; M. Malaise, La piété personnelle dans la religion isiaque, in: H. Limet et J. Ries (eds.), *L'expérience de la prière dans les grandes religions* (Louvain 1980) 83-116, esp. 100-3; J. S. Kloppenborg, Isis and Sophia in the Book of Wisdom, *HThR* 75 (1982) 67-84, esp. 67 ff.; Kee 1983, 125 ff.

> "Sarapis, Isis (.....) signify disturbances, dangers, threats, and crises, from which salvation will come when one's hopes and expectations have been abandoned. For these gods have always been regarded as the saviors of men who have tried every resort and who find themselves in utmost peril." (transl. R. J. White)[18]

That the aretalogies generally ignore these most remarkable feats should be explained by their very nature: they praise such qualities and achievements as refer to a hoary past (as Henrichs in particular has pointed out) and generally avoid references to actual reality. This is not to say that similar allusions are not *implied* in pronouncements on the sea (K 15, 39, 43, 49, 50, 54), on children (K 18-20) and on liberation in general (*e.g.* K 34 and 48), as I shall point out below.

The two lines quoted can be understood as comprehensive formulas in which Isis' supremacy over life and death, including sickness, perils and disaster, is proclaimed. The first Hymn of Isidorus[19] (2nd or 1st c. BC) 26-34, phrases it with exemplary precision:

> "Deathless Saviour, many-named, mightiest Isis,
> Saving from war cities and all their citizens:
> Men, their wives, possessions and children.
> As many as are bound fast in prison, in the power of death,
> As many as are in pain through anquished, sleepless nights,
> All who are wanderers in a foreign land,
> And as many as sail on the Great Sea in winter
> When men may be destroyed and their ships wrecked and sunk,
> All are saved if they pray that You be present to help."

Line 29 has literally: "in the fatal destiny of death"[20] (ἐμ μοίραις θανάτου). This is a crucial formula, for, like the final lines of the aretalogy of Kume, it represents an early anticipation of what was to develop into one of Isis' most specific qualities during the imperial period. From the

[18] Cf. Diod. Sic. 1, 25 3 ff. "she finds her greatest delight in the healing of mankind and gives aid in their sleep to those who call upon her, plainly manifesting both her very presence (ἐπιφάνεια) and her beneficence (εὐεργετικόν) toward those who ask for her help (.....). For standing above the sick in their sleep she gives aid for their diseases and works remarkable cures upon such as submit themselves to her; and many who have been despaired of by their physicians because of the difficult nature of their malady are restored to health by her....".

[19] Found in 1935 at Medinet Madi in the Fayum and published by A. Vogliano in 1936. For a full bibliography see the edition with commentary by Vanderlip 1972, whose text and translation I adopt. Cf. also: Bernand, *Inscriptions métriques*, 631-52; Ronchi III 1975, 539-42; Totti 1985 no. 21 ff. J. Bollók, Le problème de la datation des hymnes d'Isidore, in: *Studia Aegyptiaca* I (Budapest 1974) 27-35, unconvincingly argues for an earlier date of the hymns (last part 3rd c. BC). For the Egyptian background of these hymns see: H. J. W. Drijvers, De hymnen van Madinet-Madi en de hellenistische Isisreligie, *Vox Theologica* 32 (1962) 139-50.

[20] Cf. the Delian Sarapis aretalogy, l. 74: Sarapis has the power to "ward off the evil spirits of death".

beginning of the second century AD onwards, we find Isis glorified for having the power to shift the boundaries that determine the measured time of life, i.e. for being victorious over fate. In this she is matched by her consort Sarapis: in a papyrus of the 3rd c. AD[21] Sarapis ("who is *soter*" l.1) says to a person who has just recovered from an illness: τῆς μοίρης ἀπέχεις, Θράσων, τὸ τέρμ[α, οὐ]χ ὡς ἤθελε μοῖρα, παρὰ δὲ μοῖρα[ν. τᾶς] μοίρας γὰρ ἐγὼ μεταμφιάζω. "Thrason, you have in full the upshot of your Fate; not as Fate desired, but against the will of Fate[22]: for I change the Fate" (lit. "change the clothes of Fate"). This idea returns in Apul. *Metam.* 11,6, where Isis says: *scies ultra statuta fato tuo spatia vitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi tantum licere* ("you shall know that I alone have power to prolong your life also beyond the span determined by your destiny"). And in 11, 25 Lucius says: *depulsis vitae procellis salutarem porrigas dexteram qua fatorum etiam inextricabiliter contorta retractas licia* ("and when thou hast stilled the storms of life thou dost stretch out thy saving hand, with which thou unravelest even those threads of fate which are inextricably woven together"). This is a commentary as it were on K 55/6 quoted above, and though certainly not an assurance of blissful immortality in the netherworld, as Cumont understood it[23], it definitely exalts Isis above the ranks of the Greek gods, to whom, after all, Herodotus' words applied: τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατά ἐστι ἀποφυγεῖν καὶ θεῷ ("fate cannot be escaped, not even by a god"). A funerary inscription (*Syll.*[3] 889) informs us that "neither by flattery, nor by supplication, nor by tears will man ever be able to overstep the boundaries of the predestined" (τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὅρον), thus summarizing a stock *topos* in literature which ranges

[21] Ed. pr. Abt, *ARW* 18 (1915) 257. Totti 1985 no. 12, where a full bibliography is presented. Cf. also Weinreich 1919, 12 f. = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I (1969) 410.

[22] Παρὰ μοῖραν has a positive connotation here because *moira* implies the negative aspects of Fate as illustrated in the texts given below n.24. Elsewhere the expression παρὰ μοῖραν can have strongly negative implications since it expresses an unnatural *mors immatura* in opposition to the death κατὰ μοῖραν, which implies the notion *sua morte mori*. Exemplarily in a funerary inscription from Pisidia (*Coll. Froehner* p. 122): εἰ μὲν ἰδίᾳ μοίρῃ, ὤφειλεν ("if he died according to his fate, it had to be so") as opposed to χερσὶ δολοποιοῖς ("murderer's hands"). See on this type of texts: Versnel 1990, and on παρὰ μοῖραν: *BE* 1974, 331; 1979, 13, p.417. On the early development of the expressions: M. Finkelberg, Homer's View of the Epic Narrative. Some Formulaic Evidence, *CPh* 82 (1987) 136-8.

[23] *RHLR* 3 (1912) 539. *Contra*: Gwynn Griffiths 1975, 166, who detects a marked Egyptian trait in it. Cf. A. Erman, *Die Literatur der Aegypter* (1923) 350 ff; Ed. Meyer, *SbBerlin* (1928) 508, on the text of the praises of Amun: "He gives long life, doubling the years of him who pleases him". As Roussel 1929, 167 f., already noticed, the aretalogies contain no reference to immortality or afterlife whatsoever. The problem of the origin of this concept in the mysteries of Isis is treated by U. Bianchi, Iside dea misterica. Quando?, in: *Perennitas* 9-36. M. Malaise, Contenu et effets de l'initiation isiaque, *AC* 50 (1981) 483-98, sees no trace of a promise of happy afterlife before Plutarch or rather Apuleius. Burkert 1987, 40, notes that the oldest literary witness for mysteries of Isis is Tibullus.

from early lyric via Hellenistic poetry into epigrams, philosophical and astrological works of the Roman period[24].

The only Greek god who sometimes managed to ransom a favourite mortal from death, albeit for a limited period, was Apollo[25], an achievement usually facilitated only by the compensatory offering of another life[26]. A goddess who has the unique[27] power to overcome destiny and

[24] Just a small selection by way of illustration: Ibycus fr. 32 (Page) οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποφθιμένους ζωᾶς ἔτι φάρμακον εὑρεῖν; Simonides fr. 542 (Page) 290-30, ἀνάγκᾳ δ'οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται; Fr. adesp. 503 (N² p.937), μόνη γὰρ ἐν θεοῖσιν οὐ δεσπόζεται Μοῖρ' οὐδ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισι ἀλλ' αὐτὴ κρατεῖ; Moschos fr. 2 (N²), ὦ καὶ θεῶν κρατοῦσα καὶ θνητῶν μόνη, Μοῖρ' ὦ λιταῖς ἄτεγκτε δυστήνων βροτῶν πάντολμ' ἀνάγκη, where *moira* and *ananke* are identified, as often (cf. Petersmann 1979, and on the earlier attestations of *ananke* as 'universal Necessity': J. Brody, *'Fate' in Oedipus Tyrannus: A Textual Approach* [Buffalo 1985]). On the idea in Greek literature in general: H. Wankel, 'Alle Menschen müssen sterben', Variationen eines Topos der griechischen Literatur, *Hermes* 111 (1983) 129-54. A funerary inscription from Alexandria (Bernand, *Inscriptions métriques*, 71) says: Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐξήλυξε τὸν μίτον Μοιρῶν, οὐ θνητός, οὐκ ἀθάνατος, οὐδ' ὁ δεσμώτης, οὐδ' αὖ τύραννος βασιλικὴν λαχὼν τιμὴν θεσμοὺς ἀτρέπτους διαφυγεῖν ποτ' ᾠήθη. An inscription from Praeneste has: *[fat]a Iovem superant.... [fat]a trahunt urbes* (Vaglieri, *NSA* 1907, 685; O. Marucchi, *Guida archaeologica della città di Palestrina* [Roma 1932] 32 f.; cf. Champeaux 1982, 75 f., who takes it to be an oracle text). Josephus *Contra Ap.* 2, 245, describes Zeus as κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης. Vettius Valens 5, 9, 2 (2nd c. AD) says: "It is impossible to gain the victory over the predestined fate, neither by prayer nor by sacrifice", and Maximus of Turin, *Oratio contra Paganos* (ed. A. Spagnolo-C. H. Turner, *JTS* 17 [1916] 321): *aiunt pagani fato omnia fieri et nihil preces, nihil orationes valere*. Cf. a funerary inscription from Sitifis (*AE* 1916, 7-8, quoted by H. Solin, *ZPE* 65 (1986) 62 n.8: *tura dedi manibus supplex crepitantia flammis, quod non exauditas preces debusque supernis*. And in a Christian letter from Egypt (*SB* 12, 10840; J. R. Rea, *CE* 45 [1970] 357-63) we read: "against death we have no power". See the discussion by L. Lenaz, *Regitur Fato si Iuppiter ipse.....*: una postilla al *Carmen contra paganos*, in: *Perennitas*, 293-309.

[25] Hdt. 1, 91; cf. R. Riecks, Eine tragische Erzählung bei Herodot, *Poetica* 7 (1975) 23-44, esp. 32; Aeschyl. *Eum.* 723 ff.; Eur. *Alc.* prol.; cf. J. M. Bell, Euripides' Alcestis. A Reading, *Emerita* 48 (1980) 43-76, on the inevitability of *ananke*. Even in the 250s AD, Apollo still recalled how he had "shamed" the Fates and kept of an epidemic a century before: Lane Fox 1986, 231. On the other hand the prolongation of life belongs to the normal capabilities of Egyptian gods: Nock 1972 II, 705 n.7; Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 166, and above n.23.

[26] This also occurred in miracles by the Egyptian gods, e.g. in the cure of Thrason cited in the text. See on this principle of compensation: Versnel 1981b.

[27] Zeus holding the scales of destiny in Homer is a very rare exception to the rule as illustrated above in n.24. The Zeus who, in lyric poetry and sometimes in tragedy, is pictured as the highest lord of destiny (as e.g. in Archiloch. fr. 298 W.; cf. U. Bianchi, *Dios Aisa. Destino, uomini e divinità nell' epos, nelle teogonie e nel culto dei Greci* [Rome 1953]) may practically be identified with such notions as οἱ θεοί, ὁ θεός, τὸ θεῖον, ὁ δαίμων etc. (notably in Herodotus), which indicate the highest superhuman principle, practically identical to what later was called Tuche (Versnel 1981b). Even so, when Horace *C.* 2, 17, 22 ff. writes *te Iovis inpio tutela Saturno refulgens eripuit volucrisque fati tardavit alas*, Servius *ad Aen.* 4, 610, aptly comments: "and correctly *'tardavit'* for the necessity of fate can be hampered but not wholly deluded". Even the Christian god, once beyond the boundaries of the theologists' protectorate, is powerless against the Fates: G. A. Megas, *ARW* 30 (1933) 3; R. W. Brednick, *Volkserzählungen und Volksglaube von den Schicksalsfrauen* (FF Communications 193, Helsinki 1964), 31 ff. As we shall see below, in early Christian theology Christ or the Virgin

liberate men from the chafing bonds of *ananke* may become a new Fate herself. Isis was sometimes identified with Tuche[28], though in contradistinction to the blind and arbitrary Fortune[29], she was a seeing and helpful one. The combat between the blind and the seeing Fortunae is glorified in Apul. *Metam.* 11,15, and we shall investigate its implications later on. We shall also argue in more detail then that the notion of divine victory over Fate or *heimarmene* is not documented before the imperial period in religious texts outside Egypt. In fact, the final lines of aretalogy K, whose model can be dated to the third or second century BC, are so exceptional in the context of Hellenistic religion that they have been explained as a later addition by no less a specialist than Festugière. However this may be—Festugière recanted few years later—, for the moment we can summarize the picture delineated so far by quoting the famous acclamations of the Ephesians that "Isis is a great goddess" (μεγάλην θεὸν ἀνακαλοῦντες τὴν Ἶσιν)[30], or even more pointedly by the words of an ancient

Mother compete with Isis in the combat against Fate. They share this task with the great god of Gnostic and Hermetic speculation, also present in magical papyri. Outside this 'theosophy' the notion is rare. A good instance is Bèlos in an inscription from Vaison la Romaine (*CIL* XII, 1277; *IG* XIV, 2482; *IGRR* I, 4. [3d c. AD]), on one side: εὐθυντῆρι Τύχης Βήλῳ, on the other: *Belus Fortunae rector mentisque magister*. On this inscription see: P. Turcan, *Les religions de l'Asie dans la vallée du Rhône* (Leiden 1972) 115-7; J. Balty, L'oracle d'Apamée, *AC* 50 (1981) 5-14, esp. 8 ff.: "un dieu cosmique absolu, maître des planètes, du ciel étoilé et du zodiaque"; Veyne 1986, 276 ff., and on the sovereignty over the mind, below p.91. If, according to recent feminist complaints "anatomy is destiny", Isis was well capable of changing this type of destiny, too: in the story of Iphis (Ovid *Met.* 9, 666-797) she performed the miracle of converting a girl into a boy. On this passage, "une sorte d'arétalogie isiaque", see: F. Graf, Ovide, les *Metamorphoses* et la véracité du mythe, in: C. Calame (ed.), *Métamorphoses du mythe en Grèce antique* (Genève 1988) 57-70, esp. 61.

[28] J. Bergman, I overcome Fate, Fate harkens to me. Some Observations on Isis as a Goddess of Fate, in: Ringren (ed.), *Fatalistic Beliefs in Religion, Folklore and Literature* (Stockholm 1967) 35-51; Dunand 1973 I, 92 f.; III, 271-3; Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 241-4; *idem*, The Concept of the Divine Judgement in the Mystery Religions, in: Bianchi e Vermaseren 1982, 192-219, esp. 199 f.; Cf. Ronchi, V 1977, 1096 and 1116 (Isis Agathe Tuche) and on the name Isituche: Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* III, 65. In this quality the goddess is also the *regina caeli* and ruler over the seven planets: M. Marcovich, The Isis with Seven Robes, in: *idem*, *Studies in Graeco-Roman Religions and Gnosticism* (Leiden 1988) 52-5.

[29] On the notion and implications of the arbitrariness of Tuche or the bonds of astral predestination see: F. Cumont, Fatalisme astral et religions antiques, *RHLR* 3 (1912) 513-43; W. Gundel, *Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene* (Giessen 1914); D. Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque* (Louvain 1945 = Amsterdam 1973); *GGR* II, 200-10; H. O. Schröder, Fatum (Heimarmene), *RAC* 7 (1969) 562-70. The arbitrariness of Tuche is especially connected with various forms of bondage, on which see below p.86. In connection with Isis as *Fortuna videns* it is interesting that Isis as *Kore Kosmou* is the 'pupil' of the cosmos: Kloppenborg, *o.c.* above n.17; H. Jackson, Κόρη Κόσμου: Isis, Pupil of the Eye of the World, *CE* 61 (1986) 116-35. See for a discussion of the evils of Necessity below p.86 ff.

[30] Xen. Ephes. 5, 13. Cf. *PGM* XXIV, 1, and parallels in Peterson 1926, 208. Cf. Merkelbach 1962, 111 f.; Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 238.

glossary: "Isis, that is the great hope" (Ἶσις· ἡ μεγάλη [ἐ]λπίς)[31]. In the end this will result in the confession that Isis embraces all other gods in one person: *te tibi una quae es omnia*[32].

Viewed in this light, it is hardly surprising that the goddess in verse 25 of the aretalogy of Kume prides herself on having "destroyed the mastery of despots", nor that the actual panegyric begins with the proud statement: "Isis I am, the queen of all the land." But this is already an interpretation[33], for, literally, the two verses have:

Εἶσις ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ τύραννος πάσης χώρας[34]

[31] *P.Oxy* XLV (1977) 3239. This may refer to dream interpretations, as M. Marcovich, *ZPE* 29 (1978) 49, has suggested. For *elpis* in religious context see: F. Cumont, *Lux perpetua* (Paris 1949) 401-5; Versnel 1985, 256 ff.

[32] In an inscription from Capua: *CIL* X, 3800 = *ILS* 4362 = *SIRIS* 502. Cf. V. Tran Tam Tinh, *Le culte des divinités orientales en Campanie* (Leiden 1972) 77 and 199-234; Grandjean 1975, 69 ff. Her inclusive epithet 'Myrionyma' is so stereotyped that it occurs both in literary texts (for instance in the *Life of Aesopus* 5 = Totti 1985, no. 18) and even in Latin inscriptions (*CIL* III, 882 and 4017 = *SIRIS* 656; *CIL* V, 5080; *CIL* XIII, 3461 = *ILS* 4376a = *SIRIS* 749), and in a corrupted form in a juridical *defixio* from Spain (Versnel 1990). Turcan 1989 entitles his chapter on the goddess: 'Isis Myrionyme'. I shall discuss these and similar henotheistic tendencies in more detail below in chapter 3. The acclamation of a god as 'one' is often closely connected with expressions of his outstanding soteriological qualities: εἷς θεὸς ὁ θεραπεύων πᾶσαν νόσον ("One is the god who heals every sickness"), claims a magical papyrus published by D. Wortmann, Neue magische Texte, *BJ* 168 (1968) no. 7, p. 105 (= Betz *PGM* XCIX), who did not notice that this is just a slightly elaborated version of the common acclamation: εἷς θεὸς ὁ βοηθῶν or βοηθός: Peterson 1926, *passim*.

[33] Cf. for instance the misleading translation by F. Lexa, L'hymne grec de Kymé sur la déesse Isis, *ArchOr* 2 (1930) 138-52: "Moi, je suis Isis, la reine de la terre entière", and "Moi j'ai renversé le gouvernement des tyrans." Cf. R. E. Witt 1966, 57: "She is indeed a world-wide monarch (.....) destroying the empires of despots."

[34] The related aretalogy of Cyrene (*SEG* IX, 1938, 192; Peek 1930, p.129; Totti 1985 no. 4 [103 AD]) l. 4, reads: Ἐγὼ τύραννος Εἶσις αἰῶνος μόνη. The hymn of Andros l. 14-5, has: τυράννων πρέσβα, where I cannot follow Peek's suggestion to delete the final ν and to read a singular genitive. Cf. the counter-arguments put forward by Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 375, who adds: "Die Katachrese von Turannos ist mir nicht anstössig wenn ich z.B. an Men Tyrannos denke. Das ist orientalisches Kolorit", thus summarizing what I shall argue below. The hymn of Ios is largely identical with K. In the Isis liturgy in *P.Oxy* 1380, l. 239, the editors Grenfell and Hunt (*The Oxyrhynchos Papyri* XI, 1915, 190 ff.), in the sentence σὺ στρατείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας κυρία τοὺς [.....] ἀκόπως διαφθείρεις πίστοις βουλεύμασι, have proposed the conjecture τυράννους. They were followed by G. Lafaye, *RPh* 40 (1916) 55-90, esp. 90, and P. Collart, *REgypt* (1919) 95. However, B. A. van Groningen, *De papyro Oxyrhynchita 1380* (Diss. Groningen 1921), 58, suggests πολεμίους or ἀντιπάλους, because the Egyptian context would not tolerate the Greek concept τυράννους. I wonder if, in that case, we should not prefer the typically Egyptian ἀσεβεῖς = θεοῖσιν ἐχθρούς, 'rebels against the royal authority'. Cf. C. B. Welles, *JRS* 28 (1938) 41-9, esp. 47; L. Koenen, *CE* 34 (1959) 110 ff.; and in the new hymns to Isis from Philae edited by Zabkar *o.c.* (above n.13) no. I: "Horus ....who has caused the rebels to fall". We may infer from the repeated occurrence of the loaded term *turannos* that this was the term that figured in the Greek prototype. *Basilissa* and other 'soft' terms seem to be variations. Cf. Diod. 1, 27, Ἐγὼ Ἶσις εἰμι ἡ βασίλισσα πάσης χώρας; *P.Oxy* 1380, l. 24, κυρεία πάσης χώρης; Hymn of Isidorus IV, 8 (on a king) ὃς πάσης χώρας κύριος ἐξεφάνη.

"Isis, I am, the tyrant of all land"

Ἐγὼ τυράννων ἀρχὰς κατέλυσα[35]

"I have destroyed the mastery of tyrants"

As our introductory chapter will have led the reader to expect, the combination of these two statements has given rise to a lively anxiety among the commentators on this text. The reason for this anxiety is clear. If we assume that the goddess ascribes only positive qualities to herself, as she certainly does, the word *turannos* in the first statement must have positive connotations. In the second sentence, on the other hand, the term *turannos* must imply something negative, because the goddess clearly regarded it as necessary to destroy the persons indicated by this title.

In principle, there are two ways in which philologists have attempted to 'solve' this irritating inconsistency. The first involves the advice to read *well*. Where *turannos* is used twice, the same meaning must be implied twice, in itself neither good nor bad, but intermediate, something along the lines of the idea of 'king'. The negative aspect of K 25 is not inherent in the term itself, but is supplied by activities associated with these kings. In this way Harder 1943 succeeds in finding support for his Egyptian prototype: the destructive kings were the rebellious *nomarchoi* notorious from Egyptian history. Every Egyptian must have recognized this immediately: "So ergibt sich die schönste Übereinstimmung zwischen 3 und 25. Isis ist eben deswegen Herrin des ganzen Landes, weil sie die Macht der Gaufürsten vernichtet hat" (p.35). Thus the inconsistency is solved by eliminating the inconvenient factor. This theory, also adopted by Bergman 1968, 105 n.1, has been convincingly refuted by Müller 1961 and is generally considered to be untenable. For my argument, moreover, the question of whether this view is correct or not becomes irrelevant if we realize that the average Greek reader—for whom these texts were written—could never have grasped this supposed 'original' meaning.

The second approach is based on the implied warning *not* to read too

The hymn to Anubis from Kios (*I.Kios* 21; Kaibel *EG* 1029; *SIRIS* 325; Peek 1930, p.139; Totti 1985 no. 5) says of Isis: γαίης πάσης ..... ἄνασσαν; *PMG* V, 136 on Osiris: οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κύριος τῆς οἰκουμένης. Apul. *Metam.* 11, 25, 3: *tu.....regis mundum*. Of course, Isis possessed a wealth of royal titles, as we shall see below n.94.

[35] Again the Isis hymn of Ios has an identical wording. The hymn of Andros perhaps has a variant in l. 25: πε[ρ]ιῳ̣ῳ̣[ό]τατον δὲ μονάρχων δ̣ε̣σ[μὸν ἐγὼ κατέλυσ]α, the more so since in the next line mention is made of φόνος, just as in the hymn of Kyme. Peek *ad loc.* refers to a comparable expression in a honorary decree for a tyrant-slayer at Elaea (*Syll.*[3] 361) δ[έσμ]ια δ[εινὰ τυράννων λῦσαι. Λύειν or καταλύειν is *terminus technicus* for destroying the rule of a tyrant. See below n.52. Grandjean 1975, 85 ff. thinks that ll. 30-1 of the hymn of Maronea, τοι[γα]ροῦν αἱ πόλεις εὐστάθησαν, οὐ τὴν βίαν νομικὸν ἀλλὰ [τ]ὸν νόμον ἀβίαστον εὑροῦσαι are an amplification of our verse.

well and, in particular, not to read too fast. The author, unlike the reader, is not an intellectual. By line 25, he had already forgotten what he had written in line 3a. Admittedly, there is a contradiction in the meanings ascribed to the word *turannos*, but we should not reprove the author too harshly for his slip: "den Widerspruch (.....) muss man hinnehmen" (Müller 1961, 53 n.7); it is only an "apparente contradiction" (Festugière 1972, 144) or "quelque contradiction" (Roussel 1929, 155 n.1). Clearly, in this approach the attempt is made to eliminate the contradiction by minimizing its relevance, or preferably ignoring it altogether.

To all this two points should be added. First of all, it is out of the question that the contradiction was intended by the author, for instance as a rhetorical or poetic device. The artlessness of and, above all, the distance between the two statements are too striking to allow for *paronomasia* through *polyptoton*, as I believe my philological colleagues label it. Secondly, it is true that some scholars who defend the minimizing interpretation are vaguely aware that, somewhere in the background, the clash between the hyperbolic description of a ruler and the Greek hatred of tyrants plays a part. But this is precisely my point: I wish to argue that this antinomy should not be glossed over, but should be placed in the full limelight of historical interpretation and thus be rescued from the footnotes to which it has been relegated. This inconsistency is loaded with meaning and it signals the central ambiguity of Hellenistic political ideology, as I hope to demonstrate. In order to show this, I shall trace the historico-mental contexts of both sentences. In so doing I am bound to present a number of well-known facts, but I shall restrict myself to the absolutely essential.

2. "I HAVE DESTROYED THE MASTERY OF TYRANTS". THE PICTURE OF THE AWFUL TYRANT (I)

The term *turannos* derives from a language of Asia Minor[36] and was introduced into Greek in the Archaic Age to indicate a form of one-man government which appeared at that time and which was mainly characterized by two elements: a certain claim to totalitarianism and a lack of dynastic legitimacy[37]. The term speedily acquired strongly negative connotations in the mouths of political opponents[38] and developed into a stereotype in the 5th century: the tyrant was characterized by a love of opulence and a leaning towards violence, lawlessness, cruelty and *hubris*[39]. He became the dark contrast of the liberty of the democratic *polis*, as it is exemplarily phrased in Euripides' *Supplices* 429 ff.

> "nothing is more hostile to a city than a tyrant:
> first of all, there are no common laws,
> one man has the power, keeping the law for himself,
> and the principle of equality is gone."

[36] On the origin and original meaning of the term: Labarbe 1971, with a very useful onomastic collection. His opinion on the theophoric nature of personal names with the element *turannos* has been contested by L. Robert, *BE* 1973, 75. Linguistic observations on the Asia Minor origin of the term in: A. Heubeck, *Lydiaka* (Erlanger Forschungen 1959) 15-30, and D. Hegyi, Notes on the Origin of Greek Tyrannis, *AAntHung* 13 (1965) 303-18, esp. 308 ff. Both argue against a Lydian and for a Luwian-Lycian origin. Cf. also E. J. Furnée, *Die wichtigsten konsonantischen Erscheinungen des Vorgriechischen* (The Hague-Paris 1972) 44, 62-6, 269.

[37] Besides the specialized studies on aspects of Greek tyranny cited below, I mention only Berve 1967 as a general survey, H. W. Pleket, The Archaic Tyrannis, *Talanta* 1 (1969) 19-61, on archaic tyranny and E. Frolov, Tyrannis und Monarchie im Balkanischen Griechenland, in: Welskopf 1974, 231-434, on 4th century tyranny.

[38] The tyrant is *inter alia* accused of '*eating*' (δάπτω) the people, thus inheriting the image of the unrighteous king. After the δημοβόροι βασιλῆες (*Il.* 1, 231), Theognis 1181, created the term δημοφάγον τύραννον. See: Maria G. Fileni, Osservazioni sull' idea di tiranno nella cultura greca arcàica (Alc. fr. 70, 6-9; 129, 21-24 f.; Theogn. 1179-1183), *QUCC* NS 14 (1983) 29-35. The tyrant is a man-eating wolf: Plato, *Resp.* 8, 16 (565D-566A), on which see: M. Detienne and J. Svenbro, in: M. Detienne and J.-P. Vernant (edd.), *La cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec* (Paris 1979), 228; M. Detienne 1977, 143 f. On its meaning: 'destroy, debilitate': T. Eide, δημοβόρος, *Glotta* 66 (1988) 142-4. The fact that side to side with the ever increasing negative connotations the term *turannos* remained in use as a neutral indication of normal, albeit mythical, rulership, has given rise to much confusion. While *e.g.* Hegyi (*o.c.* above n.36) 305, correctly observes that fifth century tragedy does not display a consistent contrast between *basileus* and *turannos* (cf. also J. Cobet, König, Anführer, Herr, Monarch, Tyrann, in: E. Ch. Welskopf, *Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland* [Berlin 1981] 11-66, esp. 53 ff., and J. N. Davie, Herodotus and Aristophanes on Monarchy, *G&R* 26 [1979] 160-8), Berve 1962, 190 ff., almost exclusively emphasizes the negative accents in tragedy. So does A. Alföldi, with even greater bias: Gewaltherrscher und Theaterkönig, in: *Late Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of A. M. Friend* (Princeton 1955), 15 ff., esp. 30 f. and the literature cited there. A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London 1956) 23, explains the *vox media* of the term *turannos* as a relic of the poetic function of the term. Altogether one perceives a particularly obstinate epidemic of the 'myth of coherence', whereas, in fact, the double sense is not hard to explain, as we shall see later on.

[39] See for these negative stereotypes, mainly in tragedy: G. Thompson, *Zeus Turannos*, *CR* 43 (1929) 3-5; W. Heim, *Die Königsgestalten bei den griechischen Tragikern* (Diss. Erlangen 1903) 35 ff.; Berve 1962 I, 190-206. B. Gentili, Polemice antitirannica, *QUCC* NS 1 (1979) 153 ff.; G. Cerri, Antigone, Creonte e l'idea della tirannide nell' Atene del V secolo, *QUCC* NS 10 (1982) 137 ff. It was mainly through the mediation of (tragic) theatre that the stock character of the awful tyrant came to Rome: J. R. Dunkle, The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic, *TAPhA* 98 (1967) 154 ff.; *idem*, The Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy and Tacitus, *CW* 65 (1971) 12-20. On the Roman picture of the tyrant, see: J. Scheid, La mort du tyran. Chronique de quelques morts programmées, in: *Du châtiment dans la cité. Supplices corporels et peine de mort dans le monde antique* (Paris-Rome 1984) 177-93; R. Tabacco, *Il tiranno nelle declamazioni di scuola in lingua latina* (Turin 1985), who both show that in the Roman imagery the tyrant is a *signum* for cultural and moral chaos, the annihilation of social order. Here two lines seem to come together: related Greek representations (see for instance: W. Ameling, Tyrannen und Schwangere Frauen, *Historia* 35 [1986] 507-8), and the specifically Roman representation of the 'impius bellator', inherited from an IE tradition. See for the latter: F. Blaive, Le mythe indo-européen du Guerrier Impie et le péché contre la vertu des femmes, *Latomus* 46 (1987) 169-79; *idem*, Sylla ou le Guerrier Impie inachevé, *Latomus* 47 (1988) 812-20.

If there is *kratos* in a democracy, it is the *demos* which exercises it: the only authority that excels the power of the *demos* is the *nomos*, which is the real *despotes*[40] according to Hdt. 7, 104: ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος. Especially the Athenian fear of tyrants, which survived until two centuries after the expulsion of the last tyrant in 510 BC, is well known to us. The mere suspicion of tyranny could lead to ostracism[41] or banishment, and laws against tyranny were by no means a rarity[42], particularly from the 4th century onwards, a period in which a new generation of tyrants seized power in many cities[43]. The adulation which the tyrant-slayers Harmodius and Aristogeiton enjoyed

[40] J. A. S. Evans, *Despotes Nomos*, *Athenaeum* 43 (1965) 142-53. More often the title 'king' was attributed to the law: H. E. Stier, *Nomos Basileus*, *Philol.* 83 (1928) 225-58; F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Phusis* (Basel 1945) 29-36; M. Gigante, *Nomos Basileus* (Naples 1956); J. de Romilly, *La loi dans la pensée grecque des origines à Aristote* (Paris 1971) 18-23. Against this background it does not come as a complete surprise when Plato *Crito* 50-1 makes Socrates qualify the citizens as slaves of the laws or of the city. See: R. Kraut, *Socrates and the State* (Princeton 1984) esp. 105-114. On the historical development: M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens* (1986).

[41] Ostracism was invented as a safety valve against tyranny. A. E. Raubitschek, The Origin of Ostracism, *AJA* 55 (1951) 221-9, argues that the application of ostracism indeed exactly covers the period between the last application of Solon's law against tyranny (493 BC) and the law against the subversion of democracy of 411 BC. But see also: C. A. Robinson, Cleisthenes and Ostracism, *AJA* 56 (1952) 23-6, and M. Ostwald, The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion, *TAPhA* 86 (1955) 103-28, esp. 110. In general: R. Thomsen, *The Origin of Ostracism. A Synthesis* (Copenhagen 1972). Tyranny as the absolute opposite of democracy: V. J. Rosivach, The Tyrant in Athenian Democracy, *QUCC* 30 (1988) 43-57.

[42] Collected and discussed by Friedel 1937. Cf. also M. H. Hansen, *Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Entimoi and Pheugontes* (Odense 1976) 75-80. The very important decree of Eukrates from the Athenian agora, published by B. Meritt, *Hesperia* (1952) 355-9 (*SEG* 12, 87), has greatly fostered discussion. Cf. the ample discussion by M. Ostwald *o.c.* (preceding note). The new inscription from Teos containing a treaty with Kyrbissos (3rd c. BC) published by L. Robert, *JS* (1976) 153-235 (*SEG* 26, 1306; cf. F. Sokolowski, *ZPE* 38 [1980] 103 ff.), does not contain the word *turannos* but presents related issues. The inscription on tyranny from Ilion: *I.Ilion* 25; *OGIS* 218; Friedel 1937, 82-97. On Philippus II and the tyrants of Eresos (*OGIS* 8; Friedel 1937, 72 ff.; Tod II, 191) see: Habicht 1970, 14 ff. and Heisserer 1980, 27-78. The tyrannicide inscription for Philiskos from Erythrae: *Syll.*[3] 284; *I.Erythrai und Klazomenai* II, 503, with an incorrect interpretation (see below n.54). Agreements of cities on the non-acceptance of tyrants: Erythrae: *I.Erythrai und Klazomenai* 4; between Athens and the Peloponnesian cities (362 BC) : *IG* II^2, 112; Tod II, 144; with Thessaly (361 BC): *Syll.*[3] 184; Tod II, 147. Cf. also Quass 1979, 42 n. 25 and 44 f. with other examples. Finally, there is a very interesting new fragment of the *Dirae Teiorum*, published by P. Herrmann, Teos und Abdera im 5. Jhdt. v.Chr., *Chiron* 11 (1981) 1-30, where l.23 f. αἰσυμήτην οὐ στήσω proves that in a long known fragment the conjecture ὅστις .... αἰσυ[μ]νήτη⟨ν⟩ [ἱσταί]η ..... ἀπόλλυσθαι is correct. The *aisumnetes* has a kind of αἱρετὴ τυραννίς (Arist. *Pol.* 3, 1285 a 31) and the one who introduces it is cursed.

[43] All this does not imply that tyrants never featured as allies of democracies, as Klearchos, tyrant of Herakleia, proves. Kleomenes, tyrant of Methymna, even received the

from 510 onwards may be regarded as symbolic in this respect. Their deed, which cost them their lives, was eagerly annexed by democracy[44]: as exemplary freedom-fighters they were given a statue[45] and a hero cult, an exceptional privilege in this period[46]. "Wenn ich mich nicht täusche, ist hier der Weg, der zur Vergötterung führt, beschritten", says Nilsson *GGR* II, 140, and he is right. In the burial precinct of the family of Dexileos, who died in the Corinthian war and received the official burial of a public hero not far from the grave of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (Paus. 1, 29, 11 and 15), a red-figured oinochoe has been discovered which bears the picture of the tyrannicides. Obviously the parents laid

honour of *proxenia* in Athens (*Syll.*[3] 263). Sometimes tyrants were much appreciated by the people, as *e.g.* Euphron was at Sicyon (Diod. 15, 70; Xenoph. *Hell.* 7, 1, 44 ff). The image of the tyrant as a social reformer fostered this popularity: A. B. Breebaart, Tyran en monarch in de Griekse wereld van de 4e eeuw v. Chr., *TvG* 78 (1965) 273-93 = *idem*, *Clio and Antiquity* (Hilversum 1987) 9-31; Berve 1962 I, 221 ff.

[44] The resistance against the tyrants was certainly instigated by aristocrats: H. W. Pleket, Isonomia and Cleisthenes. A Note, *Talanta* 4 (1972) 63-81. Notably Thucydides has done the utmost to weaken the democratic claim to the tyrannicide and to substitute personal motives. Modern opinions are divided as to the exact origin of the tyrannicide cult: A. J. Podlecki, The Political Significance of the Athenian 'Tyrannicide'-Cult, *Historia* 15 (1966) 129-41; Ch. W. Fornara, The Tradition about the Murder of Hipparchus, *Historia* 17 (1968) 400-24; *idem*, The Cult of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, *Philolologus* 114 (1970) 155-80; K. H. Kinzl, Zu Thukydides über die Peisistratidae, *Historia* 22 (1973) 504-7; V. Hunter, Athens Tyrannis: A New Approach to Thucydides, *CJ* 69 (1973) 120-6; B. M. Lavelle, The Nature of Hipparchos' Insult to Harmodios, *AJPh* 107 (1986) 318-31. Personal motives need not exclude ideological ones. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1311 a, and the title of a book quoted by Athen. 438 c: 'Tyrant-slaying out of Revenge'.

[45] On this statue see: S. Brunnsaker, *The Tyrant-Slayers of Kritios and Nesiotes. A Critical Study of the Sources and Restorations* (Stockholm 1971). W. H. Schuchhardt and Chr. Landwehr, Statuenkopien der Tyrannenmörder Gruppe, *JDAI* 101 (1986) 85 ff. with recent literature mainly on the archaeological aspects. The statue has had a stirring history as a symbol of liberty. Cicero *Pro Mil.* 80, saw the statue group in Athens and heard the tyrannicide skolia. Brutus and Cassius received a statue in its vicinity (Diod. 47, 20, 4). See MacMullen 1966, 8-13. Even in the third century AD they still were mentioned as *exempla libertatis*: Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* 5, 34. I wonder if, in an epigram from Chios on Harmodius and Aristogeiton (2nd c. BC), splendidly supplemented by C. A. Trypanis, *Hermes* (1960) 69-74 (cf. L. Robert *BE* 1961, 472), it is indeed a grave that is intended and not a statue. On the exceptional significance of a statue in honour of human beings in the 5th century see: T. Hölscher, *Griechische Historienbilder des 5. und 4. Jhdts v. Chr.* (Würzburg 1973) 254 n.394 and 85 ff.

[46] B. Schweitzer, *Acta Congressus Madvigiani* 3 (1957) 14 f., and W. Gauer, *JDAI* 83 (1968) 119 f., interpret the attribution of a statue as a signal of hero cult, but Hölscher, *o.c.* (preceding note) 85, is not convinced. At least one must grant Marga Hirsch, *Klio* 20 (1926) 168 n.1, that their pictures on vases implied a mythical dimension. The tyrannicide skolia compared them with Achilles and Diomedes. Demosthenes 19, 280, refers to libations and wine-offering for the tyrannicides and Aristot. *Athen. Pol.* 58,1, to an *enagisma*. Val. Max. 2;10, 1, proves that in 321 BC. Harmodius and Aristogeiton possessed hero status on Rhodes. For the 5th century see: M. W. Taylor, *The Tyrant-Slayers. The Heroic Image in the Fifth Century BC. Athenian Art and Politics* (Cambr. Mass. 1982^2) and, also on later developments: I. Calabi Limentani, Armodio e Aristogitone, gli uccisi dal tiranno, *Acme* 29 (1976) 9-27.

in the young hero's grave the picture of those who freed Athens and who will greet him in Hades[47]. In so doing they anticipated a statement of Hypereides, *Epithaphios* 39 (322 BC), that Leosthenes and his men, who had fallen for the freedom of Athens, more than anybody deserved a place in Hades near to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. In real life this 'familiarity' was strictly forbidden: no statue of human beings should be set up in the vicinity of the statue of the tyrant-slayers[48].

The offspring of the two famous tyrannicides received various privileges, the same ones that in later democracies were also granted to contemporary tyrant-slayers[49]. These murderers—the people decided and the gods had to accept it—were not impure[50], since their victims were public enemies. Apparently, chasing the tyrant was an attractive business in Greece and the game was abundant, even if one does not take Burckhardt's remark literally: "dass in jedem begabten und ehrgeizigen Griechen ein Tyrann wohnte[51]". We conclude that to Greek ears there is an absolute contrast between democracy and tyranny. The tyrant puts down democracy (καταλύει τὴν δημοκρατίαν)[52], which is a stock phrase in both literary and epigraphical texts. On the other hand, killing or chasing the tyrant was synonymous with reinstating democracy, as we shall observe later on. Lucian *Tyrannoc.* 9, makes his tyrant-slayer say: "I have come

[47] As Jacobsthal attractively surmised in *Metr.Mus.Stud.* 5 (1934) 131. "It is a pity that they could not find a better picture of the statues ready-made; or did not commission one from a more expensive painter": G. Vermeule, Five Vases from the Grave Precinct of Dexileos, *JDAI* 85 (1970) 94-111, esp. 106.

[48] *IG* II², 450; 646; Plut. *Mor.* 852 E. Cf. Wycherley 1957 no. 278-9, cf. no. 701; 704. Of course this rule was immediately broken by Hellenistic rulers: Antigonus and Demetrius : Diod. 20, 46 (307 BC); Brutus and Cassius (above n.45) and cf. S. Weinstock, *Divus Julius* (Oxford 1971) 146.

[49] *IG* I², 77 (mid 5th c. BC). See the discussion in *SEG* 12, 17 (*sitesis*). Financial privileges in *I.Ilion* 25; Thasos: Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos* I, no. 18 = *idem*, *Choix d'inscriptions grecques* (Paris 1960) no. 31; Miletos: *Syll.*³ 58, and cf. Aristoph. *Av.* 1073 with scholia; Isaeus 5,47; Demosth. 20, 18, 29, 127-8, 159-160; 21, 170; 23, 143; Dein. 1, 101, where ἀτελῆ μηδένα πλὴν τῶν ἀφ' Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος appears to be a stock phrase. Cf. also Plut. *Arist.* 27, 4. A statue for tyrannicides also at Erythrae: *I. Erythrai und Klazomenai*, 503, and Xen. *Hiero* 4, 5.

[50] Andoc. 1, 96 ὅσιος καὶ εὐαγής; Eukrates decree (above n.42) ὅσιος; Teos treaty (above n.42) l.25/6 καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ αὐτὸν μ[ὴ] μιαρὸς ἔστω. Cf. Xen. *Hiero* 4, 5. For the interpretation see: K. Latte, Schuld und Sünde in der griechischen Religion, *ARW* 20 (1921) 254-98 = *Kleine Schriften* (Munich 1968) 3-35; Parker 1983, Appendix 5, 366-9.

[51] J. Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* I (1898³), who, however, elsewhere (211) complains: "nur die Tyrannen waren zu rar".

[52] Καταλύω is a terminus technicus for overthrowing any existing regime. It can be said of destroying democracy: Athenian decree concerning Kolophon (*IG* I², 15 l. 37 = *SEG* 3, no 3. [460 BC]); symmachia of Athens and Peloponnesian states (*Syll.*³ 181; Tod 144, 30); Eukrates decree (above n.42) l.8-9 and *passim*; honorary decree for Kallias of Sphettos: T. L. Shear, *Hesperia. Suppl.* 17 (1978) of 270/69 BC; decree for Demochares (Plut. *Mor.* 851 EF), on which see: Ph. Gauthier, Trois décrets honorant des citoyens bienfaiteurs, *RPh* 56 (1982) 221 ff. The opponents of Demetrius Poliorketes were called καταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον (Philochorus, *FGrHist* 328 F 66), afterwards the same was said of his supporters (Plut. *Mor.* 851). Cf. the comicus Philippides on the partisans of Demetrius: ταῦτα καταλύει τὸν δῆμον, on which see: G. B. Philipp, Philippides, ein politischer Komiker in hellenistischer Zeit, *Gymnasium* 80 (1973) 493-509, esp. 506 ff. and Habicht 1970, 214 ff. More evidence in Quass 1979, 46. The verb can also be used in connection with oligarchic groups. So e.g. in an inscription from Cibyra (*IGR* IV, 914) on a *sunomosia*, without doubt of an oligarchical nature: J. Nollé, Epigraphica varia, *ZPE* 48 (1982) 267-73; cf. Arrian. 1, 18, 2 and next note. Of course, the term is also stereotyped in texts on the subversion of tyrannies. Plutarch *Vita Tib. Gracchi* 19, 3, describes how Scipio Nasica invites the consul to rescue the city and to καταλύειν τὸν τύραννον. See for the lavish use of καταλύειν in the sources on the Gracchi: C. Nicolet *et alii*, *Demokratia et Aristokratia* (Paris 1983) 51-101.

[53] On its origins: R. Seager and Ch. Tuplin, The Freedom of Greeks of Asia: On the Origins of the Concept and the Creation of a Slogan, *JHS* 100 (1980) 141-54.

[54] Tyrannies and oligarchies were all lumped together in this period (Arist. *Pol.* 5, 8, 7; 6, 2, 2; Aeschin. 1, 4-5), especially if the oligarchy had the nature of a *dunasteia* (Demosth. 10, 4; Xen. *Hell.* 4, 4, 6. Cf. the *loci* in Polybius and Diodorus where the tyrant is identified with a *dunastes*, in H. Berve, *SbMünchen* [1952] 41 n.35). Very clearly in *I.Ilion* 25, *passim*; cf. also *Syll.*³ 181; Tod 144, l.25. On the implications of the term *oligarchia* as opposed to *demokratia* see: D. P. Orsi, ὀλιγαρχία, *QS* 14 (1981) 135-50; δημοκρατία, *QS* 11 (1980) 267-96. For this reason Habicht 1970, 15 n.4, concludes: "Tyrannen und Oligarchen stehen damals in Ionien in enger und natürlicher Interessengemeinschaft." Cf. also Friedel 1937, 53, 57 f., 65 ff. The Eukrates decree (above n.42) forbids the Areopagites to convene when people fear a tyrant coup. See: R. Sealy, On penalizing Areopagites, *AJPh* 79 (1958) 7-72. M. Ostwald, *TAPhA* 86 (1955) 113, correctly states that the expression that is used repeatedly in this decree: κατάλυσις τῆς δημοκρατίας "is of course a wider concept than 'tyranny' and also embraces the kind of oligarchy against which the decree must have been directed". I am unable to follow the arguments put forward by C. Mossé, A propos de la loi d'Eucrates sur la tyrannie 337/6 av. J.-C., *Eirene* 8 (1970) 71-8, who explains the decree as an act of loyalty to Philippus. Cf. J. W. Leopold, Demosthenes on Distrust of Tyrants, *GRBS* 22 (1981) 227-46. The opinion of Engelmann-Merkelbach, *I.Erythrai und Klazomenai,* no. 503, that the oligarchs, as a third party, took advantage of the occasion during the struggle between tyranny and democracy, had already been disputed by H. W. Pleket, *Gnomon* (1975) 567. For a very convincing interpretation see now: Ph. Gauthier *o.c* (above n.52) 215 ff. There is a comparable confusion in H. P. Stahl, *Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess* (Munich 1966) 8, who translates Thucyd.

here to bring you democracy (.....) and to convey you the happy tiding of freedom".

Kings and gods as tyrant-slayers and liberators

This is the familiar picture. I must now make two additions to it which are less familiar, but which will prove indispensable for my argument. They concern kings and gods in the role of tyrant-slayers.

In the period in which Alexander the Great had still to prove that he was 'the Great', the liberation of the Greeks of Asia Minor was his constant slogan[53]. Once on the road to fame he kept his word: he freed the Greek cities from the oligarchies[54] and tyrannies which had been estab-

lished there with the aid of the Persians, and restored their 'freedom'. In the literary evidence on Alexander[55] elements forming the stock formula of later decrees: αὐτονομία, ἐλευθερία, δημοκρατία can already be detected, though contemporary epigraphical material is lacking[56]. Nor do we have epigraphical evidence for the major part of the third century. All the same, literary reports[57] and inscriptions of later diadochs referring to initiatives of their predecessors[58] leave no doubt as to the existence of this ideology from Alexander onwards.

The formula αὐτονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία originated in the fifth century BC and is attested for the first time in a treaty between Athens and Chios[59]. Its implications have been the subject of a number of discussions. Ostwald[60] has convincingly argued that *autonomia* came into being as a stratagem for finding sanctions against the arbitrary use of force by a major state against minor states moving in its orbit. Before him, Bickerman[61] had laid the foundations by tracing the distinction between *eleutheria* as absolute independence, and *autonomia* as relative freedom, and the recent analysis by E.Levy[62] confirms that *eleutheria* is the more comprehensive term. It can function on three levels: at the individual level (free persons as opposed to slaves); in the internal affairs of a city (free citizens versus tyrannical rule); and between states (free city in contrast to a city subject to a major power). *Autonomia*, on the other hand, only functions at the last level. "La différence entre les deux termes explique peut-être pourquoi l'on négocie l'*autonomia* alors qu'on meurt pour l'*eleutheria*" (270)[63]. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that, at least in the Hellenistic period, the formula betrays a certain redundancy as the two terms become completely interchangeable[64]. Together they imply a city's right to have its own laws and political system, which is virtually always defined as democracy, the right to a (limited) foreign policy, and exemption from foreign garrisons or tribute. The latter two privileges could be added explicitly and so form the stereotyped combination αὐτόνομος καὶ ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἀφρούρητος καὶ ἀφορολόγητος[65]. I shall come back to the ineradica-

6, 60, 1, (the crimes against the Herms and the Mysteries were committed) ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ as "zum Zweck einer Oligarchen- *oder* Tyrannenverschwörung". Correct: Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover in their commentary: "but after a century of democracy (....) the Athenians regarded oligarchy and tyranny indifferently as the antithesis of democracy".

[55] The *locus classicus* is Arrian. 1, 18, 2, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας πανταχοῦ καταλύειν ἐκέλευσεν δημοκρατίας δὲ ἐγκαθιστάναι τε καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς σφῶν ἑκάστοις ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τοὺς φόρους ἀνεῖναι, ὅσους τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀπέφερον, on which Tarn 1948, II, 207: "We have here therefore the genesis of the later stock phrase αὐτόνομος, ἀφρούρητος, ἀφορολόγητος. Cf. Appian. *Mithr.* 8, φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ 'Αμίσον ..... ἐπὶ δημοκρατίαν ὡς πάτριόν σφισι πολιτείαν ἀναγαγών; Diod. 17, 24, 1, μάλιστα δ'εὐεργέτει τὰς 'Ελληνίδας πόλεις ποιῶν αὐτὰς αὐτονόμους καὶ ἀφορολογήτους. On this subject in general see Tarn 1948, II, 199 ff. and the literature cited below.

[56] The epigraphical evidence has been collected by Maria Britschkoff, *Über Freiheitserteilungen an die Griechen durch auswärtige Machthaber* (Diss. Berlin 1925). Since then new testimonia have turned up and the problems concerned have been discussed in numerous studies (see below p. 75 ff.). A bibliographical survey in J. Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt 1972) 90 ff.; *idem*, *Das Zeitalter der Diadochen* (Darmstadt 1983) 179. The epigraphical evidence on Alexander has been collected and discussed by Heisserer 1980. He also discusses the sole contemporary reference to Alexander's 'democratic' policy in the free Greek cities: the letter to the Chians (*Syll.*[3] 283, according to Heisserer pp.79-95, to be dated to 334 BC). Cf. also M. Jannelli, I rapporti giuridici di Alessandro Magno con i Chii, in: *Studi di storia antica offerti dagli allievi a E. Manni* (Rome 1976) 153 ff.; L. Prandi, Alessandro Magno e Chio. Considerazioni su *Syll.*[3] 283 e *SEG* XXII, 506, *Aevum* 57 (1983) 24-32.

[57] These include general statements concerning all the Greeks, as for instance in the edict of Antigonos I εἶναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς "Ελληνας ἅπαντας ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, αὐτονόμους (Diod. 19, 61, 3).

[58] The first attestation is a letter of Antiochus II to Erythrae (*OGIS* 223; Welles 15; *I.Erythrai und Klazomenai* 31): ἐπί τε 'Αλεξάνδρου καὶ 'Αντιγόνου αὐτόνομος ἦν καὶ ἀφορολόγητος ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν. Cf. Tarn 1948, 199 ff.; Heuss 1963, 216 ff.

[59] *Syll.*[3] 142; Tod 118; H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* II (Munich 1962) 248.

[60] Ostwald 1982. On the origins and development of the concept *eleutheria* see above all Raaflaub 1985, 71-125.

[61] E. J. Bickerman, Autonomia: sur un passage de Thucydide (1, 144, 2), *RIDA* 5 (1958) 313 f.

[62] E. Levy, Autonomia et éleuthéria au Ve siècle, *RPh* 57 (1983) 249-70.

[63] Recently Raaflaub 1985, 189-214, has taken a slightly different position although he accepts many of the ideas suggested by Bickerman and Ostwald. Unlike his predecessors he tends to stress the positive values of *autonomia*. I quote his conclusion (201 f.): "Mit *autonomia* wird demnach nicht ein in Ausmass und Einzelelementen von vorneherein konkret festgelegter Inhalt, sondern ein bestimmter Aspekt von Polisunabhängigkeit bezeichnet. Es werden damit zwar gewisse Abgrenzungen vorgenommen (...), aber vornehmlich eine Reihe allgemeiner und umfassender positiver Vorstellungen assoziiert (....). Der Terminus ist infolgedessen politisch eminent aussagekräftig und werbewirksam, auch wenn er gleichsam nur eine Richtung angibt und einen Rahmen absteckt. Es ist deshalb zunächst auch ein rein politischer (....) nach juristischen Kriterien jedoch unpräziser Terminus, der von Fall zu Fall mit konkreten Zusatzbestimmungen (...) ergänzt werden muss. Er spielt zwar im Bereich der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen eine wichtige Rolle, aber ist, streng genommen, kein Begriff des Völker-rechts". This long quotation finds its justification in the fact that it paves the way towards my views on the Hellenistic 'vagueness' in the conceptualisation of such terms as *eleutheria* and *autonomia*. In an unpublished paper which he kindly communicated to me, J. von Ungern-Sternberg calls *autonomia*: "Eigenständigkeit innerhalb eines grösseren Machtsbereiches (....). Der Begriff des 'selbst' muss faszinierend gewirkt und zu immer neuen Wortschöpfungen Anlass gegeben haben. Zugleich wird aber doch auch die Schwierigkeit deutlich, 'Autonomie' begrifflich näher zu erfassen." N. Loraux, La main d'Antigone, *Métis* 1 (1986) 165-96, contributes a perceptive discussion of the element *auto-* in similar compositions.

[64] As Levy himself remarks, and as had been observed by many before him. Cf. Tarn 1948, 205: "*eleutheria* and *autonomia are* the same thing", with many testimonies.

[65] The first attestation of the formula can be found in the letter of Laodike to Iasos concerning the privileges granted by Antiochus III, *I.Iasos* no. 4, first published by G. Pugliese-Carratelli, *ASA* 45-6 (1967-8) [1969], 445-53, where there is a discussion of the history of the formula. L. Robert *BE* 1971, no. 621, has demonstrated that the letter concerned Antiochus III, and not II, as Pugliese-Carratelli thought.

ble error of supposing that the mere existence of 'complete' formulas implies a political defectiveness in the concept of *eleutheria* whenever the term occurs without their company. The fact that these forms of independence have their political limitations is, of course, quite a different matter, to which we shall have to pay due attention.

In freeing the Greek cities Alexander consciously adopted the role of liberator, and especially that of a tyrant slayer[66]. Two of his initiatives in particular testify to this. After his final victory, he sent the statue group of Harmodius and Aristogeiton[67], which had been stolen a century and a half before by the Persians, from Persepolis back to Athens: a Trojan horse of tragic stature. Not long before that, he had announced to the Greeks of the mother country that "all tyrannies had been put down and the Greek cities were autonomous again"[68]. In so doing, he placed himself unmistakably in a tradition which had started in 514 BC and which was inseparably connected with the democratic ideology of the free *polis*[69]. Alexander became an example for numerous diadochs who presented themselves as opponents of tyrants and liberators of Greek cities[70].

An inscription from Iasos[71] states in an exemplary fashion that Antiochus III "has given the Greeks peace and has raised many from slaves to free men." (ll. 45 ff. [τι]νὰς δὲ ἀ[ν]τ[ὶ] δούλων ἐλευθέρους πεποιηκότος, and: τήνδε ἡμετέραν πόλιν προτερ[αί]ας ἐγ δουλείας ῥυσάμενος ἐποίησεν ἐλευθέρα[ν]), to the effect that the Iasians are "their own masters" (l.50 κυρίους). Liberty, autonomy and democracy constituted the stereotyped 'gifts' of the Hellenistic monarchs to privileged Greek cities in their kingdoms. The most remarkable service rendered by these cities in return was cultic worship of their rulers. Numerous documents confirm this: the divine worship offered by the Greek cities to their kings was a token of gratitude for the benefits they enjoyed, of which liberation was the most cherished[72]. A clear example is provided by a decree of Samothrace in honour of Lysimachus (*Syll.*[3] 372 [circa 288-281 BC]) ll. 23-4: the people decide "in order that the city may show worthy gratitude (ὅπως ἂν ἀξίας [χά]ριτας ἀποδιδῷ ἡ πόλις) to their benefactors, to erect an altar of King Lysimachus Benefactor, as beautiful as possible, and to bring sacrifices every year...". Appian *Syr.* 65, 344[73], says literally that Antiochus II received his honorary title *Theos* from the Milesians because he had liberated them from the tyrant Timarchus. And he adds a cynical jest that could serve as a perfect device for the ambiguity of ruler cult: "but this god was killed through poison by a woman." We are thus confronted with a stark contradiction: a deified and autocratic ruler bestows liberty! We will let this contradiction stand for a moment.

The second addition I want to make concerns the fact that not only humans, including kings, could function as liberators and destroyers of tyranny. Gods also belonged to this tradition. Homage is repeatedly paid to Zeus, in particular, in his function of liberator (*Eleutherios*), whenever a tyrant is ousted somewhere[74]. The most prominent is Heracles, who in later ages became the *exemplum* of the righteous king who put an end to the regimes of tyrants[75]. Heracles is often depicted as a tyrant slayer, as far as we know, for the first time in the 4th century BC[76]. And in this he

[66] Alexander as tyrant slayer: Arrian. 3, 2, 4 ff.; Curt. 4, 8, 11. That Alexander sometimes had to use his influence in order to mitigate excessively fierce measures (Arrian. 1, 17, 11 on Ephesos; *Syll.*[3] 283; Heisserer 1980, 98-111, on Eresos) supports the view of Friedel 1937, 70 f., that harsh measures must be seen as "selbständige Äusserungen der jeweiligen Stadt". Cf. also Habicht 1970, no. 10 a/h, and pp. 23-5.

[67] Arrian. 3, 16, 7 ff.; 7, 19, 2. For the date (December 331 BC) see: G. Wirth, Alexander zwischen Gaugamela und Persepolis, *Historia* 20 (1971) 617-32.

[68] Plut. *Alex.* 34, 2, φιλοτιμούμενος δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔγραψε τὰς τυραννίδας πάσας καταλυθῆναι καὶ πολιτεύειν αὐτονόμους. The Greek construction does not allow an imperative translation "all the tyrannies should be put down" as it is often interpreted. See: J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch. Alexander* (Oxford 1969) 91.

[69] Philip had set the example with the expulsion of the tyrants of Eresos, for which he received an altar for Zeus Philippios. Cf. Habicht 1970, 14 ff. This did not prevent Philip from being regarded as a friend of tyrants in the anti-Macedonian propaganda: Demosth. 8, 36; 9, 17, 27, 33, 58, 62; 10,8; 18, 71, 79; or he was a tyrant himself: Demosth. 1, 5; 6, 21, 24, 25; 10, 4; 18, 66. The same of Alexander: Demosth. 10, 4, 12, 29; 17, 3-4; 12, 14, 25, 29.

[70] Just as previously Dio of Syracuse had posed as a tyrant slayer and received cultic honors (Habicht 1970, 8 ff.), so Demetrius received a statue in Athens in 307 BC for having liberated the city from people who had put down democracy (above n.48). In 259 Antioch II was celebrated at Milete for having expelled tyranny (Appian. *Syr.* 65) and Antigonus Doson subverted tyranny at Sparta (Polyb. 9, 36, 4; Plut. *Cleom.* 30).

[71] *I.Iasos* no.4. "Es handelt sich um eine politische 'Parole', ein Schlagwort, das jede Partei gegen den Gegner benutzte", thus the comment *ad locum*. I shall argue that, however true this may be on one level, the concept of 'slogan' is insufficient as a historical tool. There is a nice reversal of this expression in E. Boswinkel and P. W. Pestman, *Les archives privées de Dionysos, fils de Kephalos* (Leiden 1982), no. 9 (139 BC), where a person fears: κινδυνεύων ἀντ' ἐλευθέρου δοῦλος γένεσθαι. A contrast between *demokratia* and *douleia* is found in the Athenian decree for Euphron (*IG* II² 448 = *Syll.*[3] 317) ll. 19 ff.

[72] Habicht 1970, *passim*; Gauthier 1985, 49-53; S. R. F. Price, Gods and Emperors: The Greek Language of the Roman Imperial Cult, *JHS* 104 (1984) 79-95.

[73] See Habicht 1970, 104.

[74] Samos after the fall of Polykrates: Hdt. 3, 142-8; Syracuse after the fall of Thrasyboulos in 465 BC (Diod. 11, 72, 2); more than a century later there are coins with Zeus Eleutherios (Head, *Historia Nummorum*² 119, 125, 126). Cf. the altar of Zeus Philippios (above n.54). On Zeus Eleutherios and other *theoi eleutherioi*: J. H. Oliver, *Demokratia, the Gods and the Free World* (Baltimore 1960); L. Robert, *CRAI* (1969) 50; Raaflaub 1985, 125-47; V. J. Rosivach, The Cult of Zeus Eleutherios at Athens, *PP* 42 (1987) 262-320.

[75] So, of course, above all in the Cynic doctrine of the ideal king, which reached its summit in Dio Chrysostom: R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King* (Uppsala 1948) 50 ff.; G. K. Galinsky, *The Herakles Theme* (Oxford 1972). Most emphatically: Dio Chrys. 1, 66 ff.; also *ibid.* 1, 63, 84; 5, 21; Seneca, *Herc. Fur.* 936; Plut. *Lyc.* 30.

[76] Lysias 30, 1, (388 BC): ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς τυράννους ἔπαυσε καὶ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας

was apparently imitated by Theseus, if we may go by the vase-paintings, which depict him—just like Heracles—in the attitude of the 'Harmodius blow'[77].

This will have to suffice as a historical context for Isis as a destroyer of awful tyrants. Down to the period in which the aretalogy originated, kings and gods appear to have posed as liberators and tyrant destroyers. They derived this task from a tradition which valued liberty and tyranny as complete opposites. In the practice of political reality, the early stages of the Hellenistic period stand at the end of this tradition; but the political ideology still remained strong enough to serve as a model for the expression of Isis' liberating activities, which, as we shall see below, fits in well with this picture. She thus follows the example of royal gods and divine kings.

3. "Isis I am, the tyrant of all land". The picture of the awful tyrant (II)

At first sight, it would not appear an easy task, after this extremely negative picture of the tyrant, to trace a historical context in which the term

ἐκώλυσεν. On Heracles as agent of civilization and destroyer of monsters see: L. Lacroix, Héracles, héros voyageur et civilisateur, *BAB* 60 (1974) 34-59; E. Paratore, Hercule et Cacus chez Virgile et Tite-Live, in: H. Bardon and R. Verdière (eds.) *Vergiliana* (Leiden 1971) 260-82. The combination of tyranny and monsters/criminals as opponents of Heracles is ubiquitous in later texts. A good example in Dio Chrys. 5, 21, Ἡρακλέα τὴν σύμπασαν γῆν καθαίροντα ἀπό τε τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν τυράννων. Isocrates repeatedly mentions Heracles as the adversary of lawlessness and crime (5, 111-2; 10, 28; 11, 38-9 etc.), but not as a tyrannicide. We find him expressly in this role in a letter of Speusippus (R. Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci*, Paris 1873. Epistolae Socraticorum 30, 6-7), whose authenticity has been demonstrated by E. J. Bickermann & J. Sykutris, Speusipps Brief an König Philipp, *Ber. Sächs. Ak.* 80 (1928) 1-86. The context is here markedly pro-oligarchic: M. M. Markle III, Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip. A Study of Isocrates' *Philippus* and Speusippus' Letter to Philip, *JHS* 96 (1976) 80-99, esp. 96. If Dion. Hal.1, 41, can say of Heracles: καταλύων μὲν εἴ τις εἴη τυραννὶς (.....) καθιστὰς (.....) σωφρονικὰ πολιτεύματα, it is not illegitimate to call him a 'democrat' as G. Kahlo, Der Demokrat Herkules, *ZAnt* 17 (1967) 137-43, does.

[77] Heracles in the attitude of tyrant slayer: O. Mörkholm and J. Zahle, *ActArch* 43 (1972) 101 ff. Theseus in the same attitude was recognized by C. Smith, *JHS* 2 (1881) 61. Since then other pictures have been found: C. P. Kardana, *AJA* 55 (1951) 293-300. A recent discussion: J. N. Davie, Theseus the King in Fifth-Century Athens, *G&R* 29 (1982) 25-34. Cf., however, the reservations put forward by E. Hudeczek, Theseus und die Tyrannenmörder, *JÖAI* 50 (1972-3) 134-49, especially against K. Schefold, *Mus. Helv.* 3 (1946) 71, and *Schweiz. Münzbl.* 13/4 (1964) 112 f. Before him B. B. Shefton, *AJA* 64 (1960) 173-9 and O. Mörkholm *o.c.* had denied any direct connection with the tyrannicides, since the so-called Harmodius blow represents a warrior attitude common in 6th century vase paintings. For a semiotic interpretation see: Cl. Bérard, Iconographie-iconologie-iconologique, in: *Essais sémiotiques*, *EL* (1983) 5-37, esp. 27-33, a reference I owe to my colleague Nacrebout.

turannos serves a honourable function, as in the opening of the aretalogy. Yet this can be demonstrated. In the same fifth century that saw the political disintegration of tyranny, we nevertheless meet the term *turannos* in a number of literary genres serving a non-negative function, as an indication of sovereignty applied to mythical monarchs and gods[78]. This is the case especially in tragedy, where the term is used when the usual meaning of 'king' must be transcended. This becomes evident when we ascertain which gods in particular were classified as *turannoi*[79]. First of all, of course, there is Zeus, but then also Ares[80], the god of war, and especially Eros[81], the capricious and stubborn god of love, to whose whims man is helplessly subjected. From other *turannoi*, e.g. the Moirai[82], too, we learn that the term in this context carries the connotation of absolute, totalitarian and even arbitrary sovereignty, to which the fitting human response was subservience and submissiviness. In this connection we also meet a number of other significant titles which are applied to gods in literature: *kurios*, at first very rarely: lord over slaves, guardian of the unemancipated, and more often *despotes*, which carries a comparable meaning, including the one of absolute rulership as the Greeks attributed it to oriental cultures, particularly that of the Persians. I stress the phrase "in literature" because these terms and the mentality of subservience to the gods inherent in them appear only rarely in the cult practice of the classical period.

This much is certain, that the mentality which made gods greater and men lesser[83] becomes particularly visible in the Hellenistic period. This correspond- with the fact that the terms mentioned above, as divine cult titles, begin to appear in this period and gain ever increasing popularity in the imperial period. Although we do not know which goddess was intended[84] by the woman who exclaimed τὴν Τύραννον in Herodas

[78] Older surveys of *turannos* as title of gods: Preisendanz, Tyrannos, *RML* 6, 1455-7; cf. Drexler, Men, *ibid.* 2, 2753. The best recent discussion in: Bömer 1961 III, 195-214; cf. E. N. Lane, *CMRDM* III, 76. The survey by Labarbe 1971, 484-9, exaggerates the distinction between poetic and cultic use of the term. Cf. also Berve 1967, 629, 704, 743; A. Heubeck, *o.c.* (above n.36) 24-5. Marcella Santoro, *Epitheta deorum in Asia Graeca cultorum ex auctoribus Graecis et Latinis* (Milano 1973) is curiously unserviceable.

[79] The evidence in Bömer 1961 III, 210 ff.

[80] Timoth. *Pers.* fr. 14 (790 Page), Ἄρης τύραννος, which becomes an expression meaning: 'à la guerre comme à la guerre': Suda A 3853 = *Paroem. Gr.* II, 147.

[81] The evidence in Bömer 1961 III, 210 and n.1. I do not follow C. Koch, *Religio. Studien zu Kult und Glauben der Römer* (Neurenberg 1960) 67, who derives the Etruscan name of Aphrodite, *Turan*, from this purely *literary* epithet. This does not imply that the derivation from tur-an, 'the giving', as defended among others by A. J. Pfiffig, *Religio Etrusca* (Graz 1975) 260 ff., is any better.

[82] See Petersmann 1979.

[83] See on one of the most prominent visual aspects in this connection: Van Straten 1974.

[84] Isis: Bömer 1961 III, 210; Cybele: Labarbe 1971, 485 ff., who gives the literature.

Mimiamb. 5, 77, we may with certainty infer that as a title it had already become naturalized in the 3rd century BC. For Men, a god from Asia Minor, the title *turannos* was so stereotyped that it became part of his name: as Men Tyrannus or Menotyrannus he was widely venerated in the first centuries AD[85]. It is also in parts of Asia Minor[86], especially in Lydia and Phrygia, that gods were often regarded as despots reigning supreme over a village[87] or a temple domain[88]. In this quality they had

[85] Men is the most prominent *turannos*. There are seven attestations of this title for his cult: Lane 1971 I, nos. 11 (cf. 12, 13) (Attica); 15 (Thasos); 30 (Pergamum); 36, 53, 61 (Lydia); III, p. 174, A 8, an inscription subsequently published by E. Schwertheim, *IM* 25 (1975) 357. There is one testimony of Zeus Tyrannos at Kula (Lane 1971 I, no. 54; *TAM* V, 1, 537), who is "kaum wesentlich von Men verschieden." (Bömer 1961 III, 204, and literature in n.5. Cf. Labarbe 1971, 489). The development towards Menotyrannus was not completed before the 4th century AD. The supplements suggested by Labarbe 1971, 488 n.5, viz. *CIL* VI, 508 and 511, remain dubious since these inscriptions have a fair chance of being false: Lane 1976 III, 176 ff. Of course, the title was by no means restricted to Men.

[86] The peculiar religious mentality of this area in the first centuries AD has elicited a number of studies. Prominent are Steinleitner 1913, 14 ff.; 76 f.; J. Keil, Die Kulte Lydiens, in: *Anatolian Studies Presented to W. M. Ramsay* (1923) 239-66; J. Zingerle, Heiliges Recht, *JÖAI* 23 (1926) 5-72; cf. Bömer 1961 III, 207 f.; Nock 1972 I, 47 and 74 ff.; Pleket 1981; Debord 1982. Juridical aspects of the relationship with the gods: Versnel 1990.

[87] The gods are called κώμην βασιλεύοντες or κατέχοντες etc. See: Zingerle *o.c.* (preceding note) 9, where Le Bas-Waddington no. 518 must be eliminated; Bömer 1961 III, 203 f. Several new testimonia can now be added: Pleket 1981, 177, and above all the good discussion by Debord 1982, 166-8. Probably the names of a pair of gods from Ancyra, Βασιλεὺς καὶ βασίλισσα, (St. Mitchell, *AS* 27 [1977] 63-103, nos 31 and 32, cf. *BE* 1978, 493) refer to the same function.

[88] It is not alway easy to draw clear distinctions between these two categories. T. Zadwadzki, Quelques remarques sur l'étendue et l'accroissement des domaines des grands temples en Asie Mineure, *Eos* 46 (1952/3) 83-96, has successfully contested the established view that these villages as ἱεραὶ κώμαι generally belonged to temple domains. Moreover: "chaque ville grecque peut avoir une ἱερὰ χώρα" and "chaque sanctuaire grec peut posséder des domaines sans qu'il ait aucune trace de théocratie d'origine orientale et de 'village sacré'" (J. et L. Robert, *La Carie* II [Paris 1954] 295 n.12). Just to mention one illustrative instance: the sacred houses on Delos, on which see: D. Hennig, Die 'Heiligen Häuser' von Delos, *Chiron* 15 (1985) 165-86, and cf. *ibid.* 13 (1983) 411-95. On the considerable variety of types of temple domains: L. Boffo, I re ellenistici e i centri religiosi dell' Asia Minore (Florence 1985) with the discussion of B. Virgilio, Strutture templari e potere politico in Asia Minore, *Athenaeum* 65 (1986) 227-31. All this is not to say that the mentality of the genuine ἱεραὶ κώμαι should not reflect itself in the attitudes of the 'free' faithful. There were many opportunities for influences since Asia Minor housed numerous enormous temple domains already in the Hellenistic period. See: H. Kreissig, Tempelland, Katoiken, Hierodulen im Seleukidenreich, *Klio* 59 (1977) 375 ff.; K.-W. Welwei, Abhängige Landbevölkerungen auf 'Tempelterritorien' im hellenistischen Kleinasien und Syrien, *AncSoc* 10 (1979) 97-118. On the status of their inhabitants: L. Delekat, *Katoche, Hierodulie und Adoptionsfreilassung* (Munich 1964); M. A. Levi, Templi e schiavi in Asia Minore, in: *Santuari e politica nel mondo antico* (Milano 1983) 51-6. For the imperial period see also: T. R. S. Broughton, Roman Asia Minor, in: T. Frank, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* IV (1938) 641-6; 676-84. On the whole complex now Debord 1982, whose conclusion (p.168) on the kingship of the gods over the free villages is worth quoting: "Il ne s'agit en aucun cas de penser que le dieu *possède* (.....) toute la terre (...). Mais

a say in the personal lives of their subjects and punished those who, by disbelief or misdemeanour, threatened to diminish their almighty power. Then confession and repentance were required to obtain the mercy of the god, after which his great power, often manifest in a miracle, was exalted and published on stone. Many so-called confession texts testify to this peculiar form of religiosity[89].

However, glimpses of this mentality can be perceived far earlier in the worship of Isis and other Egyptian gods. To give one example, a much discussed inscription from Priene (circa 200 BC)[90] contains a *lex sacra* for the cult of the Egyptian gods. In l.29 mention is made of [τ]οῖς κατεχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ (*i.e.* Sarapis). This may imply that the sanctuary at Priene was organized on the model of the Serapieium of Memphis and other Egyptian temple complexes. In Egypt, *katochoi*[91] were people who

ce qui compte ici, c'est l'*energeia*, la *dunamis* du dieu, qui lui permet d'être le maître d'un village (*kurios*) et de ses habitants." He rightly emphasizes the continuity in the various cult practices. The '*fanatici*' described by Strabo 11, 4, 7, as divinely possessed *hierodouloi* who celebrate the god's presence in a kind of enthousiasmos in Eastern Asia Minor, are closely related to the ἄνδρες ἱεροί of Pausan. 10, 32, 4, at Magnesia, who, enraptured by Apollo, uproot and carry away big trees. (Cf. L. Robert, Le dendrophore de Magnésie, *BCH* [1977] 77-88).

[89] The confession texts were collected for the first time by Steinleitner 1913. Since then many new inscriptions have been found. The specimens from North East Lydia have now been conveniently collected by P. Herrmann, *TAM*, V,1. A survey of recent publications and discussions in Versnel 1990, to which should now be added: G. Petzl and H. Malay, A New Confession-Inscription from the Katakekaumene, *GRBS* 28 (1987) 459-72; M.-L. Cremer and J. Nollé, Lydische Steindenkmäler, *Chiron* 18 (1988) 199-205; H. Malay, New Confession-Inscriptions in the Manisa and Bergama Museums, *EA* 12 (1988) 147-54, with G. Petzl, *ibid.* 155-66. We find a severe censure of this religious behaviour in Plutarch, *De superstitione*, who labels this type of belief as 'superstition' and describes the superstitious as "one who fears the reign of the gods as a gloomy and inexorable *tyranny*" (166 D). The relationship between men and gods is one of 'slaves' and 'masters': a first glimpse of the ambiguity of the concept 'tyrant'.

[90] *I.Priene* 195; *SIRIS* 291; *LSAM* 36, with literature on p. 101 and 103. Cf. also Dunand 1973 III, 56 ff.; Debord 1982, 92. Cf. *IGR* IV, 1403 from Smyrna (U. Wilcken, *Urkunden der Ptolemäerzeit* I, 52; *SIRIS* 306; *I.Smyrna* 725, with an ample discussion [Time of Caracalla]): Παπίνιος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐγκατοχήσας τῷ κυρίῳ Σαράπιδι παρὰ ταῖς Νεμέσεσιν. This *philosophos* was, as Cumont 1937, 122, demonstrated, a "docteur ès sciences occultes", very close to a magician.

[91] Reitzenstein 1927, 192 ff.; G. Heuser, *Die katochè im Serapieion bei Memphis* (Diss. Marburg 1935); Cumont 1937, 148 f.; L. Wenger, Eine juristische Erwägung zum *katoche*-problem, *AKG* 28 (1938) 113-34; A. M. Frenkian, Detinutii (ἐγκάτοχοι) în templul lui Sarapis din Memfis, *StudClas* 9 (1967) 121-41; E. Perotti, Ricerche sui κάτοχοι. *Centro di Ricerche e doc. sull' ant. class. Atti Milano-Varese. Ist. Cisalpino* 8 (1976/7) 181-202, pointing out connections with ecstasy and possession. More literature in Delekat *o.c.* (above n.88) and Debord 1982, 360 n.135. Cf. also below pp.89 ff. Almost all of the Greek and some of the demotic evidence is contained in Wilcken's *UPZ* I. Recently, D. Thompson, *Memphis under the Ptolemies* (Princeton 1988), ch. 7, has given a balanced survey of what can be known of the practical and material aspects of *katoche* on the basis of the Sarapieion archive of Ptolemaios, son of a Macedonian settler in the mid second century BC, who, like other members of his family, was 'held' by Sarapis. Adding more recent findings she concen-

had taken refuge in the sanctuary of the god and had received asylum. But such permanent residence in the sanctuary could also be the result of a vow. These sacred 'prisoners'[92] served the god as veritable slaves or servants, and this service, as we shall see below, could assume extreme forms of subservience. On the other hand, it is worth considering the possibility that the term here covers an Asia Minor reality, not unrelated to the Egyptian form of *katoche*, but also comparable, or rather more so, to the voluntary service to a god as we know it so well from local inscriptions[93].

Isis is honoured by aretalogies, which, like the Phrygian/Lydian confession texts, are *marturiai* of her powerful miracles, and in these she appears as a formidable ruler. No god or goddess has such a variety of titles indicating unlimited power and sovereignty; the most frequent are: *basilissa, despoina, kuria* and *anassa*[94]. In her cult, too, confession of sins plays a part[95] and sometimes it is the goddess herself who calls people to her service or gives them access to her temple[96]. All these features picture the

trates on the interests and daily activities of the 'detainees' and, as far as possible, keeps aloof of the great debate on the religious or secular nature of the *katoche*, for which, indeed, the evidence is scarcely adequate. Particularly interesting in the context of our enquiry is the variety of backgrounds (Greek, Egyptian, perhaps Near-Eastern) from where these devotees might come.

[92] For sometimes it was indeed a real 'Gotteshaft'. For a very realistic example in a recent confession text see: H. Malay, New Confession-Inscriptions in the Manisa and Bergama Museums, *EA* 12 (1988) 147-54, no 5, and the commentary by G. Petzl, *ibid.* p.165, where a person is said to have been in (sacred) prison (τὴν φυλακήν) for nearly two years, after which the god granted him freedom.

[93] As Debord 1982, 92 suggests. Cf. *e.g.* the woman in an inscription from the vicinity of Gölde, N.E. Lydia (*TAM* V, 1, 460), who is called upon by the god to become his servant, and first refuses, but is punished and compelled κατάγραψαι ἐμαυτὴν ἰς ὑπηρεσίαν τοῖς θεοῖς. A very curious inscription (*BCH* 7 [1883] 276) makes mention of a woman παλλακεύσασα κατὰ χρησμόν, which implies, as Nock 1972 I, 46 n.87 observes, that the woman was regarded as the god's consort. For various kinds of κατοικοῦντες in temples see: MacMullen 1981, 42 with n.43. On the question of their social position: B. Virgilio, I *katochoi* del tempio di Zeus Baisokaike, *PP* 40 (1985) 218-22.

[94] Good collections in Ronchi 1975 III, s.v. *Isis*. As ἄνασσα, sometimes with τῆς οἰκουμένης 14x; βασίλεια, βασίλισσα, sometimes with θεῶν 6x; δέσποινα, δεσπότις 3x; δυνάστις 3x; κυρία over 90x. Cf. also the useful list of epithets on pp. 551-4. The studies mentioned above n.17 have surveys in their indices. See also Vandebeek 1946, 132; Drexler, Isis, *RML* 2, 512 ff. Latin titles inter alia in *SIRIS*, index s.v. *regina* 32x; *domina* 7x. The terms *regina, domina, summa, prima* are frequent in Apul. *Metam.* 11. See the solid information given by Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 142 and 156, where he gives the only correct interpretation of τύραννος πάσης χώρας, and p.170 where he identifies *domina* with τύραννος. L. Kakosy, Isis Regina, in: *Studia Aegyptiaca* I. *Recueil d'études dédiées à V. Wessetzky* (Budapest 1974) 221-30, traces the Egyptian pre-history of these royal epithets.

[95] Here generally in the form of confession of innocence: Merkelbach 1967; *idem, ZPE* 2 (1968) 13 ff.; L. Koenen, *ZPE* 2 (1968) 31-8; R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 11 (1973) 81-100. And see below p.203 f.

[96] Most noticeably in Tithorea, where according to Pausanias 10, 32, 13, "there is no admission to the shrine except for those whom Isis herself has favoured with an invitation in a dream". On this and similar instances of 'vocation' (cf. especially *ILS* 4316, "those whom Iuppiter O.M. Dolichenus has chosen to serve him") see: Nock 1933, 152 ff.

goddess as the absolute mistress of dependent and submissive mortals. Against this background her claim to being 'tyrant of all land' becomes completely transparent. The term, in its awesome, but non-negative meaning remained applicable to supremely reigning gods and even became intensified in the Hellenistic period.

Human rulers as supreme autocrats

Finally, in this connection a glance at similar developments in the ideology of human kingship is illuminating. For Alexander and his successors the title *turannos* was not available: their image as liberators and tyrant slayers definitely resisted its application. However, the new tyrants in the more marginal areas of the Greek-speaking world were, as we have seen, not necessarily depreciated[97]. Xenophon, in his *Hiero*, and Isocrates in his *Nicocles* and *Euagoras*, sketch the conditions for a beneficent tyranny, and in the fourth book of the *Nomoi* Plato states that precisely the unrestricted power of the tyrant—provided it is applied with caution and wisdom—may guarantee the prosperity of the state. In fact, this meant the introduction of the Hellenistic *Fürstenspiegel*[98]. In a description of the 5th century tyrant of Syracuse, conveniently labelled as *basileus* for the occasion, Diodorus 11, 67, 2 ff. provides an exemplary image of the Hellenistic ideology[99]:

> "Gelon, who far excelled all other men in valour (ἀρετῇ) and strategy and out-generalled the Carthaginians, defeated these barbarians in a great battle. And since he treated the peoples whom he had subdued with fairness (ἐπιεικῶς) and, in general, conducted himself humanely (φιλανθρώπως) towards all his immediate neighbours, he enjoyed high favour (μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς) among the Sicilian Greeks. Thus Gelon, being beloved by all be-

[97] See for this and what follows especially: E. Frolov, Das Problem der Monarchie und der Tyrannis in der politischen Publicistik des 4. Jahrhunderts v.u.Z., in: Welskopf 1974, 401-34; Berve 1967 I, 360-72: 'Der Tyran und das Bemühen um seine Bildung.'

[98] Although B. Welles, in: *Studi in onore di Calderini e Paribeni* I (1956) 81 f., goes too far when he states: "The Hellenistic monarchy was created by Greek theoreticians and publicists; it was not designed to extinguish the Greek city but to preserve it". Justly contested by V. Ehrenberg, Some Aspects of the Transition from the Classical to the Hellenistic Age, in: *idem, Man, State and Deity* (London 1974) 52-63. On the origins of monarchic ideology: K. F. Stroheker, Die Anfänge der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik, *Historia* 2 (1953/4) 381 ff. On Hellenistic royal ideology: E. R. Goodenough, The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship, *YSCP* 1 (1928) 55-102; Schubart 1937, still one of the best; L. Delatte, *Les traités de la royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas* (Paris-Liège 1942); Welwei 1963, esp. 123 ff. and 162 ff.; Aalders 1975, 17 ff. Surveys in Hadot, Fürstenspiegel, *RAC* 555 ff. and 580 ff., and J. Seibert, *Das Zeitalter der Diadochen* (Darmstadt 1983) 175 f.

[99] On the intricate relationship of tyranny and kingship in Diodorus see: A. Scarpa Bonazza Buora, *Libertà e tirannide in un discorso 'siracusano' di Diodoro Siculo* (Rome 1984).

cause of his mild rule (ἀγαπώμενος διὰ τὴν πρᾳότητα) lived in uninterrupted peace until his death'' (Tr. C. H. Oldfather).

Here we have the two poles of Hellenistic royal ideology in a nutshell[100]: on the one hand, the kingship is absolute, unrestricted and based on superior power, the 'unumschränkte Siegerrecht' as basis for the patrimonial authority[101], which Hellenistic kings and tyrants had in common. In accordance with their power, kings, like gods, were called *kurios*[102]: they

[100] Note, however, that elements of these royal virtues can already be observed in Pindar, who calls the tyrant Hiero (*Pyth.* 3, 71) πραὺς ἀστοῖς οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς. Elsewhere, however, the terminology shows important differences. Cf. G. A. Privitera, Politica religiosa dei Dinomenidi e ideologia dell' 'optimus rex', in: *Perennitas*, 393-411, esp. 406 ff. The term πρᾶος, for that matter, has a long history as a marker of royal clemency: Xen. *Cyrop.* 3, 1, 41; 6, 1, 37; 2, 3, 21; 7, 1, 41, on which see: Farber 1979; Isoc. *Phil.* (places in Welwei 1963, 116-8). For the Roman period see: H. Martin Jr., The Concept of *Praotes* in Plutarch's *Lives*, *GRBS* 3 (1960) 65-73; C. Panagopoulos, Vocabulaire et mentalités dans les Moralia de Plutarque, *DHA* 3 (1977) 197-235; P. Grimal, La clémence et la douceur dans la vie politique romaine, *CRAI* (1984) 466-78. The early evidence on *praos* and the related concept of *philanthropia*: J. de Romilly, *La douceur dans la pensée grecque* (Paris 1979) 38-52; C. Carey, 'Philantropy' in Aristotle's *Poetics*, *Eranos* 86 (1988) 131-9. On later epigraphical evidence the recent discussion by H. Müller, *Chiron* 17 (1987) 199 f. Cf. also below n.106.

[101] Terms and discussion in Schmitthenner 1968, 31-46, esp. 39; A. Aymard, La monarchie hellénistique, *Relazioni X Congresso Intern. Sc. Stor.* (Roma 1955) II, 215-34, esp. 225: ''le roi est l'état''; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (Munich 1969[5]) 432. Bikerman 1938, 133 ff. (and other works cited below) regarded the ancient 'droit de victoire' as the basic and official legitimation of Hellenistic kingship, a view which has been rightly readjusted by others. See above all: A. Mehl, ΔΟΡΙΚΤΗΤΟΣ ΧΩΡΑ. Kritische Bemerkungen zum 'Speererwerb' in Politik und Völkerrecht der Hellenistischen Epoche, *AncSoc* 11/12 (1980/1981) 173-212. Nonetheless the words of Suda s.v. Βασιλεία· οὔτε φύσις οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδοῦσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡγεῖσθαι στρατοπέδου καὶ χειρίζειν πράγματα νουνεχῶς, οἷος ἦν Φίλιππος καὶ οἱ διάδοχοι Ἀλεξάνδρου reflect a genuine Hellenistic ideology. Though perhaps not the political legitimation, succes in war combined with energetic control of internal affairs was certainly experienced as the confirmation of something situated between the ineluctability and the justification of the *status quo*.

[102] According to Plut. *Alex.* 28, 2, Philip II was already called *kurios* of Samos. Many scholars have questioned the authenticity of this datum, but K. Rosen, Der 'göttliche' Alexander, Athen und Samos, *Historia* 27 (1978) 20-39, argues attractively that it is exactly this qualification that put him in the position to 'give' Samos to the Athenians. While Alexander officially still was ἡγεμὼν τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατασταθείς (Arrian. 2, 14, 4), the indication *kurios* already turned up in Asia Minor: κυρίου τῆς Ἀσίας ὄντος (Arrian. 2, 14, 8); Chr. Blinkenberg, *Die Lindische Tempelchronik* (Bonn 1915) p. 32 l.105: κύριος τῆς Ἀσίας γενόμενος. What is a functional term here, rapidly develops into a title, especially in Egypt. Cf. Ronchi 1975 III, s.v. *kurios/kuria*, Schubart 1937, 18. I cannot go into the vexed question of whether the term was transferred from mortal kings to gods or vice versa, though I do think this is not the most helpful way to present the problem. A good survey of the older discussion in: Williger, *Kyrios*, *RE* (1925) 176 ff., esp. 179. On OT and NT evidence: V. N. Neufeld, *The Earliest Christian Confessions* (Leiden 1963) 60-8, with older literature; S. Brown, Concerning the Origin of the Nomina Sacra, *StudPap* 9 (1970) 7-19; W. L. Dulière, Théos, Dieu et Adonai Kurios, *ZRGG* 22 (1970) 193-203. There is an interesting phrase in the trilingual stele from Xanthos: Πιζώταρος δὲ κύριος ἔστω (H. Metzger, *CRAI* [1974] 85). A complicating factor is the fact that κύριος, κυρία are used in

had an *anhupeuthunos arche* [103]. The rulers, persuasively pictured as the embodiment of the law[104], actually stood above it, as real tyrants did. This position made them just as distant from ordinary mortals as the gods[105].

On the other hand, the subjects now expected from their human autocrats the full scale of benefits that the gods used to bestow on them. Being pictured as virtuous, humane, righteous, clement, prudent, concerned, benevolent etc.[106], the kings were expected to provide justice,

everyday language as 'sir, madam': L. Robert, *RPh* (1974) 242. D. Hagedorn - K. A. Worp, Von *kurios* zu *despotès*. Eine Bemerkung zur Kaisertitulatur im 3/4 Jhdt., *ZPE* 39 (1980) 165 ff., argue that since the term *kurios* had lost its distinctive force, *despotes* had to take its place in the titles of the emperor.

[103] On the implications of this term see the literature mentioned in n.101. This implies that their rulership is described with terms like ἄρχειν (Appian. *Syr.* 3); δεσπόζειν (Polyb. 5, 34, 7); κυριεύειν (Diod. 20, 37, 2; already in Xen. *Mem.* 2, 6, 22; 3, 5, 10).

[104] G. J. D. Aalders, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΜΨΥΧΟΣ, in: *Politeia und Respublica* (Wiesbaden 1969) 315-29; W. Klassen, The King as 'Living Law' with particular reference to Musonius Rufus, *Studies in Religion* 14 (1985) 63-71.

[105] In astrological works one of the most propitious astral configurations foretells the granting of access to the king: Cumont 1937, 29. The epithet εὐάντητος and cognates are significant both in the intercourse with gods (Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 171 f.; 312 f.; Versnel 1981a, 34 and 71), and with rulers (Versnel 1980, 544). Of course, it is also possible to contrast the presence of the mortal king with the absence of the gods. Thus for instance in the famous ithyphallic hymn for Demetrius Poliorcetes (Douris in Athen. 6, 253 f. = *FGrHist* IIA no. 76 F 13) l. 15 ff.: ''For other gods are either far away, or lend no ear, or are not, or care nothing about us: but thee we can see in very presence...'' On this hymn see most recently: M. Marcovich, *Studies in Graeco-Roman Religions and Gnosticism* (Leiden 1988) 8-19.

[106] Farber 1979 lists the following qualifications from Xenophon: ἀρετή, φιλοτιμία, προθυμία, πρόνοια, ἐπιμέλεια, φροντίς, εὔνοια, φιλανθρωπία, πραότης, σωτηρία, εὐεργεσία; Welwei 1963 from Polybius: εὐεργετικός, μεγαλόψυχος, πρᾶος, συγγνωμικός, σώφρων, φιλάνθρωπος. Terms like εὔνοια, φιλοστόργως, εὐεργεσία, ἐπιεικῶς, φιλανθρώπως were so stereotyped that their presence in a text can confirm its authenticity at least as a direct imitation of official style: Chr. Habicht, Royal Documents in Maccabees II, *HSCP* 80 (1976) 1-18, esp. 6 and n.12. Many terms and concepts were adopted by Latin panegyrists and in official language. See especially: L. K. Borne, The Perfect Prince According to the Latin Panegyrists, *AJPh* 55 (1934) 20-35; M. P. Charlesworth, The Virtues of a Roman Emperor. Propaganda and the Creation of Belief, *PBA* 23 (1937) 105-133 (= H. Kloft, *Ideologie und Herrschaft in der Antike* [Darmstadt 1979] 361-87, where there is also a bibliographical survey p.505-9); F. Burdeau, L'empereur d'après les panégyriques latins, in: *idem et alii*, *Aspects de l'empire romain* (Paris 1964) 1-66; A. Wallace-Hadrill, The Emperor and his Virtues, *Historia* 30 (1981) 298-323; J. Gruber, Cicero und das hellenistische Herrscherideal. Ueberlegungen zur Rede 'De imperio Gn. Pompei', *WS* 101 (1988) 243-58. Some 'quiet' values comparable to Greek *praos*: T. Adam, *Clementia Principis. Der Einfluss hellenistischer Fürstenspiegel auf den Versuch einer rechtlichen Fundierung des Prinzipats durch Seneca* (Kieler Hist. Stud. 11 [Stuttgart 1970]); I. Lana, *Civilis, civiliter, civilitas* in Tacito e in Suetonio. Contributo alla storia del lessico politico romano nell' età imperiale, *Atti Ac. Sc. Torino. Cl. Sc. Mor. Stor. Fil.* CVI (1972) 465-87; V. Neri, *Costanzo, Giuliano e l'ideale del civilis princeps nelle storie di Ammiano Marcellino* (Rome 1984). Cf. Versnel 1980, 542-5. For *indulgentia* and *liberalitas* see below nn.108 and 187.

peace, mercy and benefits of many kinds [107]. Kings were no less saviours and benefactors[108] than the gods, and thus, as we have seen, liberation was expected from both categories.

In all this there is no essential distinction between Hellenistic kings and tyrants. This is strikingly illustrated by astrological texts from the second century AD or later. The relevant passages at least go back to Ptolemaic times as the frequent occurrence of the term *turannos*, for instance, proves, a term which had no point of reference whatsoever in the political reality of the Roman Empire. Though perfectly aware of the differences between kings and tyrants, these texts constantly lump them together without even

[107] κομίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον ταχέως (Letter of Aristaeas 291) is *the* basic duty of Hellenistic kings, as above all the numerous *enteuxeis* in Egypt demonstrate. Τὸ διὰ παντὸς ἐν εἰρήνῃ καθεστάναι τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους (*ibid.*) is a second best. See: Welwei 1963, 170 ff. Cf. M. Smith, *To dikaion* and Society in Third-century Greece, in: *In memoriam O. J. Brendel. Essays in Archaeology and the Humanities* (Mainz 1976) 87-93. For Rome: M. Fuhrmann, Die Alleinherrschaft und das Problem der Gerechtigkeit (Seneca: *De clementia*), *Gymnasium* 70 (1963) 481-514 (= R. Klein, ed. *Prinzipat und Freiheit* [Darmstadt 1969] 271-320); B. Lichocka, *Iustitia sur les monnaies impériales romaines* (Warsaw 1974); L. de Salvo, La 'iustitia' e l'ideologia imperiale, in: *Le trasformazioni della cultura nella tarda antichità* (Rome 1985) 71-93. A most illustrative example is handed down by Cass. Dio 69, 6, 3: When Hadrian was setting out for a journey a poor woman came to him asking for justice. When the emperor cried that he had no time, the woman responded: "then do not be king", whereupon Hadrian felt ashamed and listened to her complaints. There is a remarkable resemblance between the presenting of *libelli* with complaints to the emperor and similar 'prayers for justice' to gods. For the first see: F. Millar, Emperors at Work, *JRS* 57 (1967) 9-19, and *The Emperor in the Roman World* (London 1977) 203-72. The latter are fully discussed by Versnel 1990.

[108] *Soter* and *euergetes* are royal and divine titles *par excellence*: P. Wendland, ΣΩΤΗΡ, *ZNTW* 5 (1904) 335-53; Nock 1972 II, 720-35; Schubart 1937, 13 ff.; Habicht 1970, 156-60. However, the predicate *euergetes* was more frequently applied to human benefactors than to gods. In the same period euergetism developed as a social phenomen: Veyne 1976; Gauthier 1985. Accordingly, Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 377, aptly compares the Praises of Isis (and other gods) with the "Prosa-Barock jener Asianer, die die Herrscherinschriften stilisierten. Es sind die *Res gestae* der Königin Isis." Remarkably, there is one predicate that kings and gods do not share: father. Although, of course, the idea of the great god as father is not totally absent, it did not develop into a general concept. On the other hand, the idea of the king as 'father' or 'pastor' is widespread, especially in philosophical treatises. See: Aalders 1975, 23 ff.; Welwei 1963, 162 ff.; D. Peil, *Untersuchungen zur Staats- und Herrschaftsmetaphorik in literarischen Zeugnissen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich 1983) 29 ff. But the basic idea goes back to the archaic period: G. Camassa, Il 'pastorato' di Zaleuco, *Athenaeum* 64 (1986) 139-45. It seems to have been formulary in acclamations, combined or alternating with saviour and benefactor: Dion. Hal. 4, 32, 1; 10, 46, 8. For Roman ideas see: A. Alföldi, *Der Vater des Vaterlandes im römischen Denken* (Darmstadt 1971) 118 ff.; W. Eck, in: *Romanitas et Christianitas. Festschrift J. Straub* (Berlin 1982) 217-29. Particularly interesting is the shifting of ideas such as *indulgentia* from imperial clemency concerning the state to kindness towards the subjects as children: H. Cotton, The Concept of *indulgentia* under Trajan, *Chiron* 14 (1984) 245-66, and comparably *liberalitas*: C. E. Manning, *Liberalitas*. The Decline and Rehabilitation of a Virtue, *G&R* 32 (1985) 73-84. On the patriarchal aspects of Greek social relations in general: H. Strasburger, Zum antiken Gesellschaftsideal, *Abh.Heidelberg* (1976), 121 and n.848.

hinting at negative aspects of tyranny[109]. For instance, Vettius Valens 56, 28, says that a particular astral configuration predicts that the person involved τύραννος ἔσται, κτίσει πόλεις, ἑτέρας δὲ διαρπάξει, qualities which in other texts are specifically attributed to kings[110].

Isis *turannos* is portrayed in this light as a queen ruling with absolute power. Again we discern an awful tyrant, but this time in the non-negative sense of an awe-inspiring and venerable supreme patroness: a tyrant not to be exterminated but to be revered. Again she is the exponent of a tradition, but this time a tradition which, though previously announced, stands together with the Hellenistic period itself at the beginning of its development. And again we are confronted with a contradiction. If above we met a deified and autocratic ruler who bestows liberty, now we discover a 'tyrannical' goddess who liberates men from tyrants.

We have now done our duty at the level of philological interpretation. We have filled in the historical and ideological contexts of the two contrasting aspects of the term *turannos*. The contradiction has been brought into sharp relief, but, when seen against its double background, it has become transparent. The desire to 'solve' the inconsistency has thus been conclusively quelled. But, and this is more important, so too has the desire to minimize it. The paradox of two contrasting meanings of the word *turannos* appears to be much more then the accidental result of a banal polysemy of ideologically loaded words. The real paradox of an autocratically ruling goddess, who nevertheless grants liberty must not be glossed over or eliminated, for—as has become amply evident by now—this was one of the central antinomies of the early Hellenistic period. We have learned to distrust sweeping generalizations on periods, cultures or 'Zeitgeist'. Yet it is difficult to close our eyes to the constant tension between the prayer for liberation and the fear of freedom so characteristic of Hellenistic culture[111]. This paradoxical conflict between the bestowal of liberty and si-

[109] See the collection of texts in Cumont 1937, 25 n.2; 29 n.2; 35 n.7.

[110] *Ibid.* 28 n.3.

[111] One recognizes the influence of Dodds 1951, ch. VIII: 'The Fear of Freedom', who borrowed terms and ideas from E. Fromm, *Fear of Freedom* (London 1942). His ideas have elicited discussion. See especially R. Gordon, Fear of Freedom? Selective Continuity in Religion during the Hellenistic Period, *Didaskalos* 4 (1972) 48-60. More recent studies focus on other aspects of his work: G. Mangani, Sul metodo di Eric Dodds e sulla sua nozione di irrazionale, *QS* 11 (1980) 172-205; R. C. Smith and J. Lounibos (eds.) *Pagan and Christian Anxiety. A Response to E. R. Dodds* (New York-London 1984). Without having the opportunity of going into this here (I have given my opinion in: Religieuze stromingen in het Hellenisme, *Lampas* 21 [1988] 48-73), I believe that Dodds' appreciation of the Hellenistic mood, though obviously too one-sided, should not be totally discarded. Cf. also A.-J. Festugière, *La vie spirituelle en Grèce à l'époque hellénistique* (Paris 1977), who divides his book into two sections: 'un monde sans inquiétude' and 'un monde inquiet'.

multaneous reactions of subservience was artlessly and inadvertently phrased in our aretalogy, which stands on the border of old, weakening and new, revolutionary political developments. The philologist is irritated and wishes to reconcile the contradiction and we have attempted to prevent him. But this same contradiction has provoked similar feelings of disgust and negation from those engaged in purely historical research. The 'strain towards congruence' is epidemic.

4. Liberation and subjection. The obverse and reverse of a Hellenistic medal

The question of how the new type of kingship in the Hellenistic period could be reconciled with the firmly rooted ideal of the free and autonomous Greek *polis* has stimulated a flood of polemical studies. The fact that no one was able to solve the flagrant contradiction was preferably blamed on the extreme scarcity of source material, both literary and epigraphic. It was generally assumed that, although we do not have a scrap that points in this direction, treaties and contracts must certainly have existed between cities and rulers, which determined the rights and obligations of both. In these, without doubt, the freedom of the city would have been defined as 'derivative', or 'precarious' and at any rate as restricted[112]. In 1937, however, a bomb burst. In his book 'Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus', Alfred Heuss[113] argued that, firstly, no explicit constitutional relations were developed between kings and cities; and, secondly, that the civic liberty and autonomy granted by the monarchs were legally valid and remained such, whatever the obligations to accept royal garrisons, to pay tributes and to honour the ruler as a god. The freedom of the cities was and remained the age-old freedom of the Greek *polis*.

Jeers and whistles resounded in international harmony. 'Ausgeschlossen', one reviewer[114] claimed, 'allzu juristisch', said another[115]. With characteristic frankness the world's greatest epigraphist, L. Robert, spoke of a 'volume manqué', written by a 'paradoxal et systématique auteur'[116]. Of course, Heuss' work has its drawbacks, in particular its deliberate extremely deductive point of departure, which leaves almost no

[112] These terms were introduced by E. J. Bickermann, Bellum Antiochum, *Hermes* 67 (1932) 47-76, esp. 56 ff. and (the same) E.J. Bikerman, Alexandre le Grand et les villes d'Asie, *REG* 47 (1934) 346-74.

[113] The book has been reprinted (Aalen 1963), with a *Nachwort* by the author, in which he gives his reactions to the criticism and calls his book a "Schlag ins Wasser" (p. 275).

[114] F. R. Wüst, *Gnomon* (1939) 144 and 148.

[115] L. Wenger, *APF* 13 (1939) 290-4, esp. 292.

[116] J. et L. Robert, *La Carie* II (Paris 1954) 301 n.1, where he also characterizes A. H. M. Jones' theses on this subject (Jones 1940) as 'superficielles et confuses.'

room for local variations and postulates a uniform, generally valid pattern without decisive argumentation[117]. However, this does not erase the fact that another great epigraphist, Chr. Habicht[118], supported Heuss's central thesis, referring *inter alios* to such specialists as Tarn and Magie[119]. The battle continues[120], endless and pointless, not because the truth lies somewhere in the middle but because both parties claim to have discovered an exclusive truth where in fact both truths existed simultaneously: they were the two truths of the inhabitant of a free *polis* that belonged to the realm of a Hellenistic sovereign. But in order to see this we must migrate from the sphere of jurisdiction to that of political perspective and expectations.

No one denies that the early stages of the Hellenistic age were a time of upheaval. It was marked, on the one hand, by continuity—the uninterrupted existence of old political values and models, of which the *polis* and its ideology are the most remarkable[121]—and, on the other, by some-

[117] See especially E. J. Bikerman, *RPh* 13 (1939) 340 ff. and H. Bengtson, *DLZ* (1939) 561-8. Nowadays, I suppose, this professed Weberian approach would gain praise rather than disapproval, at least in some corners of the arena of Ancient History. Cf., however, O. Müller, *Antigonos Monophthalmos und das 'Jahr der Könige'* (Bonn 1973) 45-77, who investigates various ways of legitimating rulership in the course of time, and Orth 1977, who carefully restricts himself to one monarchy and one period.

[118] Habicht 1970, 25 n. 35.

[119] Tarn 1950 II, 199 ff. and D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton 1950) I, 56 ff.; 89-146; II, 825 ff. with good surveys of the discussion. See also: D. Magie, The Political Status of Independent Cities of Asia Minor in the Hellenistic Period, in: *The Greek Political Experience. Studies in Honor of W. K. Prentice* (Princeton 1941) 173-86.

[120] Besides the works mentioned in preceding notes see for instance: V. Ehrenberg, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Oxford 1938) 1-51; *idem* 1969, 190 ff. and 284 f.; Jones 1940, 45 ff.; Préaux 1954; G. Tibiletti, Alessandro e la liberazione delle città d'Asia Minore, *Athenaeum* 32 (1954) 3-22, whose view I cannot accept; Musti 1966, 138 ff.; R. H. Simpson, Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Greeks, *Historia* 8 (1959) 385-409; E. Badian, Alexander the Great and the Greek Cities of Asia, in: *Ancient Society and Institutions. Studies presented to V. Ehrenberg* (Oxford 1966) 37-69, the latter two with a differentiated view; Braunert 1968; Orth 1977; Quass 1979. All this demonstrates that Orth p.6 is right when he says "dass es kaum ein Historiker der hellenistischen Geschichte ganz umgehen konnte, hier in der einen oder anderen Weise Stellung zu beziehen."

[121] See the lapidary pronouncement by an eminent expert, C. B. Welles, The Greek City, in: *Studi in onore di A. Calderini e R. Paribeni* I (Milan 1956) 82: "the period of the widest expansion and of the greatest political and cultural responsibility of the Greek City", where much depends on what one wishes to understand by 'responsibility'. Very felicitous is the expression by C. Schneider, *Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus* I (Munich 1967) 4: "Nicht nur die Überwindung der Polis, sondern ebenso die unveränderte Erhaltung der Polis ist eine der Grundlagen hellenistischer Kultur." Cf. Braunert 1968, 60 ff.; F. Chamoux, *La civilisation hellénistique* (Paris 1981), ch. 'La survie de la cité', pp. 209-64. Time after time L. Robert contested the view that the Hellenistic *poleis* had lost their identity and importance. See e.g. *BE* 1978, 346 p.449: "les monarchies nouvelles n'ont pas eu sur les vieilles cités l'influence annihilante que l'on admet couramment; les citoyens ne se sont pas sentis tout d'un coup veufs et orphelins (....) la cité a continué à être le cadre normal de la vie...." This does not deny serious shifts in practice and ideology. Recently,

times abrupt renewal, which found one of its most remarkable expressions in autocratic and personal kingship[122]. If, then, we accept this picture, there is no reason for alarm when it becomes evident that the old and the new realities initially existed side by side, or on top of one another, without reconciliation or substitution. This results in situations which the historian, with his panoramic view, experiences as absurd—and which he would thus prefer to deny—, but which the contemporary observer, living in two realities, safeguarded from conflicts via a selective system of filters.

Heuss' first thesis has not been refuted[123], neither by new evidence nor by decisive arguments. The Hellenistic monarchs did *not* appeal to treaties or contracts[124], nor even to officially sanctioned rights of the conqueror when they wished to curtail the autonomy of the city. Their position was defined by their power. The king "montre la force—pourquoi dire le droit?", says Claire Préaux[125], one of the few specialists who appreciate the central inconsistency properly. But in that case, exclaim the critics, the new liberty no longer has anything in common with the freedom of the *polis*, which necessarily implied independence and self-determination. It is important to listen carefully to these voices and elicit their hidden implications and presuppositions. Here are some specimens[126]: "Als die Polis *die* politische Staatsform war, hat der Freiheitsbegriff ein anderer sein

P. McKechnie, *Outsiders in the Greek Cities of the Fourth Century* (London 1988), argued that the main cause of the increase of outsiders in 4th century Greek cities was not primarily 'the destruction' of the Greek cities but the growth of an ideology which accepted the loosening of city ties.

[122] Schmitthenner 1968, esp. 39, with literature on 'patrimoniale Staatsauffassung'; A. Heuss, in: La monarchie hellénistique, *Relazioni X Congresso Intern. Sc. Stor.* Roma 1955, II, 201-13, esp. 202: "Das problem des Ursprungs der hellenistischen Monarchie ist nahezu identisch mit dem des Ursprungs des Hellenismus überhaupt." Cf. the bibliographical survey in Orth 1977, 1 n.2.

[123] E. J. Bikerman, *RPh* 13 (1939) 337, requires a 'preuve' from his opponent. That is not justified because, in this case, the *onus probandi* lies with those who assume juridical treaties without being able to cite even one example. Not one of the testimonia produced by Bikerman is conclusive since they all refer to *political power* and not to *juridical contracts*. Inviolable international law was lacking in other periods of history as well. See for the discrepancy between ideology and practice in early Greece: T. Kiechle, Zur Humanität in der Kriegführung der griechischen Staaten, *Historia* 7 (1958) 129-56. Cf. Ehrenberg 1969, 194: "The mutual relations of polis and monarchy defy as a whole any legal definition or, in fact, any rationalization." I could not agree more. Cf. below n.135.

[124] Paola Zancan, *Il monarcato ellenistico nei suoi elementi federative* (Padua 1934) regarded the *symmachia* treaties as the real fundament of the system of relationships. This thesis has been generally rejected. In this period, *summachos* had become a term denoting loyalty. Thus already in Xen. *Cyrop.* 4, 6, and 2, 4. Exemplarily in the Coan documents: R. Herzog & G. Klaffenbach, Asylieurkunden aus Kos, *Abh. Berlin* (1952) 16 ff.; no. 6 f. In this context the term *eunoia* functions as well: Schubart 1937, 9 f. and 16. All this does not alter the usefulness of the notion of *summachos* whenever an excuse was sought for accepting the king's orders disguised as requests. See below p.77.

[125] Préaux 1954, 85.

[126] Quotations from Wüst *o.c.* (above n.114) 148; Wenger, *o.c.* (above n.115) 291;

müssen als zu der Zeit, wo sie sich in der Gewalt des Herrschers befand" (Wüst); "Das alles möchte sich formal juristisch noch im alten Geleise der freien Stadt bewegen, aber politisch ist die Macht des Herrschers unverkennbar" (Wenger, who also speaks of 'Pseudofreiheit'). Officially, the cities enjoyed autonomy, "aber all das besagt nichts gegenüber die Tatsache, dass es in Wirklichkeit einzig der Wille des Herrschers ist, der das jeweilige Mass der Selbständigkeit der Polis bestimmt", and "Es liegt doch auf der Hand, dass eine Freiheit, deren Interpretation letzten Endes beim Monarchen lag, mit jener anderen, die neben der Autonomie für die Polis der klassischen Zeit eine unerlässliche Voraussetzung ihrer Existenz war, *nichts gemein hat als nur den Namen*" (Bengtson). And so on and so forth.

What do we see? In so far as these critics are ready to accept a formal juridical freedom of the cities, they hasten to expose this freedom as unreal, illusory and belonging to the chimerical world of political slogans. Implicitly or explicitly, their next move is to declare this side of the medal irrelevant and, being irrelevant, no worthy object of historical evaluation. Now, viewed in the merciless spotlight of 'Realpolitik' and in that light alone, their arguments—not their inferences—are not unreasonable. It should immediately be added, however, that their judgement is the judgement of the onlooker. Ancient observers, too, such as Polybius[127], sometimes noticed that although kings employed the word 'liberty' as a slogan, they did not always put it into practice.

Liberty, autonomy, and democracy

There is, however, another point of view—that of the inhabitant of the *polis*, who had regained *eleutheria*, *autonomia*, and along with it *demokratia*, and who, merely on the grounds of this stereotyped combination, could not possibly interpret his new freedom in any other terms than in those of the old, free, autonomous and democratic *polis*. There are indeed a great number of inscriptions that can illustrate this. One group explicitly describes the new freedom as *democratic autonomy*[128]. The Athenians, for

Bengtson *o.c.* (above n.117) 565 and 568. Different kinds of freedom also in A. B. Ranowitsch, *Aufsätze zur alten Geschichte* (Berlin 1961) 75-86.

[127] Polyb. 15, 24, 4, προτείνουσι τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ὄνομα. Cf. Welwei 1963, 45 f. and Orth 1977, 5, who quotes Cicero, *Att* 6, 1, 15: *Graeci vero exultant quod peregrinis iudicibus utuntur. Nugatoribus quidem, inquies. Quid refert? Tamen se* αὐτονομίαν *adeptos putant.* On Polybius' assessment of the liberty of the free cities under Roman rule see: D. Musti, *Polibio e l'imperialismo romano* (Naples 1978) chs. 2 and 3. I particularly agree with his objections to A. Mastrocinque, L'*eleutheria* e le città ellenistique, *Atti Ist. Veneto Sc. Lettere Arti* 135 (1976/7) 1-23, when he argues that Polybius does *not* make any distinction at all between 'free' and 'autonomous' cities.

[128] On this combination see: M. Holleaux, *Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* III,

instance, honoured Phaidros of Sphettos because he τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατουμένην αὐτόνομον παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς νόμους κυρίους τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτόν (''he had handed over the city, free and democratic and autonomous, and the laws as highest authority to the people after him'')[129]. These texts led Tarn[130] to the statement: ''freedom in these cities meant to them democratic government'', and his judgement has been generally adopted[131]. Of course, the political and institutional implementation of this democracy often differred radically from the Athenian model[132], but traditionally it was inseparably connected with a number of conditions and ideologies. As we have seen, one of the most important was that the concept of democracy did not tolerate the simultaneous rule of one man, let alone of a man of tyrannical status.

In a second group of inscriptions[133] the regained democracy is unequivocally described as *patrios politeia*. Already in 307 BC, the Athenians received τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν from Demetrius (Diod. 20, 46, 3; Plut. *Demetr.* 10, 1). A decree of the Cretan *Koinon* says: πάτριον δαμοκρατ[ία πο]λιτείαν (*I.Cret.* I, 281 f. no. 2). The citizens of Pergamum honour a priestess of Athena ἐφ' ἧς ὁ δῆμος κατεστάθη εἰς τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν (*OGIS* 337 [133 BC]), and the city of Tlos honours an *euergetes* διατηρήσαντα τούς τε νόμους καὶ τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν (*TAM* II, 582 [c.100 BC]). It may be reasonably inferred that the numerous inscriptions celebrating the restitution of *patria politeia*, or *patrioi nomoi*, are just another circumscription of the same *patria demokratia*. Again we should realize that this traditional constitution was not precisely a decent replica of what the 'forefathers' had understood by democracy. No term lent itself more willingly to manipulation than *patrios politeia*, as everybody could know at least

153 n.1; Heuss 1963, 216 ff.; especially on democracy: 236 ff.; Tarn 1950 II, 199 ff.; Musti 1966, 139 ff. The idea that *eleutheria* and democracy belonged together was prepared by political theory: Aristot. *Polit.* 6, 1, 1317 b; Isocr. *Paneg.* 117; Demosth. 15, 18, and see the discussion above p.58 ff. Instances of *demokratia* together with *eleutheria* in Hellenistic inscriptions are collected by Quass 1979, 47.

[129] *IG* II², 682; *Syll.*³ 409. Cf. above p.61. Note, too, the reference to the *nomos basileus* ideology.

[130] Tarn 1950 II, 208.

[131] See the discussion in Quass 1979 and his conclusion (p. 48): '''Freiheit' (bezw. 'Autonomie') und 'Demokratie' sind also offensichtlich zwei Seiten derselben Sache.'' Cf. also Raaflaub 1985, ch. 15.7: 'Demokratie und Freiheit'.

[132] J. A. O. Larsen, *Demokratia*, *CPh* 48 (1973) 45 f., showed that, long before the Hellenistic period, the term *demokratia* could denote oligarchy. Ancient authors could have some difficulty in evaluating the reality behind this term. A good case is Rhodes, which generally is described as the summit of democracy (Polyb. 15, 23, 6; 16, 35, 1; 29, 10, 6; 16, 3; 30, 31, 10; 33, 17). In reality it was dominated by a narrow elite which exercised a political influence far exceeding the normal definition of democracy. Consequently(?), Strabo 14, 2, 5, characterizes the Rhodians as οὐ δημοκρατούμενοι. Cf. J. L. O'Neil, How Democratic was Hellenistic Rhodes?, *Athenaeum* 59 (1981) 468-73.

[133] See the collection in Quass 1979, 39 ff.

since 411 BC. This does not alter the fact, however, that people actually *perceived* their new democracy as identical to the ancient democracy of the free and independent Greek *polis*.

The observer who exposes this naive idea as an illusion, does so partly because of his knowledge of what was to come: the contemporary knew only the past, which supplied him with the concepts and definitions he needed and, consequently, exploited to perceive, experience, describe, and in fact, as we noted in the introduction to this book, *create* a reality. In doing so, ''he just found what he was looking for'', following the expectations nourished by his socio-political history and the connotations of its terminology. So one reality he saw was that of the free *polis*. The other reality, which, of course, regularly interfered with the first[134], was that of his dependence on an almighty but distant sovereign. And it would mean a real progress in our historical understanding if we learned to accept that in his perception, both realities, however contradictory they might be, did exist and were valid. As we have seen there is a variety of mechanisms to prevent clashes. In the present case the Hellenistic *polites* could take the royal warrants of freedom seriously and regard his city, being the king's *summachos*, as an isle of liberty surrounded by a sea of subject territory. Consequently, he could—in accordance with the general reactions to 'cognitive dissonance'—selectively close his eyes to an occasionally too inconsiderate infringement of his rights. And he was surely confirmed in his perception by two facts. One was that for Greeks (and Romans) nothing so much as a term denoting our concept 'state' existed[135]. The other, that

[134] There are many astonishing examples of this interference. Plut. *Demetr.* 24, relates an Athenian decree that everything which Demetrius commands shall be right for gods and men (this is not the only privilege which announces Demetrius as a forerunner of Caesar). Such a thing was already anticipated by Isocrates *ad Demon.* 36. Another instance is the instruction by Philip V that there shall be no *psephisma* on the money of a Sarapis temple in Thessalonike (*SIRIS* 108). Cf. Polyb. 21, 40, 2.

[135] E. Meyer, *Einführung in die antike Staatskunde* (Darmstadt 1968) 130 f. Consequently, the attempt to solve problems concerning the 'meaning' of Greek terms by introducing modern constitutional categories are vain, as D. Nörr, *Imperium und Polis in der hohen Prinzipatszeit* (München 1966) 1 ff. notes. As so often U. von Wilamowitz hit the mark when he wrote (*Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen* [Leipzig-Berlin 1923] 153) that the hope of ever finding something like Hellenistic constitutional law is a 'Selbsttäuschung'. And cf. Ehrenberg *loc. cit.* (above n.123). More recently, Finley 1982 argued that we never find anything like a theory of authority of the city, because people were not capable of thinking in schemes different from the ones that had formed their political reality . Cf. the review by H. W. Pleket, *Gnomon* 55 (1983) 459 ff. Finley also points out that, in the phrase of A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London 1981) 129-30, ''they (i.e. Greeks and Romans) lacked any public, generally shared communal mode for putting their politics to the philosophical question''. Cf. F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley 1972) 155, who argues that no less an author than Polybius was blinded ''to an extraordinary degree to the elaborate texture of political life which throughout this period ensured the domination of the *nobiles*.''

the entire period of Greek history is marked by free and autonomous *poleis* fearing or suffering violations of their freedom from their neighbours. Sometimes they could get rid of them, sometimes they had to bear with them, but it rarely prevented them from seeing themselves as free and autonomous cities[136].

What, then, should astound us, is not that this dual reality should have existed, but that attempts are constantly being made to eliminate or 'resolve' it. The futility of such efforts is implicitly demonstrated in an excellent book which appeared at practically the same time as the first version of the present chapter, and which I was thus unable to consult on that occasion: Orth 1977[137]. The author demonstrates in great detail the extremely ambiguous relationship between king and free cities. What emerges time and again is the fact that the same cities which proudly

[136] A case in point, of course, is the relationship of Athens and her allies in the Delian league. As to the intricacies of the notion of autonomy in this connection the modern discussion is revealing. For instance, M. Amit, *Great and Small Poleis. A Study in the Relations between the Great Powers and the Small Cities in Ancient Greece* (Bruxelles 1973) 39, writes: "Initially, all the cities were αὐτόνομοι and enjoyed true independence. The φόρος collected by Athens for the common expenses in the pursuit of the war against Persia did not signify that those cities that paid it had lost their independence. Later (...) the φόρος came to be regarded as a contribution paid by subject-cities to their overlord. Despite this the word αὐτόνομοι was not discarded". Amit thinks that in this connection a distinction should be drawn between autonomy in its etymological sense "to live according to its own laws", and the non-juridical language which called only those cities αὐτόνομοι which still provided ships. All the other were ὑπήκοοι. It will be clear that, even if this were true, these distinctions are as slippery as any term belonging to political language and that they tend to shift or become blurred according to the circumstances. Hence, Gomme seems to be perfectly right when he writes in his commentary on Thuc. I, 67, 2: "though αὐτόνομος is often used, naturally enough, to describe those members of the League which had retained their navies, and had never been subjected by Athens, *yet theoretically and in some ways in practice* (my italics, H. S. V.) all members were autonomous states." And so on and so forth. A never ending debate since the subject shifts with every new situation and point of view. See particularly: T. Pistorius, *Hegemoniestreben und Autonomiesicherung in der griechischen Vertragspolitik klassischer und hellenistischer Zeit* (Frankfurt-Bern-New York 1985), a study of the formulas of loyalty. In the discussion of the term 'autonomy' distinctions are drawn between: the guarantee of some measure of freedom of the weaker party, the decision of two allies to respect the independence of a third party, or the promise of equal allies to respect one another's constitutional and territorial integrity. If anything becomes clear it is that this term can be used in very different ways in different contexts. On the inconsistencies in Thucydides' manipulations of the term 'autonomy' see: T. J. Quinn, *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios 478-404 BC* (Manchester 1981) 97-101. On the entire problem see the fundamental discussion by Raaflaub 1985, 148-257. As we shall see below in the Roman empire similar ambiguities occurred. For the polysemy of *phoros* in the Roman empire see for instance: D. C. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King* (London 1984).

[137] Another important study appeared a year later: Quass 1979. He concentrates on such issues as the opposition of tyranny and democracy, the interpretation of democracy as *patrios politeia* and the ideological identification of *eleutheria* and *demokratia*. Although he has an open eye for the discussion on "die völkerrechtliche Qualität dieser Freiheitserklärung, wie der Freiheitsbegriff selbst", he does not go into the problems that concern the present issue.

boasted of their autonomy were capable of simultaneous declarations of the most Byzantine subservience to and dependence on the monarch to whom they owed that autonomy. In an illuminating decree from Ilion[138] the *demos* decides to honour Antiochus I with a statue bearing the inscription [εὐεργέτης καὶ σω]τήρ (ll. 37 f.), although the king had not even been near the city. The μείζων καὶ λαμπροτέρα διάθεσις of the realm (not of the city!) is being extolled: "may the king expand his power, overcome the ἀποστάντες τῶμ πραγμάτων and regain the πατρώια ἀρχή and βασιλεία". In the wish καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴμ βασιλείαν αὐτοῖς διαμένειν (ll. 24 ff.) one already gets a foretaste of the αἰωνία διαμονή of imperial ideology. Everything reflects the attitude of the subject and, accordingly, there is no word about the autonomy or the liberty of the *polis*. All the same, Ilion did boast the status of a free and autonomous city granted by Alexander: ἐλευθέραν τε κρῖναι καὶ ἄφορον (Strabo 13, 1, 26), *in other inscriptions*. So Orth, 50 f., concludes: "So bleibt nichts anderes übrig, als zu konstatieren, dass im dritten Jahrhundert energische Verteidigung der Unabhängigkeit und unterwürfige Ergebenheit gegenüber der Institution, die als einzige dieser Unabhängigkeit gefährlich werden konnte, keine sich ausschliessende Gegensätze gewesen sein müssen." And his book unequivocally professes the conviction that conditions regulating the relations between king and cities were never articulated in explicit juridical contracts, but remained 'veiled'[139].

I add one final astonishing example of this inconsistency. An Athenian military contingent put up an inscription in honour of Demetrius Poliorcetes about 302 BC[140]. In it Demetrius is praised for having expelled τοὺς ἐναντίους τῆι δ[ημοκρατίαι] and thus having liberated Athens. Also, he has now added many Greek cities to his kingdom ([προσηγάγετο τῆι ἑαυτοῦ] βασιλείαι). Consequently, others, especially Peloponnesians, have asked him to take care of the common freedom and safety (ἡγεῖσθαι τῆ[ς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας καὶ τῶν] κατὰ Πελοπόννησον πράξεων). To express their gratitude it is decided to erect a statue and place

[138] *OGIS* 219; *SEG* 4, 661; L. Robert, *Etudes Anatoliennes* (Paris 1937) 182 f.; *I. Ilion* 32.

[139] P.3: "Man wird nicht selten davon auszugehen haben, dass tatsächliche Rechts- und Machtsverhältnisse verschleiert werden." P. 178: "keine Ergebnisse von wünschenswerter Eindeutigkeit (.....) wobei sich der Eindruck immer weniger von der Hand weisen liess dass hierfür nicht der mangelhafte Zustand der Quellen die Hauptverantwortung trägt, sondern dass tatsächlich die Beziehungen zwischen Stadt und Herrscher viel weniger von juristischen Kategorien geprägt waren, als es ein moderner Betrachter zunächst erwarten wurde."

[140] Ed. pr. N. Kyparissis and W. Peek, *MDAI(A)* 66 (1941) 221-7, corrected by A. Wilhelm, *JÖAI* 35 (1943) 157-63. Cf. *BE* 1948, 47; *SEG* 25, 149; Moretti, *ISE* 7. S. Sherwin-White drew my attention to this text in her review of Orth's book, *JHS* 103 (1983) 214-5, where she emphasizes the ambiguity.

it *next to the image of Demokratia* (εἰκόνα [ἔ]φιππον ἐν ἀγορᾶι παρὰ τὴν Δημο[κρατίαν].

We observe the double reality that many historians found unacceptable and consequently denied, and others accepted but put away as irrelevant, in an astonishingly unequivocal articulation. Here, the ideal illustration is found for what has been pointedly expressed by Cl. Préaux[141]: "autonomy, although it carries the name of liberty, does not exclude subjection." In the end, Orth resorts to a distinction between the illusions of ideological aspiration ("die Illusion einer völligen völkerrechtlichen Freiheit", p. 180) and the reality of the political power of the monarchical regime ("Realität der Macht", *ibid.*), without, however, falling into the trap of thus regarding the former of the two as *quantité négligeable.*

If, nonetheless, I still prefer to speak of two coexisting realities, I do not wish to underrate the different qualities of practical political power, on the one hand, and ideological political aspirations, on the other. But in my view the total evidence demonstrates that what seem to us—looking through a telescope with one eye, while perusing the latest edition of our textbook on modern international law with the other—to be different levels of reality were not equally differentiated in the perception of the inhabitant of the *polis*. And we are learning in recent decades that perceptions as objects of historical research are at least as valuable as facts,

[141] Préaux 1954, 87. Of course, the same inconsistency has been noticed now and then by various authors, but the implications or its fundamental significance for the interpretation of Hellenistic political ideology have never been seriously considered. I quote some formulations: Ehrenberg 1969, 191: "the king rules over the cities (....) On the other hand, it was still true that what determined the nature of the Polis was freedom and autonomy. To maintain them became a primary necessity also for the policy of the kings, however much that might seem theoretically to contradict the fact of a unified empire with a monarch at its head." Schmitthenner 1968, 39: "Der Unsicherheit der Theorie entspricht die eigentümlichen Labilität, Zerrissenheit, Unruhe, Dynamik der hellenistischen Königreiche." M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1967) 525: "They (the kings) could not exist without them (the cities) and they could not live with them." Jones 1940, 95: "The ambiguity of the mutual relations of kings and cities arises in fact from two conflicting political theories. A king tended to regard his dominions as a complex of territories, within which, it might be, there were a number of privileged communities. The cities, while not disputing the sovereignty of the kings over the Macedonians and over the barbarians whom they had conquered, liked to regard themselves as sovereign states in alliance with the king. This conflict of ideas is illustrated by the varying terminology used on the one hand by the cities and by the kings when they were addressing cities, and on the other by subjects of the kings and the kings themselves *in unguarded moments*" (my italics, H.S.V.). Cf. also Braunert 1968, 61 f.; Cl. Préaux 1954, *passim*; G. J. D. Aalders, City State and World-Power in Hellenistic Political Thought, *Actes du VIIe congres de la F.I.E.C.* I (Budapest 1983) 293-301. See above all the judgements by Veyne and Judge as quoted below (n.186). The inconsistency has also permeated ancient literary texts. In Euhemerus' Utopia the city of Panara is called αὐτόνομος καὶ ἀβασίλευτος (Diod. 42, 6). Nevertheless its *archontes* refer the major matters to the priests of the isle Panchaia as the highest authorities. See literature below (n.144).

assuming for the moment that we are able to define what 'facts' are.

Double realities flourish especially under special conditions. One is that the terminology applied is polysemantic. 'Autonomy'—according to Polybius 21, 22, 7, ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις προσφιλεστάτη—was "not a rigorous enough term to withstand subjective manipulation" (Ostwald 1982, 42); 'freedom'—"in the eyes of Greeks not surpassed by anything else" (*I.Priene* 19, ll. 18-20)—is "an umbrella under which everyone shelters when the political weather looks uncertain" (MacMullen 1966, 13). The discussion on these terms has, if anything, disclosed their vagueness. However, other more specific terms like ὑποταττόμενοι or ἀποδοῦναι appear to be no less ambiguous. As to the first term, some scholars contend that people indicated by it cannot possibly be 'free citizens', while others find that the term perfectly tolerates this implication[142]. As to the expression ἀποδοῦναι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν some scholars interpret literally: "to give back or restore a freedom which the city had possessed before", while others quote texts in which, without doubt, it refers to an original and spontaneous act of giving liberty[143].

Naturally enough, really unambiguous terms could not figure in official documents without unequivocally contradicting one of the two realities. This, for instance, is the case with the term ἀβασίλευτος, which does—though rarely—occur in literary, especially utopian, texts[144], but which is conspicuously and understandably lacking in official letters or decrees detailing a city's rights or privileges. And what about terms like ἀφορολόγητος or ἀφρούρητος, which do haunt official texts[145]? Can they

[142] The term was adduced against Heuss by Bikerman *RPh* 13 (1939) 341 ff. but Holleaux, *Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* IV, 300 f., had already demonstrated its vagueness. The unique inscription from Cyrene (*SEG* 9, 5) which calls the citizens ὑπὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ὑποτασσόμενοι, reflects Ptolemaic/Egyptian absolutism, and cannot be extrapolated.

[143] See the discussion in Tarn 1950 II, 208 f.; Préaux 1954, 82 n.1 and 88 ff.; Heuss 1960, 222 f. Recently: A. Giovannini, Téos, Antiochos III et Attale 1er, *MH* 40 (1983) 178-84, esp. 183: "La terminologie est parfois trompeuse: ἀποδοῦναι ne signifie pas toujours 'restituer ce qu'on serait en droit de garder pour soi', συγχωρεῖν n'implique pas nécessairement que l'auteur de la 'concession' renonce à un droit acquis. De même, les verbes ἀνεῖναι et ἀφεῖναι ne peuvent pas être automatiquement interprétés comme l'abandon d'un droit de propriété." It is, for instance, practically impossible to distinquish exactly which categories are meant in the list which Cass. Dio 52, 5, puts into the mouth of Maecenas: χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τοὺς συμμάχους τούς τε ὑπηκόους, τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ δημοκρατουμένους τοὺς δ'ὑφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἠλευθερωμένους, ἐς δουλείαν αὖθις καταστῆσαι.

[144] The *polis* Panara is the only city of the isle of Panchaia that is αὐτόνομος καὶ ἀβασίλευτος (Diod. 5, 42, 5). See: M. Zumschlinge, *Euhemeros. Staatstheoretische und Staatsutopische Motive* (Diss. Bonn 1976). She correctly controverts Braunert 1968, who tries to project this utopian situation on to the political reality, with the statement that "autonomia *unter der Herrschaft* eines *Basileus* mit dem Ausdruck ἀβασίλευτος nicht belegt werden kann." (p. 153).

[145] To the literature mentioned in previous notes add: Orth 1977, 89 ff.

be decently labelled 'intrinsically ambiguous'? No, they cannot and should not. Nor did Hellenistic kings try to disaffirm their purport if they were in need of material or financial supplies from a city or deemed it in the interest of its liberty that it should be garrisoned. In such cases, a city would receive a masterpiece of epistolary prose, with orders lurking beneath the sugar coating of friendly requests[146], which were intended to maintain a certain 'Zweigesichtigkeit' (Orth). These requests were officially discussed by *boule* and *demos*, immediately after τὰ ἱερά[147], and once granted, the contribution would be regarded as a *free act* of loyalty performed by allies to a sovereign in whose πράγματα the city was embedded and whose welfare immediately influenced their own. Accordingly, Antiochus III could write a letter to the Greek cities of Asia Minor telling them to ignore his orders (κελεύων) if they should be incompatible with their own laws (Plut. *Mor.* 183 f.).

So we end up with a paradox of two contrasting realities: the reality of the free city going hand in hand with the reality of the subjection to an autocrat. But surely this is absurd? It is, but it reveals the schizophrenia naturally inherent in concepts such as freedom, autonomy, independence and the like, a schizophrenia which, moreover, tends to be exacerbated in situations of transition[148]. There are indispensable relics of the old which still exist and inevitable signs of the new which already exist, irreconciled and pregnant with tension. Shortly after their liberation by Alexander, the citizens of Priene, who consistently referred to themselves as Πριηνέων αὐτονόμων ὄντων[149], expressed their official faith that "nothing is greater for Greeks than freedom" (*I.Priene* 19, ll. 18-20: οὐθὲ[ν με]ῖζόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις Ἕλλησιν τῆς ἐ[λε]υθερίας). Round 285 BC they decided to bestow cultic honours on Lysimachus in the most

[146] "Zuckerbrot und Peitsche" (Ehrenberg *Der Staat*, 231, one of the few cases where the German language is more felicitous than the English: "sweet persuasion or the whip", *idem* 1969, 191).

[147] Heuss 1963, 128 ff., who also shows that, in other periods of Greek history too, the obligation to accomodate a garrison or to pay contribution was not necessarily experienced as being inconsistent with political autonomy.

[148] The linguistic literature mentioned in the introduction to this book emphasizes the relationship between socio-political crisis and the polysemy or ambiguity caused by new meanings of a word. Tarlton *o.c.* (p.17) 326: "Languages break down, and major political adjustments are just the sort of thing that breaks them down, leaving the political theorist with the problem of creating new symbols and uses to fit altered circumstances. Crisis followed by a period of groping is where we discover the very real and non-conventional resources of language." Pocock, *o.c.* (above p.8) 21: in political speech paradigms "migrate from contexts in which they have been specialized to discharge certain functions in others in which they are expected to perform differently".

[149] *I.Priene* 2, l.3 f.; 3, l.4; 4 l.4; 6 l.4; 7 l.3 f. Cf. Orth 1977, 102 ff.

fawning terms: "they congratulate the king, because he is prosperous and so is his power, and because everything goes according to his wishes....etc." (*I.Priene* 14, ll. 9 ff.).

And so it is: the gratitude to a sovereign who, as an act of sublime goodness, has bestowed liberty on a city, is expressed by exalting that ruler to unknown heights: the liberator is, by definition, superior. This causal connection between the two elements which together form the contradiction of the early Hellenistic age has been formulated succinctly by Dobesch[150]. He characterized the liberating activities of Alexander as 'autokratisches Wohltun', and then continued: "er bekundete sich als Tyrannenfeind durch einen im Grunde despotischen Akt"[151]. With this perfect summary *avant la lettre* of my argument, the two verses of the aretalogy that formed our starting point have been transposed into the historical reality of absolute kings and free(d) subjects. Apparently, in the early Hellenistic period gods and kings shared two contradictory, yet concomitant, faculties: they liberated people from tyranny and gave them freedom, while simultaneously—indeed by the very same act—making them their subjects and slaves. These two contrasting realities existed side by side, separately and without reconciliation, being saved from clashes by a variety of strategies: for the time being they remained separated by 22 verses. Only in later times we begin to descry reflective attempts at more systematic forms of compromise. Then the two realities are gradually amalgamated: a new hermeneutic system manifests itself. This development is another striking illustration of psyche's unlimited faculties.

5. Slavery is freedom. From unheeded inconsistency to conscious ambiguity

Isis, as we have seen, had the power of saving those stricken by illness, perils or misfortune. She was the *soteira,* just as Hellenistic kings were *soteres*, but even though the latter were sometimes referred to as *kosmokra-*

[150] G. Dobesch, Alexander der Grosse und der Korinthische Bund, *GB* 3 (1975) 73-149, esp. 107 ff. The quotations are from pp. 108 and 110. The motif of *philotimia*, explicitly given by Plut. *Alex.* 34, 2, is also splendidly demonstrated by Antiochus III, who grudged the Romans their liberating actions since they robbed him of the *charis* of the cities: Polyb. 18, 51, 9; App. *Syr* 3. This ends up with an overt 'competition in liberating' between Rome and Antiochus III: M.-L. Heidemann, *Die Freiheitsparole in der griechisch-römischen Auseinandersetzung (200-188 v.Chr.)* (Diss. Bonn 1966) ch. X, pp. 61-70: 'Antiochos und die Römer, zwei Befreier als Konkurrenten in Griechenland'.

[151] Following a suggestion by H. E. Stier, *Welteroberung und Weltfriede im Wirken Alexanders des Grossen, Vorträge Rhein. Westf. Akad. Wiss.* 187 (1973) 45, he further suggests that deification of the ruler was the only way in which the dissonance between the granting of freedom by, and the subjection of the city to the ruler could be made acceptable to the Greek cities. Aspects of this idea have been elaborated on by Price 1984.

tores[152], the goddess was by far superior in that she had control over nature and natural mishaps. Her feats of salvation are frequently referred to in terms that denote liberation from bonds or captivity[153]. An explicit[154] proclamation is found in K 48: Ἐγὼ τοὺς ἐν δεσμοῖς λύω (''I release those in bonds''). However, the expression is not without ambiguity, since these bonds can be taken either literally or metaphorically. The hymn from Andros ll. 96-7 has πε[ρ]ιῳ̣ρ̣[ό]τατον δὲ μονάρχων δ̣ε̣σ[μὸν ἐγὼ κατέλυσ]α and l. 144: δεσμῶν δ' ἀέκουσαν ἀνάγκαν ἀνλύω. We have seen that the former is a variant of K 25 Ἐγὼ τυράννων ἀρχὰς κατέλυσα. The latter can be compared to K 55/6 Ἐγὼ τὸ ἱμαρμένον νικῶ. Ἐμοῦ τὸ εἱμαρμένον ἀκούει, but in the Andros hymn Isis' superiority over Fate is phrased in terms of liberation, as in the Sarapis miracle cited above (p.47). Liberation from bonds can indeed denote any type of salvation. Chains or fetters are common symbols of death or any misfortune leading to or similar to death[155]. The Greek verb λύω and some of its compounds are widely used to denote deliverance from pain, illness and grief, both in religious and in magical texts[156]; δεσμόλυτα is *terminus technicus* in the

[152] Above all in astrological texts, which, though dating from the second century AD at the earliest, largely go back to Ptolemaic times. See the testimonies in Cumont 1937, 27 f.

[153] Her name Eleuthera, though at first sight significant, has no great import in this connection, since Isis acquired it through her assimiliation to a Lycian goddess of that name: L. Robert, Isis Eleuthera, *RHR* 98 (1928) 56-9 = *OMS* II, 1008 ff.

[154] It is implied in her self-proclamation: Ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον ἰσχυρὸν ἐποίησα (K 16) and related enunciations (Cf. the parallels given by R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 1 [1967] 63). For justice makes the weak strong: K 34, and cf. 28, 29, 32, 35-38. Indeed, Isis *is* justice, as one of her epithets testifies: she is called Δικαιοσύνη. L. Robert, *OMS* I, 603-5, has collected the evidence. Cf. Vandebeek 1946, 109 f.; Vanderlip 1972, 24; Engelmann 1975, 52 f., Grandjean 1975, 79 f.; Kee 1983, 116 f. G. Sfameni Gasparro, Iside-Dikaiosyne in una serie monetale bronzea di Catania, *SMSR* NS 10 (1986) 189 ff. Particularly interesting is a temple inventory *P.Lugd.Bat.* XVII, 1 col II 11, where E. Boswinkel argues that the statue of Δικαιοσύνη, mentioned side by side with a μασθός (both made of bronze), is not an image of Isis Dikaiosyne, but rather an attribute of the goddess, i.c. a left hand with extended fingers as mentioned by Apul. *Met.* 11, 10, 5, and Clemens Al. *Strom.* 6, 36, 2. See: Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 203 ff. On the Christian δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ see: A. Schmitt, in: *Natalicium, J. Geffcken zum 70. Geburtstag* (Heidelberg 1931) 111-32.

[155] I. Scheftelowitz, *Das Schlingen- und Netzmotiv im Glauben und Brauch der Völker* (Giessen) 5-10; H. Güntert, *Der arische Weltkönig und Heiland* (Halle 1923) 125 f.; M. Eliade, Le 'dieu lieur' et le symbolisme des noeuds, *RHR* 134 (1948) 15-20; R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge 1951) 310-31; Meuli 1975 II, 1035-83; B. Lincoln, Mithra(s) as Sun and Savior, in: Bianchi-Vermaseren 1982, 504-23; G. Saunier, Charos et l'Histoire dans les chansons populaires grecques, *REG* 95 (1982) 297-321.

[156] On the terminology in magical texts see the survey by F. Maltomini, Cristo all' Eufrate. *P.Heid.* G. 1101: amuleto cristiano, *ZPE* 48 (1982) 168, and literature in G. Geraci, Un' *actio* magica contro afflizioni fisiche e morali III/IV d.C., *Aegyptus* 59 (1979) 63-72, esp. 67 n.2, and notes 162 f. below. In religious contexts, for example: Keyssner 1932, 110-2; Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 316 f.

magical papyri and elsewhere[157]. All this is illuminatingly summarized by Aelius Aristides II, 331 K, Οὐδὲν ἄρα οὕτως βεβαίως δεδήσεται οὐ νόσῳ οὐκ ὀργῇ οὐ τύχῃ οὐδεμίᾳ, ὁ μὴ οἷον τ' ἐσται λῦσαι τῷ Διονύσῳ: ''Nothing can be so firmly bound, neither by illness, nor by wrath or any fortune, that cannot be released by Dionysos''. Miracles that set people free or break one's chains were celebrated tokens of divine omnipotence and, indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, Dionysos was a specialist in this field[158]. To anticipate one example: when in the *Bacchae* 1031 the chorus exclaims: ὦναξ Βρόμιε, θεὸς φαίνῃ μέγας (''Yes indeed, o Lord Bromios, you show yourself a great god''), this is *inter alia* an acknowledgement of his unlimited power to release, as declared in verse 498: λύσει μ' ὁ δαίμων αὐτὸς ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω (''The God himself will set me free, whenever I desire it''). The same is true of *Acts* 12, 3-19 and elsewhere in the NT[159] and the disciples of Apollonius of Tyana only *really* believed in the divine nature of their master ''when he released his body from the fetters'' (ἐξήγαγε τὸ σκέλος τοῦ δεσμοῦ, *Vita Apoll.* 7, 38). It is followed by the significant remark that, previously, his faithful follower Damis ''had been in despair (ἀπορεῖν) and he saw no way out of it (λύσιν) except such as the gods have vouchsafed to some in answer to prayer, when they were in even worse straits''.

If, then, we finally ask once more: who were the tyrants whose regime Isis had put down?, our answer must be: it depends. It is—as the theory of reception teaches us—up to the reader (and this includes the ancient readers) to decide who is *his* tyrant. That is: within the limits of semantic possibilities, of course. Even if, for the sake of argument, we assume the alleged meaning 'bad nomarchs' as intended in a supposed Egyptian original, it is still very unlikely that Greek readers—and the aretalogy was in Greek and for Greeks or Hellenizers—of the last centuries BC could have grasped this notion. And if they did, the expression would be irrelevant to them. In concentrating on this category of contemporary Hellenistic readers, we have concluded that for them tyrants could only refer to a specifically Greek type of rulers which history had taught them to hate and whose κατάλυσις evoked strong feelings of gratitude and relief. However, subsequent generations may very well have adapted their in-

[157] Reitzenstein 1906, 120 n.1; above all: Weinreich 1968, 38 ff., esp. 180 ff., and the literature mentioned in the preceding note.

[158] Significantly, the same Dionysos whose task it is to λῦσαι the fetters of all kinds of mishap, according to the same Aelius Aristides was called *Lusios*, whose praises should be sung only by worshippers in a kneeling posture (Weinreich *ibid.*). Generally on Dionysos' liberating qualities: Weinreich 1968, ch. III A: 'Die Befreiungswunder im Kreise des Dionysos', 120-33.

[159] Weinreich 1968, 147-79; cf. Peterson 1949, 148. It was prefigured in the Septuagint, for instance in Psalm 145,7.

terpretation to associations *they* used to connect with τυράννων ἀρχάς.

In the first centuries AD the idea that the course of life was governed by κοσμοκράτορες τοῦ κόσμου τούτου or the ἄρχοντες τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου[160] was rapidly spreading from its Jewish cradle throughout Gnostic, Hermetic and other theological systems, and it was also eagerly adopted in magical texts. These *archai* were generally identified with *heimarmene*, as is exemplarily shown by *Apocr.John* 72:4, "They (i.e. the *archontes*) brought Fate into being and through measure, periods, and seasons they imprisoned the gods of heavens, the angels, the demons, and men, so that all would come into its (Fate's) fetters and it (Fate) would be lord over all—an evil and tortuous plan"[161]. The author of the letter to the Ephesians 6:12—clearly influenced by Gnostic ideas—says: "We wrestle against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world" (πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου) and the Gnostic *Pistis Sophia* ch.131 (336, p.121 Schmidt-Till) says: "the archons (ἄρχοντες) of predestined fate (εἱμαρμένης) force (ἀναγκάζουσιν) man until (ἕως) he sins". The arbitrariness of fate was preferably pictured in terms of bondage: "I was born free, but now by Fortune's will I am a slave" (Achilles Tat. *Leuc. and Clit.* 5, 17) is topical, and in Seneca *Tranqu.* 10, 3, we find its ultimate expansion: "We are all fettered to Fortune. For some, the chain is made of gold, and is loose; for others it is tight and filthy—but what difference does that make? (.....) All life is slavery." The prayer for liberation[162] from this bondage of *heimarmene, ananke*, or fate is very common in this

[160] Thus in *Sap.Sal.*, a clear indication that these ideas existed in pre-Christian Jewish circles. See: Reitzenstein 1904, 76, who pointed out the firm connection with *heimarmene*. Cf. the surprising remark by Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 13, 5, 9, that the entire sect of the Essenes recognized τὴν εἱμαρμένην κυρίαν, on which see: L. Wächter, Die unterschiedliche Haltung der Pharisäer, Sadduzäer und Essener zur Heimarmene nach dem Bericht des Josephus, *ZRGG* 21 (1969) 97-114; L. H. Martin, Josephus' Use of *Heimarmene* in the Jewish *Antiquitates* XIII 171-3, *Numen* 27 (1981) 127-37. On the negative notions of ἀρχαί, ἄρχοντες, see: *TWNT* I (1933) 482 and 487; of κόσμος, κοσμοκράτορες: *ibid.* III (1938) 889 ff. Cf. further J. Z. Smith 1978, 160-6, from which I borrow some examples in the text.

[161] Translation: R. Grant, *Gnosticism: An Anthology* (London 1961) = *A Source Book of Heretical Writings from the Early Christian Period* (New York 1961) 84. The Nag Hammadi version of the same passage (Robinson 121) runs: "and bitter fate was begotten through them, which is the last of the changeable bonds (....). For from that fate came forth every sin and injustice and blasphemy etc". Cf. the famous prayer to the stars in *PGM* I, p.118, ll. 1345-80.

[162] Reitzenstein 1904, 78 ff.; J. Z. Smith 1978, 163: "the world was experienced as a prison". Cf above p.47 ff. Therefore, one of the cherished tricks of magicians was to change the fates. See: E. Peterson, Die Befreiung Adams aus der *Ananke*, in: *idem, Frühkirche, Judentum, und Gnosis* (Rome-Freiburg-Vienna 1959) 107 ff.; discussion and literature in Kolenkow 1980, 1480; Segal 1981, esp. 364.

period, both in Hermetic[163] and in magical texts. *PGM* I, l. 215 f. provides a good example: "Shield me against all excess of magical power of aerial daimon [and] fate" (ὑπεράσπισόν μου πρὸς πᾶσαν ὑπεροχὴν ἐξουσίας, δαίμονος ἀε[ρί]ου [καὶ εἱ]μαρμένης). Most significant is the qualification of the *magus* who is able to protect man against the evil traits of fate as ἀνδρὶ τυραννοῦντι τῶν ἀστρῶν[164]. It is against this slavery of tyrannical Fate that St. Paul also protests. Man finds himself in bondage (so most emphatically in *Gal.* 4), but even the 'principalities' of the cosmos are unable "to separate man from the love of God" as *Rom.* 8:38, has it. Comparably, *Pistis Sophia* ch. 15 (Schmidt-Till 15) quotes a saying of Jesus: "And the fate (εἱμαρμένη) and the sphere (σφαῖρα) over which they rule, I have changed". Now, the ruler of the twelve aeons is called "the great τύραννος Adamas". And the divine protagonist is pictured as the great opponent of the *kosmokratores*, who are the authors of the evil *heimarmene* as embodied in the fixed rules of astrology[165]. Consequently, Tatian, *Or. adv. Graec.* 9, declares: "We are exalted above Fate and in place of the planetary daimons we know but one ruler of the cosmos"[166].

All this entails the possibility that people of imperial times, imbued with or at least having knowledge of these beliefs, interpreted K 25 in accordance with ll. 55/6 as Isis' victory over the tyranny of Fate. The aretalogy of Cyrene (103 AD) opens with the words Ἐγὼ τύραννος Εἶσις αἰῶνος μόνη, a variant that may refer to this new interpretation of Isis' tyranny. As protrectress of the cosmos[167] against the threats of Fate she found a successor in the Virgin Mother in Byzantine treaties[168], where the Holy

[163] See for instance Nock 1933, 100 ff.; Nock 1972 I, 128. However, the combination of ἀνάγκη and ἐκλύειν can be found already in classical texts: J. Brody, *Fate in Oedipus Tyrannus: A Textual Approach* (Buffalo 1985).

[164] Libanius *Or.* 1, 43. Cf. Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* 5, 12 and Nock 1933, 288 f., who adds that according to Firmic. *Math.* 2, 30, 5, the Emperor alone is above fate.

[165] Schmidt-Till 1954, ch. 29, p.25. Cf. on this subject: I. P. Culianu, Feminine versus Masculine. The Sophia Myth and the Origins of Feminism, in: H. G. Kippenberg (ed.), *Struggles of Gods* (Berlin 1984) 65-98.

[166] See various other revealing testimonies in J. Z. Smith 1978, 165 and E. Peterson, Zum Hamburger Papyrus-Fragment der *Acta Pauli*, *VChr* 3 (1949) 142-62, esp. 146 ff. Of course matters are more complicated than can be elucidated in a few phrases. Viewed as the principle of arbitrariness (as opposed to the ineluctability of the fixed predestination) Tuche is often associated with hope, both principles being denounced. So for instance Vett. Val. *Anth.* 5. 9. 2. p. 219 Kroll. Interestingly, Lucian *Al.* 8, calls both ἐλπίς and φόβος τύραννοι that can only be deluded by consulting the oracles. Texts like Ἐλπὶς καὶ σύ, Τύχη, μέγα χαίρετε. τὸν λιμέν' εὗρον ... (*A.P.* 9, 49) are common in epitaphs of the imperial period. *Inveni portum, Spes et Fortuna, valete. Est Christus portus, vita salusque mea* is their very popular Christian translation. See: Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* III, 261-71.

[167] Isis *kosmokrateira*: Grandjean 1975, 69 f. with bibliography; J. J. V. M. Derksen and M. J. Vermaseren, Isis Kosmokrateira, in: *Alessandria e il mondo ellenistico-romano. Studi in onore di A. Adriani* III (Rome 1984) 430-2.

[168] See for testimonies: N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London 1955) 257 n.29. On the reception of Isiac elements in the Mariology see: Witt 1966, 65 n.1:

Virgin is called: παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου προστασία καὶ σκέπη (in which σκέπη, 'shelter, cover', corresponds with ὑπεράσπισον, 'shield', in the magical text quoted above). Like Isis, the Virgin Mother says ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ τὸν κόσμον κρατοῦσα καὶ περιέπουσα and she is κοσμοσώτειρα δέσποινα.

Since the Hellenistic sources are silent on divine victories over this specific 'tyranny' of fate, it is unlikely that such a 'fatalistic' interpretation of Isis' victory over the tyrants in the Isis aretalogy should have its roots in the (early) Hellenistic period, let alone that it was a common interpretation at that time[169]. And this is not the only difference between, roughly, the last centuries BC and the first centuries AD, especially from the second century onwards.

The paradox that man paid for his new freedom by deeper subjection to his divine liberator—the unconscious inconsistency of the Hellenistic era—was, in later times, not only noticed but also deliberately elaborated. This appeārs, for instance, in the eleventh book of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*[170]. Once he was released from his asinine form, Lucius triumphed over his *heimarmene*: *de sua Fortuna triumphat* (11, 15), but, for the rest of his life, he was to stay under the guardianship of the goddess: *vives in mea tutela gloriosus* (11, 6). He was now under the protection of another Fortuna, not a blind, but a seeing one: *in tutelam iam receptus es Fortunae, sed videntis* (11, 15). And this *tutela* entailed a *servitium* which warranted

"There (at Ios) it was that last year I heard the priest invoke Δέσποινα τοῦ Κόσμου during the liturgy, in front of the iconostasis behind which is the stele (upside down as I afterwards found out), inscribed with the Isis Aretalogy in which occurs the well-known τύραννος τῆς χώρας. Cf. *idem* 1971, 269-81. Cf. also the strong similarity of Maria hymns and Isis aretalogy: *ZPE* 42 (1981) 71 n.2. By the way I would point out that one of the earliest testimonies of the odd word γοργότης in the sense of the rapidity of divine reaction (Ael. Arist. *Or.* 49, 49) refers to Isis, whereas γοργοεπήκοος is a fixed epithet of the Panagia in modern Greek. On continuity of Mother religions in general see: E. Stauffer, Antike Madonnenreligionen, *ANRW* II, 17, 3 (1984) 1425-99.

[169] The commentators' hesitation concerning the setting of these final lines speaks volumes. In 1949, A. J. Festugière concluded his fundamental study of the Isis aretalogies (= Festugière 1972, 162 f.) with the statement that the final lines of the Kume aretalogy—"*précisément les deux derniers*, qu'il était loisible d'ajouter à un texte préexistant"—were a later addition. Although the notion of the yoke of *Heimarmene* can be documented from the 4th century BC onwards, we have no trace of gods who rescue man from these chafing bonds before the second century AD (he regards the Andros hymn as its earliest instance). This had already been anticipated by P. Roussel, *RHRL* 7 (1921) 41. However, in his *Personal Religion* of 1954, 151 n.5, Festugière says: "Today I should no longer say that these last verses on Heimarmene are a late addition. After all, the *astrological* doctrine of Heimarmene must have been common since the beginning of Greco-Egyptian astrology (third cent. BC), and, as the authors of these Isiac aretalogies are very probably Greco-Egyptian priests of Isis, they could easily conceive Isis as a Saviour in that matter as in all else." I agree with the latter position, which, however, does not alter the fact that the general Hellenistic-Greek reader did *not* connect the τυράννων ἀρχάς in line 25 with the victory over *heimarmene* in the final lines.

[170] Although there are some attractive points in J. Shumate, The Augustinian Pursuit of False Values as a Conversion Motif in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 35-60,

protection against the threats of Fate: *nam in eos quorum sibi vitas ⟨in⟩ servitium deae nostrae maiestas vindicavit, non habet locum casus infestus* (11, 15). In the concluding words: "accept of your own free will the yoke of service. For when you have begun to serve the goddess, then will you better realize the results of your freedom" (*ministerii iugum subi voluntarium. Nam cum coeperis deae servire, tunc magis senties fructum tuae libertatis*), one shocking *coincidentia oppositorum* unites the antipodes 'slavery' and 'liberation'[171], which the hymn of Kyme, as a metaphor of its political setting, kept apart for 22 lines.

This is no coincidence. Apul. *Met.* 11, 19, tells us that Lucius voluntarily retired to the temple precinct of Isis: "Hiring a dwelling within the precinct of the temple I set up house for myself for the time being[172]. Thus I attached myself to the service of the goddess in a manner so far

there can, of course, be no doubt concerning the Isiac nature of the conversion in the 11th book.

[171] Curiously enough, once again the tendency to diminish the contradiction becomes apparent in commentaries and other modern treatments. J.-C. Fredouille, *Apulei Metamorphoseon Liber* XI (Paris 1975) *ad loc.* remarks: "l'antithèse avec *servire* est donc purement verbale" (!). Better: Gwyn Griffiths 1975, *ad loc.*, but the deliberate paradox has been best recognised by H. Fugier, *Recherches sur l'expression du sacré dans la langue latine* (Paris 1963) 301-6. Note that this voluntary slavery in the service of a god is paralleled by voluntary acceptance of slavery in the secular world: J. Ramin & P. Veyne, Droit romaine et société: les hommes qui passent pour esclaves et l'esclavage volontaire, *Historia* 30 (1981) 472-92. 1 Clemens 55:2 tells us that many Christians sold themselves into slavery in order to ransom fellow Christians from prison with the proceeds: Lane Fox 1986, 299. In connection with possible Egyptian origins of the phenomenon I would like to mention some curious demotic self-dedications to Anubis published by H.-J. Thissen, *P. Freib.* IV, 72-3 and Add. 1-2, who dates them in 270/69 BC. W. Clarysse, who adds a fifth example, (*Enchoria* 16 [1988] 7-10) convincingly argues for a slightly later date, circa 200 BC. The relevant lines of his text read: "I am thy servant from this day onwards for ever and I give you 2 1/2 kite every month for my rent of service before Anubis the great god. No daemon, [monster (?) ....], spirit, evil force (?), no man who is in the underworld, no man on earth will have power over me except you from this day onwards for ever." (On these Egyptian 'contracts' which promise a monthly rent for divine protection, see also: C. Préaux, *L'économie royale des Lagides* [Bruxelles 1939] 480 ff., who refers to H. Thompson, *Actes du Congrès international de papyrologie* [1938] 497 ff.) The latter part of this formula returns literally in Greek texts concerning sacral *manumissio* or *aphierosis*, which makes a slave free by 'consecrating' him to a god or goddess. This ritual, too, displays very interesting similarities with several aspects of the issue under discussion. Expressions such as μηδένα εἶναι κυριώτεραν ἢ τὴν θεόν or ἐλεύθερος καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, which are formulaic in sacral *manumissio* texts curiously reflect the *coincidentia oppositorum* under discussion in the present chapter. Deissmann 1923, 270-81, has powerfully argued that the New Testament, especially the Pauline doctrine of Jesus' death as a ransom for man's sins is, at least terminologically, derived from the pagan sacred manumission (cf. also W. L. Westermann, The Freedmen and the Slaves of God, *PAPhS* 50 [1945] 55 ff.), but later scholars have disputed this view. See most recently: A. Bielman, Λύτρα, prisonniers et affranchis, *MH* 46 (1989) 25-41. I cannot dwell on this similarity here, but hope to return to the subject elsewhere.

[172] Thus he was οἰκῶν ἐ⟨ν⟩ οἰκίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ, as a recent confession text has it: P. Herrmann, Sühn- und Grabinschriften aus der Katakekaumene im archäologischen Museum von Izmir, *AAWW* 122 (1986) 249-61, no 2.

purely personal, taking intimate part in the comradeship of the priests and worshipping the great deity without interruption (*numinis magni cultor inseparabilis)*''. Long ago Reitzenstein 1927, 192-215, convincingly argued that Lucius was thus very near becoming a *katochos* of the goddess, like the well-known 'monks' of the Sarapieion or the Astartieion of Memphis, who, as we have seen, for various reasons but perhaps mostly in accordance with a vow, made themselves the 'prisoners' (κατάκλειστοι) of the god. This is the most rigid consequence of being a *cultor* or θεραπευτής of the god[173], terms we frequently meet in inscriptions. The captivity sometimes entailed bondage in real fetters, as for instance the fourth century author Manetho *Apotelesm.* 1, 237, testifies concerning these *catenati*: Οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν κατοχῇσι θεῶν πεπεδημένοι αἰεί, δέσμοισιν μὲν ἔδησαν ἐὸν δέμας ἀρρήκτοισιν. Once again we recognize reflections of the same concept and terminology in Christian writings[174]. St. Paul declares himself a captive of God or Christ: δέσμιος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (*Ephes.* 3:1; 4:1; *Phmn* 1:9) and again there is a marked emphasis on the paradoxical blending of slavery

[173] Recent commentaries curiously ignore this. I found nothing—not even on the term *cultor*—in the commentaries of Gwyn Griffiths or Fredouille. See: Cumont 1937, 147 f.; J. P. Louw, Note sur les thérapeutes comme ἐγκάτοχοι au Sérapéum à Memphis, *AClass* 3 (1960) 15-60; Vidman 1970, 69-75. We are very close to the concept *hierodoulos* here, though this term covers a range of different meanings: R. Scholl, ΙΕΡΟΔΟΥΛΟΣ im griechisch-römischen Ägypten, *Historia* 34 (1985) 466-92. Above (p.66) we noticed that comparable phenomena occurred in Lydia. *IG* V, 2, 472 = *SIRIS* 42 (2nd or 3rd century AD), has an interesting record on a girl who was 15 years old when παντοκράτωρ λάτριν ἐὴν ἔθετο Εἶσις, which she remained until her death. See: F. Dunand, Sur une inscription isiaque de Mégalépolis, *ZPE* 1 (1967) 219-24. This again is comparable with an inscription from Medinet Madhi quoted by Cumont 1937, 146: Ἡρώδης Διονυσίου ἱερόδουλος ἦλθον πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν Ἶσιν μν(ε)ίαν ἐπ'ἀγαθῷ τῶν ἰδίων ποιούμενος. On the *servitium* of gods see also Bömer 1957 I, 183: ''In dieser Welt verschwinden die Unterschiede zwischen Freiheit und Unfreiheit. Hier kann sogar die δουλεία θεοῦ die wahre ἐλευθερία bedeuten''. Cf. *ibid.* 126-9; *idem* 1963 IV, 24 ff.; Pleket 1981; Veyne 1986, 268 f. Cf. also the custom of branding and tattooing in religion as signs of submission and dependence: F. J. Dölger, Zur Frage der religiösen Tätowierung im thrakischen Dionysoskult, in: idem, *Antike und Christentum* 2 (1930) 107-16; K. Gross, *Menschenhand und Gotteshand in Antike und Christentum* (ed. W. Speyer, Stuttgart 1985) 262 ff.; Jones 1987. Recently, M. Bar-Ilan, Magic Seals on the Body among Jews in the First Centuries C.E., *Tarbiz* 57 (1987) 37-50 (in Hebrew), argued that in Jewish context the seal on the body was meant as a 'pass-word' into the Heavenly palace as well as a shield on earth. On *katochoi* etc. see above p.56 f. and lit. in n.91.

[174] Not only in writings: just like pagan devotees, Christian holy men, too, could accept chains by way of self-punishment or devotion. It is specifically known of the desert fathers. The skeleton of one of these has been found in Egypt, chains and all. See: C. Butler, *Lausiac History of Palladius* II (1898) 215, quoted by E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (New York 1970 = Cambridge 1965) 33 f. I do not share his reservations concerning the Hellenistic background of these Egyptian acts of devotion (see for the precursors in Egyptian paganism: Cumont 1937, 150). Mr. W. J. Beuker draws my attention to a curious relic of this ritual. The modern visitor to the Coptic Convent of St. George in Cairo is invited to take part in a 'chain-wrapping ritual'. It is possible to take photographs, the guidebook adds.

and freedom. Whereas he calls himself a δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ[175] in *Rom.* 1:1, he also preaches to ''stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free'' (ἡμᾶς ..... ἐλευθέρωσεν) in *Gal.* 5:1. And in 1 *Cor.* 7:22, the contradiction is unequivocally spelled out: ''For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant (δοῦλος), is the Lord's freeman (ἀπελεύθερος); likewise also he that is called, being free (ἐλεύθερος), is Christ's servant (δοῦλος)''[176].

As elsewhere, in the ambiance of Isis this voluntary subjection is an act of devotion[177], which sometimes has an amatory ring and can be compared with the *servitium amoris*[178]. In love poetry the verb δουλεύω and its cognates are frequently used, and even the theme of escaping a former master (mistress) in order to be seized by a new one as a 'servant'—the kernel of the Isiac conversion, as we saw[179]—is attested (*AP* 12, 169)[180]. The lover is the suppliant and servant[181] of his mistress, and so, with sometimes strikingly similar sentiments and attitude, is the devotee's relation to the goddess[182]. Tibullus 1, 2, 83, in a way combines the two when

[175] The qualification ὁ δοῦλος τοῦ θεοῦ is topical in Christian funerary inscriptions of the Byzantine period. See for instance S. Mitchell, *AS* 27 (1977) 97-103 (*SEG* 27 [1977] 873-88).

[176] Cf. E. Käsemann, *An die Römer* (Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 8a [Tübingen 1980]) *ad Rom* 6: 13; V. H. Neufeld, *The Earliest Christian Confessions* (Leiden 1963) *passim*. Of course, there is an Old Testament prehistory of these ideas as well. See *e.g.* J. P. Floss, *Jahweh dienen- Götter dienen. Terminologische, literarische und semantische Untersuchung einer theologischen Aussage zum Gottesverhältniss im Alten Testament* (Köln 1975). The idea has been adopted by Augustine, Comm. Psalm 99, 7, *PL* 37, 1275: ''It is a great joy, my brothers, to be a slave in this great household, even a slave with chains on his feet (....). The master's slavery is free.'' Cf. generally: J. Vogt, Ecce ancilla Domini. Eine Untersuchung zum sozialen Motiv des antiken Marienbildes, *VChr* 23 (1969) 240-63.

[177] See on the theme of submissiveness in the Isis religion and elsewhere: Nock 1933, 138 ff., and on vocation to her service: *ibidem* 153-5; Bonner 1937; Festugière 1954, 68-84; Cf. Gwyn Griffiths 1975, *ad* 11, 6: ''The spiritual conversion thus implied entails an exclusive and total claim by Isis''. See also Merkelbach 1962, index s.v. 'Knechtsdienst'. The goddess is, if we may borrow a title from her colleague Bèlos (above n.27): *magister mentis*. Cf. F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain* (Paris 1963) 230 n. 77.

[178] P. Murgatroyd, *Servitium amoris* and the Roman Elegists, *Latomus* 40 (1981) 589-606.

[179] There is even an instance of a Christian senator's re-conversion to the cults of Cybele and Isis in [Cyprian] *CSEL* III, 302 ff., where the senator exclaims: ''O goddess, I have sinned: forgive me. I have returned''.

[180] This type of undesirable 'conversion' induced Ignace of Antioch, *Polyc.* 4, 3, to firmly oppose the idea that Christian slaves should be bought free from community funds. He feared that they would become 'slaves to lust': Lane Fox 1986, 296.

[181] The combination turns up in an inscription from Galatia (J. G. C. Anderson, *JHS* 30 [1910] 164 [3rd c. AD]), where a person is called ἱκέτης καὶ ὑπηρετῶν.

[182] The earliest testimony of this amatory subjection seems to be Alcman's second Partheneion (fr. 3 = *P. Oxy* 2387): [ἐγὼν ἱ]κέτις. Why ''ἱκέτις ne peut définir que des relations entre un humain et une divinité'' (Cl. Calame, in his edition of Alcman [Rome 1983] 418) is incomprehensible to me. Cf. M. Davies, Alcman and the Lover as Suppliant, *ZPE* 64 (1986) 13/14; J. Gould, *JHS* 93 (1973) 74 ff.; Van Straten 1974. On terms of supplication

he pictures a lover who does not shrink from "falling prone before the temple[183] and pressing kisses on its hallowed thresholds nor from crawling on suppliant knees (*supplex*) along the earth and beating my head against the sacred door-posts".

Such an extreme affective personal surrender to the goddess, and particularly the explicit acknowledgement of the paradox of 'the freed as slave of the liberator', seems to belong largely to imperial times, especially from the second century AD onwards, the period labelled by Veyne 1986 as 'le second paganisme', in which he detects relations between gods and mortals comparable to the ones between 'un monarque et ses sujets'. A clear illustration of this can be found in Philostratos *Vita Apoll.* 4, 31, when he asks πῶς θεοὶ θεραπευτέοι; and answers: ὡς δεσπόται[184]. Indeed, again we descry a parallel development in secular relations. The relationship between *imperium Romanum* and (free) Greek cities has been treated in numerous recent studies[185]. As compared to Hellenistic times there are

in the context of Isis see Engelmann 1975, 49. *Pace* J. Gwyn Griffiths, Isis and Agape, *CPh* 80 (1985) 139-41, ἀγάπη in *P. Oxy* 1380 seems to be a surname of Isis: 'love'. Cf. C. H. Roberts, Ἀγάπη in the Invocation of Isis (*P. Oxy* XI, 1380), *JEA* 39 (1953) 114; S. West, An Alleged Pagan Use of ἀγάπη in *P. Oxy* 1380, *JThS* 18 (1967) 142 f., convincingly contested by R. E. Witt, The Use of ἀγάπη in *P. Oxy* 1380: A Reply, *JThS* 19 (1968) 209-11. On the use of the word ἀγάπη in non-Christian texts see: O. Wischmeyer, Vorkommen und Bedeutung von *Agape* in der ausserchristlichen Antike, *ZNTW* 69 (1978) 212-38; J. O'Callaghan, Ἀγάπη como titulo de trato en el siglo V p, *Aegyptus* 66 (1986) 169-73. Note especially that the Coptic *Sophia Iesu Christi* confers the same title ἀγάπη to its divine protagonist, who shares numerous qualities with Isis: W. C. Till, *Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502* (Berlin 1955) 238; Robinson 1988, 231. The same affection may be implied in the term ἴδιος added to a god's name, which is perhaps also reflected in the Latin term *singularis*, used once as a predicate of Sarapis: L. Moretti, Serapis singularis, in: *Scritti sul mondo antico in memoria di F. Grosso* (Rome 1981) 381-4.

[183] It is the temple of Venus, but "die Liebesgöttin ist gleichzeitig Venus und Isis": L. Koenen, Die Unschuldsbeteuerungen des Priestereides und die römische Elegie, *ZPE* 2 (1968) 31-8, quotation on p. 38. Cf. also: L. Koenen, Egyptian Influences in Tibullus, *ICS* 1 (1976) 127-59.

[184] Cf. the proverb: "To rule is to have the power of a god" (τὸ κρατοῦν δύναμιν ἔχει θεοῦ, Artemid. *Onir.* 2, 36, and cf. 2, 69). See: F. J. Dölger, "Herrschergewalt hat Gottes Macht." Ein antikes Sprichwort bei Artemidoros von Daldis, in: *idem, Antike und Christentum* III (Münster 1932) 128-31. Add: τὸ] γὰρ κρατοῦν [ἰσόθεόν ἐστιν] in Life of Aesop, *P. Oxy* 3720; Perry, *Aesopica* I, 68-70 and 101-2; R. Führer, *ZPE* 66 (1986) 19. Cf. the famous phrase from *P. Heid* 1716 (*Philologus* 80 [1925] 339; *RhM* 112 [1969] 48-53): "What is God? That which wields power. What is king? Godlike" (τί θεός; τὸ κρατοῦν. τί βασιλεύς; ἰσόθεος).

[185] D. Nörr, *Imperium und Polis in der höhen Prinzipatszeit* (Munich 1966) with on pp.116 ff. a discussion very similar to the ones on the freedom of Hellenistic cities referred to above: "Die Grundkategorie, mit der die Relation von Stadt und Staat zu begreifen ist, ist also eine primär politische, nur in zweiter Linie juristische. Die Römer waren eher die politischen Herren der Polis als eine 'juristische' Obrigkeit."(!); R. Bernhardt, *Imperium und Eleutheria. Die römische Politik gegenüber den freien Städten des griechischen Ostens* (Diss. Hamburg 1971); D. Nörr, Zur Herrschaftsstruktur des römischen Reiches: Die Städte des Ostens und das Imperium, *ANRW* II, 7, 1 (1979) 3-20; A. D. Macro, The Cities of Asia Minor under the Roman Imperium, *ANRW* II, 7, 2 (1979) 658-97; R. Bernhardt, Die Immunitas der Freistädte, *Historia* 29 (1980) 190 ff.; M. Stahl, *Imperiale Herrschaft und provinziale Stadt. Strukturprobleme der römischen Reichsorganisation im 1-3 Jhdt. der Kaiserzeit* (Göttingen 1978); F. Jacques, *Le privilège de liberté. Politique impériale et autonomie municipale dans les cités de l'Occident romain* (Rome 1984). The specific Roman view on sovereignty and freedom was prepared under the republic: H. Galsterer, *Herrschaft und Verwaltung im republikanischen Italien* (Munich 1976); W. Dahlheim, *Gewalt und Herrschaft. Das provinziale Herrschaftssystem der römischen Republik* (Berlin 1977); M. Humbert, *Municipium et civitas sine suffragio. L'organisation de la conquète* (Rome 1978); T. Yoshimura, Zum römischen *Libertas*-begriff in der Aussenpolitik im zweiten Jahrhundert vor Chr., *AJAH* 9 (1984) 1-22.

signs of both continuity[186] and discontinuity, but undeniably philosophical reflection, political ideology and the practical attitudes towards rulership have now undergone decisive changes. Whereas Hellenistic kings *bestowed* liberty and democracy and at the same time *demanded* obedience, and in so doing preserved the two constituents of a glaring paradox, the monarchic regime of the Roman emperor was *identified* with liberty and was declared to be identical to 'perfect democracy'[187]. In the same pericope where Harmodius and Aristogeiton are still praised, Apollonius of Tyana declares that "the rule of one man, provided it strives for the common welfare, *is* democracy": ἡ ἑνὸς ἀρχὴ πάντα ἐς τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ κοινοῦ προορῶσα δῆμος ἐστιν. So the two components of the paradox—still implicit in Augustus' proud statement in the first line of the *Res Gestae*: *rem publicam dominatione* (= tyranny!) *factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi*—are finally defined as identical and have come to blend. Freedom,

[186] Let me illustrate the continuity with two very congruent assessments of the 'Hellenistic' political inconsistency in the Roman empire by two completely different scholars. Veyne 1976, 108, on Greek cities in the empire: "La cité est autarcique et c'est pourquoi il n'importe guère qu'elle soit indépendante ..... elle se suffit, elle est complète, ce qui importe plus pour sa définition que d'être seule maîtresse chez soi" .... "Autarcie sans souveraineté: la chose peut nous paraître étrange car nous sommes habitués à définir l'État par la souveraineté; notre nationalisme ombrageux disqualifie la simple autonomie. Mais si la réalité était moins monolithique et que l'État ne soit pas une essence?". E. A. Judge, *The Social Pattern of the Christian Groups in the First Century* (London 1960) 21: "Cooperation with the Romans was obviously prudent, but they did not essentially qualify the others' autonomy. They merely guaranteed it". 23: "The idea of numerous lesser governments working in association with the Romans was plainly not simply a hypocritical fiction". Many more perceptive remarks on pp.18-23.

[187] Ch. G. Starr, The Perfect Democracy of the Roman Empire, *AHR* 58 (1952) 1-16; G. Walser, Der Kaiser als *Vindex libertatis*, *Historia* 4 (1955) 353-67; M. Hammond, *Res olim dissociabiles: principatus ac libertas.* Liberty under the Early Roman Empire, *HSPh* 67 (1963) 93-113; Chr. Wirszubski, *Libertas als politische Idee im Rom der späten Republik und des frühen Prinzipats* (Darmstadt 1967); R. Klein (ed.), *Prinzipat und Freiheit* (Darmstadt 1969); A. U. Stylow, *Libertas und Liberalitas. Untersuchungen zur innenpolitischen Propaganda der Römer* (Diss. Munich 1972); K.-W. Welwei, Augustus als *vindex libertatis*. Freiheitsideologie und Propaganda im frühen Prinzipat, *AU* 16 (1973) 29-41. H. Kloft, *Liberalitas principis: Herkunft und Bedeutung. Studien zur Prinzipatsideologie* (Köln 1970) 34, argues that the *liberalitas principis* places "die Untertanen prinzipiell in der Schuld des Herrschers", which is precisely what I have argued for the Hellenistic ruler and the Hellenistic cities.

to echo Marcus Aurelius, has now become an ἐλευθερία τῶν ἀρχομένων[188]. Accordingly, free cities like Aphrodisias could claim greater freedom than others and at the same time confess: "without the Imperium Romanum we would not prefer to live" (χωρὶς τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας οὐδὲ ζῆν προαιρούμεθα)[189].

Here, then, we see the end of a development whose origins in early Hellenistic times we have explored. The stark *coincidentia oppositorum* of imperial times regarding both divine and human relations was still veiled in the Hellenistic age. The components were there, ready for elaboration or amalgamation, but, for some time they remained disconnected and separate. Far more than the explicit reconciliation in the Roman empire, the implicit contradiction of Hellenistic times has evoked vehement irritation among scholars. Both philologists and historians demurred in a singular harmony and I have tried to show that, and especially where, they were wrong.

"Tyrant I am—I have destroyed the mastery of tyrants". The innocent philological detail has turned out to be a paradigm of a culture in inward conflict—a conflict between, on the one hand, gods and kings who turned

[188] *Ad semet ipsum* 1, 14, 2. Aelius Aristides in his *Praise of Rome* provides the most elaborated examples of similar ideas. *E.g.* ch. 36: "Of all that ever ruled, you (Rome) are the only one that rules over free people"; 38: "Are not these qualities which transcend democracy?"; 68: "a common world-wide democracy has been constituted by one man, the best ruler and orderer", and cf.: R. Klein, *Die Romrede des Aelius Aristides* (Darmstadt 1983) 89 n.68; J. Bleicken, Der Preis des Aelius Aristides auf das römische Weltreich, *Gött. Nachr.* 7 (1966) 225-75; V. Nutton, The Beneficial Ideology, in: P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (edd.) *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1978) 209-21. Significantly, the pages Wirszubski *o.c.* (preceding note) devotes to the *libertas Augusti* can be transposed without serious alterations to the relation between Isis and her subjects.

[189] J. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome. Documents from the Excavation of the Theatre at Aphrodisias* (London 1982), D 2b, l. 13-4. The freedom, however, could be cancelled by way of punishment (ἀφῃρέθη ἡ ἐλευθερία, Cyzicus in 25 AD. Cass. Dio 57, 24, 6), an action which could be referred to as ἐδουλώσατο (the same Cyzicus under Augustus in 20 BC. Cass. Dio 54, 7, 6). The Roman view of the matter is revealed by Pliny *Ep.* 8, 24. Speaking of the Greeks—*liberos maxime liberos*—, he adds: *quibus reliquam umbram et residuum libertatis nomen eripere durum, ferum, barbarum est.* The other side of the medal can be illustrated for instance by the boisterous reactions of a theatrical audience, probably in Alexandria, at a line in a Greek play referring to freedom (Philo, *Quod omnis prob. lib.* 141, mentioned by Lane Fox 1986, 49). And the *two* sides are aptly combined by Plutarch, *Moralia* 313 D-E, in his advice to upper-class youngsters with political ambitions. On the one hand, "when you enter into a post you must not only consider the calculation of Pericles (....): 'Take care Pericles, you are ruling free men, you are ruling free Greeks', (...) but you must also say to yourself: 'You who hold office are a subject, in a *polis* controlled by proconsuls, by Caesar's procurators'." The ambiguities in the freedom of the cities in the Eastern part of the Empire becomes most explicit in their judicial autonomy: J. Colin, *Les villes libres de l'Orient gréco-romain et l'envoi au supplice par acclamations populaires* (Bruxelles 1960) esp. 51-75.

slaves into free men, and, on the other, kings and gods who made these free men their subjects and slaves. If we eliminate or gloss over the paradoxical detail, we close a door that gives access to the historical meaning of the text. If we gloss over or eliminate the historical inconsistency, we distort our perception of a culture in crisis. I have discussed only one example. As I said in the introductory chapter, we would have no difficulty finding others in (ancient) history, and identical reactions by philologists and historians. I wish to argue for the recognition of the value of historical inconsistencies and to urge that more attention be paid to them. The alternative is historical falsification. Let us prefer a history of inconsistency to the myth of coherence.

ΕΙΣ ΔΙΟΝΥΣΟΣ

THE TRAGIC PARADOX OF THE *BACCHAE*

Dionysos est double: terrible
à l'extrême, infiniment doux.

J.-P. Vernant

Introduction

Every reader gets the *Bacchae* he deserves. No two scholars agree on the meaning of the play, let alone on the intention of its author. So from the middle of the last century onwards we can perceive a discouraging procession of conflicting interpretations, expanding alarmingly in the last few decades. Naturally, the continuous re-interpretation of the play entailed radically different views of the author's intention. "It seems impossible to establish agreement on the fundamental question: what effect did Euripides intend to produce on the Athenian audience for which these plays were designed? In the absence of such an agreement, the field is wide open for every man to make his own Euripides—the rationalist, the irrationalist, the political dramatist, the philosopher, the feminist, the radical, the reactionary or the mere bungler"[1].

Circa 1850, the earliest interpretation that deserves the predicate 'scholarly' pictured the *Bacchae* as Euripides' *palinodia*, a confession of his 'deathbed conversion', which made the grey poet return from the false track of sophistic agnosticism to the re-acceptance of pious religiosity and the service of the gods[2]. In the next generation it was argued that the Euripides of the *Bacchae* was not essentially different from the author of the

[1] B. Knox, *Word and Action. Essays on the Ancient Theater* (Baltimore-London 1979) 330.

[2] This interpretation has been defended by, among others, Tyrwhitt, Lobeck, K. O. Müller, Nagelsbach, also followed by Rohde and the young Wilamowitz. The idea has not died out yet: in the introduction to his Budé edition of the *Bacchae* (Paris 1961) 236 f., H. Grégoire still adheres to it, and it is not completely absent from J. Roux's commentary either. See on the 'palinode' theory in general and the contribution by Nietzsche in particular: A. Henrichs, The Last of the Detractors: Friedrich Nietzsche's Condemnation of Euripides, *GRBS* 27 (1986) 369-97, esp. 391 ff. For this rapid history of Euripidean scholarship I am specially indebted to the surveys by H. Merklin, *Gott und Mensch im 'Hippolytos' und den 'Bakchen' des Euripides* (Diss. Freiburg im Breisgau 1964) 30-9; J. M. Bremer, De interpretatie van Euripides' Bacchen, *Lampas* 9 (1976) 2-7; Oranje 1984, 7-19.

earlier work: if, indeed, the tragedy displays sentiments of authentic piety, this was not novel at all, and it went hand in hand with the criticism of myth so typical of Euripides' later plays[3]. Next appears a romantic Euripides, deeply influenced by the new ambience of primitive and ecstatic Macedonia, which led him to the discovery of the demonic and mystic aspects of religion[4]. This Euripides was in turn succeeded by the rationalist, who unremittingly denounced the excesses, delusions and cruelty of religion: *tanta religio potuit....*[5]. In more recent times, we have become acquainted with Euripides as a (Freudian) psychologist, the discoverer of the tension between two contradictory aspects of a single religious phenomenon—blessed ecstasy side by side with bestial cruelty in Dionysiac religiosity—or in a single person—Pentheus' 'schizophrenia' apparent in the conflict between his stubborn defence of law and order and the 'repressed *libido*' manifest, for instance, in his voyeurism[6]. Though the latter approach still carries much weight in the discussion, in recent interpretations, following modish literary theories, the author more and more abandons the field to the work of art: recent structuralist and semiotic approaches offer a wealth of subtle analyses of contrast and unity in especially Dionysiac religion with its paradoxical coexistence of the codified standards of civic/cultural life and the chaotic/'natural' licence of maenadic ecstasy[7]. But it seems that structure has ousted both the author and his historical setting[8].

A different *Bacchae* not only yields a different author, but also different protagonists. "Pentheus .... is left harsh and unpleasant, and very close

[3] Thus by and large: Hartung, Tyrrell, Sandys, Kraus, Wecklein.

[4] Dieterich, Schmid, in a way also Wilamowitz. Traces in Roux.

[5] The extremes in the notorious theories of G. Norwood, *The Riddle of the Bacchae* (Manchester 1908), who, however, recanted his earlier views in *Essays on Euripidean Drama* (London 1954) 52-73, and A. W. Verrall, *The Bacchants of Euripides and Other Essays* (Cambridge 1910) 1-163. Recently, Lefkowitz 1989, argued that, though the picture of impiety derives from Euripides' own dramas, any character in Euripides who expresses 'philosophical' notions about the gods does so out of desperation. Ultimately the gods will prove—not always to the character's satisfaction—that they retain their traditional power.

[6] Fundamentally in Dodds 1960, already foreshadowed in his: Euripides the Irrationalist, *CR* 43 (1929) 97-104, and Winnington-Ingram 1948. Cf. also G. M. A. Grube, Dionysos in the *Bacchae*, *TAPhA* 66 (1935) 37-54. Apart from their contributions to our insight into the psychology of Pentheus, their influence has been particularly fertile in the exploration of the typically ambiguous nature of Dionysiac piety, as it is for instance explored in Musurillo 1966, Cook 1971, and recent structuralist works.

[7] Segal 1982; 1986, with serious attention for psychoanalysis. See esp. 'Pentheus and Hippolytus on the Couch and on the Grid: Psychoanalytic and Structuralist Readings of Greek Tragedy', *ibid.* 268-93; Vernant 1986a and 1986b.

[8] The problems connected with the pursuit of the author's intention had long been recognized: "Hinter dieser frommen, allzu fromm dramatisierten Legende (....) ist der Dichter abgetreten. Man rät bis heute daran herum" (K. Reinhardt, Die Sinneskrise bei Euripides, in: E. R. Schwinge [ed.], *Euripides* [Darmstadt 1968] 506).

to the ordinary tyrant'' is the logical correlate of the 'deathbed conversion': in resisting the great god, the haughty monarch rejects everything that is valuable in religion. The rationalist Euripides, on the other hand, cannot but have devised Pentheus as ''the finest character of the piece'' (Norwood), mercilessly crushed by a cruel, arbitrary and, *à la rigueur*, faked god. There are countless variations in the interpretation of Pentheus, ranging from the essentially pious character via the truly tragic hero to the theatre tyrant *tout court* who is characterized by 'stubborn blindness'[9]. In the latter, predominantly negative view, Pentheus inevitably loses tragic weight: ''We have the ordinary hot-tempered and narrow-minded tyrant—not very carefully studied, by the way, and apparently not very interesting to the poet'', as Murray saw it[10]. The logical consequence, then, is to reduce Pentheus' dramatic function to the mere task of *e contrario* illuminating the greatness of the god[11]. Here, in particular, the more balanced views of Dodds and Winnington-Ingram, who emphasize the essential *coincidentia oppositorum* in both Dionysiac religion and the human rebel, have done much to ban the prevailing positivist monomania that had gradually shackled the play and alienated it from its tragic nature. One of their most conspicuous achievements was to bring Pentheus back to the stage, albeit, as has been correctly contended, once behind the scenes his place is 'on the couch'[12].

[9] To illustrate the international variety I refer for these three different opinions to the following titles taken at random: G. G. Anpetkova-Sarova, The figure of Pentheus in the *Bacchae* (in Russian), *Vestnik Lenengradskogo Universiteta* (1969), 110-7 (pious Pentheus); D. Gilula, On Euripides and the *Bacchae* (in Hebrew), *Bamah. Educational Theatre Review* (1971) 58-67 (Pentheus as the tragic hero). Other expressions of sympathy for Pentheus as a tragic character *inter alia* in Masqueray, Pohlenz, Deichgräber; A. Pippin Burnett, Pentheus and Dionysos: Host and Guest, *CPh* 65 (1970) 15-29 (stubborn blindness). Diller 1955 has made an attempt to reconcile the conventional image of the theatrical tyrant (''wir kommen mit den gewöhnlichsten Tyrannenpsychologie aus'') with a nonetheless truly tragical role for Pentheus. Roux 1970/2 offers an extremely contradictory picture: Pentheus is the good, wise and pious king and his motives are pure, but his tragic error is that he basically reasons as a sophist.

[10] G. Murray, *Essays and Addresses* (London 1921) 79.

[11] So for instance, explicitly: F. Wassermann, Die Bakchantinnen des Euripides, *Neue Jahrb.* 5 (1929) 273; A. Rivier, *Essai sur le tragique d'Euripide* (Lausanne 1975²) 81 f.

[12] There have been various subsequent attempts at a psychological analysis of Pentheus, some of them more convincing than others. Less convincing: I. A. LaRue, Prurience uncovered: The Psychology of Pentheus, *CJ* 63 (1968) 209-14; W. Sale, The Psychoanalysis of Pentheus in the *Bacchae* of Euripides, *YCS* 22 (1972) 63-83. More convincing: B. Seidensticker, Pentheus, *Poetika* 5 (1972) 35-64, who tries to understand Pentheus as the characteristic example of the 'authoritarian personality'. Very illuminating is the psychological analysis of the stichomythy in the *Bacchae* as proposed by E.-R. Schwinge, *Die Verwendung der Stichomythie in den Dramen des Euripides* (Heidelberg 1968) with on pp. 339-433 the consequences for the character of the protagonists: Pentheus unites a horror of and a deep craving for maenadic Dionysiac religiosity. Nor is Freudian influence lacking in the commentary of Kirk 1970, who, though generally unfavourably disposed to Dodds' psychologisms, nevertheless sees Pentheus as a theatrical tyrant who is primarily obsessed by his repressed sexual obsessions. Cf. also below n.14.

''Did Euripides approve or disapprove of Dionysos? The question is silly'' said the sensible Kitto[13], and the nearer we approach contemporary research the more he seems to be put in the right. For even for one who is not prepared to follow *frenis remissis* the protagonists of structural or semiotic theory, it will be difficult to deny that such recent interpretations as those by Vernant, Detienne and Segal have opened new perspectives on the essentially *tragic* nature of this tragedy[14]. More cogently than Dodds' psychological intuitions, the best products of recent research have at least taught us to appreciate the intrinsic ambiguities of Dionysiac religion as the potentially explosive incentives to a tragic paradox. When the first—substantially different—version of the present chapter appeared as an article in the Dutch journal *Lampas* in 1976, none of these structuralist interpretations had seen the light. Now that I have read (and benefitted from) them, I find that I have two reasons for satisfaction. The first is the remarkable correspondence between my own ideas and some of the major themes of these subsequent publications, especially the common emphasis on the intrinsic ambiguity of Dionysiac religion. The second is the equally remarkable difference in approach. Though I unconditionally adhere to the idea that the contradictions within Dionysiac ideology by their very nature may give rise to tragic clashes, my own point is an essentially different one.

I shall argue that Euripides was fully alive to the timeless ambiguity of Dionysiac religion, but that he exploited it for his own specific purpose, which aimed at converting the eternal Dionysiac ambiguity into a conflict manifest in the actual reality of his own time. In other words, I shall try to fill the gap which the structuralists have left by remaining too much ''al di qua della 'storia'''[15]. I shall argue that the poet deliberately presented Dionysiac religion as one of the new 'sects' that invaded Greece and especially Athens in his time. His chief purpose was not to evoke the innate paradoxes of Dionysiac religion, though they surely served him as a handle, but rather to question the nature of religious convictions in general, both the established and novel ones, by sowing doubt about their status and mutual relationship. For this reason he manipulated the para-

[13] H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (London 19683) 377.

[14] Nor need (post-)structuralism exclude an occasional excursion into psychoanalysis. See especially: C. Segal, Pentheus and Hippolytus on the Couch and on the Grid: Psychoanalytic and Structuralist Readings of Greek Tragedy, and: Euripides' *Bacchae*: The Language of the Self and the Language of the Mysteries, in: Segal 1986, 268-93 and 294-312, respectively. The paroxism of the 'tragic' is reached in: *idem*, The *Bacchae* as Metatragedy, in: P. Burian (ed.), *Directions in Euripidean Criticism* (Durham 1985) 156-73.

[15] The expression is from G. Casadio 1987, 191 n. 1, in a critical note on the otherwise lauded work of Vernant.

doxical aspects of Dionysiac religion by applying a stark historical distortion and cunningly mixing up the mythic past and the historical present. Contemporary authorities, backed by popular opinion, condemned the new zealots. In doing so they had the law on their side and so, from this angle, had Pentheus. However, the public knew that Dionysos was *not* a new god, but an ancient, accepted, civic deity. Seen in this light Pentheus was *not* right. I hope to show that the *Bacchae* is the tragedy of two conflicting positions which, though both right in principle, make themselves both guilty of *asebeia*. And this is a truly tragic paradox. Furthermore, I shall argue that in the context of this tragic objective, Euripides was the first Greek author to recognize and design the image of a revolutionary new type of god and the concomitant religious mentality, an image which, though no doubt tolerated by the unique nature of classical Dionysos, must have been particularly fostered by the presumptions of the new 'sects'. Deities of this nature only came to prosper in the Hellenistic and Roman period, where they became 'routinized' just as Dionysos had been long before.

In developing my ideas I start from the following assumptions, which it will for reasons of space be impossible to argue in any detail here: 1) A new interpretation of the *Bacchae* can do without a detailed survey of the literary history of the play. No new theory, however, can boast independence from previous research. The reader will soon discover my indebtedness to, for instance, Winnington-Ingram and especially Dodds, not to mention more recent authors. He will also find that my interpretation, though excluding some, certainly does not dismiss *all* previous views of the tragic clash between god and king. 2) As I said in the introduction to this book, there is in my view one indisputable precondition to embarking on an (historical) interpretation of a work of art: the conviction that the ancient audience and the modern reader share the basic human qualities necessary to provide an at least provisional platform for understanding the meaning of the work, as it was intended by the author (which does not exclude the existence of other meanings). After characterizing Euripides as "the man of hard analytic vision who sees the here and now truly and exactly for what it is", B. Knox[16] continues: "he must have *intended* (my italics H.S.V.) to produce this unsettling effect, which disturbed his contemporaries as it disturbs us: to leave us with a sense of uncertainty". Though fully aware of its blasphemous infringement upon structuralist,

[16] Knox 1985, 4. After finishing the manuscript of this book I saw Yunis 1988, who "aims to provide an answer, however, provisional, to the following question: how does Euripides reflect, modify, and even challenge those beliefs about the gods which can be considered fundamental to the religious practices by the Athenians" (11). I have inserted a few references to this modest but attractive study, wherever they seemed to be helpful.

post-modernist or post-post-modernist confessions I endorse this point of view. No literary theory will ever be able to discard the significance of the public's reactions to especially Euripidean drama. When in Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 450-1, a seller of wreaths for statues of the gods claims that Euripides has spoiled her livelyhood because "by working in tragedies he has persuaded men that gods do not exist", this speaks volumes on the immediacy of the audience's involvement. And this leads us to my third point. 3) The quest for the meaning of a text is hopeless without a certain knowledge of the expectations one may presuppose in the audience. This involves the task of investigating as far as possible the social and mental experience of the Athenians of the late fifth century. For my subject this will require, first, an analysis of the new cults and the reactions they provoked in Athens, and, second, an assessment of the position of the orgiastic and maenadic aspects of Dionysiac religion in Greece. In confessing my belief in a historical approach to the work of art, I feel buttressed by the remarkable recent reappraisal of the historical *Sitz im Leben* for the understanding of Greek tragedy[17], which had somewhat faded into the background, no doubt under the influence of the combined forces of psychological and structuralist approaches. However, not a little alarmed by such over-enthusiastic historicists who, for instance, manage to stage Dionysos as the mythical double of Alcibiades[18], I wish to concentrate on general tendencies as *traîts d'union* between the fiction of tragedy and the historical reality of its social setting. Whenever I do believe that close reflections of *specific* details can be detected, I hope they are more convincing than the identification just mentioned. Thus I hope implicitly to demonstrate the truth in the words of a great philologist: "the works we have got: Euripides—that is: these eighteen plays. In them indeed is all the history of his time; but not in the form of a running commentary on

[17] Besides the works on Euripides and his social and political context by G. Zuntz, mentioned below n.19, and for instance V. de Benedetto, *Euripide: teatro e society* (Turin 1971)—whose theories I find it generally difficult to accept—, I am thinking of such different studies as P. Walcot, *Greek Drama in its Theatrical and Social Context* (1976); H. Kindermann, *Das Theaterpublikum der Antike* (Salzburg 1979); W. Rösler, *Polis und Tragödie. Funktionsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen zu einer antiken Literaturgattung* (Konstanzer Universitätsreden 1980); H. Kuch, *Die griechische Tragödie in ihrer Gesellschaftlichen Funktion* (Berlin 1983), esp. 11-39, and see the bibliography on p. 32 n.82. Also various studies in 'l'histoire psychologique' by Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1972; 1981; Goldhill 1986; Oudemans and Lardinois 1987. I find myself in particular sympathy with the works of Kindermann and Rössler, among other things in their emphasis on the 'polisferne' function of the 'autonome Unterhaltung' which became specific for tragedy in the eyes of fourth century authors, especially Aristotle.

[18] M. Carrière, Sur le message des Bacchantes, *AC* (1966) 118-39; E. Delebecque, Alcibiade au théâtre d'Athènes à la fin de la guerre du Péloponnèse, *Dioniso* 41 (1967) 354-62.

the issues of the day. Every experience and every idea that stirred his age, every hope that winged, every despair that bent it: they have all been absorbed, by a genius of unlimited perception and penetration, into the objective world of art''[19].

1. Hailing new gods in Athens

1. New gods and their reception

The Olympian family of the archaic and early classical period strikes us as an established and fairly static society. Foreign gods could be admitted[20], it is true, but admission to official cult was only granted on condition that the new god submitted to the local *nomoi* of the *polis*. In view of the tolerant[21] and inclusive nature of polytheism, we should be less surprised by the fact that foreign gods did find their way into the Greek pantheon than by the fact that so few availed themselves of the opportunity. Strabo, in a famous passage (10, 3, 18), praises Athenian hospitality, including tolerance towards foreign gods: ''for they welcomed so many of the foreign rites that they were ridiculed by comic writers'', but he mentions only the Thracian Bendideia and the Phrygian rites of Sabazios. Granting that there must have been more foreigners—albeit hardly in the official circuit—than are documented in our sources, and ignoring the ones that are of no particular interest to our purpose—such as Hecate, Ammon, and Greek migrants like Pan or Asclepius[22]—with half a dozen

[19] G. Zuntz, Contemporary Politics in the Plays of Euripides, in: *idem*, *Opuscula selecta* (Manchester 1972) 59, who warns against a too simple historicising interpretation of Euripides' plays. See also his: *The Political Plays of Euripides* (Manchester 1963²). And cf. A. Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (Göttingen 1972³) 360, on Euripides: ''wohl aber zeigt sich an allen Ecken und Enden seines Werkes die Problematik der Zeit, in die er sich gestellt sah.''

[20] Besides the specialist studies mentioned in the foot-notes below the following studies have been useful: Schoemann 1859 II, 146 ff.; 334 ff.; Derenne 1930, 224 ff.; Deubner 1932, 219-23; Nestle 1933, 79 ff.; Kern 1935, 225-42; M. P. Nilsson, Reflexe von dem Durchbruch des Individualismus in der griechischen Religion um die Wende des 5. und 4. Jhdts. v. Chr., in: *Mélanges F. Cumont* I (Bruxelles 1936) 365-72; *idem*, *Greek Folk Religion* (New York 1961) 91 ff.; *GGR* I, 722-8; 831-9; Festugière 1972, 129-37; 243-5; Burkert *GR* 176-9. I have not been able to consult J. H. Cowell, Foreign Influences on Greek Religion (to the End of the fifth Century), *Pegasus* 13 (1971) 8-29. After having completed the greater part of this chapter I saw Freyburger-Galland *et alii* 1986. This book, which is obviously written for the general reader and is not always equally well-informed, adds nothing of importance to what I had written.

[21] I use the term 'tolerant' in the sense of 'not dogmatically hostile to foreign influences'. There was not such a thing as a conscious ideology of tolerance in antiquity. See: Sandvoss 1968; B. Kötting, Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz im Altertum, *Vortr. Rhein.-Westfäl. Ak.* (1977). On the development of the idea under the influence of philosophical theory in Cicero: A. Michel, Les origines romaines de l'idée de tolérance, *REL* 48 (1970) 433-59.

[22] Nor do I discuss Isis, since our earliest indisputable Athenian evidence is an inscription of 333/2 BC (*IG* II², 337). See: Sterling Dow, The Egyptian Cults in Athens, *HThR* 30 (1937) 221-3, followed by R. R. Simons, Isis in Classical Athens, *CJ* 84 (1989) 216-21. However, faint traces of earlier interest may be detected in the context of the 'Egyptophile' Lycurgus, who lived in the late fifth century: Aristoph. *Av.* 1296 and scholia; Kratinos fr. 11; 30. U. Köhler, Studien zu den Attischen Psephismen, *Hermes* 5 (1871) 328-53, suggested that it was this elder Lycurgus who proposed the grant of *enktesis* to the Egyptians mentioned in the above mentioned inscription, but this must remain speculation. Apart from this, we have only one tiny piece of evidence in the theophoric name of an Athenian citizen Isigenes (*IG* II², 1927, circa 400 BC), but, although this may indicate a strong interest on the part of the family involved, it probably should not be taken as evidence that a cult was established, as Sterling Dow *o.c.* 218 correctly argues. On Isis' position among the Egyptian emigrants at Piraeus see: R. Garland, *The Piraeus* (London 1987) 126 ff.

all is said and done. A few of them arrived early enough to gain a Hellenic and occasionally a well nigh Olympian status; yet none of them ever completely lost the exotic flavour associated with their names, appearances and rites. Together they provide precious bits of information that can be used in reconstructing the expectations of the audience of Greek tragedy. What sentiments were stirred by the arrival of a foreign exotic god as it was staged in Euripides' *Bacchae*? I shall summarize the evidence which I believe to be directly relevant to this question.

Adonis

The cult of the dying god Adonis[23] is already found fully developed in Sappho's circle[24]. Its West Semitic origin is generally acknowledged. *Pace* Kretschmer's denial, the name of the god clearly betrays its roots in the Semitic *Adon*[25]. The cult was restricted to women, according to Detienne even to unmarried women, more particularly *hetaerae*[26]. The most con-

[23] Older literature in *RML* art. Adonis; *GGR* I, 727 n.3; *Kleine Pauly* I, 70 f. The most important recent studies: W. Atallah, *Adonis dans la littérature et l'art grecs* (Paris 1966); M. Detienne, *Les jardins d'Adonis: la mythologie des aromates en Grèce* (Paris 1972); B. Soyez, *Byblos et la fête des Adonies* (Leiden 1977); Burkert 1979, 105 ff.; S. Ribicchini, *Adonis. Aspetti 'orientali' di un mito greco* (Roma 1981); *Adonis* 1984; G. J. Baudy 1986. I have not seen H. Tuzet, *Mort et résurrection d'Adonis. Étude de l'évolution d'un mythe* (1987). For the iconographical tradition see: *LIMC* I, 1 (1981) 222-9, with plates in I, 2, 160-70; E. Keuls, *The Reign of the Phallus* (New York 1985) 23-30.

[24] Sappho 140; 168 LP; cf. Hes. Fr. 139 Merkelbach-West.

[25] Contested by P. Kretschmer, *Glotta* 7 (1916) 29 ff. But cf. Fauth in: *Kleine Pauly*, I, 70 f. and O. Loretz, Vom Baal-Epitheton *ADN* zu Adonis und Adonaj, *UF* 12 (1980) 287-92; *idem*, *ADN* come epiteto di Baal e i suoi rapporti con Adonis e Adonaj, in: *Adonis* 1984, 25-33.

[26] *O.c.* (above n.23), who does not convince me. Cf. for instance Aristoph. *Lys.* 388 ff.; Theocr. 15. See for crucial criticism: E. Will, Le rituel des Adonies, *Syria* 52 (1975) 93-105, and G. Piccaluga, Adonis e i profumi di un certo strutturalismo, *Maia* 26 (1974) 33-51. For later times we have evidence of male contributions to Adonian ritual: *IG* II², 1261, ll. 9 f. (Piraeus 302 BC.) praises a certain Stephanos for ''having well organised the procession of the Adonia according to ancestral custom'' and an inscription from Peraia (F. Durbach-G. Radet, Inscriptions de la Périée rhodienne, *BCH* 10 [1886] no 6) mentions a *thiasos* of male Adoniastai (κοινὸν τῶν ἐρανιστᾶν τῶν [συν]αδωνιαζόντων), who honour a benefactor with the privilege of wearing a wreath καθ' ἕκαστα Ἀδώνια.

spicuous trait of the ceremonies was the mourning for the dead god performed by women on the flat roofs of their houses[27]. The death of the god was ritually represented by the 'gardens of Adonis': sherds with rapidly sprouting and withering herbs[28]. Incense and perfumes play their specifically feminine roles. Descriptions by Aristophanes and Menander show striking correspondences: they make mention of tumult, wild dances, ecstasy, and all this during nocturnal festivals (*pannuchiai*)[29] with the predictable result that innocent girls become pregnant in (not from) the commotion. This appears to be a fixed motif: ''Nachtfeiern als Anlass für βιασμοὶ παρθένων geniessen etwa denselben Originalitätswert wie ein Bad im Waldsee im Trivialfilm''[30]. Concerning a 'resurrection' of the god nothing is known. Both myth and ritual focus on the mournful aspects of his decease[31]. The Adonia never lost their character of a private celebration. The god had no temples and was never admitted to the official cult of the city[32].

[27] Aristoph. *Lys.* 388 ff. provides a lively picture. See: N. Weill, Adoniazousai ou les femmes sur le toit, *BCH* 90 (1966) 664-98; cf. *BCH* 94 (1970) 591-3. Iconographic data: *LIMC* I, 2, 160-70, especially plates 45-49. Ch. M. Edwards, Aphrodite on the Ladder, *Hesperia* 53 (1984) 59-72, identifies Aphrodite as the consort of Adonis standing on a ladder. More archaeological information in: B. Servais Soyez, Musique et Adonies. Apport archéologique à la connaissance du rituel Adonidien, in: *Adonis* 1984, 61-72, who interprets the ladder as an ''emblême de salut'' (?).

[28] V. A. Estévez, 'Απώλετο καλὸς Ἄδωνις: A description of Bion's Refrain, *Maia* 33 (1981) 35-42. Burkert 1979, 107: ''The 'garden' ritual is to be understood as play-acting the failure of planting in order to ensure by contrast the success in reality''. G. J. Baudy 1986 suggests a different origin, viz. in the wide-spread agricultural custom of testing various kinds of seeds, in order to find out which will yield the best results—in my view decidedly the most convincing solution. On the 'prehistory' of the gardens of Adonis see: M. Delcor, Le problème des jardins d'Adonis dans Isaïe 17, 9-11 à la lumière de la civilisation syro-phénicienne, *Syria* 55 (1978) 370-94. B. Servais Soyez, *o.c* (preceding note) 68 ff., denies the existence of these gardens in the Near East. All this does not imply, of course, that the same meaning should be attached to the Greek urban ceremonies, where the women must have associated the withering herbs with the wailing for Adonis. For the archaeological evidence see besides the literature mentioned (above nn. 23 and 27): A. Neppi Modena, *ADONIA* e *ADONIDOS KEPOI* nelle raffigurazioni vascolari attiche, *RPAA* 27 (1953) 177-87. On the survival of the Adonis garden: W. Baumgartner, Das Nachleben der Adonisgärten auf Sardinien und im übrigen Mittelmeergebiet, *Schweiz. Arch. Volksk.* 43 (1946) 122-48 = *idem*, *Zum Alten Testament* (Leiden 1959) 247-81.

[29] Menander *Samia* 43 ff.: ἐπὶ τὸ τέγος κήπους γὰρ ἀνέφερόν τινας, [ὠρχο]ῦντ', ἐπαννύχιζον ἐσκεδασμέναι. Comparable elements in Aristoph. *Lys.* 387-398.

[30] H.-D. Blume, *Menanders 'Samia'. Eine Interpretation* (Darmstadt 1974) 16 n.31, with the evidence. Cf. also the evidence and literature in: W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (London 1969 = 1911) 78 f. Add the revealing passage of Artemidor. 3, 61: ''Night vigils, nightly festivals, and banquets at which one stays awake the whole night are auspicious in regard to marriages and partnerships (.....). The dream indicates, moreover, that adulterers and adulteresses will be found out but that they will not be punished in any way, since the activities at night festivals are known to all those who participate and, even if they are licentious, they are, in a certain sense, permitted''. The theme of the pannuchis pregnancy occurs e.g. also in Eur. *Ion.*

[31] This had already been argued by P. Lambrechts, Over Griekse en oosterse mysteriegodsdiensten; de zgn. Adonis mysteries, *Med. Kon. Vlaamse Ak. Wet.* Kl. Lett. 16, 1 (1954); *idem*, La 'résurrection' d'Adonis, *AIPhO* 13 (1955) 205-40, whose sceptical views found more recognition recently. Cf. U. Bianchi, Adonis. Attualità di una interpretazione 'religionsgeschichtlich', and P. Xella, Adonis oggi. Un bilanco critico, both in: *Adonis* 1984; S. Ribichini, Salvezza ed escatologia nella vicenda di Adonis? in: U. Bianchi and M. J. Vermaseren 1982, 633-47. In the *Epitaphios of Adonis* by Bion of Smyrna (latest edition: M. Fantuzzi [Liverpool 1985]) of the 1st century BC, there is not the slightest allusion to a possible resurrection of the god. On the contrary, Κώρα δέ νιν οὐκ ἀπολύει (''Persephone will not let him go'', l. 96). On the new scepsis concerning the resurrection of 'mystery' gods in general see: *Inconsistencies* II ch. I. N. Robertson, The Ritual Background of the Dying God in Cyprus and Syro-Palestine, *HThR* 75 (1982) 313-59, develops a particularly intricate interpretation of the death of the god, which I am not always able to follow.

Cybele

In this respect Adonis distinguished himself from Μήτηρ Θεῶν or Μεγάλη Μήτηρ as the Greeks baptized Cybele when she arrived from Asia Minor[33]. An interesting *translatio* legend has been handed down by authors and lexicons of late antiquity[34] among which the Suda s.v. 'Metragyrtes' gives the most detailed version:

> ''A certain man came to Attica and initiated the women in the mysteries of the Mother of the Gods, according to the story told by the Athenians. The Athenians killed him by throwing him headlong into a pit. A plague followed and they received an oracle bidding them to appease the murdered man. Therefore they built a Bouleuterion in which they placed the Metragyrtes, and fencing him around they consecrated it to the Mother of the Gods and also set up a statue of the Metragyrtes. They used the Metroon as record office and repository of laws, and they filled up the pit.''

Although Von Wilamowitz has contested the authenticity of the story, which indeed betrays the well-known features of a resistance myth[35], others, including Nilsson, believe there is no compelling reason to deny

[32] Cf. Schol. Aristoph. *Lys.* 388-9.

[33] *GGR* I, 630, 725-7; *Kleine Pauly* III, 383-9; Vermaseren 1977; Burkert 1979, 102-5; *idem*, *GR* 177-9.

[34] Julian. *Or.* V, p. 159; Suda s.v. *metragurtes* and *barathron* = Phot. s.v. *Metroon* = Schol. Aristoph. *Plut.* 431; Schol. Aeschin. III, 187. I quote the translation by Wycherley 1957, 156 no. 487. The texts also in Parke-Wormell 1956, II, no. 572 and J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley etc. 1978) Q 133. On Julian's interest in Cybele: D. M. Cosi, *Casta Mater Idaea. Giuliano l'Apostata e l'etica della sessualità* (Venice 1986).

[35] There is, for instance, a marked resemblance with an event in Rome in 102 BC, when Cybele's high-priest arrived there from Pessinus and made a deep impression on the crowd with his golden crown and golden spangled robe. A Roman tribune who ordered him from the rostra with contemptuous references to 'beggars' and 'charlatans', died from fever few days later; thereupon the priest assembled a large crowd of respectful Romans to escort him on his way: Plut. *Mar.* 17, 9; Diod. 36, 13, and cf. T. P. Wiseman, Cybele, Virgil and Augustus, in: A. J. Woodman and D. A. West (eds.), *Poetry and Politics in the Age of Augustus* (Cambridge 1984) 118 ff.

it a kernel of historical truth[36]. Recently, two thorough inquiries argued independently that the tradition must be substantially correct[37]. The story has often been connected with the great plague of 430-29 BC, for various obvious reasons, but not least because modern scholars apparently find it difficult to imagine an *early* introduction of an ecstatic cult among Greeks whose most extravagant ecstatic expression seemed to be the archaic smile. However, for other areas of Greece it is beyond doubt that the goddess had firmly established her cult at least as early as the sixth century. As numerous statuettes and images prove, the Greek Great Mother of the Gods is no other than the goddess with the lions who migrated from Asia Minor, undoubtedly via Ionia[38].

Though she was predominantly worshipped by women, no less a male than Pindar founded a private cult for her at the instigation of a dream which staged the goddess' stone image descending towards the poet. He devoted songs and prayers to her and her company, Pan and the nymphs, in which her current paraphernalia were already fully detailed: *rhomboi*, *krotala*, cymbals and torches[39]. Agorakritos, if not Phidias himself, made statues of the goddess with a lion[40]. It is practically unfeasible, though, to determine the exact date of her arrival in Athens. There are two options: either before the Persian wars, a date preferred by those who identify the remnants of a late-archaic building close to the Tholos as the Metroon[41],

[36] U. von Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 14 (1879) 195 n.3. Cf.E. Will 1960, 101 n.2: "c'est une légende-type". Contra: *GGR* I, 725 n. 4; Vermaseren 1977, 32 and a number of older studies: Foucart 1873, Decharme 1904, Derenne 1930.

[37] Cosi 1984 and Cerri 1983. Their arguments, and particularly the ingenious inferences of the latter (e.g. a scholion on Aeschin. 3, 187, of the late fourth century BC, says that the Athenians had changed a part of the Bouleuterion into a Metroon, "because of that Phrygian"!) are to my mind irrefutable.

[38] Will 1960, whose views have been generally accepted. Cf. Fr. Naumann, *Die Ikonographie der Kybele in der phrygischen und der griechischen Kunst* (Tübingen 1983). On her arrival in Ionia: F. Graf, The Arrival of Cybele in the Greek East, *Actes du 7e Congrès de la FIAC* (Budapest 1984) 117-20. Already before the 6th century she was settled in the Southern part of the Peloponnesos: J. de la Genière, Le culte de la Mère des Dieux dans le Péloponnèse, *CRAI* (1986) 3-46. Her early presence in Magna Graecia is *inter alia* documented by a vase inscription from the 7th or 6th century BC: M. Guarducci, Cibele in un' epigrafe arcaica di Locri Epizefiri, *Klio* 52 (1970) 133-8, who traces her back to Colophon. Cf. also below n.50.

[39] Pind. *Dithyramb* 2; frs. 79, 80, 95; *Pyth.* 3, 77 ff. with the scholia and cf. Paus. 9, 25, 3. See: Henrichs 1976. I am not convinced by the scepticism expressed by W. J. Slater, Pindar's House, *GRBS* 12 (1971) 141-52, who tries to disprove the existence of a shrine for the Mother and Pan. His doubts on the relationship of these two gods are unfounded. On the contrary, they seem to be closely related in the cultic imagery. Cf. J. A. Haldane, Pindar and Pan, *Phoenix* 21 (1968) 18-31; Ph. Borgeaud, *Recherches sur le dieu Pan* (Geneva-Rome 1979) 215-8 and index s.v.

[40] Plin. *NH* 36, 17; according to Paus. 1, 3, 5, it was Phidias but this is unlikely: A. von Salis, Die Göttermutter von Agorakritos, *JDAI* 28 (1913) 1 ff.

[41] Thus the excavator Thompson, followed by Will 1960 and others.

or around 430[42]. Although Cerri makes a very good case for the latter date[43] and although it would perfectly fit in both the general atmosphere of the time *and* my argument, I find it difficult to understand why not a single contemporary source so much as hinted at an event which, especially in the context of the plague, must have made quite an impression. For instance, it would have deserved an honorary place in Thucydides' description[44]. This and other considerations, particularly the arguments derived from archaeological evidence discussed below, lead me to a slight preference for the earlier date.

However this may be, there can be little doubt that the goddess was received in Athens somewhere in the fifth century and the fact that she was accorded a sanctuary at the agora means that her acceptance was officially sanctioned[45]. This acceptance fostered a process of 'routinization', which was already fully under way in other parts of the Greek-speaking world. The way this routinization took form in Athens is significant: like Rome, though in a less rigorous and overt way, the Athenian *polis* eliminated or encapsulated the all too extravagant aspects. Plutarch *Nic.* 13, 2, records an incident which took place in 415 BC.: "at the altar of the Twelve Gods where a man suddenly leapt up on to the altar, straddled it and mutilated himself with a stone sherd" (ἀπέκοψεν αὑτοῦ λίθῳ τὸ αἰδοῖον). This is the only explicit reference to the notorious emasculation in the Attis cult, a cult which is itself conspicuously absent in our sources. The male atten-

[42] This date was defended by Foucart, Graillot, Picard and by many others. Cosi does not seem to take sides. Recently, N. Frapiccini, L'arrivo di Cibele in Attica, *PP* 42 (1987) 12-26, reconsidered the archaeological data. She believes that the early Attic statuettes of the Mother were of a private nature. She, too, argues for an official introduction of Cybele in the early phase of the Peloponnesian War and revises the archaeological data accordingly. The centre of the assimilation of Demeter and Cybele was the Metroon at Agrae, in the context of the mysteries celebrated there.

[43] Cerri 1983, 168 ff.: 1) Agorakritos belongs to this period, 2) the *metroon* is often mentioned as an archive in the 4th century and never before, 3) the Mother of the Gods is for the first time mentioned in tragedies from 428 BC onwards, 4) the *barathron* which received the body of the priest was probably still the 'old' place of execution until shortly after Salamis (Plut. *Them.* 22, 2), which does not suit the story.

[44] Even if, as Horstmanshoff 1989 points out, Thucydides was generally reticent on religious reactions to the plague. Cf. also Mikalson 1983.

[45] I do not quite understand Cosi 1984, 86, when he concludes that Cybele was "definitely rejected" by Athens since the Metroon was only erected on the instructions of the Delphic oracle and with the sole intention of placating the goddess. Nor do I follow his pertinent statement: "il pantheon Ateniese le restò per sempre precluso." Admittedly, the construction of the Metroon in a section of the Bouleuterion does distinguish the foreign goddess from the traditional gods with their temples, but this can hardly undermine the fact that she was accorded an official place in the cult of the city, as I shall discuss in further detail below. It is important, though, to notice that her introduction in Rome was due to an official initiative of the state, whereas in Athens it was "enforced" by the propaganda of her priest and the wrath of the goddess herself.

dant of the Great Goddess and his repulsive myth and ritual were obviously kept at bay[46]. "So bleibt uns das tröstende Gefühl, dass die Hellenen den widernatürlichen Bestandteil des Attiskults zunächst verschmähten", as O. Kern[47], not at all pleased with the unfortunate course of events, soothingly concluded.

An important instrument of domestication was the deliberate identification of Cybele with Demeter (especially in the cultic aspects) and, less emphatically, with Rhea (the myth). In his seventh Isthmian Ode Pindar furnishes Demeter with the *krotala* belonging to the cult of Cybele[48]. According to Philodemos "Melanippides (*circa* 450-400 BC) says that Demeter and the Mother of the Gods are one and the same, and Telestes (400 BC) in his 'Births of Zeus' says the same also adding Rhea"[49]. The identification of Cybele with the Eleusinian Demeter is documented by numerous archaeological data in a wide range of Greek-speaking areas and especially in Athens. At Gela the sanctuary of Demeter produced a small terracotta statuette of a seated goddess with a lion dated circa 550 BC[50]. In Athens a black-figure pot of ca. 500 BC presents Demeter and Kore attended by a lion and this is by no means exceptional[51]. Finally, various cultic utensils typical of Eleusis have been found in the immediate neighbourhood of the Metroon at Athens.

Through these elegant and unobtrusive associations the Great Mother had long been subject to a process of hellenization, which may have favoured her entry into the official cult of Athens. However, a few ambi-

[46] F. Cumont, *RE* s.v. Gallos, col. 676: "überhaupt ist in Griechenland der fremde Gott kaum eingedrungen". Cf. P. Lambrechts, Attis, van herdersknaap tot god, *Verh. Kon. Vlaamse Acad. Wet.* 46 (1962). His firm denial of Attis' presence in Attica is, however, undermined by a relief from Peiraeus (circa 300 BC): M. J. Vermaseren, *The Legend of Attis in Greek and Roman Art* (Leiden 1966) 22 f. and pl. XI.

[47] Kern 1935 II, 232.

[48] Calling Dionysos χαλκοκρότου πάρεδρον Δαμάτερος. See the discussion by B. Moreux, Dèmèter et Dionysos dans la septième Isthmique de Pindare, *REG* 83 (1970) 1-14.

[49] Philodem. *De piet.* p. 23 Gomperz; Page, *PMG* 764. See for the literary 'syncretism' for instance: R. Kannicht, *Euripides Helena* (Heidelberg 1969) *ad* 1301-68, p. 329 f., with G. Müller, *Gnomon* (1975) 244 f.; Cerri 1983; Graf 1974, 155 n. 24; Henrichs 1976, 253-4 n.3. Guépin 1968 recognizes a 6th century Orphic hymn in this passage. Cf. also the Epidaurian hymn to Meter and Eur. *Bacchae* 276, who explains Demeter as Γῆ μήτηρ, an interpretation also present in the Orphic Papyrus from Derveni: A. Henrichs, Die Erdmutter Demeter, *ZPE* 3 (1968) 111 f. This etymology may have fostered the identification of the two goddesses.

[50] P. Orlandini, *Rivista dell' Istituto Naz. di Arch. Stor. dell' Arte* 15 (1968) 39 ff. On Cybele in Sicily in general see: G. Sfameni-Gasparro, *I culti orientali in Sicilia* (Leiden 1973) 114-55. On the route of her migration see: J. de la Genière, De la Phrygie à Locres épizéphyrienne: les chemins de Cybèle, *MEFRA* 97 (1985) 693-718 (via Sparta).

[51] *ABV* 705/39. Cf. Van Straten 1976, 42 f., who also discusses thin silver tablets from the sanctuary of Demeter at Mesembria in Thrace, with pictures of a goddess with lions and tympana.

guities linger on which deserve due attention. First of all, it is hardly likely that the metragyrtes—"that Phrygian"—was thrown into the *barathron* merely because he preached a foreign deity or was dressed in a long robe and wore a mithra. In fact, there is a fair chance that we have the actual charge, or at least the actual motive, in two late sources, one of which has been partly quoted above. The Suda s.v. *Barathron* says that they threw the Prygian into the chasm, "because they considered him mad, since he publicly proclaimed that the 'mother' was coming on her quest for Kore", and Julian, *Or.* VIII (V) 159, says that the Athenians killed the Gallos because he was "introducing new religous ideas (or rituals)" (ὡς τὰ θεῖα καινοτομοῦντα) while they did not understand what a great goddess she was, being of the same order as the goddess worshipped by themselves: Deo and Rhea and Demeter..." Putting together these testimonies with the assertion that the metragyrtes "initiated women in the mysteries of the Mother of the Gods", we can perhaps descry the actual incentive for the prophet's lynching, which appears to coincide with one of the official charges of *asebeia* as we shall see below: he 'imitated' the Eleusinian mysteries by identifying his new goddess with Demeter and ritually acting in accordance with this identification[52]. In other words, the private identification by the metragyrtes—probably following an already wide-spread convention elsewhere in Greece—was sharply censured, whereas, once the goddess was officially introduced, the city of Athens adopted the general Greek trend and identified the goddess with Demeter and Rhea—or at least sanctioned similar initiatives in literature, most emphatically in Euripides' *Helena*.

Nor is this all. Although the goddess was an Athenian resident now, she never quite lost the metic associations. Her foreign origin and nature were never forgotten (there were the silent lions of iconography and the roaring adepts in ritual to recall them), but there was also a continuous eruption of ecstatic elements in private Metroac groups. *Metragurtai* or *Kubeboi*[53] paradoxically continued to preach a new, foreign goddess with a barbarous ritual, who in a diluted form was already integrated in the pantheon of the city. And these private acts of proselytism on the margin of the official religious circuit and by no means restricted to the Metroac religion seem to have mushroomed in the course of the fourth century, as the titles of a number of plays belonging to Middle and New Comedy indicate[54].

[52] See above all the charge against Ninos, below p.115 f.. Thus the *metragurtes* can be listed among the νυκτιπόλοις, μάγοις, βάκχοις, λήναις, μύσταις who are censured by Heraclitus because they τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μυεῦνται (Heraclitus 14 DK).

[53] Semonides 36 West; cf. Hipponax 156 West; Kratinos Fr 66 Kassel-Austin IV, 154.

[54] Antiphanes wrote a *Metragyrtes*, Alexis a *Theophoretos*, Menander a *Menagyrtes* and a *Theophoroumene*. See: Bömer 1963 IV, 869 f.

Thus we see a goddess whose introduction—according to a tradition whose reliability has been convincingly demonstrated—met with fierce resistance but who forced the city to accept her cult. In her 'civilized' form she was equated with Olympian gods, but concurrently her 'wild' non-Greek traits were continuously revitalized by very odd itinerant prophets who seemed to preach a different goddess under the same name[55]. They provoked violent feelings of aversion and suspicion for more than one reason: by their objectionable appearance and behaviour[56], their specific appeal to women (though we do not know what exactly attracted them to the *teletai*[57]) and, not least, by the ritual beggary professed in their title (*metr-*) *agurtes*[58].

It is this double identity, generally ignored in scholarly discussion, which will be essential for my argument. Nor is this the only example, since this typifies the eternal tension between the 'routinization' of religion and the craving for the immediate experience of god, the tension between the encapsulated official forms of religion, on the one hand, and marginal creeds of a revivalist, sectarian, heretical, bigoted, in short non-conformist nature on the other[59]. This tension may even result in such questions as:

[55] Cf. Bömer 1963 IV, 10: "So hat es für Meter neben dem anerkannten amtlichen und 'gutbürgerlichen' Kult offenbar in der Umgebung des Bettelpriestertums noch Formen der Verehrung gegeben, die mit bürgerlicher Reputation nicht so ganz vereinbar waren", with a very interesting discussion of the evidence. We observe the same ambiguity in the Roman cult. Cf. Turcan 1989, 45: "L'officialisation du culte de Cybèle se doublait d'une marginalisation effective de son clergé".

[56] On the appearance of the clergy and adepts of Cybele see: Foucart 1873, 160 ff.; V. Poland, 'Metragyrtai', *RE* 15 (1931) 1471-3; P. Stengel, 'Agurtes', *RE* 1 (1894) 915 f.; Bömer 1963 IV, 14 ff.

[57] The little we do know about the soteriological aspects are fully discussed by G. Sfameni Gasparro, *Soteriologia e aspetti mistici nel culto di Cibele e Attis* (Palermo 1979), who, on pp. 31-43, emphasizes the early connections with Dionysos and his *orgia*.

[58] Making money from religious activities such as (private) mantic activities, purifications and magical instructions is a topical cause of suspicion and disdain. Kratinos satirizes Lampon as an ἀγερσικύβηλιν, "tanquam sacrificulum stipem colligentem, tanquam avarum hominem et alieni appetentem" (Bergk quoted by Kassel-Austin fr.66) and cf. the references in the case against the metragyrtes in Rome (above n.35). "With rare exceptions, one finds the practice of divination depicted as quackery, and its practitioners accused of fraud": N. D. Smith, Diviners and Divination in Aristophanic Comedy, *ClAnt* 8 (1989) 140-58, esp. 140, who gives the complete evidence and a full bibliography. On the negative development of the term *mantis* see also: A. Chitwood, The Death of Empedocles, *AJPh* 107 (1986) 175-191, esp. 183 f. Note that Oedipus scolds Teiresias as a μάγον and a δόλιον ἀγύρτην in Soph. *OR*. 387/8, thus equating this infelicitous prophet with foreign mendicants. Cf. K. J. Rigsby, Teiresias as Magus in *OR*, *GRBS* (1976) 109-15. Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 2, 364B; Hippocr. *Morb. sacr.* 1, 10, and the cases against Theoris, Aeschines and the *magia* described by Aesop (below p.117 f.), where the same motif recurs. On the motif of ritual beggary and its function see: Nock 1933, 82 f.; 1972 I, 12 f. and, recently, D. Baudy 1986, esp. 218, on the "religiöse Dienstleistungen in Form von Orakeln und Segenswünschen", with further literature.

[59] Incidently, the juxtaposition of the acceptance of the Metroac rites and the rejection of their extravagances can be demonstrated beautifully in two roughly contemporaneous

whether the new god is really the same as the old one or whether a god preached by similar eccentrics can be taken seriously at all. We shall encounter both types of doubt, although the first may be expected to fall on more fertile soil in a polytheistic system, where identification of gods is an endemic source of uncertainty. And it is especially the later part of the fifth century BC which, for the first time in its history, made Athens the platform of such tensions[60].

Bendis

This period witnessed the influx of several foreign cults, mainly from Thrace, both in the official and the private sphere. The introduction and official integration of the Thracian goddess Bendis was doubtless fostered by the Athenian interest in good relations with the Thracian prince Sitalces[61]. The goddess is mentioned by Kratinos fr. 85 K-A and Aristo-

texts from a later period. In a letter on papyrus (*P. Hibeh* 54, ca. 245 BC.) a man summons a flutist with Phrygian flutes and another artist with drums, cymbals, castanets. "The women need them for a festival." (And cf. the rich 3rd and 2nd century BC evidence for decent *thiasoi* consisting of honourable citizens in Bömer 1963 IV, 11 n.2). On the other hand, a Pythagorean text (H. Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* [Abo 1965], 151 f., 3rd or 2nd century BC) permits "women to leave the house in order to sacrifice to the leading divinity of the community on behalf of themselves and their husbands and their households". However, "they keep away from secret cults and Cybeline orgies in their homes. For public law prevents women from participating in these rites, particularly because these rites encourage drunkenness and ecstasy"—a text which would not be inappropriate in the mouth of Cato (see below n.101).

[60] I deliberately and gladly refrain from asking why. Deliberately, since it would unnecessarily burden this chapter with a problem not directly relevant to my subject; gladly, since it belongs to those questions which are generally solved by references to material or ideological historical circumstances: war, tensions, modernisations, acculturations, which, however relevant they may be, more often than not seem to beg the question. See the literature above n.1. It is remarkable, though, that, as J. D. Mikalson, Religion and the Plague in Athens, 431-423 B.C., in: *Studies presented to Sterling Dow* (Durham 1984) 217-25, shows, the years immediately following the plague were marked by an increased interest in religious matters. However, the religious initiatives without exception pertained to traditional gods and cults. In his forthcoming book *Andokides and the Herms: A Study of Crisis in Fifth-century Athenian Religion*, W. D. Furley analyses various regulations of cult matters that mirror the state of anxiety and uncertainty concerning the state religion during the Peloponnesian war. He concludes that "religion in Athens during the Peloponnesian war underwent a crisis similar to that experienced by Athenian society in general". Cf. also Horstmanshoff 1989 and B. Jordan, Religion in Thucydides, *TAPhA* 116 (1986) 119-47.

[61] On Bendis: P. Foucart, Le culte de Bendis en Attique, in: *Mélanges Perrot* (Paris 1903) 95-102; M. P. Nilsson, Bendis in Athens, *From the Collections of the Ny Carlsberg* III (1942) 169-88 = *Opuscula* III (1960) 55-80; *idem GGR* I, 833-4, where more literature is given. On her original nature (very hypothetical): D. Popov, Essence, origine et propagation du culte de la déesse thrace Bendis, *DHA* 2 (1976) 289-303. On the political motives for her acceptance: M. P. Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Lund 1951) 45 ff.; Z. Goceva, Le culte de la déesse thrace Bendis à Athènes, in: *Thracia 2. Primus Congressus Studiosorum Thracicorum* (1974) 81-6. On the vexed question concerning the spread of her cult: K. Schauenburg, Bendis in Unteritalien? *JDAI* 89 (1974) 137-87.

phanes fr. 384 K-A. Her cult must have been introduced *and* officially sanctioned before 429/8 since it is mentioned in the official accounts of the temple treasures of that year. A well-known badly damaged inscription from Munichia mentions sacrifices, a *pannuchis,* a procession and a cult statue[62]. The first lines of Plato's *Republic* relate how Socrates himself had gone to Peiraeus "to pray to the goddess and to attend the festival". The degree of assimilation of the cult is also illustrated by the fact that there were processions of both Athenians (ἐπιχώριοι) and Thracians. However, next to the official cult in which the state actually participated, there were also private religious conventicles united as *orgeones* of Bendis, who possessed a house next to the temple for purposes of convening and dining[63]. An inscription of the early third century mentions another group of Thracian *orgeones* who successfully aspired to the same privilege in the city of Athens. They are said to have been the only group of foreigners who obtained the privilege of buying a piece of land on Athenian territory[64].

The goddess is well-known from pictures in which she is depicted as a Thracian Artemis, with high boots, a deer-skin over her chiton and a conical cap. A red-figured Attic skyphos of circa 425 BC provides a splendid illustration of the way the goddess came to be incorporated in the cultic system of the *polis*: it pictures Bendis as an exotic double of Artemis, who is present as well, and in the company of Themis who is preparing a sacrifice. This is about the most expressive way there is of indicating: "it is *themis* to worship Bendis"[65]. We have no explicit information on anything like orgiastic ritual, and the relatively modest nature of this Thracian Artemis seduced Nock 1933, 18, into making the statement: "There was nothing more revolutionary than there was in the introduction of the potato and tobacco into England from America". If this is so, it is because these were tame vegetables. As for the wild variants, not only do they not produce edible products but their consumption can be dangerous.

[62] *Ed. pr.* N. Pappadakis, *EA* (1937 [1941]) 808 ff. Exhaustively discussed by W. S. Ferguson, *Hesperia* Suppl. 8 (1949) 131 ff., who explains it as the record of the introduction of the cult in 430/29 BC in connection with the plague. However, J. Bingen, Le décret *SEG* X, 64 (Le Pirée 413/2?), *RBPh* 37 (1959) 31-44, attractively argues that the text is only concerned with 'retouches' and secondary amplifications and he would date it to 413/2 BC. However this may be, it is illustrative of the "osmose progressive d'éléments religieux athéniens et thraces en Attique" that the inscription contains an oracular question whether the priestess should be Thracian or be chosen from "all the Athenians". Cf. on this conjecture also *LSS* no. 6.

[63] *IG* II² 1361 = *LSCG* 45.

[64] *IG* II² 1283 = *LSCG* 46. Very interesting is a relief dedicated to the nymphs on the isle of Paros (*IG* XII, 5, 245). E. W. Bodnar, A Querry Relief on the Island of Paros, *Archaeology* (1973) 270-5, argues that one of the figures is the goddess Bendis, who is introduced to Demeter and Kore. The author of the dedication, Adamas, is, according to A. E. Raubitschek, a person mentioned by Aristotle. His devotion to the cult of Bendis during his exile on the isle of Paris (circa 350-25 BC) must be connected with his relationship with Lycurgus. For two other gods who possess a temple on their own land see below n.108.

[65] *GGR* I, 834 n.1, after Kern 1935 II, 238. *ARV* 1023. Cf. Van Straten 1976, 43 f. Foucart *o.c.* (above n.61) has demonstrated that the acceptance of the cult was ordered by the oracle of Dodona. Significantly, there was an explosion of theophoric names from the end of the fifth century onwards: O. Masson, Les noms théophores de Bendis en Grèce et en Thrace, *MH* 45 (1988) 6-12.

Kotys

These less welcome qualities dominate the testimonies on the equally Thracian goddess Kotys or Kotyto[66]. She is already known to Aeschylus fr. 57 Radt (Strabo 10, 470), a mutilated fragment which informs us that she was celebrated with *orgia* comparable to those of Dionysos[67]. She, too, must have been a kind of Thracian Artemis. Our sole incontestably authentic testimonia are fragments of Eupolis' *Baptai* (frs. 76 ff. K-A) which berate Alcibiades and his gang by picturing them as *kinaidoi*: perverted men in women's dresses in the cult of a perverted goddess. Although hardly any god was immune from satirical wit[68], in this case satire was very much fostered by the fact that this indecent deity was probably never admitted into Athens. She was—at least according to our not particularly impartial source—worshipped at Corinth, a place 'whither not every man's voyage headed', in view of both its ill fame and its political hostility. We have practically no information that does not finally go back to Eupolis or his scholiasts[69].

Hesychius reports that Eupolis "from mere hate for Corinth put some vulgar daimon on the stage" and the Suda calls Kotys an ἔφορος τῶν αἰσχρῶν: "an overseer of disgraceful acts". So we cannot be too confident that her cult was really marked by transvestism, although her associations with the Dorian Artemis, in whose cult similar mask-rituals did occur, might support the suggestion[70]. At any rate, the cult must have possessed features that could serve as hooks to hang the comic puns on and the Athenian audience was sufficiently informed to appreciate the allusions. No doubt their appreciation of the puns was proportionate to their disapproval of the (supposed) extravangances of the ritual.

[66] Kern 1935 II, 239; *GGR* I, 835 f.; *Kleine Pauly* III, 321 f. For the literary tradition see especially Srebrny 1936.

[67] Henrichs 1969, 227 n.13, thinks that these *orgia* are the musical instruments belonging to the ecstatic cult.

[68] J.- M. Galy, La critique religieuse dans la comédie grècque des Ve et IVe siècles, in: *Hommages à P. Fargues* = *AFLNice* 21 (1974) 173-83.

[69] This has been convincingly argued by Srebrny 1936.

[70] Nilsson 1906, 438; Srebrny 1936, 433 ff.

Sabazios

Next, the most instructive instance of all: Sabazios[71], a Phrygian Dionysos, as antiquity was well aware[72], but clearly equally at home in Thracia[73]. However, the identity of Sabazios with (a Thraco-Phrygian) Dionysos was blurred to the effect that when he came to Athens somewhere in the fifth century, he was experienced as a new god. Aristophanes mentions him several times[74] as an orgiastic god adored by women in whose rites the noisy *tympana* and inebriation play their intoxicating roles. In the *Horai* an Athenian jury sentences him and other foreign intruders to exile: "this Phrygian, this flute-player, this Sabazios" (fr. 566 Kock), because the poet *novos deos et in his colendis nocturnas pervigilationes .....vexat* (Cic. *Leg.* 2, 37). And this time the comedy is supplemented by other sources. In a well-known passage, *De corona* 259-60 (330 BC.), Demosthenes delicately reminds his opponent Aeschines of his dubious origin and youth. First, the victim is socially stigmatized for being the son of a school-master—then as now an unenviable position—and next the orator scores his main point:

> "On arriving at manhood you assisted your mother in her initiations, reading the service-book while she performed the ritual, and helping generally with the paraphernalia. At night it was your duty to mix the libations, to clothe the catechumens in fawn-skins, to wash their bodies, to scour them with the loam and the bran, and, when their lustration was duly performed, to set them on their legs, and give out the hymn: 'Here I leave evil behind, here the better way I find', and it was your pride that no one ever emitted that holy ululation so powerfully as yourself. I can well believe it! When you hear the stentorian tones of the orator, can you doubt that the ejaculations of the acolyte were simply magnificent? In day-time you marshalled your gallant *thiasoi* through the public streets, their heads garlanded with fennel and white poplar[75]; and, as you went, you squeezed the fat-cheeked snakes,

[71] Schaefer, *RE* 1A, 1540-51; *GGR* I, 836; *Kleine Pauly* IV, 1478 f.; Ch. Picard, Sabazios, dieu thraco-phrygien: expansion et aspects nouveaux de son culte, *RA* (1961) II, 129-76. For literature on the later development of the god and his cult: Bremmer 1984, 269 n.12; S. E. Johnson, The Present State of Sabazios Research, *ANRW* II, 17, 3, 1583 ff.

[72] See the testimonies in *GGR* I, 566 n.10.

[73] Diod. 4, 4, 1; Schol. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 9; Macrob. *Sat.* 1, 18, 11; Hesych. s.v. *Sauadai*, on which P. Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache* (Göttingen 1896) 195 ff.

[74] Aristoph. *Av.* 875; *Vesp.* 9; *Lys.* 387 f., *Horai* fr. 566 Kock.

[75] I have not seen any reference to this λεύκη in studies on the Orphic gold lamellae which mention λευκὴ κυπάρισσος. They are for instance explained as 'shining cypresses' by M. Guarducci, *RFIC* 100 (1972) 322-7, and cf. G. Zuntz, *Persephone. Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia* (Oxford 1971) 372 f. and 385. W. Burkert *GR* 294, points out that Harpocr. s.v. λεύκη, says that those who are being initiated in the *Bacchika* were crowned with white poplar, since this is a chthonic symbol. Anyhow, it must in some way or other refer to afterlife (cf. G. Dimitrokalis, *EHEM* 2 [1983] 15-30). Elsewhere the white poplar is sacred to Heracles: Theocrit. 2, 121; Pausan. 5, 14,3; Phaedr. 3, 17; Plin. *NH* 12, 3; Artemid. 2, 25.

> or brandished them above your head, now shouting your *Euoi Saboi*, now footing it to the measure of *Hyes Attes! Attes Hyes!*—saluted by all the old women with such proud titles as Master of the Ceremonies, Fugleman, Ivy-bearer, Fan-carrier; and at last receiving your recompense of tipsy-cakes, and cracknels, and currant-buns. With such rewards who would not rejoice greatly, and account himself the favourite of fortune?" (Translation by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince [Loeb] with one minor alteration).

Even allowing for its malicious bias and rhetorical distortion, this passage provides precious information. There are unmistakable similarities with the bacchic sphere: fawn-skin, wine, *makarismos*, snake-dance, ecstasy, *thiasoi*, ivy, initiation into *teletai* etc. etc[76]. It also appears that, though the authorities apparently condoned the rites, participation could still provoke strongly negative reactions and consequently could serve the derogatory aims of a political or legal opponent. For Demosthenes spoke to an audience of average Athenian citizens and he hunted for their votes[77]. Very similar disqualifications had been launched thirteen years before, in 343 BC, when Demosthenes (19, 199) pictured Aeschines as a boy καὶ παῖδ' ὄντ' ἐν θιάσοις καὶ μεθύουσιν ἀνθρώποις καλινδούμενον ("reeling and tumbling with *thiasoi* and tipsy worshippers"). Altogether the Sabazios cult was "un rituel plus ou moins clandestin"[78], neither officially authorized nor persecuted. *Hieropoioi* of the god could publicize a dedication to the god in an inscription from Peiraeus[79] in almost the same year in which Demosthenes launched his first accusations against Aeschines. All the same, the cleft which separated it from the perilous and ill-defined territory of the illegal or the impious was insidiously narrow, as some of its adherents experienced.

Somewhere in the fourth century, at any rate before 343 BC, a 'priestess' of Sabazios, called Ninos, was sentenced to death. As to the charge Demosthenes 19, 281 says that Glaukothea (the mother of Aeschines) "convened *thiasoi* which had led to a death sentence of a priestess" (Γλαυκοθέας τῆς τοὺς θιάσους συναγούσης, ἐφ' οἷς ἑτέρα τέθνηκεν ἱέρεια), implying that the charge referred to the introduction or propagation of specific—and illegitimate—rites belonging to the cult of Sabazios. One of the scholia confirms this: "Because they thought that the *teletai* she celebrated were a mockery, indeed even an act of arrogance against the real mysteries, they put the priestess to death. Subsequently, when the god

[76] Cf. Bremmer 1984, 269. This does not mean that this fragment should be taken to refer to Dionysiac mysteries, as Guépin 1968, 307 ff. argues.

[77] Cf. the sensible remarks by Dover 1974, 13 f.: "A rhetorical case should not be mistaken for a case-history", though, on the other hand, a rhetorical argument clarifies what the speaker "A) wished the jury to believe and B) judged that they should not find it hard to believe".

[78] Ch. Picard, *o.c.* (above n. 71) 133.

[79] IG II², 2932 (342/1 BC).

(evidently Apollo) had ordered that these mysteries should be tolerated, they commissioned the mother of Aeschines to organize the initiations'' (ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέλωτα εἶναι καὶ ὕβριν κατὰ τῶν ὄντως μυστηρίων τὰ τελούμενα ταῦτα νομίζοντες τὴν ἱέρειαν ἀπέκτειναν· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ θεοῦ χρήσαντος ἐᾶσαι γενέσθαι τὴν Αἰσχίνου μητέρα μυεῖν ἐπέτρεψαν). The story bears some resemblance to the introduction of the Great Mother in the fifth century. This version, moreover, is also handed down by Joseph. *c. Apion.* 2, 37: ''For they put to death the priestess Ninos, because she was accused by somebody of initiating people into the mysteries of foreign gods. And this was forbidden by law, and the penalty for introducing a foreign god was death'' (Νίνον μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἱέρειαν ἀπέκτειναν, ἐπεί τις αὐτῆς κατήγορησεν ὅτι ξένοις ἐμύει θεοῖς· νόμῳ δ' ἦν τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῖς κεκωλυμένον καὶ τιμωρία κατὰ τῶν ξένον εἰσαγόντων θεὸν ὥριστο θάνατος). It will be necessary to return to the latter part of this pronouncement in the next section. As to the precise charge against Ninos there is also a different version, preserved in another scholion on Demosthenes *loc. cit.* Here it is said: ''he (Demosthenes) is referring to a woman called Ninos. She was accused by Menekles on the charge of making magic potions for young people'' (ὡς φίλτρα ποιούσης τοῖς νέοις). Many scholars have argued for or against the authenticity of either one of the versions. The majority of scholars of an earlier period relegated Josephus' version to the land of fancies and regarded the charge of sorcery as authentic. However, in a thorough discussion of these texts, Derenne 1930, 224 ff. demonstrated—decisively in my view—that there is no reason whatever to distrust Josephus' testimony (see below p.127 f.).

Nor is there a cogent reason for choosing between the two accusations. It is in fact quite normal for charges of *asebeia* to contain two different—though often coherent—items. The present two charges are not contradictory at all as they represent the two sides of one very current coin. The universal tendency to associate prophets of a new religion with sorcery or magic, so typical of various periods in classical antiquity and especially of the Roman imperial period[80], was not lacking in classical Athens either.

[80] See on this phenomen in Hellenistic and Roman times: Segal 1981; Aune 1980. On the amalgamation of these motifs in the context of Jesus see: M. Smith 1978, and on the ambiguities surrounding Hellenistic miracle workers: J. Z. Smith 1978, 190-207. For accusations of magic against Jews and Christians see for instance the telling testimonies of Celsus in: C. Andresen, *Logos und Nomos. Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (Berlin 1955) 179-81. For Christians and magic: Pfister, 'Epode', *RE* Suppl. IV (1924) 342 f.; MacMullen 1966, 95 ff.; W. Schäfke, Frühchristlicher Widerstand, *ANRW* II, 23, 1 (1979) 460-723, esp. 599-602. *Vice versa*: P. Brown, Sorcery, Demons and the Rise of Christianity: from Late Antiquity into the Middle Ages, in: *idem, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine* (London 1972) 119-46. Gordon 1987, 72 ff. has an excellent discussion of the relationship between foreign cult and magic, both being represented as having been brought in, whether openly or secretly, from the world outside. Consequently, they share the characteristic of ''otherness'' and belong to the ''collective representation of 'foreign' and therefore illicit practices''.

In the perception of the Athenians, Ninos must have belonged to that elusive lot of ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις and θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες as Plato[81] lists them on various occasions, who ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες combine prophetism, charlatanism, bigotry and hocus pocus. In this respect the discovery that Aeschines belonged to a family of *manteis* may be of some significance[82]. Oedipus in Soph. *OR* 386 f. calls Teiresias both a μάγος and a δόλιος ἀγύρτης[83]. A fable of Aesop (no. 112 Halm) relates how a sorceress (γυνὴ μάγος) who used to make charms for propitiating the wrath of the gods (ἐπῳδὰς καὶ θείων καταθέσεις μηνιμάτων) and gained large profits by it (οὐ μικρὰ βιοποριστοῦσα) was accused by certain persons of making religious innovations (καινοτομοῦσαν περὶ τὰ θεῖα)[84]. Small wonder, since these practices were generally associated with professionals of foreign cults such as *metragurtai*. Besides the instances given above, Max. Tyr. 19, 3 mentions priests of Cybele who for two obols for any person interested ἀποθεσπίζουσιν[85]. And to anticipate a datum from the *Bacchae*: Pentheus does not hesitate to expose the foreign prophet as a γόης ἐπῳδός. Now, ''Γόης und Polis-Ordnung sind

[81] *Resp.* 364 BC; *Leg.* 10, 908 CD; 909 B. Cf. Hippocr. *Morb. sacr.* 1. On these *loci*: Reverdin 1945, 225 ff. and on this ''*locus classicus* des Orphikerproblems'': Graf 1974, 14 ff. For the identification of these magic charlatans and *atheoi* see: E. A. Wyller, Platons Gesetz gegen die Gottesleugner, *Hermes* 85 (1957) 292-314.

[82] See: G. Daux, *BCH* 82 (1958) 364-7; 96 (1972) 559 ff., and I. Papadimitriou, *Platon* (1957) 155-63, elaborated by Chr. Karouzos, in: *Theoria. Festschrift W. H. Schuchardt* (1960) 113-22. In a funerary inscription of Kleoboulos, this uncle of Aeschines is called a *mantis* and there is a relief of an eagle that seizes a snake. It appears that an identical scene occurred in a painting by Philochares (4th century BC), in which Glaukos, the grandfather of Aeschines, and Kleoboulos are depicted (Plin. *NH* 35, 28). Fundamentally on the iconography of eagle and serpent: R. Wittkower, Eagle and Serpent, *JWI* 2 (1938-9) = *idem, Allegory and the Migration of Symbols* (London 1977) 15-44, an information I owe to Mr. Mason. I add a story that has some resemblance to this: Plut. *Crassus* 8, says that a snake wound itself round the head of the sleeping Spartacus. A woman, μαντικὴ δὲ καὶ κάτοχος τοῖς περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον ὀργιασμοῖς, explains this as an inauspicious prodigy. Here we perceive again a combination of mantic and initiatory elements in a mystery cult (of Dionysos) plus the snake. P. Masiello, L'ideologia messianica e le rivolte servili, *AFLB* 2 (1966) 179-96, explains the scene as an initiation into the cult of Dionysos-Sabazios, which seems to me unnecessary.

[83] K. J. Rigsby, Teiresias as Magus in the *Oedipus Rex*, *GRBS* 17 (1976) 109-15, argues that Sophocles intended the term to mean 'political ambitious king-maker' in accordance with the doubtful reputation of Persian Magi, and in this connection adopted connotations as 'trickster', 'religious fraud'. Cf. Gordon 1987, 61 ff. on *magoi* as ''fraudulent showmen who deceived by claiming to perform what cannot be performed'', and 78 ff. on their Persian connotations.

[84] Note that this is the same formula we have already met in the charge against the metragyrtes (Jul. *Or* VIII (V) 159), which will again literally return in the charges against Socrates. See below p.130.

[85] See also Nock 1972 I, 315.

Gegensätze''[86]. A γόης should be arrested (Plato, *Meno* 80 AB and elsewhere) because he is *qualitate qua* an ἀσεβής (Hippocr. *Morb. sacr.* 6, 358 ff.).

Nor was Ninos an exception. It was again on the accusation of Demosthenes that another priestess, Theoris from Lemnos, was sentenced to death on the charge of practising magic and teaching slaves how to deceive their masters[87]. However, since we are not told the name of the goddess whom this priestess served, though she probably belonged to the category of 'foreign' gods, the case is not as informative as the preceding or the next ones.

Isodaites

The case against the courtesan Phryne and, more particularly, the unconventional methods of her counsel Hypereides form a *cause célebre*[88]. She was accused of *asebeia* by a certain Euthias[89]. An anonymous treaty on rhetoric[90] presents the recapitulation of the charges against Phryne. First it summarizes the capital issues: ''Phryne accused of asebeia. For she held a *komos* in the Lukeion. She introduced a new god and she organized *thiasoi* of men'' (ἀσεβείας κρινομένη Φρύνη· καὶ γὰρ ἐκώμασεν ἐν Λυκείῳ, καινὸν εἰσήγαγε θεόν· καὶ θιάσους ἀνδρῶν συνήγαγε). Next it records what is generally regarded as the authentic epilogue by the plaintiff Euthias[91]: ''So I have now proven that Phryne is impious because she has participated in a scandalous revelry, because she has introduced a new god, and because she has assembled unlawful *thiasoi* of both men and women'' ('Επέδειξα τοίνυν ὑμῖν ἀσεβῆ Φρύνην κωμάσασαν ἀναιδῶς, καινοῦ θεοῦ εἰσηγήτριαν, θιάσους ἀνδρῶν ἐκθέσμους καὶ γυναικῶν συναγαγοῦσαν).

[86] W. Burkert, Γόης. Zum griechischen Schamanismus, *RhM* 105 (1962) 33-55, esp. 53, who also provides material on the connection with the introduction of new rites or mysteries.

[87] Plut. *Demosth.* 14; Demosth. *In Aristog.* 1, 79; Philochoros *ap.* Harpokration s.v. Theoris, according to whom it was on the formal charge of *asebeia*. There is a nice parallel in a 'judicial prayer' from Amorgos where the injured author begs the goddess Demeter to take action against a certain Epaphroditos who has indoctrinated, advised and misled the accuser's slaves and persuaded them to run away: Versnel 1985, 252 ff; 1990. On Theoris see also: Dodds 1951, 205 n.98. According to Demosthenes *l.c.* the brother of Aristogeiton ''got possession of the drugs and charms (τὰ φάρμακα καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδάς) from the servant of Theoris of Lemnos, the filthy sorceress whom you put to death on that account with all her family (.....) with her help, he plays juggling tricks and professes to cure fits....''

[88] See: Foucart 1902; P. Girard, *Hypéride et le procès de Phryné* (Paris 1911); Derenne 1930, 229 ff.; A. Raubitschek, *RE* 20 (1941) 893-907; G. Kowalski, De Phrynes pectore nudato, *Eos* 42 (1947) 50-62; A. Farina, *Il processo di Frine* (Naples 1959). On her name 'toad' and its social implications: P. E. Slater, The Greek Family in History and Myth, *Arethusa* 7 (1974) 29, who ranges it among the ''names which expressed depth of avarice as well as sexuality''. But see the sceptical remarks by Ad. Wilhelm, Die sogenannte Hetäreninschrift aus Paros, *MDAI(A)* (1899) 409-40, and *JÖAI* 26 (1929) 59-65.

[89] Athen. 13, 590 D; Plut. *Vita X orat.* 889 E.

[90] *Orat. Att.* Baiter-Saupe II, p. 320; Müller II, p. 426.

[91] Baiter-Saupe *loc. cit.*; Foucart 1902, 216 ff., followed by Derenne 1930, 230 n.4.

We shall have to return to this very significant testimony in the next section. For the moment we observe that to all appearances there existed legitimate *thiasoi*[92], the best known of which were those of Dionysos, but which also included (at least some of) the *thiasoi* of Sabazios, and there were illegal *thiasoi*: strictly speaking all *thiasoi* that had not been officially ratified by *boule* and *demos*. Note in this connection that Plato *Leg.* 10, 910 BC, wants to punish anyone who celebrates other ceremonies than those that belong to the official cult (ἕτερα ὀργιάζοντα πλὴν τὰ δημόσια). In practice, however, the argument of illegality must have been largely determined by the odd and indecent practices with which they were associated. How difficult it is (and was) to trace the dividing line appears from the name of the 'new god' who was introduced by this Phryne. It is handed down by Harpokration who says s.v. Isodaites: ''Mentioned by Hypereides in his oration for Phryne. Some foreign daimon, in whose honour women of the lower classes, and particularly the ones that did not excel in virtue, used to hold *teletai*'' ('Ισοδαίτης· 'Υπερείδης ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ Φρύνης· Ξενικός τις δαίμων, ᾧ τὰ δημώδη γύναια μὴ πάνυ σπουδαῖα ἐτέλει). The name Isodaites means literally ''he that distributes equal portions'' and it is attested as an epithet of *inter alios* Dionysos[93]. Once more we observe that a new god was not so new after all, but that like Sabazios he was a double of Dionysos, some elements of whose cult received special emphasis, most probably the ones that were in some way connected with this rare surname. The name may refer to the (in this period unique?) fact that the *thiasoi* were promiscuous, which naturally provoked suspicions as to the nature of the concomitant *komoi*[94].

[92] Cf. a law attributed to Solon and handed down in the *Digesta* 47, 22, 4 (= Solon Fr 76a Ruschenbusch): ''If a people, the members of one *phratria*, *orgeones*, *gennetai*, members of a dinner-club, members of a funerary association, *thiasotai*, pirates or merchants make mutual arrangements, these shall be valid if they do not run counter to public law''.

[93] Plut. *De e apud Delphos*, 9 (389A): ''They call him Dionysos, Zagreus, Nuktelios and Isodaites...''. Also of Plouton and Helios. See *RML* and *RE* s.v. Cf. also the scholion on Hes. *Erga* 368, which recalls the Dionysiac passage in Sophocles' *Tereus TGF* 532, p.260 Nauck[2]. Cf. Eur. *Bacchae* 421-3: ''In equal measure to rich and humble he gives the griefless joy of wine.''

[94] The nature of the population of the oldest Dionysiac *thiasoi* is a vexed problem. Generally both men and women were admitted to *thiasoi*: F. Poland, *Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesens* (Leipzig 1909) 16-46. This is indeed attested for *later* Bacchic *thiasoi* (see below p.141). Against those who nevertheless contend that the older Dionysiac *thiasoi* were restricted to women (referring to maenadic groups in inscriptions), others have adduced the behaviour of Kadmos and Teiresias in the *Bacchae*. However, this argument is not valid, because, even apart from the literary nature of this source, it is not explicitly

Two instructive cases from a later period

When, after this fairly complete survey of foreign gods and their reception in classical Athens, I add two more instances from different times and places, this is because they provide explicit information on aspects which are only dimly perceptible in the lacunary evidence given so far. A well-known inscription from Delos[95] relates the vicissitudes of an Egyptian priest of Sarapis in the third century BC. This priest had built a sanctuary for his god without the permission of the authorities. His initiative met with fierce resistance on the part of the local population, who obviously considered it a stain on the isle of Apollo. Consequently some of them brought an action against the foreign priest[96] but the great god performed a miracle: he 'bound' the tongues of his accusers, who thus became "similar to statues struck by god". Like Cybele in Athens, the Egyptian god legitimated himself by a miracle that punished his accusers, and was consequently admitted to the religious community of Delos[97].

said that these men participated in a *thiasos*. Xouthos in Eur. *Ion* 550 ff. did indeed join *thiasoi* of maenads. Aristoph. *Ran.* 156 f., on the other hand, is not conclusive since θιάσους εὐδαίμονας ἀνδρῶν γυναικῶν does not refer to Bacchic maenads but to Eleusinian mysts. Perhaps the problem is complicated by the fact that in order to join the Bacchic *thiasoi* men had to undergo transvestism, as Pentheus, Kadmos and Teiresias did. Transvestism is typical of certain Dionysiac cult forms: Cl. Gallini, Il travestimento rituale di Penteo, *SMSR* 34 (1963) 211-28; *eadem*, *Protesta ed integrazione nella Roma antica* (Bari 1970) 60; Evans 1988, 18 ff. A very interesting inscription from Tlos (*LSAM* no. 77, 2nd century BC.?) restricts access to the temple to women and a group of men who in female attire take part in a collection. F. Kolb, Zu einem 'heiligen Gesetz' von Tlos, *ZPE* 22 (1976) 228-30, who has considerably advanced our understanding of the text, ascribes it to the cult of Dionysos. I would not be surprised, though, if it proved to belong to one of the 'foreign' cults of the type discussed above, particularly in view of the element of ritual beggary. Cf. the female attire of the followers of Kotys. There is a picture of a *komastes* in woman's dress: *ARV* 563/9 (to which F.T. Van Straten drew my attention). On the phenomenon in general: Kenner 1970, 102 ff, esp. 112 ff. Anyhow, we must distinguish between (Bacchic) *thiasoi* in general and maenadic groups in particular. The latter, at least in principle, did not admit male participants. See Henrichs 1978, 133, and 1982 n.97; on this distinction see below n.154. The very same objections against promiscuous Bacchic rites are apparent in the charges against the *Bacchanalia* at Rome, for which see below n.251. Cf. also Diod. Sic. 4, 4 on promiscuity in Sabazios rites. The argument was also used against the Christians: Euseb. *Vita Const.* 1, 53; 3, 55. The apostles of the New Testament Apocryphal Acts of John, Peter, Paul, Andrew and Thomas are convicted *inter alia* because their teaching has disturbed the *status quo* relations between men and women: S. Davies, *The Revolt of the Widows* (Carbondale and Edwardville 1980) 35-49; J. Perkins, The Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles and the Early Christian Martyrdom, *Arethusa* 18 (1985) 211-30, esp. 215.

[95] Text and commentary: Engelmann 1975; Totti 1985 no. 11.

[96] An interesting parallel for the obstruction of outlandish cults is provided by an inscription from Rhamnus (J. Pouilloux, *La forteresse de Rhamnous* [Paris 1954] p. 140 no. 24), in which "some people" (cf. the same term in the Delian inscription l. 23 and see for parallels and their depreciatory connotations: Engelmann *ad loc.*) have prevented a man from performing the cult of Agdistis. The *boule* decides that such obstruction is intolerable.

[97] No sooner had the island returned to Athenian rule than an attempt was made to close the temple: Engelmann 1975, 46. No doubt political interests played a part here.

The second illustration is also provided by an inscription from Delos[98]. Resident merchants and sailors from Tyrus wished to found a sanctuary for their god Heracles. More prudent than their Egyptian predecessor, they sent an envoy to Athens, in that period (153 BC) sovereign over Delos, and asked for permission. The argumentation is significant: it is emphasized that it concerns a purely religious project in honour of Heracles, who is not only the god of Tyrus but is generally "the cause of many blessings for (all) people" (πλείστων [ἀγαθ]ῶν παραιτίου γεγονότος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις). Moreover, the loyalty of the foreign group to Athens is aptly emphasized.

These two texts demonstrate that even in the Hellenistic period, generally characterized by cosmopolitan openness and syncretistic tendencies, there were nonetheless manifest symptoms of reservations against foreign gods and cults, which are for instance also apparent in the famous decree of Ptolemy IV (end of the 3rd century BC) providing that all those "who celebrate *teletai* for Dionysos" (τελοῦντες τῷ Διονύσῳ) must call at an office in Alexandria, apparently to be registered and kept under control. So Zuntz' remark: "'Purification', 'completion', 'mystical perfection' (τελετή—τελεῖν—τελειοῦσθαι) to the devotee: to the unsympathetic critic it was, and is, 'humbug', 'corruption' or, at best, 'Winkelmysterien'" does not just apply to the classical period[99].

To sum up, the very nature of the notion 'foreign' evoked various unpleasant associations: the smell of magic[100] and profit-making, connotations of licence or ecstasy, revelry and sexual promiscuity and a special appeal to women[101] and people of low social status[102]. Foreign cults also

[98] *I. Délos* 1519; Engelmann 1975, 46.

[99] G. Zuntz, Once more the so-called 'Edict of Philopator on the Dionysiac Mysteries', *Hermes* 91 (1963) 228-39 = *Opuscula Selecta* (Manchester 1972) 88-102, esp. 100.

[100] Plato *Meno* 80 B is revealing: "It is wise of you, Socrates, not to have gone abroad. For if you would do these things as a stranger in a foreign city, you would soon be expelled for being a magician (ὡς γόης). Cf. J. de Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge Mass. - London 1975) 33.

[101] For republican Rome the *locus classicus* is Cato *Agr.* 143, who will not permit the bailiff's wife to perform ceremonies, attend nocturnal cultic services or invite other women to her room. During the principate, too, foreign superstitions were portrayed as an insidious threat to the proper discipline of the household and, consequently, for society as a whole. See the evidence in: D. L. Balch, *Let Wives be submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series 26, Chico 1981) 65-80. Cf. also Meeks 1983, 25. Women, being morally weaker, were less capable of resistance to temptation and possession: R. Padel, Women: Model for Possession by Greek Daemons, in: A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt (edd.), *Images of Women in Antiquity* (London 1983) 1-19. See for the image of female religious gullibility: Plato *Leg.* 909A; Menander Fr. 277; Strabo 7, 3, 4; Plutarch *Mor.* 407C; MacMullen 1984, 39; Lane Fox 1986, 310 f., as cited by J. N. Bremmer, Why did Early Christianity Attract Upper-Class Women? in: *Fructus Centesimus. Mélanges J. M.*

tended to be associated with private or secret ritual[103], which in its turn fostered all kinds of suspicions, especially when it involved participation by Athenian citizens. Plato *Leg.* 910 B-E wishes to abolish all private cults in his ideal state, *inter alia* because by these secret rites people are enabled to inflict harm on their fellow-countrymen[104]. Various sacred laws, too, restricted acts of private religiosity in public sanctuaries. An Athenian decree[105] stipulates that nobody should place an altar in the sacred territory of the Pelargicon without official consent. A decree from Peiraeus[106] concerning the Thesmophorion is even more explicit: nobody should unleash the sacred animals, nobody should assemble *thiasoi*, nobody should erect private shrines in the sacred domain. People should not perform purifications nor approach the altars or enter the *megaron* without the priestess except during the Thesmophoria, the Plerosia, the Kalamaia and the Skira, and on occasions when women used to gather there according to ancestral custom[107].

In both classical and Hellenistic times the introduction of foreign cults and rites required the official authorization of the state. In order to found a temple for their gods foreign residents in Athens needed two formal permits: the right to acquire a piece of land *and* permission to build a temple on it[108]. May we infer, then, that without this authorization the introduction of foreign gods was officially prohibited and liable to legal prosecution? In order to answer this question it will be necessary to discuss the concept of *asebeia* and the charges implied in the processes against it

Bartelink (Dordrecht 1989) 37–47, esp. 38, who also provides instances of this peculiar male superstition in later periods.

[102] Lewis 1971, 101; B. Gladigow, in: H. Cancik (ed.) *Rausch, Ekstase, Mystik. Grenzformen religiöser Erfahrung* (Düsseldorf 1978) 38.

[103] Just so in Rome. One of the possible implications of *Leges XII*, tab. VIII, 26, *ne qui in urbe coetus nocturnos agitaret* is Min. Fel. *Octavius* 9, 4, *nescio an falsa, certe occultis ac nocturnis sacris adposita suspicio.*

[104] Reverdin 1945, 228-31; B. Kötting, Beurteilung des privaten Gelübdes bei Platon, Origenes und Gregor von Nyssa, in: *Festschrift H. Dörrie* (*JAuC Ergänzungsband* 10 [1983]) 118-22. Plato is quoted literally by Cicero *Leg.* 2, 8, 19, *separatim nemo habessit deos; neve novos, neve advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto.*

[105] *IG* I², 76 = *LSCG* 5 (circa 418 BC). Is there a connection with the oracle mentioned by Thucydides 2, 17, "Better for Athens to leave the Pelargian (for the conjecture see Gomme *ad loc.*) quarter alone" and its occupation by the immigrants in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, as my colleague Horstmanshoff suggests to me?

[106] *IG* II², 1177 = *LSCG* 36. Cf. Rudhardt 1960, 95.

[107] A similar restriction on private piety in a *lex sacra* of the cult of Asklepios at Erythrae (380-60 BC): *LSAM* 24; *I.Erythrai* 205. Cf. Cf. Burkert *GR* 256, with more evidence in n.29.

[108] Thus for example the Egyptian devotees of Isis and the Cyprian ones of Aphrodite Ourania: *IG* II², 337 = *LSCG* 34. Cf. Mikalson 1983, 93. See the full evidence in Foucart 1873, 128 ff. As a matter of fact, together with the grant of *enktesis* for the temple of Bendis (*IG* II² 1283), these are the only instances known to us. See generally: J. Pecirka, *The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions* (Chicago 1967). On the Isis temple: D. R. Simms, Isis in Classical Athens, *CJ* 84 (1989) 216-21.

briefly. This will also give us the opportunity to consider another aggravating feature of foreign gods and cults: their novelty.

2. *Athenian law against foreign gods: the charge of* asebeia

According to a well-known phrase of Aristotle, *Virt. Vit.* 1251 A 30, *asebeia*[109] is "error concerning the gods or *daimones* or concerning the dead, the parents or the fatherland." (ἡ περὶ θεοὺς πλημμέλεια καὶ περὶ δαίμονας ἢ καὶ περὶ τοὺς κατοιχουμένους καὶ περὶ γονεῖς καὶ περὶ πατρίδα). Even if we restrict ourselves to *asebeia stricto sensu*, *i.e.* the offences against religion[110], there is a wide scale of offences which can, in the words of Hypereides, *Eux.* 6, stamp the culprit as "impious against sacred institutions" (περὶ τὰ ἱερά)[111]: sacrilege proper (ἱεροσυλία)[112] such as for instance theft of temple property, cultivation of sacred land and also parody of official mysteries. Another category was the violation of sacred laws. The performance of incorrect sacrifices or rites, especially by an official priest in a vital religious sector, could entail the ultimate penalty, as it did, for instance, in the case of the hierophant of Eleusis Archias[113].

Next, there are three issues which are more directly relevant to our inquiry. First, offences against priests or, more generally, private persons with a religious mission, were considered acts of *asebeia.* Demosthenes could accuse Midias of *asebeia* because the latter had hit him while he functioned as *choregos* during the Dionysia[114]. The Delians who had chased the Amphictyons from the Delphic temple and inflicted violence upon them were severely punished[115]. In a fascinating inscription from Ephesos (c.340-320 BC)[116] the *proegoroi* of Ephesian Artemis sentenced fourty six inhabitants of Sardes to death for having committed sacrilege against the goddess' *theoroi* and the sacred clothes they had brought to Sardes (τά τε ἱ[ερὰ] ἠσέβησαγ καὶ τοὺς θεωροὺς ὕβρι[σαν]). On the other hand, the person who performed ceremonies or sacrifices in the name of the people

[109] On this subject see: Decharme 1904, 141-79; Derenne 1930; Rudhardt 1960; *RAC* s.v. Asebieprozesse; Dover 1975, 24-54; Mikalson 1983, 91-105.

[110] Cf. Rudhardt 1960, 88.

[111] Derenne 1930, 9-12, gives a survey; cf. *RAC* s.v. Asebieprozesse, col. 736.

[112] See the chapter 'Sacrilege' in Parker 1983, 144-90.

[113] Demosth. *In Neaer.* 116 f. Cf. the *asebeia* of Menesaichmos for having performed an incorrect ritual: Lycurg. fr. 79 Müller; Deinarch. *Or. Att.* 2, 451.

[114] Demosth. *In Mid.* 1; 12; 20; 34; 51; 55.

[115] *IG* II, 814 = *Syll.*³ 153 l. 135.

[116] *I.Ephesos* 2, found in 1961. Cf. L. Robert, *RPh* (1967) 34-5; O. Masson, L'inscription d'Éphèse relative aux condamnés à mort de Sardes (*I.Ephesos* 2), *REG* 101 (1987) 225-39. As to the vexed question whether the verdict was also consummated, I suggest that the proclamation is of the kind of ritual condemnations which are pronounced by angry Aya Tollas from time to time.

without satisfying the conditions, offended both state and gods and was equally liable to prosecution[117]. Secondly, there is the notorious accusation of teaching theories about 'heavenly' things and/or not believing in things divine, *i.e.* atheism[118]. The most notorious case, of course, is the charge against Socrates: "Socrates is guilty of corrupting the youth and not acknowledging the gods whom the *polis* acknowledges, but different, new *daimonia*". It will be necessary to consider this specific charge of *asebeia* in some detail[119].

In the context of the political opposition against Pericles and his enlightened *cercle*[120] the professional diviner Diopeithes proposed the decree that was to gain him the doubtful renown of a Herostratus. It provided "the prosecution by way of *eisangelia* of those persons who did not acknowledge the things divine or who propagated theories about the celestial objects" (εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας)[121]. Actions of this sort have been recorded as directed against a series of philosophers: Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Stilpon from Megara, probably Theodorus from Cyrene and, most noticeably, Socrates. The former of the two items of Diopeithes' decree turns up literally in the charge against Socrates, where three independent sources have handed down the formula: οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων[122].

[117] Demosth. *In Neaer.* 73-77.

[118] After A. B. Drachmann, *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity* (London etc 1922) the subject has been often treated. Recently, Winiarczyk 1984 has given a full list of ancient atheists with the sources. J. Thrower, *The Alternative Tradition. Religion and the Rejection of Religion in the Ancient World* (The Hague etc. 1980) is not particularly useful due to the very wide definition of 'the Ancient World', which includes China.

[119] Apart from the literature mentioned above, particularly Derenne and Rudhardt, see the basic study by H. Gomperz, Die Anklage gegen Sokrates in ihrer Bedeutung für die Sokrates-Forschung, *Neue Jahrb.* 53 (1924) 129-73, and Marasco 1976, 113-31. Between these two, practically no study on any aspect of late fifth century culture has managed to evade this 'Socratic question'. See the by no means exhaustive list in H. Patzer, *Bibliographia Socratica* (Munich 1985) no. 790-896. For some major works see the footnotes below.

[120] L. Prandi, I processi contro Fidia, Aspasia, Anassagora e l'opposizione a Pericle, *Aevum* 51 (1977) 10-26. J. Mansfeld, The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period and the Date of his Trial, *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979) 39-69; 33 (1980) 17-95, esp. 80, ascribes the decree to the year 438/7 BC.

[121] Plut. *Pericl.* 32. Dover 1975, 39 f., seriously questions both the historicity and the wording of the decree, but finally grants it the benefit of the doubt.

[122] Favorinus *ap.* Diog. Laert. 2, 40; Xen. *Mem.* 1, 1, 1; Plato *Apol.* 24 C. The authenticity is confirmed by the fact that Favorinus quoted the text from the official acts which were kept in the Metroon in Athens. M. Montuori, *Socrate. Fisiologia di un mito* (Firenze 1974) 362: "la sola testimonianza storica che abbiamo su Socrate." The now following section on Socrates had been written when I saw Brickhouse & Smith 1989 (thanks to the kindness of Mr. W. J. Beuker). I am very happy to find that we are in complete agreement on the various issues relevant to my subject and I have only added references to their work where it seemed useful or illuminating.

It has long been fashionable to dismiss the obvious interpretation 'not believe in (the existence of) the gods'. Instead, the expression should be understood as 'not honour the gods by worshipping them according to (cultic) tradition'. The charge, then, would be "one of nonconformity in religious practice, not of unorthodoxy in religious belief"[123]. However, without denying that for instance in Herodotus νομίζειν does mean 'to practise' or 'observe' as a custom or institution—a meaning which naturally may be *implied* in the charge quoted—Derenne has shown that the interpretation: 'not believe in the *existence* of the gods (in the way it is traditionally done by the *polis*)' is the correct one in quite a number of passages[124]. Following in his tracks, Fahr has shown that in both Xenophon and Plato, albeit with different overtones, both meanings can be established, and not only for the obvious reason that the most natural way to profess 'belief' in the existence of gods was by observing the religious institutions. After his arguments it can no longer be questioned that the latter part of the fifth century witnessed a gradual shifting from "die Götter nicht nach Brauch ehren" towards "die Existenz der Götter nicht für wirklich halten", the latter probably being implied in Diopeithes' decree, at any rate explicitly expressed in Aristophanes (especially the *Nubes*) and Euripides and almost certainly intended in the accusation against Socrates[125]. The double meaning of the term is perhaps best rendered by English 'acknowledge'.

It was suggested long ago and defended by many since that the second part of Diopeithes' decree may be recognized in the second charge against Socrates ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος (Favorinus *ap.* Diog. Laert. 2, 40) or εἰσφέρων (Xen. *Mem.* 1, 1, 1). Socrates, *pour besoin de la cause* pictured as a sophist with astronomical interests (in the best tradition of Anaxagoras, and in accordance with the malicious satires of Aristo-

[123] I quote the formulation of J. Burnet in his commentary on Plato's *Apology* (Oxford 1924 and many reprints) *ad loc.*, who makes himself the mouthpiece of a popular view among philologists. W. Fahr 1969 gives the history of the debate and a very judicious treatment of the problem. K. J. Dover *Aristophanes' Clouds* (London 1968) seems to take an intermediate position when he understands νομίζει as "accept (or treat, practise) as normal" and hence translates θεοὺς νομίζειν by "to accept the gods in the normal way". He is followed by Yunis 1988, with whose discussion of Socrates I generally find myself in agreement.

[124] Derenne 1930, 217-23, whose perfectly convincing argument rests on the following passages among others: Plato, *Apol.* 26 C; 27 C; 35 D; *Leg.* 10, 885 BC; Xen. *Mem.* 1, 1, 5; 1, 1, 20. In these texts Socrates explicitly defends himself against the idea that he does not believe in the *existence* of gods. Rudhardt 1960, 91, refers to Lys. 6, 19, which indeed provides decisive proof.

[125] Fahr 1969, 55 f. (Euripides); 73 ff. (Aristophanes, cf. also the works mentioned in the next note); 118 f. (Xenophon); Plato, *Apol.* 153-57. Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 31, give a list of the most decisive arguments. One is that Xenophon *Mem.* 1, 1, 2-5, also understood the charges against Socrates to involve atheism.

phanes)[126], was suspected of attributing divine status to celestial objects and substituting them for the traditional gods. This, at any rate, would offer an explanation for the indeed very exceptional term δαιμόνια, which was by no means current in the sense of 'gods'. On the other hand, his own allusions to a personal *daimonion* will have contributed to the terminology, if not to the accusation itself. A direct influence of the *daimonion* on the charge has been emphatically denied by A.E. Taylor[127], whose judgement has influenced many later scholars. He emphasized that, according to Plato *Apol.* 18 A-19 D, Socrates thought it necessary to controvert the imputation of sophistical scientific ideas, since "they think that people who investigate these things do not acknowledge gods" (ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν). This recalls *Euthyphro* 3, where the accusation is phrased in terms of the charge of '*making*' new gods. For 'to make new gods' can only refer to the deification of things that were nowhere regarded as divine before: not foreign gods but such things as celestial objects[128].

However, the very same *Euthyphro* (*loc. cit.*) took this accusation as referring to the *daimonion* (ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γένεσθαι)[129], thus providing one of the key testimonies for the opposite theory, still adhered to by many specialists, that, after all, the *daimonion* must have played an important part in the accusations[130]. Add to this various other suppositions, for instance Socrates' notorious connections with Pythagorean circles as a possible background of the accusation[131], and the resulting scepticism as to our capacity of ever reaching the 'real'

[126] Aristophanes' parodies of Socrates' teaching have elicited two simultaneous monographs. L. Strauss, *Socrates and Aristophanes* (New York 1966) (p.5: "Far from being an enemy of Socrates, Aristophanes was his friend, but somewhat envious of his wisdom"[!]) is too idiosyncratic to be of any serious use to me. M. Montuori, Socrate tra Nuvole prime e Nuvole seconde, *AAN* 77 (1966), persuasively stresses the marked resemblance between the Aristophanic parody of 423 BC and the real accusations of 399 BC.

[127] A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica* (Oxford 1911) 10 ff.; *idem*, *Socrates* (Boston 1951² = 1975) 94-137, esp. 110 ff.

[128] Cf. P. Ciholas, Socrates. Maker of New Gods, *Class. Bull.* 57 (1980-1) 17-20. "If the charge is to make any sense as a charge of impiety, it must be that Socrates introduces as divinities new entities that are not real divinities at all": Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 34, and on the meaning of *daimonia*: 122 ff.

[129] The same in Xen. *Mem.* 1, 1, 2, cf. *Apol.* 12, Plato *Apol.* 31 C8-D2.

[130] Derenne 1930, 153 f.; Dodds 1951, 202, n.74; V. Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates* (London 1967) 367 ff. See especially: A. Ferguson, The Impiety of Socrates, *CQ* 7 (1913) 157-75, esp. 158 f.; 169-75, for compelling reasons. Cf. Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 35.

[131] On Pythagorean commitments: *Phaedo* 59 C1-2, according to Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 20, rather overemphasized by A. E. Taylor, Plato's Biography of Socrates, *PBA* (1917) 26; cf. *idem*, *What Plato Said* (Chicago 1933) 59-68; A. D. Winspear and T. Silverberg, *Who Was Socrates?* (New York 1960) 79 f.; in fact already refuted by L. Robin, Sur une hypothèse récente relative à Socrate, *REG* 29 (1916) 129-65.

implications of the charge is understandable[132]. Surveying the evidence I see no other reasonable conclusion than that this part of the accusation was deliberately phrased in such vague and ambiguous terms precisely in order to shelter a complex of unexplicit imputations[133]. At any rate, the accusations were sufficiently vague to elicit strikingly diverging interpretations even among Socrates' intimates. This is also apparent from the fact that Socrates, to be on the safe side, was at pains to prove that nobody had ever seen him "sacrificing to strange gods (καινοῖς δαίμοσιν—not δαιμονίοις) nor swearing by or acknowledging other gods (οὔτε ὀμνὺς οὔτε νομίζων ἄλλους θεούς, *Apol.* 24)[134].

There can be little doubt as to the historicity of the formula itself. The charge of *asebeia* for "having introduced new gods or rites", which here makes its debut, perhaps as a product of contemporary Athenian concerns about intellectual forms of deviance, returns in the 4th century charges against Phryne and Ninos. As we have seen above, in his description of the case of Ninos, Joseph. *c. Apion.* 2, 267, comments upon the charge of introducing a new god as follows: "for this was forbidden by law and the penalty for those wo introduced a foreign god was death". Servius *ad* Verg. *Aen.* 8, 187, offers a confirmation: "The Athenians saw to it that nobody should introduce superstitious cults: on this charge Socrates was sentenced" (*cautum fuerat apud Athenienses ne quis introduceret religiones: unde et Socrates damnatus est*). Though many have contested the authenticity of

[132] Most noticeable in O. Gigon, *Sokrates. Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte* (Bern 1947, 1980²), whose excessive agnosticism I do not share. According to A. W. H. Adkins, Clouds, Mysteries, Socrates and Plato, *Antichthon* 4 (1970) 13 ff., we should add still another accusation: the charge of organising bogus mysteries (cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 298-313 and Plato *Euthyd.*). However, his views were correctly criticised by G. J. de Vries, Mystery Terminology in Aristophanes and Plato, *Mnemosyne* 26 (1973) 1-8.

[133] Illuminating for the vagueness is Socrates' *stichomythia* with his accuser Meletos (*Apol.* 26 B-E), where Meletos is entrapped into accusing Socrates of believing the sun and the moon to be stones, whereupon Socrates points out the confusion with Anaxagoras. Again I find myself in complete agreement with Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 35: "But as a number of scholars have noted, the charge of 'introducing new divinities' almost certainly also reflects a strategic decision on the part of the prosecution, for it well accords both with the portrayal of Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and with the widespread prejudice that Socrates was a nature philosopher (*Apol.* 18 A7-C2; 19A8-C5; 23D2-E3). Such men, the jury might be convinced, replace the old gods with new sorts of (often explictly called 'divine') powers. This is no doubt why the second charge is in the plural, so as to be purposefully vague. Socrates' *daimonion* can be cited directly in court; the other 'new divinities' need never be cited by the prosecution directly. Insinuation is all that is needed to call the jury's attention to their own long-standing prejudices". On the vagueness of the charges for impiety see especially: E. Ruschenbusch, ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΚΥΡΙΟΝ, *Historia* 6 (1957) 257-74, esp. 266 f.; D. M. MacDowell, *The Law of Classical Athens* (Ithaca 1987) 199 f.

[134] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1, 1, 2-4; 1, 3, 1; 1, 3, 4; *Apol.* 10-11; *Anab.* 3, 1, 4-8; Plato, *Apol.* 21 B; 33 C; *Phaedo* 60 B-61 B, where it is stressed that Socrates participated in and advocated the traditional cults.

these testimonies[135], Foucart and Derenne[136] have made a strong case for the historicity of a law which forbade the introduction of new gods[137]. One of their most convincing arguments is the fact that Josephus must have drawn on a different source from Demosthenes, since the name Ninos, not mentioned by Demosthenes, was known to him[138].

Of course, the existence of a law is one thing, its application is another. Where no public prosecutor existed, the decision to prosecute depended on individual initiatives, which required the fuel of personal motives and interests[139]. Many private cults of foreign gods must have passed unnoticed or were condoned[140]. But the law was there—a ready stick to beat the dog whenever necessary, as Ninos and Phryne experienced. Nor were their cases unique. Demades and Aristotle, too, were charged on the strength of this act, the former when he wanted to introduce a cult of Alexander, the latter on the charge of deifying Hermias, the tyrant of Atarne, and his daughter[141]. Admittedly, these are events of the late fourth century and the trials of Ninos and Phryne do not take us back beyond the first half of that century. Did a law of this kind exist already in the latter part of the fifth century? Derenne and Rudhardt are positive mainly on the ground that the wording of Socrates' accusation could never have been as we have it if there had not been a law to inspire or dictate it. If they are right, and I believe they are, it remains as difficult to identify the law with the decree of Diopeithes as it is to disconnect the two totally.

Two serious arguments tell against sheer identification. First, the decree of Diopeithes, as described by Plutarch, provided for *eisangelia*, whereas Socrates' prosecutors proceeded against him by an ordinary *graphe*. Secondly, prosecution of a man in 399 BC under a decree which antedated 403 was a vulnerable, if not impossible, procedure[142]. On the

[135] Already Lobeck 1829, 664, and a series of 19th century scholars mentioned by Derenne 1930, 224 ff.

[136] Foucart 1873, 127 ff.; *idem* 1902, 216 ff.; Derenne 1930, 168 ff.

[137] They are followed by Reverdin 1945, 208-17, whose argumentation I fully endorse.

[138] Admittedly, the name Ninos is a conjecture by Lobeck 1829, 668, but nobody questions it. See: Derenne 1930, 226 n.3.

[139] Cf. the explicit references to personal motives for the indictment of *asebeia* in Lys. 7, 39; Eupol. fr. 122 B (*FAC* I, 352 ff.). On personal and political motives: Marasco 1976.

[140] The family of Isagoras, for instance, could maintain a cult of Zeus Stratios (from Caria) for generations without facing any problem from the side of their fellow-citizens (Herod. 5, 66). Cf. also Aristoph. *Aves* 1534. According to an inscription of 333/2 BC (*IG* II² 337) the orator Lycurgus supported the request of merchants from Cyprian Kition to acquire a piece of land to found a temple for Aphrodite, and the ekklesia grants the request "just as the Aegyptians had been allowed to build the sanctuary of Isis".

[141] For the testimonia see the ample discussion by Derenne 1930, 185-98.

[142] These are the well-known counter arguments as formulated by Dover 1975, 40.

other hand, the similarities in atmosphere, form and purport between Diopeithes' decree and Socrates' indictment are so striking that they can hardly be completely independent. Once we accept an interrelation, there are again two possibilities: either (a precursor of) the law that sanctioned the trials of Ninos, Phryne, Demades and Aristotle must have come into existence somewhere between Diopeithes' decree and Socrates' trial, perhaps in the context of the reforms under the archonship of Euclides in 403/2 BC[143]. It took its inspiration from ideas which were also present in the decree of Diopeithes and its wording may have been close to what Deinarchos 1, 24 hands down as phrased by Demosthenes: γράφων καὶ ἀπαγορεύων μηδένα ἄλλον νομίζειν θεὸν ἢ τοὺς παραδεδομένους. Or this law came into being only later, in the fourth century, and the charge against Socrates was an improvisation of sorts, though clearly on a theme which was sufficiently popular to stand a chance before a jury. For to be a victim of a *graphe* at Athens it was not necessary to have committed an act which was forbidden by the law in so many words.

The scanty evidence does not allow us to decide unequivocally which of these options is the right one, but fortunately this uncertainty does not affect my further argument. Although I agree with Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 19 n.60, who are inclined to believe that Socrates' trial was not unique, it is sufficient to have established that in the late fifth century a person could be convicted for *asebeia* on the charge of 'introducing or worshipping a new god'. Though in the trial of Socrates the καινὰ δαιμόνια perhaps still pertained to the μετάρσια or other things sophists were expected to be interested in, the term was now also conveniently applicable to the quite *un*sophisticated lot of doubtful Athenians who were a bit too enthusiastic in welcoming foreign gods and who were, if not actually prosecuted, at least heartily and unequivocally censured in literary texts of the same period. The ambiguities discernible in the alternating terms δαιμόνια and θεούς and in the varying motifs of the defence of Socrates may be indicative of the shifting implications of this type of accusation. Although there are very few points of comparison between Socrates and

For literature on this amnesty during the archonship of Eucleides see: Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 32 n.113, who comment (p.33) that, of course, the decree of Diopeithes was annulled, along with all the others that had been passed in prior years, by the general amnesty of 403/2. But it was hardly singled out for annulment and there is no reason to suppose that its effects could not be obtained under a constitutional law, in this case the one proscribing impiety.

[143] This is the opinion of Derenne, followed among others by Reverdin 1945, 213, who (p. 217) adds an important argument for the existence of a law against the introduction of new gods. Plato did not generally deviate from the existing laws of Attica. Now, in *Resp.* 909 he rejects private cults, arguing that it is extremely difficult to introduce new cults and gods without making mistakes. This may very well imply his fear that people may become guilty of *asebeia* for incorrectly introducing new forms of religion.

the witch described by Aesop 112, both are accused in identical terms: ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντος σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν[144].

It appears from this rapid survey that in addition to the negative connotations of *foreign* cults summarized in the preceding section there is also a marked resistance to the *novelty* of non-traditional gods and cults. This traditionalism permeates Greek literature right from the start. In a passage on religion, Hesiod[145] gives the maxim that the best thing to do is to follow the ancient laws of the city (ὥς κε πόλις ῥέζῃσι, νόμος δ' ἀρχαῖος ἄριστος). A law of Draco, quoted by Porphyry *De abst.* 4, 22, ordered the people "as a group to honour the gods and local heroes in accordance with the ancestral practices and in private as best they can". The Delphic oracle answers the question of how to perform the sacrifices to the ancestors, with a significant conciseness: νόμῳ πόλεως[146]. Κατὰ τὰ πάτρια seems to be formulary in oracular answers[147], as it is elswhere. Isocrates *Areop.* 30, praises the Athenians as follows: "They guarded against the elimination of any of the ancestral sacrifices and against the addition of any sacrifices outside the traditional ones (ἔξω τῶν νομιζομένων). For they thought that piety existed not in great expenditures, but rather in not changing any of those things which their ancestors had handed down to them." The final part of this passage may be taken as the shortest Athenian definition of piety[148].

The persistence of these principles can be splendidly illustrated by a passage from Maecenas' speech to Augustus as given by Cassius Dio 52, 36, which, of course, contains a good deal more of Cassius Dio than of Maecenas[149]. It provides a most appropriate summary of the principal objections against both foreign and new gods and rites as we have analysed them.

> "Do not only yourself worship the Divine Power (τὸ θεῖον) everywhere and in every way in accordance with the traditions of our fathers (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια), but compel all others to honour it. Those who attempt to distort our religion with strange rites (ξενίζοντας) you should abhor and punish, not merely for the sake of the gods (since if a man despises these he will not pay honour to any other being), but because such men, by introducing new divinities in place of the old (καινὰ δαιμόνια ..... ἀντεσφέροντες), persuade

[144] Plato, *Euthyphro* 3 B. For Aesop see above p.117.

[145] Fr. 322 Merkelbach-West.

[146] Xen. *Mem.* 1, 3, 1; cf. 4, 3, 16. Cic. *Leg.* 2, 16, 40: *cum consulerent Athenienses Apollinem Pythium, quas potissimum religiones tenerent, oraculum editum est "eas quae essent in more maiorum"*. Parke-Wormell 1956 no. 135.

[147] Parke-Wormell 1956, nos. 282; 283; cf. 339.

[148] Examples abound, as already noticed by Schoemann 1859, 146, and as remarked by many since. There is a short recent treatment with some more evidence in Mikalson 1983, 96-8, one of whose translations I have borrowed.

[149] A. V. van Stekelenburg, *De redevoeringen bij Cassius Dio* (Diss. Leiden 1971) 107-20.

> many to adopt foreign practices (ἀλλοτριονομεῖν), from which spring up conspiracies, factions, and cabals (συνωμοσίαι, συστάσεις, ἑταιρίαι) which are far from profitable to a monarchy. Do not, therefore, permit anybody to be an atheist (ἄθεος) or a sorcerer (γόης). Soothsaying, to be sure, is a necessary art (.....) but there ought to be no workers of magic (μαγευτάς) at all. For such men by speaking the truth sometimes, but generally falsehood, often encourage a great many to attempt revolutions (νεοχμοῦν). The same thing is done also by many who pretend to be philosophers; hence I advise you to be on your guard against them, too".

Here we have it all: although naturally Severan (or Augustan) philosophers, *atheoi* and magicians might differ considerably from their namesakes of 400 BC, the sentiments and associations they provoked are strikingly identical. We note the following elements: a tenacious clinging to traditional religion, which is explicitly defined as the mainstay of the political *status quo*. Next, a sheer automatic amalgamating of new/foreign cult, magic and (certain types) of philosophy. Finally, a belief in the destructive effects of these forms of 'atheism' on both the cultural-moral and the socio-political identity of the society, *inter alia* as a result of the private and secret nature of their cabals, a decoy for decent citizens[150].

In this ideal pattern we recognize the complete dossier of negative connotations we have found associated with the metragyrtes, Socrates, Ninos, Theoris, Phryne and all other representatives of foreign or new cults and ideas discussed in this section. We shall encounter another ideal instance in the *Bacchae*.

2. Bacchic rites in classical Greece

1. Dionysiac ambiguities

Dionysos is Greek. No Greek city of any importance could ignore his claims nor do without one or more sanctuaries of the god[151]. His festivals were ubiquitous and were so deeply rooted in religious tradition that they had given their names to months. Athens honoured the god with several great festivals; the great dramatic genres, tragedy and comedy, had their

[150] All this tallies neatly with such texts as Cicero *ND* 3, 5, "I will always defend, and have always defended, the traditional Roman religious opinions, rites and ceremonies, and nothing that anyone, learned or unlearned, says will move me from the views I have inherited from our forefathers about the worship of the immortal gods...", or Cornutus 35: "Concerning these things and the service of the gods and all that is fitly done in their honour in accordance with ancestral custom you will receive the perfect explanation. It is only so that the young are led to piety and not to superstition and are taught to sacrifice and pray and swear correctly at the right times and in the suitable order." For a good discussion and a wealth of material on the preference for τὰ πάτρια and πάτριοι θεοί in religious texts of the imperial period see: MacMullen 1981, 2-4.

[151] Significantly, their position was often extramural, perhaps an indication of the 'eccentricity' of the god: Graf 1985, 295 n.95.

origins in the ambience of the Dionysiac cult; the god was pictured in numerous vase-paintings: single or accompanied by his followers, sometimes also in the company of Olympian gods. And yet—to quote a specialist who has substantially advanced our understanding of the complicated and ambiguous Dionysiac myth and ritual in the last two decades—"'Dionysos was different"'[152].

Myth claims that Dionysos had arrived from Thrace or Lydia. His annual *epidemiai* from distant countries are ritual reflections of this mythical arrival, so the Greeks believed. The very Greek Dionysos, then, was neither autochthonous nor a genuine Olympian. His personality is marked by ambiguities: born twice, Dionysos displays both human and animal traits. As the inventor of wine he has made a fundamental contri-

[152] A. Henrichs, Greek and Roman Glimpses of Dionysos, in: C. Houser (ed.), *Dionysos and his Circle. Ancient through Modern* (The Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University 1979) 1-11, whose characterization of the god's ambiguous nature I shall summarize in the next lines. Among his illuminative studies of things Dionysiac and Bacchic are: Die Maenaden von Milet, *ZPE* 4 (1969) 223-41; Greek Maenadism from Olympias to Messalina, *HSCP* 82 (1978) 121-60; Changing Dionysiac Identities, in: B. F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders (edd.), *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition* III (London 1982) 137-60; Loss of Self, Suffering, Violence: The Modern View of Dionysus from Nietzsche to Girard, *HSCP* 88 (1984) 205-40. I refer to these works for discussions of all details not directly relevant to my subject and for detailed bibliographic information. Apart from the well-known monographs on Dionysos by Otto 1933, Jeanmaire 1951, Kerényi 1976, Detienne 1977 and the general textbooks of Greek religion, various aspects of Dionysiac religion have been promisingly researched in recent times. Particularly relevant and helpful for the themes of maenadism and Bacchic ritual are: J. N. Bremmer, Greek Maenadism Reconsidered, *ZPE* 55 (1984) 267-86; R. S. Kraemer, Ecstasy and Possession: The Attraction of Women to the Cult of Dionysus, *HThR* 72 (1979) 55-80; *eadem*, Ecstasy and Possession: Women of Ancient Greece and the Cult of Dionysus, in: N. A. Falk and R. M. Gross (eds.), *Unspoken Words: Women's Religious Lives in non-Western Cultures* (San Francisco 1980) 53-69; F. Zeitlin, Cultic Models of the Female: Rites of Dionysos and Demeter, *Arethusa* 15 (1982) 129-57. After these works (and ignoring several of the most important ones) R. J. Hoffman, Ritual License and the Cult of Dionysus, *Athenaeum* 77 (1989) 91-115, offers no revelations in spite of his pretension to have discovered Victor Turner and the conviction that "no scholar has yet employed constructs from anthropolgy for the ritual of license in the cult of Dionysus" (!). On Dionysos' connections with the ideology of mysteries: Graf 1974, 40-78; S. G. Cole, New Evidence for the Mysteries of Dionysos, *GRBS* 21 (1980) 223-38; R. Seaford, Dionysiac Drama and the Dionysiac Mysteries, *CQ* 31 (1981) 252-75; G. Casadio, Per un' indagine storico-religiosa sui culti di Dioniso in relazione alla fenomenologia dei misteri I, II, *SSR* 6 (1982) 209-34; *SMSR* 7 (1983) 123-49. On various aspects of ambiguity of Dionysos: Ch. Segal, *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides'* Bacchae (Princeton 1982); *idem*, *Interpreting Greek Tragedy: Myth, Poetry, Text* (Ithaca-London 1986), chs 8 and 9; M. Detienne, *Dionysos à ciel ouvert* (Paris 1986); J.-P. Vernant, Le Dionysos masqué des *Bacchantes* d'Euripide, *L'Homme* 93 (1985) 31-58 = J.-P. Vernant et P. Vidal-Naquet, *Mythe et tragédie. Deux* (Paris 1986) 237-70. Cf. *idem*, Conclusion, in: *L'association dionysiaque dans les sociétés anciennes* (Paris-Rome 1986) 291-302. While Henrichs calls Dionysos 'different', Vernant, following Gernet, calls him 'l'Autre', being the representative of the 'other reality'. For Evans 1988 see below n. 5. Practically all these recent studies, which will be cited by name and date henceforth, appeared after the original publication of my present paper in *Lampas* 9 (1976), which, being in Dutch, was not easily accessible to international scholarship.

bution to Greek civilization; as the 'Raw-Eater' he challenges the foundations of Greek (and generally human) culture[153]. In the former quality he was predominantly worshipped by men, in the latter, the domain of maenadism, by women[154]: Dionysos has both masculine and feminine traits[155]. Embodying the vitality of life, he has also marked connections with death and afterlife. He comes[156] and disappears. "'In short, then, Dionysos is essentially a paradox, the sum total of numerous contradictions"'[157].

[153] Cf. Graf 1985, 74-80, on Dionysos Omadios, with an interpretation as a signal of 'abnormality' on p. 80 n. 44.

[154] Maenadism was restricted to women. Originally and naturally, male maenads were unimaginable, since maenadism was *inter alia* an expression of female rebellion against male authority and a ritual reaction to the restrictions of women's life in Greece. The most extravagant image of these functions can be found in Strabo's report—after Posidonius—that in the Ocean near the mouth of the Loire there is an isle inhabited by the women and wives of a Gallic tribe, who are totally devoted to and possessed by Dionysos. In marked contradistinction to historical Greek maenads, who every second year temporarily left their husbands to seek Dionysos, these Gallic *Bakchai* regarded the island as their home-land and only visited their husbands once a year, soon to return to their god and his abode: Strabo 4, 4, 3-6; Posidonius *FGrHist* 87 F 56, discussed by Detienne 1986, 67 ff. On maenadic rituals as women's monopoly: D. M. Kolkey, Dionysus and Women's Emancipation, *CB* 50 (1973-4) 1-5; Kraemer 1979 and 1980; Zeitlin 1982; Bremmer 1984, 282 ff., who wants to trace their origin back to girls' initiations, an idea developed before him by Seaford 1981, 264. Henrichs 1978, 133 n. 40, and *idem*, Male Intruders among the Maenads. The so-called Male Celebrants, in: *Mnemai. Classical Studies in Memory of K. K. Hulley* (Chico 1984) 69-91, gives the evidence for women's monopoly. This does not exclude an occasional male involvement in Bacchic ritual and *thiasoi* already in the 5th century BC. See: Henrichs 1982, 147 and especially Casadio 1987, 212 n. 39a, who refers to vase pictures as represented and discussed by C. Bérard - C. Bron, Le jeu de Satyre, in: *La cité des images* (Lausanne-Paris 1984) 127-46, nos. 179, 191, 197. Of course, (promiscuous) *thiasoi* need not always have had a maenadic character. Cf. also above p.119, n.94.

[155] See on this amalgamation of male and female features and its threat: Segal 1978, 185-202. In a recent book, which I saw only when the manuscript of this chapter was completed, A. Evans, *The God of Ecstasy. Sex-roles and the Madness of Dionysos* (New York 1988), concentrates on the sexual ambivalence, and more especially the homosexual nature of Dionysos. The author turns out to be a veritable Dionysiac 'enthusiast' and so is his book. Unfortunately, his discussion of problems and evidence does not always meet the necessary scholarly requirements. Enthusiasm threatens to run wild when he mixes up neolithic 'agrarian' Dionysianism, Mother-goddesses, Indian Shiva and Jesus Christ. Nonetheless, there is much to appreciate in this sympathetic book, especially on the sexual threats as staged in the *Bacchae*.

[156] The classical evocation of Dionysos as the 'coming god' is Otto 1933, 75-81. Cf. recently: M. Detienne, Dionysos et ses parousies: un dieu épidémique, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 53-83 and below p.165.

[157] Henrichs 1979, 3. The paradoxical and ambiguous nature of Dionysiac religion was already emphasized by Otto 1933 and L. Gernet, Dionysos et la religion dionysiaque, *REG* (1953) 377-95 = *Anthropologie de la Grèce antique* (Paris 1968) 63-89. For the Nietzschian roots of this idea see: Henrichs 1984 and Casadio 1987, 191-3. Cf. Vernant 1985, 38, 48; 1986b, 291. Also in *Ann. Collège de France* 1983/4, 491 f. M. Detienne *AEHE* 92 (1984-5) 320 ff., has made an attempt to attribute the ecstatic, threatening aspect to Theban, and the mild, cultural aspect to Athenian Dionysos.

We shall focus our attention on the two contrasting aspects that could be discerned in the experiences of the participants and in the outsiders' reactions to the foreign cults in Athens and which we shall explore again in the *Bacchae* of Euripides: the threatening side of the ecstatic, potentially asocial, dangerous and disorientating experiences, on the one hand, and the comforting aspects of happiness and *euphoria*, on the other, perhaps including references to a blissful afterlife, promised by initiations into the *teletai* of the god. Though quite befitting the god's ambiguous nature, it is nonetheless astonishing to what extent these two contrasting aspects are often inextricably amalgamated in the cult of this god[158].

Euripides' *Bacchae* offers the most complete description of what we believe we must understand by Bacchic *orgia*. The tragedy provides a most welcome, albeit precarious, supplement to the evidence provided by other sources, literary, epigraphical and archaeological, that have a more direct bearing on ritual reality. Together these sources constitute the foundation of the conventional picture of maenadism. The tragedy describes how three *thiasoi* consisting of Theban women take to the mountains of the Kithairon (*oreibasia*), abandoning their houses, hearths and husbands to seek the god outside the boundaries of the *polis*. The *parodos* pictures the mental disposition of the female acolytes of Dionysos, this time pictured as his 'mythical' retinue of maenads who have followed him all the way from his Oriental realm. During their stay in the mountains the women are driven to a wild frenzy (*mania*), generally referred to as ecstasy (*ekstasis*) or divine possession (*enthousiasmos*). The *orgia* are celebrated in the wild and free lands outside culture[159], the realm of the god. Nature takes part in the celebration: the earth produces streams of milk, honey and wine. The maenads dance their ecstatic dances, violently shaking their heads and wielding *thyrsos* staffs and torches during the nocturnal ceremonies. They handle snakes, suckle whelps of wild beasts, and, finally, perform the unspeakable acts of *sparagmos*: the tearing apart of animals, and

[158] This ambiguity is the kernel of Dionysiac religion according to the recent studies by Vernant 1985; 1986. Cf. O. de Cazanove, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 1-11.

[159] The *oreibasia* "hat die Funktion, das heraustreten aus der normalen Welt zu bezeichnen": Graf 1985, 80 n.44. Note that εἰς ὄρος and related expressions are ambiguous in themselves: they are also applied to the ritual relegation of illness, daemons and enemies beyond the boundaries of human civilisation: Versnel 1977, 40 ff. When Antiochus IV perishes ἐν ὄρεσιν, this term for 'desert' also implies a scornful reference to the miserable separation from the civilized world: Th. Drew-Bear, Recherches épigraphiques et philologiques, *REA* 82 (1980) 155-7. R. G. A. Buxton is preparing a study on the 'polysemy' of the mountains in Greek imagery. In a lecture held at Utrecht in 1989 he convincingly distinguished three different functions: the land of the wilds, the land of the beginnings, and the place of reversals. As I shall argue in more detail in *Inconsistencies* II, ch. 2, these three functions appear to be variations of one prototypical concept: nature as the borderland between cosmos and chaos.

of *omophagia*: the devouring of the raw flesh of the victims.

This is myth. Was it also rite and, if so, do we find traces of it in 5th century Greece and Athens? A. Rapp wrote an article on these issues in 1872 which is still worth consulting. He argued for a distinction between "historisches und mythologisches Mänadentum"[160]. His thesis that the mythical maenads existed only in the imagination of artists and poets and hence are of little avail as evidence for ritual maenadism did not prevent generations of scholars from freely projecting literary mythical elements, especially those pictured in Euripides' *Bacchae*, on to supposed historic ritual maenadism. It was only recently that Henrichs reopened the discussion on the relationship of myth and ritual in our evidence. Although he is ready to acknowledge ritual reflections in literary sources, as for instance in Euripides' *Bacchae*, he cogently argues that certainty as to which of the two has influenced the other is beyond our reach, since "maenadic myth mirrors maenadic ritual", but at the same time "ritual practice mollifies the mythical model"[161]. Since there are clear indications that historical maenads, consciously or not, imitated maenadic behaviour as it is known from myth, the degree of realism in various literary or plastic pictures cannot be unequivocally established. "Whether we like it or not, we must accept the basic dichotomy of maenadism into a mythical and a ritual realization as an irreducible datum of Greek religion as we know it"[162].

Consequently, any answer to the question: "how mad were the maenads of history?" will never entirely escape the pitfall of arbitrariness. We shall continuously be confronted with problems connected with this uncertainty. For the moment I would note that to deny historical maenads an occasional bite of 'le cru' on the argument that such savage behaviour should be confined to the category of myth, is no less arbitrary than the avid visions of raving, blood-thirsty and blood-stained maenads cherished by many a 'romantic' scholar of a former generation[163].

[160] Rapp 1872.

[161] Henrichs 1978, 143, with discussion of the problem on p. 143/4 and 147/8. Cf. *idem* 1969, 223 and 232, and see next note.

[162] Henrichs 1982, 146, and discussion on p. 143 (with the history of the question in n.53) and 156.

[163] Henrichs 1982, 143 f. argues against the historicity of these savage forms of maenadic behaviour by pointing out their incompatibility with three common features of ritual maenadism: its fixed biennial periodicity, its regional character, and the organization of maenads in local congregations of restricted membership. Although these data do tell against both the massivity and the spontaneity often attributed to these religious forms of ecstasy, they by no means exclude extreme forms of ecstatic behaviour in principle. See above all Casadio 1987, 211 f. for a different view and the conviction that literary sources should not be totally banished from the discussion, and cf. recently Evans 1988, 14. Bremmer 1984, who largely follows Henrichs' critical approach, provides rich material on the

As I shall argue in *Inconsistencies* II, fundamentally there are three ways to explain conspicuous similarities between myth and ritual: 1) the myth is an (aetiological) reflection of actual ritual; 2) the ritual imitates mythical examples; 3) both are parallel but more or less independent symbolic processes for dealing with the same type of situation in the same affective mode. The first view is the traditional one and the great majority of textbooks on ancient religion adhere to it. The second is only rarely resorted to in scholarly literature, but is—rightly—put forward as a vital and creative agent in Bacchic expressions by Henrichs, who does acknowledge the existence of both processes in the Dionysiac context[164]. In the context of Dionysiac religion, the third approach has only been exploited by W. Otto, here as always an inspiring *Einzelgänger*, no doubt *bien étonné* to find himself in agreement with quite a number of modern anthropologists, as I shall also show in the second volume. Indeed, some of Otto's formulations come very close to what, for instance, the anthropologist Cl. Kluck-

mechanisms, techniques *and* effects of ecstatic behaviour. He also implicitely illustrates the difficulties inherent in the differentiation of mythical and ritual descriptions when he first shows that snake-handling is a general phenomenon in ecstatic ritual, then reminds us that snake-handling did occur in the 4th century Sabazios *thiasoi* of Aeschines (above p.114 f.) with their strong Bacchic flavour, and nevertheless concludes: "Euripides indeed took his snake-handling maenads from the mythical (iconographical?) tradition, but the iconographical tradition and the passages from Aeschines and Andromachos strongly suggest that snake-handling was practiced by maenads in more archaic times." (p.269).

[164] Henrichs 1978, 143: "many important features of Dionysiac myth (....) which are clear reflections of maenadism as practiced, that is, they are in various ways aetiological." *Ibid.* 144: "The Greeks understood maenadism as a reenactment of myth and thus basically mimetic, or commemorative." *Ibid.* 147: "cultic maenadism, says Diodorus, is an imitation of mythical maenadism". (These statements seem to have escaped Evans 1988, 14, who criticizes Henrichs' views). Accordingly, "Greek ritual tends to mitigate where myth is cruel" (*ibid.* 148), which Bremmer 1984, 272 f., in a more extensive discussion of the diverging potentials of myth and ritual, phrases the other way round according to conventional theory. He sees ritual as the material on which myth could improvise, as it undoubtedly often, though by no means exclusively, was. Consequently, he has little appreciation for suggestions made independently by Henrichs and Versnel that the maenads of Hellenistic inscriptions may imitate literary and mythical prototypes following scenarios like that of the *Bacchae*: "unconvincingly" (275 n.39); "unnecessarily" (276 n.43). Although no certainty can be reached here, a universal rejection of this possibility would imply a misconception of the dramatic and theatrical nature of ritual in general, and of maenadic ritual in particular. See for instance E. G. d'Aquili, C. D. Laughlin Jr., J. McManus, *The Spectrum of Ritual. A Biogenetic Structural Analysis* (New York 1977) for a general theory on the neurobiological origins of the connections between myth and ritual and especially on the "myth structure or cognitive matrix in which ritual is embedded" 152-82. In his introduction to V. W. Turner (ed.) *Celebration. Studies in Festivity and Ritual* (Washinton D.C. 1982) p. 28, Turner describes celebratory behaviour as 'framed' behaviour: "by enclosing a ritual literally or figuratively in a border (a temple, theater, playground, a court) and so creating a set of expectations about the kind of behaviour or conduct that should fill the encased spacetime". Exactly in this way, the 'border' of the maenads is formed by the ὄρος, whose 'set of expectations' was perfectly familiar to the maenads from myth (cf. n.159 above). And they behaved accordingly.

hohn said. For him, myth and rital are both expressions of the experience of the god's existence, one in words and the other in action, both being essentially *responses* to the primordial existence of the god: "Immer steht am Anfang der Gott"[165]. Despite his idiosyncratic taints of mysticism, I believe that Otto has inaugurated a line of thought which, particularly in the Dionysiac atmosphere, is more promising than scholars have been inclined to realize. If, indeed, myth and ritual are nowhere as intricately interwoven as in Dionysiac religion, it would be only consistent to seek the explanation of the typical blurring of boundaries and the resulting confusions first of all in the very nature of Dionysiac belief itself.

Now, one of its most remarkable features is the excessive identification of the adepts with their god by way of *ekstasis* and *enthousiasmos*, the profound experience of the god's *parousia*, and the emphasis put on his *epiphaneiai*. This, however, is just another way of saying that Dionysiac religion fosters an atmosphere in which the otherworldly or mythical existence of the god and the reality of ritual activity intermingle: maenads, while—and through—performing ritual *orgia*, sought access to another reality, that of the mythical ambience of the god. Nobody has given a sharper picture of the crucial ambiguity of the maenads' situation than Euripides. I shall return to this ambivalence and argue that only in this perspective can some vexed passages of the *Bacchae* receive a satisfactory explanation. For the moment we may conclude that the inextricability of mythical and ritual elements in our tradition may very well be closely bound up with the nature of the god, who more than any other interrupts the normal course of human existence and provides glances into the utopian reality of a mythical world[166].

All this should not keep us from questioning our sources on their mythical or ritual value, however frustrating this enquiry may prove to be. Here we are practically completely dependent on the archaeological evidence, more specifically vase-paintings, and these pictures have so far resisted decisive answers. Our literary and epigraphical sources do flow abundantly, but with only few exceptions they belong to the Hellenistic or Roman period. Nevertheless, we shall now start with the latter type of evidence.

2. Dionysiac ritual: the literary and epigraphical evidence

Pausanias 10, 4, 3, provides an interesting piece of information on the

[165] Otto 1933, 31, and the discussion pp. 11-46 and 96-112.

[166] "Pour voir Dionysos il faut pénétrer dans un univers différent, où l'Autre règne, non le Même", Vernant 1985, 44, and *passim* on the Dionysiac intrusion of the otherworldly into our world and life, which brings "l'extrême béatitude d'un âge d'or retrouvé, le ciel sur la terre" (*ibid.* 46).

Delphic *Oreibasia*: "*Thuiades*[167] are Attic women who set out for the Parnassos every second year (the *trieteris* of *Bacchae* 133, characteristic of maenadic rites), there to celebrate the *orgia* for Dionysos together with the women of Delphi. On their way these Thuiads perform also choral dances in other places." Plutarch *De primo frig.* 953 D, tells us that once in his own time women belonging to these *thiasoi* were overtaken by severe cold and were in danger of succumbing. For, just as in other places of Greece, the time for maenadic ritual was midwinter and at Delphi the month November/December bears the name *Dadaphorios* after the torch-light of the maenadic processions. Elsewhere (*Mul. virt.* 249 E) he has a story about the Thuiads from Phocis who went astray in the dark of the night and ended up at the market-place of the enemy city Amphissa, where they fell asleep and were protected by the local Thuiads. This happened in 355 BC. In Elis, according to Plutarch *Mul. virt.* 251 E, there was a female cult group in honour of Dionysos: αἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον ἱεραὶ γυναῖκες, ἃς ἑκκαίδεκα καλοῦσιν. The fact that according to Pausanias 6, 26, 1, a religious feast celebrated outside the city of Elis bore the name *Thuia* clearly points to maenadic practices[168]. During this feast empty jars used to be sealed and stored up in a locked building. The next day they appeared to be filled with wine—a ritual miracle which was only matched on the isle of Andros, where once a year during the festival of Dionysos a stream of wine came forth from the temple of the god. This is the stereotyped miracle that we know so well from literary and mythical reports on epiphanies of the god[169]. Or rather, according to Greek perception, it *is* an *epiphaneia* of the god[170].

[167] M.-Chr. Villanueva Puig, A propos des Thyiades de Delphes, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 31-51, has collected the evidence and traces back their origins to rites of women's initiation in the region of the Parnassus, which, in origin, were not necessarily connected with Dionysos. For other theories on initiatory origins of Dionysiac ritual see above n.154.

[168] V. Mitsopoulos-Leon, Zur Verehrung des Dionysos in Elis. Nochmals: ΑΞΙΕ ΤΑΥΡΕ und die sechzehn heiligen Frauen, *MDAI(A)* 99 (1984) 275-90, tends to differentiate between the Thuia with the epiphany of the god in the form of a bull *in the city* and the wine epiphany *outside the city*, but does not deny that they form part of the same festival.

[169] Wine miracle in Elis: Paus. 6, 26, 1; Athen. 1, 61 p. 34 A = Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 277; Andros: Paus. 6, 26, 2; Plin. *NH* 2, 231 and 31, 16, says that in the first century AD consul Mucianus had thrice been witness of this annual miracle. Diod. 3, 66, 2, records that on Dionysos' birthday a spring of wine suddenly came into existence. To the same order of ideas belongs the magical vine at a certain place in Euboia, which, according to Soph. *Thyestes* fr. 234 Radt, was said periodically to go through all the stages of growth and vintage in a single day. See the literature mentioned by Henrichs 1982, n.30, and V. Mitsopoulos-Leon, *o.c.* (preceding note) 276 f. For later literary descriptions of wine miracles see: Merkelbach 1988, 54-6.

[170] On the implications of the Greek term *epiphaneia* as a miracle announcing or representing the presence of a god: Versnel 1987.

For Elis, Plutarch *QG* 299 A, quotes the *hymnos kletikos*[171] which was sung by the chorus of women to elicit the epiphany of the god: "Come, hero Dionysos, to the holy temple of Elis, together with the Charites, to the temple with bull-foot raging, worthy bull, worthy bull". The god, coming in the image of a bull, betrays an orgiastic atmosphere which we may perhaps also infer for a cult of Arcadic Kynaitha. According to Pausanias 8, 19, 2 (cf. 6, 5)[172], during a mid-winter festival of Dionysos men used to carry a bull, selected by the god himself, on their shoulders to the temple. A report on a festival of Dionysos at Sicyon combines the two essential aspects. During the night two images of Dionysos Bacchios and Dionysos Lusios were carried to the temple by torch-light, accompanied by hymns: Dionysos comes in an annual epiphany, in the two shapes that determine his nature. 'Bacchios' characterizes him as the god of *orgia* and ecstasy, 'Lusios' as the one who liberates man from chafing bonds and daily sorrows[173]. The exponents of these qualities are *mania* and wine, which are by no means indissolubly interconnected[174], though they do occur in combination from time to time, as we have seen at Elis. Dionysos as the inventor of viticulture and the giver of παυσίλυπος ἄμπελος (*Bacchae* 772) is *Pausilupos*, a name under which he was worshipped down to the fourth century AD, as theophoric names indicate[175]. But also in a more literal sense he is the god who breaks the bonds that keep people oppressed. "Nothing can be so firmly bound, neither by illness, nor by wrath or any fortune, that cannot be released by Dionysos" says Aelius Aristides 2, 331 (K). At Thebes, the hallowed centre of maenadic activity, there were *Lusioi teletai*[176].

So there is no reason to doubt the wide range of various forms of maenadic ritual in Greek-speaking areas as early as the archaic and classi-

[171] See: Cl. Bérard, ΑΞΙΕ ΤΑΥΡΕ, in: *Mélanges P. Collart* (Lausanne 1976) 61 ff.

[172] See on this and other Dionysiac festivals Nilsson 1906, 258-311. On rites of 'raising the bull' see: Gordon 1989, 60-4.

[173] On *Bakchios* see below p.151 f.; for Dionysos Lusios see Weinreich 1909, 28, Merkelbach 1988, 103, and below p.166. Corinth, too, had its Dionysos Lusios and Dionysos Bakcheios: Paus. 2, 2, 6-7. On this duality see: Casadio 1987, 199 ff. He also gives an ample analysis of the Sicyonian rites, which he regards as the image of a cultic reality which had its model in Thebes.

[174] Henrichs 1982, 145 and n.71, though Guthrie 1950, 148 f., closely associates them. Significantly, it is precisely in the sphere of wine festivals that Dionysos was assimilated with Christian cult-festivals: R. Kany, Dionysos Protrygaios. Pagane und christliche Spuren eines antiken Weinfestes, *JbAC* 31 (1988) 5-23.

[175] G. Bakalakis, Παυσίλυπος von Thessalonike, in: *Provincialia. Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart* (Basel 1968) 3-5. On wine as a medicine against illness and sorrow see the testimonies in Henrichs 1982 n.26.

[176] Photios and Suda s.v. Plato *Resp.* 2, 366 AB, speaks about *teletai* for *Lusioi theoi*, but this seems to refer to Orphic theology: Graf 1974, 16 n.57.

cal periods[177]. Even if *mainas* in μαινάδι ἴσῃ (*Il.* 22, 460), said of Andromache, should not mean 'maenad', but rather 'raving mad', other places in the epic show that Homer was already acquainted with the phenomenon of female maenadic groups[178] and so were other authors of the archaic period. Heraclitus B 15 (= 50 Marcovich) says that Hades is the same as Dionysos: ὁτέῳ μαίνονται καὶ ληναίζουσιν[179]. Already in the 6th century BC we find personal names with the element *Lenai* at Olbia in an overtly Dionysiac context[180]: ΔΗΜΩΝΑΣΣΑ ΛΗΝΑΙΟ ΕΥΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΛΗΝΑΟΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΛΟ ΕΙΑΥ.

Indeed, in the classical period maenadic or, more generally, orgiastic behaviour was regarded as characteristic of Greek culture, as for instance Herodotus 4, 108, remarks in connection with *trieteris* and *bakcheuein*. The same author (4, 79 ff.) has an interesting story about the Hellenophile Scythian king Skyles, who used to visit the city of Olbia, change his clothes there and behave exactly as if he were a Greek himself. One day Skyles conceived the desire to be initiated into the mysteries of Dionysos Bakcheios (Ἐπεθύμησε Διονύσῳ Βακχείῳ τελεσθῆναι). Now the Scythians find it shameful to indulge in Dionysiac orgies (τοῦ βακχεύειν). For they say that it is unseemly to invent (ἐξευρίσκειν[181]) a god who drives people out of their wits. After he had been initiated, the Greek inhabitants of the city warned the compatriots of Skyles: "You think it funny that we should be possessed by the god when we celebrate his rites (ὅτι βακχεύομεν καὶ ἡμέας ὁ θεὸς λαμβάνει). Well, this same spirit has now taken hold of your own king, he is under his influence—Dionysos has driven him mad." (νῦν οὗτος ὁ δαίμων καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον βασιλέα λελάβηκε, καὶ βακχεύει τε καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μαίνεται). When they saw their king revelling in a *thiasos* (σὺν τῷ θιάσῳ ..... βακχεύοντα) they were far from being amused and this uncouth behaviour formed the introduction to his subsequent violent death.

In this story we have an unquestionable contemporary testimony of a Bacchic *thiasos* in a genuinely Greek city circa 450 BC, the very same city where a maenadic tradition can be traced back to the 6th century. It combines ecstatic traits and the esoteric idea of initiation into a secret cult. The initiation of a male forbids us to list this *thiasos* among cases of *maenadism* proper, but it was certainly ecstatic and uproarious. "Beginning in the fifth century BC at the latest, men too 'went mad'"[182]. Together with the other testimonies adduced above, this may encourage us to extrapolate at least to the fifth century[183] a generalizing statement of Diod. Sic. 4, 3:

> "For this reason in many Greek cities every other year Bacchic bands of women gather, and it is lawful for the maidens to carry the thyrsus and to join in the frenzied revelry (ἐνθουσιάζειν) thus celebrating the god with the cry *eua*. The matrons, forming groups, offer sacrifices to the god and perform their Bacchic rituals and extol with hymns the *parousia* of Dionysos. In doing so they imitate the Maenads who, as history records, accompanied the god in the old days."

If, then, maenadism and related Bacchic rites can be established as a ubiquitous phenomenon in the classical period, we should none the less exercise due caution when it comes to historical inferences. First, the existence of a *thiasos* or Bacchic cult in a city, attested for a certain point of time, can never prove that it existed there from times immemorial: these Bacchic cults were very much liable to export and migration. This appears especially from a famous inscription from Magnesia[184]. The text goes back to the second quarter of the third century BC. The Magnesians have consulted the Delphic oracle concerning a miracle: a plane-tree had been blown down and the cloven tree appeared to hide a statue of Dionysos. In its answer the oracle said that this appearance of Dionysos was meant as a warning because the Magnesians, when founding their city, had omitted to build a sanctuary for Dionysos. So the first thing to do was to

[177] "Dunque, a Sicione come a Tebe e Corinto, esistavano veri e propri tiasi organizzati di donne che praticavano l'orgiasmo dionisiaco: il menadismo mitico delle baccanti nelle sculture templari non è che un riflesso del menadismo rituale delle fedeli del dio nella realtà storica" (Casiadio 1987, 211). Henrichs 1978, 153, ascribes the ritual of the Thuiades at Delphi to the mid-fifth century BC at the latest.

[178] *Il.* 6, 130 ff.; G. A. Privitera, *Dioniso in Omero e nella poesia greca arcaica* (Roma 1970) 53-74. *Hom. h. Dem.* 386, and Richardson *ad loc.*

[179] Heraclitus B 14 (= 87 Marcovich) censures νυκτιπόλοις [μάγοις], βάκχοις, λήναις, μύσταις ..... τὰ γὰρ νομιζόμενα κατ' ἀνθρώπους μυστήρια ἀνιερωστὶ μυοῦνται, but the authenticity of this text is doubtful. For a survey of opinion see: M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus* (Merida 1967) 465, and M. Conche, *Héraclite. Fragments* (Paris 1986) nos 42 and 43. *Lenai* and maenads are identical: Hesychius s.v. Λῆναι· Βάκχαι; cf. a title of Theocritus 26 in *P.Antinoe* Pack² 1487, edited by A. S. Hunt and J. Johnson, *Two Theocritus Papyri* (London 1930) p.49: Λῆναι ἢ Βάκ[χαι Δω]ρίδι.

[180] On a mirror, itself an Orphic-Dionysiac symbol, as Burkert demonstrates in an unpublished lecture (see below n.218). The cry *euai* betrays the maenadic atmosphere: M. L. West, *ZPE* 45 (1982) 26, and see below n.221 for more Dionysiac evidence from Olbia and the curious connections with Heraclitus.

[181] Note the terminological resemblance to the accusations against Socrates.

[182] Henrichs 1982, 147, speaking of private congregations which admitted both sexes, met in secret, and required initiation ceremonies (*teletai*), so characteristic of Hellenistic and Roman times. Cf. Burkert *GR* 292, who, by oral communication, referred to a Thracian all-male symposium, connected with Dionysiac iconography, represented on a gold cup of king Cotys (383-360 BC): F. Graf, in: Bremmer 1987, 104 n. 43. For transvestism in Dionysiac circles see above p.120 n.94.

[183] The fact that maenads already occurred in vase-paintings of the archaic period (cf. Sh. McNally, The Maenad in Early Greek Art, *Arethusa* 11 [1978] 101-35) should be used with caution, since, as we shall see below, pictured maenads are of a doubtful 'reality'.

[184] *I.Magnesia* 215; Quandt 1913, 162 f.; Parke and Wormell 1956 II, no. 338. "Vielfach überschätzt": Von Wilamowitz 1931 II, 368, on the ground that this is a copy from the imperial period, but cf. Henrichs 1969, 240 f. with n. 57, and 1978, 123-37, with an ample discussion of its dating: 276-250 BC.

build a temple and then: "go to Thebes' holy plain in order to fetch maenads from the race of Ino, daughter of Cadmus. They will give you *orgia* and excellent institutions and they will establish *thiasoi* of Bacchos in the city" (ll. 9-12). Following this oracle the text gives a prose comment: "In accordance with the oracle, Thebes provided three maenads: Kosko, Baubo and Thettale[185]. And Kosko founded the *thiasos* of the Platanistai, Baubo the one 'in front of the city' and Thettale the 'Kataibatai'.

Among various interesting aspects of this text, the following are specifically relevant to our subject: the mention of *three thiasoi* whose foundation is traced back to Thebes, which immediately recalls the situation of the *Bacchae*. There are clear references to missionary activity. The *official* nature of the *thiasoi* is revealing. Though no doubt organized as private groups with restricted membership in accordance with the general nature of the Hellenistic *thiasoi*, they obviously formed part of the official religious apparatus of the city. This, however, virtually precluded an all too extravagant conduct.

And this takes us to a second problem where, once again, caution is called for: if maenadic ritual is attested, what exactly does that mean? Did maenads (always) behave like Maenads, raving around, handling snakes, tearing animals to pieces and devouring pieces of raw flesh? For some people this is no problem at all, since they are convinced that these more extreme forms of maenadism *never* existed, neither in the perfumed Hellenistic *thiasoi* nor in the savage prehistory of Dionysiac cult. Legend has it that Bertrand Russell—admittedly a logician—once offered Jane Harrison to regale her with a bull, on condition that she and her *thiasotai* tore the poor beast apart with their bare hands. Of course, an honest logician would never accept her refusal as a decisive proof of the legendary nature of this kind of maenadic excess. But he is not the only sceptic. Recent scholarship tends to present the *oreibasia* of later, particularly Hellenistic, times as an outing "das dem Ausflug eines Dameskegelklubs ähnlich genug war und dennoch eine religiöse Dimension hatte"[186] and to retroject this harmless picture to earlier times in a determined attempt to enervate the bloody fancies of comparativists, psychologists and other un-classical fauna[187].

As a matter of fact we do catch glimpses of bloody extravagances, but they impress us as being 'errors': transgressions or aberrations of ritual behaviour. Plutarch *QG* 38, 299 EF, says that during the Dionysiac festival of the *Agrionia*[188] at Orchomenos the priest of Dionysos had the

[185] On the implications of the names see Henrichs 1978, 131, who disputes the view that the names have mythical connotations.

[186] R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 9 (1972) 79. Cf. Henrichs 1978, 156: "The *oreibasia* of ritual maenadism had become a routine mountain picnic for men and women..."

[187] After Dodds it was particularly R. Girard (especially his *La violence et le sacré* [Paris 1972]), B. Simon, *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece. The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry* (Ithaca-London 1978) and Detienne 1977, who served as targets for classical attacks. See especially: Henrichs 1984, in whose view these scholars "overemphasize the dark and 'subversive' aspects of Dionysus" (240 n.0). I agree, but Detienne at least has recanted in his recent study (1986), in which he does pay attention to the brighter aspects of Dionysiac religion. Whoever wants a sugar sweet Dionysos should consult Merkelbach 1988, for the imperial period. And cf. above n.163. On Girard see also: P. Nottet, Girard, Euripide et Dionysos, *AC* 50 (1981) 607-20; P. Dumonchel (ed.), *Violence et vérité. Autour de René Girard.* Colloque de Cerisy (Paris 1985); W. van Beek (ed.), *Mimese en Geweld. Beschouwingen over het werk van René Girard* (Kampen 1988).

[188] On the Agrionia see: Burkert 1983, 168-79; Graf 1985, 80 n.42. On Hellenistic evolutions of this festival see the literature in Henrichs 1978, 137 n.48.

[189] This has been very well seen by A. Brelich, Symbol of a Symbol, in: *Myth and Symbols, Studies in Honour of M. Eliade* (Chicago-London 1969) 198 f. In general on this distinction between myth and ritual: Burkert 1979, 1-58; Bremmer 1984, 272 f.

[190] There is a comparable motif on a kalyx krater from Ferrara (T 128, *ARV* 1052, 25; 1680), where two little girls of different ages try to imitate the movements of their maenadic mothers: "They are apprentice mad-women, so to speak": Keuls 1984, 287-97, esp. 290.

[191] The charges of infanticide and cannibalism against the Christians (see for instance: W. Schäfke, Frühchristlicher Widerstand, *ANRW* II, 23, 1 [1979] esp. 579-96) as recorded

doubtful privilege of chasing the women of the race of Minyas and killing the woman he caught. Even without further information nobody will believe that this 'sacrifice' was regularly consummated, and not only because the women must have broken records. Whereas myth can and indeed ought to stage 'ideal', *i.e.* extreme, solutions, ritual has to content itself with restricted and symbolic action[189]. Significantly, Plutarch adds that in his lifetime the priest Zoilos indeed performed such a ritual killing. Not only was this obviously an exception worth relating, but it was even experienced as an excess: later on Zoilos was punished by the gods for his excessive zeal and propitiatory rites had to be instituted. Dionysiac ritual by its very nature threatens—or is at least expected—to go off the rails now and then, as is illustrated by a revealing story told by Aelian *Var. Hist.* 13, 2: Makareus, a priest of Dionysos at Miletus, celebrated the *trieteris* of the god and performed rich sacrifices. Meanwhile his little children imitated the ritual actions, one in the role of priest, the other as the victim[190]. However, the little priest was a bit too enthousiastic and killed his brother, upon which their mother in a frantic fit of grief beheaded the murderer. Upon hearing this, the father ran home and slew the mother with his thyrsos staff.

It is beyond our possibilities to assess to what extent these accounts are historical. On the one hand, they may reflect general expectations concerning rites about which rumours of strange and atrocious secrets went round. Everybody knew that initiations—and in particular those of a Dionysiac ambience—had something to do with bloodshed, killing and the eating of unspeakable things[191] and this story may be just the sediment

of these disquieting bits of information, gossip and suspicions. The existence of similar associative processes is strikingly confirmed by comparable associations in dreams and their interpretations. Artemidorus *Onir.* 4, 39, tells us that "a woman dreamt that she was drunk and danced in a chorus to honour Dionysos", with the actual outcome that "she killed her own child who was three years old". His comment: "for such is the legend of Pentheus and Agaue. And the festivals conducted in honour of the god are triennial". Indeed, just as myth may generate ritual, so myth and ritual may furnish the setting for allegedly historical, but actually fictitious transformations of the atrocious[192].

On the other hand, the stories may just as well be truly historical instances of derailments inherent in Dionysiac enthusiasm. Actions intended for symbolic performance through 'hypocritical' rites may result in real eruptions[193]. If, as Diodorus *loc. cit.* says, during the maenadic ritual women used to *sunenthousiazein* and *bakcheuein*, something must have *happened*. When the cry *euhoi* is repeated by many mouths in a continuous refrain and many dancing feet accompany the chant in a metrical staccato, this may produce a state of mind that can be labelled variously as 'teles-

by Tertullian (*Nat.* 1, 7, 23 f.; *Apol.* 8, 2 ff.; cf. Min. Fel. 9, 2 ff.) have often been ascribed to his own imagination. But F. J. Dölger, *Sacramentum infanticidii* in: *Antike und Christentum* 4 (1934) 188-228, has collected many similar reports of pagan practices, especially in the context of mystery and oath-taking. The communal eating of (human) flesh is a standard theme in scenes describing oath-taking in political conspiracies. See: G. Marasco, Sacrifici umani e cospirazioni politiche, *Sileno* 7 (1981) 167-78, with the evidence. For charges of immorality, including cannibalism, against religious sects in general see recently: R. Pochia Hsia, *The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany* (1988) and the literature in *Inconsistencies* II ch. 1.

[192] See A. Henrichs, Human Sacrifice in Greek Religion, in: *Le sacrifice dans l'antiquité* (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1981) 195-235, esp. the example of the human sacrifice on Salamis, 208-24. Elsewhere (*Die Phoinikika des Lollianos. Fragmente eines neuen griechischen Romans* (Bonn 1972), Henrichs is inclined to accept ritual reminiscences in the human sacrifice and anthropophagy as described in the new fragments of Lollianus *Phoinikika*, whereas others deny any ritual background to this purely literary phantasy. See: T. Szepessy, Zur Interpretation eines neu entdeckten griechischen Roman, *AAnt Hung* 26 (1978) 29-36; J. Winkler, Lollianos and the Desperadoes, *JHS* 100 (1980) 155-81. On the various manners of association in dreams and dream-interpretation, past and present, see: S. R. F. Price, The Future of Dreams: from Freud to Artemidorus, *P&P* 113 (1986) 3-37.

[193] Various sources mention such derailments or measures to prevent them. There is a mythical parallel to the story just quoted in the text: Kyanippos of Syracuse refused to bring sacrifices to Dionysos. The angry god made him drunk and he raped his own daughter. After an oracle of Apollo the daughter killed the father and committed suicide (Plut. *Mor.* 310 B; Parke-Wormell 1956 II, 552; J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* [Berkeley-London 1981] Q 84). Casadio 1987, 201, argues that the myth of Aktaion originally belonged in the context of Dionysiac *sparagmos*. Pausan. 9, 8, 2, says that during a sacrifice for Dionysos the citizens of Potniae got drunk and killed the priest, and Aen. Tact. 17, 4, says that at Chios on the day of the *pompe* to the altar of Dionysos it was customary to block the streets with armed guards. See: Graf 1985, 79, who suggests two possible reasons: fear of revolution or ritual prescription.

tic madness', 'dancing madness', 'mass hysteria', 'trance' or 'self-hypnosis'[194]. It has been correctly observed that we are concerned with strictly regulated, periodic and stereotyped ritual, which by its nature would exclude the maenadic spontaneity that former generations of scholars took for granted. However, the very fact that ritual is a form of theatrical demonstration with strict rules and prescriptions means that historical maenads knew what they were expected to do and how they were expected to behave. And there is no reason to doubt that in the end they could reach a state of mind which is well described by the term 'ecstasy' and which made them do 'unbelievable' things.

All this of course did not preclude a drastic routinization of maenadism in the context of the official cult practice. A famous inscription from Miletus (276/5 BC)[195] provides vital information. It describes the privileges of a priestess of Dionysos: "Nobody may convene a *thiasos* before the *thiasos* of the city is assembled", a telling illustration of the coexistence of a 'state' thiasos and private congregations. "If a woman wishes to perform initiations in order to honour Dionysos Bakcheios (.....), she must pay a *stater* to the priestess every *trieteris*". Apparently, any woman had the right to found a private cult for Bacchos and to initiate other women in it. The much-discussed phrase: "Whenever the priestess performs the rites of sacrifice on behalf of the whole city, nobody must ὠμοφάγιον ἐμβαλεῖν before the priestess has done so on behalf of the city" is tantalizing.

What does this mean? Dodds 1951, 276, in an excessive fit of comparativism, thought that a sacrificial animal was thrown into the crowd of worshippers to be torn apart and eaten raw, as it is—or was in his time—in some places in North Africa. This suggestion has not met with broad approval. Nor is any alternative solution totally convincing[196]. The best I can do is to join Von Wilamowitz[197] in his conclusion: "Wohin die *omophagia* hinein getan wurden, war nur damals verständlich. Diels hat gesehen dass es die Stücke waren, welche die Bakchen roh essen mussten, als Ersatz für die Zerfleischung der Rehkälber im Walde (....).

[194] Henrichs 1982, 145, gives a survey of previous interpretations; *ibid.* 156, on the ritual cries. On the hypnotic effects of repetitive chant: Segal 1982, 112, and generally on the techniques of self-hypnosis in Bacchic context: Bremmer 1984, 277 ff.

[195] Th. Wiegand, *Abh. Berlin* (1908) 22-25; Quandt 1913, 171; *LSAM* no 48. See the discussions in Henrichs 1969, 235, and 1978, 149-52.

[196] Other ethnological parallels in: Jeanmaire 1951, 258 ff.; L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* V (1909) 302 f. Henrichs 1978, 150, suggests that portions of raw meat were placed before the image of the god, which still does not quite satisfy Greek ἐμβάλλειν. Festugière 1972, 110-3, ingeniously proposed "putting pieces of raw meat into baskets". Detienne 1977, 200, translates "bouchée de viande crue", returning to the savage view, but no certainty can be reached, as once again became apparent in the discussion in *Le sacrifice dans l'antiquité* (Vandoeuvres - Genève 1981) 38.

[197] Von Wilamowitz 1931 II, 367 n.1.

Die Bissen werden in Milet den Gläubigen nicht mehr widerlich gewesen sein. Die *hostia* war zur Hostie geworden."

How very un-Bacchic the atmosphere had become in later Dionysiac clubs appears from various inscriptions, *inter alia* from an inscription of a *thiasos* from Physkos (Locris, 2nd century AD), from which it appears that the *oreibasia* had to be enforced under pain of penalty[198]. Or from the famous Iobakchoi inscription (2nd century AD)[199]: admission to the Iobakchoi, which was a male club devoted to ritual wine-drinking, was preceded by a check of the candidate's record. During the meals members should behave decently and should not usurp the dinner-couch of a neighbour nor annoy fellow members. Trespasses were corrected by a functionary with the title *eukosmos*[200]. Whenever he carried his *thyrsos* towards an offender, the latter had to leave the scene, if not willingly, then under the compulsion of *hippoi*. These steady descendants of the once so lascivious satyrs illuminate the civilized atmosphere of these later Dionysiac colleges.

3. Athenian maenadism: archaeological evidence

All this pertains to Greece and more remote parts of the Greek world. What do we know about classical Athens? The answer is: distressingly little. While searching for maenadism we may safely leave aside all the other well-known Dionysiac festivals such as the Anthesteria and both the country and city Dionysia, and focus our attention on the only festival which by its name is unmistakably defined as maenadic: the *Lenaia*[201]. Festivals of this name were celebrated in various Greek cities and in many of them, though not in Athens, had given their name to the winter month which roughly corresponds to our January. The archaeological evidence is tantalizing. Though abundant and in many respects very informative, we cannot be sure that the numerous pictures of maenadic scenes on the so-called 'Lenäenvasen'[202] actually refer to the Lenaia. They provide scenes

[198] *IG* I² , 3, 670; *LSCG* no. 181. See Henrichs 1978, 155 f.

[199] *IG* II² 1368; *Syll.*³ 1109; *LSCG* no. 51 and pp. 95-101. Cf. *GGR* II, 359 ff. See: L. Moretti, Il regolamento degli Iobacchi ateniesi, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 247-59; Merkelbach 1988, 25-9, and on private *thiasoi* in general: 15-30.

[200] Note that *eukosmia* is also a Dionysiac feature in the *Bacchae*: B. K. Gold, *Eukosmia* in Euripides' *Bacchae*, *AJP* 98 (1977) 3-16.

[201] Nilsson 1906, 275-79; Deubner 1932, 123-34; Pickard-Cambridge 1969, 1-125.

[202] A. Frickenhaus, *Lenäenvasen* (72 Berl. Winckelmannspr. 1912), published a collection of the 29 pieces known in his time. Some ten new representations have been published since. See: Pickard-Cambridge 1969, 30 ff., with a good discussion of the problems; cf. Webster 1972, 118 ff.; Van Straten 1976. More literature on the iconography of maenadism: Keuls 1984, 288 n.7. On the special category of the stamnoi see: J. de la Genière, Vases des Lénéennes? *MEFRA* 99 (1987) 43-61.

with women dressed as maenads and exhibiting all imaginable maenadic features: the *nebris*, the *thyrsos*, *tympana*, torches, snakes, *kantharoi* (the least maenadic of all), deer cubs and even a *sparagmos*[203]. Most pictures show the maenads in an ecstatic dance violently tossing their heads. Some of them, in particular the later ones, present a more peaceful scene, sometimes clearly representing the situation after the *orgia* proper. The dance frequently circles round the god Dionysos, who, however, is rarely drawn as a living being, but frequently in the form of a stake or a pillar with clothes and a Dionysiac mask or the god's head to mark its identity.

The notorious battle of giants between Nilsson and Deubner[204], the former connecting these pictures with the second day of the Anthesteria named *Choes*, the second following Frickenhaus in his *Lenaia* interpretation, is still not definitively settled. Although I personally tend to range myself on Deubner's side for reasons which it would take me too long to expand on here[205], I realize that absolute certainty cannot be reached. And there is yet another and more essential aggravating consideration.

The problem concerning the distinction between mythical or ritual interpretations of the literary evidence returns with increased vigour in the interpretation of the pictures[206]. Even if we could be sure that the images

[203] The latter being performed by the god himself in two paintings: *ARV*, 585/34; E. Simon, *Opfernde Götter* (1953) 52 ff.; *ARV* 298; 1643. Cf. J.-J. Maffre, Quelques scènes mythologiques sur des fragments de coupes attiques de la fin du style sévère, *RA* (1982) 195-222, esp. 203 ff. On the earliest development of Dionysiac imagery: Th. H. Carpenter, *Dionysian Imagery in Archaic Greek Art: Its Development in Black-Figure Vase Painting* (Oxford 1986), who shows that maenadic scenes only start circa 540 BC.

[204] Deubner 1932, 127 ff.; Nilsson, *GGR* I, 572, 587-88, and his earlier publications cited there.

[205] I follow the judicious arguments of Van Straten 1976.

[206] The pictures have elicited an abundance of ingenious hypotheses recently. S. Angiolillo, La visita di Dioniso a Ikarios nella ceramica attica: appunti sulla politica culturale pisistratea, *DA* NS 1 (1981) 13-22, connects the masks of the 'Lenäenvasen' with the marble mask of Dionysos found in Ikaria (circa 530 BC), a village which she regards as the cradle of the ritual, but I. Bald Romano, The Archaic Statue of Dionysos from Ikaria, *Hesperia* 51 (1982) 398-409, points out that the latter is not a mask but the head of a cult statue. É. Coche de la Ferté, Les ménades et le contenu réel des scènes bacchiques autour de l'idole de Dionysos, *RA* 37/8 (1951) 12-23, had already supposed that the pictures provide composite representations constructed from elements that refer to various scenes of cultic reality. Following in this track, J. L. Durand and F. Frontisi-Ducroux, Idoles, figures, images: autour de Dionysos, *RA* (1982) 83-108, interpret the pictures as signs, referring to Dionysiac ideology rather than to reality. They signalize the mediating functions of women between the world of Dionysos and the *polis*: the women manipulate the wine but do not drink it. Cf. the elaboration of this view by F. Frontisi-Ducroux, Images du ménadisme féminin: les vases des 'Lénéennes', in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 165-76, and generally: J.-P. Vernant, *La mort dans les yeux. Figures de l'Autre en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1985). See also the discussions of various Dionysiac representations in: *La cité des images. Religion et société en Grèce antique* (Lausanne 1984) 117-61, and compare the fundamental remarks on the function and meaning of Greek imagery by C. Bérard, Iconographie, iconologie, iconologique, *Études de lettres* 6 (1983) 5-37. On the related genre

do refer to the Lenaia, the question remains whether we are confronted with ritual *Lenai* or with mythical Maenads. The fact that in some of the pictures the god figures as a living person and even dances together with the maenads need not necessarily tell against a ritual interpretation: artists could and did picture the *parousia* of gods among their worshippers in this way. Satyrs, however, and not seldom in rather compromising attitudes at that, are worse. It would, of course, make all the difference if they were pictured as human beings in disguise, but alas they are not: they are very real satyrs, and consequently cannot but refer to a mythical reality[207]. Nor do mythical names as identifications of the dancing maenads make for realism[208].

In accordance with my previous suggestions concerning the literary evidence I would venture the surmise that these scenes provide a hybridism of sorts: they do refer to a ritual reality, but since ritual in this case explicitly imitates elements of the myth (cf. also the doubleness of the mythical 'Lydian' and the human Theban maenads in the *Bacchae*), mythical elements legitimately intrude into the scenery. What the maenadic χοροὶ κρυφαῖοι (*Bacchae* 1109) experienced in the mountains during the holy night no man really knew, though he might have his misgivings, as Pentheus had. What everybody did know was that maenads expected or imagined themselves to be in the immediate presence of the god, in a landscape with overt utopian traits, in "the god's own country"[209], that is in 'the other reality' of myth. Painters had several ways of depicting such a mythical scenery, one of which was by strewing about a handful of 'mythical' satyrs. But that myth does not entirely monopolize the picture is borne out by the representations of the god as an idol receiving sacrifices. Myth would require the consistent presence of a living god. Bacchic cult was unique in that during the *orgia* the maenads so intimately embraced

of the 'Anacreontic' vases: F. Frontisi-Ducroux et F. Lissarrague, De l'ambiguité à l'ambivalence. Un parcours dionysiaque, *AION (archeol)* 5 (1983) 11-32. Later Dionysiac representations may give rise to comparable discussions: A. Geyer, Das Problem des Realitätsbezuges in der dionysischen Bildkunst der Kaiserzeit (Würzburg 1979).

[207] I cannot agree with Keuls 1984, 288 and *passim*, who thinks that the satyrs are theatrical figures, disguised actors who play a part. She believes that "both (maenads and satyrs) are 'real', i.e. participants in an actual ritual, with that significant difference that the satyrs are theatrical, that is playing a role, whereas the maenads are undisguised" (p.289). Transvestism as Satyrs etc. is only attested for later times: Merkelbach 1988, 96-8.

[208] "explanatory personifications": C. Fraenkel, *Satyr- und Bakchennamen auf Vasenbilder* (1912); Webster 1972, 68 ff. Cf. Henrichs 1978, 132.

[209] Bremmer 1984, 277. Vernant 1985, 46: "Il (...) insère le surnaturel en pleine nature" and "il apporte ici-bas la révélation d'une autre dimension de l'existence, l'expérience de l'ailleurs, de l'au-delà, directement insérés dans notre monde et notre vie" (*ibid.* 47).

the mythical state that they became *Bakchai* themselves[210], images of the god. I believe that an explanation of the ambiguities of the 'Lenäenvasen' should be looked for in this direction.

Unfortunately, the ambiguity of the evidence prevents us from assessing the 'degree' of maenadism of Athenian women. To make it worse, the literary evidence is equally disappointing, though for another reason. However, the one and only substantial testimony that we do have—besides Plutarch's report of the Delphic outings of Athenian maenads—proves unequivocally that female Dionysiac *thiasoi* of a private nature did exist in Athens. Aristophanes *Lys.* 1 ff., says on Athenian women: "If only somebody had invited them to a Bacchic feast, or to the sanctuary of Pan or to cape Kolias to the goddess Genetullis, you could not get through the crowd because of their tambourines". And the scholiast explains: "for the women used to celebrate many feasts outside the state ceremonies, and they convened privately". This is all. We may safely assume that Athens knew forms of maenadism comparable to that of other places. The more extravagant forms were perhaps celebrated at Delphi, as Plutarch says. For nothing is known of ritual *oreibasia* in Attica. It has been argued that Athenian maenads danced at a place in the centre of the city[211], but, for all we know, there was no '*eis oros*' for them. However, the existence of an official 'maenadic' festival is established by the very name 'Lenaia'. And there were also private celebrations of an ecstatic Bacchic nature[212]. Together with the ubiquity of maenadic ritual throughout the Greek-speaking world, this suffices for my further argument.

So much, for the moment, on the more extravagant aspects of Dionysiac religion. We may conclude that the threatening and potentially disruptive features inherent in the Bacchic rites, although not entirely unnoticed, never provoked serious restrictive measures in Greek *poleis* as far as we

[210] Burkert *GR* 162.

[211] On the the exact location of the Lenaion see: N. W. Slater, The Lenaean Theatre, *ZPE* 66 (1986) 255-64. Interestingly, the disreputable activities of Aeschines' mother were placed ἐν τῷ Κλεισίῳ τῷ πρὸς τῷ Καλαμίτῃ ἥρῳ (Demosth. *Corona* 129), which, according to one scholion, was adjacent to the Lenaion: another connection between Bacchic and Sabazios cult? However this may be, we have no decisive evidence that might definitively disprove the negative conclusion by Henrichs 1982, 144: "ritual maenadism proper was apparently not practised in Attica: Athenian women went to Delphi to celebrate maenadic rites on Mount Parnassus".

[212] Vernant 1986, 299, contends that the evidence of the fifth century does not stage private Dionysiac groups in continental Greece or in Athens. The testimony of Aristophanes seems to refute this. Moreover, the private *teletai* of Sabazios, which were very Dionysiac indeed, must have been modelled on comparable private Dionysiac associations. But one must concede that direct evidence is extremely scarce.

know. Dionysos was Greek and, what is more, he was basically a civic god. However deviant they may have been, his Bacchic rituals were tolerated since they formed an integral part of the *polis* religion and functioned as ritually fixed and temporary escapes from daily grind and sorrow[213].

4. Mystic aspects

And the bright side? What happy experiences or expectations fell to the share of the 'initiated'? Indeed, *was* there anything like initiation and mystery cult with secret rites in the classical period[214]? We have seen terms with τελεῖν, τελετή several times. Apparently, people could be 'initiated' into Dionysiac *teletai*. In the passionate attempts of Festugière, Nilsson, Dodds and others[215] to deny classical Dionysos connections with mysteries, let alone the possession of them, one of the recurrent arguments was that the term τελετή, from the archaic period into the fifth century, did not necessarily carry the meaning 'mystery' but could refer to practically any form of ritual. "τελετὰς καταδεῖξαι ist beinahe Fachausdruck für die Institution von Kulten"[216]. Yet it can hardly be doubted that in the fifth century, and certainly in the latter part of it, the meaning 'mystery' or at least 'esoteric and secret ritual' dominated[217].

[213] Once again, it is above all Vernant who has emphasized the key function of the eccentric in the cultic centre of society. Vernant 1985, 50: "Dionysos entend placer au coeur, au centre de la vie publique, des pratiques qui comportent, de façon ouverte ou sous une forme allusive, des aspects d'excentricité" and he concludes that "L'irruption victorieuse de Dionysos signifie que l'altérité s'installe, avec tous les honneurs, au centre du dispositif social" (51). Cf. *idem* 1986, 300, and Cl. Bérard et Chr. Bron, Bacchos au coeur de la cité. Le thiase dionysiaque dans l'espace politique, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 13-27: "le dionysisme est tout à fait intégré aux structures socio-religieuses de l'Athènes classique" (27).

[214] There is an abundant literature on the Dionysiac mysteries in Hellenistic-Roman times. I mention only a few well-known works: Von Wilamowitz 1931 II, 368-87; A. J. Festugière, Les mystères de Dionysos, in: Festugière 1972, 13-63; M. P. Nilsson, *The Dionysiac Mysteries in the Hellenistic Age* (Lund 1957); F. Matz, *DIONYSIAKE TELETE*, *Abh.Mainz* (1963). Cf. various contributions to *L'association dionysiaque* 1986. The most important recent reconsiderations of Bacchic mysteries in classical and early Hellenistic times are: Cole 1980; Seaford 1981; Casadio I,II, 1982/1983; Burkert *GR* 290-5; Burkert 1987, *passim*.

[215] See the instructive survey of the discussion between advocates of early mysticism in Dionysiac religion and their opponents in Casadio II, 1983, 139-47. Recently, Vernant 1985, 34 ff., and 1986, 295 f., warned against a too easy attribution of the concept of Dionysiac 'mysteries' to the fifth century. In my view, however, he seems to overemphasize the differences between the evidence from various parts of the Greek-speaking world which I shall adduce and situations in central Greece and Athens.

[216] Graf 1974, 31. The evidence in C. Zijderveld, ΤΕΛΕΤΗ (Diss. Utrecht 1934). Cf. Boyancé 1936, 42 ff.; Nock 1933, 28: "any kind of rite and in particular for purification"; *idem* 1972 II, 798: "any solemn rite"; Casadio II, 1983, 124 f.

[217] See Graf 1974, 32 n.48; G. Zuntz, *Opuscula Selecta*, 88-102; Zijderveld *o.c.* (preceding note); P. Boyancé, Dionysiaca, à propos d'une étude récente sur l'initiation dionysiaque, *REA* 68 (1966) 33-60; *idem*, Eleusis et Orphée, *REG* (1975) 195-202, where he made a veritable *salto mortale* as compared to his earlier views in 1936; Dodds *ad Bacchae* 73: "from the later fifth century onwards used chiefly of the rites practised in the mystery-cults. It does not always mean 'initiations': initiation can happen only once..." ; Seaford 1981, 253 n.12, correctly contests the arguments advanced to bear out the latter statement. J. Roux, in her commentary on the *Bacchae*, consistently renders the term τελετή by 'mysteries'. Cf. also Burkert *GR* 291 f.; Casadio II, 1983, 125, who quotes "la felice definizione di Ateneo II, 40 D": '*teletai* is the name of the most distinguished cults, which are characterized by a *mustike paradosis*.'

Revolutionary new evidence has come to light in recent decades, which, in addition to long-known testimonies, now virtually proves that Bacchic mysteries, or at least initiations into Bacchic esoteric cult congregations, did exist in Greek-speaking areas since the sixth century at the latest. The famous 'Orphic' gold tablet from Hipponion[218] in South Italy (circa 400 BC.) mentions *mustai* and *bakchoi* in the same breath. The equally famous inscription from an ancient private cemetery near Italian Cumae ([early?] fifth century BC)[219] forbids the interment of any person who is not *bebakcheumenos* (οὐ θέμις ἐντοῦθα κεῖσθαι ἰ μὲ τὸν βεβαχχευμένον)[220]. Fifth century bone tablets from Olbia, at the other end of the Greek-speaking world, have been interpreted as membership tokens of an esoteric cult of Dionysos. At the very least their texts betray marked connections between Dionysos, Orphism and a special knowledge (ἀλήθεια) connected with initiation, the soul and afterlife[221].

Nor is this all: the parallelism of *mustes* and *bakchos* is also found in Eur. *Cret.* fr. 472 N² (= 79 Austin): Διὸς Ἰδαίου μύστης γενόμην ..... βάκχος ἐκλήθην ὁσιωθείς and in Heraclitus fr. B 14 (= 87 Marcovich, if this part

[218] Published by G. Pugliese Carratelli, *PP* 29 (1974) 108-26. Cf. R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 18 (1975) 8 f.; M. L. West, *ZPE* 18 (1975) 229-36; O. Zuntz, *WS* 10 (1976) 129-51; W. Burkert, *GR* 293 ff.; more literature in Cole 1980, 223 n.3. The preserved Orphic gold tablets are collected in G. Colli, *La sapienza greca* I (1977) 172-93; 399-405. I am particularly grateful to W. Burkert for his kindness in sending me a copy of the unpublished lectures he delivered at Cambridge in 1979 in which he discussed the new evidence on Dionysiac and Orphic mysteries. Cf. *idem*, in: *Orfismo in Magna Grecia* (Atti del quattordicesimo convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia [Taranto 1975]) 81-104; Casadio II, 1983, 136 n. 24.

[219] *NSA* 1905, p.337; E. Schwyzer, *Dialectorum Graecorum exempla epigraphica potiora* (1923) no. 792; L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 240 no. 12; *LSS* 120. See R. Turcan, Bacchoi ou bacchants? De la dissidence des vivants à la ségrégation des morts, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 227-44.

[220] The term must imply something like 'initiated into a bacchic, that is ecstatic, secret cult'. Literally it means 'possessed or invaded by Bakchos, made into a Bakchos/ Bakcheus': Casadio II, 1983, 137 f. (with additional literature in n.31); R. Turcan, *o.c.* (preceding note) 235. Burkert *GR* 294-5, points out that this is the very period that offers the first Dionysiac symbols in funerary art and the gifts to the dead. Cf. for a survey of the evidence: Cole 1980, 237 n.47 and Henrichs 1982, 160.

[221] The first treatment after their initial publication in Russian was the lecture by Burkert mentioned above n.218. Cf. F. Tinnefeld, Referat über zwei russische Aufsätze, *ZPE* 38 (1980) 67-71. A full treatment was given by M. L. West, The Orphics of Olbia, *ZPE* 45 (1982) 17-29.

of the quotation is authentic). Plato (*Leg.* 815 C) explains *bakcheia* as περὶ καθαρμούς τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελοῦντων and has the famous expression: ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι (*Phaedo* 69 C)[222]. In *Bacchae* 40, Thebes is called ἀτέλεστον ..... τῶν ἐμῶν βακχευμάτων. All these data point emphatically in the direction of mystery, initiation and esoteric ritual[223]. But if, then, connections between Dionysos and esoteric *teletai* have been established for the classical period, what exactly was the purport of these initiations: were they of the Eleusinian kind and did they bear comparable promises? A funerary epigram from Miletus (3rd or 2nd century BC)[224] honours a priestess of a Bacchic cult. The texts says: "You Bakchai of the city, say: 'Farewell, holy priestess'. This is the rightful privilege of this excellent woman. She led you to the mountains, carried all *orgia* and *hiera*, marching at the head of the whole city. If a foreigner asks her name: Alkmeionis, daughter of Rhodios. She knows her share in the beautiful" (καλῶν μοῖραν ἐπισταμένη). Here we have a priestess of a Bacchic cult who was the guide of the city thiasos. The final words are most interesting. Merkelbach and Henrichs have amply argued that they must refer to the core of the Hellenistic-Roman Dionysiac mysteries: the posthumous bliss of those who have been initiated into the secrets of the cult. Theognis 15-17 says on the wedding of Cadmos and Harmonia: "Muses and Charites, daughters of Zeus, who, having come to the wedding of Kadmos, sang the beautiful words: ὅττι καλὸν φίλον ἐστί, τὸ δ' οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλον ἐστίν. From this marriage four children sprouted: Semele, mother of Dionysos, Ino, Autonoe and Agaue, who became the leaders of the three prototypical *thiasoi*. Ὅττι καλὸν φίλον ἐστίν is specifically Dionysiac and accordingly occurs in *Bacchae* 881-901 (cf. 1007-9). Dionysos is a god of beauty as he is a beautiful god. But that is not all: knowledge of these καλά gives εὐδαιμονία: happiness[225]. There

[222] The context is overtly mystic: ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται.

[223] Casadio 1982/1983 correctly argues that much depends on the definition of the term 'mysteries'. In a later study he convincingly argued for the attribution of an authentic mystery nature to the *nocturnal* Bacchic rites at Sicyon (Casadio 1987). M. L. West has tried to show that *bakchos* originated outside the Dionysiac sphere, only to become solidly rooted in Dionysiac soil in the fourth century BC: "Essentially it denotes those who have undergone a certain kind of ritual purification" and "Reinigung, Sakrament und ἐνθουσιασμός sind es vor allem die den Bakchos bestimmen." (M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambos* [Berlin 1974] 24, and *ZPE* 18 [1975] 229-236, esp. 235, respectively). This view has been succesfully disputed by G. Pugliese Carratelli, *PP* 171 (1976) 458-66, and more extensively by Cole 1980, 226 ff. Cf. Burkert *GR* 291 ff.; Graf 1985, 285 ff.

[224] Th. Wiegand, *SbBerlin* (1905) 547. Important commentaries: B. Haussollier, *REG* 32 (1919) 256 ff.; Henrichs 1969, 226 ff.; R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 9 (1972) 77 ff.; Henrichs 1978, 148 ff.

[225] L. Robert, *BE* (1970) 505, does not follow this interpretation and translates: "qui sait la destinée reservée aux bons", as did Haussollier.

was only one way to acquire this knowledge: through initiation into the secrets of myth and ritual. Only for the initiated "shines a cherishing light" as Aristophanes *Ran.* 384 f. says, and this light also illuminates the dreary abode of the hereafter. The 'knowledge' mentioned in the inscription is only really accomplished in death: it is only on entering the realm of death that the priestess really comes to know her share in the beautiful. We do not know if the author (or his readers) imagined this happy experience as concretely as it is described in a funerary inscription from Rome, in which a nine year old girl is given the privilege of "dancing in the *thiasoi* as a leader of a bacchic group" (ἐν θιά⟨σ⟩οισ[ιν] [ἡγ]ήτειραν ..... σπείρης ..... [χ]ορεύειν)[226]. The motif of the continuation of mystery ritual, in particular of the elated dances, in the hereafter is well-known from other sources[227], most noticeably from Aristophanes' *Frogs*.

Numerous testimonies prove that from Hellenistic times onwards Bacchic initiates cherished the promise of an eternal and blissful life after death, a blessed existence which we also find expressed in the representations on sarcophagi[228]. The earliest straight testimony of this expectation is the Hellenistic inscription just quoted[229]. The question is in what period Dionysos acquired a position in the Eleusinian mysteries or developed his own mysteries, irrespective, for the moment, of the exact nature of the expectations involved. As to the first part of this question, it has long been the fashion to deny Dionysos any relationship with the Eleusinian mysteries. However, the recent reassessment of both the archaeological and literary evidence has established firm Dionysiac connections with Eleusis already in the 6th century BC[230]. Anyhow, Sophocles regarded this connection as a matter of course. He calls Eleusis the "place of Dionysos" and identifies the god with the undeniably Eleusinian Iakchos, leader of the procession of the mysts[231]. Last but not least, a scholion on Aristophanes *Ranae* 479 says: "During the *Lenaia* the *dadouchos* takes the torch

[226] L. Moretti, *BCAR* 79 (1963/4 [1966]) 143-6, with corrections by L. Robert, *BE* (1971) 739, who does not believe that it refers to the hereafter. Cf. R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 7 (1971) 280. The theme of the mystic dance in the netherworld occurs explicitly in an inscription from Philippi: W. Vollgraff, in: *Hommages Bidez et Cumont* (Bruxelles 1949) 353-73.

[227] Burkert *GR* 293: "Afterlife is repetition of the mysteries".

[228] See Henrichs 1982, 160 for a survey of the evidence and bibliography.

[229] S. G. Cole, Life and Death. A New Epigram for Dionysos, *EA* 4 (1984) 37-49, discusses the evidence: "The first explicit Dionysiac epigram to imply that existence after death might be painless dates from the Hellenistic period" (J. et L. Robert, *Fouilles d'Amyzon en Carie* I [Paris 1983] 259-63 no. 65).

[230] Guépin 1968, *passim*, esp. 264; Graf 1974, 40-78. Dionysos is for instance represented in the two-wheeled chariot of Triptolemos on a black figured amphora of the late 6th century (*ABV* 331/13).

[231] Soph. *Antig.* 1146 ff.; fr. 958 Radt.

in his hand and says: 'call the god' and those present shout: 'Semele's son, Iakchos, Giver of wealth'.'' This, indeed, is decisive: during the truly Bacchic festival of the *Lenaia*—the only celebration in Athens that can be connected with maenadism—one of the highest Eleusinian priests orders the people to invoke Dionysos in the person of the Eleusinian Iakchos: no poetical metaphor this time, but cultic reality[232]. Even the cautious and reserved Nilsson had to give in and recognize this text as one of the earliest testimonies that indicated connections between the Dionysiac and the Eleusinian spheres[233].

This connection has nothing surprising considering the emotional and phenomenological similarities between *orgia* and *musteria*. P. Boyancé[234] says on the mysteries: ''Il y a là un point fondamental pour la psychologie du mystère. Ce qui distingue essentiellement celui-ci d'une fête religieuse ordinaire, c'est la croyance à un lien intime qui s'établit avec le dieu, et cette croyance puise son fondement dans le sentiment, beaucoup plus intense que dans le culte ordinaire, de la présence divine''. Presence of and immediate contact with the god are precisely the most specific features of the Bacchic *orgia*, as we observed. On these two points both *orgia* and mysteries were equally different from normal cultic practice.

How true this is becomes apparent by a comparison of passages from the *Ranae* and the *Bacchae*[235]. In the former, the chorus which dances and sings in the netherworld consists of blissful mysts who continue the celebration of their mysteries in the hereafter under the guidance of Eleusinian (and Dionysiac) Iakchos[236]. Various terms and images strongly recall Bacchic experiences: the mysts call themselves ὅσιοι θιασώται (327). Old men move their knees with grace and shake off the

[232] On the identification of Dionysos and Iakchos see: H. S. Versnel, Iakchos, *Talanta* 4 (1972) 23-39; Graf 1974, 51-8. Cf. also the function of the Eleusinian *epimeletai* in the Lenaia: Graf 1974, 53 n.14; Pickard-Cambridge 1969, testim. 12-5.

[233] *GGR* I, 599; *idem*, *Greek Folk Religion* (New York 1940 = 1961) 48: ''from the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC, there was a certain mixing up of the Mysteries of Eleusis and the cult of Dionysus.'' Cf. Deubner 1932, 125 f. Sabbatuci 1965, 62, uses the term ''misticismo *ante litteram*'', and rightly opposes an all too simplistic picture of Dionysos as a mystery god. Cf. Vernant 1985 and 1986.

[234] *REA* 68 (1966) 44. Cf. Deubner 1932, 126: ''Orgien und Mysterien stehen einander nahe. Es sind verwandte seelische Erregungszustände, aus denen sich hier wie dort die religiösen Handlungen entwicklen.''

[235] Both were produced in the same year 405 BC and betray the renewed interest in mysteries and their personal fascinations. It is remarkable, for instance, that the pictures of Triptolemos, so cherished in Attic vase-painting as a symbol of Athenian nationalism in earlier times, now make room for scenes and symbols of a more personal piety: R. A. Padgug, Eleusis and the Union of Attica, *GRBS* 13 (1972) 135 ff.; Ch. Dugas, La mission de Triptolème d'après l'imagerie athénienne, in: *Recueil Ch. Dugas* (Paris 1960) 123-39.

[236] M. Tierney, The Parodos in Aristophanes' Frogs, *PRIA* 42 (1934/5) 199-218, has connected the passage with the Lenaia, but Graf 1974, 40-50, has shown, once and for all, that nothing else than the procession of Eleusinian mysts can have been intended.

burden of long years. Songs in honour of Demeter, Δήμητερ, ἁγνῶν ὀργίων ἄνασσα (384 f.) resound. ''Show us, Iakchos, how we achieve the long journey without effort.... For no one but for us the sun shines and the light is comforting; for us who are initiated and who have always behaved well towards foreigners and compatriots, according to the will of the gods.'' It is impossible not to be reminded of the *euphoria* of the Maenads in the parodos of Euripides *Bacchae*[237]. The god grants this Bacchic *euphoria* only to those initiated in the *orgia*. Others are excluded from the secret knowledge (ἄρρητ' ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν 472). We shall have to return to this aspect in the next section, but have already perceived clear lines: mystery in an orgiastic dress in the *Ranae*, *orgia* with a mystic flavour in the *Bacchae*.

The evidence cited above induced W. Burkert[238] to make the statement: ''by the fifth century at the latest there are Bacchic mysteries which promise blessedness in the afterlife''. This indeed cannot be doubted for the areas in the margin of the Greek world. As to fifth century continental Greece and Attica, the existence of Dionysiac mysteries or mystery groups cannot be documented with certainty, but there are many indications that the concepts and terminology of mystery already profoundly influenced Dionysiac ideology in the classical age. Whether this also entailed expectations of a blissful afterlife, like the Dionysiac mysteries of more distant Greek-speaking areas, we simply do not know, and in this respect it may be wise to follow Vernant in emphasizing the pre-eminently worldly nature of Bacchic bliss[239]. Dionysiac bliss is marked by *euphoria* during the Bacchic rites, induced by the immediate presence of and the unity with the god. This escape into another world is experienced as a temporary liberation from the fetters of daily life. Neither the more extrovert nor the esoteric rites which engendered this experience met with any serious repression from the *polis*, as far as we know. The underlying cause of this tolerant behaviour was excellently analysed recently by a number of scholars belonging or related to the *école de Paris*. To quote one of them: ''Mais si, à Athènes, il n'y a jamais eu crise dionysiaque, c'est bien parce que, au départ, la cité tout entière était initiée''[240].

[237] See especially R. Cantarella, Dioniso, fra Baccanti e Rane, in: *Serta Turyniana* (Urbana 1974) 291-310, who argues that the *Frogs*, though presenting a diametrically different picture of the god, often echoes the *Bacchae* and who, though not free from exaggeration, in my view deserves more recognition than J. Diggle, *CR* (1977) 100 (''not one of the alleged echoes convinces me'') allows him.

[238] *GR* 294.

[239] Vernant 1985, 37; 1986, 300.

[240] Cl. Bérard et Chr. Bron, Bacchos au coeur de la cité. Le thiase dionysiaque dans l'espace politique, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 27.

3. Ambiguities in the *Bacchae*

In the first section of this chapter we have analysed the Athenian reactions to the arrival of foreign and new gods. What emerged was a decidedly negative picture: whenever foreign cults were admitted at all, their incorporation tended to entail a radical denaturation of their original character: Cybele, for instance, was tamed and indeed literally encaged in her Metroon. No other exotic deity (perhaps with the sole exception of Bendis) came to stay in the official cult of the *polis*; private forms of worship were subject to severe restrictions. The negative connotations connected with private cults of questionable new gods are stereotyped: drunkenness, seduction of women, ecstatic licence, magical practices (with profit making as an aggravating extra). Some of the more vehement reactions reveal deeper concerns than can be accounted for by mere infringements of the law or of accepted codes of behaviour. Private rites, secret beliefs and an all too emphatic devotion to one new god apparently threatened to affect the cultural identity and social unity of the *polis* by upsetting time-honoured values, as the charges against Socrates in particular betray. Nor is this all: the remarkable degree of personal control exerted by the new gods or their representatives over the adepts presented a vivid contrast with the conventional religious obligations. Constituting an integral part of the culture of the *polis*, the traditional cults presented an essential instrument "to create a world of meaning in the context of which human life can be significantly lived"[241], in other words to create, confirm and consolidate society, its images and values. Consequently, the new cults could easily be experienced as disruptive since they lured away the adepts from the socio-political system by offering them both a competing sense of belonging and a different model for constructing 'the other reality'. If religion is "an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings"[242], a radical change in religious approach—and some of the new cults were radically different—must have strongly disquieting cultural implications. That modern anthropological theory strikingly corresponds with ancient experience is at least comforting: the passage of Cassius Dio 52, 36, quoted above p.130, speaks volumes. It is this fear and disapproval from the side of the *polis* that dominates our sources and entirely outvoices the experiences or expectations of the initiated.

In the second section we detected a radically different atmosphere in the

[241] T. F. O'Dea, *The Sociology of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 5.

[242] I adopt here the definition proposed by M. E. Spiro, Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation, in: M. Banton (ed.), *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (London 1966), 85-126, esp. 96.

evidence on the Bacchic cult of Dionysos, who, according to myth, had once been a new god himself. Without exception the rare allusions to socially disruptive aspects refer to the realm of fantasy, myth or 'pseudo-history' and they are dwarfed by the tokens of positive appreciation. Side by side with the official cult, sometimes organized in official 'state' *thiasoi*, private Bacchic groups flourished. Both show an uncanny resemblance to the 'sectarian' groups just mentioned: they were often restricted to women, but there were also mixed *thiasoi*. Wine, ecstasy and revelry dominate the scene, and in an isolated case even certain financial interests are referred to. Yet we do not hear of any negative notes at all, and consequently, whenever miracles are referred to they are never associated with the notion of magic. Despite his eccentric traits Dionysos is a genuine Greek civic god: he is firmly rooted in the religious scenery of the city and confines his extravagances to ritually regulated, exceptional excursions *eis oros* and comparable restricted celebrations. In the pertinent phrasing of Vernant: "la transe et le thiase, qui semblent caractériser le dionysisme, devraient lui conférer un statut marginal, le confiner dans des associations religieuses extérieures aux groupement civique; or, au Ve siècle c'est le contraire qui est vrai: le culte de Dionysos n'engage pas seulement la cité tout entière; il se pratique suivant les mêmes normes qui régissent la religion politique"[243]. This time we happen to know the cause of the *euphoria* of his followers: the blessed experience of the god's presence, perhaps sometimes enriched with the expectation of the future continuation of this happiness in the hereafter. In Greek civilization both can be documented as early as the 6th/5th century BC. Though Dionysos is an ambivalent god, his *thiasoi* were not generally distrusted as a danger for the city. Like their god they belong to routinized religion.

I now propose to show that the ample demonstration of these two comparable, yet so contrasting, phenomena in classical Athens is a condition for a correct understanding of the tragic paradox of the *Bacchae*. Our efforts will be immediately rewarded if we re-read the *Bacchae* from this double perspective. The two contrasting themes appear to dominate the entire tragedy and the tragic conflict between adoration and rejection of one and the same god can be only fully appreciated if we interpret the attitudes of the tragic *personae* in the light of the evidence collected above. This is what we are now going to do.

[243] Vernant 1986, 297; cf. the quotations given above p.150, n.213 and O. de Cazanove, C. Bérard & Chr. Bron, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 1-11 and 13-27.

1. Negative signs in the Bacchae

"Pentheus looks at the Stranger the way a sheriff in Arizona would at a bearded guru who has invaded the town with a gang of tattered girls. He counters the arrogance of mysticism with the arrogance of pragmatic reason, cuts off the Stranger's tresses and orders him to be locked in a stable. The God has been offended. Sacrilege has been committed. The Chorus cries to the heavens for revenge"[244]. What are the objections or suspicions of the highest authority in the *polis* of Thebes against the new god and his prophet, two *personae* ironically and tragically identified during the greater part of the tragedy?

First of all[245], the stranger is accused of or described as introducing a strange god from foreign lands or, worse, of concocting a new deity, whose existence Pentheus, like his mother and aunts before him, flatly denies. In his opinion Semele and her child have been burnt to death long ago by the lightning of Zeus as a penalty for her lies about her divine intercourse (243-5). "The new evils" (216) that have just broken out in the city are caused by the arrival of "the new-made god (τὸν νεωστὶ δαίμονα 219) Dionysos, whoever he is". The king accuses Teiresias of "introducing this new deity to mankind" (δαίμον' ἐσφέρων νέον 256) and asks the stranger: "You came here first, to introduce the god?" (481). His scornful disbelief is summarized in his ironic question: "There is some local Zeus there (viz. in Lydia) who begets new gods?" (467). The reader is irresistibly reminded of the atmosphere and terminology of the *asebeia* trials, both those against the introduction of foreign gods and the one against Socrates on the charge of inventing new gods, all the more so since Dionysos is frequently called a *daimon* in the play[246].

[244] J. Kott, *The Eating of the Gods: An Interpretation of Greek Tragedy* (London 1974) 188.

[245] I have largely followed the translation by G. S. Kirk, *The Bacchae by Euripides* (Englewood Cliffs 1970). Since it gives a line by line, and, whenever possible, a word by word translation nobody can suspect the user of preconceived 'hineininterpretieren'. This does not mean that I totally reject the sometimes pertinent criticism by D. S. Carne-Ross, Dionysus in Cambridge, *Arion* NS 1 (1973-4) 538-49. I have consistently collated other translations and commentaries, above all, of course, the one by Dodds, and not for the reason that "Kirk writes as a pragmatic no-nonsense Englishman, whereas Dodds has the advantage of being Irish" (Carne-Ross p.543). The new, rather free, translation by Evans 1988, 207-72, appeared too late for consultation. As a rule, I have refrained from any comment not directly relevant to my argument.

[246] M. Detienne, *De la pensée religieuse à la pensée philosophique. La notion de daimon dans le Pythagoreisme ancien* (Paris 1963). On the implications of this term see most recently: D. Baudy, Dämonen, in: *Lexikon der Religionen* (1987) 116-20. It is generally assumed that the term *daimon*, especially in Homer, is mainly to be distinguished from *theos* in that the former implies a sudden, inexplicable and often terrifying action by an unidentified divine power. See for instance: R. Schlesier, Daimon und Daimones bei Euripides, *Saeculum* 34 (1983) 267-79, who observes that the term prevails in the *Bacchae* (17x, of which 12x for Dionysos): "Dionysos (...) von Anfang als eine grausame, ja mörderische Macht zu erkennen, die nicht nur keinen Widerspruch (...) duldet, sondern die, wenn ein Mensch sie zu ignorieren oder gar zu bekämpfen wagt, in eine—Kalkül und Intrigantentum keineswegs ausschliessende—Raserei verfällt, in deren Verlauf Freund und Feind unterschiedslos dahingemäht werden". The accepted view was contested by I. J. F. de Jong and N. van der Ben, Daimon in Ilias en Odyssee, *Lampas* 17 (1984) 301-16. Although prevailing ideas are not radically disproved by their study, they do add a most important characteristic: it appears that *daimon* is particularly used in cases of a specific and unique action by a god with special reference to the speaker. They also show that later developments of the term always imply the notion: "miraculous contact with mortal beings". This is, of course, very characteristic of Dionysos in the *Bacchae*. Thus the term acquires a truly ambiguous meaning, combining the negative elements of contemporary fake gods, who are as a rule referred to as *daimones*, and the awe-inspiring aspects of its authentic meaning in Homer and elsewhere.

Accordingly, Pentheus depicts and addresses the prophet (the god) and his followers in strongly negative terms and accuses them of offences against society which, after our first section, are quite familiar by now. Thus he insinuates that Teiresias supports the new god in order to "have more birds to watch, more fees from burnt offerings" (257). The stranger himself is a "wizard and enchanter" (γόης ἐπῳδός 234), marked by an effeminate countenance with long curls and an oriental female dress (235; cf. θηλύμορφον ξένον 353; 453-9)[247]. We immediately recognize elements of the story of the metragyrtes who introduced Cybele in Athens, the charges of magic against Ninos and Theoris (cf. the joking remark on Socrates in Plato *Meno* 80 B, above n.100), the financial motives ascribed to *metragurtai* in general and Aeschines in particular, and there may also be allusions to transvestism as it was practised in the Kotys cult[248].

If his personal charm makes the prophet dangerously seductive to women, the rites he introduces give rise to even more serious misgivings:

[247] Similar references to Dionysos' weakness and effeminacy also occurred in Aeschylus' *Lycurgus* fr. 59-62 Radt, which were the immediate cause of the palace miracle as described in fr. 58.

[248] This is not to imply a rejection of the authentically Dionysiac function of the ambiguity of the male and female features. I fully endorse for instance the remarks by Segal 1978, 185-202, who states that Dionysos "confuses the boundaries between youth and adult and between male and female" (190) and concludes: "The adolescent Dionysus of the *Bacchae*, as also of the vase-paintings of the latter half of the fifth century, has the force and energy of man, but the grace, charm, soft beauty and seductiveness of a girl. For Greek tragedy that combination of male and female characteristics is menacing and ominous rather than potentially helpful and harmonious" (191). It is one of the many ambiguities analysed in the works by Henrichs and Vernant, which Evans 1988 turns into the central issue of Dionysiac religion. His discussion and especially the theatrical pictures added to his book, belong to the most impressive evocations of this aspect. As for ambiguities, one could even add another: the luxuriant countenance and attire of the stranger belong to the typical characteristics of the theatre tyrant (A. Alföldi, Gewaltherrscher und Theaterkönig, in: *Late Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of A. M. Friend* (Princeton 1955) 15 ff. esp. 21. We therefore attend a clash between two tyrants, a view that will be substantiated by our further argument. However, my present point is that in the social context of contemporary Athens effeminate countenance and behaviour provoked strongly negative reactions, *inter alia* because they were associated with foreign aberrations.

"Wine-bowls are set among the *thiasoi*" (221/2) in order to incite women "to serve the lechery of men" (223, cf. 260-263) or the lust of the stranger himself, "with the charm of Aphrodite wine-dark in his eyes" (236-8; 354; 453-6)[249]. The *teletai* he brings are nocturnal (485/6) and "darkness for women is deceitful and corrupt" (487). Altogether they form a "new disease for women" (νόσον καινὴν γυναιξί 353/4)[250]. Though the first messenger reports that "it is not as you say that drunken from the mixing bowl and to the skirl of the flute they hunt in the woods for the Cyprian's pleasure...." (686-8), Pentheus is not convinced and his downfall is ironically inaugurated by his sheer erotic obsession to see the maenads, even if he "will be pained to see them drunk" (814). Similarly, the subsequent—and decisive—step to his destruction, viz. his decision to climb the tree, is prompted by his desire to watch the "maenads' shameful deeds" (αἰσχρουργίαν 1062). It is quite immaterial to my argument whether the accusations are justified or are—as they indeed turn out to be—products of an excited imagination. Nor do I see it as my task to analyse Pentheus' deeper psychic motives. Suffice the observation that obviously contemporary—and indeed perennial—insinuations against foreign and new *teletai* furnished the materials for these passages. Compare the objections to the nocturnal extravagances of the Adonia and other *pannuchides*, the Kotys cult, the charges against Phryne and her promiscuous *komoi*.

Small wonder, then, that Pentheus assesses the "new disease" as an alarming challenge to law and order: the stranger "holds both Pentheus and Thebes in contempt" (503); the maenads raid villages and gain victories over the male population (751 ff.). Thus they represent "a mad insolence, a huge reproach to the men of Hellas" (779), for "this exceeds all bounds, if at the hands of women we are to suffer what we do" (785/6). The fear of social and political disruption as the result of foreign and private cult is manifest, and in this respect the reactions of Pentheus display striking similarities with the Roman repression of the Bacchanalia in 186 BC[251]. There is indeed a clear undertone of insurrection in the triumphal

[249] On the general idea that wine provokes aphrodisiac lust: H. M. Müller, *Erotische Motive in der griechischen Dichtung bis auf Euripides* (Hamburg 1980) 34-8; Dodds *ad Bacchae* 402 ff.; G. A. Privitera, *Dioniso in Omero e nella poesia greca arcaica* (Rome 1970) 110-20. On the positive aspects of this connection: M. R. Halleran, *Bacchae* 773-4 and Mimnermus Fr. 1, *CQ* 38 (1988) 559-60. On (old) women and (the attractions of) wine see: J. N. Bremmer, The Old Women of Ancient Greece, in: J. Blok and P. Mason (edd.), *Sexual Asymmetry. Studies in Ancient Society* (Amsterdam 1987) esp. 201 f., and the literature mentioned there.

[250] Significantly, Pliny *NH* 30, 8, qualifies the magic craft introduced in Greece by the Persian Othanes as a madness (*rabies*) and a contagious disease: *velut semina artis portentosae sparsit obiter infecto quacumque conmeaverant mundo.*

[251] Studies on the Roman *Bacchanalia* abound. I mention only a few important and/or recent titles: C. Gallini, *Protesta e integrazione nella Roma antica* (Bari 1970); Festugière 1972, 89-109; R. Turcan, Religion et politique dans l'affaire des Bacchanales, *RHR* 181 (1972) 3-28; J. L. Voisin, Tite-Live, Capoue et les Bacchanales, *MEFRA* 96 (1984) 601-53; J.-M. Pailler, La spirale de l'interprétation: les Bacchanales, *AnnalesESC* (1982) 929-52; W. Heilmann, *Coniuratio impia*. Die Unterdrückung der Bakchanalien als ein Beispiel für römische Religionspolitik und Religiosität, *AU* 28 (1985) 22-41; Freyburger-Galland *et alii* 1986, 171-206. The subject is passed over in silence in *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, though the collection has a welcome treatment of the term *bacanal/bacanalia* by J.-M. Pailler, pp. 261-73, who was apparently unaware that Ph. Robin, *Bacchanal, Bacchanalia, Bacchanalis*, *Pallas* 26 (1979) 63-75, had preceded him. The Roman persecution of the *Bacchanalia* provides a full scale of the customary aspects: a dubious foreign priest, nocturnal rites, violations of the social boundaries between the elite and lower classes, old and (extremely) young participants, free and slaves, promiscuity, debauchery, wine, licence, manipulation of miracles and other trickery, and incitation to all sorts of crimes against society, including arson. In the "Niederkämpfung des religiös-perversen Fanatismus" it becomes manifest "wie der moralische Selbsterhaltungsinstinkt des römischen Volkes als ganzen in dem Senat das Organ besass", thus the *neos Pentheus* R. Schotlaender, *Römisches Gesellschaftsdenken. Die Zivilisierung einer Nation in der Sicht ihres Schriftsteller* (Böhlau 1969) 84; cf. I. Weiler, *Gnomon* (1972) 474. After the completion of this chapter I noticed that J.-M. Pailler has managed to write 865 pages on this event: *Bacchanalia. La répression de 186 av. J.-C. à Rome et en Italie* (Paris-Rome 1988).

cry of the Bacchic chorus: "It is Dionysos, Dionysos, not Thebes which has power over me" (1037/8). This defiant cheer hides the kernel of the tragic conflict between two opposing and irreconcilable points of view, one of which we have now analysed as to its motives. Its consequences are equally predictable.

The rejection of the new god naturally implies the refusal to worship him. Pentheus' disbelief is a prominent theme of the tragedy and it is almost exclusively put into words by his adversaries: "Dionysos....who you say does not exist" (517); "for you did not consider him a god" (θεὸν γὰρ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθε νιν 1297); "he failed to reverence the god" (οὐ σέβων θεόν 1302; cf. 490). Pentheus himself qualifies the god, his followers and the whole ritual hocus pocus as ridiculous and humiliating. In 204/5 Teiresias (implicitly referring to Pentheus and similar sceptics) presumes that "people will say that I have no shame for old age since I intend to crown my head with ivy and to dance" and in 250-3, on perceiving Teiresias with the narthex—"ridiculous" (πολὺν γέλων)—Pentheus says: "I am ashamed, old man, to see the foolish senility (τὸ γῆρας ὑμῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον) of the pair of you". This is repeated again and again: "I and Cadmus, whom you make fun of" (ὃν σὺ διαγελᾷς 322); "Teiresias the instructor of your folly" (ἀνοίας 345). The god summons the maenads to arms with the words: "I bring the man who makes you and me and my worship (ὄργια) into a mockery (γέλων 1080/1). Tragically, Pentheus has to suffer the very same abuse (828) when he is provoked to disguise himself as a maenad. In order to prevent the "bacchants (from) mocking me"

(842)[252] he makes himself a laughing-stock for all Thebes "by being led through town disguised as a woman after the earlier threats he tried to terrorize us with" (854-6). It is as if we read Aristophanes' puns at the rites and followers of Kotys or, more precisely, Demosthenes' picture of the mysteries of Sabazios and the parts played by Aeschines and his mother.

Consequently, the highest political authority feels forced to stop the disease and punish the agents. The followers are or will be chained in public prison (226-32) and be sold off in slavery or kept as slaves in the royal palace (512-4). The prophet will be caught and beheaded (241) or be stoned to death (356). By way of *hors d'oeuvre* and "to pay penalty for his foul sophistries" (489) his delicate locks are cut off (493), his attire is removed (495) and he is locked up (497) in the stable (509-10). Teiresias will be punished by the total devastation of his "throne where he takes the omens" and the scattering of his holy paraphernalia (346-50). It is the sort of treatment we recognize in the spontaneous actions against the Cybele priest and in the official penalties inflicted in the *asebeia* trials on the charge of introducing new cults and rites.

Surveying the evidence there can be little doubt that Pentheus' reactions must have been easily recognized by the audience and, moreover, must have struck them as perfectly credible. Their *vraisemblance* will have lent them a certain legitimacy. If, for the moment, we leave aside the crucial datum that Dionysos was a real god—and in order to do justice to one of the characters in the conflict *and* to the definition of tragedy, we must do so maximally, at least up to line 642 ff. (after the first great miracle)—, the only honest conclusion is that against the background of the contemporary reactions to new gods and cults Pentheus' attitude was neither absurd nor reprehensible in principle. The evidence collected in our first section definitely precludes the simplistic idea that Pentheus is a theatrical tyrant *tout court*, who in haughty arbitrariness crushes everything that challenges his simple world view, irrespective of one's personal predilection for his alleged puritanism as the result of a repressed libido (Dodds), his naive lust for power (Winnington-Ingram) or his rationalistic-sophistic feelings of superiority (Roux)[253].

[252] M. Neuburg, Whose Laughter does Pentheus fear? (Eur. *Ba.* 842), *CQ* 37 (1987) 227-30, suggest a conjecture, which is rightly rejected by P. T. Stevens, Whose Laughter does Pentheus fear? (Eur. *Ba* 842), *CQ* 38 (1988) 246-7, whose interpretation: "I still find repugnant the idea of dressing as a woman, but anything would be better than allowing the Bacchants to triumph over me", seems perfectly convincing to me.

[253] This is not to say that Pentheus is a particularly agreeable character. But his stubbornness and boldness may have a function in providing possibilities of identification to the audience, as Nussbaum 1986, 42 ff. argues for Aeschylus' Agamemnon.

Of course, I would by no means disregard allusions to these and other psychological blemishes[254] (with the exception, that is, of the ideas of Roux, which I find completely untenable). But it was the chief task of the tragedian to show how a character reacted within the framework of the traditional tale to the circumstances κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον as Aristotle (*Ars poet.* 1451 b) has it. This implies the necessity of attributing a (psycho-)logically and above all culturally credible behaviour to his characters, which should facilitate feelings of identification, understanding and even—if only in the literal sense of the word—sympathy. That is precisely what Euripides is doing here. Without exception Pentheus' suspicions, insinuations and accusations reflect attitudes documented for the late fifth and fourth centuries. Pentheus is pictured as the bourgeois *polites* in defence of law and order and adamantly opposed to any modernisms that might disrupt the stability of society. Transposed to Athenian democratic procedures, Pentheus was the prosecutor in a process of *asebeia* against a foreign wizard and magician on the charge of concocting a new *daimon* and introducing nocturnal *teletai* which corrupt women and foster drunkenness, lechery and licence. Provided the charges were well-founded, his action was fully justified by both Athenian law and public opinion: the priest of Cybele, Socrates and Ninos deserved their death penalties.

There is only one—decisive—complication: the charges of Pentheus appeared to be *not* well-founded, since the god was not a fake daimon but a real god and he was not even a foreign or new *daimon* but an ancient Greek deity. Consequently, in his turn, Pentheus was punished because he was guilty. Guilty of what? We shall consider this question in an analysis of the opposite reactions, *viz* those of the god's adepts in the *Bacchae*. We shall find that their religious convictions and experiences were equally recognizable as expressions of contemporary ideas. However, this should not lead us into following the numerous attempts to ruin the tragedy by ignoring the fact that Pentheus did *not* have the opportunity of *personally* appreciating this side of the picture until we are well on our way in the play.

2. *The positive side of the* Bacchae

There is another side, the side of the enthusiastic adepts who do believe

[254] Provided they are treated as professionally as it is done by M. Parsons, Self-knowledge Refused and Accepted: Psychoanalytic Perspective on the *Bacchae* and the *Oedipus Colonus*, *BICS* 35 (1988) 1-14.

in the god and hallow his majesty. Through the mouth of the chorus, the prophet, Teiresias and the human maenads the play is one continuous proclamation of Dionysos' divinity. Moreover, essentially, he is not a new or foreign god but his cradle stood in Hellas. Finally, he is a *great* god and outshines other gods of the Greek pantheon. Now he has come to establish his divine power: "to this land I first came....to be a manifest god to men" (ἐμφανὴς δαίμων 22); "I shall show myself to be a god" (47).

With the following detailed analysis of the glorious aspects of the new religion as proclaimed by the adepts of the god I hope to serve two aims: first, to show how this picture, in contradistinction to the dark colours of Pentheus' insinuations, closely corresponds to the cheerful aspects of contemporary Dionysiac experience and thus essentially contributes to the tragic conflict. Secondly, I thus collect the materials for another comparison, which will bring to light a religio-historical aspect of Euripides' masterpiece that has hitherto gone unnoticed. The organization of this analysis has been determined chiefly by the latter objective and will hopefully prove its utility later on.

1. Dionysos is a cosmopolitan god who demands reverence by all people all over the world.

He has left Asia where he has "set his dances, established his rituals" (21/2) and where "every foreigner dances in these rites" (482). He has come now to Thebes and Hellas "to be a manifest god to men" (22). Here, too, he demands the reverence of all: "whoever is on the road....let him make way...and sanctify himself" (68-70)[255]; all Thebes, the whole country must dance, women and men (105-115), young and old (206-7), including Kadmos and Teiresias (175-7), rich and poor, for his gifts are for everybody irrespective of social rank (421-32). In sum "he wishes to have honours equally from all" (ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάντων βούλεται τιμὰς ἔχειν 208). Even nature, "mountains and animals join in Bacchic worship" (726/7).

[255] I believe that this hotly discussed text must be taken as an annunciation of the god's epiphany. There is an unnoticed parallel in an old folkloristic song (Athen. 14, 622B = Page *PMG* 851) ἀνάγετ', εὐρυχωρίαν τῷ θεῷ ποιεῖτε, θέλει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς (.....) βαδίζειν. K. J. McKay, *CQ* 17 (1967) 192 n.1, gives more parallels. Together with Aristoph. *Ran.* 354 f. this tells for the meaning "clear the way", and against "let him be present" (Kirk) or "let him be outside" (J. Diggle, *CR* 17 [1967] 261 f.; J. Roux in her commentary *ad loc*).

2. He manifests his greatness by the miracles that accompany his presence and by his magnificent gifts to humanity.

The *Bacchae* is the tragedy of a continuous *epiphaneia*, in the double sense of that word: the divine presence (epiphany) and the miracles by which that presence manifests itself. It provides a unique case in that a god in mortal guise is continuously on the stage. Numerous passages expressly refer to the immediacy of his presence[256]. Even if we admit that ἐμφανής in line 22, "to be a manifest god to men", may have an elative sense, his appearance is explicitly referred to in: "I must speak in defence of my mother Semele by appearing (φανέντα) to mortals as the god she bore to Zeus" (41/2) and: "For this reason I shall show myself to be a god (θεὸς γεγὼς ἐνδείξομαι)[257], to him and to all Thebans" (47-50), just as in other lands "I shall reveal my true self" (δεικνὺς ἐμαυτόν). He is seen face to face (ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα 470) and his presence is directly experienced in the shaking of the palace (582 ff.). "Take courage" (θαρσεῖτε 607) and "you, because of your impiety, do not behold him" (502) contain stereotyped references to the terminology of epiphany[258]. His appearance on top of the building in 1328 ff. conforms rather to the conventions of the *deus ex machina*.

Miracles abound. When the god accompanies his maenads "the ground flows with milk, flows with wine, flows with bee's nectar" (142/3), generally, and in the mountains of Thebes in particular (704-11). Old men move their limbs with ease. They do not tire and they forget their age (187-89), women tear heifers to pieces with their bare hands (735/6)

[256] '*Deus praesentissimus*': Henrichs 1982, 152. Otto 1933, 78, was the first to appreciate fundamentally the "einzigartige Unmittelbarkeit seines Erscheinens", and pictured him as "den Kommenden, den Epiphaniengott, dessen Erscheinung viel dringender und zwingender ist als die irgend eines anderen Gottes". Recently, Vernant 1985, 39-44, and M. Detienne, Dionysos et ses parousies: un dieu épidémique, in: *L'association dionysiaque* 1986, 53-83, have paid due attention to this aspect. M. Massenzio, *Cultura e crisi permanente: la 'xenia' dionisiaca* (Rome 1970) 75-84, takes the notions of 'vision' and 'seeing' as the central themes of the *Bacchae*. Similarly Vernant, *o.c.* 44, states: "aucun autre texte ne comporte avec une insistance comparable, et qu'on pourrait presque dire obsessionelle, un tel foisonnement du vocabulaire du voir et du visible". Cf. also: J. Gregory, Some Aspects of Seeing in Euripides' *Bacchae*, *G&R* 32 (1985) 25-31. I do not follow R. Hamilton, *Bacchae* 47-52: Dionysus' Plan, *TAPhA* (1974) 139 ff., when he explains the palace miracle as an allegory of Dionysos' epiphany = his birth.

[257] Of course not a "birth epiphany", as W. J. Verdenius, Notes on the Prologue of Euripides' *Bacchae*, *Mnemosyne* 33 (1980) 12, who sees the whole play as a continuous epiphany of Dionysos, rightly remarks.

[258] Pfister 1924, 319 f.; M. Simon, Études de vocabulaire religieuse, *RHR* (1936) 188-206; Merkelbach 1962, 100, 141, 212, 331 (especially in the context of mystic epiphanies); A. de Pury, *Promesse divine et légende cultuelle dans le cycle de Jacob I* (Paris 1975) 222 ff.; Engelmann 1975, 51.

just as Agaue performs her dreadful *sparagmos*, "not by her normal strength, but the god gave a special ease to her hands" (1125-8). The maenads display extraordinary powers of balance (755/6), carry fire on their heads that does not burn them (757/8), they are invulnerable and gain victories over men (761 ff.)[259]. All this is summarized in the messenger's words: "amazing things they perform, greater than miracles" (667). Pentheus is deceived and takes a bull for Dionysos (616 ff.) or perceives Dionysos as a bull in 921/2[260]. The god himself performs amazing miracles: he draws down a tree with ease (1065 ff.), his great voice is heard coming from heaven (1078) attended by a great fire between sky and earth (1082/3).

Special attention is paid to two categories of miracles. The first pertains to liberation[261]. The women are miraculously freed from their prison (443 ff.), the prophet predicts that "the god himself shall release me, when I will it" (498) and afterwards confirms it once again: "Myself, I rescued myself, easily, without effort" (614). The second concerns the destruction of the palace (585-603). Both miracles have the vital function of convincing—and converting—the recalcitrant king and, by failing to do so, of exposing his guilt. As a matter of fact, one of the seminal functions of miracles, viz. "to prove deity"[262], finds an explicit expression in the *Bacchae*. The servant's words after the miraculous liberation of the Theban women: "Full of many wonders this man has come to our city of Thebes—but the rest is your concern" (449-50), conceals a menace that is undisguisedly expressed by the messenger who has witnessed the miracles performed by the maenads: "Had you been there, the god you now condemn you would have courted with prayers because of these sights" (712/3).

Side to side with these actual miracles, there are the references to the

[259] Several of these miracles are characteristic of ecstatic cults all over the world: Dodds *ad loc.*; Bremmer 1984, 269 ff.

[260] These two instances of optic illusion should suffice to reject R. Seaford, Pentheus' Vision: *Bacchae* 918-22, *CQ* 37 (1987) 76-8, who argues that the double vision described there is caused by a mirror.

[261] On the liberating qualities of Dionysos in Euripides see: Weinreich 1968, 120-8. On the opposition of binding/loosing in the *Bacchae*: Ch. Segal, Etymologies and Double Meanings in Euripides *Bacchae*, *Glotta* 60 (1982) 81-93, esp. 81-3. W. C. Scott, Two Suns over Thebes: Imagery and Stage Effects in the *Bacchae*, *TAPhA* 105 (1975) 340 ff., discovers reflections of this theme in the emphasis on enclosure and walls. On epithets with the element *lusi-* (of Dionysos and other gods): Keyssner 1932, 111 f. In this connection it is interesting that M. Gronewald, Euripides, *Bakchen* 294, *ZPE* 19 (1975) 304, defends the ms. διάλυσον against Διόνυσον and aptly compares Cornutus *De Nat. Deor.* 30, ὡσανεὶ Διάλυσος κεκλημένος.

[262] The famous expression of Nock 1933, 91. Cf. MacMullen 1983; Kee 1983, *passim*, who also analyses other functions of the miracle.

primordial gifts Dionysos has bestowed on humanity, which *aretai* prove both his divinity and his venerable antiquity. The god is eminently great, according to the Theban seer, because he has blessed mankind with one of the two principles that are conditional for human culture: wine. Likewise Demeter represents the other principle: bread. The unequivocally sophistic nature of his argument[263] should not detract us from the central message that, first, these qualifications make Dionysos a basically *Greek* god[264] (μέγεθος .... ὅσος καθ' Ἑλλάδ' 273/4; μέγαν τ' ἀν' Ἑλλάδα 309) and, secondly, that he controls the most powerful instrument that liberates mankind from pains and daily sorrows[265]. It is this specific gift that makes him the democratic god *par excellence*, "equal to everybody" (421 ff.) and παυσίλυπος (cf. 280-284; cf. 381-6 and 772-4). But in the same breath Teiresias adds a series of other qualities: "he is a prophet, too, this deity, since *mania* posesses mantic powers" (298/9), "he has a share of Ares as well" (302)[266]. In fact due to his towering greatness he unites many divine aspects in one divine person.

3. His major blessings are the happiness experienced by whoever follows him and celebrates his Bacchic rites. This happiness is of the order of mystic euphoria.

The parodos opens with a veritable *makarismos* of the 'initiated': "blessed (μάκαρ) is he who in happiness (εὐδαίμων), knowing the τελεταί of the god, makes holy his way of life and mingles his spirit with the sacred band in the mountains serving Bacchus with reverent purifications ..." (73-7). It is one magnificent praise of the happiness caused by the surrender to the god[267]. Similarly, the first stasimon calls the god "the foremost

[263] The similarity with the theories of Prodikos is obvious. See for instance Dodds *ad* 274-85, who pictures Teiresias as "the modernist". Cf. B. Gallisti, *Teiresias in den Bakchen des Euripides* (Diss. Zürich, Würzburg 1979), 44-59. Interestingly, Henrichs 1984a has forcefully argued that the praises of the Hellenistic aretalogies have at least one of their roots in the 'materialistic' interpretation of the gods as introduced by the sophists. Cf. my argument below p.176 f.

[264] (Mixed) wine is one of the most prominent markers of Greek civilization: Graf 1980; J. N. Bremmer, *Arethusa* 13 (1980) 295 n. 49; *ZPE* 39 (1980) 33; Henrichs 1982, 140 f. Bread (Demeter) is another: Vidal-Naquet 1981, 39-68.

[265] Henrichs 1982 n.26. Cf. p.139 above.

[266] On which see: M. G. Lonnoy, Arès et Dionysos dans la tragédie grecque: le rapprochement des contraires, *REG* 98 (1985) 65-71, who argues that especially in trance and rapture Dionysos adopts the aggressive nature of Ares.

[267] The evidence in: M. McDonald, *Terms for Happiness in Euripides* (Göttingen 1978). She shows that both the terms μάκαρ and εὐδαίμων increase in frequency in the meaning 'internal (and lasting) happiness' in the later plays, especially in the *Bacchae*. Cf. also: De Romilly 1963, 362: "le 'programme' des *Bacchantes* c'est un bonheur sacré", and particularly P. Lévêque, *Olbios* et la félicité des initiés, in: *Rayonnement grec: Hommages à Ch. Delvoye*

divinity of the blessed ones'' (μακάρων 378) and lauds the blessings of wine (381 ff.; τέρψιν ἄλυπον 423, and cf. the passages just mentioned). The third stasimon again depicts the joy of Bacchic revelry (862-76) and ends with another *makarismos*, the glorification of the person who has surmounted the dangers of life: ''but him whose life day by day is happy do I count blessed'', a life which, according to the context, is only predestined for the worshippers of the god[268]. At the end of the play the *anagnorisis* is introduced by a final reference to happiness. Agaue considers her father ''blessed (μακάριος), since we have achieved such things'' (1242/3) and wants to summon Pentheus ''to see my happiness'' (με τὴν εὐδαίμονα 1258). Some of these *makarismoi* and especially the one in the parodos, as has often been observed, strongly recall the atmosphere of mystery[269]. And numerous are the passages in which a reference to the language of mystery may be hidden: τελεταί (22, 73, 465), ὄργια (34, 78, 470, 471, 476, 998, 1080). Of course, as we have noticed before, the terms τελεταί and ὄργια, especially when applied to Bacchic ritual, do not necessarily imply the notion of 'mystery', but various scholars[270] have rightly point-

(Bruxelles 1982) 113-27, who defines the basic notion of ὄλβιος as ''doté d'un potentiel divin exceptionnel'', a meaning which subsequently favours the mystical use of the term. On the terminology used in the parodos see especially: W. J. Verdenius, Notes on the Parodos of Euripides' *Bacchae*, *Mnemosyne* 34 (1981) 300-15.

[268] There is a remarkable shift in the atmosphere and nature of the happiness as pictured in the successive choral odes. De Romilly 1963 describes it as the development from a mystic happiness in the parodos towards a more quiet and even hedonistic type of cheerfulness. M.B. Arthur, The Choral Odes of the *Bacchae* of Euripides, *YCIS* 22 (1972) 145-81, argues that certain ideas and themes developed by the chorus are independent of, although not unrelated to, the dramatic action of the play. There is a tension between the ecstatic happines and the apology for 'bourgeois morality' (p.147). This, I would add, is very much in accordance with Teiresias' apology for the 'quiet values' as represented by Dionysiac religion. Cf. also: Musurillo 1966, an important article in which he sees the kernel of the tragedy in the choral ode ll. 370-433: the dissonance between Dionysiac peace and orgy, ''the two elements which must be reconciled in any *polis*'', as Marilyn Arthur, *o.c.* says. Cf. the distinction in types of *makarismoi* in the next note.

[269] The classical treatment is by Festugière, La signification religieuse de la Parodos des Bacchantes, in: Festugière 1972, 66-80. He discovered the essential nature of the cultic hymn with the elements: *phusis, genos, dunamis*, the latter differentiated into *erga* and *heurèmata*: ''C'est comme on le voit aussitôt un *makarismos*, c'est à dire les félicitations qu'on adresse, dans les religions à mystères, à un nouvel initié''(73). Of course, several different types of *makarismoi* exist: Adami, *Jahrb. Cl. Phil.* Supp. 26 (1901) 213 ff; G. L. Dirichlet, *De veterum macarismis* (RVV 1914). F. Ferrari, La parodo delle Baccanti: moduli e composizione, *QUCC* 3 (1979) 69-80, draws a useful distinction between the mystic type as represented in the parodos of the *Bacchae* (cf. *Hom. Hymn Demeter* 480; Pindar. fr. 137 Snell; Soph. fr. 837 Radt) and the *makarismos* on the quiet life in other odes of the *Bacchae* (cf. Alcman fr. 1, 37-9 Page; Soph. *Ant.* 582). However, one should not overlook the similarities either: the *makarismos* of the wise man, for instance, praises the sage because he has 'knowledge' of things that remain concealed for ordinary people, which is clearly influenced by the ideology of mystery: B. Gladigow, Zum Makarismos des Weisen, *Hermes* 95 (1967) 404-33. Cf. Empedocles fr. 132 DK.

[270] ''De quoi s'agit-il là, sinon du secret des mystères et de l'initiation?'', P. Boyancé,

ed out that their contexts in the *Bacchae* leave little or no doubt as to their mystical implications, at least in a number of passages: ἀτέλεστον οὖσαν (40), τελετὰς εἰδώς (73), ἄρρητ' ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν (472), οὐ θέμις ἀκοῦσαί σ' (474). Unmistakable references to the atmosphere of mystery can also be found in the Iakchos cry of the maenads: ''calling in unison on Bromios as Iakchos'' (725/6), and the summoning of the maenads to ''prevent Pentheus' reporting the god's secret dances'' (1108/9).

Next, there are less unequivocal passages, which nevertheless may contain allusions to the mysteries: references to ''seeing light'' (210, 608/9)[271], or venerable darkness: σεμνότητ' ἔχει σκότος (486); the similarity between the old men dancing easily (187-94) and the Eleusinian passage of the Frogs quoted above (p.154 f.); the parallelism of Dionysos and Demeter (274 ff.); and the fact that in later times miracles with milk, honey and wine were standard ingredients of Bacchic mysteries. The phrase Διόνυσον, ὃς πέφυκεν ἐν τέλει θεός δεινότατος (860/1) is too enigmatic to provide a reliable clue.

4. Consequently his greatness should be and is acknowledged and magnified by his followers.

His ''desire to be magnified'' (αὔξεσθαι θέλει 209) is fully complied with in various praises which extol the greatness of the god: ''This new god (....) I could not describe how great he will be throughout Hellas'' (οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην μέγεθος ἐξειπεῖν 273), says Teiresias, and by way of argument he adds the catalogue of gifts to mankind described above. The god is called ''the foremost divinity of the blessed ones'' (377/8) by the chorus, and ''the equal of any of the gods'' (ἥσσων οὐδενὸς θεῶν 777). ''This god is ....great'' (μέγας 770, cf. 329) the messenger confesses. And it is all condensed into the acclamations of the chorus: δέσποτα δέσποτα (583), ''O Lord Bromios, you reveal yourself as a great god'' (θεὸς φαίνῃ μέγας 1031); ''Dionysos, Dionysos, not Thebes has power over me'' (1037/8).

REA 68 (1966) 55; cf. Roux *ad* 73. See especially Festugière 1972, 66-80; Graf 1974, 30; Seaford 1981; Casadio II, 1983, 130-3. We can therefore conclude with R. Cantarella, Il Dioniso delle Baccanti e le origini del dramma, in: *Studi filologici e storici in onore di V. de Falco* (Naples 1971) 130: ''Euripide dunque (...) rappresenta il dio delle Baccanti soprattutto nell' aspetto mistico e orgiastico...''.

[271] On the significance of the notion ''seeing light'' in mystery context see: Grandjean 1975, 33 f.; L. Paquet, *La médiation du regard* (Leiden 1973) 296-356. On its opposition ἀμαθία as characteristic of the uninitiated: Festugière 1972, 75; B. K. Gold, *Eukosmia* in Euripides' *Bacchae*, *AJP* 98 (1977) 3-16 espec. 14 f.

5. Hence it is wise to revere and cultically worship him in a most humble fashion.

The god "appreciates being honoured" (321). So "you will be wise in honouring him, a great god" (329). "In company with us give honour to the god" (342). Honour (three times the term τιμή) is of course first and foremost demonstrated by the acceptance and cultic worship of the god: "so this god (....), receive him into this city" (769-70); "revere him—we revere him" (σέβετε—σέβομεν 590); "I would prefer to sacrifice to him...." (794). This worship tends to be described in terms of submissiveness: "Cast to the ground, cast your trembling bodies, Maenads" (600/1), service of the god (θεραπεύει 82) and even as a sacred slavery of sorts: "we must serve (δουλευτέον) the Bacchic god" (366), but the god makes it a sweet labour: "sweet toil....labour no-labour" (πόνον ἡδὺν κάματόν τ' εὐκάματον 66-7). Teiresias supports his decision to go by foot with the belief that "the god will lead them without toil" (ἀμοχθί 194), for "the god would not have equal honour" (191) if the two old men were to use a chariot. People can be "sacred" to the god[272], as for instance the prophet: "My long hair is sacred, I grow it for the god" (494), or "possessed by the god" (ἐκ Βακχίου κατείχετ' 1124)[273]. These references to 'sacred slavery' may entail a *double entendre*, for instance in the scene which stages Pentheus dressing up as a maenad (820 ff.) and thus implicitly subjecting himself to the god and even "confessing" his dependence on Dionysos with an expression that *inter alia* means: "to be dedicated to" (σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακείμεσθα δή 934).

6. The refusal to worship the god is interpreted as mockery, disdain of or hybris against the god. A person who behaves in this manner is a θεομάχος.

Refusal of honour or worship: "he refuses my worship (θεομαχεῖ) and thrusts me away from his libations and nowhere addresses me in his prayers" (45/6); "your stupid impiety towards the god" (ἀσεβοῦντ' 490), "he failed to reverence the god" (1302), "his (the god's) name was without honour (ἀγέραστος) in Thebes" (1378), and cf. above. p.161. Laughing at the god: "I bring the man who makes you and me and my worship into a mockery" (1080/1, cf. 286). Terms of disdain: "The god you now blame" (ψέγεις 712); "I am a mortal and do not despise (καταφρονῶ) the gods" (199, Kadmos as opposed to others); "if there is any man who looks down (ὑπερφρονεῖ) upon a god" (1325). Terms implying the notion

[272] In later times this could be indicated by tattoo marks: Henrichs 1982, 157; generally: Jones 1987. Cf. above p.90 n.173.

[273] Followers of Dionysos could be referred to as θεοφόρητοι, as is done by the author of *Peri Hupsous* 15, 6, in his introduction to the passage of Aeschylus' *Lycurgus* fr. 58 Radt: ἐνθουσιᾷ δὲ δῶμα, βακχεύει στέγη.

of ὕβρις towards the god(s): 375, 1297, 1347. Passages implying the 'struggle' of a mortal against the god: 635/6, 789; θεομαχεῖν: 45, 325, 1255.

7. His struggle, like any human resistance against gods, is vain since the god is invincible.

Terms with θεομαχ- in themselves imply the hopelessness of the struggle[274]. This is explicitly expressed in the famous lines "I would rather sacrifice to him than in rage kick against the pricks, a mortal against a god" (794/5), or in those passages which declare the θεομάχος to be out of his senses: 387, 997-1000 (and see below). In the end the god always gains the victory: "and the winner shall be I and Bromios" (975/6); "it is slow to stir, but nonetheless it never fails, the strength of gods" (882/3). The god is καλλίνικος (1147) or ἀνίκατος (1001). He manifests his absolute superiority by his imperturbable behaviour: 622, 636. As a lover of peace (419, 790) he maintains his divine smile when he proffers his hands to be bound (437-9, cf. 1021). The scene following line 820 is a dreadful illustration of his superiority: the mortal is now reduced to a mindless puppet in the hands of the god[275].

8. The θεομάχος is punished, excessively punished.

The god "hates who has no care for this" (i.e. his noble gifts of wine and joy, 424) and "will exact punishment for these insults" (516/7), while also exhorting his followers: "take revenge on him" (1081). By way of punishment for their unbelief the women of Thebes are driven mad and chased out of their houses (32 ff.), as is Pentheus in the overture to his definitive destruction: "Let us take vengeance on him: first put him out of his mind" (850). In 387-9 it is prophesied in general terms that "for unbridled mouths and lawless folly the result is misfortune", and the atrocious death of Pentheus provokes acknowledgements that the god has given a deserved punishment (1249, 1303 ff., 1312, 1327) albeit not without excess: 1249/50, 1327/8; "but your reprisals are too severe" (1346, cf. 1374-6).

[274] Diller 1983, 361: "θεομάχος has already moved decisively towards the notion 'to fight a hopeless fight against the inevitable' in *Bacchae* 325, 1255, *Iphig. Aul.* 1408". For this development see: J. C. Kamerbeek, On the Conception of θεομάχος in relation with Greek Tragedy, *Mnemosyne* 4e ser. 1 (1948) 271 ff. But the tragic irony is that the fight is hopeless precisely because it is directed against a god: the term regains its proper meaning.

[275] M. Kalke, The Making of a Thyrsus. The Transformations of Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*, *AJPh* 106 (1985) 409-26, discovers illustrations of Dionysos' omnipotence in his arbitrary transformations of the thyrsos = Pentheus in the tree = the staff with Pentheus' head on top.

9. In the end, the culprit will confess his sins, repent and, together with all the bystanders acknowledge the greatness of the god.

In 39/40 Dionysos announces that "this land must learn to the full, even against its will, that it is uninitiated in my Bacchic rites". Teiresias tries in advance "to beseech the god for this man's (Pentheus') sake (....) and for the city's, to do nothing drastic" (360/2) and Dionysos predicts that the rebel "shall recognize (γνώσεται) the son of Zeus, Dionysos, as a god in perfect essence" (ἐν τέλει θεός 859/60). A first dim reference to a 'conversion' may be perceived in the ironic words of Dionysos: "I congratulate you on your change of mentality" (μεθέστηκας φρενῶν 944). Next, more explicitly from the mouth of the sinner himself: "my errors" (ἁμαρτίαισι 1121) and Kadmos: "Dionysos, we beseech you, we have done wrong" (ἠδικήκαμεν 1344). All this is summarized in the warning conclusion: "If there is any man who despises deity, let him look on Pentheus' death and judge that gods exist" (1325/6). Various acknowledgements of the majesty of the god quoted above were induced by the observation of the god's revenge.

3. Asebeia *versus* asebeia: *the tragic paradox of the* Bacchae

Our analysis of the positive aspects in the *Bacchae* mirrors the complete phenomenology of Bacchic myth and ritual in contemporary Greece. This is hardly surprising since the *Bacchae* has generally been regarded as the most informative—albeit precarious—source on things Bacchic. Every tiny detail that we laboriously wrenched from other sources is there, but as if seen through a magnifying glass: the epiphany of the god, the miracles that accompany his presence, the ecstasy of his followers, the happiness of the unison with the god, the liberating effects of wine and of the attendance of 'mysteries', whatever their message. Evidently, these elements of the Bacchic cult were firmly rooted in the religious experience of the *polis*, as was the god. In its pro-Dionysiac expressions, then, the *Bacchae* both condenses and magnifies familiar Bacchic experiences.

Historical acts of resistance, on the other hand, were exclusively levelled at new gods who could *not* boast such an established reputation. No doubt their adepts, too, experienced their god as great, beneficent, Lord of all people (cf. the name Isodaites). We know that they had *teletai*, but we do not receive an answer to the question (in Pentheus' words, 473): "what gain do they bring to those who sacrifice?". Our first analysis has shown that the *Bacchae* unmistakably presents Dionysos as such a new god. The range of anti-Dionysiac references in the play clearly corresponds with the actual accusations known from history.

If these two opposing viewpoints clearly refer to contemporary experiences, the same can be said of their clash. As we have seen, the new goddess Cybele was rapidly identified with very old and venerable Greek deities such as Rhea and Demeter. Consequently, the Athenians who rejected her could be blamed for not understanding "what a great goddess she was, being of the same order as the goddess worshipped by themselves: Deo and Rhea and Demeter..".(see p.109). In the *Bacchae* this is reflected in the argument of Teiresias who seeks to sanction the god by referring to his venerable Greek origins, his equivalence with the goddess Demeter and his specific *aretai*. Just like Dionysos in the *Bacchae*, Cybele was represented by a prophet, who was despised and even killed. And with identical consequences: both deities castigated the city that had rejected them and thus enforced acknowledgement of their greatness and acceptance of their cults. And just as in the case of Cybele, it is by the instructions of the Delphic oracle that the Dionysos of the *Bacchae* will eventually be accepted (306/7; cf. 328).

In fine, the *Bacchae* pictures Dionysos as a new *daimon* who, being outlawed by the city officials, turns out to be a real, great god and thus proves the resistance to be *hamartia*. And this, I believe, is the tragic kernel of the play. The conflict itself has, of course, not entirely escaped the attention of—admittedly an astonishingly small number of—commentators[276]. But, if noticed at all, it has always been disposed of as a more or less subordinate element, and has never been thoroughly analysed as to its tragic meaning. Yet, such an analysis turns out to be rewarding: for the data collected in our discussion of the religious experience of contemporary Athens allow us to formulate our final conclusion: *the tragic theme of the Bacchae is the conflict between two asebeiai.* Pentheus is the prosecutor in an *asebeia* trial[277] (the negative view analysed above), but in his turn becomes the defendant in an *asebeia* trial (as a result of the authenticity of the new god)[278]. He accuses his opponents of "introducing or concocting new

[276] Dodds, *Bacchae*, Introd. XVIII-XXII, has some perceptive remarks on the 'returning of the past' in the coming of Sabazios (*alias* Dionysos) and other Oriental gods, and suggests that we "may understand better some parts of the play if we relate them to this contemporary background". Cf. also J.-P. Vernant, *Ann. Collège de France* 1983-4, 475-500. Independently of my article in *Lampas* 1976, P. McGinty, presents somewhat related ideas in his: Dionysos' Revenge and the Validation of the Hellenic World View, *HThR* 71 (1978) 77-94, but he incorporates them in a rather different vision. He views the "vengeance and resistance myth" as an instrument in class tensions: "each class would be able to focus on different aspects of the myth and see its own values upheld". Though admiring the subtlety of the argument I hesitate to connect the new religions too closely with "underlying groups".

[277] Note that, ironically enough, it was the *basileus* who conducted the charges of impiety in Athens: Arist. *Athen. Pol.* 57, 1-2; Dem. 22, 27; Hyperid. 4, 6; cf. Dem. 59, 74-77.

[278] That is, of course, in the sense of '*asebeia* trials as we know them from Socrates and the fourth century'. I am not trying—nor is it necessary—to suggest that Euripides had actual trials in mind on which he constructed his play, although this is not impossible. It

gods'' (cf. Socrates, Phryne, Ninos) and incurs the charge of ''blasphemy and rejection of a venerable god'' (cf. Socrates and the charges against intellectuals in general). The tragic paradox lies in the fact that both parties are right.

Materials for a tragic paradox

In Pentheus' perception the stranger and his god easily satisfy all the conditions that justify a charge of *asebeia* according to the late fifth century Athenian definition. After the evidence collected in the first section of this chapter this needs no further substantiation. Nor did the poet leave his audience in doubt. The accusations are loud and clear, the references to contemporary ideology immediate and eloquent. On the other hand, the fact that Pentheus himself should fall into the category of *asebeis* must have been far less, if at all, obvious at first sight. If the evidence had been restricted to the impression that the new god belonged to the same dubious category as the gods introduced by Ninos, the mother of Aeschines, Phryne, and no doubt a number of unknown predecessors, the idea of his *asebeia* would not even have come to the mind of the audience. There was only one fact, though an essential one, that made Pentheus a veritable *asebes*, and this was the fact that he erred. The god he persecuted did *not* belong to this category but he was a real, ancient Greek (and cosmopolitan) god, which it was imperative for the poet to clarify unequivocally. This is what he did, employing a rich variety of expressions. Two of the most obvious have been pointed out: first, a direct appeal to the foreknowledge of the public, who knew that Dionysos was an ancient Greek deity, and, second, the continuous glorification of his greatness and power throughout the tragedy[279]. But there are other procedures as well which only betray their function when viewed from the correct perspective. By looking afresh at some relevant passages it will be possible to throw new light on some enigmas that have been haunting the discussion for decennia.

Two asebeiai

In addition to the ones mentioned above, the most obvious method for revealing the true nature of Pentheus' actions is of course the use of unequivocal terminology. In ll. 45/6 Dionysos censures Pentheus: ''who

suffices that the materials were there in the social and religious mentality of his time, as we analysed it above. These materials the poet used just as, in the *Horoi*, Aristophanes devised a scene in which foreign gods, especially Sabazios, were sentenced by an Athenian court.

[279] For this reason I fully agree with G. Zuntz, *Hermes* 113 (1985) 119-21, in his rejection of Dihle's conjectures in the prologue of the *Bacchae*, defended *inter alia* with the argument: ''zumal in v. 20-22 verschiesse eigentlich der Dichter sein Pulver recht unnötigerweise'' (p.11).

fights the gods (θεομαχεῖ) by refusing my worship and thrusts me away from his libations, and nowhere addresses me in his prayers'' (the very suspicion Socrates tried to evade, above p.126 f.). This is only the first of a long series of expressions that identify Pentheus' misdemeanour against Dionysos with blasphemy *in general*. These generalisations invariably entail a generalised characterization of Pentheus as an *asebes*. ''Impiety (τῆς δυσσεβείας)! Foreigner, do you not reverence the gods?'' (263), says the chorus to Pentheus. ''You practise impiety (ἀσέβειαν ἀσκοῦντ') and thus the god's rites are hostile to you'' (476), and ''you impious'' (σὺ ἀσεβής, 502), says Dionysos to Pentheus. ''To reverence the things divine'' (σέβειν τὰ τῶν θεῶν) is identical with ''to be sound of mind'' (σωφρονεῖν, 1150; cf. σοφώτατον 1151), and the one who, like Pentheus, refuses to do this is ruled by ''lawless folly'' (ἀνόμου τ' ἀφροσύνας, 387), by ''unrighteous judgement and lawless temper'' (ἀδίκῳ γνώμᾳ παρανόμῳ τ' ὀργᾷ 997), by ''foolishness'' (ἀγνωμοσύναν) and ''madness of judgement'' (μαινομένᾳ δόξᾳ) since he ''fails to foster things divine'' (τὰ θεῶν αὔξοντας 885-7). The qualifications reach a remarkable degree of 'actuality' when Pentheus is called: ''atheist, unlawful, unrighteous'' (τὸν ἄθεον ἄνομον ἄδικον, 1015)[280].

The tragic paradox reaches its paroxysm the moment that Pentheus, who is convinced that he defends the order of the *polis* against the new madness in accordance with the *patrioi nomoi*, is precisely called ''a bad citizen (κακὸς πολίτης)—for he lacks sanity'' (νοῦν οὐκ ἔχων 271). Thus the good citizen who duly prosecutes *asebeis*, by his miscalculation becomes himself an *asebes* and a bad citizen. The tragic ambiguity is elaborated in 489-90, where the two *asebeiai* are contrasted, radically and irreconcilably: ''You must pay penalty for your foul sophistries'' (σοφισμάτων κακῶν) says Pentheus to the stranger, who replies: ''And you too, for your stupidity and impiety (ἀσεβοῦντ') toward the god''. Each, from his point of view, is right. Only the audience knows—what remains hidden for Pentheus—which of the two is mistaken[281].

[280] There is a remarkable terminological resemblance in a closely related accusation from 362 AD. When the Christian prefect of Egypt Artemisios had dispelled the heathen crowd that had come to the rescue of Sarapis and his temple in Alexandria, Julian the Apostate qualified his action with the terms ἀδίκως καὶ παρανόμως καὶ ἀσεβῶς (*Imp. Iul.* 379 B). The combination seems to be formulaic: Lysias fr. V Gernet = 53,1 Scheibe calls Kinesias ἀσεβέστατον ἁπάντων καὶ παρανομώτατον ἀνθρώπων. Ἄνομος καὶ δυσσεβής form a fixed combination in the so-called *diabolai* of later antiquity, a special branch of *defixiones* with forged accusations of sacrilege against personal enemies who thus are expected to be punished by the (in this case Egyptian) gods. See for instance Audollent 1904, no's 155 A 48, 188, and on this genre of curses: S. Eitrem, Die rituelle ΔΙΑΒΟΛΗ, *SO* 2 (1924) 43-58.

[281] There is a striking similarity with Sophocles' *Antigone*, the prototypical tragedy of two conflicting parties who both claim to be right and who both *are* right, at least in the

Two sophiai

Against this background the great debate between Teiresias and Pentheus on the two forms of wisdom reveals its specific function. The candidly sophistic nature of some of the arguments has long attracted attention and has given rise to quite divergent interpretations, the most extravagant of which is perhaps the image of the 'rationalistic sophist' Pentheus, as portrayed by J. Roux. I prefer the view of Dodds (and others). He contends that it is precisely Teiresias who is "a man of the fifth century, an intellectual of sorts, who has read his Protagoras and his Prodicus", for, indeed, his arguments are imbued with sophistic ideas. I am not going into the details of this discussion here[282], but merely notice that my interpretation of the tragic conflict is strongly supported by this conflict between the two forms of 'wisdom'[283]. Each party claims superior wisdom and reproaches the other for using sophisms in defending his case. Teiresias' words:

interpretation initiated by Hegel and revived in recent decades. Accordingly, this tragedy has given rise to equally contradictory interpretations. After a long period of romantic praise of Antigone, some recent scholars contend that it was Creon (like Pentheus) who had the poet's sympathy (see e.g.: W. Calder III, Sophocles' Political Tragedy: Antigone, *GRBS* 9 [1968] 389 ff; D. A. Hester, Sophocles the Unphilosophical, *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971) 11 ff.). Others regard both protagonists as being wrong, a theory which no less implies a degradation of Antigone's attitude: W. Bröcker, *Der Gott des Sophokles* (Frankfurt 1971); cf. B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley-Los Angeles 1966) 62 ff; esp. 82 ff. On problems of cultural subjectivism and the use of historical background in interpretation see: G. Steiner, *Antigones* (Oxford 1984); W. Rösler, *Polis und Tragödie. Funktionsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen zu einer antiken Literaturgattung* (Konstanzer Universitätsreden 1980) and especially Oudemans and Lardinois 1987. The tragic conflict of the *Bacchae*, as I see it, is very close to what H. Rohdich, *Antigone. Beitrag zu einer Theorie des sophokleischen Helden* (Heidelberg 1980), sees as the tragic kernel of the *Antigone*: the tension between the longing for a greater "individuality" and the need for safety in the collectivism of the *polis*. However, what especially interests me is the problem analysed by J. Dalfen, Gesetz ist nicht Gesetz und fromm ist nicht fromm. Die Sprache der Personen in der Sophokleischen *Antigone*, *WS* 11 (1977) 5-26. He argues that Sophocles makes the two opponents use the same words which, however, refer to contrasting contents. His analysis of the use of the terms *nomos* and *sebein* is particularly relevant to my thesis: both parties claim to defend the *nomoi*, both accuse the other of *asebeia*. Cf. on polysemy in terms like *nomos* and *dike:* J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1973), 15 f.; Nussbaum 1986, ch. 3; Goldhill 1986, ch. 2.

[282] P. Roth, Teiresias as *Mantis* and Intellectual in Euripides' *Bacchae*, *TAPhA* 114 (1984) 59-69, convincingly argues that there was no real inconsistency in being a *mantis* and nurturing sophistic ideas. He gives the bibliography and I only refer to a few recent studies on traces of 'sophistic' linguistic theory in the *Bacchae* in general and the Teiresias episode in particular: H. Van Looy, Παρετυμολογεῖ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, in: *Zetesis. Festschrift E. de Strijcker* (Antwerp/Utrecht 1973) 345-66; Ch. Segal, Etymologies and Double Meanings in Euripides *Bacchae*, *Glotta* 60 (1982) 81-93; L. R. Kepple, The Broken Victim: Euripides *Bacchae* 969-70, *HSPh* 80 (1976) 107-9.

[283] On the meaning and context of τὸ σόφον see: C. W. Willink, Some Problems of Text and Interpretation in the Bacchae, II, *CQ* 16 (1966) 220-42; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, Euripides' Bacchae 877-881 = 897-901, *BICS* 13 (1966) 34-7; D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama, Myth, Theme and Structure* (Toronto-London 1967) 73-7; Oranje 1984, 159-66; I. Giudice Rizza, Euripides' *Bacchae* 877-81 = 897-901, *C&M* 37 (1987) 155-64.

"Only we are sane—the rest is mad" (196), constitute the most flagrant reversal of Pentheus' qualifications of the 'mad' followers of the god. The seer's *gnome*: "Our wisdom is as nothing in the eyes of deity" (200), intentionally introduces a *general* truism whose application to the new religion cannot but be rejected by his opponent. Thus, explicitly and implicitly, each party accuses the other of *asebeia*[284].

New god is old god, myth is history

Pentheus turns out to be a *theomachos*, his *hamartia* is that he mistakes a real god for a fake daimon[285]. If this were a mere act of *hybris* by a 'theatre tyrant', as has sometimes been suggested, the play would not have become one of the most fascinating tragedies of Euripides. It *is* a tragedy because Pentheus is convinced of being in the right[286] and only gradually becomes aware of his fatal mistake in the final part of the play, for the first time explicitly in 1120. On the other hand, it was imperative that the audience should be informed about the real nature of the god right from the beginning: in the very first lines Dionysos introduces himself and makes an appeal to the mythological knowledge of the public. The poet maintains this ambiguity of knowing—not knowing by continuously speculat-

[284] See on the central function of the *sophia* debate: Dodds' introduction to lines 170-369; Winnington-Ingram 1948, 88; 167-70; M. B. Arthur, The Choral Odes of the *Bacchae* of Euripides, *YClS* 22 (1972) 145-81, esp. 176-81; Vernant 1985, 51 f. "The ambiguity of the term is not based on the contrast between rationalism (or intellectualism) and irrationalism, but between self-conceit and the sageness of submitting to the power of the god": Verdenius 1988, 242, with more literature. Generally on the stichomythia in the *Bacchae*: Schwinge 1968, 339-433. E. M. Craik, Sophocles and the Sophists, *AC* 49 (1980) 247-54, shows that traces of a discussion on *sophia* versus piety already occur in Pindar, *Ol.* 9, 37/8. Of course, the idea of "wisdom in the world is a bad thing and the foolishness a good" (Celsus 1, 9) was granted a great future. See for instance Nock 1933, 204 ff., and the institutionalized fools of Syrian Christianity: L. Rydén, *Das Leben des heiligen Narren Symeon von Leontios von Neapolis* I-II (Uppsala 1963-70); J. Saward, *Perfect Fools. The Holy Fools of Christendom who have been called by God to look foolish in the eyes of the world* (1980).

[285] On *hamartia* as 'error' see: Dover 1974, 152 f. On its tragic function: J. M. Bremer, *Hamartia. Tragic Error in the Poetics of Aristotle and in Greek Tragedy* (Diss. Amsterdam 1969) and S. Saïd, *La faute tragique* (Paris 1978). I quote the conclusion of T. C. W. Stinton, *Hamartia* in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, *CQ* 25 (1975) 221-54: the term "embraces a wide range of meanings, from acts done δι' ἄγνοιαν, at one end of the scale, through acts done by an agent ἀγνοῶν διὰ πάθος, and acts done through ἀκρασία (a kind of ignorance), to wrong acts done knowingly for the sake of a greater good (μικταὶ πράξεις). What is common to all these is that the agent has some excuse for his act, ranging from complete defence (...) to various degrees of extenuating circumstances permitting a plea in mitigation". This, in my view, is the case of Pentheus.

[286] Winnington-Ingram 1948, 45: "nor should we hurriedly condemn him. He is reporting what others have told him, and this is what it was inevitable people would say", and cf. *ibid.* 58.

ing on a certain schizophrenia of the onlooker, a double view in which the γενόμενα of the myth interfere with the γιγνόμενα of the dramatic action. Pentheus thinks he knows, but the audience really knows, and every action of the protagonist that brings the γιγνόμενα of the tragic action closer to the γενόμενα of the myth stimulates the tragic tension. The poet, who, according to Nietzsche, "den Zuschauer auf die Bühne gebracht hat", cunningly exploits this conflict of two strata of knowledge in those passages which paradoxically allude to the antiquity of the 'new' religion. The paradox is already emphatically introduced in the opening words of the chorus: "For with the ever-accustomed words (τὰ νομισθέντα γὰρ αἰεί) Dionysos shall I hymn" (71-2), and the argument is elaborated upon by Teiresias: "The traditions of our fathers, from time immemorial, our possession—no argument casts them down, not even with the wisest invention of the keenest mind" (201-3), followed by Kadmos: "My son, (.....) dwell with us, not outside the accustomed ways" (θύραζε τῶν νόμων, 331).

It is remarkable how—and why—commentators have struggled with these passages. Dodds writes *ad* 200: "this language is surprising here: for in the play Dionysos is a *new* god and it is Pentheus, not Dionysos, who is entitled to appeal to tradition". In order to explain this he points out that Euripides makes Teiresias speak as a fifth century intellectual who accepts the new religion: "the glaring anachronism is a warning to the audience that the debate which follows will represent a fifth-century controversy transposed into the mythical past." In a slightly different way, Winnington-Ingram (p. 43) attributes a certain "weakness" to this passage, in view of its anachronism, yet remarks on the novelty of the god: "but this novelty Euripides is always willing to forget. For the truth is that the religion of Dionysos was never new" (p.112)[287].

[287] Kirk *ad* l. 200, is even more negative: "Tiresias' professions of conservatism are odd for one who goes on to demonstrate sophistic cleverness and rationalism at its worst. He is part hypocritical, part confused: *The traditions of our fathers* clearly do not have much bearing on strange new cults like that of Dionysos, though the Chorus, too, likes to stress the traditional affiliations of its god". Comparably: B. Gallisti, *Teiresias in den Bakchen des Euripides* (Diss. Zürich [Würzburg] 1979), 5: "Ein offener Wiedersinn aber liegt darin, dass sich der Priester gerade dort auf die Unumstösslichkeit ältester Überlieferung beruft, wo es doch gerade gilt, der Neuartigkeit eines Gottes und seines Kultes eine Lanze zu brechen". This is one of the main reasons for the divergence of interpretations of the figure of Teiresias (see survey in Gallisti) and the internal contradiction is often interpreted as a result of the comical side of Teiresias' behaviour. On this see especially: B. Seidensticker, *Palintonos Harmonia. Studien zu komischen Elementen in der griechischen Tragödie* (Göttingen 1982) 116-28. The enigma of the anachronism is perhaps best illustrated by the great variety of improbable escapes. Diller 1983, 364: "The general readiness to fulfil the demands of religion without examination, knowing that this amounts to an alliance with the stronger power, has always been a prerequisite for the pursuit of any religious cult. In this respect the new Dionysiac cult also fulfils the demands of tradition" (For the claim to immemorial antiquity in general see: Nock 1933, 53). I find this explanation as difficult to accept as the one proposed by H. Merklin, *Gott und Mensch im 'Hippolytos' und den 'Bakchen' des Euripides* (Diss. Freiburg 1964) 131 ff. A list of other desperate solutions in Verdenius 1988, 247, who himself suggests: "Tiresias argues that Dionysus, although being *a comparatively* new god (....) has the same traditional status as Demeter in so far as they represent the elementary contrast dry-most" is far to be preferred to Lefkowitz 1989, 74, who says that "Tiresias' (or Prodicus') arguments thus prove worthless" (n.b. the arguments of the advocatus Dei!). I find myself in sympathy with Gallisti's demonstration that Teiresias' arguments can be understood at two different semantic levels, the trivial level that is represented by Pentheus and a deeper one on which Teiresias operates. Tragedy required, of course, that the deeper message of the 'warner' should not reach the tragic victim.

Neither is completely satisfactory: it is *not* a fifth century *debate*, but it is certain fifth century views that are retrojected, nor can it be said that—at least according to mythology—Dionysos was *never* new. What Euripides did, and did intentionally, was to make the characters in his play voice (contradictory) opinions, sentiments and knowledge which were available in fifth century Athens, and have them interfere with the unshakeable data of myth. Incidentally, this procedure may be regarded as characteristic of the poet. Γέρασε ἀνάμεσα στὴ φωτιὰ τῆς Τροίας καὶ στὰ λατομεῖα τῆς Σικελίας ("He grew old between the fire of Troy and the quarries of Sicily"), wrote the modern Greek poet G. Seferis, and indeed, *both* components, the mythical and the actual, are intertwined throughout his oeuvre as here in the *Bacchae*[288]. The resulting conspicuous anachronism must have had an important function, which by now should be obvious. It was in fact the only possible way to grant both protagonists—and it is not by chance that it is practically impossible to decide which one is *the* protagonist—the necessary degree of credibility. Not a trace of doubt should be left concerning the true nature of the god, since otherwise the punishment would exceed the boundaries of the acceptable. Kadmos regrets the excessiveness of the god's wrath (1346 ff.) and Winnington-Ingram 1948, 26, sensibly comments: "It is hard to believe that his protest evoked no response in the hearts of the Greek audience". However, while the public knew the god's true nature, Pentheus did not. He could—and should—have made the correct inferences from the powerful miracles[289] and—ultimate paradox—he might have perceived, as the audience did, the anachronistic allusions to a myth in which he played a part himself. Naturally and fortunately he was unable to do so and thus he suffered the consequences, which made the play a tragedy.

[288] This is excellently pointed out by S. L. Schein, Mythical Illusion and Historical Reality in Euripides' *Orestes*, *WS* 9 (1975) 49-66, to whom I owe the quotation from Seferis. He also notes (p. 50): "the later a play of Euripides, the more fifth century Athens is present in it."

[289] Cf. Diller 1983, 362: "Since he is repeatedly informed of the true facts (314 ff., 683 ff.) he cannot be regarded as the victim of misinformation. Yet it could be said that his misconception results largely from his own conclusions."

Dionysiac is Metroac

There is another puzzling passage whose function, too, can now be understood better. In line 59 Dionysos calls the drums (τύμπανα) an invention of Mother Rhea (= Cybele) and himself, an invention which is elaborated upon in lines 125 ff. More poignantly still, the chorus in the parodos plainly identifies the orgiastic cult of Dionysos with that of Cybele (76-82). "It is surprising [again! H.S.V.] to find the *orgia* of Dionysos so intimately associated, if not identified with those of the Asiatic Cybele", says Dodds *ad* 78/9. His explanation, which resorts to a supposed ancient relationship in which Dionysos is "the Son of the Mother", is one of the least convincing parts of his commentary. Here, Kirk's reference (*ad* 78-82) to Euripides' tendency "to mix together, or syncretize, the ecstatic cults" should be preferred. However, there is more to it. The association is so emphatic that it can hardly be a mere poetical adornment. I believe its true function can be discovered: Cybele, as we have seen, is the goddess whose ecstatic cult raised severe suspicions and initially prevented her acceptance in Athens and who overcame the resistance by the power of her miracles. By his immediate and emphatic identification of the ecstatic cults of Cybele and Dionysos the poet obviously wishes to accentuate the ambivalence of Dionysiac religion which dominates the play. Once again the audience has received a veiled signal: Dionysos, that is the Dionysos of the *Bacchae*, belongs to the same contested, ambiguous but in the end triumphant divine category as Cybele[290].

Mystic is bacchic

Finally, following this track we may also shed some light on the vexed question concerning the mystery elements in the *Bacchae*. Above I have listed the direct and indirect references to the atmosphere of (Eleusinian) mystery, but I have so far refrained from joining in the discussion on its implications. I have also argued that we should not too rashly use the *Bacchae* as a source of accurate information on the Bacchic *orgia*. Nor does the play provide unquestionable information on Bacchic mysteries, though it is practically certain that both Bacchic *orgia* and Bacchic (mystic) *teletai* existed in the fifth century. While it is not inconceivable that Euripides incorporated references to existing Bacchic mysteries into his play, I would suggest that the emphasis on this aspect should be explained differently.

[290] This means that I do not think that Moreux' ideas on the identification of Theban Demeter and Cybele and their relation to Theban Dionysos (B. Moreux, Dèmèter et Dionysos dans la septième Isthmique de Pindare, *REG* 83 [1970] 1-14) are of any relevance to the interpretation of these passages in the *Bacchae*.

Just as in the cases of the 'anachronism' between myth and history and of the amalgamation of the Metroac and the Dionysiac ecstasy, it served to signal the ambiguity of the Dionysiac cult in the *Bacchae*. For the *telestic* terminology has two possible frames of reference which tend to intermingle and thus contribute to the tragic paradox: it may be understood as referring to the doubtful *teletai* of the type of the new gods[291]—and that is the way Pentheus chooses to take it—, or it may refer to experiences of the order of the Eleusinian mysteries, bringing real joy and happiness, as the chorus claims.

"This, then, is the folly of Pentheus and all 'superior' men, to reject the peace and freedom that Dionysian piety would bring", says Musurillo 1966, 34[292], voicing one type of wisdom, the mystic *sophia* of the Bacchants, endorsed by the audience who know that Dionysos is a great god. However, there is another *sophia*, the *sophrosune* of Pentheus who represents the equally credible and justifiable civic resistance to a new religion that shakes the pillars of society. The resulting paradox is beautifully expressed by Cook 1971, 133: "Dionysos refers everything back to Dionysos. It is destructive to face him partially, whether to welcome him in self-deceptive longing for peace, as the chorus does, or to fight him for the 'evils' of driving the women out of their homes, as Pentheus returns to Thebes to do. And yet by definition he cannot be faced wholly", and he concludes: "Euripides locks these events so that he neither fights the god nor praises him, or rather he does both, impossibly and successfully".

4. Confusing cult and sect

The *Bacchae* is the tragedy of two contrasting *sophiai*. It is also the tragedy of two contrasting *asebeiai*. The double charge against Socrates is dramatically anticipated in the two conflicting impieties of the play's protagonists: the worldly king legitimately charges the divine stranger with *asebeia* (καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων) and by this very action becomes an *asebes* under the laws of his own city (οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων)[293]. That this

[291] Besides the notions of (secret) 'initiation' or 'mysteries', the term τελετή also preserved connotations of (secret) incantation and purification, which pre-eminently evoked associations with magic, charlatans etc. "This notion of secret knowledge was the core around which the dominantly negative representation of magic formed": Gordon 1987, 63. Cf. the survey in Casadio 1983, 126 f.

[292] This important article views the theme of the choral ode 370-433 as the kernel of the whole tragedy: the ambiguity of peace and orgy as the two opposing and combined components of the Dionysiac atmosphere.

[293] In this connection it is relevant that, as Brickhouse & Smith 1989, 34, argue, these two charges are independent of one another: each requires independent support and interpretation.

is indeed the central tragic paradox of the tragedy finds additional support in our explanation of the three inconsistencies that so far formed a stumbling block to generations of interpretators. But there is a more general import as well: Euripides has succeeded in moulding the perennial tension between true piety, which demands total surrender to the god, and society which requires complete obedience to its laws and conventions, into a dazzling pasticcio of myth and topicality. On these two levels, the one of topical experiences and the one of universal tension, this amalgam must have left his audience in utter confusion. In order to understand this it will be imperative to give both their due.

Ever since Weber published his classic works on the sociology of religious groups[294] we are accustomed to draw a distinction between institutional, routinized forms of religion and charismatic 'deviant' expressions of faith. Among the first we count formal and codified types of worship, in which the matter-of-course participation is a traditional and relatively unemotional affair, which, as a rule, does not require a personal choice. Charismatic forms of religion are characterized by personal surrender, emotional involvement, an individual relationship with or affection for the god, a conscious choice, vocation or conversion[295]. Though the dichotomies of church/sect as elaborated by E. Troeltsch cannot claim to be a perfectly adequate tool for analysis in the sociology of religion, considering for instance the variety of types within each category, they can still be of service as the most convenient instruments for a rough distinction[296]. For instance, one of the most common characterizations of sects as oriented negatively to the wider society and cults as positively

[294] The most relevant to our subject: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen 1920-1), translated as *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston-Toronto 1963).

[295] Though I realize that in some respects it conflicts quite sharply with some recent studies of sectarianism, which tend to give preference to the Weberian criterion of membership over that of charisma, I still feel that there is much to say for the propositions of P. L. Berger, The Sociological Study of Sectarianism, *Social Research* 21 (1954) 467-85; Sectarianism and Religious Sociation, *American Journal of Sociology* 64 (1958) 41-4. He defines a sect as a religious grouping based on the belief that *the spirit is immediately present* and church as a religious grouping based on the belief that *the spirit is remote*. And he draws a geographical map where the sacred can be seen as the centre of a set of concentrical circles: immediately surrounding it is the sectarian circle, further out is the church circle and beyond that the world. There is a recent comprehensive discussion of all relevant issues in: Th. Robins (ed.), *Cults, Converts and Charisma. The Sociology of New Religious Movements = Current Sociology* 36.1 (1988).

[296] After the classic analysis by E. Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, in the English version: *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (New York 1931), J. M. Yinger, *Religion in the Struggle for Power* (Durham 1946) and *The Scientific Study of Religion* (London 1970) established the most accessible approach to the subject. Among other things he pointed out that the rigid distinctions as developed by Troeltsch are only the extremes of a continuum, where we find for instance 'institutionalized or established sect' somewhere midway between sect and church.

oriented[297] has by no means been falsified by the more subtle and detailed typologies of sects as established by the greatest specialist in the field B. R. Wilson[298].

Nor is there any reason for abandoning the traditional classification of classical Greek religion among the typically institutional forms of religion. Indeed, expressions of *structural* personal devotion *to a specific god*, though not completely lacking in the Greek *polis*, were practically restricted to the margins of society. Devotees, hermits, *theoleptoi*, 'sacred' slavery etc, if they can be documented at all, were the exception, as I shall demonstrate below. On the other hand, from the late fifth century onwards we do perceive *fixed groups* that convened for the specific purpose of the exclusive adoration of a particular god. But these κοινωνίαι ... θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν, intended, in the words of Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 1160 A, 19-23, for "sacrifice and social intercourse", though presenting new forms of association between men and gods, did *not* place themselves outside the world or society[299]. In this respect the various cult groups around foreign and new gods were indeed a revolutionary novel phenomenon. Accordingly, in his famous book *Conversion*, Nock 1933 had practically nothing to say on the classical period of Greek religion. No society can tolerate a massive and permanent exodus of stylites, least of all the Greek *polis* with its totalitarian claims on the citizen. Incidental acts of individual devotion were, of course, ubiquitous, as thousands of votive inscriptions illustrate, but as a rule they did not exceed the boundaries drawn by communal religion. The *polis*, in Burckhardt's phrase, was 'unentrinnbar'[300]. Anything but doctrinaire, revelatory or prophetic, Greek religion is a classic example of Weber's 'routinized' religion[301].

[297] Introduced and elaborated most emphatically by M. E. Marty, Sects and Cults, *Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sc.* 332 (1960) 125-34. It is significant that in his book of 1970 (see preceding note) Yinger selects the element "alienation from societal values" (next to inclusiveness and organization) as one of the three fundamental criteria for his typology of sects.

[298] I have consulted the following of his works: *Sects and Society* (London 1961); An Analysis of Sect Development, in: *idem* (ed.), *Patterns of Sectarianism* (London 1967) 22-45; A Typology of Sects, in: R. Robertson (ed.), *Sociology of Religion* (Harmondsworth 1969) 361-83; *Religious Sects* (London 1970); (ed.), *The Social Impact of New Religious Movements* (New York 1981, 1983[2]).

[299] See: Vernant 1989, 220 f.

[300] J. Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* (repr. Darmstadt 1956) I, 77, quoted by Finley 1982, 10 f., in a powerful evocation of the *polis*' totalitarianism. "The dissolution of a citizen's allegiance to these religious institutions was ultimately a dissolution of his allegiance to the *polis*": thus Yunis 1988, 27, in his discussion of the inclusiveness of the *polis* religion (19-28).

[301] In order to prevent a twofold misunderstanding concerning the implications of these distinctions I would stress, first, that calling a religion 'routinized' as such says nothing about the *intensity* of the sentiments and emotions involved. By way of illustration I quote from a debate on the rigidly ritualist cultures of the Zuni and Hopi Indians of Ari-

However, even an institutional religion cannot completely escape from making at least some concessions to the need for charismatic experiences. Here, the *polis* resorted to rigorously timed and regulated religious excursions, short-time vacations from worldly bonds and conventions, for instance in the form of various rituals of licence, some of which I shall discuss in *Inconsistencies* II. As we have seen, this is exactly one of the main functions of Bacchic ritual[302]. Apart from the mysteries, Bacchic religion is indeed the closest thing to charismatic experience in ancient Greek culture. Now, the most remarkable novel development in the late fifth century is that charismatic experience was sought by groups, which a) bore a strong resemblance to Dionysiac *thiasoi*, but b) threatened to evade official supervision and control, and c) threatened to change the incidental and exceptional nature of the official 'outings' into structural, continuous and more demanding ways of communication with the divine[303].

Application of a recent typology of the sect to our previous analysis of

zona and Mexico. One specialist, R. Bunzel, Introduction to Zuni Ceremonialism, *47th Annual Report. Bureau of American Ethnology* (1932) 467-544, comes to the conclusion that "there is no single bit of religious feeling equal in intensity and exaltation to the usual vision quest of the North American Indian". Another specialist, Li-An-Che, Zuni: Some Observations and Queries, *Am. Anthr.* 39 (1937) 62-76, reacts: "One naturally has this question in mind: Why should 'the spontaneous outpouring of the heart' be antithetical to 'the repetition of fixed formula'?". P. Kloos, *Door het oog van de antropoloog* (Muiderberg 1988) 49, to whom I owe these references, argues that the rigid opposition between these two view-points can be explained by their different cultural backgrounds. The Western view is programmed by antithetical and exclusive categories, whereas the Oriental (and especially the Chinese) accepts the amalgamation of contrasting ideas. Visiting Turkey in 1989 and observing the personal devotion of a Moslim peasant doing his ritual prayer in his orchard, I realized how very intense ritual may be in what many a Westerner would tend to see as the most ritualized of religions. Secondly, routinization does not exclude a living belief. Rightly, Yunis 1988, 39 says: "there are certain beliefs about the gods which at a minimum the worshipper must *necessarily* have held, if he were to believe that the ritual and accompanying prayers (....) had a religious significance". These *fundamental* beliefs are: the gods exist; the gods pay attention to the affairs of men; reciprocity between men and gods.

[302] Especially R. J. Hoffman, Ritual License and the Cult of Dionysus, *Athenaeum* 77 (1989) 91-115, but cf. my remark above p.132 n.152.

[303] "But whereas civic cult, and the imperial regime which was its parasite, tended constantly to politicize religious discourse, subordinating the gods to a theodicy of good fortune, non-traditional religions expressed their independence of that pressure by contrasting the social world against the Other World. They offered to make purity or separation the goal of the religious life; to break, at least in ritual contexts, the ties of social obligations; to ease the burden of deference; to rewrite the rules for maintaining personal honour" (Gordon 1989, 49). And even more challengingly the new cults were no longer satisfied with a fixed place (ἔγκτησις) for their sanctuary and cult, but now developed into a religion that "was 'utopian' in the strictest sense of the word, it was religion of 'nowhere', a religion of transcendence", as J. Z. Smith said about the metamorphosis of foreign cults after they had settled in Greece and Italy (*History of Religions* 11 [1971] 238, where he also says that there is a "shift [in Quaker terms] from 'birthright' to 'convinced' religion").

the contemporary reactions to these new charismatic groups will enable us to appreciate the deeply confusing effects of the *Bacchae* on the Athenian public better. B. R. Wilson[304] gives the following set of characteristics by which a sect may be typically identified: "it is a voluntary association; membership is by proof to sect authorities of some claim to personal merit—such as knowledge of doctrine, affirmation of a conversion experience, or recommendation of members in good standing; exclusiveness is emphasized, and expulsion exercised against those who contravene doctrinal, moral or organisational precepts; its self-conception is of an elect, a gathered remnant, possessing special enlightenment; personal perfection is the expected standard of aspiration, in whatever terms this is judged; it accepts, at least as an ideal, the priesthood of all believers; there is a high level of lay participation; there is opportunity for the member spontaneously to express his commitment; the sect is hostile or indifferent to the secular society and to the state". And he adds that the commitment of the sectarian is always more total and more defined than that of the member of other religious organisations and that sects have a totalitarian rather than a segmental hold over their members. Obviously, some elements of this typology particularly apply to specific Christian forms of sectarianism[305]. But it is precisely Wilson who has done much to demonstrate the applicability of his typology to non-Christian belief systems. Elsewhere he gives the following summarizing elements: voluntariness, exclusivity, merit, self-identification, elite status, expulsion, conscience (self-consciousness), legitimation (anti-clericalist and anti-worldly). Transposed to the Athenian religious scene it becomes immediately apparent that the new foreign cults can legitimately be labelled 'sects'[306]. But at the same time a second observation forces itself on us: the typology perfectly fits the retinue of the Dionysos of the *Bacchae* as well.

This means that Euripides has transformed the harmless 'charismatic'

[304] I quote a passage from his contribution in: Wilson (ed.) 1967, cited above (n.298) 23/4, and furthermore refer to his extended analysis in Wilson 1970, 22-35.

[305] Any textbook of sociology of religion has to cope with the distinction between sects and institutional forms of religion and the relationship Christian/non-Christian forms of congregation. I have drawn much profit from R. Robertson, *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion* (Oxford 1970) 113-150, and M. Hill, *A Sociology of Religion* (London 1973) 71-95, to which I refer for more subtle differentiations than I find it necessary to draw for my purpose. It is disappointing, to say the least, that Freyburger-Galland *et alii* 1986, which specifically deals with the phenomenon of sects in antiquity, refrains from discussing the problem of definition or even from providing the reader with a glimpse of the modern *status quaestionis*.

[306] It should be understood that whereas a Christian sect may vindicate the true interpretation of or more direct inspiration by God as opposed to the Church, sects in a polytheistic world may claim that their god is essentially superior to all other gods or that, though not the only deity, yet their god is more 'uniquely' god than the others. This is exactly what we shall demonstrate in the rest of the present and in the next chapter.

ritual instruments of a fully routinized religious system into the socially incompatible representation of a genuine sect, and, moreover, a sect which has the totalitarian presumptions of a new world religion[307]. In other words: he 'exposes' one of the religious pillars of society as an expression of deviant behaviour[308]. This must have provoked a twofold reaction of bewilderment. On the one hand, the tragedy casts a revolutionary different light on the intrinsically ambivalent nature of routinized Dionysiac religion. In it the barriers and distinctions between institutional and charismatic aspects of religion, so essential for the social self-preservation of the Greek *polis*, are questioned and, indeed, put to trial. The dangerous aspects of Dionysiac religion are revealed. All of a sudden the incidental and strictly regulated excursion has adopted the nature of a total, structural and permanent surrender to a very untraditional god: "Dionysos, Dionysos, not Thebes has power over me" (1037/8). It is these effects which have been rewardingly analysed in recent, especially structuralist, studies.

However, it is the other effect which is particularly important to my subject. I am referring to the inevitable consequences for the appreciation of the contemporary new cults. If the play pictures Dionysos as a new charismatic god who after initial repudiation finally proves his divine majesty, and if, consequently, his followers—true sectarians in many respects—are put in the right, why should a similar eventual justification be inconceivable in the case of the new and exotic gods of fifth century Athens? How *do* you falsify the godhood of a god, if the tragedy shows that a decent charge of *asebeia* will boomerang on the head of the accuser? How can you *know* that Kotys, Sabazios, Bendis, Isodaites do *not* belong to the same category of great and majestic gods as Dionysos except by the differences in cultic and, above all, mythical legitimation? But when it comes to this, *does* the lack of an established myth really disprove the authenticity of these gods? Had not Cybele shown recently that public opinion can be wrong? And did not the new gods bear a remarkable resemblance to Dionysos? The *Bacchae* resolutely undermined the familiar, automatic and decisive criterion of the god's venerable antiquity as opposed to the newness of the foreign daimons. It also floored other comfortable distinctions

[307] On these totalitarian claims see: J.-P. Vernant, *Ann. Collège de France* 1983/4, 493: "Dionysos ne veut pas être le patron d'une secte, d'un groupe restreint, d'une association repliée sur elle-même et confinée dans son secret. Il exige de figurer à part entière au rang des divinités de la communauté civique. Son ambition est de voir son culte, sous les divers formes qu'il peut revêtir, officiellement reconnu et unanimement pratiqué. C'est la *polis* qui doit être, comme telle, initiée."

[308] It is significant to find that many of the characteristics of sects as listed above recur in descriptions of deviant behaviour in general. See for instance the first chapter of A. K. Cohen, *Deviance and Control* (Englewood Cliffs 1977³).

like the one which is exemplarily worded by Aristotle *Rhet.* III 1405 A 20, in drawing a distinction between a *metragyrtes* and a *dadouchos*: ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον ("both have to do with god, but the one is honourable, the other ignominious"). Teiresias' references to the antiquity *and* respectability of the new god could be—as they probably were—adopted by the followers of Sabazios or Isodaites, just as they had been exploited previously in the propaganda for the Great Mother, and no mortal could ever be completely certain of their legitimacy.

A rapid comparison with a more familiar phenomenon in the history of religion may help to clarify my argument. That Jesus Christ is our Lord and Saviour is a matter of confession, not of discussion, among present-day Christians. Tradition, dogmatics, myth and ritual have resulted in self-evident confidence. But Jesus' position was a moot point indeed in the first centuries AD[309] and the source of his miraculous power was even disputed within the original Jesus-movement, as Mk 3: 19-27 illustrates. Some of his own followers feared that "he was out of his mind", and thus reflected the ambiguity of the *Bacchae*: those who criticise the marvellous deeds of the saviour—in the name of sanity calling him insane—run the risk of committing "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost"[310]. Miracles in general and the ones performed by Jesus in particular are a cherished property of the church as long as they refer to a mythic past and from that distant stronghold legitimate routinized religion, or if they are safely hedged in by official ritual and thus belong to the authorized realm of the sacred. However, a very different situation looms up as soon as miracles disturb our actual reality. Then it suddenly appears that to decide which event is a miracle and consequently carries a meaning, and which one is a mere event, is ultimately a matter of choice. J. Z. Smith[311] illuminatingly calls "ritual an exercise in the strategy of choice": "What to include? What to hear as a message? What to allow to remain as background noise? What to understand as simply 'happening'?" And he summarizes

[309] Nor did the problems just formulated escape his contemporaries: when Peter and the apostles were brought before the Jewish Council in Jerusalem, the Pharisee Gamaliel argued that these sectarians should be left alone: other deviant groups had been dispersed, so: "Refrain from these men and let them alone. For if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought. But if it be of God, you cannot overthrow it, lest perhaps you will be found even to fight against God" (θεομάχοι *Acts* 5: 38).

[310] See on this ambiguity: M. Smith 1978; Segal 1981, 349-75, esp. 366 ff. The underlying problem is that, in the words of B. R. Wilson, *Magic and the Millennium. A Sociological Study of Religious Movements of Protest among Tribal and Third World Peoples* (New York 1973) 134, "the living god, the man who claims to be a messiah, must of necessity be a thaumaturge". This applies to messianic as well as to other charismatic movements, just as it does to the movement of Dionysos, god and man on the Euripidean stage. Cf. also Aune 1980.

[311] Smith 1982, in a brilliant chapter: 'The Bare Facts of Ritual', 53-65, esp. 56.

it as an "economy of signification." In other words, a miracle is only a miracle once it has been authorized by official authorities, secular or religious, who as a rule display a professed reluctance, as Bernadette Soubirou at Lourdes and numerous other visionary founders of miracle cults have experienced[312]. This is even more true if secular and religious power is concentrated in one body or person, as was the case in the Greek *polis* (and in Pentheus). Then we may expect regulations like the one by a French king who had the following text placed in a churchyard where too many miracles were taking place and threatened to disturb order: "De par le roi défense à Dieu de faire miracles à ce lieu"[313]. Indeed, maintaining order often requires repudiating or ignoring miracles.

What applies to miracle, *mutatis mutandis* also applies to movements, groups and prophets that seek to legitimate their claim to (exclusive) religious truth by references to miraculous deeds and experiences. Nowadays the average middle of the road Christian seriously questions the Christian calibre of sects that practise ecstasy, speaking in tongues, faith healing, or other deviant forms of communication. Mr Jim Jones was the 'one and only' for the community of the People's Temple in Jonestown, Guyana, but he was 'a self-proclaimed messiah', a 'fanatic', 'a foul paranoid', 'a wrathful, lustful giant' for one *Newsweek* journalist among many. To put the founder of Christianity on a par with this and comparable dubious prophets of a new religion is sheer blasphemy to the routinized Christian. For the contemporary Roman and Jewish authorities this would have been a different matter. Incidentally, it even required the ever alert acumen of J. Z. Smith, firstly, to expose the general reluctance among scholars to regard the tragedy of Jonestown as one of many interesting events in the history of religions and, secondly, to demonstrate its astonishing similarities with the Bacchic movement as pictured by Euripides[314].

This confusion of categories, however, is exactly what Euripides presents in his *Bacchae*. It was one of the tasks of tragedy to reveal and problematize the fundamental tensions and ambiguities of human society and religion and no other tragedian staged the experiences and thoughts of his time with as much dedication as Euripides. The audience will have talked about what they had seen[315]. Euripides has made a topical issue of

[312] As an introduction to the ambiguities in (modern) reactions to miracle stories MacMullen 1984, 23-4, should be compulsory reading.

[313] I read this in a review of E. and M.-L. Keller, *Miracles in Dispute*, in: *TLS* 25-6-1970, p.692.

[314] J. Z. Smith 1982, 102-20.

[315] R. Harriott, Aristophanes' Audience and the Plays of Euripides, *BICS* 9 (1962) 1-8, convincingly argues that the existence of over a hundred quotations from Euripides and the extensive paratragedy prove that the mass audience knew, remembered and reflected on Euripides' plays.

the eternal conflict between the intransigent presumptions of a 'charismatic' god who demands the complete submission of the entire community and the socio-political reality, which cannot possibly allow this to happen. The two are irreconcilable: Dionysos has no alternative, nor has Pentheus. This is the lasting *significance* of the play. But the play also holds a more specific *meaning*, which must have entailed quite a challenge to the audience. By staging Dionysos as a foreign, new god, introduced by a foreign and doubtful prophet and worshipped by an unmistakably sectarian movement, Euripides intentionally blurred the comfortable distinctions between the solid foundations of institutional religion and the deviant sects on the margin of Athenian society.

5. Euripidean Dionysos: Hellenistic avant la lettre

There is more to it. More than any of his contemporaries Euripides adumbrated ideas, feelings and notions that did not blossom before the Hellenistic period. The poet has been portrayed as "someone who foresees only because he sees, sees clearly, unmoved by prejudice, by hopes, by fears, sees the heart of the present, the actual situation" (Knox 1985, 4). I believe that the *Bacchae* provides a hitherto unnoticed additional justification of Euripides' epithet: "Hellenistic *avant la lettre*"[316]. I shall demonstrate now that he was the first Greek author who sensed the 'existence'—and the imminent approach—of gods who cherished essentially greater ambitions than any of the traditional Greek gods and whose arrival was accompanied by a radically novel religious mentality. In my view it is these very claims which formed both the core of the doctrines of the new cults and the legitimation of their enthusiasm, deviancy and—in a sense—their 'martyrdom'. In presenting the Bacchic retinue as a charismatic group Euripides also presented Dionysos as their 'new' type of god. The choice of Dionysos, of course, was not accidental. The ambiguity of the civic, yet deviant, god was an ideal platform for staging the conflicting attitudes. However, what interests me at the moment is that Dionysos is no longer a purely classical deity but has all the features of a race of gods that we have met in our first chapter: the race of Isis. And these gods lay claim to radically different modes of adoration. This can be most conveniently substantiated through a systematic comparison of the nine Euripidean Dionysiac characteristics collected above with well-

[316] Accordingly, Euripides was easily the most popular tragedian during the Hellenistic period: W. Schmid-O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* III (Munich 1940) 823-33. On the popularity of the *Bacchae*, see: C. Schneider, *Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus* II (Munich 1967) 803-4.

known features of the religious mentality of the Hellenistic and Roman period.

1. Cosmopolitan pretensions and claims to universal worship are not typical of ancient Greek gods. It is true that classical gods, too, were frequently identified with foreign gods, as Herodotus particularly illustrates, but these early forms of syncretism were not as a rule exploited to justify claims of omnipresence or universality. Such expressions, on the other hand, as: "all mortals who live on the boundless earth, Thracians, Greeks, and Barbarians, express Your fair Name, a Name honoured among all" are highly characteristic of great Hellenistic gods, especially of Isis[317]. Above (p.121) we noted an explicit appeal to the universality of a god in the plea of the Tyrian sailors who wished to found a cult for their god Herakles Melkart.

2. "Miracle proved deity", to quote once more Nock's expression, is equally true for archaic and classical Greece and for later times[318]. Particularly the mythical epiphanies and the concomitant miracles as related in the Homeric Hymns to Apollo, Dionysos and Demeter are expressly intended to legitimate the foundation of a cult or a sanctuary[319]. For all that, Greek literature of the classical period provides only scarce examples of miracles or epiphanies that serve as evidence of a god's greatness and as an incentive to worship. Apollo's miraculous defence of his Delphic shrine against the Persians and the punishment of Glaucus who tempted him, are indeed elsewhere responded to by a creed-like *ego*-proclamation:

[317] The phrase is taken from one of the most extensive 'topographical' catalogues, viz. the first Isiac hymn of Isidorus ll.14 ff. (Totti 1985 no. 21), the most extensive being *P. Oxy* 1380. In her commentary Vanderlip 1972, *ad loc.* gives a survey of parallel expressions. For a discussion of the most concise formula: "I am the tyrant of all the land" see the first chapter of this volume. Cf. also the evidence collected by Grandjean 1975, 66-70, and Gwyn Griffiths 1975, *ad* Apul. *Metam.* 11, 2. The epithets πολυώνυμος and μυριώνυμος are so stereotypical that the latter even turns up, albeit in a very corrupted form, in a recently found '*defixio*', or rather judicial prayer from Spain: Versnel 1990. Cf. above p.50 n.32. Turcan 1989 entitles the chapter on Isis: 'Isis myrionyme ou Notre-Dame-des-Flots'. A curious reference to the universality of gods can be found in a unique dedication from Pergamum: θεοῖς τοῖς πανταχοῦ (Chr. Habicht, *Altertümer von Pergamon* VIII, 3, *Die Inschriften des Asklepieions*, no. 133, with a discussion on pp. 12 ff.). On the concept of παντοκράτωρ *vel sim.* see above p.87 and especially Grandjean 1975, 69; Pleket 1981, 171 f. Significantly, G. Capizzi, *Pantokrator: Saggio d'esegesi letterario-iconografica* (Rome 1964), observes that in practically all translations of the Bible the word *pantokrator* is translated by terms that do not so much express the absolute attribute of God's power, as, rather, his relative attribute of sustaining and governing: in German for instance not *allmächtig*, but *allwaltend*.

[318] Nock 1933, 91, a maxim which found its way into the text-books. MacMullen 1981, 96, gives a more comprehensive version: "True divinity (....) will prove itself by its wide or long-lasting impact on the human scene".

[319] Nock 1933, 23 f.; "Missionslegende": Pfister 1924, col. 288 ff.

"I know the number of the sand and the measures of the sea", but this is an exception[320]. The first traces of a *structural* advertising function of miracles can be discovered in the fourth century Epidaurian records of Asclepius' *epiphaneia*[321]. Significantly, the earliest epigraphical attestation of the term *arete* as the expression of a miraculous deed of a deity (the goddess Athena) likewise dates from the fourth century BC.[322]. On the other hand, miracles and epiphanies adduced as proof of the greatness of a god belong to the most characteristic features of the Hellenistic and Roman period[323]. We have seen above (p.40) that Isis and Sarapis were fre-

[320] Herodot. 1, 47. There is a related expression in Pindar *Pyth.* 9, 44-9: "You who know the definite end of all things .... the number of the leaves ... the number of the sands .." Cf. Nock 1933, 21 f.

[321] The term ἐπιφάνεια τοῦ Ἀσκληπίου is used by Strabo 8, 6, 15, and translated by A. D. Nock, *Gnomon* 29 (1957) 229 as: "the constant visitation to do miracles". On the double meaning of the term ἐπιφάνεια—both apparition and miracle—see: Versnel 1987. On the recording of epiphanies in general: M. Rostovtzeff, *Epiphaneia, Klio* 16 (1919) 203-6; P. Roussel, Le miracle de Zeus Panamaros, *BCH* 55 (1931) 70-116; Nock 1933, 90 ff. On the Epidaurian records: Herzog 1931. On their advertising function: Versnel 1981a, 54 ff. The god explicitly ordered that the miracle should be recorded as a reward: *ibid.* 55 and n.225. A contemporary of Euripides, the tragedian Aristarchos, is said to have written a tragedy "Asklepios" as a *charisterion* after a cure performed by the god and at his request: Suda s.v. 'Aristarchos'. *Credite posteri*, says Horace *c.* 2, 19, and makes himself the *aretalogos* of Dionysos, whom he had seen in a vision: Henrichs 1978a. Cf. also Weinreich 1909, 4 ff., and next note.

[322] *Syll.*[3] 1131, whose importance has been duly valued by Kiefer 1929, 21 f. and cf. Grandjean 1975, 1 ff. The hymn of Isyllos to Asklepios is of about the same time (*IG* IV[2], 1, 128 = Longo 1969 no. 44) ll. 59 ff. The final lines run: Ταῦτα τοι, ὦ μέγ' ἄριστε θεῶν, ἀνέθηκεν Ἴσυλλος, τιμῶν σὴν ἀρετήν, ὦναξ, ὥσπερ τὸ δίκαιον. For the earliest testimonies of ἀρετή as 'miracle' see also: Van Straten 1976a, esp. 16, and *idem* and H. W. Pleket in: Versnel 1981a, 77 and 157 respectively. A particularly complete accumulation of the elements: epiphany, ἀρετή, (being the miracle of) a 'merciful god', the wish to write down the ἀρετή, so that all who come—and particularly the powerless doctors—may *know* the power (δύναμις) of the god, can be found in a curious miracle of Amenotes (*SEG* 8, 729; Totti 1985 no. 16 [261-60 BC.]).

[323] Miracles of healing, in particular, abound (Weinreich 1909) and the great majority date from the Roman period. Like other miracles, they were widely recorded for reasons of propaganda. *Facio te apud illum deum, virtutes narro* ("I make you a god in his eyes: I tell of your virtues [= Greek *aretai*]"), says a person in the *Adelphoe* of Terence (535 f.). *Virtutisque tuae, Bacche, poeta ferar* ("I shall be the poet of your virtues"), says Propertius 17, 20, in an aretalogy for Dionysos. In *P. Oxy* 1381 (Totti 1985 no. 15) the author wishes to express his gratitude for a cure by the promise to translate the *aretai* of Imuthes-Asklepios into Greek (see for parallels: Weinreich *Aegyptus* 11 (1931) 17-22 = *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 384-9). And thus "the sacred shelves were filled with countless volumes" describing the miraculous achievements of Sarapis, according to Aelius Aristides, *Hymn to Sarapis* (II, 360 K). *P. Oxy* 1382 (Totti 1985 no. 13) gives the title of a book "The Miracle (ἀρετή) of Zeus Helios, great Sarapis, done to Syrion the Pilot". In the preceding passage a miracle is described whose final words are: "This miracle is recorded in the libraries of Mercurium. Do all of you who are present say 'There is one Zeus Sarapis'". Artemidorus 2, 44, too, knew of several books on the miracles of Sarapis. For full evidence and discussion see: Weinreich 1919, 13-8 = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 420-3; Nock 1933, 83-93; *idem* 1972 I, 327-8 and n. 107; Versnel 1981a, 53-62; MacMullen 1981, 96, with 191 notes 1 & 2, and,

quently forced to exact obedience and worship through (dream-) visions or miracles and the same is true for other gods, including the god of the Christians[324]. When the Lord wished to convince Saul of his Lordship, his apparition was undertitled with a text taken from the *Bacchae* of Euripides[325]. Likewise, the records of miraculous rescues of the apostles are curiously similar to the one of the Stranger in the *Bacchae*[326].

Although it is true that by their very nature hymns are meant to extol the qualities of a god, the praise worded by Teiresias in the *Bacchae* is actually the first instance of a *protreptic* aretalogy of the type that was to enjoy great popularity in Hellenistic propaganda, and above all in the Isis cult[327]. And, as I noted before[328], it is not by chance that Teiresias'

above all, *idem* 1984, index s.v. 'miracles'. There are perfect summaries of all this in OT and NT texts: *Jeremia* 16:21, "I will cause them to know my might and they shall know that my name is The Lord" (γνωριῶ αὐτοῖς τὴν δύναμίν μου, καὶ γνώσονται ὅτι ὄνομά μοι κύριος), or *Gospel of St John* 19:35, "And he that saw it bare record (μεμαρτύρηκεν), and his record (μαρτυρία) is true, and he knoweth that he saith true, that ye might believe (πιστεύητε)", in which W. Ameling, *ZPE* 60 (1985) 25 ff., has recognized an aretalogical motif. He was anticipated by K. Kundsin, *Charakter und Ursprung der Johanneischen Reden* (Riga 1939) espec. 291 ff. on the Isis aretalogies. For similar functions of miracles in the New Testament and other Christian writings see next note and below n.350.

[324] I refrain from citing the abundant literature on Christian miracles and their functions. Besides the titles in the preceding note, there are recent surveys in G. Theissen, *Urchristliche Wundergeschichten* (Gütersloh 1974); Kee 1983; *idem*, *Medicine, Miracle and Magic in New Testament Times* (Cambridge etc. 1986); MacMullen 1983; *idem* 1984, 22, 25 f. and notes on pp. 131-3. For a particularly instructive discussion of the protreptic function of Christian miracles see: D.-A. Koch, *Die Bedeutung der Wundererzählungen für die Christologie des Markusevangelium* (Berlin- New York 1975) 15-19. On differences between Christian and pagan interpretations: G. Fowden, Pagan Versions of the Rain Miracle of AD 172, *Historia* 36 (1987) 83-95; M.M. Sage, Eusebius and the Rain Miracle: Some Observations, *ibid.* 96-113; H. Remus, Does Terminology Distinguish Early Christian from Pagan Miracles? *JBL* 101 (1982) 531-51; *idem*, *Pagan-Christian Conflict over Miracle in the Second Century* (Philadelphia 1983).

[325] *Acts* 9: 3-9; 22: 6-11; 26: 12-16. For a bibliography on this event: E. Pfaff, *Die Bekehrung des H. Paulus in der Exegese des 20 Jhdts* (Rome 1942). There is a sound discussion of the problems and scholarly opinions in: G. Lohfink, *Paulus vor Damaskus. Arbeitsweisen der neueren Bibelwissenschaft dargestellt an den Texten* (Stuttgart 1966). On the reminiscences of Euripides' *Bacchae* see: W. Nestle, Anklänge an Euripides in der Apostelgeschichte, *Philologus* 13 (1900) 46-57; G. Rudberg, Zu den Bacchen des Euripides, *SO* 4 (1926) 29-34; J. Hackett, Echoes of the *Bacchae* of Euripides in the Acts of the Apostles? *ITQ* 23 (1956) 218-27; Weinreich 1968, 172 ff.

[326] This has been exemplarily demonstrated by Weinreich 1968, 151-79.

[327] For Hellenistic aretalogies see the first chapter of this volume. In archaic and classical antiquity there are very few traces of praises that breathe the same atmosphere, quite apart from idiomatic differences. One example is the highly enigmatic hymn to Hecate in Hesiod *Theogony* 411 ff., in which Nock 1933, 22, suspects a piece of propaganda by immigrants who introduced their goddess from her homeland—South-west Asia Minor—to Greece. Cf. West *ad loc.* and P. A. Marquardt, A Portrait of Hecate, *AJPh* 102 (1981) 243-60.

[328] See above p.167. It should be considered that these early examples of literary eulogy may have influenced the changes in religious feeling under discussion. See on the possibility that poetry influenced religious feeling: N. J. Richardson, Innovazione poetica e

aretalogy contains elements of sophistic theology, since in various respects the Hellenistic aretalogies are the final products of the very same Prodicean process.

3. *Makarismoi* as expressions of beatitude, though not restricted to the language of mystery in the archaic and classical periods, are certainly characteristic of it. Unlike the beatitudes of the mysteries, the *makarismoi* in the *Bacchae* do not allude to expectations of afterlife. The bliss they proclaim is effected by the immediate divine presence, here and now. As such this—specifically Bacchic—experience is quite unique in the classical period, whereas it is again a general feature of Hellenistic piety. The curious confessions of personal devotion and the concomitant beatitude as exemplarily expressed in the eleventh book of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*[329] have no exact parallel in classical literature, with the exception of the *Bacchae*[330]. The strong interdependence of bliss and devotion, on the one hand, and the liberating qualities of a god, on the other, has been demonstrated in our first chapter. While the relief praised in the *Bacchae* is typical of one particular god, the eulogy by Aelius Aristides (II, 331 Keil): "Nothing can be so firmly bound, neither by illness, nor by wrath or any fortune, that cannot be released by Dionysos", is echoed *passim* in the aretalogies and hymns of all saviour gods[331].

mutamenti religiosi nell' antica Grecia, *SCO* 33 (1983) 15-27. In this respect, the recent book of J. Kinneavy, *Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith* (Oxford 1988), which attempts to show that the Christian concept of πίστις has its origins in Greek rhetoric, may turn out to be of fundamental importance.

[329] See above p.91, and especially the literature in n.182 there. "We may assume, then, that neither θεοφιλής, as said of men, nor φιλάνθρωπος as a quality of a god, is an idea foreign to Greek religious feeling even in classical times. But as one passes to a later period it becomes clear that something has happened to intensify the feeling of individual dependence upon the gods, to bring about a clinging faith in the care of the gods ..." says Bonner 1937, 122 f., who offers an interesting discussion of private religiosity as it appears in Aelius Aristides *Sacred Discourses*, Philostratos *Heroikos* and Apuleius *Metamorphoses*. It is especially after reading J. S. Rusten, ΓΕΙΤΩΝ ΗΡΩΣ: Pindar's Prayer to Heracles (N.7.86-101) and Greek Popular Religion, *HSPh* 87 (1983) 289-97, who has collected the evidence for the classical period (bibliography: 290 n.7), that one realizes the fundamental shift in the 'quality of nearness' of the hero Protesilaos in the *Heroikos* (cf. Philostratos *Vita Apollon.* 4, 31: gods are to be worshipped as masters [*despotai*], the heroes as fathers).

[330] With as a good second *Ion* 130 ff., on which see: Bömer 1961 III, 47 f.; Pleket 1981, 164; 186, and the *Hippolytos*: Festugière 1954, 1-18.

[331] Significantly, the sole existing prescription to kneel before Dionysos concerns precisely Dionysos Lusios in the context of the expression quoted in the text: Aristides' fourth Sacred Discourse (*Or* 50, 435, 30 f. [K]): καὶ ἔδει τὸ γόνυ τὸ δεξιὸν κλίναντα ἱκετεύειν τε καὶ καλεῖν Λύσιον τὸν θεόν. On Lusios see also above p.139 and n.261, esp. Keyssner 1932, 110-2. Dionysos preserved his liberating qualities into late antiquity. There is a curious hymn to the 'mystic grape' in Harpocration, quoted and discussed by R. Heim, Incantamenta magica graeca latina, *Jahrb. cl. Philol.* (Suppl. 19, 1893) no. 130 p. 506: "master of the earth, (...) no physician can match you, neither in word nor in matter,

4. Hymns are praises of a god. By definition they concentrate on one particular deity and magnify his greatness. Thus they are 'henotheistic' moments in an otherwise polytheistic context. However, henotheism never developed into a structural religious, let alone cultic, phenomenon in the pre-Hellenistic period. The dogmatic elevation of one god above all others and the concomitant *affective* exclusion of other gods are features of Hellenistic and later religiosity[332]. Mythically speaking, Zeus was superior to all other gods, a position which gave rise to a unique aretalogical formula of omnipotence at the beginning of Hesiod's *Erga*[333]. However, this had no cultic consequences whatever. In classical times, outside the sphere of philosophical 'monotheism'[334], a permanent exclusive devotion to one god was confined to deviant *theoleptoi* on the margin of society, as we shall see presently. The most outstanding exception, again directly connected with the deviant nature of Bacchic religion, is the 'magnification' of Dionysos in the *Bacchae*. Although, naturally, 'great' is a common epithet of gods[335], the emphatic acclamations of the *Bacchae* are exceptional and immediately call to mind the acclamations of Hellenistic and Roman henotheistic ideology[336]. In these periods "the desire to be magnified" (*Bacchae* 209) is structurally reflected in endless 'magnifications', most emphatically documented in the curious confession inscriptions from North Eastern Lydia and the bordering area of Phrygia[337], without exception dating from the second and third centuries AD. Their frequent *exordium:* "Great is (the god) NN" is a ritualized acclamation whose spontaneous and incidental forerunners can be discovered in the *Bacchae*: "this god is...great" or "you reveal yourself as a great god". The ritual was even put into action as a propagandistic weapon in the struggle between pagans and Christians: "Great is the Artemis of the Ephesians" shouted the inhabitants of Ephesus during two full hours in a henotheistic attempt to stop an advancing monotheism. And the Christians never stopped yelling back[338]. Consequently, the faithful often underlines his inadequacy

when it comes to freeing (λύειν) those who drink thee". A revealing mosaic in the recently excavated 'house of Aeon' at New Paphos, Cyprus (4th century AD) shows the infant Dionysos on the knees of Hermes and adored by a number of gods, among whom Theogonia (!) is clearly pictured as his mother. The scene is an obvious imitation of a Christian model: Dionysos is the 'Saviour'. See: W. A. Daszewski, *Dionysos der Erlöser: Griechische Mythen im spätantiken Zypern* (Mainz 1985). Aelius Aristides, who lauded Dionysos as liberator, could also praise the same virtue in Asclepius: "this is he who guides and governs the universe, saviour of all things, guardian of the immortals (...) bringing salvation to all that is and is to be" (*Or* 42, 4), and in the same period Dio of Prusa stated that the contemplation of Phidias' statue of Zeus at Olympia could lift the burden of care even from a man tortured by sorrows and a stranger to the refreshment of untroubled sleep (*Olympic Or.* 12). On the 'spiritualisation' of the liberation from bonds in apocryphal Christian literature: Peterson 1949, 142-62.

[332] Of course, Nock 1933, is right in making a distinction between monotheistic conversion (which implies the "reorientation of the soul and the consciousness that the old was wrong and the new is right" [7]) and polytheistic "adhesion" (but cf. recently: MacMullen 1983 and 1984). However, the fact that henotheism has also been coined: "affective monotheism" implies that in the mind of the believer, for a shorter or longer period of time, one god dominates his consciousness. Expressions of genuine monotheism are extremely rare in pagan texts. Of the objectionable baker's wife in Apul. *Met.* 9, 14, it is said: "a despiser of all gods whom others did honour, one that affirmed that she had instead of our sure religion an only god by herself" (*spretis atque calcatis numinibus in vicem certae religionis mentita sacrilega praesumptione dei quem praedicaret unicum*). But it is very likely that this includes a contemptuous allusion to the Christian or Jewish belief in one god: L. Herrmann, l'Ane d'or et le christianisme, *Latomus* 12 (1953) 188-91. M. Simon, Apulée et le christianisme, in: *Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à H.-Ch. Puech* (Paris 1974) 299-305, even argues that Apuleius may have been inspired by the Pauline epistles. Cf. Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 359. For some implications of these henotheistic tendencies see the next chapter.

[333] Cf. above p.43 n.12.

[334] C. Ramnoux, Sur un monothéisme grec, *RPhL* 82 (1984) 175-98.

[335] B. Müller, *Megas Theos* (Diss. Halle 1913); M. Bissinger, *Das Adjektiv megas in der griechischen Dichtung* (1966). Specifically applied to mystery gods: B. Hemberg, *Die Kabiren* (Uppsala 1950); R. Stiglitz, *Die grossen Göttinnen Arkadiens. Der Kultname Megalai Theai und ihre Grundlagen* (Vienna 1967). Cf. also M. Marcovich, *CPh* 66 (1971) 262. Sabbatucci 1965, 197-226, even calls *megas* an 'epiteto mistico'. A complication is that there are several kinds of 'greatness'. One is implied in the words of M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Folk Religion*, 87: "The great gods became greater and more glorious, but religious feeling gave way to feelings of patriotism (....). The State gods, the great gods, thus became more remote from human beings." However, there is a different kind of greatness, which manifests itself in a superior majesty, which nonetheless admits or even invites personal contact from the side of the human believer, as it is characteristic of a certain trend in Hellenistic religion. The two aspects are for instance recognized by V. Langholf, *Die Gebete bei Euripides und die zeitliche Folge der Tragödien* (Göttingen 1971) 137: "Die Gottheit ist wichtiger—und göttlicher—geworden. In der *Iph. Aul.* und gar in den *Bacchai* ist ihr Anspruch ein absoluter", and F. Chapouthier, in: *La notion du divin* (Entretiens Hardt 1952) 224: "dans Eschyle et dans Sophocle, le dieu avait eu tendance à s'éloigner de l'humanité", whereas in Euripides "il devient un objet d'expérience religieuse; il garde le visage des dieux de la mythologie traditionnelle, mais on sait que c'est un ami." Cf. M. Orban, *Les Bacchantes*: Euripide fidèle à lui même, *LEC* 52 (1984) 217-32, esp. 225: "Dionysos ne le cède en rien aux Olympiens, mais il se distingue d'eux en ce que, dieu de bonté, il vient parmi les hommes, se mèle à eux et comprend leurs souffrances". There is a remarkable praise of Asklepios in an inscription from Athens (*IG* III 1, Add. no. 171) which perfectly illustrates this junction of elevation and familiarity. In l. 218, the god is acclaimed: μόνος εἶ σύ, μάκαρ θεῖε, σθένων, while in l. 210 he is called τὸν ἐμὸν θεόν.

[336] Cf. the variant in Menander: "how holy is Serapis?" (*P.Oxy* 1803; Cf. O. Weinreich, *Aegyptus* 11 (1931) 13 ff = *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 379-81. I shall discuss these *megas* acclamations and their congruence with *heis* acclamations in the next chapter. On their specifically Hellenistic-Roman ideology as opposed to classical ideas see: Pleket 1981, 179 f. There are some faint traces of ac(ex)clamations in the classical period. Aesch. *Agam.* 48, μέγαν ἐκ θυμοῦ κλάζοντες Ἄρη, interpreted as a 'war-cry' by Groeneboom *ad loc.*, but others prefer a different explanation: J. Bollack, *Agamemnon* I (Lille 1981) 62; Xen. *Anab.* 1, 8, 16, Ζεὺς Σωτήρ; Theophr. *Deisid.* 16, 8, Ἀθηνᾶ κρείττων ("Stossgebet": H. Herter, *Kleine Schriften* [Munich 1975] 49). Very little, indeed, and nothing really comparable.

[337] For literature see above p.65 n.89.

[338] In apocryphal Acts of Apostles the crowd generally exclaims "Great is the god of the Christians" (or "of Peter" or "of Paul"). On these and comparable Christian acclamations κύριος Ἰησοῦς and εἷς θεός, εἷς Κύριος see: *TWNT* s.v. μέγας; κύριος; V. H. Neufeld, *The Earliest Christian Confessions* (Leiden 1963) 51-68; K. Wengst, *Christologische Formen*

to describe the greatness of the god: "for it is within the reach of gods alone and not of mortals, to describe the mighty deeds of the gods" says *P.Oxy* 1381, ll. 40 f., one of many examples of this expression[339]. This again seems to be foreshadowed by Teiresias' exclamation quoted above: "I could not describe how great he will be throughout Hellas" (*Bacchae* 273/4).

5. Cultic worship is the natural privilege of a god. Terms like θεραπεύειν, of course, occur in Greek religious texts of all periods[340]. But the interpretation of such service as a personal submission or devotion to the god, even to the effect of being 'possessed' or 'enslaved' by the deity, as it is called in the *Bacchae* several times, is definitely foreign to classical religiosity[341]. In classical literature a few passages in the *Ion* come close to it, but here the protagonist *was* a temple slave, a position which may have influenced the terminology[342]. In actual cult we have the isolated and very eccentric case of the *numpholeptos* Archedemos from Thera who decorated a cave in Attica in ca. 400 BC, laid a garden for it and did everything in honour and on the instructions of the nymphs, by whom he was

und Lieder des Urchristentums (Bonn 1967) 123-36. On *pantokrator* as an acclamation: P. Smulders, "God-Father All-sovereign", *Bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie* 41 (1980) 3-15. Generally: F. Hahn, *Christologische Hoheitstitel. Ihre Geschichte im frühen Christentum* (Göttingen 1966³).

[339] Totti 1985 no. 15. See above all the opening lines of the aretalogy of Maronea and Grandjean's commentary.

[340] One may grant this to N. J. Richardson, *JHS* 103 (1983) 194, in his criticism of Pleket 1981, who on pp. 159-71 provides a full discussion of terms denoting the servants and service of a deity (and cf. H. Volkmann, Zur Theokratie im alten Griechenland, *WJA* 3 [1948] 58-78, esp. 72), but it does not affect Pleket's main argument. Just to give an idea: in the entire work of Euripides the term θεραπεύειν and cognates occur in a religious setting only in *Bacch.* 82 and 932—which, if my argument is correct, are precisely exceptions to the rule—and in *Ion* 111, which, however, just as δουλεύσω in 182, pertains to the actual practice of sacred slavery. Cf. the following notes.

[341] W. L. Westermann, The Freedmen and the Slaves of God, *PAPhS* 92 (1948) 56; K. H. Rengsdorff, δοῦλος, *TWNT* II (1935) 267. Volkmann *o.c.* (preceding note) correctly observes that the notion of theocracy is foreign to classical Greece. For all relevant evidence and a fundamental discussion I refer to Pleket 1981.

[342] Especially *Ion* 151 f.: "Oh, I would that my service to Apollo would never end...". The affinity had already been noticed by R. Reitzenstein 1927, 199 n.1. But surely Bömer 1961 III, 47/8, is right when he says: "Sein (*i.e.* Ion's) Leben ist ein Erzeugnis dichterischer Verklärung, das der Wirklichkeit des griechischen Tempelalltags und dem normalen Glauben der Menschen des 5. Jhdts nicht entspricht", which was already seen by Volkmann *o.c.* (preceding note) 73: "Zweifellos hat der Dichter seine eigenen Anschauungen in den Munde des Tempelsklaven gelegt (.....). Wenigstens sind solche Selbstweihungen zum Tempeldienst (....) für griechische Kulte der klassischen Zeit nicht nachgewiesen und auch kaum vorstellbar." Cf. Pleket 1981, 164 f. On the specific piety in the *Ion* see also: Yunis 1988, 121-38.

'seized' or 'possessed', literally and figuratively[343]. Apart from a few scraps of related evidence, classical texts are silent. On the other hand, structural symptoms of personal or collective surrender to a god, frequently in the form of sacred slavery, are rife in later periods. We have extensively discussed the phenomen in our first chapter[344]. Words containing the element *katech-/katoch-* were technical terms indicating both the monk-like submission of, for example, the devotees of Sarapis and the sovereignty of the local god holding sway over Maeonian villages[345], whose inhabitants considered themselves the slaves of the deity[346]. In the *Bacchae* (as well as elsewhere) it also means the kind of mental possession exercised by the god over his subjects, in this case Agaue. There are striking similarities as well in the imagery of carrying a burden in honour of the god coupled with the idea that the god will make this a light burden. *Bacchae* 66/7: "sweet toil...labour no labour" looks like a prefiguration of the sweet slavery proclaimed by Isis and Kurios Jesus in Apuleius and the New Testament, as quoted above p.88 f. Euripidean Dionysos, like the great Saviours of Hellenistic-Roman times, was a god who liberates man in order to enrol him into his service. Accordingly, his "yoke was easy and his burden light" (Mt. 11:30).

6. With the exception of a few isolated cases of ostentatious atheism, the most notorious of which are Diagoras of Melos and the anonymous *kakodaimonistai*[347], the refusal of worship is an unknown phenomen in the

[343] *IG* I² 784, 785, 788. Extensively discussed by N. Himmelmann-Wildschütz, *Theoleptos* (Marburg 1957), who adduces the few related texts. Cf. also: Van Straten 1976a, esp. 19 and notes 264-8; Pleket 1981, 162 f.; W. R. Connor, Seized by the Nymphs: Nympholepsy and Symbolic Expression in Classical Greece, *ClAnt* 7 (1988) 155-89.

[344] One of the first references to an ideological servile devotion to a god from a Greek-speaking area may be the fact that the father of Mausollos called himself Hekatomnos: slave of Hekate.

[345] On the terminology see especially Herrmann 1978, 415-24 and Pleket 1981, 162 f.; 177. We should not forget, however, that the verb κατέχειν is traditional in the 'unmarked' meaning of 'hold as one's own place (= to have one's domicile), province, specialty'. See: Keyssner 1932, 77 ff. It is worth noting that (dream-)commands of a deity, particularly those recorded in votive inscriptions, are, with few exceptions, all from post-classical periods. See: Nock 1972, 45 f.; Van Straten 1976a, 24 f.; Veyne 1986. As so often it is the fourth century Epidaurian inscriptions which provide the earliest instances: Pleket 1981, 158 f.

[346] Full discussion of θεράπων, θεραπεύειν etc. in religious contexts in Pleket 1981, 159 f., who shows that apart from Oriental sources these terms only occur in the Epidaurian cure inscriptions. Generally, prudence is called for since, of course, the terms may occur in quite different contexts: θεράποντες Δήμητρος denote nothing more than a *collegium* of grain merchants (L. Robert, *BCH* 101 [1977] 92 f.). For literary metaphors such as θεραπευταὶ Ἄρεως see: *Studi E. Manni* (1979-80) 1626 n. 15.

[347] Winiarczyk 1984 provides a full list of ancient atheists.

archaic and classical period. "Il n'y a pas de place, dans ce système, pour le personnage du renonçant", says Vernant[348]. Challenge of the gods as expressed in the myths of Tantalos, Niobe, Arachne and Marsyas are of a decidedly different nature and allude to the sin of *hybris* and its consequences rather than to lack of faith in the existence of the god[349]. In fact, the term 'faith' is of little avail in defining archaic and classical forms of belief, since the pantheon of the *polis* was as self-evident and unquestioned as the *polis* and her *nomoi*[350]. The refusal to believe in and, consequently,

[348] Vernant 1989, 213, speaking of the inclusive cultic world of fifth century Athens.

[349] Nestle 1936; A. Ronconi, Exitus Illustrium Virorum, *RAC* VI, 1262-4; W. H. Friedrich, Der Tod des Tyrannen, *A&A* 18 (1973) 97-129, esp. 99-103. On the nature of the transgressions of Tantalos and comparable sinners of archaic mythology see: Chr. Sourvinou-Inwood, Crime and Punishment: Tityos, Tantalos and Sisyphos in *Odyssey* 11, *BICS* 33 (1986) 37-58.

[350] This has long been recognized as one of the most characteristic distinctions between the religion of the classical *polis* and the confession creeds in Hellenistic and later periods. Although Kinneavy (*o.c.* above n.328) recently argued that the concept of *pistis* rooted in classical rhetoric, faith as a conscious choice and involving acts of conversion is, as everybody knows since Nock 1933, practically restricted to heno- and monotheistic creeds. One of its concomitants, common to classical and Hellenistic religion, is miracle. However, as we have seen time and again (see esp. above pp.190 ff.), the function of miracle gradually changed gaining ever more impetus and impact: "The result of miracle is πίστις—that is to say, those present or some of them take up an attitude of submissive reliance in the new δύναμις and its representatives" (Nock 1972 I, 185, referring to the *Bacchae* as an exceptional instance from the pre-hellenistic period). This process, of course, is particularly characteristic of the rise of Christianity. In the apocryphal *Acts of John* 41-2, the spectators of a miracle declare: "One is the God of John ... We are converted now that we have seen thy marvelous works. Have mercy on us, O God, according to thy will and save us from our great error". MacMullen 1984, 3-5, who quotes this text, rightly argues that πίστις should often be translated rather by 'trust' than by 'faith', since it often implies an instantaneous belief in a supernatural power to bestow benefits rather than doctrinal faith. Even if I appreciate some of his qualifications concerning the all too harsh theological definition of Nock (cf. also MacMullen 1983 and *idem*, Conversion: A Historian's View, *The Second Century. A Journal of Early Christian Studies* 5 [1985/6] 67-81, and the critical reactions by W. S. Babcock, MacMullen on Conversion: A Response, *ibid.* 82-9, and T. G. Elliot in *Phoenix* 40 [1986] 235-8), this does not affect my argument since the issue under investigation concerns those types of conversion and faith which do involve more radical and lasting attitudes of devotion and subjection to one god. And, after all, Greek pendants of the well-known graffiti from Rome: *Laus Isidis* and *si modo conscius non es, ita animo bono* (Cumont *CRAI* 1945, 398; *AE* 1946, 117; *SIRIS* 390, on which see esp. A. D. Nock, Graeco-Egyptian Religious Propaganda, in *idem* 1972 II, 703-11. Recent revisions of these graffiti of the S. Sabina: H. Solin and R. Volpe, in: Bianchi and Vermaseren 1982, 132 ff. and 145 ff. respectively) are unimaginable on walls of classical Athens. "No group of pagans ever called themselves 'the faithful'" (Lane Fox 1986, 31). There is a significant Epidaurian inscription (no. 3 Herzog) in which a person who mocks the ἰάματα of Asklepios is punished for his ἀπιστία by an illness which is only cured after his 'conversion'. Henceforth his name will be Apistos. This is the same terminology and ideology as we see in the confession texts of the second century AD. In *TAM* V, 1, 179b, a person is punished διὰ τὸ ἀπιστῖν. On the idea of *pistis* in the New Testament see recently: Chr. D. Marshall, *Faith as a Theme in Mark's Narrative* (Cambridge 1989).

to honour a particular god finds a unique expression in the *Bacchae*[351] and is specifically linked with the theme of the resistance to the introduction of a new god whose authenticity has still to be established. Again, as we have seen, this theme, though in evidence in classical myth and legend (cf. the introduction of the Great Mother), becomes a veritable *topos* in the legends of the expansion of Hellenistic gods and cults. Significantly, the only occurrence of the word θεομάχος in the entire New Testament, *viz. Acts* 5: 39, is precisely in the context of a 'Penthean choice': either to allow the new religion and see what happens, or to suppress it and "perhaps be found to fight against god". In a pagan context the same applies to the persecutor Tigellinus' reaction to the miraculous words and deeds of Apollonios of Tyana: "these things impressed Tigellinus as being *daimonia* and beyond human nature, and as if to prevent himself from fighting against a god he said: go free..."[352]. Just as in the *Bacchae*, those who reject the god are accused of impiety and related sins. *Videant irreligiosi, videant et errorem suum recognoscant*, says the Isis priest after Lucius' miraculous recovery in Apul. *Metam.* 11, 15[353]. The agonistic reciprocity of the recrimination is splendidly illustrated by the legend of the Christian martyr Polycarp who was pressed by the Roman governor to recant and say to his fellow Christians: "Away with the atheists!", whereupon the martyr "looked at the mob of lawless pagans (....) and cried: 'Away with the atheists!'"[354]. Again, the theme is central in the Maeonian confes-

[351] Of course, Dionysiac religion is specifically marked by resistance myths. The sequence: introduction of the new god, refusal to accept him, punishment with a plague, 'conversion' after consultation of the Delphic oracle, is exemplarily illustrated, for instance, in the story of the introduction of Dionysos' image from Eleutherae to Athens. Cf. Parke-Wormell 1956, no. 545-546. However, as Yunis 1988, 77 f. remarks, Pentheus in the *Bacchae* is the only one who resists because he *does not believe that Dionysos is a god* or, in other words, that Dionysos exists.

[352] Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* 4, 44, a *locus* which escaped Nestle 1936, 48 f. I accept his inference that Luke, like many of his contemporaries, must have been quite familiar with the works of Euripides and has consciously or unconsciously borrowed his terminology.

[353] According to W. Wittmann, *Das Isisbuch des Apuleius* (Stuttgart 1938) 79 and 85, *Met.* 11, 15, represents a "typische Missionspredigt", in which "die ganze Leidenschaft des orientalischen Missionars gegen die Ungläubigen entlädt." Cf. *P.Oxy* 1381 (Totti 1985 no. 15) ll. 204-5, after an incitement to propagate the faith in Imouthes Asclepius (following a miraculous cure) the pious are welcomed whereas conversely: "Go hence, o envious and impious". On the origin of this curse see: O. Weinreich, *Aegyptus* 11 (1931) 19 ff. = *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 386 ff., who also presents a remarkable variant *ibid.* III, 62 f. Vettius Valens 9 pr., p. 331, 12, hopes that his exposition will convince the ἀμαθεῖς καὶ θεομάχοι (quoted by Nock 1972 I, 478 n.57). Note that in an Epidaurian miracle (no. 4 Herzog) Asklepios orders an unbeliever to sacrifice a silver sow as a "testimony of her stupidity" (ὑπόμναμα τῆς ἀμαθίας). See for more interesting examples: Norden 1923, 6 ff., 134 ff.; Nock 1933, 4; 88; Gwyn Griffiths *ad* Apul. *Metam.* 11, 15.

[354] *Martyrium Polycarpi* 9.

sion inscriptions, where trespasses against gods or humans are preferably explained as tokens of deficient faith and therefore as contempt of the gods[355]. The term καταφρονεῖν used in *Bacchae* 199 (cf. 712 and 1325) is a *terminus technicus* in the fixed endings of the Phrygian confession texts: παραγγέλλω μηδένα καταφρονεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπεὶ ἔξει τὴν στήλλην ἐξενπλάριον: "I warn all mankind not to hold the god in contempt for they shall have this *stele* as an admonition"[356]. There is an exact parallel in *Bacchae* 1325-6: "If there is any man who despises deity, let him look on Pentheus' death and judge that gods exist". The notion of laughing at the god returns in a variant of these confession texts, a bronze tablet from Asia Minor which invites the goddess Meter Theôn "to track down a number of lost gold pieces and bring everything to light and punish the guilty in accordance with her power and in this way will not be made a laughing stock"[357]. Apparently, the theme of the impious unbeliever becomes only relevant when it concerns either a god who still has to conquer a place in the cult, or one whose claims are substantially higher than those of the ancient gods of the *polis*, whose cult formed an unquestioned part of *polis* tradition. In these cases the words of a Sarapis devotee apply: "for a mortal cannot contradict Lord Sarapis"[358].

7. Any attempt to match onself against a god is a fatal folly. Gods are invincible and the human rebel is doomed to get the worst of it. This is the

[355] This is foreshadowed in the Epidaurian inscriptions where Asclepius punishes those who refuse to believe in or even ridicule his miraculous healing, or otherwise despise the god: Herzog 1931 nos. 3; 4 (the aforementioned case of the woman who deemed some of the accounts of cures "improbable and impossible" and who after her own recovery was ordered to dedicate a silver pig as a fee, in memory of her stupidity); 7; 9 (a case of mockery without retaliation); 11 (penalty for curiosity); 22 (refusal to pay the reward for healing); 36; 47; 55 (as no. 22).

[356] Steinleitner 1913, nos. 22-26, 29, 30, 32. Ἐξενπλάριον and variants are so formulary that they return in different genres as well: for instance in a recently found 'judicial prayer' from Belo (Spain) to the goddess Isis: *fac tuo numini maestati exemplaria* (J. H. Bonneville, S. Dardaine and P. LeRoux, *Fouilles de Belo: Les inscriptions* [Paris 1988] discussed by Versnel 1990. I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. LeRoux for sending me the text) and in Sethianic *defixiones* from Rome (Audollent 142): *ut omnes cog[n]osc[ant] exempl[um e]or[um]*. Cf. also Steinleitner 1913, 113 n.1. Recently, two inscriptions from Saittai were published of which one has the text παρανγέλλει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ καταφρονεῖν το[ῦ θε]οῦ and the other the variant παρανγέλλω δὲ αὐτοῦ τὰς δυνάμις μή τίς ποτε κατευτελήσι, where κατευτελῶ means 'belittle': G. Petzl, Inschriften aus der Umgebung von Saittai, *ZPE* 30 (1978) 249-58, nos 1 and 2 = *TAM* V, 1, 179 a and b.

[357] Editio princeps: C. Dunant, "Sus aux voleurs!" Une tablette en bronze à inscription grecque du musée de Genève, *MH* 35 (1978) 241-4. I have discussed this text in Versnel 1990.

[358] *P.Michigan* inv. 4686. Ed. H. C. Youtie and J. G. Winter, *Pap. Mich.* 8, 511; Totti 1985 no. 49.

central message of the above mentioned myths of competition. Characteristically, this theme was not exploited for propagandistic ends in classical times. In that period it was as superfluous to substantiate the invincibility of a god as it was to explicitly profess his immortality[359]. Both features were simply inherent in the definition of deity and were only made explicit if and when it was required to contrast divine superiority with the vulnerable position of man. Conversely, the epithet ἀνίκητος, *invictus* became very popular in the Hellenistic and Roman periods[360], particularly in the competition between various henotheistic movements in imperial times: Σάραπις νικᾷ[361] is a common variant of the acclamations μέγας or εἷς Σάραπις. "We shall win" says the god to his priest in the Delian Sarapis aretalogy l.27 and a dedication, no doubt connected with this trial, was erected with the text: "The priest Apollonios and those of the *therapeutai* who contributed, to Victory"[362]. The futility of resisting a god and the divine triumph over atheists or sinners is a *topos* in the confession texts and related genres[363], where, as we have seen, the consequences of human resistance have the function of an 'admonition' or 'testimony'[364].

8. *Theomachoi* are always severely punished. The penalties inflicted upon mythical rebels such as Tantalos[365] and Sisiphos are exemplary. Both in

[359] *Athanatos* as a formulaic predicate of gods does not seem to be documented before the third century AD: L. Robert, Documents d'Asie Mineure, *BCH* 107 (1983) 583-6.

[360] The evidence in S. Weinstock, Victor and Invictus, *HTR* 50 (1957) 211-47; *idem*, *RE* VIII A2 (1958) 2485-500 and 2501-42, s.v. 'victor' and 'victoria'.

[361] Weinreich 1919, 19 ff. = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 426-8; 438-40, also on the Christian response; Peterson 1926, 152-63; Engelmann 1975, 24.

[362] *IG* XI 1, 4, 1290, Ὁ ἱερεὺς Ἀπολλώνιος καὶ οἱ συμβαλόμενοι τῶν θεραπευτῶν Νίκει. Cf. P. Roussel, *Les cultes égyptiens à Délos* (Paris-Nancy 1916) 85 f. Weinreich, *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 426 n.35, calls Nike "'Eigenschaftsgöttin' als personifizierte Siegeskraft des Sarapis". Sarapis is often represented with a Nike on coins: Drexler, *Philol. Wochenschr.* (1886) 1434.

[363] A very important related text is the well-known sacred law of a cult group round the goddess Agdistis at Philadelphia in Lydia (2nd/1st century BC). After the basic discussion by O. Weinreich, *SbHeidelberg* 1919, there is a good recent treatment by S. C. Barton and G. H. R. Horsley, A Hellenistic Cult Group and the New Testament Churches, *JbAC* 24 (1981) 7-41. In line 31 ff. we read that a man or woman who are guilty of aforementioned acts shall not enter the *oikos*: "for great are the gods set up in it, they watch over these things and will not tolerate those who transgress the ordinances" and in ll. 50 ff.: "they shall hate such people and inflict upon them great punishments."

[364] Likewise the behaviour of devotees who humiliate themselves by confessing their sins in oriental religions is a παράδειγμα and is referred to by the term παραδειγματισμός (Ptolemaios *Apotelesmata* 3, 13 = p. 154, 6-11 Boll-Boer, as quoted by Kudlien 1978, 3.

[365] He is like a brother united with Pentheus in a very original funerary curse form Phrygia: Whoever violates this grave, κρίσιν πάθοιτο Πενθέος καὶ Ταντάλου. (E. Ch. Haspels, *The Higlands of Phrygia* I, no. 41; *BE* [1972] 469).

myth and legend—but only rarely in history—we find above all blindness and madness[366], besides other kinds of illnesses and afflictions, as specific expressions of divine wrath[367]. Historically, the punishment of mortals who resist (the coming of) a god does not becomes topical until the Hellenistic and imperial periods[368]. The forerunners are discernable in some Epidaurian inscriptions[369] and we have seen examples in the resistance legends around Sarapis, especially the Delian aretalogy, in which the adversaries of the god are θεοπληγέσσιν ἐοικότας εἰδώλοισιν ("like statues struck by the god") and cannot utter a sound; in the legend of the Roman tribune who resisted the prophet of Cybele; or in the story of Saul who was (temporarily) blinded. Among numerous other examples there is a splendid case in Cassius Dio 54, 34, 5, who tells us that in 11/10

[366] For madness see for instance: Steinleitner 1913, 85, 94; L. Robert, *BE* 1963, 224; 1965, 358; 1980, 401, *idem*, *Nouvelles Inscriptions de Sardes* (Paris 1964) 25; J. Mattes, *Der Wahnsinn im griechischen Mythos und in der Dichtung bis zum Drama des fünften Jhdts* (Heidelberg 1970) 50-2; J. L. Calvo Martínez, Sobre la manía y el entusiasmo, *Emerita* 41 (1973) 157-82. Blindness: Weinreich 1909, 189 ff.; *idem*, *Studien zu Martialis* (Stuttgart 1928), 147 ff.; S. Eitrem, *SO* 8 (1929) 27 n.2; *TWNT* s.v. τυφλός; Grandjean 1975, 25 f.; *BE* 1980, 401. Cf. G. Devereux, *JHS* 93 (1973) 36 ff.; R. G. A. Buxton, Blindness and Limits: Sophokles and the Logic of Myth, *JHS* 100 (1980) 22-37. Cf. also the next note. It is not by chance that blindness and madness also signify being possessed or seized by a god: Lewis 1971, ch. 3.

[367] W. Roscher, *RhM* 53 (1898) 169-204; L. Robert, *o.c.* (preceding note) 25; W. Speyer, Fluch, *RAC*, 7 (1969) 1179 f.; 1112-4; *idem*, Gottesfeind, *RAC* 11 (1981) 996-1043, esp. 1017-9; 1025 f.; 1037-9; *idem*, Zorn der Gottheit, Vergeltung und Sühne, in: U. Mann (ed.), *Theologie und Religionswissenschaft* (Darmstadt 1973), *passim*; B. W. Vickers, *Towards Greek Tragedy* (London 1973) 252-5; L. Robert, *Hellenica* XI-XII, 439. In Christian context: E. Heck, Μὴ θεομαχεῖν *oder: Die Bestrafung des Gottesverächters. Untersuchungen zu Bekämpfung und Aneignung römischer Religio bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Lactanz* (Frankfurt 1987). The numerous oracles (Parke-Wormell 1956, *passim*) concerning personal or epidemic diseases and afflictions attributed to divine anger, generally pertain to trespasses against religious or ritual rules, and are especially concerned with purity. Cf. particularly the subtle and differentiated discussion by Parker 1983, 235-56.

[368] It is significant that Weinreich 1909, s.v. "Strafwunder", besides some well-known mythical and legendary miracles (especially the ones performed by images of heroes [cf. the famous case of Theagenes] and the instances from Epidaurus mentioned above, takes his entire evidence from Hellenistic and above all Roman times. Parker 1983 stresses the fatalistic views on illness etc. in the archaic period and for the classical period draws our attention to the complex attitudes to divine (though often amoral) and natural causation in cases of illness. In classical Greece there was nothing like the automatic connection of illness and sin that is so characteristic of Ancient Near Eastern cultures: W. von Siebenthal, *Krankheit als Folge der Sünde* (Hanover 1950). Parker, 254, concludes: "The conceptual framework for a religion of confession therefore existed. In practice, however, it made little headway against the dominant ethic of 'turning the fair side outwards'", and he contrasts this with the internalization of the conscience in the Lydo-Phrygian confession texts. Similar conceptions of divine punishment for disbelief or other sins still occur in present day Greece: R.H. and E. Blum, *The Dangerous Hour* (London 1970) 77, 84, 87, 106 f.; *idem*, *Health and Healing in Rural Greece* (Stanford 1965), index: "illnesses which doctors don't know".

[369] See above n.355 and cf. Weinreich 1909, 88.

BC a Thracian priest of Dionysos Vologaeses revolted and drove king Rhoemetalces into flight "stripping him of his forces without a battle by belief arising from the god". Accordingly, the divine triumph or punishment is called "worthy of his power or majesty" in various texts[370]. Whoever wishes to be convinced of the ubiquity of punitive miracles in Hellenistic and imperial times will find rich evidence in such sources as the collections of Maeonian confession texts and in Lactantius *De mortibus persecutorum*[371].

9. Public confession of guilt towards the god, either as a token of reverence or as an instrument of propaganda or both, is not found in our sources before the 4th century miracle records from Epidaurus[372]. In this collection there are three instances of people who confess their mistakes and subsequently are healed by the god[373]. These scattered and incidental instances are the first hesitant signs of a mentality which in its institutionalized form and with much greater rigidity became particularly typical of (though by no means restricted to) the Maeonian confession texts, who took their name from it[374]. Essentially concise aretalogies[375], and accord-

[370] νικησάντων ἡμῶν ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ (Delian Sarapis aretalogy l. 27/8). In a bronze tablet from Asia Minor (above n.357), the Mother of the Gods is requested to "punish [some unknown thieves] in a way worthy of her power" (ἀξίως τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως). Above (n.356) I already referred to a recently found Latin tablet from Belo (Spain) which asks the goddess: *fac tuo numini maestati exemplaria*. A variant can be found on a Delian lead tablet, where the Syrian gods are implored to "punish and give expression to your wondrous power" (ἐκδικήσετε καὶ ἀρετὴν γεννήσετε: Ph. Bruneau, *Recherches sur les cultes de Délos à l'époque hellénistique et à l'époque impériale* [Paris 1970] 650 ff.). A prayer of revenge asks for retaliation "that I may see your power" (ἵνα βλέπω τὴν δύναμιν: Björck 1938, p.46 no. 24); another asks "let the evildoers be pursued... Lord, quickly show them your might" (δ[εῖξον] αὐτοῖς ταχεῖαν τὴν δύναμίν σου: Björck 1938, 6); a late prayer on the wall of a monastery in Nabataea: "fight them with your power" (πολέμεσον τῇ σῇ δυνάμει: Le Bas - Waddington, *Voyage archéologique en Grèce et Asie Mineure* III [Paris 1870] 2068). I have discussed these texts in Versnel 1990, where there are more examples.

[371] See generally Weinreich 1909; Nestle 1933; A. Ronconi *o.c.* (above n.349).

[372] R. Pettazzoni, Confession of Sins and the Classics, *HThR* 30 (1937) 7 ff., mentions Menander fr. 544 K (Porphyr. *De abst.* IV, 15) on the followers of the Dea Syria as the first literary record of public confession of sins. Cf. S. Eitrem, Kultsünden und Gottesverleugner, *SMSR* 13 (1937) 244 f.; MacMullen 1981, 32. The prayer for forgiveness belongs in the same atmosphere. It is extremely rare in the classical period. The clearest instance is Glaucus' prayer to Apollo for συγγνώμη after he had challenged the god: Herod. 6, 86.

[373] They are discussed by Kudlien 1978, 1-14, esp. 5 f., who unnecessarily suggests Oriental influence here. The verb used twice ὁμολογέω (the third case has δηλόω) recurs in the peculiar judicial prayers found at Knidos (2nd or 1st century BC), which are related to the confession texts (in which terms with the element ὁμολογέω abound) as I have shown in Versnel 1990, where the reader will find all further information.

[374] I follow here the argument of Pleket 1981, 180 and n.135. On confession of sins in antiquity see the fundamental work of R. Pettazzoni, *La confessione dei peccati*, especially III, 2 (Bologna 1936). For literature on confession inscriptions see above p.65 n.89. Outside the Lydian-Phrygian inscriptions the practice of public confession is particularly

ingly, as we have seen above, frequently beginning with a *megas* acclamation, they describe the reason for the inscription: as a rule an offence against a god or human being; next the punishment by the god, mostly in the form of illness or even death; the public confession of the lapse, sometimes followed by an act of divine mercy, for instance the recovery from illness; and finally the formulary recognition of the divine majesty: καὶ ἀπὸ νῦν εὐλογῶ (''and from now on I praise the god'') or, in Phrygian texts, the formula of warning quoted above[376]. The sequence: claims of the god, disobedience by a mortal, punishment, confession of sin and recantation is exemplarily illustrated by a confession text[377] which may conclude our survey of Hellenistic-Roman features that are prefigured in the *Bacchae*:

> ''In the year 118/9 AD Trophime, daughter of Artemidoros Kikinnas, was summoned by the god to his service but she did not want to come quickly. So the god punished her and made her mad. She consulted Meter Tarsene and Apollo Tarsios and Men Artemidorou Axiottenos, who rules over Koresa, and he ordered her to set up a stele (στηλλογραφθῆναι) with the record of the god's anger (νέμεσις) and to enrol myself (*sic*) in the service of the gods.''

Here we have the *Bacchaec* in a nutshell—minus sublimity and tragic ending but not entirely destitute of its tragic flavour.

Though most of the elements analysed above can already be found sporadically in earlier periods, their amalgamation in one structural complex is specifically characteristic of a religious mentality which flourished in the Hellenistic and imperial periods in the cults of the new type of gods we encountered in the first chapter of this book. These deities manifested themselves as autocratic rulers to whom a mortal could only respond with an attitude of humble subservience or even slavery. This went hand in hand with the appearance of new forms of a more intense and personal relationship between god and man, sometimes accompanied by well nigh Christian experiences and expressions of sin, guilt, confession and mercy. In this context in particular we meet with claims that the god is 'great',

prominent in the religion of the Egyptian gods and of the Dea Syria. See for example Ovid *Ex Ponto* 1, 1, 51 ff., who states: *talia caelestes fieri praeconia gaudent ut sua quid valeant numina teste probent.* (''The gods rejoice in such heraldings that witnesses may attest their power.'').

[375] For this reason Longo 1969, 158-66, included five confession texts in his collection. The term for miracle most commonly used in these texts is δύναμις, but ἀρετή is attested as well, *e.g.* in: *TAM* V, 1, 264. Cf. Van Straten 1976a, 16; Versnel 1990, n.76.

[376] On εὐλογία as a specific expression of later religious texts: Pleket 1981, 183 ff.

[377] *TAM* V, 1, 460.

indeed greater than other gods. He is 'unique' and outshines all other deities by his greatness, as expressed in the acclamation εἷς θεός. A comparison with the complete henotheistic complex shows beyond doubt that the Dionysos of the *Bacchae* is pictured as a Hellenistic god *avant la lettre*. The truly Hellenistic poet of the fifth century has sensed the first signs of a new religious atmosphere and projected them onto the only Greek god who could bear this burden. As an 'eccentric' Dionysos possessed some of the new qualities in a rudimentary form. Pictured as the god of a new religious movement he received the idiosyncrasy of a great Hellenistic god[378]. Every feature is there. Only, however great he might be, he was not acclaimed as εἷς in the *Bacchae*. For this he had to wait, though not long. A Gurob papyrus[379] has preserved a fragment of what may have been an Orphic book. It contains an invocation of the *Kouretes* and the password: εἷς Διόνυσος[380]. The papyrus is from the third century BC, but the text itself should be attributed to the fourth century at least. So, as far as we know, Dionysos was the first god to be hailed with an acclamation that became the most characteristic identification of the great gods of later times. If, in the words of B. Knox, ''in any case, the Euripidean play is a terrifying masterpiece''[381], we have now discovered the hidden foundations of this qualification. The terrifying god of the *Bacchae* has the ambiguous nature of the deities described in our first chapter: benign despots who grant happiness to the obedient believer, while submitting him to their yoke, and cruel tyrants who crush everyone who resists them.

[378] As far as I can see, after the *Bacchae*, the earliest Greek literary text that betrays comparable, though in some respects varying, sentiments, is the utopian description of the Hyperboreans by Hecataeus of Abdera (c. 300 BC) as handed down by Aelian. *Hist. An.* 11, 1, and Diod. 2, 47. All Hyperboreans sing daily praises to Apollo. A whole city is devoted to the god and the majority of its inhabitants are professional cither players who honour the god with continuous hymns. In reward of their devotion the god pays frequent visits to his devotees. This is indeed an early *literary* image of religious *katoche* in a markedly henotheistic context.

[379] *P. Gurob* 1,23; Kern *OF* 31; R. A. Pack, *The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt* (1965²) 2464.

[380] That it is a password may be inferred from the word immediately following the acclamation: εἷς Διόνυσος σύμβολα. On these passwords and other *symbola* in Dionysiac cult see: Henrichs 1982, 156 f.

[381] B. Knox, *Word and Action. Essays on the Ancient Theater* (Baltimore-London 1979) 68.

HERMES TER UNUS

MARTIAL 5, 24: TRANSFORMATIONS OF HENOTHEISM

> L'étude approfondie des réalités doit nécessairement précéder le jugement esthétique: sans elle il n'est point d'interprétation littéraire.
>
> L. Robert

Hermes Martia saeculi voluptas,
Hermes omnibus eruditus armis,
Hermes et gladiator et magister,
Hermes turba sui tremorque ludi,
Hermes quem timet Helius sed unum,
Hermes cui cadit Advolans sed uni,
Hermes vincere nec ferire doctus,
Hermes subpositicius sibi ipse,
Hermes divitiae locariorum,
Hermes cura laborque ludiarum,
Hermes belligera superbus hasta,
Hermes aequoreo minax tridente,
Hermes casside languida timendus,
Hermes gloria Martis universi,
Hermes omnia solus et ter unus.

One glance suffices to recognize the exceptional nature of this poem within Martial's works. A similar continuous anaphora does not occur anywhere else in Martial[1]. The concluding line with its cryptic formulas is also unique. Both features unmistakably point to hymnic style and, more especially, to aretalogy. It is curious that this relation has never been pointed out in any of the well-known editions of Martial[2]. Nor is there to

[1] Naturally, anaphora is a common phenomenon in Martial. Kruuse 1941, 278, gives numerous examples. They all differ from that of 5, 24 in that the latter is maintained consistently throughout the epigram.

[2] I have consulted the following editions, translations and commentaries, which will be henceforth referred to by author's name and date: H. J. Izaac, *Martial. Épigrammes* (Paris 1930); R. Helm, *Martial. Epigramme* (Zürich 1957); F. A. Paley and W. H. Stone, *Martialis. Select Epigrams* (London 1868); J. A. Pott and F. A. Wright, *Martial. The Twelve Books of Epigrams* (London 1920); W. C. A. Ker, *Martial* (Loeb Library 1930); Stephenson, *Selected Epigrams of Martial* (London 1880); A. Berg, *Die Epigramme des M. Val. Martialis* (Stuttgart 1865); H. G. Bohn, *The Epigrams of Martial* (London 1884); L. Friedländer, *M. Valerii Martialis Epigrammaton Libri* (Leipzig 1886); all the seventeenth century editions preserved

my knowledge a separate treatment of this interesting poem[3]. In an article on the meaning of *ludia*[4], P. Piernavieja quotes the epigram and remarks: "L'épigramme a l'allure d'une sorte de ritournelle magique: il suffit de lire la base de ces phaléciens pour s'en rendre compte". That is all I was able to find in the literature on Martial. One has to turn to special studies of hymns, Hermes Trismegistos, the number three, etc. in order to find some very disparate and mostly casual remarks on Martial's poem. Nor do these remarks lead to an unequivocal interpretation; particularly the final line remains problematic. The great importance of a correct interpretation, especially of the clause *ter unus*, for the history of religions is only one of several considerations that justify a treatment of the epigram as a whole.

The poem consists of fifteen hendecasyllabi. Each line opens with the name of the celebrated gladiator Hermes, followed in each case by one of his qualities, added in apposition or in a relative clause. The first line contains a general laudatory statement, which is elaborated and specified in the twelve lines that follow. The fourteenth line rounds off this series and refers back to the opening line, after which the poem ends with a summary in the fifteenth line.

Gladiators rarely adopted names of gods. L. Robert has collected the names of gladiators in Asia Minor[5] and found that—understandably—many names of heroes occur. He does not discuss the names of gods in particular, apparently since they are so rare. Out of all the names collected, only two are those of real gods, and curiously enough these are the same ones that appear in our poem. Robert mentions one inscription with the name Helios[6] and three with the name Hermes[7]. In a later study[8] he adds one more. Moreover, the name Hermes for gladiators also occurs in

in the Leiden University Library. This leaves the astonished reader with the impression that practically every commentator copies his predecessor(s), though carefully making sure that the really good comments, preferably those by the giants of the seventeenth century, are omitted.

[3] The only exception seems to be Kleinknecht 1937, 199 ff. Following Weinreich, he recognized the hymnic character of the poem. However, his discussion is superficial and needs drastic corrections and supplements on crucial points. *Ter unus*, the climax of the poem, receives no more comment than: "Damit ist ohne Zweifel auf den Ἑρμῆς Τρισμέγιστος angespielt".

[4] Piernavieja 1972, esp. 1039.

[5] Robert 1940, 297 ff. and index.

[6] *O.c.* 298 n.5.

[7] *O.c.* nos. 67, 109, 162. On no. 67 see also L. Robert, *Hellenica* III, 124 and 140-2. This inscription, Ἑρμῆς ὁ πρὶν Φίλων, like others (e.g. *ILS* 5137), proves that the name was sometimes deliberately chosen by gladiators. On 'Spitznamen' or 'noms de guerre' of gladiators see also: H. Solin, *Arctos* 8 (1979) 165 f.; Ville 1981, 308 f.

[8] *Hellenica* V, 79 no. 316: four gladiators Ἑρμῆς, Κῦρος, Κίναιδος, Τροφόνιος. "Hermes est un nom banal..."

Italy[9]. So the name seems to have been popular among gladiators, although the reason for this choice is not immediately apparent. In spite of the fact that Hermes was the god of the *palaestra* (ἐναγώνιος)[10], he was not specifically connected with gladiators, unlike Mars, Bellona, Hercules, Nemesis, and even Minerva[11]. Could there be some apotropaeic idea involved, because Hermes was the *psychopompos* who, in the flesh, used to drag the slain gladiators from the arena, and who according to Horace *C.* 1, 10, 20, was *superis deorum gratus et imis*? Is it an allusion to the erotic functions of Hermes?[12] Or does it—more likely—refer to swiftness?[13] Many gladiators bore names containing the element 'swift': *Celer, Advolans*, etc.[14]. Robert also sees this aspect in the gladiatorial name Achilles.

However, the frequency of the name Hermes as a common name in general calls for prudence. In his study of personal names in inscriptions, H. Meyersahm[15] found 146 Greek divine names of which Hermes alone accounts for 91 and Phoibos (cf. Helios!) 36. Among 1234 divine names in Latin inscriptions, Hermes occurs 840, Mercurius 120 and Phoebus 175 times. So it is perhaps the frequency of the common name which is responsible for the relative over-representation of the name in gladiatorial contexts. Be this as it may, the main point is that Martial had a name at his disposal that was sufficiently common not to strain his principle of *parcere personis* (10, 33) and which, on the other hand, could insert a double meaning into his poem by adding its divine connotation to the formal aspects of a religious litany[16]. For it must have been obvious to every

[9] *CIL* I, 776b; XII, 5696, 32. *ILS* 5137. Commodus fought as Mercurius in gladiatorial shows.

[10] Frequently represented in gladiatorial reliefs. Cf. L. Robert, *Hellenica* III, pl. VI, 3; *Hellenica* VIII, pl. XXVII and p. 101. Cf. Athen. 561 D; H. Siska, *De Mercurio ceterisque deis ad artem gymnasticam pertinentibus* (Diss. Halle 1933); Delorme 1960, 339 f.; I. Tsirivakos, Ἑρμᾶν εὐσεβέως, ὃς ἀγῶνας ἔχει μοῖραν τ'ἀέθλων, *AAA* 5 (1972) 505-8.

[11] K. Schneider, in: *RE* Suppl. III, 779; Lafaye 1896, 1592. Nemesis was easily the most 'gladiatorial' of the gods. See recently: Papapostolou 1989, 368-78. L. Berger-Haas, in: *Gestalt und Geschichte. Festschrift K. Schefold* (Bern 1967) 76-83, connects the *gladiatores tunicati* from a mosaic at Augst with the cult of Hercules, or rather Mercurius, in that city, but this is very hypothetical.

[12] Many gladiators had erotic names: Peitheros, Numpheros, Eros, Kinaidos, Cupido, etc. Cf. Robert 1940, 301. Petron. *Cena Trim.* 52, *Hermerotis pugnas et Petraitis in poculis habeo* and Perrochat *ad loc.* For the erotic function of Hermes/Mercurius see: W. Déonna, *AC* 23 (1954) 426. Note that Antinous is the Neos Hermes *par excellence*: W. D. Lebek, *ZPE* 13 (1972) 111, with more literature. This aspect of Hermes was still known in late antiquity: Julian *Or.* 5, 179 B, calls him τὸν Ἐπαφρόδιτον Ἑρμῆν.

[13] Ἐριούνιος. Testimonies: C. M. Bowra, *JHS* 54 (1934) 68; K. Latte, *Glotta* 34 (1955) 192 ff.; W. Fauth, *Gymnasium* 69 (1962) 18 n.47. Combined with beauty: Ael. Arist. *Hier. Log.* IV, 40.

[14] Cf. Robert 1940, 300.

[15] H. Meyersahm, *Deorum nomina hominibus imposita* (Diss. Kiel 1891).

contemporary reader, as it is to us, that the epigram was an imitation of a hymn[17].

In particular, the repetition of personal and relative pronouns and of the copula is a typical feature of hymns and aretalogy[18]. Among the numerous instances we find Lucretius' celebrated proem: *Aeneadum genetrix... te dea, te fugiunt venti, te nubila caeli, ...tibi tellus summittit flores, tibi rident aequora ... volucres te, diva, tuumque significant initum....* Cicero liked to imitate this hymnic style[19] and Mart. 8, 8 proves that our poet was acquainted with it[20].

In this genre we may also expect predicates and relative clauses celebrating the qualities and great deeds of the god[21]. Excellent illustrations can be found in the hymns to Isis, which have been discussed in the first chapter of this book. A characteristic feature is the stereotyped opening Ἐγώ εἰμι, followed by a relative clause or a participle describing the wonderful qualities of the goddess, as for instance in the version transmitted by Diod. 1, 27[22]:

[16] The name Hermes should be ranged with the category of names which "are employed to add the implications of their connotation to the poem": J. M. Giegengack, *Significant Names in Martial* (Diss. Yale Univ. 1969). On names in Martial see also: Friedländer I, 21 ff.; A. Cartault in: *Mélanges Boissier* (Paris 1903) 103 ff.; E. Renn, *Die griechischen Eigennamen bei Martial* (Landshut 1889). An identification of Hermes/Mercurius with a human being (viz. Augustus) already occurs in Hor. *C.* 1, 2. Cf. W. Fauth, *Gymnasium* 69 (1962) 12 ff.; T. Oksala, *Religion und Mythologie bei Horaz* (Helsinki 1973) 89 ff. In Sparta a certain Damokrates was honoured with the title *neos Hermeias* (*IG* V, 1, 493).

[17] For my investigation into the hymnic aspects of the epigram I have made use of the following works: Norden 1923; Wünsch, art. Humnos, *RE* 9 (1916) 140 ff.; Keyssner 1932; H. Meyer, *Hymnische Stilelemente in der frühgriechischen Dichtung* (Diss. Cologne 1933); E. Pfiffner, *Die Götteranrufungen in den Werken des Aischylos, Sophocles, Euripides etc.* (Diss. Freiburg 1931); K. von Fritz, Greek Prayer, *Rev. of Rel.* 10 (1946) 5 ff.; É. des Places, La prière cultuelle dans la Grèce ancienne, *RSR* 33 (1959) 343 ff. K.-D. Dorsch, *Götterhymnen in den Chorliedern der griechischen Tragiker. Form, Inhalt, Funktion* (Diss. Münster 1983) 1-12, gives a useful survey of the existent cult hymns, their structure, and the modern literature.

[18] On aretalogy see besides the literature cited in the first chapter: Kiefer 1929 with a complete list of aretalogies on pp. 38 ff. Crusius, in: *RE* 2 (1896) 670, gives the essentials. Reitzenstein 1906, 9 ff. describes the development of the term, on which see now Grandjean 1975. Cf. also Esser 1969, 100 ff. and E. von Severus, Gebet, *RAC* 8 (1972) *passim*. Especially on repetition and anaphora: Norden 1923, 149 ff.; Festugière 1972, 249 ff.; A. D. Nock, A Traditional Form in Religious Language, *CQ* 18 (1924) 185-8. For the anaphora of οὗτος in honorific inscriptions see: Robert 1967, 206 ff.

[19] E.g. in *Tusc.* 5, 5, and —negatively—in *Catil.* I, 18. Cf. O. Weinreich, Ciceros Gebet an die Philosophie, *ARW* 21 (1922) 505 ff. = *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 5-7; cf. III, 381-94; H. Hommel, Ciceros Gebetshymnus an die Philosophie. *Tusc.* V, 5, *SbHeidelberg* 1968; Chr. Ratkowitsch, Ein 'Hymnus' in Ciceros erster Catilinaria, *WS* 15 (1981) 157-67.

[20] A possible parody also in 7, 32.

[21] A survey in Norden 1923, 166-76; 201-7.

[22] There are different formulas, for instance in the aretalogy of Andros and in the hymns of Isidorus. On the other hand, ἐγώ εἰμι is not restricted to the Isis-aretalogy. Cf.

Ἐγὼ Ἶσίς εἰμι ἡ βασίλισσα πάσης χώρας
ἡ παιδευθεῖσα ὑπὸ Ἑρμοῦ .....
ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ πρώτη καρπὸν ἀνθρώποις εὑροῦσα ...
ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ἐν τῷ ἄστρῳ τῷ ἐν τῷ κυνὶ ἐπιτελλοῦσα.

However, whereas anaphora is a regular characteristic in the style of aretalogy, the emphatic repetition of the name of the god at the beginning of the verse does not occur frequently. In older literature an example can be found in Aeschylus fr. 70 Radt:

Ζεύς ἐστιν αἰθήρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ'οὐρανός,
Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα, χὤ τι τῶνδ' ὑπέρτερον.

It seems to be related to the Orphic hymns that have been handed down by authors of late antiquity, Ps. Aristotle *Peri Kosmou* 7, p. 401 a 25 (= Kern *OF* no. 21 a) and Porphyrius *ap.* Eusebius *Praep. ev.* 3, 9, p.100a-105d (= Kern *OF* no. 165). I quote the first lines of the former:

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀργικέραυνος,
Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ'ἐκ πάντα τελεῖται.
Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος,
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη.

In fact, these were the only examples known to Weinreich of "grössere Gruppen sakraler Verse, die alle mit dem Gottesnamen beginnen"[23]. Kern already thought that this hymn to Zeus must have existed in some form or other in classical Greece, parts of it being quoted by Aeschylus, Plato and others. This supposition was recently confirmed by the discovery of the, now famous, Derveni papyrus, which contains *inter alia* lines 1, 2 and 7 of the hymn quoted[24]. Thus it has been established that longer

e.g. ἐγώ εἰμι in the magical papyrus of Paris (*PGM* IV, 2998). On this subject see Norden 1923, 177-201; Festugière 1972, 221 n.40; W. Manson *JTS* 48 (1947) 137-45; E. Schweitzer, *Ego eimi* (Diss. Göttingen 1939), and the literature mentioned above p.43 n.10.

[23] Weinreich 1916, 88. There is an ample discussion of the late hymns mentioned in the text in R. Reitzenstein, *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus aus Iran und Griechenland* (Leipzig-Berlin 1926) 69-103, with, apart from untenable Iranian theories, many useful elucidations.

[24] Parts of it were provisionally published by St. Kapsomenos, *AD* 19 (1964) 17 ff. Cf. R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 1 (1967) 21 ff. A provisional edition of the whole text was published in *ZPE* 47 (1982) 300 ff. The official publication by K. Tsantsanoglou and G. M. Parassoglou is eagerly awaited. West 1983 provides a discussion and a reconstruction on p. 114. Cf. also W. Burkert, Orpheus und die Vorsokratiker. Bemerkungen zum Derveni Papyrus und zur pythagoreischen Zahlenlehre, *A&A* 13 (1967) 93-114; M. Henry, The Derveni Commentator as Literary Critic, *TAPhA* 116 (1986) 119-47.

hymns of this type must indeed have existed in the classical period of Greece. This is important for our views on Martial's epigram since it is very close to this hymn both in form and in content.

The anaphoric figure did not reach perfection and popularity until late antiquity, especially in Christian hymnody[25]. In pagan literature I know of only one other example of a long anaphoric invocation in a hymn[26]. It is the hymn to Sol in *AL* 389[27], the concluding verses of which are:

Sol cui sereno pallescunt sidera motu,
Sol cui tranquillo resplendet lumine pontus,
Sol cui cuncta licet rapido lustrare calore,
Sol cui surgenti resonat levis unda canorem,
Sol cui mergenti servat maris unda teporem,
Sol mundi caelique decus, Sol omnibus idem,
Sol noctis lucisque decus, Sol finis et ortus.

It is this striking parallel that makes it undeniably clear that the poem on Hermes is intended as a parody of hymns[28]. As I said before, this character has already been discerned outside the study of Martial. In this connection E. Peterson speaks of 'Prädikationen im Hymnenstil' in his famous book on εἷς θεός formulas, but he controverts the view of Reitzenstein, who thought that Martial's epigram mocked "eine Heilsbotschaft, die in dem Bekenntnis zu Hermes als dem dreieinigen Weltgott gipfelt"[29]. According to Peterson, the poem belongs to the genre of aretalogical hymns, and not to that of confessions of faith. At this point we do not need to concern ourselves with this distinction—if, indeed, it

[25] See Weinreich 1916, 60; H. Engberding, Die Kunstprosa des eucharistischen Hochgebets, in: *Mullus. Festschrift Th. Klauser. JbAC* Ergänz.bd. 1 (1964) 100-10; A. Gerhards, *Die griechische Gregorius-anaphora. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Eucharistischen Hochgebets* (Münster 1984).

[26] Instances of anadiplosis of the type Ἄρες, Ἄρες βροτολοιγέ are a different phenomenon, though in the end perhaps stemming from the same root. See: E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro. Aeneis Buch VI* (Stuttgart 1957⁴) 136 f. and O. Weinreich, Trigemination als sakrale Stilform, *SMSR* 4 (1928) 198-206 = *Ausgewählte Schriften* II, 250-57. More examples of gemination and trigemination in a sacral context: Fehling 1969, 169-71, though he has no examples of a multiple anaphora of names of gods. Nor are they to be found in K. Schinkel, *Die Wortwiederholung bei Aischylos* (Diss. Tübingen 1973); P. Avezzù, Per una recerca sull' uso di ripetizioni nei tragici, *BIFG* 1 (1974) 54-67; J. Veremans, L'anaphore dans l'oeuvre de Tibulle, *AC* 50 (1981) 774-800; F. Skoda, *Le redoublement expressif: un universal linguistique. Analyse du procédé en grec ancien et en d'autres langues* (Paris 1982).

[27] Cf. Weinreich 1916, 88; Norden 1923, 174; Kleinknecht 1937, 200. Cf. also the anaphora of *Carthago* in *AL* 376 and of *Corsica*, *ibid.* 236.

[28] The aretalogical genre lends itself very well to parody: Horace *Sat.* 1, 8; Iuven. *Sat.* 15, with Reitzenstein 1906, 25 ff. On aretalogical themes in Lucian and Petronius see: Kiefer 1929, 41 ff.; Esser 1969, 221 n.29.

[29] Peterson 1929, 171 n.29; Reitzenstein 1927, 27.

is a distinction at all. Reitzenstein's statement implies the central problem: are there, besides the obvious formal characteristics, also thematic connections with religious hymns?

It is easily understood that the last line in particular, in combination with the name of Hermes, has prompted scholars to think in a certain direction. Reitzenstein[30] already argued that the whole poem would be senseless if Martial and the majority of his readers had not heard of a doctrine according to which the god is 'one and all', which is exactly the keynote of Hermetic mysticism. According to Reitzenstein, *ter unus* indicates that Martial was not improvising on a more general theme, such as that represented in the acclamation *Te tibi una quae es omnia dea Isis*[31]. The words express much more than just a reference to Hermes Trismegistos: "Sie stehen in gewolltem Gegensatz zu *omnia solus* und setzen eine Theologie voraus, nach welcher derselbe Gott in drei verschiedenen Gestalten der Eine, das All Erfüllende ist". Reitzenstein seems to have developed this idea independently of Usener, who had already observed[32]: "der allein alles ist, konnte nicht gleichzeitig 'dreifach einer' heissen, wenn es nicht üblich war in drei Göttern die Summe des göttlichen Wesens umfasst zu sehen". Thus both scholars detect traces of trinitarianism in the formula. As far as I have been able to ascertain, this view does not appear to have been shared by later scholars. Norden compares the formula *Hermes omnia solus* to the invocation of Isis just quoted and calls them 'hellenistische Bekenntnisformel'. Kleinknecht and Festugière suggest that *ter unus* is no more than a pun on τρισμέγιστος, and *omnia solus* is said to refer to 'le dieu Un et Tout'[33]. The French scholar does not refer to the remarks of Usener and Reitzenstein. Usener's general views on ancient pagan ideas on trinity and their transition to Christian trinitarian theology met with stern opposition. It is within the framework of this criticism that R. Mehrlein[34] remarks in passing that the final line of the epigram on Hermes should not be advanced as a proof of trinitarian ideas, for this verse "bedarf wohl noch einer Klärung und bleibt deshalb hier besser ausser Betracht". My remarks are intended to contribute to such a clarification. The problem is not without importance, considering the fact that on the basis of the idea of trinity supposed to be contained in *ter*

[30] Reitzenstein 1906, 126 f.; *idem*, *GGA* (1911) 550.

[31] *CIL* X, 3800; *ILS* 4362; *SIRIS* 502. Cf. also the discussion in V. Tran Tam Tinh, *Le culte des divinités orientaux en Campanie* (Leiden 1972) 41 ff.; 77; 199-234.

[32] Usener 1966, 36.

[33] Norden 1923, 246; Kleinknecht 1937, 201; Festugière 1944 I, 74. In his *RE* article 'Hymnos', R. Wünsch had already pointed out the hymnic character of our epigram. Nock 1964, 34 n.2: "μόνος of Hermes is parodied by Martial V, 24". For previous remarks by Letronne and Preisendanz *vide infra*.

[34] Mehrlein 1959, 281.

unus, Reitzenstein wanted to have the poem included in all histories of Christian dogma. However, we can only hope for an explanation after having thoroughly examined the entire poem for its religious overtone. For this purpose I shall start with the formula *solus omnia* in the last line, since it puts us on the religious track; I shall then discuss the whole poem and end with *ter unus*.

1. Analysis of the poem

omnia solus

The parallel from the theology of Isis quoted above proves that the idea of *solus omnia* was clearly not the exclusive fruit of Hermetic speculations. *Solus*/μόνος (without *omnia*/πάντα) is an authentic element of aretalogical hymns and prayers[35]. It is true that the polarity of *solus*/*omnia* is a very ancient idea, but originally it remained confined to Orphic-Eleatic circles[36]. It also occurs in the Orphic Zeus hymn of the Derveni papyrus, col. XII. Xenophanes' *unum esse omnia*, as handed down by Cicero *Acad.* 2, 118, did not become common until the Hellenistic period, undoubtedly through the intermediary of the Stoa. Seneca *Nat. Quaest.* 1 praef. 13 gives a good summary: *Quid est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo illi una redditur qua nihil maius cogitari potest, si solus est omnia.* Thus, when we eventually find this idea in Gnostic circles, in magical texts[37], in the aretalogy of Isis[38], in praises of Sarapis[39], in Orphic hymns[40], and even in Christian[41] texts, it need not surprise us that it con-

[35] Norden 1923, index s.v.; Nock 1964, 34 n.2, and literature cited there; Keyssner 1932, 38 f. gives numerous examples.

[36] Norden 1923, 246 ff.; Reitzenstein 1927, 27 f. Cf. in general W. Pötscher, *Strukturprobleme der aristotelischen und theophrastischen Gottesvorstellung* (Leiden 1970).

[37] For instance, the hymn to Selene, *PGM* IV, 2786-2870. See Norden 1923, 246 ff.

[38] For instance in the hymn of Isidorus 1, 23, ὅτι μούνη εἶ σὺ ἅπασαι αἱ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀνομαζόμεναι θεαὶ ἄλλαι. The μούνη-formula has an Egyptian component in this case; it is the translation of the Egyptian Thiouis, a name of Isis, which means 'the one'. That is why the hymn in *P.*Oxy 1380, l. 6 calls her τὴν μίαν, and Apul. *Metam.* 11, 4 speaks of her *nomen unicum*. Cf. Vanderlip 1972, 31; Grandjean 1975, 70 f.; Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 145. On the general diffusion of this expression among Egyptian and Near Eastern civilizations: C. H. Gordon, His Name is 'One', *JNES* 29 (1970) 198 ff. However, compare also the aretalogical formula which, according to Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 9 (354C), was inscribed on the statue of Isis at Saïs: ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὂν καὶ ἐσόμενον, on which see: Gwyn Griffiths in his commentary *ad.loc.*

[39] Ael. Arist. *Or.* XLV, p. 352 ff. K, πάντα αὐτὸς εἷς ὤν, on which see: A. Höfler, *Der Serapishymnus des Aelius Aristides* (Stuttgart-Berlin 1935) 80; 85.

[40] For instance, the hymn to Physis (10, 28): πάντα σὺ ἔσσι· τὰ πάντα σὺ γὰρ μούνη τάδε τεύχεις.

[41] Reitzenstein 1904, 39 n.1, points out the Hellenistic origin of similar ideas in St. Paul, 1 *Cor.* 8: 6 and *Col.* 1: 16. See also P. Courcelle, Ambroise de Milan dévot de la monade, *REG* 87 (1974) 144-54.

siderably influenced the Hermetica too[42]. In *CH* 12, 8, it is said that ἕν ἐστι τὰ πάντα, a formula which recurs in various forms in many places, for no doubt it was pre-eminently the Hermetic doctrine that delighted in such speculations. We often see expressions that are practically identical with the formula of our hymn to Hermes: *Ascl.* 2, *omnia unum esse et unum omnia*[43]; *ibid.* 20, *hic ergo solus ut omnia*; *ibid.* 30, *in eo sunt omnia et in omnibus ipse est solus*; *ibid.* 29, *is qui solus est omnia.*

We have now sufficiently traced the religious component. Two remarks should be added:

1. The *solus* formula occurs already earlier in Latin literature (cf. Lucretius 1, 21), as does the idea of *unus omnia.* Augustinus, *CD* 7, 9, preserves a fragment of Valerius Soranus quoted by Varro[44]:

> Iuppiter omnipotens regum rerumque deumque
> Progenitor genetrixque deum, deus unus et omnes.

2. Outside the religious sphere, too, such formulas occur, especially in the language of love and adoration. Persons on whom one sets all one's hopes or towards whom one directs all one's affection are *(unus) omnia*[45]: Lucan. 3, 108, *omnia Caesar erat*; Liv. 40, 11, 3, *Demetrius iis unus omnia est*; Liv. 1, 54, 5, *ut omnia unus Gabiis posset*[46]. Evidently it is a current phrase, which has its distant precursors in Greek. When it is said in *Cena Trimalchionis* 37: *et Trimalchionis topanta est*, the phrase *topanta* is a slang expression for the Greek τὰ πάντα, of which Herodotus 1, 122 is the earliest example[47]. As far as the hyperbolical expression of feelings of dependence is concerned, the languages of love and religious adoration are fused, as we saw in the first chapter (p.91 f.). They coalesce in the acclamations to emperors such as *Antoninum habemus, omnia habemus* (*SHA*, *Vita Diadum.* 1), or *unus mihi omnia Gratianus* (Auson. *Grat. Act.* 3, 13)[48].

Thus we see that the material for the formula *omnia solus* had long been available, not only in Hellenistic texts but also in Latin literature. The reader must immediately have recognized the formula, and it cannot have struck him as something special or strange. Furthermore, we have seen that the formula functioned in two spheres, the human and the divine. Both these findings are of direct importance for the ultimate interpretation of the epigram.

As for Reitzenstein's far-reaching conclusions with regard to the Hermetic doctrine, it may at this point be remarked that neither the anaphora[49] nor the *solus omnia* formula are specific to the Hermetic hymns[50]. It is still possible that Martial constructed his parody from elements furnished by aretalogies in general and possibly the aretalogies of Isis in particular, since these—in contradistinction to Hermetic literature—were carved in stone, were spread far and wide and consequently open to general consultation. The supposition of the existence of Hermetic conventicles known to Martial[51], or the assumption that Martial had a profound knowledge of Hermetism thus depends completely on the interpretation of *ter unus*.

Before discussing this formula we shall first consider the poem in its entirety. Weinreich noticed that when we exclude the final verse, which is clearly distinct from the preceding ones, the poem consists of fourteen lines[52]; and he concluded from a number of parallels that it was 'sakral

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[42] The evidence in: Nock-Festugière 1972 I, 68 n.29 and 33. Cf. II, 234 n.8: "τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ πᾶν, ces deux formules désignent Dieu dans l'hymnodia". The idea has been extensively discussed by Festugière 1946 II, 55-71 and *passim*. Cf. further *ibid.* 1954 IV, 18-51.

[43] Other examples in Nock-Festugière II, *ad loc.*

[44] On these verses: J. Préaux, L'hymne à Iupiter de Valerius de Sora, in: *Hommages à Marie Delcourt* (Bruxelles 1970) 182 ff. Comparable examples: Norden 1923, 246 n.5. Esp. Tiberianus (*PLM* III, 267 f.) line 7: *tu solus, tu multus item* and 21, *tu genus omne deum, tu rerum causa vigorque.* On androgynous formulas cf. Weinreich 1916, 63 f.; 89 n.1. In later theological systems: Nock-Festugière 1944 I, 20 n.24 and 22 n.43. Cf. Varro *ap.* Augustin. *CD* 4, 11 (fr. 15 b Aghad): *omnes dei deaeque sit unus Iuppiter* and the prayer in Firm. Matern. *Math.* discussed by F. Skutsch *ARW* 13 (1910) 291 ff.: *Tu omnium pater pariter ac mater, tu tibi pater ac filius uno vinculo necessitudinis obligatus.*

[45] The following examples are partly borrowed from Marx *ad* Lucil. 613 (II, 228).

[46] Cf. Mart. 3, 26 *omnia solus habes*; Ovid. *Her.* 12, 161, *deseror coniuge, qui nobis omnia solus erat.*

[47] Mr. Mason reminds me of an interesting place in a tragic fragment (D. L. Page, *Select Papyri* III [London 1950] 140). Achilles says: "Comrades in arms are saying that I alone (εἷς ὤν) have made this mighty rout: so am I not all in all (τὰ πάντα) to the Greek army?" Arguments have been put forward to ascribe this fragment to the *Myrmidons* of Aeschylus, in which case this might be the earliest instance of εἷς καὶ πάντα as a predicate of a human being in Greek literature. However, as Page argues, the ascription is far from certain, though Radt has accepted it in his *TGF* III, 132c as genuinely Aeschylean.

[48] In these acclamations we sometimes find explanations of what is actually intended. For instance: *SHA* Vita Probi 11, 9: *tu Francicus, tu Gothicus, tu Sarmaticus, tu Parthicus, tu omnia*; Cod. Theod. *Gesta sen.* 5, p. 21. 43: *Bono generis humani, bono senatus, bono rei publicae, bono omnium*; *ibid.* p. 311: *per vos honores, per vos patrimonia, per vos omnia.* See: H. U. Instinsky, Kaiser und Ewigkeit, *Hermes* 77 (1942) 350 n.1. This, too, was foreshadowed in Hellenistic times. The people of Thessaly and Thebes φίλον, εὐεργέτην, σωτῆρα τὸν Φίλιππον ἡγοῦντο· πάντ' ἐκεῖνος ἦν αὐτοῖς ..... See P. Wendland, *ZNTW* 5 (1904) 338.

[49] Anaphora also occurs in *CH*, e.g. *CH* I, 31; V, 10-11; XIII, 16-20; *Ascl.* 41. Cf. Festugière 1954 IV, 204 n.1. On the Hermetic style of prayer cf. Reitzenstein 1904, 15-30; *idem*, *GGN* (1910) 324-9. Especially on the hymns of *CH* XIII: G. Zuntz, *Opuscula Selecta* (Manchester 1972); Nock 1972, I, 194 n.110. H. Windisch, *Theol. Tijdschr.* 52 (1918) 194, recognized Old Testament influence here, particularly in the anaphora of ἅγιος in *CH* I, 31.

[50] J. Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos* (Münster 1914) 50, considers Martial's *omnia solus* to represent a general religious formula, and not one borrowed from Hermetism. *Contra*: Festugière.

[51] Thus R. Reitzenstein, Göttin Psyche, *SbHeidelberg* (1917) 10; 50. Cf. P. Valette, *L'apologie d'Apulée* (Paris 1908) 318. Contested by Preisendanz, *vide infra.*

[52] Weinreich 1916, 89. On the exceptional significance of the number 7 or its multiples cf. Dieterich 1891, 47.

komponiert'. A consideration of the content of the verses demonstrates that the ambiguity we already found in *solus omnia* is maintained throughout the poem: the text may be read simultaneously as both a (comical) panegyric on a gladiator and a (parody of a) hymn to a god.

1. *Hermes Martia saeculi voluptas*

The first verse contains a general eulogy which links the god with a fellow god, Mars, thus determining his nature. Although there is no genealogical relationship here[53], we may point out the general tendency to start an aretalogy with an all-embracing formula of power plus a genealogical or typological characterization. The stereotyped scheme of a hymn or an aretalogy is[54]:

1. a description of the god's nature, often combined with a localization of his cult and/or a genealogy,
2. a description of his δύναμις with mention of his superior power[55],
3. an elaboration in a series of ἀρεταί, ἔργα or εὑρήματα,
4. a conclusion with a greeting or prayer, which may, however, be lacking.

A good example is the aretalogy of Isis of Kyme, discussed in the first chapter of this book (further quoted as K), or the hymn to Harpokrates from Chalkis which begins: Καρποκράτης εἰμι ἐγώ, Σαράπιδος καὶ Ἴσιδος υἱός, Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης καὶ Διονύσου καὶ Ἰάκχου Ὕπνου καὶ Ἠχοῦς ἀδελφός. Πᾶς καιρός εἰμι ἐγώ ....

Already in the first line of our epigram we are in difficulties. In which sphere are we: the divine or the human? The term *voluptas* and its connotations have firm roots in both. It at once calls to mind that other *hominum divumque voluptas*, where the ambivalence is expressed in an exemplary way. Martial is known for his subtle references to earlier poets, his suggestive allusions to and imitations of Catullus, Propertius, Vergil and Ovid.

[53] Naturally, *Martia voluptas* refers to the specific activities of the gladiator Hermes, just as Greek inscriptions speak of Ἄρεως ἄθλα, Ἄρεως νεῖκαι as references to gladiatorial shows. Cf. L. Robert, *Hellenica* III, 131 n.6, who rightly objects to Izaac's translation: ''délices du siècle pour les fils du Mars''. Cf. *ILS* 5150, an inscription of a *tibicen*: *Martios accentu stimulans gladiantes in arma vocavi*.

[54] Cf. Norden 1923, 168 ff. In his analysis of the Isis hymns, Festugière 1972, 150 ff. also distinguishes: 'prooimion' with 'nature de la divinité; caractéristiques essentielles'; further: 'généalogie, culte'; next: a declaration concerning 'omnipotence et inventions'. He points out that theorists like Quintilian, Alexander and Menander also mention the following essential elements of hymns: 1. φύσις and γένος, 2. δύναμις, 3. ἔργα or εὑρήματα. Here, too, the salutation and the object of prayer are lacking.

[55] On the formula of omnipotence in hymns to Isis see above p.43 f.; Bergman 1968, 170 f; 174; Festugière 1972, 150 ff., and in general Keyssner 1932, 31; 45f.; F. Cumont, *CRAI* (1931) 243 f.

The pointed placing of the word in the first line shows that the resemblance to Lucretius can hardly be accidental[56]. We shall see that in Martial's poem Hermes too is *hominum divumque voluptas*. The term can then be seen as a programmatic direction for the interpretation of the poem. And besides, *voluptas* has a remarkable origin in hymnic poetry. Norden[57] has pointed out that in Lucretius it was the translation of the Greek ἄγαλμα or γάνος (also applicable both to gods and men), ''was die Lateiner sonst mit *decus* übersetzen'', and which in Lucretius is rendered by *voluptas* in order to suggest an Epicurean atmosphere[58]. Norden mentions a few places where *decus* occurs in a hymn-like exhortation (Hor. *C.* 1, 1, 2; 1, 32, 3; 2, 17, 4; *Carm. Saec.* 2). Many more might be added[59], for instance Firm. Mat. *Math*, Proem. 1, *Mavorti, decus nostrum*. In the hymn to the sun of which I quoted the final lines, *decus* occurs twice in the last two lines. In Martial himself we find 7, 74 (*Mercurius) Cyllenes caelique decus*. I mention this because the connection of this *decus* with a conception like *saeculum* is not rare. In the religious domain we find an exact parallel in a magical papyrus (*PGM* V, 155), χάρις τοῦ Αἰῶνος[60], said of the sun. We shall not occupy ourselves with the problems connected with the identity of this Αἰών, nor with his relations with Isis, the sun or Hermetism, all the more so because, as Latin parallels prove, *saeculum* in our epigram means 'era' or 'generation'[61]. A good parallel is *saecli decus* ..... *nostri* in Ovid *Ex Ponto* 2, 8, 25, denoting the emperor as a *god*, whose image is in front of the poet. It is used for a human being in Seneca *Suasor.* 6, 26, where he quotes a verse of Cornelius Severus on Cicero's death: *Abstulit una dies aevi decus*. In this function *decus* occurs very frequently in Martial,

[56] It is imitated by Statius *Theb.* 3, 295.

[57] Norden 1923, 172.

[58] Cf. Bailey *ad* Lucretius 1, 1. Of course, *voluptas* may also represent other Greek terms, as is illustrated by a gloss of an Oxyrhynchus papyrus discussed by L. Robert, *Hellenica* XI, 1 ff., esp. 8 n.4: *voluptas*: ἡδονή, ἀπάτη, ἀκολασία, τρυφή. M. Marcovich, Two Mosaics from Hagios Taxiarches, *ZPE* 20 (1976) 44, made a good guess in identifying ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ in a fifth century Mosaic near Argos with the Goddess Voluptas, the more so since an inscription from Ephesos (D. Knibbe, Neue Inschriften aus Ephesos, *JÖAI* 49 Beiblatt 1968-71 [1974] no 3 p.19-21) mentions an ἐπίτροπον ἐπὶ τῶν [ἀπο]λαύσεων καὶ λούδου μα[του]τίνου, being the translation of *procurator a voluptatibus et ad ludum*. Perhaps it returns in the predicate of Isis: *Agape*, in *P.Oxy* 1380, 109 f. See above p.91 n.182 for the discussion of this epithet of Isis.

[59] Cf. Verg. *Georg.* 2, 40; Prop. 2, 1, 73.

[60] Where A. Dieterich 1891, 25 wrongly reads λάτρις. Reitzenstein 1904, 362, who quotes the same text (p.185), comments on a passage in a prayer to Aion, τέλει πάσας χάριτας: ''Es scheint, dass der Aion als πλήρωμα χάριτος gedacht ist''. Cf. Merkelbach 1967, 69. On χάρις in magical papyri see: H. I. Bell, A. D. Nock, H. Thompson, Magical Texts from a Bilingual Papyrus in the British Museum, *PBA* 17 (1931) 235-87. In religious texts in general: Nock 1964, 38.

[61] For this reason I do not assume any connection with the frequent expression πρῶτος καὶ μόνος ἀπ' αἰῶνος. Many examples are given by Robert 1967, 191; 275 and *passim*. Cf. *idem*, *OMS* I, 654. This expression means ''premier et seul de toute éternité''.

whereas *voluptas* occurs only once apart from its place in our poem, namely in an epigram (11, 13) that bears a marked resemblance to ours:

> Quisquis Flaminiam teris, viator,
> Noli nobile praeterire marmor.
> Urbis deliciae salesque Nili,
> Ars et gratia, lusus et voluptas,
> Romani decus et dolor theatri
> Atque omnes Veneres Cupidinesque
> Hoc sunt condita, quo Paris, sepulcro.

This poem is illuminating in many respects. For instance, it shows how Martial lends a new function to a quotation from Catullus[62]: via an association with the *passer*[63] it reveals at one blow the relative value of the pompous accumulation of eulogies, thus consciously ruining it. Similarly, in our epigram *voluptas* clearly has a functional reference. Furthermore, it also illustrates that the poem on Hermes, though of a different nature, bears a relation to the funerary epigram[64]. Finally, the use of *decus*, *voluptas* and the other predicates refers to that field of human activities where they essentially belong, viz. the theatre, the circus, the amphitheatre. There we expect to find the 'darlings' of the public, the 'sweethearts of the forces', in ancient Rome as in our own day[65]. This conclusion is corroborated by Weinreich's extensive study of this epigram[66], where he scrutinised all the abstract nouns that occur in it with regard to their function in general, and in Martial in particular.

That Martial uses *voluptas* exclusively for the mime Paris and the gladiator Hermes can also be explained by the function of the term in the language of love: Verg. *Aen.* 8, 581 *care puer mea sola et sera voluptas*. Even

[62] *Deliciae* is a fixed epithet of adored persons. Sueton. *Titus* 1, describes the emperor as *amor et deliciae generis humani*. W. Steidle, *Sueton und die antike Biographie* (Munich 1951) 106, points out its stereotyped nature. Cf. Aur. Victor 10, 6; Eutrop. 7, 21; Suda s.v. Τίτος. Did Titus owe his title to his enthusiasm for the *ludi* (on which see: H. Galsterer, *Athenaeum* 59 [1981] 435 n. 82)? Cf. a *defixio* from Hadrumetum (Audollent 1904, no. 265), where a person refers to himself as *puella[r]u d[eli]cias*. A funerary inscription from Rome calls a *nuntius* of the *circus*: *delicium populi* (S. Panciera, *ArchClass* 22 [1970] 152). Cf. also: D. Korzeniewski, Elemente hymnischer Parodie in der Lyrik Catulls, *Helikon* 18-9 (1978-9) 228-57, esp. 230 ff. On καλλίμορφος as an example of gladiatorial names indicating beauty: Papapostolou 1989, 393-5.

[63] R. A. Pitcher, Passer Catulli. The Evidence of Martial, *Antichthon* 16 (1982) 97-103; R. W. Hooper, In Defence of Catullus' Dirty Sparrow, *G&R* 32 (1985) 162-78.

[64] R. Schmook, *De M. Val. Martialis epigrammatis sepulcralibus et dedicatoriis* (Diss. Leipzig 1911); S. Johnson, The Obituary Epigrams of Martial, *CJ* 49 (1953/4) 265-72; P. Veyne, Martial, Virgile et quelques épitaphes, *REA* 66 (1964) 48-52; W. C. Korfmacher, *Class. Fol* 23 (1969) 254 ff.

[65] E.g. Martial. 10, 53; 9, 28; 8, 82. *Voluptas* belongs to the atmosphere of the theatre and arena, as L. Robert, *Hellenica* XI, 1 ff. demonstrates.

[66] Weinreich 1941.

though Bailey does not allow us to translate *voluptas* in Lucretius 1, 1, by 'darling', there is nothing to prevent us from taking this meaning to be implied in the *voluptas* of our epigram. This fits very well in the gladiatorial sphere. In inscriptions the Pompeian gladiator Celadus is called *suspirium puellarum*; *puellarum decus* (twice); *puparum dominus*. This particular meaning becomes topical once more later in the poem.

It is evident, then, that in the first line *Martia voluptas* alludes to both the god and the gladiator. With this two parallel series are set in motion, which we shall adopt as a code in analysing the epigram.

2. *Hermes omnibus eruditus armis*

In accordance with the laws of aretalogy, the *aretai*, the qualities or the great deeds of the god, now follow. The first line already announced that Hermes' special qualities are in the field of arms and fighting (which sometimes also occurs in real aretalogy, e.g. Isis hymn K 41, ἐγώ εἰμι πολέμου κυρία), but in that field—it appears now and will be specified later—he is absolutely versatile. The extent to which we have a parody of real gladiatorial versatility will be investigated later on. Dim references to religious aretalogy come into view, since gods are generally praised as almighty, many-sided and superior to all other gods, as we saw in the chapters on Isis and Dionysos. Here are a few general illustrations: *CH* V, 10, πάντα γὰρ ἃ ἔστι καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν, *ibid.* V, 11, ὁ πάσης δυνάμεως ἰσχυρότερος, a common epithet of Isis: παντοκράτωρ, or in the Zeus hymn of Cleanthes: παγκρατὲς αἰεί. These all-embracing qualities return in the final *omnia*.

3. *Hermes et gladiator et magister*

I do not believe that *magister* hints at a supposed didactic function of the divine διδάσκαλος Hermes, as Kleinknecht suggests[67]. The contrast with *gladiator* fixes our attention too much on the arena for that. *Magistri* were persons, often former gladiators themselves, who taught their skills to beginners. In principle, the functions of *instructor*[68] and gladiator ex-

[67] There is a passage in Tertullian *adv. Val.* 15, which could point in this direction: *Mercurius ille Trismegistus, magister omnium physicorum*. As a curiosity I quote what M. Raderius in his edition of 1627 writes on *ter unus* of the last line: "potuit allusisse ad Hermeten Trismegistum, id est ter maximum. Quin et apud Latinos magistri a magis ter videntur dicti".

[68] Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte* II[9], 68 n. 21: *magister* = *doctor*, 'instructor'. Cf. *idem* in his Martial commentary *ad loc.* Similarly, there are many references to *magistri athletarum*: Cumont 1937, 79 n.4.

cluded one another. The *magister* did not himself fight in the arena[69]. We may, therefore, explain this paradox as a form of exaltation of Hermes: he is a gladiator, but at the same time he has the qualities of a *magister*. However, seen against the background of aretalogy, this phrase acquires significant overtones, since it obviously refers to a characteristic that was very much *en vogue* there: the polar expression, indicating perfection and completeness. The god unites two qualities that normally exclude one another: a symbol of omnipotence. One of the many examples has already been mentioned above: *Sol finis et ortus*, which has many parallels both in the literature of early Greece and in that of other cultures, for example in the Old Testament[70]. In Eur. *Or.* 1496, Zeus is invoked: ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ γᾶ καὶ φῶς καὶ νύξ, and in the Hymn of Mesomedes to Rhea we read: Ἀρχὰ καὶ πάντων γέννα πρεσβίστα κόσμου μᾶτερ, καὶ νὺξ καὶ φῶς καὶ σίγα[71]. The polarity is stressed by the emphatic καί ..... καί, which is reflected in our epigram in *et.....et*[72].

Finally, there may be another implication, well-known from praises of gods and great mortals, namely that Hermes had acquired his skills from nature itself and not from instruction by another master. He was his own instructor because he did not need another one. We have many explicit

[69] *CIL* VI, 10183 = *ILS* 5110, *Marcion doctor et primus palus* seems to contradict this, but it should be interpreted in the light of *IG* XIV, 1832: πάλος πρῶτος ἐσσεδαρίων εἶτα ἐπιστάτης. Lafaye 1896, 1581, calls *magistri* 'anciens gladiateurs'. An inscription of a gladiator discussed by L. Robert, *RA* (1929) 24-41 = *OMS* I, 691 ff., is interesting in this connection. The deceased mentions his activities and victories in various cities. In the middle of the list we read: εἰ]ς Ἔφεσον σχολάζω, interpreted by Robert as: "in Ephesos I did not fight but functioned as a *magister*".

[70] Weinreich 1916, 59, gives numerous examples of what he calls "die für alle Mystik so charakteristische *coincidentia oppositorum*, die Addition polarer Gegensatzpaare". We came across this figure earlier in the Isis aretalogies (p.43). On the principle: M. Eliade, Mythes de combat et de repos. Dyades et polarités, *Eranos Jb.* 36 (1967) 59-111; *idem*, *The Two and the One* (New York 1965) 78-124; Prolegomena to Religious Dualism, in: *The Quest* (Chicago 1969) 127-75. Some examples from antiquity: *CH* V 10, οὗτος ὁ ἀφανής, οὗτος ὁ φανερώτατος (....) οὗτος ὁ ἀσώματος, ὁ πολυσώματος, μᾶλλον δὲ παντοσώματος, with the conclusion, just as in our epigram, πάντα γὰρ <ἃ> ἔστιν καὶ οὗτος ἐστι. The new oracle inscription from Oenoanda (below n.117) has οὔνομα μὴ χωρῶν, πολυώνυμος. Cf. Festugière 1954 IV, 65-70, and Fehling 1969, 274 ff. In *PGM* V, 98 ff. we read of Osiris: τὸν κτίσαντα γὴν καὶ οὐρανόν, τὸν κτίσαντα νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν, σὲ τὸν κτίσαντα φῶς καὶ σκότος, just as Isis, according to Plutarch, *De Iside* 77, embraces all contrasts: φῶς σκότος, ἡμέραν νύκτα, πῦρ ὕδωρ, ζωὴν θάνατον, ἀρχὴν τελευτήν. Cf. Merkelbach 1976, 61 f.

[71] Many examples of ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος in hymns in: Keyssner 1932, 14 ff. In general on this type of formula: W. C. van Unnik, Het godspredikaat 'Het begin en het einde' bij Flavius Josephus en in de Openbaring van Johannes, *Med.Kon.Ak.Wet.* 39 (1976) 1-81.

[72] A very interesting example is found in Cass. Dio 63, 5, 2, where Tiridates is reported to have said to Nero: σὺ γάρ μοι καὶ μοῖρα εἶ καὶ τύχη. F. Cumont, L'iniziazione di Nerone da parte di Tiridate d'Armenia, *RFC* 61 (1933) 145-54, explains this as part of an initiation ritual. On this text see recently: G. Firpo, Antioco IV di Commagene e la *Moira* dell'imperatore Gaio (Caligola), *ASNP* 16 (1986) 679-89.

expressions of this idea, *e.g.* in Epictetus 4, 6, 11, who asks his readers: "will you not (....) become your own pupil and your own teacher?" (Οὐ θέλεις .... αὐτὸς σαυτῷ γενέσθαι καὶ μαθητὴς καὶ διδάσκαλος;)[73]. They occur in epitaphs and honorary decrees[74], especially in those of 'enfants prodiges' of later antiquity: *qui, studens litteras Graecas, non monstratas sibi Latinas adripuit*[75]. Moreover, among the various predicates which express the boundlessness and infinitude of the god such as ἄναρχος, ἀγέννητος, ἀφυής—which our poem will give reason to discuss—we find also ἀδίδακτος and αὐτοδίδακτος[76]. Finally, it is Martial himself who elsewhere (14, 73) exploits this *paradoxon*: *Psittacus a vobis aliorum nomina discam; hoc didici per me dicere: Caesar have*[77]. And, to return to the world of the agon, in Greece, and especially in Athens, we perceive a traditional admiration for achievements in war or in the lists that were performed by virtue of natural talent and not as the result of training[78]. Compare such acclamations as νικᾶν ἐγεννήθης: "you were born to conquer"[79], and p.225 below, where I return to this aspect.

4. *Hermes turba sui tremorque ludi*

In this line, which presents a first specification of the omnipotence of Hermes, one might discern a similar *coincidentia oppositorum* as in the preceding line. Friedländer, for instance, explains *turba sui tremorque ludi* as follows: 'um den sich die ganze Schule drängt und den sie zugleich fürchtet'. In that case I would prefer to explain *turba sui ludi* as meaning 'he who by himself constitutes the entire troop' (cf. *omnia solus*). However, I am not at all sure that this is the correct or even a possible meaning. I fear that the connecting *que* is not emphatic enough, since in an *oppositio* one expects either a disjunctive asyndeton or *et/atque*[80]. *Cura laborque* of line 10

[73] Cf. also Diogenes *ap.* Stob. 3, 1, 55.

[74] Nock 1972, I, 507-11, discusses some examples from Olbia, where αὐτοδαής and αὐτοφυής alternate. A new Mani codex asserts twice that Mani did not acquire his wisdom from human teaching or from books: *ZPE* 5 (1970) 108.

[75] *CIL* VI 33929. On this theme: H. I. Marrou, *Mousikos Aner* (Grenoble 1937) in his chapter on 'enfants prodiges', espec. 203.

[76] For instance in the new oracle from Oenoanda: [α]ὐτοφυής, ἀδίδακτος, ἀμήτωρ, ἀστυφέλικτος. Most recent discussion: Lane Fox 1986, 168 ff. On this text and the other predicates see below n.117. Festugière 1972, 260, refers to *Const. Apost.* 8, 12, for a hymn to the Christian God containing the verse: σὺ γὰρ εἶ ἡ ἀδίδακτος σοφία.

[77] The *paradoxon* nature of the *adidaktos* has been brilliantly elucidated by O. Weinreich, *Studien zu Martial* (Stuttgart 1928) 113-32.

[78] N. Loraux, *L'invention d'Athènes. Histoire de l'oraison funèbre dans la cité classique* (Paris 1981) 152 ff.

[79] Cf. R. de Vaux, *RB* 47 (1938) 423-4.

[80] Thus in all cases of *decus et dolor* mentioned by Weinreich, 1941, 14 f. He compares the phrase with *turba sui tremorque ludi* but it is not clear to me what he infers from this comparison.

does not contradict this since it does not contain a real polarity. Therefore, 'the terror and panic of his own school of gladiators' seems the most likely interpretation.

Martial is thus presenting us with a subject that we also know from epitaphs of gladiators. A gladiator Victor from Libya says of himself[81]: ὃν πάντες τρόμεον σύνζυγοι ἐν σταδίοις, which is explained by L. Robert as follows: "certains gladiateurs spécialement vigoureux ou exercés devaient ainsi inspirer la crainte, et ce devait sonner comme un arrêt de mort que d'être apparié avec eux, de devenir leur σύνζυγος". Our verse contains exactly the same idea[82].

5. *Hermes quem timet Helius sed unum*
6. *Hermes cui cadit Advolans sed uni*

In these verses a further specification follows. Even Helius (as we saw, Helius, like Hermes, is prominent among gladiatorial names) fears him, even Advolans is struck down by him[83]. Besides omnipotence, invincibility is a *topos* in Hellenistic religious writings of the most divergent kinds. As we noticed before, it is very prominent in litanies to Isis (K 47 ἐμοὶ πάντ' ἐπείκει) and Sarapis, and thus furnishes the well-known πάντα νικᾷ ὁ Σάραπις, repeated endlessly on magical tablets, of which the followers of Mithras, the worshippers of Sol Invictus, and the Christians created their own variants[84]. But Hermes too is ἀνίκητος, in a private letter from the days of Trajan[85], and παντοκράτωρ in an inscription[86]. The Hermetic god is πάσης δυνάμεως ἰσχυρότερος and ὁ πάσης ὑπεροχῆς μείζων (*CH* I, 31, 8). The syncretism of this type of religious writings is especially apparent from the fact that practically the same formula occurs in a Christian papyrus[87]: ἅγιος εἶ ὁ πάσης δυνάστεως ἰσχυρότερος.

The choice of Helios as an adversary of Hermes is perhaps no coincidence. In the language of religion Helios is the highest of the visible gods of the sky, e.g. *CH* V, 3, ὁ ἥλιος θεὸς μέγιστος τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν θεῶν, ᾧ πάντες εἴκουσι οἱ οὐράνιοι θεοὶ ὡσανεὶ βασιλεῖ καὶ δυνάστῃ. This fact is too banal to merit further substantiation. However, a god may be so great that even the sun bows down to him. The passage from the *CH* quoted above is followed by a section in which even this great Helios proves not to be the highest god. There may be a still greater, invisible god. Alexarchos, the brother of Cassander, imagined himself to be Helios, but as a slave of Menecrates he had to bow down before this physician, who had similar megalomaniac ideas and called himself *Zeus Basileus*. In the fourth hymn of Isidorus it is said of the god-king Porramanres = Amenemhet III[88]:

> τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ γαῖα ὑπήκοος ἦν τε θάλασσα
> καὶ ποταμῶν πάντων νάματα καλλιρρόων
> καὶ πνοιαὶ ἀνέμων καὶ ἥλιος, ὃς γλυκὺ φέγγος
> ἀντέλλων φαίνει πᾶσιν ἀριπρεπέως.

Besides the religious component we find the human one again[89]. Invincibility is of course one of the current themes of gladiatorial epitaphs. Robert 1940 gives examples, e.g. no. 148, νεικήσας μὲν π[άντας], no. 30, νείκην [δ'ἀπ'] ἐμοῦ λάβε οὐδείς etc. Numerous *aleiptos* inscriptions (both of gladiators and athletes) provide further evidence. Among them there is one that praises a pancratiast who was both ἄλειπτος and ἀσυνέξωστος: "never thrown out of the area of competition by an opponent"[90]. It is further summarized in nicephoric names such as Βίκτωρ, Πολυνείκης, Πασινείκης, etc.

I have already referred to the fact that *sed uni* and *sed unum* as μόνος-formulas belong to the fixed *topoi* of aretalogy (Mart. 8, 66, has *rerum prima salus et una Caesar*). Their repetition[91] and place at the end of the line make them an obvious anticipation of *unus* at the end of the poem. Still, this does not mean that they must inevitably have an identical meaning. In aretalogy and hymns *unus, solus,* μόνος may have two different

[81] Robert 1940, 145 no. 106 and p. 303. On the gladiatorial *familia* recently: Papapostolou 1989, 378-88.

[82] As Robert already noticed. He mentions another relevant inscription from Pompei: *N-us et Iucundus Amaranthum ess(edarium) Marcu- tremant utroque.*

[83] Wright, in J. A. Pott and F. A. Wright 1920, translates *cadit* by 'falls mute', probably wishing to prepare a rhyme with the next line: 'himself his only substitute'. Paley and Stone 1868, comment upon *cui cadit*: "like ἐγὼ σιωπῶ τῷδε, Ar. *Ran.* 1134", which perhaps elucidates the construction but not the meaning of *cadere*. *Cadere* may have the sense of 'fall silent', but only in combination with *lingua* etc. Here it cannot but mean: 'goes down before' (C. A. Ker and others). The Greek πίπτω is a *terminus technicus* in this sense.

[84] On this formula cf. Weinreich 1919, 20 ff. = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 426 ff. and Beilage IV and V; Peterson 1926, 152 f. Cf. above p.201.

[85] Wilcken, *Chrestomathie* 15.

[86] Kaibel, *EG* 815.

[87] *P. Berlin* 9794; C. Schmidt - W. Schubart, *Berliner Klass. Texte* VI (1910).

[88] The opinion of Vanderlip 1972 that there is an opposition between the king as the True Sun and Helios as the True Sun's visible image is not confirmed by the context. Cf. also Apul. *Met.* 11, 25.

[89] However, the two worlds are interrelated: "The invincibility of human athletes is an element in a narrative process which effects an 'impossible' transition between the status of ordinary mortal and that of hero" (Gordon 1989, 64).

[90] M. Poliakoff, ΑΣΥΝΕΞΩΣΤΟΣ, *ZPE* 44 (1981) 78-80.

[91] Cf. a similar repetition in an inscription: *n]overat unum (.....) coepit et unus.* (*AE* 1974, no 277).

functions[92], although these cannot always be entirely separated. We have already met one of these functions. It is the all-embracing ἕν καὶ πᾶν idea culminating in the *solus omnia* formula. This implies an ontological unity: the god has united in himself all that is: ὅτι μούνη εἶ σὺ ἅπασαι αἱ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀνομαζόμεναι θεαὶ ἄλλαι.

However, there is a different function of *unus/solus,* which is the one that is intended with *uni* and *unum* of lines 5 and 6. They are of the type *tu sola potes* (Lucretius 1, 31) and χαῖρέ μοι Ῥώμα .... σοὶ μόνᾳ, πρέσβιστα, δέδωκε Μοῖρα κῦδος .... πάντα δὲ σφάλλων ὁ μέγιστος Αἰὼν .... σοὶ μόνᾳ πλησίστιον οὖρον ἀρχᾶς οὐ μεταβάλλει. ἦ γὰρ ἐκ πάντων σὺ μόνα κρατίστους ἄνδρας αἰχματὰς μεγάλους λοχεύεις[93] with an anaphora as emphatic as in Martial's poem on Hermes[94]. In these formulas, those qualities of the revered god that make him *exceptional* are emphasized. He is the only one who can do things that all others cannot. This time *unus* has a contrastive force. In this sense of 'unique', the terms are also very frequent in elative[95] formulas for famous mortals: generals, emperors, athletes, etc., both in Greece and Rome. The expression μόνος ἄλειπτος, for instance, is so formulary that it could be parodied in a mock funerary epigram from Edessa that mourned a pig that had been killed in a traffic accident[96]. The first Latin attestation is the famous *elogium* of L. Cornelius L. f. Scipio (cs. 259 BC, *CIL* I^2 8, 9) *Honc oino ploirume consentiont R[omae] duonoro optumo fuise viro. Unus* and *solus* freely alternate, the latter having the monopoly whenever a plural is required. Sueton. *Galba* 15, 2: *solos ex omnibus Neronis emissariis vel maleficentissimos*[97], or, likewise negative, Plin. *Paneg.* 76, on Domitian: *unus solusque censebat quod sequerentur omnes*. Quite often Latin *unus* or *solus* acquires the sense of Greek εἷς or μόνος in acclamations, as we shall demonstrate below. For the present the observation suffices that the terms function on both the human and divine

[92] On this difference cf. Nock 1972, I, 39 f. and Nock-Festugière 1972 I, 57. Weinreich 1919, 28 = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 434, too distinguishes between henotheistic and 'elative' εἷς formulas.

[93] Hymn of Melinno to Rome. Stob. *Flor.* 1 p. 312 (H); Norden 1923, 160.

[94] Cf. Norden 1923, 155 n.1 and 245 n.1.

[95] See for εἷς- and μόνος formulas in agonistic *elogia* p.243 below.

[96] Ph. Petsas, *AAA* 2 (1969) 190-4; *BE* 1970, 363. The disastrous results of failing to recognize this word play are illustrated in G. Daux, *BCH* (1970) 609-18, corrected in *BE* 1971, 396-8. See recently: N. Nikolaou, Le cochon d'Édesse, *REG* 98 (1985) 147-52. It seems that people in antiquity cherished certain specific feelings of endearment where dead piglets are concerned. Cf. N. A. Bott, *Testamentum Porcelli* (Diss. Zürich 1972); E. Champlin, The Testament of the Piglet, *Phoenix* 41 (1987) 174-83.

[97] H. C. Nutting, Suetonius *Galba* 15, 2, *CW* 28 (1935) 182, has recognized *solos* as 'plural' of *unus* plus superlative. Cf. also below n.188. That *unus* and *solus* are practically identical is also proven by *univira* inscriptions, where the same words alternate: G. Williams, Some Aspects of Roman Marriage Ceremonies and Ideals, *JRS* 48 (1958) 6-29, esp. 23.

levels and that in the poem the final *unus,* though unmistakably referring back to lines 5 and 6, does not necessarily bear a completely identical meaning.

7. *Hermes vincere nec ferire doctus*

This verse is hard to interpret with any certainty. It has the ring of an *adunaton*, and Kleinknecht rightly speaks of the "fast zauberhafte *vincere nec ferire*", but what it exactly means has never been fully understood. The difficulty has caused great confusion in the *ms* tradition, where one frequently finds *sed* instead of *nec*. The origin of this corruption was already explained by Raderius in his edition of 1627, whose defence of *nec* reads: "Hermes potest vincere sine ictu; quamvis posset ferire, tamen vincere potest etiam si non feriat, quod summam habet admirationem et speciem quandam ἀδύνατον, cum tamen non sit ἀδύνατον. Poterat involvere gladiatorem (.....) non ferire." He compares Quintil. 6, 3, 61, where a similar case is described, though used as a joke. Friedländer seems to adopt this explanation in his commentary: "Ohne Verwundungen zu siegen, d.h. durch Entwaffnung des Gegners". Other 17th century authors added another explanation. In his edition of 1624, Thom. Farbanius wrote: "premendo et involvendo vincere sine ictu, vel adversario parcere, ubi posset ferire". The interesting point is that a similar *laus clementiae*, perhaps not exactly what one might expect in the ideology of gladiators, does occur in epitaphs. Robert 1940, 306, has collected several instances of the type πολλοὺς δ' ἐν σταδίοις ἔσωσα (no. 56); ψυχὰς πολλὰς σώσαντα (no. 55); μηδένα λυπήσας (no. 20).

When I nevertheless reject the latter interpretation, this is mainly because it does not really extol our Hermes as a miracle-worker, as he is pictured in the other verses. The explanation first mentioned, on the other hand, does contain enough of *adunaton* to stress this aspect. Moreover, clearer references exist to the actual practice of agonistic sports than have been put forward so far. Close parallels for a victory without bloodshed do exist, for instance in reports on boxing: Dio Chrys. *Or.* 28, 7[98]: πυγμὴν ..... πρότερον δὲ ἠνάγκαζε τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς ἀπειπεῖν, οὐ μόνον πρὶν αὐτὸς πληγῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὶν πλῆξαι ἐκείνους· οὐ γὰρ τὸ παίειν καὶ τιτρώσκεσθαι ἀνδρείαν ἐνόμιζεν. This boxer is so feared that his antagonists do not even have the courage to come to the arena to compete. He wins without striking. This is a much lauded quality and it has even led to the creation of a special term ἀκονιτεί[99]. Various sources inform us

[98] See the interesting discussion by Robert 1968, 235.

[99] An epigram in the *Anthologia Palatina* 11, 316, praises the famous boxer Milon

that this means 'dustless': a victory won without the victor having taken part in the competition[100]. We should be constantly aware that Martial's poem is a parody. Here, I suggest, he transposes a situation from agonistic sports[101], where this is imaginable and did indeed occur, to the domain of gladiators, where, of course, it could *not* occur, since gladiators could not refuse to fight. This makes it an *adunaton*, comparable to the gladiator who is at the same time a *magister*. As such it is a perfect introduction to the absurdity of the next line.

8. *Hermes subpositicius sibi ipse*

Subpositicius, also called *tertiarius*[102], is the gladiator who takes the place of a fallen colleague. What Martial evidently wanted to express was: Hermes never falls, so he does not need a *subpositicius*. Though a hyperbole[103], this was apparently not sufficient for what he wanted to put into the verse as an overtone. Instead of making a simple prosaic observation, he used a complicated, illogical, and even impossible idea: Hermes replaces himself, is his own successor, as he was his own *magister*. This *adunaton* has a distant parallel in a particular kind of theological speculation which, though already attested for the fifth century BC, came to flourish in the second century AD. In this case, I would not assume a relationship as confidently as I do in other—much more obvious—instances. The following

because he once was the only candidate that turned up for the sacred games and was awarded the wreath without further delay. See: W. Rudolph, *Olympischer Kampfsport in der Antike* (Berlin 1965) 37. A stone halter from Olympia has the text: 'Ακματίδας Λακεδαιμόνιος νικῶν ἀνέθεκε τὰ πέντε ἀσσκονικτεί (*sic*). (L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni agonistiche Greche*, 8; *SEG* 11, 1227). See the discussion by J. Ebert, Zum Pentathlon der Antike, *Abh. Leipzig* 56 (1963) 6f., whose suggestions I regard as the only correct interpretation.

[100] On κόνις as the sand of the wrestling place: R. Katzoff, Where did the Greeks of the Roman Period practice wrestling?, *AJA* 90 (1986) 437-40.

[101] That the ideology of gladiators was closely akin to that of combat sports in general may be inferred from the fact that πυκτεύω, meaning 'to box', was no less common in gladiatorial jargon: L. Robert, *RA* (1929) 24-42 = *OMS* I, 691-708; cf. G. H. R. Horsley, *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity* 4 (1979 [1987]) 18-20. Generally: M. B. Poliakoff, *Combat Sports in the Ancient World. Competition, Violence, and Culture* (New Haven 1987).

[102] Lafaye 1896, 1596 and lit. in n.4; Cf. Petron. 45. Cf. Ville 1981, 33, 324 and especially 396 f., with a correct interpretation of this line of Martial.

[103] In passing, it may be pointed out that the extraordinary and miraculous aspects of the performance of athletes, boxers, gladiators, etc. were ardently admired in antiquity, witness the common epithet παράδοξος or παραδοξονίκης. The former term came to acquire the meaning 'extremely good', as Robert 1940, 250 ff. shows (cf. *idem*, *OMS* I, 645 n. 7; *Documents de l'Asie Mineure méridionale* [Paris 1966] 82 and n.3). *Contra*: R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 14 (1974) 94 ff. The latter term denotes an athlete who won both the wrestling-match and the pancration on the same day (Plut. *Comp. Lucull.* 2). Gordon 1989, 60-4, has an interesting discussion of athletic *paradoxa*.

section should therefore be seen as an excursus, whose relevance the reader may judge for himself.

The idea of a god's taking his own place, replacing or succeeding himself, is a common feature in various theologies. The image is predominant of a god who brings himself forth, who is his own father and his own son, the one born from himself, a process that may take place in an endless cycle[104].

I give some examples. On the first of November the calendar of Philocalus states on Osiris: *ex se natus*. This is typically Egyptian. In Egypt Ra is 'his mother's bull', he impregnates his mother and is himself the father and the son[105]. Similarly, Ptah is 'the one who has created himself'. In a well-known liturgical text from the Sabazios mysteries we read: ταῦρος δράκοντος καὶ ταύρου δράκων πατήρ. Zeus begets Dionysos-Sabazios, who is himself identical with Zeus[106]. The idea flowered from the second century AD onwards[107]. Aelius Aristides *Or.* 43, 8, says of Zeus: ἐποίησεν δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, ... αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησεν[108]. Comparable terms occur in magical texts, for instance in a new magical inscription from Antinoupolis[109] δεῦρο μοι ὁ αὐτογεννήτωρ θεέ and αὐτοπάτωρ, αὐτομήτωρ. Similar ideas abound in Gnostic and Hermetic texts[110] and are common in pagan theosophies of late antiquity. *Quicumque es deus qui per dies singulos caeli cursum celeri festinatione continuas .... tu tibi pater ac filius uno vinculo necessitudinis obligatus, tibi supplices manus tendimus*, writes Firmicus Maternus *Math.* 5, 3. And, of course, the same idea can be found in Christian authors: Synesios 3, 145, invokes the Christian God: πατέρων πάντων πάτηρ αὐτοπάτωρ, προπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ, Υἱὲ σεαυτοῦ, and Didymos *Peri Triados* 3, 2, 2 (39, 788 Migne) writes: ἀθάνατος ὁ θεός .... αὐτογένεθλος, τίκτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, ἀεὶ νέος, οὐ ποιητός and

[104] In Babylonian hymns this occurs frequently as an indication of omnipotence: A. Falkenstein and W. von Soden, *Sumerische und Akkadische Hymnen und Gebete* (Zürich 1953) 222 and 296.

[105] Norden 1924, 35 n.3. But *ex se natus* as a translation of αὐτογενής occurs frequently in Latin: H. Wagenvoort, *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion* (Leiden 1956) 16 ff., where the intriguing words of Augustus (Plin. *NH* 2, 94) *sibi illum natum seque in eo nasci* are discussed.

[106] Firm. Matern. *De errore* 26, 1; Clem. *Protr.* 2, 14; Arnob. *Adv. Nat.* 5, 21. On this subject see Dieterich 1923, 155; *GGR* II, 660.

[107] The evidence is collected by Whittaker 1975.

[108] Cf. O. Weinreich, Typisches und Individuelles in der Religiosität des Aelius Aristides, *Neue Jahrb* 33 (1914) 597-606, esp. 601 ff. = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 304 ff.

[109] I. Crisi, in: *Antinoe 1965/68. Missione Arch. in Egitto dall' Univ. di Roma* (Rome 1974) 119-24; *BE* 1976, 766. The graffito contains parts of *PGM* XIX a-b. Other related expressions in magical papyri: Whittaker 1975, 206.

[110] Whittaker 1975, and especially on the Gnostic texts: *idem*, Self-generating Principles in Second-Century Gnostic Systems, in: B. Layton (ed.) *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism* I *The School of Valentinus* (Leiden 1980) 176 ff.

αὐτολόχευτος γίνεται ἐξ ἔθεν αὐτὸς ἐών, γενέτης τε καὶ υἱός[111]. However, the origins of these speculations manifest themselves much earlier. The notion of self-causation appears already in a fragment of the *Perithous* of either Critias or Euripides (II, 88 B 18 D.-K. = Eur. fr. 594 Nauck[2]) ἀκάμας τε χρόνος (....) τίκτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. In another fragment of the same play (88 B 19 = Eur. fr. 593) this idea is expressed as αὐτοφυῆ. Later, but still in the first century BC, Philodemus *Peri Eusebeias* (p. 80, Gomperz, *SVF* II, 1078) has ἅπαντα ἐστὶν αἰθήρ, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ πατὴρ καὶ υἱός, which goes back at least to Chrysippus, while Philodemus himself refers to Orphic theology, where, indeed, ideas such as αὐτοφυής occur[112].

The necessity for such speculations arises especially in the case of Aion[113], which is eternal and immutable: ἀρχὴν μεσότητα τέλος οὐκ ἔχων, μεταβόλης ἀμέτοχος[114], but which, on the other hand, moves away, and so changes and has even come into being. Then it is said of Aion: ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων[115], and in a Hermetic context ὁ μεταμορφούμενος εἰς πάντας[116]. He has come into existence, but then he must be αὐτογέννητος as an Orphic text has it or as it is explained in *CH* VII, 2, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου οὐκ ἐγένετο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐγένετο, ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ (.....) ὁ δὲ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ. In Alexandria the birthday feast of Aion was celebrated every year[117]. Again there seems to

[111] See on these Christian ideas e.g. E. P. Meyering, Athanasius on the Father as the Origin of the Son, *Ned. Arch. Kerkgesch.* 55 (1974-5) 1 ff. J. C. MacLelland, *God the Anonymous. A Study in Alexandrian Philosophical Theology* (Cambridge Mass. 1976). On similar ideas in Jewish theology: E. des Places, Le dieu incertain des Juifs, *JS* (1973) 288 ff.

[112] Cf. H. Usener, *RM* 55 (1900) 293; Dieterich 1923, 156; Norden 1923, 229 n.1. On αὐτοφυής in Orphica see Keyssner 1932, 27 f.; West 1983, 231 and n.9.

[113] On the triadic formula in the theology of Aion see: O. Weinreich, Aion in Eleusis, *ARW* 19 (1919) 174 ff. = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I, 442 ff., who gives examples. On Aion as a personification of three phases of life: J. Duchesne-Guillemin, A Vanishing Problem, in: C. H. Kitagawa and J. M. Long (eds.), *Myths and Symbols. Studies in Honor of M. Eliade* (Chicago-London 1969) 275 ff. Of course, this 'language of eternity' was adopted by Christian liturgy. H. Engberding, Die Kunstprosa des eucharistischen Hochgebets, in: *Mullus. Festschrift Th. Klauser* (*JAuC* Erganz.Bd. I [1964] 100-10) discusses various examples, such as: τὸν ἄφραστον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν ἀχώρητον, τὸν ἄναρχον, τὸν ἀιώνιον, τὸν ἄχρονον, τὸν ἀμέτρητον, τὸν ἄτρεπτον.

[114] In an inscription from Eleusis (*Syll.*[3] 1125), where see the commentary of Weinreich = *Ausgewählte Schriften* I 479 f. On similar formulas see Fehling 1969, 277.

[115] Plato *Leg.* 4, 715 E.

[116] Cf. Reitzenstein 1904, 22.

[117] See especially Norden 1924, 24 ff. Claudian. *Cons. Stil.* II, 424 ff. describes how round the grotto which is guarded by Aion, a serpent *caudam reductam ore vorat tacito relegens exordia lapsu*. This is an image of cyclic regeneration. Cf. Nock-Festugière 1972 I, 12; *GGR* II, 499 n.7. Cf. αὐτοφυής in an Aion oracle of the *Theosophia of Tübingen* (Nock 1972, I, 160) where the question is whether the highest god is ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος, and the answer is αὐτὸς ἄναξ πάντων, αὐτόσπορος, αὐτογένεθλος. The closely related inscription from Oinoanda, brilliantly discussed by L. Robert *CRAI* (1971) 602 ff., begins:

be an Egyptian component in this idea. Plut. *Iside* 62 p. 376 A, relates that the Egyptians translate Athena as: ἦλθον ἀπ' ἐμαυτῆς[118].

Of course, one should not look for consistency in this field. It suffices to establish the fact that the idea of a god who begets himself was a very general one. It is not necessary for the god to die in order to revive again, but usually he emerges anew, rejuvenated in a mysterious way[119]. This is an idea which we find, transposed into the language of gladiators, in line 8 of the epigram on Hermes, where *sibi ipse* corresponds to the emphatic αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ of the texts quoted. By this curious *adunaton* Martial may have intended at least to refer to the hymnic *genre* in general, in which impossibilities are fixed *topoi*, as it is splendidly summarized in an inscription from Phrygia[120]: εὐχαριστῶ Μητρὶ Λητοῖ ὅτι ἐξ ἀδυνάτων δυνατὰ ποιεῖ. At most we may recognize a deliberate parody of formulas like those described above. Some of them were already in use before Martial, as the quotations from Critias/Euripides and Philodemus prove, and as may perhaps also appear from Horace C. 1, 12, 13 ff., where he says of Iuppiter: *unde nil maius generatur ipso*[121]. And it is certain that similar speculations were *en vogue* in the first century AD. Plutarch *De E apud Delphos* relates a discussion which had been held in his youth, in the mid-60s AD. Here, Plutarch's teacher Ammonius pictures the Supreme Divinity as "eternal, uncreated, undying", "immovable, timeless, undeviating". And this god, Apollo, is higher even than the Sun. Apparently, these issues were topical in Martial's time, although their bloom was in the second and third centuries[122].

Finally, it should be noted that this idea could be transposed to mortals,

[A]ὐτοφυής, ἀδίδακτος, ἀμήτωρ. Porphyr. 141 (Wolff) mentions an oracle that calls the god of the Jews αὐτογένεθλον ἄνακτα, and Gregory of Nazianze, *Carm.* II, 2, 7, 253 ff. (*PG* 37, 1571) quotes a false oracle of Apollo, in which the god announces his fall by the hand of Christ, of whom it is said αὐτοπάτωρ, ἀλόχευτος, ἀμήτωρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος. On similar ideas in the *Oracula Chaldaica* see: Majercik 1989, 14 ff. and commentary on fr. 39, p. 158. Cf. further *LSJ* s.v. and W. Speyer, Genealogie, *RAC* 9 (1976) esp. col. 1235 f.

[118] She is identical to Neith from Sais: Th. Hopfner, *Plutarch, Über Isis und Osiris* II (Prague 1941) 246 f. For this reason I am sceptical about the proposed interpretation of αὐτοφαν[οῦς κούρ]ης in a recent oracle text from Miletus published by P. Herrmann, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 291-8, as 'Die Göttin die aus eigener Kraft in Epiphanie erschien'. Thus: R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 8 (1971) 93-5, followed by Th. Drew-Bear and W.D. Lebek, *GRBS* 14 (1973) 65-73, esp. 68. I prefer to interpret it as: 'the one that came into being by her own force'. In the same period Ael. Arist. *Or.* 37, 2, extols Athena for her 'motherless birth'.

[119] *CH* I, 11, ἄρχεται γὰρ οὗ λήγει.

[120] W. R. Ramsay, *JHS* 4 (1883) 385. Cf. L. Robert, *Hellenica* X, 57. See for further literature and discussion: Versnel 1981a, 53 n.218, and Pleket, *ibid.* 178 n.124.

[121] That is, if Norden 1923, 229 n.1, has offered a correct interpretation.

[122] See the admirable discussion by Lane Fox 1986, 185 ff., who also reminds us that Ammonius was a younger contemporary of the Alexandrian Jew Philo, that similar ideas had been current among teachers in Philo's Alexandria and that, in one late text, Ammonius is said to have come from Egypt.

albeit mortals with divine aspirations, just as Hermes is pictured in our epigram. Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* 1, 6, on the divine Apollonius: ''The people of the country say that Apollonius was the son of Zeus, but the sage called himself the son of Apollonius''. J. Z. Smith 1978, 196, makes the following comment: ''Regardless of the possible historical truth of the tradition that Apollonius' father bore the same name as his son, I find it impossible not to read a further meaning here. Apollonius is his own father, he is *sui generis*, he is himself, himself alone. All other definitions are inadequate''.

9. *Hermes divitiae locariorum*
10. *Hermes cura laborque ludiarum*

These two verses reflect the typical atmosphere of the amphitheatre and nothing more than that. *Divitiae locariorum* indicates that Hermes attracts masses of spectators, thus furnishing rich profits for those who made it their business to sell their seats. It should be noticed that the word *divitiae* also functions in love poetry. Cf. Maximian. *Eleg.* 5, 87 f. *Mentula.....quondam deliciae divitiaeque meae.* I find it difficult to believe in an allusion to Hermes πλουτοδότης, as Kleinknecht 1937 suggests. Similarly, in the next line a comparison with *Isis cura Anubis* in Avien. 282 does not prove more than that *cura* (and *labor*) is typical of the language of love. Cf. Mart. 6, 52, *domini cura dolorque sui.* The interpretation 'le souci et l'angoisse des femmes des gladiateurs' (Izaac), though well in line with verse 4, is certainly mistaken. *Ludiae* were the women and girls who delighted in both the gladiatorial shows and their protagonists[123]. After all, Manetho 5, 289, already called ἀρχικυνηγοί (= the special kind of gladiators who were called *venatores*) οὐχὶ μόνον ζῴων θηρήτορες ἀλλὰ γυναικῶν[124]. Even an emperor's wife, Faustina, fell in love with a gladiator, if we may believe *SHA Marc. Anton.* 19, 2. Truly, Hermes was *saeculi voluptas.*

11. *Hermes belligera superbus hasta*
12. *Hermes aequoreo minax tridente*
13. *Hermes casside languida timendus*
14. *Hermes gloria Martis universi*

These lines belong together and present an exegesis of line 2. The first three verses tell us what the *omnia arma* are. The gladiator, who has just

[123] See Piernavieja 1972; Ville 1981, 330 f. and *ibid.* 432 on *locarii.*
[124] Cf. Robert 1938, 78 n.1.

been described as his own *tertiarius*, is called master of *three* weapons, specified in three verses: the *hasta*, the *tridens* and the *cassis*. It is not equally certain from these which kind of gladiator was meant[125]. The *hasta* probably denotes the *velites*, who fought in the equipment of the military troops of the same name with *hastae amentatae*[126]. There can be no doubt about the *tridens*: only the *retiarius* carried this. *Casside languida* refers either to the *Samnites*[127], the specific opponents of the *retiarii*, who always fought in visored helmets with high crests, or to the *andabatae*[128], who fought in helmets without eyeholes, and for the rest wore full armour, which possibly made a lumbering, sluggish impression. What is really important to us, of course, is the fact that these three kinds express a total[129], referring back to *omnia arma* in line 2 and pointing forward to *gloria Martis universi* in line 14. Thus the circle is closed. For, in accordance with a favourite method of Martial (cf. the epigram 11, 13 quoted above) the poem is a ring-composition, in which *Martia saeculi voluptas* and *gloria Martis universi* correspond. There is a second ring: *omnibus armis* and the three weapons, combined in *universi*.

As to the 14th line, the term *gloria* pre-eminently belongs to the world of gladiators. Many examples of the glorification of δόξα are found in Greek gladiatorial inscriptions[130]. The highest honour was to νεικήσαι ἐνδόξως,[131] but *universus*, which is a final anticipation of the concluding word *unus*, and which once more stresses the idea of universality, also reflects the world of the *agon*. Artists, athletes and gladiators are extolled for their universality. A gladiator who fights with two weapons is indeed exceptional. We know of one who was both a *dimachaerus* and an *essedarius*[132], but the epigram on the mime Paris quoted above gives a

[125] Surveys of the various gladiatorial genres: F. Drexel, in Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte* IV, 258 ff.; K. Schneider, *RE* Suppl. III (1918) 777 ff.; Lafaye 1896, 1590; Robert 1940, 65 ff.; P.-J. Meier, *De gladiatura Romana* (Diss. Bonn 1881); Ville 1981.
[126] Cic. *Brut.* 78, 271. Thus Friedländer, Helm, Lafaye. Paley and Stone think that the *Samnites* are meant. But the *Samnites* (= *secutores* in later times) used the *hasta* exclusively in the *prolusio*, the sham fight (Cic. *De Or.* 2, 325). Pictures of gladiators on foot with a spear are very rare. L. Robert *Hellenica* III, 131, gives only three examples. He too considers this genre to be *velites*.
[127] Lafaye, Stephenson, Izaac, Helm and others.
[128] Ker, Paley and Stone and others. Friedländer does not give an opinion.
[129] This use of 'three' will be discussed below and may be an allusion to Hermes Trismegistos. The strange explanation of Kleinknecht: ''Mit *hasta, tridens*, und *cassis* wird ironisch auf die für den Gott typische *tela* angespielt'', is unconvincing.
[130] Robert 1940, 302; for *gloria* in related texts see: Mart. 9, 28 and 8, 82.
[131] L. Robert, *Hellenica* XI, 351 ff.
[132] Lafaye 1896, 1590. Even in this case I am not certain of the interpretation. It is perfectly possible that *dimachaerus* does not denote a special kind of gladiator, but an individual practice *within a genre*, just as the *scaeva* did not form a separate kind of gladiator, but belonged to the *retiarii, secutores*, etc. As far as I can see, Robert does not give any instance of a gladiator belonging to two genres.

clear example of the admiration for versatility[133]. It is Weinreich, on p. 16 of his commentary on this epigram, who has shown that behind the conventional expression *decus et dolor*, for the very reason that *theatri* has been added here, we should also read: "Paris war ein Meister dem *jegliche* Art des Pantomimus lag", viz. comedy (or fable) *and* tragedy. In this connection he mentions an inscription from Pompei in which it is said of an actor: *Paris, unio scaenae*: 'Paris, Nummer Eins der Bühne'[134]. With this universality a theme has been broached in which the last verse, and with it the whole poem, culminates.

Before we tackle this problem, it should be noted that the four verses just discussed unmistakably refer to a specific trait of hymnody and of the hymns of Isis in particular. Here, the ideas of syncretism and henotheism have co-operated in creating new and revolutionary formulas. The higher a god rose—as did Egyptian and other oriental gods—the more the question of priority came to be identified with that of an all-embracing uniqueness. This was expressed in various formulas explaining that the great deity united not only his/her own specific qualities but also those of (all) other gods, in fact 'she *alone is* the other gods', as it is curiously expressed in the formula quoted on p.224. A large number of variations[135] say that Isis in her own person embraces all the other gods. On a divine level, this is exactly what Martial parodies when he makes Hermes a specialist in all kinds of gladiatorial weapons.

2. Three and one

Finally, we return to the last line *Hermes omnia solus et ter unus*, which clearly contains a recapitulatory climax, the *summa theologiae*. The hymn to Isis K ends with the lines: Ἐγὼ τὸ ἱμαρμένον νικῶ, ἐμοῦ τὸ εἱμαρμένον ἀκούει. In the first chapter I have discussed the implications of this statement, *inter alia* the *parallelismus membrorum*, foreign to Greek hymnody and without doubt the fruit of oriental influence. The same parallelism is suggested in our epigram and it has the same function: to create an all-embracing formula of omnipotence. For, at least at first sight, *omnia solus* and *ter unus* seem to reflect one another, and there is nothing to suggest

[133] Cf. also the παραδοξονίκης mentioned above n.103.

[134] *CIL* IV, 3867 = *ILS* 5181 a. For the term *unio* see: H. Bier, *De saltatione pantomimorum* (Diss. Bonn 1920) 85. Another meaning of *unio* is 'pearl' (cf. Martial 8, 81; 12, 49, 13). It occurs several times as the nickname of a gladiator and once of a Delian actor (M. Rostovtzeff, *BCH* [1896] 392; P. Perdrizet, *REA* [1902] 88 f.). It even occurs in Greek transcription in an epitaph from a catacomb in Alexandria as Οὐνίων: B.Boyaval, *ZPE* 17 (1975) 150 f.; *BE* 1976, 758.

[135] See Vanderlip 1972, 27 ff.; Grandjean 1975, 66-73; Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 148 ff.

a contrast between the two *membra*, as Reitzenstein supposed.

Now that we are going to tackle the problem of the meaning of *ter unus*, I would first and foremost exclude from the discussion one suggestion, put forward by Reitzenstein and Usener, namely the supposed relation to the Christian idea of trinity in the dogmatic sense of 'three persons in one God'. Any history of dogma can inform us that after a long and laborious genesis this doctrine of trinity did not receive its definite form until the latter half of the fourth century[136]. The Christian trinity *stricto sensu* was created from the necessity to forge three *existing* divine beings into one, a process which took place in phases. This evolution bore a strongly theoretical nature, which can in no way be compared to triads from pagan antiquity that came into existence more or less spontaneously[137]. A question which *is* important to us remains, namely whether in pagan antiquity there indeed existed triads that can be defined correctly as trinities formed by three persons being one god. Did contemporary theologies or religions provide examples to which Martial's *ter unus* could be an allusion?

It is true that there was an abundance of gods joined in triads, as there was of gods, heroes and mythical beings with three heads or bodies, which could therefore be called τρίμορφος, *triformis, trigeminus, tricorpor*, etc.[138]. We know of a Ἑρμῆς τρικέφαλος[139]. Egypt in particular could boast a

[136] See e.g. J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité* (Paris 1927); M. Werner, *Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas problemgeschichtlich dargestellt* (Bern-Leipzig 1941) 512-606; W. Koehler, *Dogmengeschichte* (Zürich-Leipzig 1943) 269 ff.; G. Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie* (Tübingen 1956); W. R. Schoedel, A Neglected Motive for Second-Century Trinitarianism, *JThS* 31 (1980) 356 ff. For the development of the Christian idea within a pagan world see especially: Prümm 1935, 153 ff.; Mehrlein 1959, 281. The context of possible influences from pagan ideas is looked for in fields different from the ones investigated by Usener and his contemporaries: P. Gerlitz, *Ausserchristliche Einflüsse auf die Entwicklung des christlichen Trinitätsdogmas* (Leiden 1963). Very adventurous: D. L. Miller, Between God and the Gods, *Eranos Jb.* 49 (1980) 81-148. Significantly, the theme is lacking in early Christian iconography: J. Engemann, Zu den Dreifaltigkeitsdarstellungen der frühchristlichen Kunst: Gab es im 4 Jhdt. anthropomorphe Trinitätsbilder?, *JbAC* 19 (1976) 157-72.

[137] Koehler, *o.c.* (preceding note) 269: "Trias und Trinität sind noch lange nicht identisch". Tertullian, for instance, knows of a Trias, but this is not yet a 'trinity' *stricto sensu*. Cf. J. Moingt, *Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien. Répertoire lexicographique et tables* I-IV (Paris 1966).

[138] There is an extensive literature on three, triads, etc. in religious contexts. I have consulted: Usener 1966; Lease 1919; *HDWA* s.v. Dreieinigkeit; Weinreich 1928; Déonna 1954, 403-28, a very useful introduction (Cf. on this 'threefold' Celtic Mercurius: P. Lambrechts, Note sur une statuette en bronze de Mercure au musée de Tongres *AC* 10 [1941] 71-6; G. Charrière, De Cernunnos à Gargantua, *RHR* [1977] 48-69; on Italic parallels: A.-M. Adam, Monstres et divinités tricéphales dans l'Italie primitive, *MEFRA* 97 [1985] 577-609); Mehrlein 1959; W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge Mass. 1972) 465 ff.; *idem*, 1979, 181 f. For Greece: Th. Hadzisteliou Price, Double and Multiple Representations in Greek Art and Religious Thought, *JHS* 91 (1971) 48-69; L. Robert, *Hellenica* III, 75 f.; VII, 50 f.; *BE Index III. Les mots français*, s.v. triade.

[139] Hesych. s.v.; Harpokration p. 178, 3; Usener 1966, 167.

rich tradition[140]. Elsewhere, however, it is extremely difficult to find anything in pagan antiquity to which Augustinus' *unus deus est ipsa trinitas* could be applied. In the first place, one might think of well-known formulas such as the Orphic verse[141]:

> Εἷς Ζεύς, εἷς Ἀΐδης, εἷς Ἥλιος, εἷς Διόνυσος,
> εἷς θεὸς ἐν πάντεσσι· τί σοι δίχα ταῦτ' ἀγορεύω;

or Julian *Or.* IV p.175 (Hertlein):

> εἷς Ζεύς, εἷς Ἀΐδης, εἷς Ἥλιος ἐστι Σάραπις.

However, it would be a serious error to define such expressions as trinitarian formulas and then to explain Martial's *ter unus* with their aid. These formulas prove to be extensions of older single or bipartite formulas, of which εἷς Ζεὺς Σάραπις is particularly prominent. It need not surprise us that, beside tripartite expressions[142], quadripartite ones occur as well, such as Ἷς Ζεὺς Σέραπις καὶ Ἥλιος Ἑρμανοῦβις[143], or:

> χείματι μέν τ' Ἀΐδην, Δία δ' εἴαρος ἀρχομένοιο
> Ἥλιον δὲ θέρευς, μετοπώρου δ' ἁβρὸν Ἰαώ[144].

We find this formula associated with the four seasons of the year. Peterson 1926, 227-56, has devoted a thorough investigation to the entire complex. He postulated a Chaldaean astrological origin, which came into its own

[140] Th. Kraus, Alexandrinische Triaden der römischen Kaiserzeit, *MDAI(K)* 19 (1963) 97-105; H. te Velde, Some Remarks on the Structure of Egyptian Divine Triads, *JEA* 57 (1971) 80-6; J. Gwyn Griffiths, Antecédents de la triade divine dans l'Égypte préhistorique, *Boll. Centro Com. Stud. Preist.* 9 (1972) 104-5, and *idem* 1973. J. Leclant, in: Dunand-Lévêque 1975, 10-15, gives a survey of the recent discussion. He emphasizes how very different and diverse Egyptian triads were as compared to anything else in the ancient world and above all: "combien tout fait religieux doit être considéré dans son contexte". Cf. also: L. S. B. MacCoull, A Trinitarian Formula in Dioscoros, *BSACopte* 24 (1979-82) 103-10. On an interesting formula which combines an explicit triad of gods and their qualification as 'great': Ἰάω Σαβαώθ Ἀδωναί· οἱ τρεῖς οἱ μεγάλοι (2nd century AD) see: R. Kotansky, Kronos and a New Magical Inscription Formula on a Gem in the J. P. Getty Museum, *AncW* 3 (1980) 29-32.

[141] Ps. Justin. *Cohortatio* 15; Abel, *Orphica* 148; Kern *OF* 239.

[142] *E.g.* εἷς Ζεὺς Σάραπις ἐπιφανὴς Ἀσκλήπιος σωτήρ or εἷς Ζεὺς Μίτρας Ἥλιος κοσμοκράτωρ. These and other examples in Peterson 1926, 237 f.; Weinreich 1919, 22 and 26.

[143] Weinreich 1928, *l.c.*

[144] Macrob. *Sat.* 1, 18, 20, probably going back to Labeo. Cf. on these formulas Nock 1972 I, 160 ff.; *GGR* II, 504 n.4. P. Mastandrea, *Un neoplatonico latino: Cornelio Labeone* (Leiden 1979) 159-69, has a good discussion. Cf. also a formula Ζεὺς Ἰαὼ Ζὴν Ἥλιος in a magical papyrus: *ZPE* 17 (1975) 25 ff.

in later solar theology. The essential meaning of the εἷς θεός formula in which the two, three or four specifications were embedded is of special importance. With an abundance of data Peterson demonstrated that this is not a syncretistic confession of the unity or identity of the gods mentioned: on the contrary, it is an acclamation emphasizing the exceptional character and the greatness of the god or gods invoked. In other words, it represents the elative, not the unifying force of the word εἷς[145]. Paradoxically enough, with the extension of the formula to several names of gods, the henotheistic element gradually increased at the cost of the acclamatory-elative component, although the difference is not always easy to trace. But this extension and its henotheistic consequences are typical features of the late second and early third century AD[146]. Apart from the fact that there are as many bipartite and quadripartite as tripartite formulas, it is essential that there is never so much as an allusion to 'trinity'. In other words, the number one (εἷς) does occur, but the number three

[145] L. Robert, *OMS* I, 427 n.101, in connection with Εἷς θεὸς ἐν οὐρανοῖς. Μέγας Μὴν οὐράνιος. Μεγάλη δύναμις τοῦ ἀθανάτου θεοῦ (Peterson 1926, 268-70) speaks of "le caractère de superlatif de l'acclamation *heis théos*". With Peterson he contests Cumont's interpretation 'dieu unique'. It is rather 'dieu suprême' and there is an "équivalence pratique entre εἷς et μέγας". As opposed to the French 'unique', the English 'unique', like the Dutch 'enig', combines the two notions that we distinguished before: the 'exclusive' and the superlative. The same is true of the Latin *unicus*. E. Dutoit, 'Unicus', 'unice' chez Tite-Live, *Latomus* 15 (1956) 481-488, counts 25 cases in Livy out of which 8 have the sense 'only' (with the exception of others) and 17 'without equal', 'unmatched'. This may provoke ambiguities: for instance in Hor. *C.* 3, 14, 5 *unico gaudens mulier marito*: "Ob *unicus maritus* 'der einzige Gatte' oder 'der einzigartige Gatte' heisst ist eine alte Streitfrage" (U. W. Scholz, *WS* 5 [1971] 133 n.34 a, with reference to Catull. 73, 6: *qui me unum atque unicum amicum habuit*). In this connection I think that Dodds 1970, 44, is wrong in interpreting Asclepius' words spoken to Aelius Aristides σὺ εἶ εἷς as "thou art uniquely chosen". In fact, if Dodds is referring to *Hier. Log.* 4, 51, as I suppose, the acclamatory-elative nature of εἷς is more emphatic than his paraphrase suggests. That even the expression εἷς καὶ μόνος does not exclude the existence of other gods is curiously illustrated by an inscription from Lydia (*TAM* V, 1, no. 246): τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου θεοῦ ἱερεὺς καὶ τοῦ Ὁσίου καὶ Δικαίου, on which see: Versnel 1981a, 12. The elative function of εἷς καὶ μόνος is also demonstrated by the fact that the expression also denotes exceptional human beings: P. Herrmann-K. Z. Polatkan, Das Testament des Epikrates, *SbWien* Phil.-hist. Kl. 265 (1969) 53 with n.113. Cf. on related expressions below p.243.

[146] It came into vogue in the times of Trajan and Hadrian: W. Weber, *Drei Untersuchungen zur ägyptisch-griechischen Religion* (Diss. Heidelberg 1911) 15; Peterson 1926, 235; 239; 251 n.2; Nock 1972 I, 166. L. Robert, *CRAI* (1968) 568 ff., has managed to date prosopographically some oracles of the type described to the beginning of the third century AD. Cf. *GGR* II, 478. Exactly the same is true of the 'trinity' of the Chaldaean oracles. They too date from the late second century AD, probably after Numenius: thus A.-J. Festugière, *REG* 64 (1951) 482; J. H. Waszink in: *Entretiens Hardt* 12 (1966) 43 f.; 65. Moreover, a similar inconsistency occurs in fr. 26 (des Places; Majercik) μουνάδα γάρ σε τριοῦχον ἰδὼν ἐσεβάσσατο κόσμος, side by side with fr. 27, παντὶ γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ λάμπει τριάς, ἧς μονὰς ἄρχει. See the commentary in: Majercik 1989, 151 f.

does not, at any rate not in explicit and deliberate combinations with one[147].

There is an exception to every rule, as there is one here. A Graeco-Egyptian amulet (*IG* XIV, 2413; Kaibel *EG* 1139) has the following text:

> εἷς Βαίτ, εἷς Ἀθώρ, μία τῶν βία, εἷς δὲ Ἄκωρι
> χαῖρε πάτερ κόσμου, χαῖρε τρίμορφε θεός.

This is the only text Usener could put forward in support of his theory about trinity in pagan antiquity. According to W. Spiegelberg[148] the amulet dates from the first or second century AD. Its text strongly suggests the second century, more particularly the latter half, but there is a slight possibility that it is contemporaneous with Martial's epigram. Here we have indeed one god with three shapes, who is therefore called τρίμορφος. However, this triple god is absolutely unique; it seems to be an *autoschediasma*, and it might as well have been a double or quadruple god, in the same way as there is a Ἑρμῆς τρικέφαλος beside a Ἑρμῆς τετρακέφαλος (Eustathius 1353). The fact that a triad was preferred may have been caused by its Egyptian background, for triads of gods abound in that country[149].

I find proof of the absence of this idea of trinity in the fact that, as far as I have been able to ascertain, in the entire Hermetic literature there is not a single allusion to be found to a 'thrice one' god. And, if anywhere, it is here that one might have expected to find traces. The name τρισμέγιστος cries out, as it were, for a trinitarian interpretation, which it indeed received later[150]. And it is exactly with Hermetic theology that

[147] Serv. *Ecl.* 5, 66, *sed constat secundum Porphyrii librum, quem Solem appellavit, triplicem esse Apollinis potestatem et eundem esse Solem apud superos, Liberum patrem in terris, Apollinem apud inferos*, reflects third century solar syncretism.

[148] *ARW* 21 (1922) 225 ff., who follows Usener. *Contra*: Peterson 1926, 240 n.2: "Geradezu falsch"; Prümm 1935, 438 n.101. Moreover, the first line is suspect for reasons of both grammar and syntax. Eitrem, *SO* 10 (1932) 155, reads μί' ἀτῶν = αὐτῶν. Cf. also Nock 1972 I, 399 n.175; Weinreich 1919, 28. Preisigke-Bilabel, *SB* III, no 6128, give only the second verse. Cf. C. Bonner, *Studies in Magical Amulets* (Ann Arbor 1950) 175. An identical gem without text in: A. Delatte-Ph. Derchain, *Les intailles magiques gréco-égyptiennes* (Paris 1964) no. 224. F. Dunand, in: Dunand-Lévêque 1975, 163: "document (....) extrêmement intéressant, dans la mesure où il comporte non seulement la formule hénothéiste du type εἷς θεός, mais également une conception trinitaire du dieu unique". She wonders if this unitarian Amon theology may have influenced Christian dogma.

[149] See above n.140. J. Gwyn Griffiths 1973 assumes genuine 'trinitarian' ideas in ancient Egypt.

[150] G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion* (Zürich 1951) 58 f., mentions the epithets τριγένεθλος and τριγενής, which belong to a gnostic power, possibly called Hermes. Sceptical: H. Ch. Puech, *Coptic Studies in Honour of Walter Ewing Crum* (Boston 1950) 144 and Nock-Festugière 1972 IV, 149. Even if this identification proved to be correct, it is a late interpretation of the name *Trismegistos*, just like Suda εἰπὼν ἐν Τριάδι μίαν εἶναι θεότητα,

Reitzenstein wanted to connect *ter unus*. We shall have to resign ourselves to the fact that in the first century AD we cannot discover any trinitarian tendencies, neither in the sphere of Hermes nor outside it[151]. It is inadmissible to base the existence of a trinitarian theology on a single Egyptian amulet of uncertain date and authenticity, and subsequently to confirm it from Martial.

3. Dating the birth of Hermes Trismegistos

One thing, of course, should not be overlooked: Hermes has become great as Trismegistos[152]. In order to evaluate the relevance of this epithet as a possible model for Martial's *ter unus* we have to ask the following questions. Firstly: at what time did the term τρισμέγιστος (or τρίσμεγας) come into being? And secondly: how do we imagine the development of the term? M. Letronne already provided an answer to the latter question in 1842[153]. He referred to the Egyptian usage by which the superlative is formed by repetition of the positive degree. Indeed, μέγας (καὶ) μέγας in

or Malalas, *Chron.* 2, 5, 10, referring to Hermes Trismegistos, who taught a doctrine that proclaimed three μεγίστας ὑποστάσεις and μίαν θεότητα. These are all "späte Deuteleien" (Preisendanz 1924, 1141 f., with more examples). The same is true of speculations by Hermias *in Phaedr.* (cf. Puech, *REG* 59/60 [1946/7] 11 ff.), where τρίς is explained as referring to the third visit of Hermes to Egypt or his third incarnation. Cf. Cyrill. *contra Iulian.* V, *PG* LXXVI, 779 B, on which see: Nock-Festugière, *l.c.* The idea that a god manifests himself several times as a new individual is of course widely known. Cic. *ND* 3, 21, 53, distinguishes five manifestations of Hermes, of which, however, not the third but the fifth is the *sermonis dator* identified with Thot (Hermes Trismegistos). Cf. Pease *ad loc.*

[151] A very interesting, though cryptic, inscription from the vicinity of Thessalonike may not go unrecorded here. First published by S. Pelekidis, *BCH* (1921) 541, and now included in *IG* X, 2, 1, no 259, it has been discussed by G. Daux, *CRAI* (1972) 478 ff. The inscription dates from the first century AD and begins with the formula [Ἀγαθῇ]ι Τύχηι Διὸς Διονύσου Γονγύλου. Since in the next line reference is made to ὁ θεός, one might infer that the latter two names are "des qualitatifs de Zeus" and wonder whether "il s'agit d'un dieu trionyme", the more so since a Thracian god Zeus Dionysos is well-known. However, the composition of the first lines resists this interpretation. Moreover, Zeus is inscribed with large letters, the other names in a smaller type, so the latter gods may be rather *parhedroi* of minor importance. Festugière, *CRAI* (1972) 487 n.1, suggests that Zeus is here identified with Sarapis and Dionysos with Harpocrates. Gongylos might be an epithet of the larger god. In that case, the reference would not be to three, but to two gods. The entire inscription requires further careful investigation.

[152] Two important studies of Hermes Trismegistos have appeared since the publication of the first version of this study in 1974. One is Fowden 1986, to be consulted on all issues that concern Hermes Trismegistos and Hermetic literature in general. The other, Quaegebeur 1986, offers a full discussion of the origin and chronology of the name Hermes Trismegistos. Neither has given me cause to change my argument, though I shall refer to them whenever it will serve purposes of clarification.

[153] M. Letronne, *Receuil des inscriptions grecques et latines d'Égypte* I (Paris 1842) 283.

the sense of 'very great' occurs frequently as an epithet of Egyptian gods. In her very useful collection of divine names and epithets, Giulia Ronchi offers a formidable list of 115 instances of μέγας μέγας, among which, however, there is only one of Hermes[154]. Letronne assumed an intermediate phase μέγας (καὶ) μέγας (καὶ) μέγας—which does indeed occur, though rarely[155]—, finally resulting in τρίσμεγας[156]. The term τρισμέγιστος is then explained as an analogical formation after terms such as τρισμακάριστος and τρισέχθιστος, being, according to Letronne, a superlative 'in the second power' with the meaning 'nine times great Hermes'.

Since this explanation is generally referred to in agreement, it is perhaps not superfluous to point out that it is almost certainly mistaken, at least in one respect. It is correct that terms such as τρισμακάριος, τρισευδαίμων and τρισέχθιστος originated from a threefold blessing or malediction, after which analogy claimed its rights[157]. It is also true that 'double' superlatives exist. One may compare ὁ μεγιστότατος Ἥλιος in a magical text[158], or dizzy Byzantine titles such as πρωτοπανσεβαστουπέρτατος, but in the case of τρισμέγιστος the evolution took a different course to that supposed by Letronne, since it is certain that μέγιστος καὶ μέγιστος existed side by side with μέγας καὶ μέγας before τρίσμεγας or τρισμέγιστος came into existence. Already the Raphia decree of 217 BC calls Hermes ὁ μέγιστος καὶ μέγιστος[159], a gemination which also occurs in the Saqqara ostraca discussed below. Thissen, who discusses these terms[160], explains μέγιστος καὶ μέγιστος as a (Greek) misunderstanding

[154] Ronchi III, IV, 704 ff. In III, p. 672 three instances of μεγάλοι μεγάλοι. The one inscription with Hermes is also the most famous: the Rosetta inscription (*OGIS* 90, l.19). The evidence increases continuously: G. Wagner, *ZPE* 20 (1976) 225 ff.; J. Bingen *ZPE* 24 (1977) 245.

[155] Ronchi IV, 721, mentions 4 instances, none of Hermes and all from the 2nd century BC.

[156] Cf. Preisendanz in *RML* V, 1141; Ronchi, V, 1090 mentions three cases, all of Hermes and all from the 2nd or 3rd centuries AD.

[157] This has been argued by Fehling 1969, 171 f. Cf. magical trigeminations like λύε λύε πόνους λύε in a Christian amulet: F. Maltomini, *P.Heid.* G.1101: amuleto cristiano, *ZPE* 48 (1982) 149-70, with literature p.168, and cf. on repetition in magic and religious prayer: R. W. Daniel, *ZPE* 50 (1983) 147 n.2. On the literary trichotomy particularly typical of religious expressions: T. B. L. Webster, *Hermes* 71 (1936) 272 f.; Fr. Göbel, *Formen und Formeln der epischen Dreiheit* (Tübingen 1935) 31 ff. On the superlative force of trigemination *vide infra*.

[158] In B. Müller, Μέγας θεός (Diss. Halle 1913) no. 225. His evidence of Hermes Trismegistos: nos. 234-9 is now superseded by Ronchi's lists. L. Robert, *Hellenica* X, p. 87, discusses some instances of double superlatives of the type: μεγιστότατος, μονότατος and cf. also μειζότερος as a title of *maiordomo*: B. Lifschitz, *JSJ* 4 (1973) 43-55.

[159] Ronchi IV, 787. For the following argument cf. also Quaegebeur 1986, 531 ff.

[160] H. J. Thissen, *Studien zum Raphiadekret* (Meisenheim 1966) 10 and 35.

of the Egyptian way of writing the superlative, but that is of minor importance here.

Twenty years later the inscription of Rosetta has μέγας καὶ μέγας[161]. The combination of these facts makes it probable that τρισμέγιστος originated from μέγιστος καὶ μέγιστος καὶ μέγιστος and not as a kind of double superlative of μέγας, as supposed by Letronne. This seems indeed to be confirmed by the existence of τρίσμεγας side by side with τρισμέγιστος[162].

As to the date of origin of τρισμέγιστος, scholars generally refer to a papyrus dating from the late third century BC, edited by U. Wilcken and reprinted in his *Chrestomathie* no. 109: ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ μ[εγίστου καὶ μεγίστου Ἑρμοῦ], which, of course, does not prove anything. Since the earliest certain papyrological testimonies of τρισμέγιστος date from the late second century AD[163] and epigraphic finds do not occur before the middle of the third century AD, while explicit testimonies in literature do not appear before Tertullian and Athenagoras[164], Kroll and Reitzenstein[165] supposed that Martial's *ter unus* was the earliest existing allusion to the thrice great god, conveniently overlooking the fact that this verse does not have *ter maximus* (cf. Lactantius *DI* 1,7,2) or *ter magnus*, but *ter unus*. Preisendanz[166] rightly pointed out that *ter unus* is not automatically conclusive, even though it may very well be a pun on τρισμέγιστος.

The discovery of an oracle text dating from 168-4 BC at Saqqara in 1966 seemed to change the situation. This text mentions three times τὰ ῥηθέντα ὑπὸ μεγίστου καὶ μεγίστου θεοῦ μεγάλου Ἑρμοῦ. That suggests a stereotyped expression, and T. C. Skeat and E. G. Turner, in their commentary[167], think that "the present ostraca would appear to be the earliest instances in Greek of the title Hermes Trismegistos in the peculiar form, carefully maintained in all three texts where it occurs, of two superlatives and a positive". Welcome as the datum would be, I doubt its validity. I am afraid that the addition μεγάλου θεοῦ is just as close a unity as was the Graeco-Egyptian μέγιστος καὶ μέγιστος. The addition may prove that the latter superlative had suffered depreciation, but the origins of the

[161] *OGIS* I, 90,19.

[162] Ronchi V, 1090, mentions three examples of τρίσμεγας, all from the 2nd or 3rd centuries AD.

[163] Ronchi V, 1090, gives only two instances from papyri, one from the 2nd or 3rd century AD and one from the 4th, both concerning Hermes.

[164] See now Fowden 1986, 216 f., who adds one instance in Philo of Byblus fr. 2 (810.3), who lived circa 60-140 AD. However, this may be a later interpolation.

[165] W. Kroll, Hermes Trismegistos, *RE* 8 (1913) 793; Reitzenstein 1904, 2 n.4.

[166] Preisendanz 1924, 1142.

[167] T. C. Skeat and E. G. Turner, An Oracle of Hermes Trismegistos at Saqqara, *JEA* 54 (1968) 199-208, esp. 207. The texts also in Totti 1985 no. 58. For later interpretations of this expression see Quaegebeur 1986, 527 ff.

two kinds of epithet were too divergent for them to be simply upgraded to the form τρισμέγιστος[168]. It may be noted that in the third century AD the epithet μέγας θεός was still added to Hermes Trismegistos, thus producing in an inscription (ca. 240 AD): θεὸν μέγαν Ἑρμῆν τρισμέγιστον[169]. Recently Quaegebeur[170] endorsed this negative inference concerning the Saqqara formula. He presents a complete dossier of demotic texts which proves that the Saqqara formula goes back to an Egyptian model, and that in demotic texts formulas denoting 'thrice great' or 'thrice greatest' occur at least from the second century BC onwards. He correctly infers that this must have been the formula which, much later, ended up as τρισμέγιστος.

The real problem is that even if we did find three times μέγας in relatively early times, as we do, or three times μέγιστος, as we do not, this is still not sufficient to prove the existence of a Greek term τρισμέγιστος. A Greek inscription from Hermopolis, dating from the late second or early first century BC and published in 1965[171] records ἱερεῖς τοῦ ΩΩΩ νοβΖμουν, which is a Greek transcription of a demotic formula meaning: 'Thot great, great, great, lord of Ashmunein'. Did V. Girgis have the right to translate: 'Thot Trismegistos'? I do not think so, any more than hieroglyphic or demotic texts recording 'Thot great, great, great' are proof of the existence of this name[172]. What we need, or rather, what Martial needed, was a well-established term in which τρίς presented itself

[168] Comparably the Hymn of Isidorus IV, 23 has: Σούχου παγκράτορος μεγάλου μεγάλου τε μείστου, where Vanderlip 1972, *ad loc.* says: "perhaps (it) is intended really as a strengthened superlative form, like Trismegistos, but Vogliano considers the first century BC to be too early for such an interpretation."

[169] *OGIS* 716, 1.

[170] Quaegebeur 1986, 532. Totti 1985, 140, "Dies ist eines der ältesten Dokumente, auf welchem der Name des dreimal grossen Hermes erscheint. Dieses Epitheton des Gottes kommt sonst in vorchristlicher Zeit nur noch auf dem Raphiadekret vor", causes confusion.

[171] It was found in 1952/3 and published by V. Girgis, A New Strategos of the Hermopolite Nome, *MDAI(K)* 20 (1965) 121. Also in: P. W. Pestman, J. Quaegebeur and R. L. Vos, *Receuil de textes démotiques et bilingues* (Leiden 1977) I, p. 106 f.; II, p. 113 f. It was apparently not known to Skeat and Turner when they wrote their article mentioned above.

[172] So for instance in a letter to Thot of 502 BC: 'Thot, thrice great Master of Hermopolis, the great god': G. R. Hughes, *JNES* 17 (1958) 1-21; P. Boylan, *Thot, the Hermes of Egypt* (Oxford 1922) 182. Cf. Fowden 1986, 26, "That the title *trismegistos* was still unknown in the second/first century B.C. is proved by an inscription erected by the priests of Thot at Hermoupolis, who could think of no way to describe their god precisely in Greek except by transliterating his Egyptian titles". Quaegebeur 1986, 527: "la traduction de c3 c3 c3 par Trismégiste au lieu de Trismegas n'est étayée par aucune justification". Contrary to my initial conviction (in the first version of this paper of 1974) that we might have

as material for the pun with *ter*. We still do not have a single attestation of this.

What does exist, and this is important enough, is a marked connection of (Egyptian) Hermes with the number three. There is a Graeco-Egyptian epigram of the first century AD to confirm this, which, if I am not mistaken, has not yet been utilized in this connection[173]:

> Χαῖρ', Ἑρμῆ πατρῶιε, δίδου δ'ἀρετὴν Ἀχιλλῆι
> καὶ κλέος ἐς λιπαρὸν γῆρας ἀνερχομένωι,
> Τρίσμακαρ Ἑρμεία, οἶμον τριτάτην ἀνύσας σοι,
> αἰτέομαι τρισσῶν τέρμ' ἐσιδεῖν ἀγαθῶν.

Here the number three is stressed three times in connection with the god Hermes. The three wishes are specified in ἀρετήν, κλέος and λιπαρὸν γῆρας. The latest commentator, É. Bernand, assumes that this emphasis on three suggests an allusion to Hermes Trismegistos. One might wonder why in that case the name was not mentioned. A solution might be found in the assumption that τρισμέγιστος was a 'Geheimname des Kultes'[174]. However this may be, the epigram once more confirms that the number three was firmly associated with the Egyptian Hermes, and I do believe that it is this association that Martial may have seized upon. That he also covertly referred to a Hermes Trismegistos *stricto sensu* is unprovable and, given the chronology of the evidence, unlikely[175].

As for the Hermetic doctrine itself, Nock-Festugière[176] date the remaining tracts of the *Corpus Hermeticum* to about 100-300 AD. The existence of 'Hermetic' astrological writings before the beginning of the

here the first indication of the existence of τρισμέγιστος, I would now even hesitate to transliterate this as τρίσμεγας. There is a very remarkable parallel trigemination in the formula 'Apis, Apis, Apis' (W. Spiegelberg, *Die sogenannte demotische Chronik* [1914] V, 12-3, p. 12) to which J. Leclant, in: Dunand-Lévêque 1975, 13, refers.

[173] Kaibel *EG* 974; É. Bernand, *Inscriptions métriques*, 622 ff.

[174] Preisendanz 1924, 1143.

[175] It is equally unlikely that Hor. *C.* 1, 10, alludes to Hermes Trismegistos, as supposed by Reitzenstein 1904, 176 f.; 178, and G. Pasquali, *Orazio lirico* (Firenze 1920) 67 f.; 182 f. Rightly disputed by W. Fauth, *Gymnasium* 60 (1962), 12, where he gives more literature.

[176] 1972 I, p. V; W. Kroll, *RE* 8 , 820. Fowden 1986, 10 f., confirms that the only thing we can be certain of is that there were specimens of the philosophical Hermetica in circulation by the end of the second century AD. He shares the current consensus which assigns the composition of the philosophical Hermetica to the period from the late first to the late third centuries AD. The oldest Hermetic text among the magical papyri, *P.Berol.* 21243, is firmly dated to the Augustan period: W. Brashear, Ein Berliner Zauberpapyrus, *ZPE* 33 (1979) 261, 278.

Christian era is attested by Strabo 17, 1, 46, but of course this does not say anything about the name of the god involved. Both scholars firmly deny the existence of religious conventicles. The doctrine has a typically literary, not a liturgical character. The dogmas are contradictory among themselves and no indications can be found of ritual or moral precepts. Although here and there a certain missionary fervour is evident (*CH* I and VII[177])—elsewhere silence is imposed, for that matter[178]—for early Hermetism the word of Asclepius holds good: *sunt autem non multi, aut admodum pauci, ita ut numerari etiam in mundo possint religiosi*[179].

On the ground of the above data we may now conclude that:

1) it is possible, and even likely, that with the emphatically elaborated *ter (unus)* Martial alludes to a god Hermes of whom he knew the established connection with the number three. There is a slight possibility that the name *Trismegistos* was *in statu nascendi*, though our evidence maximally denotes the god only as 'great and great and great';

2) it is most unlikely that Martial knew more about this god than his name and perhaps the fact that he was connected with cosmological speculations;

3) we can be certain that he did not construct his epigram after the pattern of a Hermetic hymn and we may assume that he based it on contemporary aretalogies that were common knowledge and/or on the fixed rules of hymnic tradition;

4) finally, it is practically out of the question that with *ter unus* Martial alluded to a trinitarian conception, which cannot be demonstrated either in Hermetism or in any other contemporary religious system that could be known to him from Greek or Latin literary texts.

It has now become evident that the word *ter* was to be expected in the poem. At any rate it need not have provoked astonishment. In its literal meaning 'three times' it is elaborated in the enumeration of the three kinds of gladiators, but this should not make us blind to the other function of *ter*/τρίς, namely the superlative one, to which we shall return below.

And *unus*? It is no less apposite in this place in the poem, certainly as a climax. More meanings may be implied in *unus* too, exactly as in *ter*. We

[177] Cf. Nock 1972 I, 501.

[178] G. van Moorsel, *The Mysteries of Hermes Trismegistos* (Diss. Utrecht 1955) 77 f. and the evidence on p. 79 f.

[179] Cf. Nock 1972, I, 31 n.15. Fowden 1986, 186 ff., argues for the existence of a 'Hermetist milieu' (in late antiquity) whose privacy prevented any acquaintance with its secrets outside the limited circle of initiates. See also: S. Giversen, Hermetic Communities? *Opuscula Graecolatina. Suppl. Musei Tusculani* 30 (1989) 49-54, for a balanced account of what can be deduced from the Hermetic tractates themselves.

have already discussed two of them: the contrasting 'elative' meaning of *uni* and *unum* in lines 5 and 6, and the 'all-embracing' function, present in the *omnia solus* formula[180]. There is, however, a third, undoubtedly related but none the less distinct function, that must have forced itself on the reader with even more emphasis than the other two because of the acclamatory accent at the end of the verse and the poem. In this *unus* the ancient reader must immediately have recognized the acclamatory εἷς, which has come down to us in hundreds of invocations, most of them of the εἷς θεός type. Sarapis addressed his *protégé* Aelius Aristides with the formula σὺ εἶ εἷς[181]. Martial himself may have heard the acclamations addressed to Nero, rendered by Cassius Dio as follows: ὁ καλὸς Καῖσαρ, ὁ Ἀπόλλων, ὁ Αὔγουστος, εἷς ὡς Πύθιος, μά σε Καῖσαρ, οὐδείς σε νικᾷ[182]. Acclamations with εἷς, μόνος and πρῶτος and various combinations of these terms are especially frequent in the agonistic sphere[183]. The most popular was εἷς ἀπ' αἰῶνος or πρῶτος καὶ μόνος ἀπ' αἰῶνος, which according to Tertullian, *De spect.* 25, was the usual cheer at the *ludi* and *agones*[184]. Similar acclamations existed in Latin[185]. An inscription even acclaims a horse as *altus unus*[186]. There are several examples of the acclamation *unus tu* (cf. Aelius Aristides above)[187] and we may even recognize the plural of this expression in an inscription: *haec vos soli*[188].

[180] *Unus* and *solus* form fixed combinations: Lewis and Short s.v. *unus*. A good example is *AL* 1, 1, 6a: *Lux mundi laeta, deus, haec tibi celeri cursu, Alma potens, scribsi, soli famulatus et uni*. On εἷς καὶ μόνος cf. Nock-Festugière 1972 I, *ad* IV, 1. Cf. also *supra* n.97 and 145. Festugière 1954 IV, 18 ff. argues for an Egyptian origin. J. Whittaker, Ammonius and the Delphic E, *CQ* 19 (1969) 185-192, proposes a Pythagorean, perhaps an Alexandrian Pythagorean origin. See also: J.-P. Ponsing, L'origine égyptienne de la formule 'un et seul', *RHPhR* 60 (1980) 29-34. All this, however, by no means implies that the elative formula did not exist in Greece before Egyption influences made themselves felt.

[181] See above n.145.

[182] Cass. Dio 61, 20, 5 (cf. 63, 20, 5), a locus that has escaped Peterson. Did Nero's special Alexandrian 'claqueurs' (Suet. *Nero* 20) introduce this agonistic εἷς acclamation from Egypt? There are more εἷς acclamations that were directed at human beings, *e.g.* Lucian, *Peregr.* 15, and *vide infra*.

[183] They have been discussed by M. N. Tod, Greek Record-keeping and Record-breaking, *CQ* 43 (1949) 105 ff., esp. 111 f.

[184] This text has been amply discussed by Robert 1938, 108-111, who several times returns to these acclamations: *Hellenica* X, 61; XIII, 216; Robert 1968, 275 f.

[185] S. Mrozek, *Primus omnium* sur les inscriptions des municipes italiens, *Epigraphica* 33 (1971) 60-9, discusses some Latin expressions, without realizing, or so it seems, that they go back to Hellenistic Greek prototypes. Cf. *sui temporis primus et solus factionarius* in an inscription from 275 AD (*CIL* VI, 10060). Martial 8, 66, 6, himself has: *rerum prima salus et una, Caesar*.

[186] Le Blant, 750 pierres gravées, *MAI* 36, 81.

[187] Peterson 1926, 180 f.

[188] In the so-called 'Isaona' mosaic of El Djem, discussed by J. W. Salomonson,

Thus *unus*, no less than *ter*, completely fits in and answers the expectation. The only unexpected feature—indeed so remarkable that whole theories have been built on it—is the *combination* of the two terms. In the many hundreds of εἷς acclamations not a single one runs τρὶς εἷς. As far as I have been able to find in the indices of the well-known authors, the combination *ter unus* is not attested in Classical or Silver Latin. Unlike all the formulas and terms of the poem discussed so far, only *ter unus* is unexpected, surprising and new. What does this mean?

4. Thrice one through the eyes of a satirist

The failure to find a satisfactory solution to this problem so far is caused by the fact that the formula *ter unus* has been treated as a religio-historical document by scholars whose preoccupations and specific interests made them neglect the satirical nature of its context. No use whatsoever has been made of what is known as Martial's method. When one considers this aspect of the matter, the solution has already implicitly been indicated. For the terms 'unexpected', 'surprising' and 'new', used above to qualify the closing words of the poem, are nothing but a translation of the process that may well be called Martial's speciality: the ἀπροσδόκητον[189]. It is the trick of destroying in the last line of the poem, often in the last word(s), the expectation the reader had built up in the course of the poem. What is first announced as earnestness and reality is eventually exposed and ridiculed in a terse point by a technique that Quintilian 6, 3, 84, called *genus decipiendi opinionem*[190]; in the most literal sense of the word: *venenum in cauda*. When after a steady and consistent construction the house of cards is almost complete (*omnia solus*), the bottom card is

BaBesch 35 (1960) 34 f. Cf. A. Beschaouch, La mosaïque de chasse à l'amphithéâtre découverte à Smirat en Tunisie, *CRAI* (1966) 134 ff.

[189] A selection from the literature: O. Gerlach, *De Martialis figurae* ἀπροσδόκητον *quae vocatur usu* (Diss. Jena 1911); Kruuse 1941, 248-300; K. Barwick, Martial und die zeitgenossische Rhetorik, *Ber. sächs. Ak. Wiss.* 104 (Berlin 1959), esp. Anhang II. Nor was Martial the first to introduce this. It already occurs in graffiti in Pompei: W. D. Lebek, Romana simplicitas in lateinischen Distichen aus Pompei, *ZPE* 22 (1976) 287-92, which proves its popularity. Juvenal was equally fond of it. J. Martyn, Juvenal's Wit, *GB* 8 (1979) 219-38, esp. 221, gives a perfect general description of what is actually going on in our epigram: (Juvenal's satirical jokes are) "achieved through a prolonged suspense and a final shock. Whereas there is first a lead-in of four or five lines with *i.a.* mock-epic vocabulary, lists of official proper-names, grand-sounding polysyllabic words, anaphora, emphatic repetitions, at the end there is the anti-climax: surprising, incongruous, ridiculous and laughter-provoking, containing *i.a.* pointed oxymorons, reversals of normality, incongruities, irony, hyperboles etc."

[190] Cf. G. Petrona, *La battuta a sorpresa negli oratori latini* (Palermo 1971).

pulled away[191]. *Ex his omnibus nihil ridetur, quam quod est praeter expectationem, cuius innumerabilia sunt exempla,* as Cicero, *De Or.* 2, 284, has it.

The extensive literature on Martial's satirical methods provides a range of different tricks. The ἀπροσδόκητον may lie in the nonsensical character of the final phrase, which may be created by linking two elements which each in itself had a reasonable function earlier in the poem as e.g. in 1, 5:

> Do tibi naumachiam, tu das epigrammata nobis
> Vis, puto, cum libro, Marce, natare suo.

The comical effect may be brought about because an ambiguous word acquires the 'wrong' meaning through combination with the new partner, a kind of word-play of which Martial is fond[192]. In 10, 49 Cotta offers a cheap wine and asks: *vis in auro?* Martial answers *Quisquam plumbea vina volt in auro?* (where *plumbeus* takes on its second meaning of 'cheap').

These few examples sufficiently show what Martial aimed at by the concluding words of our poem. The poet composed a eulogy of a gladiator from elements partly derived from religious aretalogy and hymnody. We have seen how throughout the poem he continues to build up this ambiguous façade until the climax is reached in *omnia solus*. This παρασκευή or *praeparatio* has lulled the reader asleep. He expects a 'logical' continuation of the idea. Then comes the denouement: "La surprise doit apparaître au moment où l'esprit du lecteur est au maximum disposé d'une manière toute spéciale et où la surprise sera par conséquence le plus inattendue"[193]. That is exactly what is achieved in *ter unus*. It is an ἀπροσδόκητον in the true sense of the word, composed of two words announced previously, each of them—as we know now—appropriate enough, but which no one before Martial had ventured to combine. It is a strange formula, which rouses the reader, ridicules everything that comes before and causes the invincible *divine* gladiator Hermes to bite the dust for the first time in his existence but definitely.

[191] Kruuse 1941, 288: "le paradoxe .... devient alors un moyen qui, au moment même de dénouement, laisse crépiter un instant la foudre au dessus de la tête de la victime avec une absurdité et une innocence apparentes, avant que la foudre ne tombe".

[192] Many examples in Kruuse 1941, 275 ff. There is a good discussion of several types of ambiguity by P. Plass, An Aspect of Epigrammatic Wit in Martial and Tacitus, *Arethusa* 18 (1985) 187-210.

[193] Kruuse 1941, 293. Martial was a specialist in this technique: "More than any other classical poet, Martial is associated with the word 'point'": A. J. Adams, *The Nature of Martial's Epigrams* (Diss. Indiana Univ. 1975) 90. He stresses that the technique of the 'point' is hardly used at all before the 1st century BC and comes into prominence only in Martial's work.

In whatever way one looks at it, *ter unus* is nonsense. Suppose that Martial, referring to the three genres in which the gladiator Hermes excelled, had intended to express 'three persons in one'—the trinity formula Usener and Reitzenstein wanted to read from it. He had a choice of many possibilities, such as *trigeminus, tricorpor, triformis* (at any rate the Greek counterpart τρίμορφος was selected in the Graeco-Egyptian epigram quoted above in order to express such an idea), *triplex*, terms used dozens of times by many writers to denote creatures that are 'three and one' in some way or other, such as Hecate, Cerberus and especially Geryon[194]. He could have employed a paraphrase such as *in tribus unus erat* (Ovid. *Heroid.* 9, 92 on Geryon). It is a method used by Martial himself elsewhere when he describes a certain Labienus, whose head is bald in the middle and has a fringe of hair on either side (5, 49, *Solum te, Labiene, tres putavi*) whom he compares to Geryon. Cf. 9, 32, 4, *Hanc volo quae pariter sufficit una tribus,* and 2, 52, *Novit loturos Dasius numerare: poposcit mammosam Spatalen pro tribus: illa dedit*[195]. It appears that *ter unus* simply was not available to describe a 'trinity', which is also clear when one considers the meaning of each component separately.

But is it not possible that Martial was in fact using a ridiculous formula to allude to a *triformis* creature? After all, via his curious *subpositicius sibi ipse* and the three kinds of gladiators embodied in one person he may have been working towards it. If we assume this we must ask what *triformis* creature must have come to the mind of the Roman reader. Since we must definitely exclude any truly theological idea of trinity, the choice is extremely limited and very specific. In Latin literature practically the only creatures that had three shapes or bodies were Hecate, Cerberus, Chimaera, and—as we have seen from several examples—Geryon. They were all unpleasant creatures from the underworld, which, with the exception of Hecate, had another trait in common: they belonged to the world of fairy tales, and as monsters they did not 'really' exist. The triple creature that occurs by far the most often is Geryon, and sometimes he is explicitly considered to be an instance of 'that which is not real', 'that which cannot exist'[196]. That we should first of all think of this particular monster is made plausible by the fact that in the only other place I know of where *ter unus* occurs, Geryon is meant: Tertullian, *De pallio* 4, 3, *ubi Geryon ter unus?* This clear allusion to Martial's invention[197], by the way, proves that in early Christianity *ter unus* could not imply anything like a conception of the holy trinity.

Further reflection on this possibility leads to the following conclusions:

1) if *ter unus* refers to a *triformis* creature, there was hardly any other association the Roman reader could form than with monsters of the type mentioned. He simply knew no others. Geryon might indeed be called *subpositicius sibi ipse*;

2) this supposed association would have a destructive effect on the hieratic atmosphere of the poem as a whole. The illusion is dispelled. The reader finds that Hermes is not a god, nor even a gladiator, but a monster at most, and moreover a monster that does not exist. With this, Hermes "falls into the realm of the monstrous or whatever is completely impossible and cannot reasonably occur when one is awake", to quote Artemidorus, *Onir.* 2, 44, speaking of nightmares;

3) the surprise is intensified because the reference is contained in a formula that has never been used before and in itself is surprising: *ter unus*;

4) however, in my opinion the association with Geryon *vel similibus* can at most have occurred to the reader as a secondary consideration, a kind of afterthought. After all, an explicit combination *Geryon-ter unus* as in Tertullian is something completely different from an unspecified *ter unus*, used for the first time in literature. When the reader, lulled asleep to the cadence of the litanies, is roused, it is not because of a reminiscence of Geryon but primarily because he is confronted with a formula that must appear ludicrous to him on formal-logical grounds.

In order to grasp this, it will be useful to demonstrate that words such as εἷς, μόνος, μόνος καὶ πρῶτος, *omnia solus*, etc. exercised an unremitting attraction on comici, satirists and sceptics of various denominations throughout antiquity. Kleinknecht 1937 has exemplarily shown that the

[194] Many examples in Déonna 1954 and Lease 1919. Cf. Pease *ad* Verg. *Aen.* 4, 511; I. B. Carter, *Epitheta deorum quae apud poetas latinos leguntur,* Suppl. *RLM* , index s.v. An investigation into the indices of the Latin poets made it clear to me that Geryon was the *trigeminus par excellence.*

[195] Playing with numbers is a favourite activity of Martial (cf. 1, 19) and of comic poets in general. An extreme instance of word play with 'three' is Plaut. *Pseud.* 704. A good example in *SHA* Marc. Anton. 29, 2, where there is an allusion to Tertullus, the *amant* of Faustina: *cum stupidus nomen adulterii uxoris a servo quaereret, et ille diceret ter 'Tullus' et adhuc stupidus quaereret, respondit ille: "iam tibi dixi ter, Tullus dicitur."* This type of word play is popular even in our times: L. Vidman discusses an Isiac inscription, which had been broken in three pieces that had been published separately, in an article entitled "Inscriptio trina et una", *LF* 97 (1974) 34 f.

[196] One example: Ovid. *Trist* 4, 7, 13, where Geryon is mentioned amongst the creatures of the underworld in whose existence nobody can believe. E. Dutoit, *Le thème de l'adynaton dans la poésie antique* (Paris 1936), 108, rightly reckons this instance among the literary *adynata*. There is a difference between a 'rationalistic' *adynaton*, an expression of absolute impossibility, and an *adynaton* in the sphere of religious devotion, which, as we saw above, can be changed into a *dynaton* by the powerful hand of the god.

[197] Martial was imitated by Christian writers. For instance, his phrase *Romani decus et dolor theatri* quoted above is imitated by Sidon. Apol. *Epist.* 4, 11: *germani decus et dolor Mamerti.* Cf. R. E. Colton, Some Echoes of Martial in the Letters of Sidonius Apollinaris, *AC* 54 (1985) 277-84, esp. 81 f.

style of hymns and prayers in general, by its rhetorical extravangances, elicited persiflage. Particularly the pronominal anaphora is imitated in a great number of satirical poems. More specifically, we find allusions to μόνος already in Aristophanes[198], for example, *Aves* 1546, μόνον θεῶν γὰρ διά σ' ἀπανθρακίζομεν, and cf. *Eccles.* 7 and 12. More interesting still is *Plut.* 181 f. τὰ δὲ πράγματ' οὐχὶ διὰ σὲ πάντα πράττεται; μονώτατος γὰρ εἶ σὺ πάντων αἴτιος. Here we see both an anticipation of *omnia solus* and a derision of the ridiculous superlative μονώτατος. This *monstrum* did actually occur in 'real' language. Eusebius, *Vita Const.* 4, 67, says that the emperor was the only one who reigned even after his death: τοῦτο μονωτάτῳ αὐτῷ ἀπ' αἰῶνος τοῦ θεοῦ δεδωρημένου, a clear hyperbole of the usual acclamation μόνος ἀπ' αἰῶνος, and as such favourite material for sarcasm. A cherished object for ridicule is πρῶτος καὶ μόνος, which already occurs in Aeschin. *in Ctes.* 77, and is attested in numerous inscriptions and literary reports[199]. It was a constant joke in antiquity. Lucian. *Demonax* 29, says: εἰ μὲν πρῶτος, οὐ μόνος, εἰ δὲ μόνος, οὐ πρῶτος, and the fact that we find the same expression in the Byzantine *savant* Michael Italicus leaves us with the strong impression that both title and joke were common in late Roman and Byzantine intellectual circles[200].

Indeed, in these overwrought formulas the languages of praise and satire meet, and they leave room for manoeuvre to those whose situation made it desirable to remain in between. Thus Phylarchus (Athen. 6, 261 B = *FGrHist* 81 F31) reports a special variant of the μόνος acclamation. The διάδοχοι of Demetrius Poliorketes pledged a toast to the health of the king in the following terms: Δημητρίου μὲν μόνου βασιλέως. Commenting upon this phrase and considering that Demetrius was *not* the only king, since Antigonus still existed in the background, H. Hauben[201] says: "μόνος in my opinion does not exclude Antigonus". He is surely right and it may even be worse. There may be a hidden *double entendre*[202] with

[198] Many examples in G. Dellinger, *ThLZ* 77 (1952) 470-6.

[199] M. N. Tod, *o.c.* (above n.183) 111 f., counted 36 epigraphic testimonies, but since then many more have turned up.

[200] See: B. Baldwin, The First and Only, *Glotta* 62 (1984) 58 f. On hyperboles in Christian literature see: A. Quacquarelli, Note sull' iperbole nella Sacra Scrittura e nei Padri, *VetChr* 8 (1971) 5-26.

[201] H. Hauben, A Royal Toast in 302 BC, *AncSoc* 5 (1974) 105-7 esp. 113.

[202] In this connection W. Heckel, Demetrios Poliorketes and the Diadochoi, *PP* 39 (1984) 438-40, aptly notes that not only other diadochoi received mock names as well, but that even the name Poliorketes itself had come into being as one. Sometimes it is practically impossible to distinquish between hyperbolic praise and mockery. *P. Cairo Masp.* I 67097 (*REG* 24 [1911] 444) contains 16 verses from the pen of Dioscorus of Aphrodito (6th century AD). They are postluded by a piece of 'polysyllabic doggerel' (B. Baldwin *ZPE* 42 [1981] 285 f.). This salutation of an unnamed emperor presents a stark anaphora of

an ironic ring as there is for instance in Catull. 29,11 and 54, 7: *unice imperator.*

There is therefore no reason for surprise if we find an explicit word play in Martial that mixes numerals *vel similia* in an unexpected combination[203]. Let us, finally, quote one splendid instance. *AP* 11, 84 presents the praise of a pentathlete who has lost all five items of the competition. The little poem ends as follows: πέντε δ' ἀπ' ἄθλων πρῶτος ἐκηρύχθην πεντετριάζομενος. "He was the first one who was publicly announced by the *kerux* as *pentetriazomenos*". The latter term has been cruelly maltreated in the scholarly treatises. Yet if one knows that τριάζω means 'to win three items of the pentathlon and in so doing win the whole competition'[204], the solution is implicitly given, as J. Ebert has seen[205]. If three victories suffice to win a competition that officially consists of five parts, it is unnecessary to continue and (try to) win the remaining two as well. Consequently, this did not occur in reality. The comic point is built up of several unexpected reversals and puns: firstly, τριάζω is made passive, which, of course, is unusual[206]: 'to lose three items of the pentathlon and thereby the whole match' is not an activity that requires the creation of a specific verb. Secondly, there is the deliberate misuse of the elative praise: πρῶτος. Thirdly, the content of this praise: he is the first to have lost *five* parts, where three would have sufficed. And finally, the creation of a new comically cumulative verb 'five times thrice beaten'. Thus τριάζω, which was so current that it had come to mean simply 'win', 'be victorious'[207], regains its proper numerical meaning and together with the equally 'normal' πέντε it creates a nonsensical and impossible combination, thus lending extra comical force to the final line and definitely turning the praise into mockery.

χαῖρε κύριε and χαῖρε δέσποτα. It comprises a series of rampant compounds such as: παναξιοκτηνοπτηναστροφωστηροκοσμοποιίας. Was this really intended seriously, as all commentators seem to believe?

[203] Even W. Burnikel, *Untersuchungen zur Struktur des Witzepigramms bei Lukilios und Martial* (Wiesbaden 1980), who generally denies that Martial exploited the absurd (in contrast to Kruuse), admits that absurdisms do occur in the images of the 'threefold person': 2, 52; 5, 49; 8, 47 and 10, 83.

[204] 'To conquer the adversary in three bouts' (*LSJ*) ; τριάς is 'le groupe de trois épreuves qui assurait la victoire' (Robert 1968, 240 f. and 253 ff.). The implications of this meaning are still being mistaken in recent literature, e.g. R. Patrucco, *Lo sport nella Grecia antica* (Florence 1972) 213.

[205] J. Ebert, Zum Pentathlon der Antike, *Abh. sächs. Ak. Leipzig* 56 (1963) 16. Cf. W. E. Sweet, A New Proposal for Scoring the Greek Pentathlon, *ZPE* 50 (1983) 287-90; R. Merkelbach, Der Fünfkämpfer Nikoladas, *ZPE* 67 (1987) 293-5.

[206] On the unique form ἀτρίακτος (Aesch. *Choeph.*339) see: P.Burian, *Zeus Soter Tritos* and Some Triads in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, *AJPh* 107 (1986) 332-42. On the isolated position of τριαστής: H. A. Harris, An Athletic *hapax legomenon*, *JHS* 88 (1968) 138 f.

[207] R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 11 (1973) 262 and J. Ebert, *ZPE* 13 (1974) 257 ff.

After this telling parallel I think the sense and function of *ter unus* can now be fully understood. Enough has been said on the several implications of *unus* as an honorific acclamation. *Ter*, apart from the implications related above, was common in the function of superlative, especially in an acclamatory context. According to Servius *ad Aen.* 6, 229, *ter* expresses *aut saepius aut revera ter*[208]. Both in Greek and in Latin we find many combinations that were used frequently: τρίσμακαρ, τρίλλιστος, τριπόθητος, *ter felix, ter beatus, ter magnus*. Certainly if an allusion to Hermes Trismegistus, whatever his name at that moment, were intended, the final verse *Hermes omnia solus et ter magnus* would be exactly what was expected, if the poem was a genuine panegyric. Very frequently this superlative *ter* is connected with numerals as a poetic indication of 'many times': *ter centum, ter quinos, ter quinque*, etc., also frequently in Martial[209]. However, our poem is *not* an ordinary panegyric and for that reason it introduces the only combination in which *ter* can only be used at the cost of losing its superlative meaning. The combination with *unus* (which did not have its proper numerical meaning either) is ludicrous[210], just as for instance "some animals are more equal than others". Even if we were ready to understand what *could have been meant* in real acclamation, we must conclude that *it does not mean* this in this final line of a parody. The juxtaposition of the two numerals forces upon each of them their original meaning, which together in the sense of 'thrice one' form the ridiculous remnant of what could have been 'most' (*ter*) 'exceptional' (*unus*). For this very reason a formula τρὶς εἷς could never have developed. And for the same reason, when eventually the 'double' superlative *unissimus* developed in Christian Latin, Augustine still has to apologize for what he evidently considers linguistically unusual[211].

Whichever way we turn, *ter unus*, like comparable terms such as *ipsissima*, αὐτότατος etc., etc., belongs to the comic jargon on account of its unexpectedness and novelty. At the end of the series of liturgical praises the reader is roused. *Ter unus* is an ἀπροσδόκητον, created by the poet for the occasion. *Ter unus* is not 'really real'. That is fatal to the person who is

[208] Cf. Lease 1919, 68; Déonna 1954, 409-15. Cf. Mart. 9, 92, 11 f. *Quod nec mane vomis nec cunnum, Condyle, lingis, non mavis quam ter Gaius esse tuus?* More examples: *LSJ* s.v. τρι-, τρισ-. On τρίτος as 'third and final': P. Burian, *o.c.* (above n.206). On the origin of these forms see Fehling 1969, 171 f., and on the *trishagios* formula mentioned there: L. Koenen, Ein christlicher Prosahymnus des 4. Jhdts., in: *Antidoron M. David oblatum* (Leiden 1968) 31-52; E. Klum-Boehmer, *Das Trishagion als Versöhnungsformel der Christenheit* (Munich 1979).

[209] See Friedländer in his commentary, index s.v. *ter*.

[210] The combinations given by Lewis and Short, s.v. *unus* I, 3 B are of a different nature.

[211] Augustin. *Epist.* 109, 1 *tecum artius coniunctus est et, ut ita dicam, unissime.* Similarly Bernard. *De consid.*5, 7 *est autem unus, et quomodo aliud nihil. Si dici possit, unissimus est.*

indicated by it. He is not real either: the invincible divine gladiator does not exist.

A joke explained is no joke and it is no joke to explain a joke, certainly when this demands so much background information as this type of text does. Yet the effort does not go entirely unrewarded: Martial's mastery in the matter of parody and satire has once again been illustrated. Our insight into several problems of religious history is enhanced here and there. Human beings, however miraculous, should not try to become gods, nor be described in terms appropriate to gods, at least in the opinion of one Roman satirist of the first century AD. And, last but not least, it has become clear that Martial will not be admitted to the history of Christian dogma, at any rate not on presentation of his own *tessera*: *ter unus*.

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INDEXES

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This is the first of a two-volume collection of studies in inconsistencies in Greek and Roman religion. Their common aim is to argue for the historical relevance of various types of ambiguity and dissonance. The first volume focuses on the central paradoxes in ancient henotheism. The term 'henotheism' – a modern formation after the stereotyped acclamation: εἷς ὁ θεός ('one is the god'), common to early Christianity and contemporaneous paganism – denotes the specific devotion to one particular god without denying the existence of, or even cultic attention to, other gods. After its prime in the twenties and thirties of this century the term fell into disuse. Nonetheless, the notion of henotheism represents one of the most remarkable and significant shifts in Graeco-Roman religion and hence deserves fresh reconsideration.

This book should be of interest to scholars and students working in the fields of Classical Antiquity, Graeco-Roman Religion, the New Testament and Early Christianity.

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